La Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie du Bénin (CCI Bénin) a tenu, ce vendredi 19 septembre 2025, sa 2ème session ordinaire de l'Assemblée Consulaire, consacrée à l'examen et à l'adoption du budget 2026 de l'institution.
Les élus consulaires ont examiné et adopté le projet de budget de la CCI Bénin pour l'exercice 2026, premier budget de la mandature 2025-2030. « Plus qu'un exercice financier », cette session marque, selon le président Arnauld Akakpo, la mise en œuvre de la « vision stratégique » de la CCI Bénin et l'« acte fondateur de nouvelles dynamiques » pour l'institution consulaire.
Le président de la CCI Bénin s'est réjoui de la présence du représentant de la ministre de l'industrie et du commerce au lancement des travaux. C'est la preuve que le gouvernement est à l'écoute du secteur privé, a-t-il indiqué.
Le projet de budget 2026 s'articule autour de cinq programmes majeurs, couvrant à la fois l'investissement et le fonctionnement institutionnel. Il vise à repositionner la CCI Bénin « comme une institution moderne et efficace ». « Les défis sont nombreux : compétitivité, financement, transformation industrielle, intégration régionale et continentale. Nous devons être audacieux et proposer des solutions concrètes pour nos entreprises », a exhorté Arnauld Akakpo.
Au nom de la ministre Shadiya Alimatou Assouman, son représentant, Is Deen Bouraïma, a insisté sur l'importance du vote. « Cette session n'est pas une simple formalité. Elle constitue un acte fort de gouvernance consulaire qui engage la trajectoire de votre mandature », a-t-il déclaré.
Le représentant du gouvernement a salué « la cohérence entre le budget 2026 et le plan stratégique 2025-2030 », soulignant qu'il s'inscrit dans les priorités nationales de transformation structurelle, de promotion de l'investissement privé et de développement industriel. Il a invité les élus consulaires à « aborder le budget avec lucidité, rigueur et ambition ».
Les travaux de la 2ème session ordinaire de l'Assemblée Consulaire se sont déroulés avec la participation de la ministre de l'industrie et du commerce. Shadiya Alimatou Assouman a fait des amendements au cours de la session. Le projet de budget 2026 a été voté avec l'intégration de ces amendements par 63 élus présents sur 69.
Ce budget s'inscrit dans la poursuite de l'optimisation des recettes et du renforcement opérationnel des missions de la CCI Bénin. Il est équilibré en emplois et ressources, avec un montant d'un peu plus de 6 milliards de FCFA.
M. M.
Du 10 au 15 novembre, le Salon des Industries Musicales d'Afrique Francophone (SIMA) tiendra sa deuxième édition à Cotonou sous le thème « Du potentiel aux preuves : faire rayonner et financer les musiques d'Afrique francophone », rassemblant près de 7 000 participants – artistes, producteurs, managers, labels, bailleurs, médias et mélomanes – contre 5 000 lors de la première édition à Abidjan.
Créé en 2022 par des experts du secteur, le SIMA se veut à la fois un miroir de l'écosystème musical francophone et une plateforme d'affaires où les professionnels peuvent rencontrer partenaires, valoriser leurs offres et approfondir leurs connaissances des logiques commerciales locales et internationales, afin de transformer le potentiel créatif en projets concrets et financés.
Le Bénin a été choisi comme hôte car, depuis 2016, le pays mise sur le tourisme et le segment MICE (Meetings, Incentives, Conferences, Exhibitions) pour positionner Cotonou comme destination d'événements professionnels, ce qui promet des retombées immédiates pour l'hôtellerie, la restauration et les services logistiques tout en ouvrant aux acteurs locaux un réseau international d'investisseurs.
Le soutien du Ministère du Tourisme, de la Culture et des Arts, via l'Agence Bénin Tourisme, assure un cadre organisationnel solide et renforce le soft‑power culturel du pays, un atout stratégique dans une région où les industries créatives favorisent l'intégration.
Le Global Music Report 2025 indique que les revenus musicaux en Afrique subsaharienne ont dépassé les 100 millions de dollars, avec une croissance de 22,6 %, et le SIMA se positionne comme catalyseur capable de mobiliser ces ressources pour une industrie encore sous‑capitalisée.
Vers une professionnalisation durable de la musique
Le programme 2025 s'articule autour d'une résidence artistique les 10‑12 novembre, d'un salon professionnel les 13‑14 et d'un grand concert de clôture le 15, afin de croiser réflexion et création autour du financement, de la propriété intellectuelle, de la data, du marché du live et des modèles d'exportation.
Le programme BOOST, lancé lors de la première édition, propose master‑classes, réseautage intensif et stages pour artistes, managers, producteurs et promoteurs, répondant aux défis d'accès aux ressources et de structuration du secteur tout en favorisant la diversité de genre.
Le salon professionnel offre un espace de rencontres entre labels, bailleurs de fonds, startups et institutions publiques, facilitant la mise en place de modèles de financement durables et d'outils de protection des droits indispensables à la monétisation internationale.
En rassemblant plus de 7 000 acteurs sur six jours, le SIMA crée un écosystème d'échanges où chaque interaction peut déboucher sur des projets concrets, du financement de tournées à la création de catalogues numériques et à la mise en place de réseaux de distribution régionaux.
À moyen terme, le SIMA 2025 pourrait devenir un catalyseur de professionnalisation permanente, en consolidant les liens entre les industries culturelles africaines et les marchés mondiaux. Si les partenaires institutionnels maintiennent leur engagement et que les programmes comme BOOST s'étendent à d'autres pays francophones, l'industrie musicale d'Afrique francophone pourrait enfin disposer d'une infrastructure de soutien capable de convertir son riche capital humain en une dynamique économique durable.
Omar Sylla
X : @Le_Ndar_Ndar
Die im DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) für 12 Wochenstunden.
Die am DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) ist eine der größten und am längsten laufenden multidisziplinären Panelstudien weltweit, für die derzeit jährlich etwa 30.000 Menschen in knapp 15.000 Haushalten befragt werden. Das SOEP hat den Anspruch den gesellschaftlichen Wandel zu erfassen und steht immer neuen vielfältigen Themen- und Aufgabenfeldern gegenüber.
Ihre Aufgabe ist die Mitwirkung bei der Fragebogentestung, Datenaufbereitung und -prüfung sowie Berichtslegung und wissenschaftliche Recherche. Dabei lernen Sie das reichhaltige Angebot der SOEP-Daten in seiner ganzen Breite kennen und gewinnen Einblicke in die Arbeit mit empirischen Daten.
Amidst different global food insecurity challenges, like the COVID-19 pandemic and economic turmoil, this article investigates the potential of machine learning (ML) to enhance food insecurity forecasting. So far, only few existing studies have used pre-shock training data to predict food insecurity and if they did, they have neither done this at the household-level nor systematically tested the performance and robustness of ML algorithms during the shock phase. To address this research gap, we use pre-COVID trained models to predict household-level food insecurity during the COVID-19 pandemic in Uganda and propose a new approach to evaluate the performance and robustness of ML models. The objective of this study is therefore to find high-performance and robust ML algorithms during a shock period, which is both methodologically innovative and practically relevant for food insecurity research. First, we find that ML can work well in a shock context when only pre-shock food security data are available. We can identify 80% of food-insecure households during the COVID-19 pandemic based on pre-shock trained models at the cost of falsely classifying around 40% of food-secure households as food insecure. Second, we show that the extreme gradient boosting algorithm, trained by balanced weighting, works best in terms of prediction quality. We also identify the most important predictors and find that demographic and asset features play a crucial role in predicting food insecurity. Last but not least, we also make a contribution by showing how different ML models should be evaluated in terms of their area under curve (AUC) value, the ability of the model to correctly classify positive and negative cases, and in terms of the change in AUC in different situations.
Amidst different global food insecurity challenges, like the COVID-19 pandemic and economic turmoil, this article investigates the potential of machine learning (ML) to enhance food insecurity forecasting. So far, only few existing studies have used pre-shock training data to predict food insecurity and if they did, they have neither done this at the household-level nor systematically tested the performance and robustness of ML algorithms during the shock phase. To address this research gap, we use pre-COVID trained models to predict household-level food insecurity during the COVID-19 pandemic in Uganda and propose a new approach to evaluate the performance and robustness of ML models. The objective of this study is therefore to find high-performance and robust ML algorithms during a shock period, which is both methodologically innovative and practically relevant for food insecurity research. First, we find that ML can work well in a shock context when only pre-shock food security data are available. We can identify 80% of food-insecure households during the COVID-19 pandemic based on pre-shock trained models at the cost of falsely classifying around 40% of food-secure households as food insecure. Second, we show that the extreme gradient boosting algorithm, trained by balanced weighting, works best in terms of prediction quality. We also identify the most important predictors and find that demographic and asset features play a crucial role in predicting food insecurity. Last but not least, we also make a contribution by showing how different ML models should be evaluated in terms of their area under curve (AUC) value, the ability of the model to correctly classify positive and negative cases, and in terms of the change in AUC in different situations.
Amidst different global food insecurity challenges, like the COVID-19 pandemic and economic turmoil, this article investigates the potential of machine learning (ML) to enhance food insecurity forecasting. So far, only few existing studies have used pre-shock training data to predict food insecurity and if they did, they have neither done this at the household-level nor systematically tested the performance and robustness of ML algorithms during the shock phase. To address this research gap, we use pre-COVID trained models to predict household-level food insecurity during the COVID-19 pandemic in Uganda and propose a new approach to evaluate the performance and robustness of ML models. The objective of this study is therefore to find high-performance and robust ML algorithms during a shock period, which is both methodologically innovative and practically relevant for food insecurity research. First, we find that ML can work well in a shock context when only pre-shock food security data are available. We can identify 80% of food-insecure households during the COVID-19 pandemic based on pre-shock trained models at the cost of falsely classifying around 40% of food-secure households as food insecure. Second, we show that the extreme gradient boosting algorithm, trained by balanced weighting, works best in terms of prediction quality. We also identify the most important predictors and find that demographic and asset features play a crucial role in predicting food insecurity. Last but not least, we also make a contribution by showing how different ML models should be evaluated in terms of their area under curve (AUC) value, the ability of the model to correctly classify positive and negative cases, and in terms of the change in AUC in different situations.
Emmanuella Doussis, Professor, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens; Head of the Climate and Sustainability Programme and Senior Policy Advisor, ELIAMEP
Guterres’ recent report and speech to the General Assembly present clean energy as a reality, and one which must not and cannot be held back. It is already creating growth, jobs and energy security, and billions of dollars are being channelled into the green transition. Renewable energy sources are now more cost-effective than fossil fuels, and new renewable energy capacity is outstripping conventional fuels on every continent. However, progress is not fast enough and, still more crucially, not fair enough. Africa and developing countries receive only a small share of the global funding, while fossil fuel subsidies continue.
The General Assembly can serve as a key forum for cooperation, even amidst geopolitical antagonisms, as environmental and climate issues are, and must increasingly be, perceived as peace and security issues. Multilateral alliances (G77, LDCs, AOSIS), as well as regional blocs like the EU, often play an active role in helping build majorities, making concerted demands, and putting pressure on major powers that often act unilaterally (e.g. China, the US, Russia), as well as on other polluting states. The General Assembly’s unanimous decision to consult the International Court of Justice on states’ obligations with regard to climate change has recently led to a landmark opinion relating to the international law governing the response to the phenomenon. Although non-binding, the opinion could shape practice and open the way for appeals, in particular from the countries most affected by climate change. So, while the General Assembly does not produce legally-binding texts directly, its actions can produce important results indirectly. Which is to say the General Assembly can keep the debate around the green transition in the spotlight and act as a catalyst for multilateral cooperation, especially in areas where convergences and potential partnerships (should) transcend geopolitical divisions.
Maria Gavouneli, Professor, National & Kapodistrian University of Athens; Member of the Board, ELIAMEP
There is a short answer: none at all! The General Assembly has always been a forum for big words and little action. Over the decades, we have had a series of declarations and statements that rarely translate into binding obligations for UN member states, and then only after their content has been transposed in treaties or monitoring and accountability mechanisms as a result of difficult and often lengthy negotiations. Lately, even texts that formerly would have been adopted by consensus have been subject to complicated and lengthy voting processes.
The longer answer is, of course, different and more involved. It is on the sidelines of the General Assembly, in the UN’s corridors of power, that the big issues are discussed and often decided. While world leaders read their prepared monologues in turn, it is the organized meetings in smaller chambers—and ad hoc huddles—that can make the difference. This is especially true in times like the present, when simply setting-up a session is problematic, even before one considers the agenda and items ranging from the Middle East ceasefire and the peace plan in Ukraine to energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean and the resolution of bilateral disputes between Greece and Turkey. Truth be told, this has always been where the General Assembly, and the UN in general, has made its most important contributions.
Mihalis Kritikos, Adjunct Professor, School of Governance, University of Brussels; Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP
The UN is back: the example of artificial intelligence
Amidst a frantic and ever-escalating geopolitical rivalry in the sphere of technology, artificial intelligence is redefining the dynamics of global power while its governance has become the subject of hundreds of separate initiatives. Given this somewhat fragmented landscape, the recent decision by the UN General Assembly to create two new mechanisms to promote international cooperation in AI governance—the UN Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and the Global Dialogue on AI Governance—is especially important. There are three reasons for this:
First, because the UN is setting out to create a global platform for dialogue that will give developing countries an equal voice in shaping the future of AI, while aligning the discourse with the ambitions of the Global South. Second, because the resolution seeks to put in place a framework based on a human-centred approach to AI that promotes the transparency and social utility of the technology. And third, because it sends a powerful signal to the world that the UN remains capable of achieving convergence and laying the foundations for a common framework to address the challenges of a rapidly evolving technological landscape.
If the scientific independence of the committee and the multilateralism of the global dialogue are safeguarded, then the future global governance of this influential technology will be in safe hands.
Panayotis Tsakonas, Professor, National & Kapodistrian University of Athens; Head, Foreign Policy & Security Programme, ELIAMEP
The retreat of multilateralism, the systematic erosion and/or removal of international norms/rules, and the ascendancy of the logic of power in inter-state relations that followed Trump’s election and have largely been imposed by the United States is expected to detract markedly from the Great Powers’ ability to cooperate in a meaningful and effective way at the upcoming 85th General Assembly of the United Nations. There, the United States (the strongest but least legitimate part of a divided—if not fragmented—West), an ever-stronger China, which is already working towards building an enlarged anti-Western coalition, the dynamically “anti-Western” Russia, and India, the most populous nation in the world, are expected to reaffirm their positions and roles in the new and continually evolving “post-Western” world.
In this world, however, several “non-aligned” countries will, for reasons of pragmatism and self-interest, may choose not to place themselves under the “protection” or control of the US, China or Russia. These non-aligned nations, which include most of the almost forty that did not condemn Russia’s invasion at the UN General Assembly in March 2022 and February 2023, not only do not form a distinct bloc (a “Global South”), they are often in conflict with one another.
The scope for cooperation between the Great Powers within the framework of the UN General Assembly will therefore be curtailed, with the few areas of potential cooperation limited to “global goods” such as the climate, health and/or development, and global security problems such as international terrorism, organized crime, unregulated AI development, and the uncontrolled militarization of space. The Great Powers may find themselves cooperating on these issues, either because they recognize the cost of non-cooperation, or because their interests largely converge. Moreover, the prospect of China, Russia, India, and a number of other medium- and small-sized states forging alliances in one or more of these domains cannot be discounted. Formed under an “anti-Western banner” at the forthcoming UN General Assembly, they may seek to create and promote new international principles and norms.
Dimitris Tsarouhas, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University; Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP
To mark the UN’s annual assembly, the organization released a shocking report that accurately describes the state of the international community 80 years on from its founding. In 2024, military spending soared to 2.7 trillion dollars, an amount more than 13 times higher (!) than the official development aid provided by wealthy nations, and 750 times the UN’s regular budget.
Many member states are either actively engaged in, or preparing for, military conflict. The window for saving the UN mission is closing, even though its good offices are needed now more than at any other time since the end of the Cold War.
African states and regional organizations have increasingly turned to new forms of African-led security arrangements that differ in mandate, composition, and structure from African Union (AU)–led peace support operations. These ad hoc security initiatives (ASIs) and enterprise security arrangements (ESAs) have provided flexible and rapid responses to complex security threats. However, they are heavily militarized and poorly aligned with evolving frameworks for the protection of civilians (POC).
This issue brief examines how ASIs and ESAs, while offering speed and adaptability, often lack civilian components, rely on external support, and do not consistently draw on a coherent normative framework for POC. As a result, protection frequently becomes secondary to counterinsurgency objectives, creating logistical weaknesses, alienating local populations, and reinforcing perceptions that protection is transactional or secondary to other interests. The brief highlights emerging practices—such as Rwanda’s deployment in Mozambique and the Multinational Joint Task Force’s Civil-Military Cooperation Cell—that suggest the potential for more protection-conscious approaches, though these remain uneven and underdeveloped.
The brief concludes that ASIs and ESAs are likely to remain features of Africa’s security landscape, but their effectiveness will remain limited unless they systematically integrate AU and UN POC frameworks. Stronger pre-deployment planning, the inclusion of AU civilian cells in the field, and alignment with broader political strategies are essential to ensure that these mechanisms contribute not only to counterinsurgency but also to the protection of civilians.
The post The Role of Ad Hoc Security Initiatives and Enterprise Security Arrangements in the Protection of Civilians in Africa appeared first on International Peace Institute.
With UN peacekeepers increasingly deployed in areas experiencing local-level conflicts that do not involve state forces, responding to communal violence has become an acute challenge for missions. Such contexts require peace operations to adopt a dialogue-based approach to the protection of civilians (POC), focused specifically on local political solutions.
This issue brief examines the engagement of the UN mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in the town of Batangafo, where communal violence between Christian and Muslim communities has been pervasive. It highlights how MINUSCA’s dialogue-based engagement helped reduce violence and strengthen local peace agreements. It identifies four lessons:
The post Political Solutions to Political Problems: UN Peacekeeping Operations and Dialogue-Based Protection of Civilians in Communal Conflicts appeared first on International Peace Institute.
UN peacekeeping missions are often criticized for failing to act when civilians are under threat. Yet recent empirical evidence suggests that peacekeepers can and do respond to violence by adjusting where and how they deploy forces in the field. This issue brief examines patterns of subnational deployment across African missions from 2012 to 2022, focusing on whether and how missions with protection of civilians (POC) mandates adjust their military presence in response to attacks on civilians. The findings indicate that peacekeeping missions are more likely to strengthen their presence in areas experiencing recent violence—especially violence perpetrated by non-state armed groups—but also respond to state-led violence, albeit less consistently. This responsiveness highlights the operational flexibility some missions can exercise and challenges the assumption that host-state consent fully constrains the implementation of POC mandates. The brief also underscores the need to assess peacekeepers’ behavior not only in terms of mandate design but also in terms of how missions adapt on the ground.
The brief concludes with important considerations for peacekeeping stakeholders committed to POC:
The post Being Present Where It Counts: Peacekeeping Responsiveness to Violence against Civilians appeared first on International Peace Institute.
This paper applies the concepts and theories of “policy norms” to the disruptive effects of the second Trump administration on global development cooperation. We argue that recent US actions represent more than a domestic political shift. They signal a tipping point to longstanding norms of the development cooperation system and specifically multilateralism as well as notions of global solidarity. This paper’s objective is to explain how, why and through which political and institutional mechanisms policy norms break down or are reconstituted in global development cooperation. It uses the current moment as a case study of “norm antipreneurship”, potentially even “norm imperialism” illustrating the political and institutional strategies through which policy norms are currently been contested, dismantled or displaced. This paper addresses a set of questions: (i) What are the core mechanisms through which development cooperation norms are formed, contested and fragmented? (ii) How is the second Trump administration seeking to reshape normative regimes in development cooperation? (iii) What research agenda is needed to understand norm change in a multipolar and contested development cooperation landscape?
Andy Sumner is Professor of International Development at King’s College in London and President of the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.
This paper applies the concepts and theories of “policy norms” to the disruptive effects of the second Trump administration on global development cooperation. We argue that recent US actions represent more than a domestic political shift. They signal a tipping point to longstanding norms of the development cooperation system and specifically multilateralism as well as notions of global solidarity. This paper’s objective is to explain how, why and through which political and institutional mechanisms policy norms break down or are reconstituted in global development cooperation. It uses the current moment as a case study of “norm antipreneurship”, potentially even “norm imperialism” illustrating the political and institutional strategies through which policy norms are currently been contested, dismantled or displaced. This paper addresses a set of questions: (i) What are the core mechanisms through which development cooperation norms are formed, contested and fragmented? (ii) How is the second Trump administration seeking to reshape normative regimes in development cooperation? (iii) What research agenda is needed to understand norm change in a multipolar and contested development cooperation landscape?
Andy Sumner is Professor of International Development at King’s College in London and President of the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.
This paper applies the concepts and theories of “policy norms” to the disruptive effects of the second Trump administration on global development cooperation. We argue that recent US actions represent more than a domestic political shift. They signal a tipping point to longstanding norms of the development cooperation system and specifically multilateralism as well as notions of global solidarity. This paper’s objective is to explain how, why and through which political and institutional mechanisms policy norms break down or are reconstituted in global development cooperation. It uses the current moment as a case study of “norm antipreneurship”, potentially even “norm imperialism” illustrating the political and institutional strategies through which policy norms are currently been contested, dismantled or displaced. This paper addresses a set of questions: (i) What are the core mechanisms through which development cooperation norms are formed, contested and fragmented? (ii) How is the second Trump administration seeking to reshape normative regimes in development cooperation? (iii) What research agenda is needed to understand norm change in a multipolar and contested development cooperation landscape?
Andy Sumner is Professor of International Development at King’s College in London and President of the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.
Are climate treaties, like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or the Paris Agreement, the only way forward for intergovernmental climate cooperation? By now, there are hundreds of multilateral treaties governing a wide range of environmental issues, including energy, freshwater, oceans, air pollution, biodiversity conservation, hazardous waste, agriculture and fisheries. This policy brief examines whether the 379 multilateral environmental treaties that do not primarily address climate change can nevertheless contribute to advancing climate commitments.
We find that decisions adopted under environmental treaties have increasingly mainstreamed climate considerations since 1990. Today, climate-related decisions account for around 10% of regulatory decisions adopted under environmental treaties across different issue areas. Some treaty regimes are particularly active in addressing climate change, such as those focused on energy, freshwater and habitats, with up to 60% of their decisions addressing climate change. In contrast, treaties regulating agriculture and fisheries demonstrate a notably lower level of engagement in climate mainstreaming.
These findings demonstrate that environmental treaties that do not specifically focus on climate change can still contribute to shaping climate governance, albeit to varying degrees. This policy brief concludes with a set of recommendations for researchers, treaty negotiators, secretariats, governments and climate activists seeking to advance intergovernmental cooperation on climate change through means other than climate treaties.
Key policy messages:
Non-climate-focused treaties can serve as a means for developing climate mitigation and adaptation commitments, notably through decisions adopted by their respective bodies. Yet, there is room for increased climate mainstreaming in those decisions. Various actors can contribute to such mainstreaming:
• Researchers could further investigate why some conferences of the parties (COPs) are more receptive to climate concerns than others and what potential trade-offs are associated with climate mainstreaming in environmental treaties.
• Treaty negotiators can favour cross-cutting mandates that enhance policy coherence across interconnected environmental challenges, enabling a more integrated approach to environmental decision-making. They can also design dynamic collective bodies, able to adopt decisions swiftly when new issues or information arise.
• Governments can appoint climate experts in non-climate COPs and advisory committees and report climate-related aspects of their implementation of non-climate treaties.
• Treaty secretariats can coordinate joint initiatives and promote knowledge exchange across climate and other environmental regimes.
• Climate activists can intensify their engagement with non-climate COPs by participating in consultations, submitting position papers, and collaborating with sympathetic delegates to amplify the climate relevance of treaty decisions.
Annabelle Olivier is a PhD student in Political Science at the University of British Columbia.
Jean-Frédéric Morin is Full Professor at the Political Science Department of Université Laval, Canada
Are climate treaties, like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or the Paris Agreement, the only way forward for intergovernmental climate cooperation? By now, there are hundreds of multilateral treaties governing a wide range of environmental issues, including energy, freshwater, oceans, air pollution, biodiversity conservation, hazardous waste, agriculture and fisheries. This policy brief examines whether the 379 multilateral environmental treaties that do not primarily address climate change can nevertheless contribute to advancing climate commitments.
We find that decisions adopted under environmental treaties have increasingly mainstreamed climate considerations since 1990. Today, climate-related decisions account for around 10% of regulatory decisions adopted under environmental treaties across different issue areas. Some treaty regimes are particularly active in addressing climate change, such as those focused on energy, freshwater and habitats, with up to 60% of their decisions addressing climate change. In contrast, treaties regulating agriculture and fisheries demonstrate a notably lower level of engagement in climate mainstreaming.
These findings demonstrate that environmental treaties that do not specifically focus on climate change can still contribute to shaping climate governance, albeit to varying degrees. This policy brief concludes with a set of recommendations for researchers, treaty negotiators, secretariats, governments and climate activists seeking to advance intergovernmental cooperation on climate change through means other than climate treaties.
Key policy messages:
Non-climate-focused treaties can serve as a means for developing climate mitigation and adaptation commitments, notably through decisions adopted by their respective bodies. Yet, there is room for increased climate mainstreaming in those decisions. Various actors can contribute to such mainstreaming:
• Researchers could further investigate why some conferences of the parties (COPs) are more receptive to climate concerns than others and what potential trade-offs are associated with climate mainstreaming in environmental treaties.
• Treaty negotiators can favour cross-cutting mandates that enhance policy coherence across interconnected environmental challenges, enabling a more integrated approach to environmental decision-making. They can also design dynamic collective bodies, able to adopt decisions swiftly when new issues or information arise.
• Governments can appoint climate experts in non-climate COPs and advisory committees and report climate-related aspects of their implementation of non-climate treaties.
• Treaty secretariats can coordinate joint initiatives and promote knowledge exchange across climate and other environmental regimes.
• Climate activists can intensify their engagement with non-climate COPs by participating in consultations, submitting position papers, and collaborating with sympathetic delegates to amplify the climate relevance of treaty decisions.
Annabelle Olivier is a PhD student in Political Science at the University of British Columbia.
Jean-Frédéric Morin is Full Professor at the Political Science Department of Université Laval, Canada
Are climate treaties, like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or the Paris Agreement, the only way forward for intergovernmental climate cooperation? By now, there are hundreds of multilateral treaties governing a wide range of environmental issues, including energy, freshwater, oceans, air pollution, biodiversity conservation, hazardous waste, agriculture and fisheries. This policy brief examines whether the 379 multilateral environmental treaties that do not primarily address climate change can nevertheless contribute to advancing climate commitments.
We find that decisions adopted under environmental treaties have increasingly mainstreamed climate considerations since 1990. Today, climate-related decisions account for around 10% of regulatory decisions adopted under environmental treaties across different issue areas. Some treaty regimes are particularly active in addressing climate change, such as those focused on energy, freshwater and habitats, with up to 60% of their decisions addressing climate change. In contrast, treaties regulating agriculture and fisheries demonstrate a notably lower level of engagement in climate mainstreaming.
These findings demonstrate that environmental treaties that do not specifically focus on climate change can still contribute to shaping climate governance, albeit to varying degrees. This policy brief concludes with a set of recommendations for researchers, treaty negotiators, secretariats, governments and climate activists seeking to advance intergovernmental cooperation on climate change through means other than climate treaties.
Key policy messages:
Non-climate-focused treaties can serve as a means for developing climate mitigation and adaptation commitments, notably through decisions adopted by their respective bodies. Yet, there is room for increased climate mainstreaming in those decisions. Various actors can contribute to such mainstreaming:
• Researchers could further investigate why some conferences of the parties (COPs) are more receptive to climate concerns than others and what potential trade-offs are associated with climate mainstreaming in environmental treaties.
• Treaty negotiators can favour cross-cutting mandates that enhance policy coherence across interconnected environmental challenges, enabling a more integrated approach to environmental decision-making. They can also design dynamic collective bodies, able to adopt decisions swiftly when new issues or information arise.
• Governments can appoint climate experts in non-climate COPs and advisory committees and report climate-related aspects of their implementation of non-climate treaties.
• Treaty secretariats can coordinate joint initiatives and promote knowledge exchange across climate and other environmental regimes.
• Climate activists can intensify their engagement with non-climate COPs by participating in consultations, submitting position papers, and collaborating with sympathetic delegates to amplify the climate relevance of treaty decisions.
Annabelle Olivier is a PhD student in Political Science at the University of British Columbia.
Jean-Frédéric Morin is Full Professor at the Political Science Department of Université Laval, Canada
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On September 16th, IPI in partnership with the Asia Society, hosted a reception to open the exhibit of the global WISH TREE project by Yoko Ono.
Since 1996, Yoko Ono has invited people from around the world to write their personal wishes and tie them to a tree branch as WISH TREE.
WISH TREE is an interactive art installation by the artist Yoko Ono where participants write wishes for peace on tags and tie them to a tree’s branches. These wishes become a visual testament to collective hope and continue on in connection with Ono’s IMAGINE PEACE TOWER in Reykjavík, Iceland.
The project invites people to reflect on peace and unity, transforming the tree into a symbol of global aspiration.
Welcoming Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute (IPI)
Debra Eisenman, Executive Vice President & COO, of The Asia Society; Founding Director & Senior Fellow, Asia Society Policy Institute
Opening Remarks:
Katia Mead, Representative of IPI’s Art for Peace Committee; and Director of the US Nominating Committee, Praemium Imperiale
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