This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.
Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.
Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.
Fossil fuel subsidies are widespread, regressive, and environmentally costly, yet abrupt removal can raise poverty. To identify a practical reform pathway, we evaluate the effectiveness of compensatory policies grounded in existing national social protection systems. We develop a high-resolution global social accounting matrix to quantify how reallocating subsidies through actual social assistance impacts poverty, inequality, and CO2 emissions. Without compensation, reform lowers emissions but increases poverty, especially for low-income households in emerging economies. Redirecting funds via social assistance disproportionately benefits the bottom half and reduces national poverty, particularly under targeted cash transfers or expanded programs where savings are large. However, full revenue recycling is not always desirable: Once vulnerable households are adequately protected, additional recycling can weaken both fiscal and climate gains. We therefore treat full recycling through social assistance as an analytical benchmark rather than a policy prescription and show that partial, targeted recycling, as illustrated by retaining roughly 20% of savings while channeling the remainder through social protection, can still reduce poverty while preserving emissions cuts. Overall, fossil fuel subsidy reform is most effective when social assistance is used to compensate low-income households, not to absorb all fiscal savings, leaving residual revenues available for other public priorities.
Fossil fuel subsidies are widespread, regressive, and environmentally costly, yet abrupt removal can raise poverty. To identify a practical reform pathway, we evaluate the effectiveness of compensatory policies grounded in existing national social protection systems. We develop a high-resolution global social accounting matrix to quantify how reallocating subsidies through actual social assistance impacts poverty, inequality, and CO2 emissions. Without compensation, reform lowers emissions but increases poverty, especially for low-income households in emerging economies. Redirecting funds via social assistance disproportionately benefits the bottom half and reduces national poverty, particularly under targeted cash transfers or expanded programs where savings are large. However, full revenue recycling is not always desirable: Once vulnerable households are adequately protected, additional recycling can weaken both fiscal and climate gains. We therefore treat full recycling through social assistance as an analytical benchmark rather than a policy prescription and show that partial, targeted recycling, as illustrated by retaining roughly 20% of savings while channeling the remainder through social protection, can still reduce poverty while preserving emissions cuts. Overall, fossil fuel subsidy reform is most effective when social assistance is used to compensate low-income households, not to absorb all fiscal savings, leaving residual revenues available for other public priorities.
This paper draws on the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behaviour Survey of 2,383 manufacturing firms to provide the first systematic, firm-level evidence on how Egypt’s industrial policy institutions are experienced by manufacturing firms. Using firms’ own perceptions of institutional obstacles, the analysis distinguishes between ministries (“institutions”) and subordinate ministerial and corporatist bodies (“entities”), and classifies these entities into capability-building bodies, regulatory gatekeepers, and quasi-public corporatist bodies. This framework allows the identification of systematic differences in firms’ perceptions across types of institutions and entities, as well as across firm types. It also enables the mapping of mandate overlaps among the entities most frequently identified as problematic. Three results emerge. First, firms report entities as substantially more problematic than ministries. Second, reported institutional burdens are unevenly distributed. In particular, regulatory gatekeepers that control licensing, standards, inspections and continued market access are associated with disproportionately higher reported burdens on structurally more vulnerable firms. Reported frictions are systematically higher for domestically oriented non-exporters, small and medium enterprises, firms located outside industrial zones, privately owned firms and especially informal firms. Third, these patterns are consistent with coordination failures arising from overlapping mandates and weak accountability within specialised agencies. The findings suggest several reform priorities centred on predictable and published requirements, a single coordinated front end for firms, end-to-end case handling, outcome-based monitoring and disclosure, and scaling only those programmes with rigorously demonstrated impact.
This paper draws on the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behaviour Survey of 2,383 manufacturing firms to provide the first systematic, firm-level evidence on how Egypt’s industrial policy institutions are experienced by manufacturing firms. Using firms’ own perceptions of institutional obstacles, the analysis distinguishes between ministries (“institutions”) and subordinate ministerial and corporatist bodies (“entities”), and classifies these entities into capability-building bodies, regulatory gatekeepers, and quasi-public corporatist bodies. This framework allows the identification of systematic differences in firms’ perceptions across types of institutions and entities, as well as across firm types. It also enables the mapping of mandate overlaps among the entities most frequently identified as problematic. Three results emerge. First, firms report entities as substantially more problematic than ministries. Second, reported institutional burdens are unevenly distributed. In particular, regulatory gatekeepers that control licensing, standards, inspections and continued market access are associated with disproportionately higher reported burdens on structurally more vulnerable firms. Reported frictions are systematically higher for domestically oriented non-exporters, small and medium enterprises, firms located outside industrial zones, privately owned firms and especially informal firms. Third, these patterns are consistent with coordination failures arising from overlapping mandates and weak accountability within specialised agencies. The findings suggest several reform priorities centred on predictable and published requirements, a single coordinated front end for firms, end-to-end case handling, outcome-based monitoring and disclosure, and scaling only those programmes with rigorously demonstrated impact.
Nach den Landtagswahlen in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern und Berlin kommentiert Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), die Wahlergebnisse wie folgt:
Dieser Wahltag war ein weiterer schlechter Tag für unsere Demokratie. Die AfD hat in beiden Bundesländern stark zugelegt. Da in beiden Ländern nun Dreierkoalitionen zur Regierungsbildung nötig sein werden, dürfte die Umsetzung dringend notwendiger Reformprogramme noch schwieriger werden.
Diese Wahlergebnisse sind ein weiteres Misstrauensvotum für die Bundesregierung. Für die Bundesregierung wird es nun noch schwieriger werden, den Mut und die politische Unterstützung für ein grundlegendes Reformprogramm zu mobilisieren. Wenn CDU, CSU und SPD weiterhin an ihren roten Linien festhalten, wird sich die politische Lähmung verfestigen, die wirtschaftliche Schwäche fortsetzen und die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Wahlsiegs der AfD 2029 weiter steigen.
Das Versprechen eines Tankrabatts zwei Tage vor der Wahl hat wohl weder der CDU noch der SPD entscheidend geholfen. Die falsche Lehre für die Bundesregierung wäre nun der Versuch, die Bürgerinnen und Bürger mit Wahlgeschenken wie dem Tankrabatt ruhigzustellen. Die Energiekrise wird sich mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit verschärfen. Die Bundesregierung braucht jetzt einen überzeugenden Plan, wie sie Menschen und Unternehmen sozial und wirtschaftlich ausgewogen entlastet. Dafür wird sie das Steuersystem reformieren und Subventionen abbauen müssen. Genauso wichtig sind Strukturreformen, die Deutschland wirtschaftlich voranbringen und die Sorgen der Menschen nachhaltig beantworten.
Deutschland hat noch immer alle Karten in der Hand, um seine eigene Zukunft zu bestimmen. Dafür braucht es jetzt jedoch einen Pakt zwischen Politik und Wirtschaft: mutige Reformen umzusetzen und auch seitens der Wirtschaft mehr Verantwortung zu übernehmen. Stetes Klagen über die Politik wird nicht ausreichen, um Deutschland zukunftsfähig zu machen.
In a world undergoing tumultuous transition, sustainable futures are at stake. Disruptive policy-making is on the rise, taking the form of new waves of authoritarian nationalism and the systematic erosion of rules-based politics. Yet, reform initiatives are simultaneously taking shape. Rather than proclaiming the collapse of the multilateral order or focusing on disruptive trends, this volume highlights the institutions, actors and coalitions that are advancing and shaping reform to sustain and rebuild cooperation in a multipolar world. It builds on the premise that,
in this era of concurrent disruption and reform, Germany and Europe need to invest in politics of cooperation and perseverance. Drawing on research and policy engagement by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) and its partner networks, the publication identifies practical and political pathways for reform. These include opportunities for middle-power coalitions; new forms of plurilateral cooperation and institutional adaptation; reconfigured partnership and financing architectures; and new cultures of cooperation and political leadership. These pathways are explored across four thematic sections: geopolitics, partnerships and a new global order; multilateralism in a multipolar world; sustainable transformation architectures; and (social) innovation and transformative capabilities. The volume does not seek to resolve the tension between disruption and reform, but to equip its readers to understand where reform is already taking shape and the actors who may need to be persuaded or supported to take the lead. It thereby aims to offer the expertise and inspiration needed to turn disruptive change into reform dynamics that enable the pursuit of sustainable futures.
Table of Contents:
1) Geopolitics, Partnerships, and a New Global Order
Reforming the WTO in an Age of Power-Based Trade (Brandi, Clara)
2) Multilateralism in a Multipolar World
A bold post-UN80 reform agenda for the next UN Secretary-General (Novoselova Anna / Ronny Patz)
The Geopolitics of a Global Sustainability Framework Beyond 2030 (Leininger, Julia)
3) Sustainable Transformation Architectures
Global Health Beyond 2030: Protecting Ambition in a Fragmented World (von Haaren, Paula)
4) (Social) Innovation and Transformative Capabilities
AI’s Potential to Facilitate More Agile Development Cooperation (Sinanoglu, Semuhi / Michael Roll)
In a world undergoing tumultuous transition, sustainable futures are at stake. Disruptive policy-making is on the rise, taking the form of new waves of authoritarian nationalism and the systematic erosion of rules-based politics. Yet, reform initiatives are simultaneously taking shape. Rather than proclaiming the collapse of the multilateral order or focusing on disruptive trends, this volume highlights the institutions, actors and coalitions that are advancing and shaping reform to sustain and rebuild cooperation in a multipolar world. It builds on the premise that,
in this era of concurrent disruption and reform, Germany and Europe need to invest in politics of cooperation and perseverance. Drawing on research and policy engagement by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) and its partner networks, the publication identifies practical and political pathways for reform. These include opportunities for middle-power coalitions; new forms of plurilateral cooperation and institutional adaptation; reconfigured partnership and financing architectures; and new cultures of cooperation and political leadership. These pathways are explored across four thematic sections: geopolitics, partnerships and a new global order; multilateralism in a multipolar world; sustainable transformation architectures; and (social) innovation and transformative capabilities. The volume does not seek to resolve the tension between disruption and reform, but to equip its readers to understand where reform is already taking shape and the actors who may need to be persuaded or supported to take the lead. It thereby aims to offer the expertise and inspiration needed to turn disruptive change into reform dynamics that enable the pursuit of sustainable futures.
Table of Contents:
1) Geopolitics, Partnerships, and a New Global Order
Reforming the WTO in an Age of Power-Based Trade (Brandi, Clara)
2) Multilateralism in a Multipolar World
A bold post-UN80 reform agenda for the next UN Secretary-General (Novoselova Anna / Ronny Patz)
The Geopolitics of a Global Sustainability Framework Beyond 2030 (Leininger, Julia)
3) Sustainable Transformation Architectures
Global Health Beyond 2030: Protecting Ambition in a Fragmented World (von Haaren, Paula)
4) (Social) Innovation and Transformative Capabilities
AI’s Potential to Facilitate More Agile Development Cooperation (Sinanoglu, Semuhi / Michael Roll)
In a world undergoing tumultuous transition, sustainable futures are at stake. Disruptive policy-making is on the rise, taking the form of new waves of authoritarian nationalism and the systematic erosion of rules-based politics. Yet, reform initiatives are simultaneously taking shape. Rather than proclaiming the collapse of the multilateral order or focusing on disruptive trends, this volume highlights the institutions, actors and coalitions that are advancing and shaping reform to sustain and rebuild cooperation in a multipolar world. It builds on the premise that,
in this era of concurrent disruption and reform, Germany and Europe need to invest in politics of cooperation and perseverance. Drawing on research and policy engagement by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) and its partner networks, the publication identifies practical and political pathways for reform. These include opportunities for middle-power coalitions; new forms of plurilateral cooperation and institutional adaptation; reconfigured partnership and financing architectures; and new cultures of cooperation and political leadership. These pathways are explored across four thematic sections: geopolitics, partnerships and a new global order; multilateralism in a multipolar world; sustainable transformation architectures; and (social) innovation and transformative capabilities. The volume does not seek to resolve the tension between disruption and reform, but to equip its readers to understand where reform is already taking shape and the actors who may need to be persuaded or supported to take the lead. It thereby aims to offer the expertise and inspiration needed to turn disruptive change into reform dynamics that enable the pursuit of sustainable futures.
Table of Contents:
1) Geopolitics, Partnerships, and a New Global Order
Reforming the WTO in an Age of Power-Based Trade (Brandi, Clara)
2) Multilateralism in a Multipolar World
A bold post-UN80 reform agenda for the next UN Secretary-General (Novoselova Anna / Ronny Patz)
The Geopolitics of a Global Sustainability Framework Beyond 2030 (Leininger, Julia)
3) Sustainable Transformation Architectures
Global Health Beyond 2030: Protecting Ambition in a Fragmented World (von Haaren, Paula)
4) (Social) Innovation and Transformative Capabilities
AI’s Potential to Facilitate More Agile Development Cooperation (Sinanoglu, Semuhi / Michael Roll)
How do local elections affect societal peace after civil war? Existing research focuses on national elections or secession risks. This article examines municipal elections in post-war Mozambique and their impact on social cohesion (positive horizontal and vertical societal relations). Based on 33 semi-structured interviews conducted in Maputo and Nampula in 2019, the analysis finds limited but positive effects, mainly through improved state-society relations, more inclusive representation, and a greater sense of belonging. However, these gains are constrained by an autocratic context and centralised party structures. Against theoretical expectations, local elections neither enhanced inter-party cooperation nor intensified social divisions.
How do local elections affect societal peace after civil war? Existing research focuses on national elections or secession risks. This article examines municipal elections in post-war Mozambique and their impact on social cohesion (positive horizontal and vertical societal relations). Based on 33 semi-structured interviews conducted in Maputo and Nampula in 2019, the analysis finds limited but positive effects, mainly through improved state-society relations, more inclusive representation, and a greater sense of belonging. However, these gains are constrained by an autocratic context and centralised party structures. Against theoretical expectations, local elections neither enhanced inter-party cooperation nor intensified social divisions.
21. September 2026 – Die Bundesregierung will die hohen Kraftstoffpreise mit einem Tankrabatt und einem Preisdeckel abfedern. Der Tankrabatt kostet Bund und Länder rund 2,5 Milliarden Euro. Eine Auswertung der 1,6 Milliarden teuren Maßnahme vom Frühsommer zeigt, dass davon ein dreistelliger Millionenbetrag nicht bei den Verbraucher*innen ankam, sondern bei den Mineralölunternehmen blieb. Am stärksten profitiert zudem, wer am meisten verbraucht. Ein Preisdeckel belastet den Staatshaushalt zwar nicht, wird in der Praxis aber oft zum Zielpreis, an dem sich auch die günstigen Tankstellen nach oben orientieren. Und er bedeutet erheblichen bürokratischen Aufwand: Er muss laufend festgelegt, angepasst und kontrolliert werden. Wenn man entlasten will, wären direkte Zahlungen an einkommensschwache Haushalte und kleine Betriebe zielführender als Eingriffe in den Preis. Der Auszahlungsweg dafür steht seit Ende 2024 bereit und wurde bislang nicht genutzt.
Bonn, 21. September 2026. Indiens Entscheidung aus dem Jahr 2025, den Indus-Wasservertrag auszusetzen, beeinträchtigt Pakistans Wassersicherheit und die Sicherheitsbeziehungen zwischen Indien und Pakistan und könnte zudem zur Aushöhlung des Völkerrechts beitragen.
Im April 2025 setzte Indien den Indus-Wasservertrag (Indus Waters Treaty, IWT) nach einem tödlichen militanten Anschlag in Pahalgam im indisch verwalteten Kaschmir „außer Kraft“. Am 31. August 2026 entschied der Ständige Schiedshof in Den Haag einstimmig, dass Indiens Aussetzung oder Kündigung gemäß dem Vertrag und dem Völkerrecht unzulässig sei. Indien wies das Urteil jedoch umgehend zurück, bestritt die Zuständigkeit des Gerichts für seine hoheitlichen Entscheidungen und erklärte, dass es die Außerkraftsetzung des IWT aufrechterhalten werde. Dies könnte nicht nur schwerwiegende Folgen für die Wassersicherheit Pakistans und die Sicherheitsbeziehungen zwischen Indien und Pakistan haben, sondern auch zu einer umfassenderen Aushöhlung des Völkerrechts beitragen.
Der Indus-WasservertragDas Indus-Flussgebiet versorgt über 200 Millionen Menschen in Pakistan (über 80 Prozent der Bevölkerung) und etwa 100 Millionen Menschen im Nordwesten Indiens. Der 1960 unter Vermittlung der Weltbank ausgehandelte IWT weist Indien die ausschließliche Nutzung der drei östlichen Flüsse (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) und Pakistan die der drei westlichen Flüsse (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) zu, vorbehaltlich bestimmter Nutzungen, die Indien im stromaufwärts gelegenen Kaschmir gestattet sind, darunter Laufwasserkraftwerke innerhalb bestimmter Grenzen. Der Vertrag schreibt den Datenaustausch über alle Flüsse vor, die nach Pakistan fließen. Er sieht einen dreistufigen Streitbeilegungsmechanismus vor, und zwar durch i) die Ständige Indus-Kommission, ii) einen neutralen Sachverständigen und iii) ein Schiedsverfahren vor einem Ad-hoc-Schiedsgericht. Die Entscheidung, den IWT auszusetzen, ist beispiellos für einen Vertrag, der oft als ein seltener Erfolg in der grenzüberschreitenden Wasserkooperation bezeichnet wird und mehr als sechs Jahrzehnte an Feindseligkeiten zwischen den Vertragsstaaten überstanden hat, darunter die Kriege von 1965, 1971 und 1999.
Pakistans WassersicherheitIndiens Vorgehen birgt hydrologische Risiken für Pakistan, da es die etablierten Vereinbarungen zur Weitergabe hydrologischer und technischer Informationen unterbricht, die für die Hochwasservorhersage und Katastrophenvorsorge flussabwärts von entscheidender Bedeutung sind. Die Überschwemmungen von 2025 verdeutlichten die Risiken einer geschwächten institutionellen Kommunikation, als Warnungen Berichten zufolge über diplomatische Kanäle statt über die Ständige Indus-Kommission übermittelt wurden. Seit der Aussetzung des IWT hat Indien den Ausbau der Wasserkraft und andere Maßnahmen zur Wasserbewirtschaftung an den westlichen Flüssen beschleunigt, was nach pakistanischer Befürchtung Indiens Fähigkeit stärken könnte, die derzeit nach Pakistan fließenden Wassermengen zu regulieren und abzuleiten.
Sicherheitsbeziehungen zwischen Indien und PakistanIndiens Entscheidung vom April 2025 entstand nicht in einem politischen Vakuum. Nach einem tödlichen militanten Anschlag in Uri im indisch verwalteten Kaschmir im September 2016 erklärte der indische Premierminister Narendra Modi, dass „Blut und Wasser nicht zusammen fließen können“, womit er die Bewirtschaftung des Indus ausdrücklich mit Indiens Sicherheitsbeziehungen zu Pakistan verknüpfte. Nach der Aussetzung des Abkommens im Jahr 2025 wurde diese Sprache noch deutlicher. Indiens Wasserminister C.R. Patil erklärte im Juni 2026, die Regierung arbeite daran, sicherzustellen, dass in den kommenden Jahren „kein einziger Tropfen“ Wasser nach Pakistan fließen werde.
Eine solche Rhetorik löste Gegenreaktionen aus, die die Spannungen weiter verschärften. Nach der Aussetzung warnte Pakistans Nationaler Sicherheitsausschuss, dass jeder Versuch, das Pakistan im Rahmen des IWT zugeteilte Wasser abzuleiten oder zu stoppen, einen „Kriegsakt“ darstellen würde. Der ehemalige Außenminister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari warnte sogar vor einem möglichen „nuklearen Armageddon-Szenario“. Dies zeigt einen sich verschärfenden Prozess der Versicherheitlichung um das Thema Wasser zwischen zwei atomar bewaffneten Nachbarn.
Aushöhlung des Völkerrechts?Der Ständige Schiedshof hat vier Urteile gefällt, seit Indien den Vertrag im April 2025 außer Kraft gesetzt hat. Diese gingen auf Verfahren zurück, die Pakistan 2016 wegen der Wasserkraftprojekte Kishanganga und Ratle im indisch verwalteten Kaschmir eingeleitet hatte. Pakistan berief sich auf ein Schiedsverfahren gemäß Artikel IX und Anhang G des IWT und argumentierte, dass der Streit weiterreichende Fragen der Vertragsauslegung betreffe, während Indien später gemäß Artikel IX und Anhang F einen neutralen Sachverständigen beantragte und argumentierte, dass es sich bei den Fragen primär um technische Aspekte handele. Die Weltbank setzte beide Verfahren im Jahr 2016 aus und forderte Indien und Pakistan auf, den Streit bilateral beizulegen, nahm sie jedoch im Jahr 2022 wieder auf, nachdem sie zu dem Schluss gekommen war, dass die Pattsituation selbst ein Risiko für den Vertrag darstellte. Am 31. August 2026 ordnete der Ständige Schiedshof Einschränkungen beim Bau des Ratle-Wasserkraftwerks bis 90 Tage nach der Entscheidung des neutralen Sachverständigen an, die für Juli 2027 erwartet wird. Vorerst sollte die Entscheidung des neutralen Sachverständigen abgewartet werden, bevor am Standort Ratle weitere Tatsachen geschaffen werden. Eine anhaltende Aussetzung des Vertrags könnte jedoch das Vertrauen in das internationale Wasserrecht schwächen und zu einer allgemeinen Aushöhlung des Völkerrechts beitragen.
Die Einhaltung der Regeln des Indus-Wasservertrags ist für die Wassersicherheit Pakistans und zur Vermeidung einer militärischen Eskalation zwischen Indien und Pakistan von großer Bedeutung. Damit würde Indien zudem ein starkes Signal für seine Achtung des Völkerrechts setzen.