Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Cleopatra Kitti, Senior Policy Advisor to ELIAMEP and Founder of the Mediterranean Growth Initiative, offers a review of Cyprus’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union, which concluded a few days ago.

Read the ELIAMEP Explainer here.

Europäischen Ermittlern ist es gelungen, ein Vergewaltiger-Netzwerk zu zerschlagen. 156 Opfer und Täter konnten identifiziert werden. Ermittlungen in neun Ländern enthüllen Tausch von Anleitungen zu Betäubungsmitteln und Missbrauch.

Die Spitzen von Union und SPD haben sich auf ein Reformpaket für wirtschaftliches Wachstum und soziale Sicherheit verständigt. Es folgt eine Einordnung von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die Einigung auf das Reformpaket beendet eine lange Hängepartie in der Bundesregierung. Sein Beitrag zur Lösung der strukturellen Probleme Deutschlands dürfte jedoch begrenzt bleiben. Das Paket enthält eine Reihe von guten und sinnvollen Elementen. Vor allem der Abbau von Bürokratie, die Ziele beim Wohnungsbau und die steuerliche Entlastung bis in die Mitte hinein sind positive Aspekte. Es ist aber nicht der große Wurf, sondern eher ein Symbolpaket. Es wird der deutschen Wirtschaft nicht den gewünschten Impuls für Wachstum und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit geben. Es handelt sich um einen politischen Kompromiss mit begrenzten Ambitionen, der die großen Differenzen innerhalb der Bundesregierung zeigt und drei Botschaften enthalten soll: die Entlastung der Mitte, die Flexibilisierung für Unternehmen und eine härtere Linie beim Sozialstaat.

Zudem mangelt es in dem Vorstoß an Gerechtigkeit. Es hat eine soziale Schieflage, da der Fokus auf der Entlastung von Unternehmen liegt, zum Teil zulasten der Beschäftigten. Die Ausweitung der sachgrundlosen Befristung und die teilweise Aufweichung des Kündigungsschutzes als großen Wurf zu verkaufen, ist nicht seriös. Auch durch die geplanten Reformen bei Rente, Gesundheit und Pflege werden vor allem Menschen mit wenig Einkommen und Ersparnissen harte Einschnitte erfahren. Die Begrenzung der Westbalkan-Regelung auf 25.000 Personen pro Jahr kann den Arbeitsmarkt in Engpassbranchen zusätzlich belasten. Unter dem Strich bedeutet das Reformpaket Einschnitte vor allem für Menschen mit geringen, aber auch mit mittleren Einkommen.

Die Steuerreform ist unambitioniert, nicht ausfinanziert und entlastet zwar auch Familien und mittlere Einkommen, aber in absoluten Euro-Beträgen profitieren vor allem höhere Erwerbseinkommen unterhalb der Reichensteuer-Schwelle. Eine echte Entlastung kleiner und mittlerer Einkommen müsste stärker bei Sozialabgaben, Transfers oder Erwerbstätigenzuschüssen ansetzen - dies fehlt jedoch größtenteils. Bei der Steuerreform hat sich die Union durchgesetzt, da die Erhöhung des Reichensteuersatzes ab 250.000 Euro Jahreseinkommen eher symbolisch ist und dem Staat nur geringe zusätzliche Einnahmen verschaffen wird. Der Steuerreform fehlt Ehrlichkeit, denn es gibt faktisch keine annähernd ausreichende Gegenfinanzierung. Dass der bayerische Ministerpräsident Söder die Verhinderung einer Kürzung des Dienstwagenprivilegs als großen Erfolg verkauft, spricht für sich.

Germany's failure to secure a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council is more than a diplomatic setback. It is a structural signal; and a credibility problem. For decades, Germany cultivated a reputation as an honest broker: a power that applied international law consistently. That reputation has taken damage. Germany's hesitant position toward Israel’s conduct in Gaza and Lebanon, and its evasive response to the US’ intervention in Venezuela, have seeded a perception of selectivity – that international legal norms are called for when politically convenient, and set aside when one’s own history or current dependencies make this difficult. In a world where countries from across Africa, Asia and Latin America are increasingly attentive to such inconsistencies, this matters. Credibility, once spent, is difficult to rebuild.

Germany's failure to secure a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council is more than a diplomatic setback. It is a structural signal; and a credibility problem. For decades, Germany cultivated a reputation as an honest broker: a power that applied international law consistently. That reputation has taken damage. Germany's hesitant position toward Israel’s conduct in Gaza and Lebanon, and its evasive response to the US’ intervention in Venezuela, have seeded a perception of selectivity – that international legal norms are called for when politically convenient, and set aside when one’s own history or current dependencies make this difficult. In a world where countries from across Africa, Asia and Latin America are increasingly attentive to such inconsistencies, this matters. Credibility, once spent, is difficult to rebuild.

Germany's failure to secure a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council is more than a diplomatic setback. It is a structural signal; and a credibility problem. For decades, Germany cultivated a reputation as an honest broker: a power that applied international law consistently. That reputation has taken damage. Germany's hesitant position toward Israel’s conduct in Gaza and Lebanon, and its evasive response to the US’ intervention in Venezuela, have seeded a perception of selectivity – that international legal norms are called for when politically convenient, and set aside when one’s own history or current dependencies make this difficult. In a world where countries from across Africa, Asia and Latin America are increasingly attentive to such inconsistencies, this matters. Credibility, once spent, is difficult to rebuild.

Zum Auslaufen des Tankrabatts äußert sich Tomaso Duso, Leiter der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte im DIW Berlin und Vorsitzender der Monopolkommission, wie folgt:

Der Tankrabatt geht zu Ende, und die Bilanz fällt gemischt aus. Bis Mitte Juni wurde die Steuersenkung zum großen Teil, aber nicht vollständig weitergegeben – nach den Schätzungen der Monopolkommission zu etwa 85 bis 90 Prozent. In der vergangenen Woche jedoch zogen die Preise bereits spürbar an, und die Weitergaberate fiel unter 50 Prozent. Das ist ökonomisch besonders problematisch, weil gerade in diesen Tagen viele Verbraucher*innen noch einmal vollgetankt haben. Die Mehrbelastung traf also einen großen Teil des Absatzes. Und auch nach Auslaufen des Tankrabatts sind die Preise heute um 12 Uhr wieder sprunghaft und kräftig gestiegen – bei einzelnen Kraftstoffsorten um mehr als zehn Cent pro Liter. 

Für mich bestätigt das vor allem eines: Das eigentliche Problem sitzt nicht an der Tankstelle, sondern auf den vorgelagerten Stufen bei Raffinerien und Großhandel. Ein befristeter Rabatt ändert daran nichts: Er verschiebt nur, wann und bei wem das Geld landet. 

Am Ende bleibt festzuhalten: Der Tankrabatt war eine teure und sozial unausgewogene Maßnahme. Ein Teil davon – nach Schätzungen der Monopolkommission 100 bis 200 Millionen Euro, nach dieser Woche möglicherweise sogar mehr – ist bei der Mineralölindustrie hängengeblieben. Zudem haben Vielfahrer*innen am stärksten profitiert, die überproportional zu den einkommensstärkeren Haushalten zählen. In einer Knappheitssituation hat er außerdem die falschen Anreize gesetzt. Der Tankrabatt war damit von Anfang an das falsche Instrument – und es ist richtig, ihn auslaufen zu lassen.

How do grievances turn into collective action? This article examines how citizens' expectations in social contracts lead them to embark on street protests. It draws on original, nationally representative telephone surveys in Tunisia and Lebanon and unpacks popular preferences about the states' obligations to deliver social service provision, protection, and political participation. We measure empirically whether participation in protest can be explained predominantly by people's grievances with their states' social contract obligations or the position of people in society. Findings reveal intriguing differences between the two countries but also among social groups within societies. We find that socially privileged people are more likely to take to the streets in pursuit of their demands, lending support to theories that identify society's middle classes as drivers of protest action. We believe that the article's findings will have significant implications for studies of contentious state-society relations in the MENA region and beyond.

How do grievances turn into collective action? This article examines how citizens' expectations in social contracts lead them to embark on street protests. It draws on original, nationally representative telephone surveys in Tunisia and Lebanon and unpacks popular preferences about the states' obligations to deliver social service provision, protection, and political participation. We measure empirically whether participation in protest can be explained predominantly by people's grievances with their states' social contract obligations or the position of people in society. Findings reveal intriguing differences between the two countries but also among social groups within societies. We find that socially privileged people are more likely to take to the streets in pursuit of their demands, lending support to theories that identify society's middle classes as drivers of protest action. We believe that the article's findings will have significant implications for studies of contentious state-society relations in the MENA region and beyond.

How do grievances turn into collective action? This article examines how citizens' expectations in social contracts lead them to embark on street protests. It draws on original, nationally representative telephone surveys in Tunisia and Lebanon and unpacks popular preferences about the states' obligations to deliver social service provision, protection, and political participation. We measure empirically whether participation in protest can be explained predominantly by people's grievances with their states' social contract obligations or the position of people in society. Findings reveal intriguing differences between the two countries but also among social groups within societies. We find that socially privileged people are more likely to take to the streets in pursuit of their demands, lending support to theories that identify society's middle classes as drivers of protest action. We believe that the article's findings will have significant implications for studies of contentious state-society relations in the MENA region and beyond.

Sicherheitenrahmen gibt vor, welche Vermögenswerte Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) als Sicherheit für Refinanzierungsgeschäfte von Banken akzeptiert – Lockerung dieses Rahmens lässt Aktienkurse der Banken steigen und senkt ihr Ausfallrisiko – Änderungen wirken aber asymmetrisch in verschiedenen ...

Schöne Neuigkeiten von Roman Bürki. Während die Schweiz an der WM spielt, hat der Ex-Nati-Keeper seine Traumhochzeit gefeiert.

Smart farming enables farmers to produce more with fewer resources, make better decisions under uncertainty, and reduce agriculture's environmental footprint. Credit: FAO

By Beth Bechdol
ROME, Jun 30 2026 (IPS)

Farmers today are producing food under pressures that would have been unimaginable to previous generations. Input costs are rising and supply chains are unreliable. Water is scarcer. Weather is less predictable. And for a growing number of farmers — in Sudan, in Ukraine, in Myanmar, in Gaza — the challenge is producing food at all, in the middle of active conflict. These are not marginal conditions. They describe the reality facing hundreds of millions of people who grow the food the world depends on.

Smart farming — using data, digital tools, and precision technologies to make better decisions, use fewer inputs, and get more from every hectare — is not a luxury response to these pressures. It is increasingly a practical and necessary one. It helps farmers know when to plant, where fertilizer will generate the greatest return, how much water a crop actually needs, where pests are likely to emerge, and which risks are developing before they become crises.

Three agricultural revolutions got us here. The first gave humanity settled agriculture. The second transformed land use and productivity through new methods and early machinery. The third — the Green Revolution — combined improved seeds, fertilizers, and modern practice to feed a rapidly growing world. Each solved the defining challenge of its era … producing enough.

Smart farming — using data, digital tools, and precision technologies to make better decisions, use fewer inputs, and get more from every hectare — is not a luxury response to these pressures. It is increasingly a practical and necessary one

The fourth revolution faces a fundamentally different challenge. It is no longer simply about producing more food. It is about producing more with fewer and less reliable inputs, under greater uncertainty, on land under increasing stress, and while reducing agriculture’s environmental footprint.

The tools that drove the Green Revolution were extraordinary, but they are not infinitely scalable. Synthetic fertilizers depend on energy-intensive production and supply chains that have proven fragile. Aquifers in key agricultural regions are being drawn down faster than they recharge. The yield gains from conventional intensification are flattening. There is no endless supply of cheap water, cheap fertilizer, or cheap fuel to sustain food production the way we have for the past half-century.

Smart farming is how we meet this new challenge. It enables farmers to produce more with fewer resources, make better decisions under uncertainty, and reduce agriculture’s environmental footprint. It is not a vision for the future. It is already happening.

FAO’s own operational programmes demonstrate what is already possible. Our Desert Locust early warning system uses satellite imagery, weather data, and field intelligence to forecast outbreaks before they reach crops, giving governments time to act rather than simply respond. The SoilFER programme is turning faster, more affordable soil mapping into actionable fertilizer recommendations for farmers in Central America and sub-Saharan Africa. The Hand-in-Hand Initiative combines geospatial, market, and socioeconomic data so governments and investors can direct agricultural investment where it will have the greatest return. These are not pilots. They are operational programmes with measurable outcomes — and they include AI-driven tools that forecast pest and disease pressure, analyze crop stress, and help governments make better decisions faster than was previously possible.

My own family’s seven-generation grain farm in rural Indiana today uses GPS-guided equipment, variable-rate fertilizer applications based on soil sampling, yield mapping, and real-time weather tools to make planting and harvesting decisions. The technology works. The question is who has access to it.

That is the central challenge. The benefits of smart farming currently concentrate among producers who already have the resources, connectivity, and institutional support to adopt new tools. Smallholder farmers — who produce a third of the world’s food — are too often last in line. Women farmers and young producers face additional barriers to technology and financing, which means the whole system underperforms when they are excluded.

At FAO’s Global Conference on Smart Farming in Rome from 1 to 3 July, the commitments required are specific and clear. Governments need to modernize regulatory environments and invest in the digital infrastructure agriculture depends on. Development banks should finance data systems and precision agriculture as essential infrastructure rather than optional innovation. Private companies need business models that reach smallholders, not only large commercial farms. And organizations like FAO must ensure that technical knowledge becomes practical solutions farmers can actually us e.

The fourth agricultural revolution is already underway. What remains to be decided is whether its benefits reach the farmers who need them most — or whether the gap between what is possible and what is accessible becomes permanent.

Beth Bechdol is Deputy Director-General, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations