Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

• The EU Internal Security Strategy comes to complete the Union’s institutional security architecture until 2030, functioning as the inner circle of the ven diagram composed of the EU Strategy for Preparedness Union for preventing and responding to emerging threats and crises and the European Defence White Paper.
• The main feature of this new strategy is the concept and goal of Protection, which is why it is called ProtectEU.
• Security issues must be integrated into all EU legislation, policies and programmes, including EU external action.
• The Strategy reflects a broad list of threats, which are significantly influenced by the situation in the EU’s neighboring regional subsystems and, at the same time, have many interconnections with hybrid threats.
• It is based on four central pillars that function as umbrellas of actions: anticipate, detect, prevent and respond.
• The Commission will propose an ambitious revision of Europol’s mandate to transform it into a truly operational police service, better supporting Member States.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy paper by Triantafyllos Karatrantos, ELIAMEP Senior Research Fellow.

Interview 
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IPI and Perry World House, University of Pennsylvania, in partnership with the Permanent Missions of Jamaica and the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations, cohosted a roundtable discussion on The Declaration on Future Generations: Moving from Vision to Reality, on April 25th.

On September 22, 2024, the United Nations adopted the Declaration on Future Generations (DFG) as one of the three main outcome documents emanating from the Summit of the Future. The DFG offers a new lens through which to view pressing global issues and provokes change and acceleration toward future-oriented solutions beyond immediate, short-term goals. It urges governments to conduct policy and decision making by not only assessing current needs but also taking into account how current actions will impact future generations.

In adopting the DFG, member states committed to leveraging science, data, statistics, and strategic foresight to ensure long-term thinking and planning and to develop and implement sustainable practices and institutional reforms necessary to ensure evidence-based decision making, while also making governance more anticipatory, adaptive, and responsive to future opportunities, risks, and challenges. The DFG also called for “enhancing cooperation with stakeholders, including civil society, academia, the scientific and technological community, and the private sector, and encouraging intergenerational partnerships by promoting a whole-of-society approach to share best practices and develop innovative, long-term, and forward-thinking ideas to safeguard the needs and interests of future generations.”

This event explored several approaches proposed or actually taken by governments including the “Design for the Future” movement, ombuds or ministers for future generations, and tabletop and computer-based modeling.

The roundtable discussion featured speakers including: the American novelist and renowned science fiction writer Kim Stanley Robinson, author of The Ministry for the Future; H.E. Brian Wallace, Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations; and H.E. Lise Gregoire-van Haaren, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations.

The post The Declaration on Future Generations: Moving from Vision to Reality appeared first on International Peace Institute.

This Working paper draws on the emerging literature that has established that the employment rates and the earnings of men and women start to diverge once they have children, with women’s labour market performance deteriorating, while that of men’s left unaffected or even improving. This phenomenon has been dubbed the motherhood penalty (or the child penalty). The size of the penalty is affected by the choices parents make as regards employment and childcare, which in turn are affected by gender norms, instilled in women and men early in life, but also by public policies aiming to establish a better work-life balance and help working mothers and fathers combine bringing up a child with pursuing a career. The paper reviews cultural norms and institutional arrangements as potential determinants of mothers’ employment in two polar cases: Greece (where female employment is low, and child penalties large) compared to Norway (where female employment is high, and child penalties are virtually non-existent). The paper concludes with a list of policy recommendations, inspired by our understanding of the gradual emergence of family-friendly work-life policies in Norway, and informed by our awareness of constraints facing policy makers in Greece.

Read here in pdf the Working paper by: Manos Matsaganis, Head, Greek and European Economy Programme, ELIAMEP; A. G. Leventis Foundation Senior Research Fellow; Professor, Polytechnic University, Milan; Tone Fløtten, Senior Researcher, FAFO Institute for Labour and Social Research, Oslo; Chrysa Papalexatou, Research Fellow, Greek and European Economy Programme, ELIAMEP; European Institute, London School of Economics; Daphne Nicolitsas, Research Associate, Greek and European Economy Programme, ELIAMEP;
Assistant Professor, University of Crete and Bjorn Dapi, Researcher, FAFO Institute for Labour and Social Research, Oslo.

 

Die am DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches

Panel (SOEP) sucht zum 1. Juni 2025

zwei studentische Hilfskräfte (w/m/div)

(für 10 Wochenstunden)

Martin Kittel, Research Associate in the Energy, Transportation, Environment Department, successfully defended his dissertation entitled “Five Essays in Energy System Analysis - Exploring the Dunkelflaute and Unintended Storage Cycling” on January 27, 2025. The scientific reviewers were Tom Brown, ...

Solange es keine Chancengleichheit für Mütter am Arbeitsmarkt gibt, ist die Mütterrente eine Notwendigkeit. Aus der Rentenkasse sollte sie aber nicht bezahlt werden. , Der Streit um die Mütterrente ist exemplarisch dafür, wie populistisch die Debatte um Sozialleistungen in Deutschland geführt wird. Union und SPD haben in ihrem Koalitionsvertrag festgehalten, die Mütterrente anzugleichen – was notwendig ist und richtig. Nur: Wie soll das bezahlt werden? Zu viele in ...

Steuererleichterungen für Unternehmen, Rentengarantie für Babyboomer: Mit Schwarz-Rot nimmt die wirtschaftliche Umverteilung von Arm zu Reich und von Jung zu Alt zu. , Die Unterstützung für die AfD ist in den letzten Monaten gewachsen, mittlerweile liegt sie in Umfragen gleichauf mit der Union. Da stellt sich die Frage, welche Verteilungswirkungen der neue Koalitionsvertrag zwischen Union und SPD haben wird – und was dieser etwa für AfD-Wähler*innen bietet. Aber ...

Die heutige Entscheidung des Rates der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB), die Leitzinsen erneut zu senken, kommentiert Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Die EZB setzt ihren graduellen Kurs einer weniger restriktiven Geldpolitik fort. Allerdings agiert die EZB zu zögerlich und riskiert, nicht vorausschauend genug zu handeln. Eine Zinssenkung um 50 Basispunkte wäre wahrscheinlich die bessere Entscheidung gewesen. 

Finanzmärkte, Unternehmen und Bürger*innen benötigen ein klareres Bekenntnis der EZB, dass sie sich mit ihrer Geldpolitik proaktiv und entschiedener gegen die globalen Risiken stemmt. Durch die vom Handelskonflikt ausgelösten Turbulenzen an den Finanzmärkten sind die Finanzierungsbedingungen trotz der EZB-Zinssenkung tendenziell restriktiver geworden. 

Die Sorgen um die Gewährleistung der Finanzstabilität haben durch den Handelskonflikt und das erratische Handeln der US-Regierung deutlich zugenommen. Die EZB sollte die Verwerfungen an den Finanzmärkten und deren Implikationen für Wirtschaft und Preise nicht unterschätzen. 

Die Risiken einer noch schwächeren wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung überwiegen zurzeit deutlich. Das größte Problem dabei sind nicht die Zölle oder finanzpolitischen Maßnahmen, sondern die enorm gestiegene Unsicherheit, die private Investitionen und Konsum weiterhin empfindlich schwächen dürfte. Die noch immer restriktive Geldpolitik der EZB bremst die Wirtschaft des Euroraums – insbesondere die Deutschlands – zusätzlich. 

Die EZB erfüllt ihr Mandat der Preisstabilität nun seit Längerem wieder. Die Krisen der vergangenen Monate haben die langfristigen Inflationserwartungen reduziert, sodass die EZB eher aufpassen muss, ihr Mandat der Preisstabilität nicht zu unterschreiten.

KI-Modell analysiert Kommunikation der Europäischen Zentralbank – Ermittelter Kommunikationskursindikator in Verbindung mit ökonomischen Indikatoren verbessert Prognose künftiger Zinsschritte – Aktuell hohe wirtschaftspolitische Unsicherheit spricht für vorsichtiges Vorgehen der EZB Die ...

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for March 2025.

According to Vassilis Nedos (Kathimeri), Greece may receive more than the originally agreed 600 US-made Switchblade drones as increased production has lowered costs, defense officials say. As mentioned in earlier versions of the Transatlantic Periscope brief, the Greek military had secured a deal for Switchblade 300 block 20 and Switchblade 600 loitering munitions worth $75 million, with $50 million funded through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. However, with manufacturer AeroVironment ramping up production, the US has informed Athens that more drones could be acquired under the existing budget.

On March 18, 2025, a bilateral meeting was held between a delegation of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff (HNDGS) and the U.S. Marine Forces Europe and Africa (MFEA) at “Papagos” camp, in Athens. The HNDGS delegation was headed by 1st Infantry Division (1st ID) Commander, Major General Dimitrios Drosos, representing the Commander of the Hellenic Special Warfare Command (SWC), while on behalf of the US MFEA, the meeting was attended by its Commander, Major General Robert B. Sofge, accompanied by members of his staff and officials from the U.S. Embassy in Greece. The discussions focused on the framework and opportunities for joint training of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) with the Greek marine in Greece, with the aim to further enhance the close cooperation between the Special Operations Forces of both countries in the near future.

National Defense Minister Nikos Dendias met on March 19 with US Embassy Chargé d’Affaires Maria Olson at the Hellenic Ministry of National Defense. Dendias posted on X that they discussed “bilateral defence relations and the ways they could be further strengthened. We also exchanged views on the regional and international security challenges.”

US president Donald Trump celebrated Greek Independence Day, hosting an event at the White House on March 24. “The legacy of the Greeks is all around us. It surrounds us,” he told a group from the Greek-American community gathered at the White House before signing a proclamation recognizing March 25 as Greek Independence Day in the US, “celebrating 204 years of glorious Greek sovereignty and freedom.” “Perhaps the greatest gift we have inherited from this amazing culture is our incredible Greek-American community, now more than 3 million strong,” he added. The US president was accompanied by Archbishop Elpidophoros of America, who congratulated him on his re-election.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

Im Juni 2025 kehrt unsere Online-Seminarreihe "SOEPcampus: Learn to Use the SOEP Over Lunch" mit neuer Workshop-Leitung zurück. Der Workshop bietet eine umfassende, praxisnahe Einführung in die Daten des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels (SOEP). Die Teilnehmenden lernen den Inhalt der Studie, die ...

Migration management has become a critical axis of foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, moving beyond its traditional framing as a humanitarian or administrative challenge. Within Greek–Turkish relations, human mobility now functions as a means of exerting pressure, projecting power, and renegotiating geopolitical roles. The 2020 Evros crisis underscored this dynamic, triggering strategies that transcend the bilateral level and involve both European and regional actors. This report analyses the Evros crisis and the broader strategic approaches of Turkey and Greece through the lens of migration diplomacy, drawing on concepts such as issue-linkage and rent-seeking. It examines both coercive and cooperative tactics employed by the two states and the European Union’s often contradictory or defensive role. Finally, the report calls for a more resilient and institutionally coherent strategy that respects humanitarian principles and integrates migration into a broader vision of foreign policy and regional cooperation.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy Paper by Gerasimos Tsourapas, Professor of International Relations at the University of Glasgow; Non-Resident Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

Ein Experiment mit dem bedingungslosen Grundeinkommen zeigt: Menschen, die es bekommen, ändern ihr Arbeitsverhalten nicht. Für den Sozialstaat ist das dennoch lehrreich., Die Idee eines bedingungslosen Grundeinkommens (BGE) hat in den vergangenen Jahren viel Hoffnung und Begeisterung geschürt. Die Auswertung eines Experiments mit dem BGE, an der auch das DIW beteiligt war, zeigt nun – auch für mich – ein ernüchterndes Resultat: Die Probanden haben mit dem Erhalt ...

Der Koalitionsvertrag ist ein Kompromiss, der am Status quo wenig ändern wird und in Teilen eine Fortsetzung des Kurses der Ampel-Regierung ist. Er enthält viele richtige und kluge Elemente, lässt aber einen klaren Kompass für den notwendigen Kurswechsel in zentralen Zukunftsfragen vermissen., Das Sondervermögen für Infrastruktur von 500 Milliarden Euro und die Reform der Schuldenbremse in Bezug auf Verteidigungsausgaben waren kluge Schritte und gaben Anlass zur Hoffnung, dass die deutsche Politik nun die Weichen für eine deutlich bessere Sicherheit und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Deutschlands ...

Wir freuen uns, den Start der internationalen Forschungsinitiative #ManyDaughters bekanntzugeben. Diese Studie untersucht, wie Töchter das Verhalten, die Präferenzen und Einstellungen beeinflussen. Forscherinnen und Forscher aus allen Bereichen der Sozialwissenschaften sind eingeladen, an diesem ...

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IPI and the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN cohosted a policy forum on April 10th on “Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Peace Operations Settings: Multilateral Responses.”

Since 2020, there have been at least a dozen military coups d’état and other unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs) around the world. These include takeovers by armed groups in Afghanistan and Syria and coups in Mali, Myanmar, Chad, Guinea, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Gabon. This presents a challenge for the United Nations. Member states in the General Assembly and Security Council need to decide whether and how to condemn the UCGs and whether to recognize the new de facto authorities. In the field, UN peace operations and UN country teams face the task of continuing to carry out their work in the midst of a political crisis and of deciding how to engage with the new authorities. This rise in UCGs has also increasingly put to the test regional organizations’ anti-UCG mechanisms, particularly in Africa.

Panelists shared lessons from the multilateral response to UCGs, with a focus on UN peace operations. The event also launched the IPI policy paper on “UN Peace Operations and Unconstitutional Changes of Government” co-authored by Albert Trithart and Bitania Tadesse. Building on the insights of the report and the insights of the panelists, the forum brought together representatives of the UN Secretariat, member states, and civil society organizations to discuss how the UN can most effectively respond to UCGs and engage with de facto authorities alongside other actors such as regional organizations.

Welcome and Opening Remarks:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute
Djeyhoun Ostowar, Counsellor, Deputy Head of Political Affairs Section, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations

Speakers:
Albert Trithart, Senior Fellow and Head of Publications, International Peace Institute
Renato Mariani, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Team Leader, Policy Planning Unit, Policy and Mediation Division, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)
Ramiz Alakbarov, Assistant Secretary-General, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Ethiopia, former DSRSG/RC/HC, UNAMA (Virtual)
Bitania Tadesse, Policy Specialist for Africa, International Peace Institute (Virtual)
Katharine Brooks, Partnership Specialist, Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions, UNDP (Virtual)

Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute

The post Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Peace Operations Settings: Multilateral Responses appeared first on International Peace Institute.

The White Paper on the Future of European Defence, released in March 2025, represents a landmark initiative by the European Commission to articulate a cohesive vision for strengthening the EU’s defence posture amid mounting geopolitical instability. Acting as a framework for the ReArm Europe plan, the document proposes mobilising hundreds of billions of EUR in defence investments, making use of national and EU resources.

The ReArm Europe Plan and the White Paper clearly succeed in politically signalling the EU’s renewed commitment to defence investment and military readiness. However, despite their rhetorical strength, four major concerns could undermine their transformative potential:

1. Coordination gaps: Without a robust coordination mechanism, national funds may be allocated to less pressing areas and may serve other – national and/or domestic – objectives and interests. In the meantime, the Union will not achieve effectiveness and efficiency unless it focuses on standardisation and interoperability.
2. Financial markets’ sensitivity: While the activation of the national escape clause offers fiscal leeway, it is unclear how the financial markets will react to increased national debts. Alternative instruments, such as the Defence Eurobonds or the European Defence Mechanism, could be examined.
3. Creative ambiguity: The Proposal for a SAFE Regulation includes references presented vaguely enough to allow for multiple interpretations and thus avoid frictions. In view of the negotiations in the Council, the issue of a third country’s participation in a procurement consortium must be further elaborated and clarified.
4. Democratic legitimacy and parliamentary oversight: Article 122 TFEU sidesteps the European Parliament, despite the latter’s willingness to further support the EU defence initiatives. Without adequate parliamentary involvement, defence investments risk alienating public opinion in a policy area which requires broad societal consensus.

All the aforementioned shortcomings reflect a deeper structural issue: the absence of a common threat perception and a truly common foreign and security policy. Without a coherent strategic vision at the EU level, member-states remain inclined to prioritise national over collective objectives and interests.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Spyros Blavoukos, Senior Research Fellow, Head, EU Institutions & Policies Programme, ELIAMEP; Head of the ‘Ariane Condellis’ European Programme; Professor, Athens University of Economics & Business and Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, EU Policies and Institutions Programme, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

In response to the new geopolitical and geoeconomic realities – including but not limited to the protracted Russian war on Ukraine and the Trump 2.0 administration – and following the earlier announcement of the ReArm Europe Plan, the White Paper on the Future of European Defence was published in March 2025. The White Paper outlines the path to enhanced EU defence capabilities and aims to mobilise hundreds of billions of EUR, detailing measures to finance and strengthen the EU’s military readiness.

The White Paper features well-intentioned objectives and its communication strategy was well orchestrated. It does provide answers to two key questions: first, where the money will come from and second, in what defence capabilities the EU is going to invest. Starting from the former, in the best-case scenario, national resources up to €650 billion will be mobilised through the activation of the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which defines the fiscal governance framework for the EU member-states and sets rules for constraining national government deficit and debt. In essence, this clause will allow member-states to accommodate additional defence spending. The €650 billion will be topped by EU resources of up to €150 billion that will be gathered through the common issuance of bonds, as envisaged by the new SAFE instrument. In addition to these €800 billion, the White Paper proposes four additional -but rather vague and not quantified- ways to step up defence spending: a) redirecting existing EU funds towards defence (e.g., cohesion funds), b) contributions from the European Investment Bank (EIB), c) private investments, and d) ensuring financial predictability for the European defence industry in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), currently under negotiation. Overall, the resources envisaged in the White Paper are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Envisaged resources for EU defence in the White Paper

 

Regarding the capability needs, the White Paper identifies seven priority areas: Air and missile defence, Artillery systems, Ammunition and missiles, Drones and counter-drone systems, Military Mobility, AI, Quantum, Cyber & Electronic Warfare and strategic enablers & critical infrastructure protection. Additionally, the Proposal for a SAFE Regulation (i.e., the €150 billion funding instrument mentioned above that accompanies the White Paper) refers to the following two categories of defence products, the common procurement of which will be funded:

1. Category One: ammunition and missiles, artillery systems, small drones and related anti-drone systems, critical infrastructure protection, cyber and military mobility, and
2. Category Two: air and missile defence, drones (other than small ones) and related anti-drone systems, strategic enablers, space assets protection, AI and electronic warfare.

 ‘Money Makes the World Go Round’: Financing EU Defence

National resources for defence

In 2023, the EU member-states spent €279 billion on defence, marking an almost 10% increase in defence spending compared to 2022 (€254 billion). Approximately one fourth of this expenditure (26%) was directed to research, development and procurement of defence equipment.[1] In 2024, the total defence expenditure made by the EU member-states reached (provisionally) €326 billion, an almost 17% rise compared to 2023, which amounts to 1.9% of the EU’s GDP and is very close to the 2% NATO requirement. These figures are in line with the broader, decade-long trend of increased military spending, especially fuelled by the Russian invasion into Ukraine in 2022.

Still, Europe is lagging in military deterrence and defence, and much more money needs to be poured to close the gap in terms of military capabilities, especially should the US truly reconsider its military presence in Europe. This is the underlying logic behind the proposal to create additional fiscal space for member-states to invest more in defence, bypassing the strict framework of the EU’s macroeconomic governance. The ReArm Europe plan calls for such a fiscal margin for higher defence expenditures (of up to €650 billion) through the coordinated activation of the national escape clause by the member-states. The national escape clause will apply from 2025 to 2028, for expenditure up to 1.5% of GDP.  The reference year is 2021, i.e., the last pre-war year when the EU member-states had spent €214 billion on defence. In other words, if the national escape clause has been activated and a member-state’s increase of military expenditure remains within the 1.5% ceiling, the excessive deficit procedure will not be launched, even if the total budget deficit exceeds the limits set by the revised rules of the fiscal and macroeconomic governance framework. The EU’s executive branch has invited all – interested – member-states to submit a request to activate this escape clause by the end of April 2025. The member-states’ requests will be coordinated by the Council in order to accelerate the process, and the recommendations activating the national escape clause(s) will be adopted by qualified majority voting (QMV).

On- and Off-EU Budget resources for defence

Besides the financial resources under the full control of each member-state’s government at the national level, there are two main channels of financing defence-related activities at the EU level: first, a direct budget line from the EU budget and second, off-EU budget resources that are collectively managed by EU member-states. As regards the former, Article 41 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) forbids, in principle, the use of the Union budget for operations having military or defence implications. Hence, the Commission’s main defence-related initiatives have focused primarily on strengthening the European defence industry and supporting the development of dual use infrastructure, with an allocated budget of approximately €10.55 billion in the current MFF.[2] These initiatives comprise the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Military Mobility, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). The European Defence Industry Programme, which falls in this category and is agreed to provide 1.5 billion over the period 2025-2027, has yet to be adopted. The legal basis for financing the European defence industry lays primarily in Article 173(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which touches upon the industry’s competitiveness. Other relevant TFEU articles that could be used to finance European defence-related projects comprise Article 179, on the improvement of the EU’s scientific and technological base, Article 170 on the development and interconnection of trans-European networks, and Title XIX on research, technological development and space policy. As far as the second channel is concerned, the largest defence-related, off-EU budget tool is the European Peace Facility (EPF). As depicted in Figure 2, comparing the two categories, the biggest part of the funds allocated to EU defence remain under full member-states’ control.[3]

Figure 2: EU budget and off-budget major defence-related tools

Created with flourish.studio.

The Proposal for a SAFE Regulation has the potential to make available up to €150 billion, a huge upgrade compared to the current situation, as shown in Figure 3. The SAFE Instrument operationally looks very similar to the EDIRPA, as it focuses on providing the necessary financial resources to procure eligible defence equipment jointly. However, financially, the two instruments are totally different as SAFE, in its current format at least, will operate through loans (and subsequently debt), whereas EDIRPA provides grants. Consistent with the general approach of EU defence funding mechanisms, the SAFE Instrument promotes a cooperative format. In this context, common procurement under SAFE requires at least the involvement of one member-state in conjunction with either another member-state or an eligible third country.

Figure 3: EU Budget funding for defence(-related) initiatives

From Reports to Action: Shaping the Future of EU Defence

A 2024 briefing from the European Parliamentary Research Service brought together the various proposals for the future of EU defence that were put forward in four different documents: a) the Mission Letter to the then Commissioner-designate for Defence and Space, b) Von der Leyen’s Political Guidelines, c) Draghi Report and d) Letta Report. The great majority of the proposals mentioned in the four documents have been integrated into the White Paper and the Proposal for a SAFE Regulation, as clearly shown in Figure 4. The interconnection between defence policy and economic competitiveness and the extent to which these two areas are mutually reinforcing are evident. The defence industrial policy aims to enhance military readiness, while also seeking to bolster economic growth, job creation and innovation. This relationship is highlighted in the Letta and Draghi Reports, both of which focus primarily on the economy, albeit emphasising the importance of a robust EU Defence Technological and Industrial Base. Most of their insights and proposals found their way into the White Paper.

The proposals that did not get through refer to sensitive political issues, such as the issuance of “Defence Eurobonds”, or older initiatives and/or institutional arrangements that are already in place, like, for example, EDIRPA & ASAP and the proposal for a Defence Commissioner. In addition, Letta’s proposal for the creation of a European Stability Mechanism (ESM)-like specialised credit line was not outrightly rejected but rather treated in a non-committing way. The White Paper vaguely notes that if the demand by member-states for funds for defence-related investments outstrips supply, then “the Commission will continue to explore innovative instruments, such as in relation to the European Stability Mechanism”.    

Figure 4: Proposals integrated into the White Paper/Proposal for a SAFE Regulation

Created with flourish.studio.

Critical Assessment and the Road Ahead

‘ReArm Europe’ and the White Paper have managed to raise awareness about the need to further invest in EU defence. Politically, they have sent a strong message about the Union’s commitment to security and enhancing defence capabilities. They have emphasised the necessity to direct money towards defence, reflecting a proactive approach and have signalled a level of readiness to act, especially in combination with the publication of the Preparedness Union Strategy. However, there are four main concerns that are hard to ignore:

• First, as discussed above, the lion’s share of the ReArm Europe plan will come from the national budgets. While the flexibility to use additional national resources is a positive first step, it remains unclear to what extent member-states will actually decide to invest in defence and, more importantly, whether those investments will be directed towards what is truly needed. In particular, the International Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG), which will be used to measure the member-states’ defence expenditures, includes a very broad set of different sub-categories. For example, COFOG Category 02 – Defence entails expenditure on military personnel, other non-combat defence forces and military aid. There is a genuine concern that, without a robust coordination mechanism, funds may be allocated to less pressing areas and may serve other – national and/or domestic– objectives and interests. To be more specific, there is a possibility that additional defence spending may predominantly be allocated to cover personnel costs rather than addressing critical needs, such as the development of advanced military capabilities or training. Achieving the right balance in order to guarantee long-term strategic readiness is crucial. Furthermore, efficiency and effectiveness in defence cannot be assessed solely in financial terms. Without a clear focus on standardisation and interoperability, progress will likely remain incremental rather than transformative. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has underscored the critical importance of ensuring that national armed forces are capable of operating together effectively and efficiently. As such, the European family has yet to decide how to foster standardisation and interoperability. To achieve this goal, different options exist:

1. Alignment of EU defence initiatives with established NATO standards, and/or
2. Strengthening the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the Capability Development Plan (CDP) to improve alignment between member-states’ defence planning and capabilities, and/or
3. Use/strengthening of existing mechanisms (for example, the European Defence Agency) or launch of new – potentially pan-European – initiatives (for example, the European Defence Mechanism, see below).

• Regarding the fiscal space that the national escape clause may provide, an issue not addressed is how the (already destabilised due to the tariff war) financial markets will respond to potential increases in debt levels across the EU member-states. Southern EU member-states have already expressed their doubts on the possibility of further indebting themselves, which will undermine – or further derail – the long-term sustainability of their sovereign debt. Instead, they favour the issuance of “Defence Eurobonds”, which practically entails the EU borrowing money from the capital markets and then distributing it to member-states in the form of grants. Needless to say, in this case, the identification of the distribution criteria will be challenging. Another option would be the establishment of an ESM-like intergovernmental mechanism, called the European Defence Mechanism (EDM), as described in a Bruegel proposal prepared for the Polish Presidency. To be more precise, this extra-EU intergovernmental organisation could act as a “planner, funder and potentially owner of strategic enablers”, allowing the debt incurred to acquire certain defence assets to remain on the EDM’s books instead of national accounts.
• Although “implementation, implementation, implementation” is important, one of the key criticisms lies in the creative ambiguity that characterises parts of the White Paper. Given diverging views among member-states, certain concepts are not fully clarified and allow for multiple interpretations. For example, the Proposal for a SAFE Regulation contains a European preference clause for the procurement source (at least 65% of the costs of the final product must originate from within the Union, Ukraine or EEA/EFTA states). However, the text seems to adopt an extremely wide definition vis-à-vis the potentially eligible third countries that may participate in a procurement consortium. In particular, it states that ‘the Union may conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements with like-minded countries, namely acceding countries, candidate countries other than Ukraine and potential candidates’. In that sense, all current and potential candidate countries constitute like-minded partners for the Union, which is – at least – disputable in the current geopolitical context.
• Finally, issues of implementation are closely linked to (the lack of) legitimacy. It is crucial to encourage public understanding and support for the need to boost defence investments. By having Article 122 TFEU as a legal basis, the Commission bypasses the European Parliament, although the latter has repeatedly positioned itself in favour of enhanced defence cooperation. For example, the European Parliament has recently proposed a higher budget for EDIP, indicating that it is ready to constructively back such defence-related initiatives. It has also called on the European Commission and the member-states “to enable and strengthen parliamentary oversight of EU external action…by involving Parliament in the proper further implementation and scrutiny of the EPF and the Strategic Compass”, thus highlighting its willingness and readiness to oversee key defence tools. The exclusion of the European Parliament from the legislative process could lead to mounting public criticism and a growing negative public disposition to increased defence spending.
• All the aforementioned arguments are deeply interconnected with the absence of a truly common threat perception and, by extension, the member-states’ unwillingness to establish a truly Common Foreign and Security Policy. As such, it becomes nearly impossible to effectively align national defence (industrial) strategies and investments. Obviously, in the absence of such a unified vision and foreign policy framework, governments prioritise national needs over broader pan-European strategic objectives. Can we realistically expect EU defence to emerge in such a political vacuum?

 

 

 

 

[1] Official data from the European Defence Agency (EDA).

[2] Different numbers may also appear due to inflation and changes in currency exchange rates.

[3] Other relevant expenditures comprise the national contributions to CSDP military missions and operations as well as EU Battlegroups. Although these are EU-led initiatives, the associated costs are, in principle, borne by the participating member-states under the ‘costs-lie-where-they-fall’ principle.

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Pressemitteilung der Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München e. V. in Kooperation mit dem Österreichischen Institut für Wirt­schaftsforschung (WIFO), Kiel ...

Das Thema Klima und Energie nimmt im soeben von CDU, CSU und SPD vorgestellten Koalitionsvertrag nicht übermäßig viel Raum ein. Die klima- und energiepolitischen Maßnahmen kommentiert Claudia Kemfert, Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im DIW Berlin, wie folgt:

Gut ist, dass die Koalitionsparteien an den Klimazielen und der Erreichung der Klimaneutralität bis 2045 festhalten wollen. Es muss jedoch bezweifelt werden, dass das Klimaziel tatsächlich erreicht werden kann. Dies liegt im Wesentlichen daran, dass sowohl im Gebäude- als auch im Verkehrssektor Maßnahmen ergriffen werden sollen, die diese Ziele konterkarieren. Insbesondere die Abschaffung des Heizungsgesetzes ist höchst problematisch, dies führt zu unnötigen Verzögerungen, zu Verunsicherung von Gebäudeeigentümern und zieht hohe Kosten nach sich. Die angestrebten Maßnahmen lassen befürchten, dass gerade im Gebäudebereich die nötigen Emissionsminderungsziele nicht erreicht werden können, was Strafzahlungen nach sich ziehen würde.

Auch im Verkehrssektor fehlen die nötigen Maßnahmen zur Emissionsminderung. Zwar ist es zu begrüßen, dass Investitionen in Bahn- und Ladeinfrastruktur fließen sollen. Auch die Beibehaltung des Deutschlandtickets ist gut, wenn auch eine Preissenkung nötig wäre. Zu begrüßen sind ebenso Sonderabschreibungen für Elektrofahrzeuge und gezielte Förderprogramme für Haushalte mit Niedrigeinkommen hin zu mehr klimafreundlicher Mobilität. Allerdings werden einige umweltschädliche Subventionen nicht abgeschafft, sondern erhöht, wie etwa das Dienstwagenprivileg, die Rückvergütung von Agrardiesel oder aber die Senkung von Luftverkehrssteuern. Fliegen sollte nicht billiger, sondern teurer werden. Es fehlt ein dringend benötigtes Tempolimit, das nicht nur Emissionen senkt, sondern auch die Verkehrssicherheit stärkt.

Eine pauschale Senkung der Strompreise ist mit über 10 Milliarden Euro unnötig teuer und ineffizient. Die pauschale Senkung der Strompreise bevorteilt Unternehmen, die es nicht nötig haben. Zudem wird so das Ziel des vermehrten Stromsparens konterkariert. Statt einer pauschalen Entlastung mit der Gießkanne ist eine bedarfsgerechte Entlastung der stromintensiven Industrie wirkungsvoll. Der Bau von neuen Gaskraftwerken mit 20 Gigawatt erscheint überdimensioniert und verhindert Flexibilität und Speicherlösungen. Der Markt sollte entscheiden, wie viel Kraftwerkskapazitäten tatsächlich benötigt werden. Ohnehin ist nicht ausgemacht, dass der Strompreis wirklich sinkt. Zum einen wirkt der geplante Zubau von Gaskraftwerken strompreissteigernd, da Gaspreise hoch sind und steigende CO2-Preise ebenso den Strompreis steigen lassen. Zum anderen können es, wie oft in der Vergangenheit, Stromkonzerne ausnutzen und die Margen erhöhen. Zudem sollte der Kohleausstieg früher erreicht werden, um die Klimaziele zu erreichen.

Zwar will die Koalition die Einnahmen aus der CO2-Bepreisung an die Haushalte zurückgeben, aber nur indirekt über angebliche Entlastungen bei Wohnen und Mobilität. Es fehlt aber ein sozial gestaffeltes Klimageld. Zudem ist problematisch, dass der naturschutzrechtliche Ausgleich reduziert werden soll. Vereinfachungen von Genehmigungsverfahren sollten nicht zu Lasten des Natur- und Umweltschutzes gehen.

CDU, CSU und SPD haben den Koalitionsvertrag präsentiert. Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), kommentiert dies wie folgt:

Der Koalitionsvertrag von Union und SPD ist ein Kompromiss, der den Status quo weitgehend beibehält und zentrale Zukunftsfragen unzureichend adressiert. Während richtige und ambitionierte Schritte, wie das Sondervermögen für Infrastruktur und die Reform der Schuldenbremse für Verteidigungsausgaben sowie die richtige Prioritätensetzung in der Klima- und Energiepolitik und privaten Investitionen, enthalten sind, fehlen klare Umsetzungsstrategien. Zweifel gibt es, ob die angekündigten Mittel tatsächlich zweckgebunden investiert werden oder für konsumtive Ausgaben genutzt werden. Einsparungen und grundlegende Steuerreformen wurden ausgelassen, was eine Verlagerung von Investitionen in Sonderfonds nötig machen dürfte. 

In wichtigen Bereichen wie Sozialpolitik, Fachkräftemangel und Migration bleiben die angestrebten Maßnahmen unzureichend. Die Rentengarantie verschärft die Umverteilung zu Lasten der jungen Generation, und eine nachhaltige Lösung für den Arbeitskräftemangel fehlt. Positiv hervorzuheben ist die Anhebung des Mindestlohns, während Strukturreformen, etwa beim Ehegattensplitting, ausbleiben. Digitale Innovationen und Modernisierungsziele werden betont, doch bleibt unklar, ob die finanziellen Mittel ausreichen werden. Europas Rolle wird vernachlässigt, trotz drängender globaler Krisen.

Dem vorliegenden Koalitionsvertrag mangelt es an Ambitionen. Er zeigt, dass Union und SPD die Dringlichkeit der aktuellen Krisenlage noch nicht erkannt haben und bleibt in vielen Bereichen ambitionslos. Die Krisen und Bedrohungen für Sicherheit, Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Wohlstand in Deutschland könnten in den kommenden Jahren zunehmen. Es bleibt zu hoffen, dass Union und SPD dann schnell und pragmatisch genug reagieren werden, um Kurskorrekturen vorzunehmen. Weitere vier Jahre mit einer zerstrittenen Bundesregierung und politischer Lähmung kann sich Deutschland nicht mehr leisten.