Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for March 2025.

According to Vassilis Nedos (Kathimeri), Greece may receive more than the originally agreed 600 US-made Switchblade drones as increased production has lowered costs, defense officials say. As mentioned in earlier versions of the Transatlantic Periscope brief, the Greek military had secured a deal for Switchblade 300 block 20 and Switchblade 600 loitering munitions worth $75 million, with $50 million funded through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. However, with manufacturer AeroVironment ramping up production, the US has informed Athens that more drones could be acquired under the existing budget.

On March 18, 2025, a bilateral meeting was held between a delegation of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff (HNDGS) and the U.S. Marine Forces Europe and Africa (MFEA) at “Papagos” camp, in Athens. The HNDGS delegation was headed by 1st Infantry Division (1st ID) Commander, Major General Dimitrios Drosos, representing the Commander of the Hellenic Special Warfare Command (SWC), while on behalf of the US MFEA, the meeting was attended by its Commander, Major General Robert B. Sofge, accompanied by members of his staff and officials from the U.S. Embassy in Greece. The discussions focused on the framework and opportunities for joint training of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) with the Greek marine in Greece, with the aim to further enhance the close cooperation between the Special Operations Forces of both countries in the near future.

National Defense Minister Nikos Dendias met on March 19 with US Embassy Chargé d’Affaires Maria Olson at the Hellenic Ministry of National Defense. Dendias posted on X that they discussed “bilateral defence relations and the ways they could be further strengthened. We also exchanged views on the regional and international security challenges.”

US president Donald Trump celebrated Greek Independence Day, hosting an event at the White House on March 24. “The legacy of the Greeks is all around us. It surrounds us,” he told a group from the Greek-American community gathered at the White House before signing a proclamation recognizing March 25 as Greek Independence Day in the US, “celebrating 204 years of glorious Greek sovereignty and freedom.” “Perhaps the greatest gift we have inherited from this amazing culture is our incredible Greek-American community, now more than 3 million strong,” he added. The US president was accompanied by Archbishop Elpidophoros of America, who congratulated him on his re-election.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

Im Juni 2025 kehrt unsere Online-Seminarreihe "SOEPcampus: Learn to Use the SOEP Over Lunch" mit neuer Workshop-Leitung zurück. Der Workshop bietet eine umfassende, praxisnahe Einführung in die Daten des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels (SOEP). Die Teilnehmenden lernen den Inhalt der Studie, die ...

Migration management has become a critical axis of foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, moving beyond its traditional framing as a humanitarian or administrative challenge. Within Greek–Turkish relations, human mobility now functions as a means of exerting pressure, projecting power, and renegotiating geopolitical roles. The 2020 Evros crisis underscored this dynamic, triggering strategies that transcend the bilateral level and involve both European and regional actors. This report analyses the Evros crisis and the broader strategic approaches of Turkey and Greece through the lens of migration diplomacy, drawing on concepts such as issue-linkage and rent-seeking. It examines both coercive and cooperative tactics employed by the two states and the European Union’s often contradictory or defensive role. Finally, the report calls for a more resilient and institutionally coherent strategy that respects humanitarian principles and integrates migration into a broader vision of foreign policy and regional cooperation.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy Paper by Gerasimos Tsourapas, Professor of International Relations at the University of Glasgow; Non-Resident Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

Ein Experiment mit dem bedingungslosen Grundeinkommen zeigt: Menschen, die es bekommen, ändern ihr Arbeitsverhalten nicht. Für den Sozialstaat ist das dennoch lehrreich., Die Idee eines bedingungslosen Grundeinkommens (BGE) hat in den vergangenen Jahren viel Hoffnung und Begeisterung geschürt. Die Auswertung eines Experiments mit dem BGE, an der auch das DIW beteiligt war, zeigt nun – auch für mich – ein ernüchterndes Resultat: Die Probanden haben mit dem Erhalt ...

Der Koalitionsvertrag ist ein Kompromiss, der am Status quo wenig ändern wird und in Teilen eine Fortsetzung des Kurses der Ampel-Regierung ist. Er enthält viele richtige und kluge Elemente, lässt aber einen klaren Kompass für den notwendigen Kurswechsel in zentralen Zukunftsfragen vermissen., Das Sondervermögen für Infrastruktur von 500 Milliarden Euro und die Reform der Schuldenbremse in Bezug auf Verteidigungsausgaben waren kluge Schritte und gaben Anlass zur Hoffnung, dass die deutsche Politik nun die Weichen für eine deutlich bessere Sicherheit und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Deutschlands ...

Wir freuen uns, den Start der internationalen Forschungsinitiative #ManyDaughters bekanntzugeben. Diese Studie untersucht, wie Töchter das Verhalten, die Präferenzen und Einstellungen beeinflussen. Forscherinnen und Forscher aus allen Bereichen der Sozialwissenschaften sind eingeladen, an diesem ...

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IPI and the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN cohosted a policy forum on April 10th on “Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Peace Operations Settings: Multilateral Responses.”

Since 2020, there have been at least a dozen military coups d’état and other unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs) around the world. These include takeovers by armed groups in Afghanistan and Syria and coups in Mali, Myanmar, Chad, Guinea, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Gabon. This presents a challenge for the United Nations. Member states in the General Assembly and Security Council need to decide whether and how to condemn the UCGs and whether to recognize the new de facto authorities. In the field, UN peace operations and UN country teams face the task of continuing to carry out their work in the midst of a political crisis and of deciding how to engage with the new authorities. This rise in UCGs has also increasingly put to the test regional organizations’ anti-UCG mechanisms, particularly in Africa.

Panelists shared lessons from the multilateral response to UCGs, with a focus on UN peace operations. The event also launched the IPI policy paper on “UN Peace Operations and Unconstitutional Changes of Government” co-authored by Albert Trithart and Bitania Tadesse. Building on the insights of the report and the insights of the panelists, the forum brought together representatives of the UN Secretariat, member states, and civil society organizations to discuss how the UN can most effectively respond to UCGs and engage with de facto authorities alongside other actors such as regional organizations.

Welcome and Opening Remarks:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute
Djeyhoun Ostowar, Counsellor, Deputy Head of Political Affairs Section, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations

Speakers:
Albert Trithart, Senior Fellow and Head of Publications, International Peace Institute
Renato Mariani, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Team Leader, Policy Planning Unit, Policy and Mediation Division, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)
Ramiz Alakbarov, Assistant Secretary-General, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Ethiopia, former DSRSG/RC/HC, UNAMA (Virtual)
Bitania Tadesse, Policy Specialist for Africa, International Peace Institute (Virtual)
Katharine Brooks, Partnership Specialist, Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions, UNDP (Virtual)

Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute

The post Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Peace Operations Settings: Multilateral Responses appeared first on International Peace Institute.

The White Paper on the Future of European Defence, released in March 2025, represents a landmark initiative by the European Commission to articulate a cohesive vision for strengthening the EU’s defence posture amid mounting geopolitical instability. Acting as a framework for the ReArm Europe plan, the document proposes mobilising hundreds of billions of EUR in defence investments, making use of national and EU resources.

The ReArm Europe Plan and the White Paper clearly succeed in politically signalling the EU’s renewed commitment to defence investment and military readiness. However, despite their rhetorical strength, four major concerns could undermine their transformative potential:

1. Coordination gaps: Without a robust coordination mechanism, national funds may be allocated to less pressing areas and may serve other – national and/or domestic – objectives and interests. In the meantime, the Union will not achieve effectiveness and efficiency unless it focuses on standardisation and interoperability.
2. Financial markets’ sensitivity: While the activation of the national escape clause offers fiscal leeway, it is unclear how the financial markets will react to increased national debts. Alternative instruments, such as the Defence Eurobonds or the European Defence Mechanism, could be examined.
3. Creative ambiguity: The Proposal for a SAFE Regulation includes references presented vaguely enough to allow for multiple interpretations and thus avoid frictions. In view of the negotiations in the Council, the issue of a third country’s participation in a procurement consortium must be further elaborated and clarified.
4. Democratic legitimacy and parliamentary oversight: Article 122 TFEU sidesteps the European Parliament, despite the latter’s willingness to further support the EU defence initiatives. Without adequate parliamentary involvement, defence investments risk alienating public opinion in a policy area which requires broad societal consensus.

All the aforementioned shortcomings reflect a deeper structural issue: the absence of a common threat perception and a truly common foreign and security policy. Without a coherent strategic vision at the EU level, member-states remain inclined to prioritise national over collective objectives and interests.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Spyros Blavoukos, Senior Research Fellow, Head, EU Institutions & Policies Programme, ELIAMEP; Head of the ‘Ariane Condellis’ European Programme; Professor, Athens University of Economics & Business and Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, EU Policies and Institutions Programme, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

In response to the new geopolitical and geoeconomic realities – including but not limited to the protracted Russian war on Ukraine and the Trump 2.0 administration – and following the earlier announcement of the ReArm Europe Plan, the White Paper on the Future of European Defence was published in March 2025. The White Paper outlines the path to enhanced EU defence capabilities and aims to mobilise hundreds of billions of EUR, detailing measures to finance and strengthen the EU’s military readiness.

The White Paper features well-intentioned objectives and its communication strategy was well orchestrated. It does provide answers to two key questions: first, where the money will come from and second, in what defence capabilities the EU is going to invest. Starting from the former, in the best-case scenario, national resources up to €650 billion will be mobilised through the activation of the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which defines the fiscal governance framework for the EU member-states and sets rules for constraining national government deficit and debt. In essence, this clause will allow member-states to accommodate additional defence spending. The €650 billion will be topped by EU resources of up to €150 billion that will be gathered through the common issuance of bonds, as envisaged by the new SAFE instrument. In addition to these €800 billion, the White Paper proposes four additional -but rather vague and not quantified- ways to step up defence spending: a) redirecting existing EU funds towards defence (e.g., cohesion funds), b) contributions from the European Investment Bank (EIB), c) private investments, and d) ensuring financial predictability for the European defence industry in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), currently under negotiation. Overall, the resources envisaged in the White Paper are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Envisaged resources for EU defence in the White Paper

 

Regarding the capability needs, the White Paper identifies seven priority areas: Air and missile defence, Artillery systems, Ammunition and missiles, Drones and counter-drone systems, Military Mobility, AI, Quantum, Cyber & Electronic Warfare and strategic enablers & critical infrastructure protection. Additionally, the Proposal for a SAFE Regulation (i.e., the €150 billion funding instrument mentioned above that accompanies the White Paper) refers to the following two categories of defence products, the common procurement of which will be funded:

1. Category One: ammunition and missiles, artillery systems, small drones and related anti-drone systems, critical infrastructure protection, cyber and military mobility, and
2. Category Two: air and missile defence, drones (other than small ones) and related anti-drone systems, strategic enablers, space assets protection, AI and electronic warfare.

 ‘Money Makes the World Go Round’: Financing EU Defence

National resources for defence

In 2023, the EU member-states spent €279 billion on defence, marking an almost 10% increase in defence spending compared to 2022 (€254 billion). Approximately one fourth of this expenditure (26%) was directed to research, development and procurement of defence equipment.[1] In 2024, the total defence expenditure made by the EU member-states reached (provisionally) €326 billion, an almost 17% rise compared to 2023, which amounts to 1.9% of the EU’s GDP and is very close to the 2% NATO requirement. These figures are in line with the broader, decade-long trend of increased military spending, especially fuelled by the Russian invasion into Ukraine in 2022.

Still, Europe is lagging in military deterrence and defence, and much more money needs to be poured to close the gap in terms of military capabilities, especially should the US truly reconsider its military presence in Europe. This is the underlying logic behind the proposal to create additional fiscal space for member-states to invest more in defence, bypassing the strict framework of the EU’s macroeconomic governance. The ReArm Europe plan calls for such a fiscal margin for higher defence expenditures (of up to €650 billion) through the coordinated activation of the national escape clause by the member-states. The national escape clause will apply from 2025 to 2028, for expenditure up to 1.5% of GDP.  The reference year is 2021, i.e., the last pre-war year when the EU member-states had spent €214 billion on defence. In other words, if the national escape clause has been activated and a member-state’s increase of military expenditure remains within the 1.5% ceiling, the excessive deficit procedure will not be launched, even if the total budget deficit exceeds the limits set by the revised rules of the fiscal and macroeconomic governance framework. The EU’s executive branch has invited all – interested – member-states to submit a request to activate this escape clause by the end of April 2025. The member-states’ requests will be coordinated by the Council in order to accelerate the process, and the recommendations activating the national escape clause(s) will be adopted by qualified majority voting (QMV).

On- and Off-EU Budget resources for defence

Besides the financial resources under the full control of each member-state’s government at the national level, there are two main channels of financing defence-related activities at the EU level: first, a direct budget line from the EU budget and second, off-EU budget resources that are collectively managed by EU member-states. As regards the former, Article 41 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) forbids, in principle, the use of the Union budget for operations having military or defence implications. Hence, the Commission’s main defence-related initiatives have focused primarily on strengthening the European defence industry and supporting the development of dual use infrastructure, with an allocated budget of approximately €10.55 billion in the current MFF.[2] These initiatives comprise the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Military Mobility, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). The European Defence Industry Programme, which falls in this category and is agreed to provide 1.5 billion over the period 2025-2027, has yet to be adopted. The legal basis for financing the European defence industry lays primarily in Article 173(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which touches upon the industry’s competitiveness. Other relevant TFEU articles that could be used to finance European defence-related projects comprise Article 179, on the improvement of the EU’s scientific and technological base, Article 170 on the development and interconnection of trans-European networks, and Title XIX on research, technological development and space policy. As far as the second channel is concerned, the largest defence-related, off-EU budget tool is the European Peace Facility (EPF). As depicted in Figure 2, comparing the two categories, the biggest part of the funds allocated to EU defence remain under full member-states’ control.[3]

Figure 2: EU budget and off-budget major defence-related tools

Created with flourish.studio.

The Proposal for a SAFE Regulation has the potential to make available up to €150 billion, a huge upgrade compared to the current situation, as shown in Figure 3. The SAFE Instrument operationally looks very similar to the EDIRPA, as it focuses on providing the necessary financial resources to procure eligible defence equipment jointly. However, financially, the two instruments are totally different as SAFE, in its current format at least, will operate through loans (and subsequently debt), whereas EDIRPA provides grants. Consistent with the general approach of EU defence funding mechanisms, the SAFE Instrument promotes a cooperative format. In this context, common procurement under SAFE requires at least the involvement of one member-state in conjunction with either another member-state or an eligible third country.

Figure 3: EU Budget funding for defence(-related) initiatives

From Reports to Action: Shaping the Future of EU Defence

A 2024 briefing from the European Parliamentary Research Service brought together the various proposals for the future of EU defence that were put forward in four different documents: a) the Mission Letter to the then Commissioner-designate for Defence and Space, b) Von der Leyen’s Political Guidelines, c) Draghi Report and d) Letta Report. The great majority of the proposals mentioned in the four documents have been integrated into the White Paper and the Proposal for a SAFE Regulation, as clearly shown in Figure 4. The interconnection between defence policy and economic competitiveness and the extent to which these two areas are mutually reinforcing are evident. The defence industrial policy aims to enhance military readiness, while also seeking to bolster economic growth, job creation and innovation. This relationship is highlighted in the Letta and Draghi Reports, both of which focus primarily on the economy, albeit emphasising the importance of a robust EU Defence Technological and Industrial Base. Most of their insights and proposals found their way into the White Paper.

The proposals that did not get through refer to sensitive political issues, such as the issuance of “Defence Eurobonds”, or older initiatives and/or institutional arrangements that are already in place, like, for example, EDIRPA & ASAP and the proposal for a Defence Commissioner. In addition, Letta’s proposal for the creation of a European Stability Mechanism (ESM)-like specialised credit line was not outrightly rejected but rather treated in a non-committing way. The White Paper vaguely notes that if the demand by member-states for funds for defence-related investments outstrips supply, then “the Commission will continue to explore innovative instruments, such as in relation to the European Stability Mechanism”.    

Figure 4: Proposals integrated into the White Paper/Proposal for a SAFE Regulation

Created with flourish.studio.

Critical Assessment and the Road Ahead

‘ReArm Europe’ and the White Paper have managed to raise awareness about the need to further invest in EU defence. Politically, they have sent a strong message about the Union’s commitment to security and enhancing defence capabilities. They have emphasised the necessity to direct money towards defence, reflecting a proactive approach and have signalled a level of readiness to act, especially in combination with the publication of the Preparedness Union Strategy. However, there are four main concerns that are hard to ignore:

• First, as discussed above, the lion’s share of the ReArm Europe plan will come from the national budgets. While the flexibility to use additional national resources is a positive first step, it remains unclear to what extent member-states will actually decide to invest in defence and, more importantly, whether those investments will be directed towards what is truly needed. In particular, the International Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG), which will be used to measure the member-states’ defence expenditures, includes a very broad set of different sub-categories. For example, COFOG Category 02 – Defence entails expenditure on military personnel, other non-combat defence forces and military aid. There is a genuine concern that, without a robust coordination mechanism, funds may be allocated to less pressing areas and may serve other – national and/or domestic– objectives and interests. To be more specific, there is a possibility that additional defence spending may predominantly be allocated to cover personnel costs rather than addressing critical needs, such as the development of advanced military capabilities or training. Achieving the right balance in order to guarantee long-term strategic readiness is crucial. Furthermore, efficiency and effectiveness in defence cannot be assessed solely in financial terms. Without a clear focus on standardisation and interoperability, progress will likely remain incremental rather than transformative. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has underscored the critical importance of ensuring that national armed forces are capable of operating together effectively and efficiently. As such, the European family has yet to decide how to foster standardisation and interoperability. To achieve this goal, different options exist:

1. Alignment of EU defence initiatives with established NATO standards, and/or
2. Strengthening the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the Capability Development Plan (CDP) to improve alignment between member-states’ defence planning and capabilities, and/or
3. Use/strengthening of existing mechanisms (for example, the European Defence Agency) or launch of new – potentially pan-European – initiatives (for example, the European Defence Mechanism, see below).

• Regarding the fiscal space that the national escape clause may provide, an issue not addressed is how the (already destabilised due to the tariff war) financial markets will respond to potential increases in debt levels across the EU member-states. Southern EU member-states have already expressed their doubts on the possibility of further indebting themselves, which will undermine – or further derail – the long-term sustainability of their sovereign debt. Instead, they favour the issuance of “Defence Eurobonds”, which practically entails the EU borrowing money from the capital markets and then distributing it to member-states in the form of grants. Needless to say, in this case, the identification of the distribution criteria will be challenging. Another option would be the establishment of an ESM-like intergovernmental mechanism, called the European Defence Mechanism (EDM), as described in a Bruegel proposal prepared for the Polish Presidency. To be more precise, this extra-EU intergovernmental organisation could act as a “planner, funder and potentially owner of strategic enablers”, allowing the debt incurred to acquire certain defence assets to remain on the EDM’s books instead of national accounts.
• Although “implementation, implementation, implementation” is important, one of the key criticisms lies in the creative ambiguity that characterises parts of the White Paper. Given diverging views among member-states, certain concepts are not fully clarified and allow for multiple interpretations. For example, the Proposal for a SAFE Regulation contains a European preference clause for the procurement source (at least 65% of the costs of the final product must originate from within the Union, Ukraine or EEA/EFTA states). However, the text seems to adopt an extremely wide definition vis-à-vis the potentially eligible third countries that may participate in a procurement consortium. In particular, it states that ‘the Union may conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements with like-minded countries, namely acceding countries, candidate countries other than Ukraine and potential candidates’. In that sense, all current and potential candidate countries constitute like-minded partners for the Union, which is – at least – disputable in the current geopolitical context.
• Finally, issues of implementation are closely linked to (the lack of) legitimacy. It is crucial to encourage public understanding and support for the need to boost defence investments. By having Article 122 TFEU as a legal basis, the Commission bypasses the European Parliament, although the latter has repeatedly positioned itself in favour of enhanced defence cooperation. For example, the European Parliament has recently proposed a higher budget for EDIP, indicating that it is ready to constructively back such defence-related initiatives. It has also called on the European Commission and the member-states “to enable and strengthen parliamentary oversight of EU external action…by involving Parliament in the proper further implementation and scrutiny of the EPF and the Strategic Compass”, thus highlighting its willingness and readiness to oversee key defence tools. The exclusion of the European Parliament from the legislative process could lead to mounting public criticism and a growing negative public disposition to increased defence spending.
• All the aforementioned arguments are deeply interconnected with the absence of a truly common threat perception and, by extension, the member-states’ unwillingness to establish a truly Common Foreign and Security Policy. As such, it becomes nearly impossible to effectively align national defence (industrial) strategies and investments. Obviously, in the absence of such a unified vision and foreign policy framework, governments prioritise national needs over broader pan-European strategic objectives. Can we realistically expect EU defence to emerge in such a political vacuum?

 

 

 

 

[1] Official data from the European Defence Agency (EDA).

[2] Different numbers may also appear due to inflation and changes in currency exchange rates.

[3] Other relevant expenditures comprise the national contributions to CSDP military missions and operations as well as EU Battlegroups. Although these are EU-led initiatives, the associated costs are, in principle, borne by the participating member-states under the ‘costs-lie-where-they-fall’ principle.

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Pressemitteilung der Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München e. V. in Kooperation mit dem Österreichischen Institut für Wirt­schaftsforschung (WIFO), Kiel ...

Das Thema Klima und Energie nimmt im soeben von CDU, CSU und SPD vorgestellten Koalitionsvertrag nicht übermäßig viel Raum ein. Die klima- und energiepolitischen Maßnahmen kommentiert Claudia Kemfert, Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im DIW Berlin, wie folgt:

Gut ist, dass die Koalitionsparteien an den Klimazielen und der Erreichung der Klimaneutralität bis 2045 festhalten wollen. Es muss jedoch bezweifelt werden, dass das Klimaziel tatsächlich erreicht werden kann. Dies liegt im Wesentlichen daran, dass sowohl im Gebäude- als auch im Verkehrssektor Maßnahmen ergriffen werden sollen, die diese Ziele konterkarieren. Insbesondere die Abschaffung des Heizungsgesetzes ist höchst problematisch, dies führt zu unnötigen Verzögerungen, zu Verunsicherung von Gebäudeeigentümern und zieht hohe Kosten nach sich. Die angestrebten Maßnahmen lassen befürchten, dass gerade im Gebäudebereich die nötigen Emissionsminderungsziele nicht erreicht werden können, was Strafzahlungen nach sich ziehen würde.

Auch im Verkehrssektor fehlen die nötigen Maßnahmen zur Emissionsminderung. Zwar ist es zu begrüßen, dass Investitionen in Bahn- und Ladeinfrastruktur fließen sollen. Auch die Beibehaltung des Deutschlandtickets ist gut, wenn auch eine Preissenkung nötig wäre. Zu begrüßen sind ebenso Sonderabschreibungen für Elektrofahrzeuge und gezielte Förderprogramme für Haushalte mit Niedrigeinkommen hin zu mehr klimafreundlicher Mobilität. Allerdings werden einige umweltschädliche Subventionen nicht abgeschafft, sondern erhöht, wie etwa das Dienstwagenprivileg, die Rückvergütung von Agrardiesel oder aber die Senkung von Luftverkehrssteuern. Fliegen sollte nicht billiger, sondern teurer werden. Es fehlt ein dringend benötigtes Tempolimit, das nicht nur Emissionen senkt, sondern auch die Verkehrssicherheit stärkt.

Eine pauschale Senkung der Strompreise ist mit über 10 Milliarden Euro unnötig teuer und ineffizient. Die pauschale Senkung der Strompreise bevorteilt Unternehmen, die es nicht nötig haben. Zudem wird so das Ziel des vermehrten Stromsparens konterkariert. Statt einer pauschalen Entlastung mit der Gießkanne ist eine bedarfsgerechte Entlastung der stromintensiven Industrie wirkungsvoll. Der Bau von neuen Gaskraftwerken mit 20 Gigawatt erscheint überdimensioniert und verhindert Flexibilität und Speicherlösungen. Der Markt sollte entscheiden, wie viel Kraftwerkskapazitäten tatsächlich benötigt werden. Ohnehin ist nicht ausgemacht, dass der Strompreis wirklich sinkt. Zum einen wirkt der geplante Zubau von Gaskraftwerken strompreissteigernd, da Gaspreise hoch sind und steigende CO2-Preise ebenso den Strompreis steigen lassen. Zum anderen können es, wie oft in der Vergangenheit, Stromkonzerne ausnutzen und die Margen erhöhen. Zudem sollte der Kohleausstieg früher erreicht werden, um die Klimaziele zu erreichen.

Zwar will die Koalition die Einnahmen aus der CO2-Bepreisung an die Haushalte zurückgeben, aber nur indirekt über angebliche Entlastungen bei Wohnen und Mobilität. Es fehlt aber ein sozial gestaffeltes Klimageld. Zudem ist problematisch, dass der naturschutzrechtliche Ausgleich reduziert werden soll. Vereinfachungen von Genehmigungsverfahren sollten nicht zu Lasten des Natur- und Umweltschutzes gehen.

CDU, CSU und SPD haben den Koalitionsvertrag präsentiert. Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), kommentiert dies wie folgt:

Der Koalitionsvertrag von Union und SPD ist ein Kompromiss, der den Status quo weitgehend beibehält und zentrale Zukunftsfragen unzureichend adressiert. Während richtige und ambitionierte Schritte, wie das Sondervermögen für Infrastruktur und die Reform der Schuldenbremse für Verteidigungsausgaben sowie die richtige Prioritätensetzung in der Klima- und Energiepolitik und privaten Investitionen, enthalten sind, fehlen klare Umsetzungsstrategien. Zweifel gibt es, ob die angekündigten Mittel tatsächlich zweckgebunden investiert werden oder für konsumtive Ausgaben genutzt werden. Einsparungen und grundlegende Steuerreformen wurden ausgelassen, was eine Verlagerung von Investitionen in Sonderfonds nötig machen dürfte. 

In wichtigen Bereichen wie Sozialpolitik, Fachkräftemangel und Migration bleiben die angestrebten Maßnahmen unzureichend. Die Rentengarantie verschärft die Umverteilung zu Lasten der jungen Generation, und eine nachhaltige Lösung für den Arbeitskräftemangel fehlt. Positiv hervorzuheben ist die Anhebung des Mindestlohns, während Strukturreformen, etwa beim Ehegattensplitting, ausbleiben. Digitale Innovationen und Modernisierungsziele werden betont, doch bleibt unklar, ob die finanziellen Mittel ausreichen werden. Europas Rolle wird vernachlässigt, trotz drängender globaler Krisen.

Dem vorliegenden Koalitionsvertrag mangelt es an Ambitionen. Er zeigt, dass Union und SPD die Dringlichkeit der aktuellen Krisenlage noch nicht erkannt haben und bleibt in vielen Bereichen ambitionslos. Die Krisen und Bedrohungen für Sicherheit, Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Wohlstand in Deutschland könnten in den kommenden Jahren zunehmen. Es bleibt zu hoffen, dass Union und SPD dann schnell und pragmatisch genug reagieren werden, um Kurskorrekturen vorzunehmen. Weitere vier Jahre mit einer zerstrittenen Bundesregierung und politischer Lähmung kann sich Deutschland nicht mehr leisten.

Dreijährige Feldstudie untersucht Wirkung von bedingungslosen Geldzahlungen – Geldempfänger*innen sparten viel und veränderten Arbeitsmarktverhalten kaum – Mentale Gesundheit und Lebenszufriedenheit verbesserten sich signifikant – Bedingungsloses Grundeinkommen kann als Reformoption nun ...

Over the past eighty years, the evolution of UN peace operations has encountered several critical junctures. Now, UN peace operations have arguably reached another turning point with the decline in the number of UN-led multidimensional missions and a growing role for partners, including regional and subregional organizations. This has led to calls to examine how peace operations are conceived, mandated, structured, and led, and several review processes are ongoing. It is important that these processes consider not only the supply side of peace operations but also the demand side—in other words, to take conflict settings as the starting point and work backward to determine the type of intervention needed.

Within this context, IPI organized a series of scenario-based workshops to brainstorm potential responses to a mix of real and hypothetical scenarios. The first workshop was held over two days in Addis Ababa in January 2025 in partnership with the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). A second workshop was held in New York in March 2025. The workshops brought together civilian, military, and police representatives of the UN, African Union (AU), subregional organizations, and member states, as well as independent experts.

This paper reflects on several key considerations that emerged from these workshops:

• The UN Security Council and UN Secretariat should work together to ensure that mandates and mission activities are driven by clear political strategies that address politics at the local, national, regional, and international levels.
• The Secretariat should establish a standing and integrated operational planning team in the shared regional divisions to facilitate a shift from templated approaches to context-specific, demand-driven approaches.
• Field missions should have enhanced capacity to develop operational responses to scenarios based on their current mandate or possible changes to their mandate.
• Member states and the Secretariat should explore how to operationalize modular approaches to mission configurations to foster more flexible and targeted mission mandates.
• Troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs) should provide more specialized and targeted contributions to match missions’ capabilities to new mission approaches and current demands.
• Building on their commitments in the Pact for the Future, member states should demonstrate leadership by actively contributing to the ongoing reviews of peace operations and by providing a clear political direction to the work of the Secretariat.

These lessons can feed into several ongoing and upcoming policy processes, including the UN peacekeeping ministerial, the review on the future of peace operations, the ten-year review of the report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), and the review of the UN peacebuilding architecture.

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There has been a significant increase in the number of unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs) since 2020. This presents a challenge for the United Nations, which has a presence in all countries that have recently experienced UCGs. In places like Afghanistan, Mali, and Sudan, it has also presented particular challenges to UN peace operations, which face the task of continuing to carry out their work amid a political crisis and using their good offices to facilitate a peaceful return to constitutional order.

The report examines lessons from the experiences of the UN missions in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Mali (MINUSMA), and Sudan (UNITAMS) following recent UCGs. It provides a brief overview of recent trends in UCGs and how the responses of member states and international and regional organizations have impacted the responses of UN peace operations. It then analyzes how these UN peace operations approached political engagement with the de facto authorities. It concludes with several lessons:

• A principled approach at the highest levels of the UN: While some UCGs may bring to power leaders with greater political will to engage with the UN, they are almost always an indicator of growing political instability. The UN secretary-general, along with the African Union (AU) and other regional organizations, should thus continue adopting a principled approach to condemning UCGs.
• A pragmatic approach for UN peace operations: While the UN should take a principled approach to UCGs at the headquarters level, UN peace operations are well-positioned to take a more pragmatic approach to engaging with de facto authorities. They should take advantage of any openness displayed by the authorities to engage despite fears that doing so might legitimize them.
• Planning for UCGs and reviewing political strategies: Even if the UN is unable to prevent UCGs, it can better prepare for managing relationships with transitional authorities. It is therefore important to consider such scenarios in mission planning for potential and current operations and to conduct strategic assessments as soon as possible following UCGs to consider how to adapt and potentially identify a new direction for engagement.
• The challenge of remaining impartial: Fears of “legitimizing” de facto authorities stem from the assumption that those authorities are inherently illegitimate. Yet not all elected authorities have popular legitimacy, and not all authorities who come to power unconstitutionally lack it. UN missions thus need to factor public opinion into how they respond on the ground.
• The need for a “One UN” response: While there is unlikely to be a “one-size-fits-all” approach to engagement with de facto authorities across the entire UN presence in a country, coordination is needed to ensure UN personnel have a common understanding of core principles of engagement and a coherent approach to communication.
• The limits of UN engagement: Ultimately, the ability of UN missions to shape political transitions following UCGs tends to be constrained by factors outside their control. Regional organizations like the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) tend to adopt a more principled response, raising questions about the extent to which UN missions should seek to link their engagement to that of these organizations. Missions also face competing pressures from member states supporting different political factions.

The post UN Peace Operations and Unconstitutional Changes of Government appeared first on International Peace Institute.

The policy brief “From Migration Fears to Missed Opportunities: The Cost of Politicising EU Enlargement” follows upon the results of the report “The Rise of Radical Right and Eurosceptic Political Forces and the Impact on the EU’s Enlargement Policy.” It is part of the think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration initiative, led by ELIAMEP’s South-East Europe Programme and supported by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

As debates over EU enlargement intensify, migration has become a focal point for radical right and Eurosceptic parties across Europe. This brief by Ioannis Armakolas (Director, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) and Ioannis Alexandris (Research Associate, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) explores how these political forces frame enlargement as a migration risk, shaping public discourse and influencing policy decisions. The brief highlights how migration concerns are linked to fears over cultural identity, security, and economic stability, influencing public perception and national policies.

The analysis also examines the broader political landscape, including how national governments respond to these pressures and the role of public referenda in shaping enlargement outcomes. Drawing lessons from past accessions, the brief underscores the economic and strategic benefits of integration while cautioning against the long-term costs of stagnation. Offering concrete policy recommendations, the paper advocates for a proactive communication strategy that counters misinformation, highlights the economic advantages of enlargement, and reengages public opinion with a fact-based narrative.

You can read the policy brief here.

 

 

The South-East Europe Programme of ELIAMEP is a member of the IGNITA network which is led by led by OSF-WB.

 

 

 

 

 

You can learn more about think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration by visiting the website of ELIAMEP and OSF-WB.

 

 

 

Funded by: OSF WB

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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IPI and Grace Farms Foundation cohosted the second Art for Peace series event featuring global human rights advocate and artist Nasreen Sheikh on March 26th.

For the first time publicly, Nasreen Sheikh did a reading of her poem “A Table for Peace,” which she wrote during an artist residency at Grace Farms Foundation in Connecticut. The event also featured “The Veil,” a textile-based fine art piece symbolizing protection and honoring the anonymity of survivors of modern slavery. It will be part of a performance art installation and integrated into the film ANAVARANA—Nasreen Sheikh’s documentary filmmaking debut—which explores modern slavery’s impact on women and its connection to the global climate crisis.

At the event, Nasreen demonstrated how her work amplifies the intersection of art, social transformation, and peacebuilding, as well as the lasting power of art as both a historical record and a tool for shaping global consciousness.

Nasreen Sheikh is a survivor of modern slavery and a visionary leader committed to ending this issue through survivor-led initiatives. She is the founder of the Empowerment Collective, an organization dedicated to ending modern slavery through survivor leadership, and Local Women’s Handicrafts (LWH), a social business venture in Nepal that empowers marginalized women through traditional craftsmanship. Nasreen’s dedication to a transparent global economic and supply chain system, illustrated through her development of the TransparaTrade initiative, enhances supply chain transparency and promotes corporate engagement and legislative reforms to end modern slavery. In addition to her advocacy, Nasreen is a documentary filmmaker, author, and multimedia artist. Her creative work weaves her experiences and insights into compelling narratives.

The Art for Peace Series, in partnership with Grace Farms Foundation, highlights the role of art and education in building a culture of peace and reconciliation and is chaired by IPI President Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein.

Opening Remarks:
Chelsea Thatcher, Founding Creative Director, Chief Strategic Officer at Grace Farms

Featured Artist:
Nasreen Sheikh, Global Advocate for Human Rights, Documentary Filmmaker, Author, and Multimedia Artist

Moderator:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute

The post Building a Culture of Peace and Reconciliation through Art, Featuring Artist and Activist Nasreen Sheikh appeared first on International Peace Institute.

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for February 2025.

Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Diplomacy and Openness Tassos Hatzivasileiou visited Washington to meet with high-ranking officials of the Federal Office of the United State Trade Representative (USTR). Specifically, on February 10, Hatzivasileiou met with the Deputy Assistant US Trade Representative Bryant Trick with Deputy Assistant US Trade Representative for Europe Michael Rogers and the official responsible for Greece, Dana Fager. The two sides discussed the further deepening of trade relations between Greece and the USA.

On February 23, 2025, the Minister of Culture Lina Mendoni held a working meeting at the State Department with the US Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, Darren Beattie and the Assistant Under Secretary for Education and Culture Scott Weinhold. According to a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both interlocutors expressed satisfaction  “for the fact that this was the first meeting between the Greek government and the new Trump government”. The meeting focused on the efforts to combat antiquities trafficking, a major global problem linked to organized crime and terrorism.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis on February 28, 2025. In its announcement on the meeting between the two ministers, the State Department said Rubio reaffirmed the strategic importance of the US-Greece partnership, emphasizing that Greece is a “valued NATO ally and critical to regional stability.” Reportedly the two ministers also discussed the importance of “confronting illegal immigration.” In addition, the United States applauded Greece’s strong commitment to meeting NATO defense spending obligations. Finally, the State Department statement noted that Secretary Rubio welcomed Greece’s presence on the UN Security Council for the 2025-2026 term.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

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On the occasion of Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Siobhán Mullally’s visit to New York during the 69th Commission on the Status of Women (CSW69), IPI, in partnership with the Permanent Missions of Ireland, Sierra Leone, and Switzerland to the United Nations, cohosted a policy forum on “Trafficking in Persons, WPS, and Peacebuilding,” on March 20th.

Despite a recognition of the links between trafficking in persons and conflict, there has been limited attention paid to trafficking in persons in the reporting on and monitoring of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). To date, the resolutions adopted on women, peace, and security (WPS) have focused primarily on sexual violence in conflict. Trafficking in persons is recognized as a form of sexual violence in conflict. However, it is critical that we now effectively implement all pillars of the WPS agenda in ensuring the participation and leadership of those most affected by conflict-related trafficking in persons; in the design and implementation of peacebuilding measures; and in the recovery programs that ensure economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights. In advance of the twenty-fifth anniversary of both the adoption of resolution 1325 and the Trafficking in Persons Protocol (the Palermo Protocol), there is a need to strengthen these policies by better integrating considerations on trafficking in persons into the WPS agenda.

Welcoming Remarks:
Adam Lupel, Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, International Peace Institute

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Fergal Mythen, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations
Onike Spencer-Coker, First Secretary and Spokesperson, Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations

Speakers:
Siobhán Mullally, Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children
Awa Dabo, Director and Deputy Head, Peacebuilding Support Office, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
Aleksandra Dier, Gender Coordinator at the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)
Brigitte Chelebian, Attorney at Law, Founder and Director, Justice Without Frontiers (virtual)
Delphine Schantz, Director, New York Liaison Office, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
Thomas Kontogeorgos, Chief, UN Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Section

Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of Women, Peace and Security, International Peace Institute

The post Trafficking in Persons, WPS, and Peacebuilding appeared first on International Peace Institute.

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IPI and the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations cohosted a policy forum on March 13th on “The Protection of Civilians in African-led and UN-led Peace Operations.”

The purpose of this event was to discuss how the protection of civilians (POC) has been undertaken within peace operations that are African-led and UN-led, looking particularly at the respective comparative advantages, limitations, and lessons learned. The event also launched the IPI publication, “The United Nations-African Union Partnership and the Protection of Civilians,” authored by Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, Senior Researcher with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, and Lauren McGowan, Policy Analyst with IPI.

Building on the insights of the report, this forum brought together representatives of the UN Secretariat, AU Commission, member states, and civil society organizations to discuss how the protection of civilians will be upheld in the context of partnerships in peace operations.

Opening Remarks:
Djeyhoun Ostowar, Counsellor, Deputy Head of Political Affairs Section, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations

Speakers:
Lauren McGowan, Policy Analyst, International Peace Institute
Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, Senior Researcher, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Yishak Tefferi, Protection of Civilians Officer in the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, UN Department of Peace Operations
Adebayo Kareem, Coordinator, Human Rights, Compliance & Accountability Project, African Union (VTC)
Emma Birikorang, Director of Research at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (VTC)

Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute

The post The Protection of Civilians in African-led and UN-led Peace Operations appeared first on International Peace Institute.

The landscape of peace operations in Africa has transformed over the past decade, including a marked increase in African-led peace support operations (PSOs). Since the early 2000s, the African Union (AU) and UN have evolved distinct, albeit parallel, conceptual and operational approaches to the protection of civilians (POC). While the UN views POC in peacekeeping as a whole-of-mission objective, with military, police, and civilian components prioritizing POC and proactively protecting civilians, the AU views itself as contributing to the protection of civilians primarily by neutralizing armed groups and establishing a protective environment. These differences raise important questions about how POC will be upheld in the context of the UN-AU partnership.

This report examines the operational differences between UN and AU approaches to POC, assessing their respective advantages and limitations. It highlights how African-led PSOs tend to be more able and willing to use force to respond to outbreaks of violence and to contain aggressors but have less sustainable and flexible financing than UN peacekeeping operations. Meanwhile, UN peacekeeping missions with POC mandates have more robust civilian and police components but may lack rapid response capabilities. To strengthen their partnership on POC, the two organizations should leverage their comparative advantages, acknowledge their respective limitations, and work toward an approach to POC that is tailored to each context.

Based on the findings in this report, the following recommendations are made:

Understandings of POC:

• The UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) should continue to facilitate understanding of their comparative advantages and challenges on POC.
• POC should be a central focus of efforts to implement the 2017 Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security.
• UN DPO and AU PSOD should share lessons learned and strengthen each other’s capacity.
• The AU compliance team should continue to support regional economic communities in adhering to AU POC policies.

Structures on POC:

• The UN and AU should establish a joint lessons-learned mechanism within the UN Office to the AU to systematically assess joint UN-AU missions and African-led operations.
• UN DPO and AU PSOD should develop and implement a joint protection strategy when engaged in partnered operations.
• UN DPO and AU PSOD should conduct a thorough joint POC assessment prior to any partnered deployments.
• The AU Peace and Security Council and UN Security Council should engage in regular consultations on peace support operations, including on mandates.

The post The United Nations–African Union Partnership and the Protection of Civilians appeared first on International Peace Institute.