Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.
This paper examines the renegotiation of social contracts, using the example of Colombia’s phase-out process for fossil fuel subsidies that provides empirical evidence for broad reforms of state–society agreements. While calls for new social contracts increasingly highlight the need to integrate ecological sustainability and address systemic inequalities, few studies explore how such transitions unfold in practice. Drawing on interviews with 43 experts from government, academia, civil society, and the private sector, the paper analyses Colombia’s efforts to remove gasoline and diesel subsidies under President Petro’s reform agenda. The findings reveal four central obstacles: the political cost of reform, structural dependencies in the transport sector, limited state capacity, and the absence of long-term policy continuity. We find that creating a new social contract requires broad support by a range of stakeholders and a clear vision for the new agreement, which is supported across ideological camps. The Colombian government offered an incoherentversion of a green growth social contract, which relied on reforming the existing structures with novel technologies. In contrast to government participants, the interviewees from society, academia and the private sector in Colombia seem to dismiss the plans of the government as unrealistic, as they do not address the deep-rooted challenges within the transport sector and lacks a clear pathway. The Colombian reform process highlights the contested nature of renegotiating social contracts, illustrating the challenges of aligning societal expectations with government visions.
This paper examines the renegotiation of social contracts, using the example of Colombia’s phase-out process for fossil fuel subsidies that provides empirical evidence for broad reforms of state–society agreements. While calls for new social contracts increasingly highlight the need to integrate ecological sustainability and address systemic inequalities, few studies explore how such transitions unfold in practice. Drawing on interviews with 43 experts from government, academia, civil society, and the private sector, the paper analyses Colombia’s efforts to remove gasoline and diesel subsidies under President Petro’s reform agenda. The findings reveal four central obstacles: the political cost of reform, structural dependencies in the transport sector, limited state capacity, and the absence of long-term policy continuity. We find that creating a new social contract requires broad support by a range of stakeholders and a clear vision for the new agreement, which is supported across ideological camps. The Colombian government offered an incoherentversion of a green growth social contract, which relied on reforming the existing structures with novel technologies. In contrast to government participants, the interviewees from society, academia and the private sector in Colombia seem to dismiss the plans of the government as unrealistic, as they do not address the deep-rooted challenges within the transport sector and lacks a clear pathway. The Colombian reform process highlights the contested nature of renegotiating social contracts, illustrating the challenges of aligning societal expectations with government visions.