European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Stéphanie Pradier.

The Congress is the legislative branch of the United States (US) system of government. It is divided into two chambers: the House of Representatives (the lower chamber) and the Senate (the upper chamber). The formal powers of Congress are set out in Article I of the US Constitution, and include making laws, collecting revenue, borrowing and spending money, declaring war, making treaties with foreign nations, and overseeing the executive branch. Elections to the US Congress occur every second November, with the Congress convening the following January. Additionally, every four years, these elections coincide with the presidential election. The current, 119th Congress was elected in November 2024, and convened in January 2025. The US has a long-standing two-party system, which means that nearly all members of Congress belong to either the Republican or Democratic parties. Independent members, if any, generally align or caucus with one of the two main parties. In the most recent US Presidential and Congressional elections, held in November 2024, the Republican party won the White House. They also retained control of the House with a five-seat margin – the smallest in modern history – and won back the Senate with a six-seat majority, taking account of two independents who caucus with the Democrats. This gave the Republicans a governing trifecta, with control of the presidency and both chambers of Congress. This EPRS briefing provides key facts and figures about the US Congress as an institution, including relevant comparisons with the European Parliament (EP).

Read the complete briefing on ‘United States Congress: Facts and Figures‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by David de Groot.

The prohibition of discrimination and the protection of human rights are important elements of the EU legal order. Nevertheless, discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people persists throughout the EU and takes various forms, including verbal abuse and physical violence.

Sexual orientation is now recognised in EU law as grounds of discrimination. However, the scope of the provisions dealing with this issue is limited and does not cover social protection, health care, education or access to goods and services, leaving LGBTI people particularly vulnerable in these areas.

Moreover, EU competence does not extend to recognition of marital or family status. In this area, national regulations vary, with some Member States offering same-sex couples the right to marry, some allowing alternative forms of registration, and others not providing any legal status for same-sex couples. Same-sex couples may or may not have the right to adopt children and to access assisted reproduction. These divergent legal statuses have implications, for instance, for partners from two Member States with different standards who want to formalise/legalise their relationship, and for same-sex couples and their families wishing to move to another Member State.

Combating discrimination has become part of EU internal and external policies, and is the subject of numerous resolutions of the European Parliament. However, action in this area remains problematic when it touches on issues pertaining to areas traditionally the preserve of Member States, such as marital status and family law.

This is a further updated version of a briefing first published in 2010, the previous edition of which was published in June 2024.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The rights of LGBTI people in the European Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Pieter Baert.

Over the last ten years, the EU has taken several key measures to combat aggressive corporate tax planning, aiming to curb the billions in revenue losses suffered by Member States. However, the variety and breadth of the measures introduced have raised concern about their administrative complexity and overall effectiveness. The Subcommittee on Tax Matters will hold a public hearing on this topic on 15 May 2025.

From post-crisis reforms to simplification initiatives

Following the Great Recession and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, and fuelled by publication of various ‘tax leaks’, the EU set out an ambitious range of initiatives to counter corporate tax avoidance. Numerous laws were put into place to close tax loopholes and increase transparency on the tax practices of (large, multinational) companies, including the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) and the directives on Administrative Cooperation (DAC) and Public Country-by-Country Reporting (Public CbCR). In 2021, a historic global agreement paved the way for the introduction of a minimum effective corporate tax of 15 % for multinationals in the EU, which entered into force in 2024.

Following the 2024 European elections, the European Commission embarked on an overall strategy to cut red tape and simplify EU legislation. In March 2025, the Council called on the Commission to present a road map before the end of Q3 2025 to reduce the reporting burdens for both tax administrations and taxpayers, eliminate outdated and overlapping tax rules, increase the clarity of tax legislation and streamline the application of tax rules, procedures and reporting requirements. This work should cover both direct and indirect taxation, and should ‘preserve the successful achievements’ the EU has made in this area.

Commission evaluations of the ATAD and DAC are already ongoing, and may lead to legislative changes.

Anti-tax Avoidance Directive

The Anti-tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) set out five key provisions – four specific, one general – to close loopholes that were often abused for aggressive tax avoidance purposes. The ATAD rules entered into force between 2019 and 2022.

Table 1 – ATAD overview

Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal marketArt. 4Interest limitation ruleDiscourages debt arrangements designed to minimise taxation, limiting the deductibility of taxpayers’ excess borrowing costsArt. 5Exit taxation rulePrevents companies from avoiding tax when relocating assetsArt. 6General anti-abuse rule (GAAR)Counters aggressive tax planning when other rules do not applyArt. 7-8Controlled foreign company (CFC) ruleDeters profit shifting to a dependent company in a low-tax country to reduce taxable profitsArt. 9Hybrid mismatch rulePrevents companies from exploiting national mismatches to avoid taxation

The provisions of the ATAD function as ‘minimum standards’, allowing Member States to introduce stricter provisions, if they choose to. This flexibility has led to some divergence in the application of these standards, resulting in legal complexity. Additionally, the directive includes several options for Member States, often to exclude certain entities from the scope of a particular anti-avoidance rule. Some stakeholder feedback on the ATAD encouraged the Commission to seek more harmonisation in this area. A study conducted for the Subcommittee on Tax Matters (FISC) similarly noted that reducing the number of available options ‘should be considered for a more homogenous anti-avoidance landscape’.

Discussions are also ongoing about the continued relevance of certain ATAD provisions – such as the CFC rules – in the context of the broader global minimum corporate tax framework. While ATAD is designed to target specific tax avoidance loopholes, the EU Minimum Tax Directive focuses on a minimum level of effective taxation, irrespective of any tax planning strategies employed.

Directive on Administrative Cooperation

As its name implies, the Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC) does not govern the imposition or payment of taxes directly. Instead, it facilitates the collection and, increasingly, the automatic exchange of tax-related information between Member States concerning individuals and companies. Benefiting from increasingly efficient digital tools, Member States can track and cross check income streams, swiftly detect evasion or avoidance practices and impose taxes where required according to national legislation. The DAC has undergone eight revisions (DAC1-DAC9) over the past ten years. This has progressively widened the scope of taxpayers and reportable data.

Table 2 – DAC overview

DACInformation being reported and exchangedDACInformation being reported and exchangedDAC1Income from employment, pension, director fees, income and assets from immovable property and life insuranceDAC6Potentially aggressive tax planning schemes of intermediariesDAC2Financial account data (account balances, gross amount of interest and dividends received …)DAC7Income earned by sellers on digital sales platformsDAC3Advance cross-border tax rulings and advance pricing arrangements of companiesDAC8Income earned by crypto-asset tradersDAC4Country-by-country reports on multinationals (data on revenue, profits, tax paid …)DAC9Top-up tax information returns for the purposes of the Minimum Tax DirectiveDAC5Beneficial ownership and due diligence information as collected through the anti-money laundering legal framework. 

Stakeholder responses to the public consultation on DAC indicated that many would welcome greater transparency on how, and to what extent, tax authorities use the data reported. The European Court of Auditors raised a similar concern, noting Member States ‘generally underused’ the data reported under DAC1 to DAC5, which were subject to limited data quality checks.

Stakeholders have been particularly critical of DAC6, which obliges intermediaries – such as tax advisors and accountants – to report information on potentially aggressive cross-border tax arrangements to the tax authorities. Stakeholders regarded the criteria for identifying such arrangements, known as ‘hallmarks’, as overly broad or difficult to apply in practice. This concern was echoed in a study commissioned by the FISC Subcommittee, which also warned about the additional administrative costs for tax authorities: ‘Tax authorities will also be heavily impacted due to the [… expected] volume of disclosed information they will receive. The danger of over-reporting due to the over-inclusion and multiplicity of hallmarks (…) is a real one, and may cause tax authorities [to miss …] some red flags’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘The future of EU anti-tax avoidance rules‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

The European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) brought together Members of the European Parliament, the European Commission and researchers on 29 April 2025, to discuss the opportunities and challenges of the use of AI in science, at a workshop entitled ‘Generative AI and scientific development’.

STOA Vice‑Chair Lina Gálvez (S&D, Spain) opened the event, and called for a fruitful debate on all angles of the use of AI in scientific development – from the undeniable advantages, to the risks associated with an extensive deployment of AI and ways to counter them.

A first panel focused on the technologies involved in using AI to help foster scientific research in the EU. Serge Belongie (University of Copenhagen) set the scene with a keynote speech about the challenges and opportunities of AI. Maria Cristina Russo, Director of Prosperity at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, then commented on the Commission’s efforts to mobilise €200 billion for investment in AI, including €20 million to develop gigafactories devoted to high-performance cloud storage (HPC), as well as the political priorities of the Competitiveness Compass. She also commented on the AI continent action plan, the AI in science initiative, the communication on a European strategy for AI in science, and the creation of the resource for AI science in Europe (RAISE), as well as on the ‘Choose EU‘ initiative to attract researchers. Francesca Campolongo, Director for Digital Transformation and Data at the Joint Research Centre (JRC), highlighted that the EU is at the forefront of AI research and development, but that this does not translate well enough into innovation. She mentioned the GPT@JRC platform as an example of JRC’s commitment to help unlock the full potential of AI in science. Ana García Robles, of the Big Data Value Association, focused on competitiveness and emphasised the need to consider both small and medium-sized enterprises and big companies. Wijnand Ijsselsteijn (Eindhoven University of Technology) highlighted the relation between data science, AI and psychology.

The second panel focused on how AI affects scientific dialogue and gave an overview of the use and the abuse of AI in science. Oxford University Professor Sonia Contera’s keynote speech framed the way AI affects the exchange of information that is essential in science. Lex Bouter of Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam insisted on the need to focus on the concept of research integrity. Anita De Waard, of Elsevier underlined the need for collaboration among academic and industry partners to improve trust and reproducibility, as well as research integrity. Commenting on these issues, Sebastián Ventura Soto from the University of Córdoba noted how new developments in AI can also be used to tackle them. Finally, Elizabeth Gadd of the Coalition for Advancing Research Assessment highlighted the need for responsible research evaluation and for improved metrics for evaluating research. During the Q&A session which followed, Ana Vasconcelos, (EPP, Portugal) discussed the idea of ‘fake’ scientific publications and the reliability of assessing AI manipulation while insisting on the need for trustworthy scientific communication.

STOA Vice-Chair Lina Gálvez closed the event, underlining the need to reap the full benefits of the development and uptake of AI in science, as promoted by the Commission and the JRC, while avoiding drawbacks such as interfering with a necessary and productive scientific dialogue. She ended by announcing that, since the Commission and JRC are already doing excellent work in promoting the deployment of AI with their different programmes, STOA will complement this effort by launching a study analysing the status of open science and the effects of generative AI in scientific exchange.

Prior to the event, the European Science-Media Hub (ESMH) published an article featuring interviews with the keynote speakers. A web-stream recording of the event, a video and photos, are available on our website.

Your opinion matters to us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu and follow us on X at @EP_ScienceTech.

Written by Marc Jütten.

President Donald Trump threatens that the US will take back the Panama Canal, a strategic maritime route for global trade, because of perceived Chinese influence in the Canal Zone. In fact, a Hong Kong-based private company owns two of the canal’s five port terminals at strategically important points. The Panama Canal is a key maritime trade route that handles about 40 % of US container traffic and approximately 5 % of world trade.

Background

From 1904 to 1914, the US completed the building of the Panama Canal. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter and Panamanian military leader Omar Torrijos signed the Neutrality Treaty and the Panama Canal Treaty, referred to as the Torrijos-Carter Treaties, which ended decades of US control over the canal. The agreement guaranteed the canal’s neutrality and passed full sovereignty over the canal to Panama by 31 December 1999. Since then, the Panama Canal has been managed and operated by the Panama Canal Authority (PCA), an agency of the Panamanian government. Over time, various expansion programmes have increased the canal’s traffic handling. The completion of a major expansion in 2016 significantly increased Panama’s revenues and global trade influence, with the works involving a consortium of companies from Spain, Italy and Belgium. In addition, the European Investment Bank (EIB) provided US$500 million, representing 10 % of the project costs and marking the EIB’s largest operation so far in Latin America.

Figure 1 – The Panama Canal © Peter Hermes Furian/Adobe Stock. A global trading hub

The Panama Canal is an artificial 82-kilometre (51-mile) waterway that connects the Atlantic Ocean with the Pacific Ocean (see Figure 1), making it an important trade and logistics hub. By allowing vessels to bypass the southernmost tip of South America, the canal significantly reduces transit times, distances and logistics costs, and is the fastest route for trade between the US east coast and Asia. Overall, the canal connects 180 maritime routes and 1 920 ports worldwide. It generates roughly 4 % of Panama’s GDP, through the tolls paid by vessels using the canal. According to the PCA, the canal handles approximately 5 % of world trade; 40 % of all US container traffic traverses it annually, and more than 70 % of the cargo that goes through the canal originates in or is destined for the US, making the Panama Canal vital to US supply chains. The canal is also a crucial component of US naval strategy, allowing the US Navy to swiftly transfer vessels between the Atlantic and Pacific. China accounted for 21.4 % of the cargo volume transiting the canal, making it the second largest user after the US. Other major users of the waterway include Japan, South Korea and Chile (see Figure 2). From an EU perspective, the third most important trade route, which the Panama Canal connects, is from South America’s west coast to Europe.

The Panama Canal relies on freshwater, which makes it dependent on climate change. In recent years, unprecedented droughts (the El Niño weather phenomenon) have been affecting the water supply from nearby lakes, leading authorities to impose surcharges and weight limits on ships traversing the canal. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), drought reduced the Panama flows by 5 % in 2023, with economic damage estimated at around 0.5 % of Panama’s GDP for 2024.

Figure 2 – Top countries shipping cargo through the Panama Canal Data source: Panama Canal Statistics. China’s presence in the Panama Canal Zone

A company controlled by CK Hutchison Holdings, a Hong Kong-based private multinational conglomerate corporation, has operated two of the canal’s five port terminals since it won the tender in 1997; their contract was renewed for another 25 years in 2021. The company operates one container terminal at the port of Balboa (on the Pacific side) and another at Cristóbal (on the Atlantic side), which provide access to the Panama Canal Railway. The railway has become increasingly important over the years, among other reasons because of the canal’s chronic lack of water. Because of low water, many large container ships have to offload cargo and transport it by rail to the other end of the canal. The Chinese government lacks any direct institutional channels to influence CK Hutchison’s decision-making. However, experts point out that, if Hutchison were to give preferential treatment to the cargo of Chinese ships, it might have an impact on the supply of goods to the US. According to an announcement made on 4 March 2025, CK Hutchison agreed to sell most of its global ports business, including those on the Panama Canal, to US-led group BlackRock. CK Hutchison stressed that the transaction was purely commercial in nature and unrelated to recent political events. However, in the meantime it has been reported that China’s market regulator said it would carry out an antitrust review of the Panama port deal in accordance with a law to protect fair competition and safeguard the public interest. Consequently, the deal was not signed on 2 April as expected. In addition to the two container terminals, there are other undertakings around the Panama Canal operated by Chinese state-owned companies. In 2024, a new cruise ship terminal was inaugurated, built by a consortium led by China Harbour Engineering Company. The latest project is the construction of the fourth bridge over the Panama Canal, involving a consortium comprising state-owned China Communications Construction Company and China Harbour Engineering Company.

Panama’s sovereign rights under threat?

President Trump’s allegations regarding the Panama Canal are two-sided. He accused Panama of charging US ships exorbitant rates to transit the canal and urged free transit for American commercial and military ships. In fact, the PCA charges fees based on the size and type of ships that are using the waterway; rates are uniform, impartial, and non-discriminatory. Panama’s President, Jose Raul Mulino, added that US government vessels, including navy vessels, paid US$6 million a year for the right of passage. The Torrijos-Carter Treaties only granted preferential treatment to vessels from Costa Rica and Colombia. Secondly, Trump claimed that the US would take back the Panama Canal because of Chinese influence in the Canal Zone, which poses a threat and represents a violation of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties. In fact, the Treaties envisage the US having primary responsibility for protecting and defending the canal against armed attacks or other actions which threaten the canal’s security. While Panama rejected US claims threatening Panama’s sovereign rights over the canal, the government has made some concessions, including on migration, the fight against organised crime and security cooperation. Following a visit by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in February 2025, President Mulino confirmed that Panama would withdraw from China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In addition, Mulino and US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, during his visit to Panama, issued a joint statement on 8 April that included information about the signature of a memorandum of understanding on enhanced security cooperation. Moreover, Panama and the US would work on a mechanism to compensate for the payment of tolls and charges. However, while the Spanish-language version of the statement, released by Panama, said ‘Hegseth recognised Panama’s leadership and inalienable sovereignty over the Panama Canal’, that line did not appear in the English version released by the Pentagon.

In 2012, the EU and Panama signed the EU-Central America Association Agreement, which establishes a free trade area between the EU and Central America, consisting of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. In April 2024, the Council adopted a decision to conclude the agreement; this is the final step of the ratification process, which allows for the full implementation of the agreement. The European Parliament gave its consent to the agreement on 11 December 2012. Panama has also established partnerships with the EU under the Global Gateway Investment Agenda.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘The Panama Canal: Panama’s sovereign rights under threat?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Isabelle Ioannides.

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK), which entered into force in May 2021, governs the EU’s relationship with the UK, following its withdrawal from the EU. In addition to the European Commission evaluating the implementation of the TCA on an annual basis, Article 776 of the TCA provides for a joint review of the deal’s implementation five years after its entry into force, in 2026.

On 20 November 2024, the European Parliament’s Conference of Presidents approved a joint request from the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and on International Trade (INTA) to draw up an implementation report in response to the European Commission’s 21 March 2024 report on the implementation and application of the EU-UK TCA.

This briefing seeks to inform the drafting of the joint AFET–INTA implementation report. The briefing provides an analysis of the data on trade flows between the EU and the UK in the last two years (2023 and 2024), in the context of the implementation of the TCA. It should be read in tandem with the European Implementation Assessment on the EU-UK TCA, published by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) in December 2023, which analyses EU-UK trade flows in the first two years of the TCA’s implementation. That EPRS study was requested by AFET and INTA to inform their 2023 joint implementation report on the same subject.

Similar to the 2023 EPRS study, this briefing concludes that the TCA continues to have a stronger impact on the UK than on the EU in the trade relationship. Trade between the EU and the UK continues to be more complex and challenging compared to when the UK was an EU Member State, even if the implementation of the TCA in the last four years has been generally smooth, with some exceptions. The UK has managed to bounce back from COVID and Brexit less successfully than the EU and has, like the EU-27, been affected by Russia’s war in Ukraine and inflation. EU-UK trade in goods decreased slightly in 2023 and 2024, and it is still below pre-Brexit levels. EU-UK trade in services (the TCA does not cover financial services), continues to be less disrupted, and surpassed pre-COVID‑19 levels as of 2023. At a time of uncertainty on the future direction of trade policy, geopolitical upheaval, and the United States administration’s (potential) new tariffs on imports from its trading partners (including the UK and the EU), the TCA offers an opportunity to deepen EU-UK trade relations.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-UK trade flows: Continuities, changes and trends‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU-UK trade in the agri-food sector EU services imports from the UK EU services exports to the UK EU goods imports from the UK EU goods exports to the UK UK share in EU total trade EU-UK trade in goods and services (2010-2024 for goods, 2010-2023 for services) The UK’s top 10 Member State partners in terms of trade in goods (imports and exports) Main EU-27 and UK global partners in terms of trade in goods (exports and imports) Trends in EU-UK total trade versus trade between the EU and the rest of the world (trade in goods and services, imports and exports)

Written by Agnieszka Widuto.

On 26 February 2025, the European Commission presented the Clean Industrial Deal, a new EU plan to support competitiveness and decarbonisation of EU industry. The Deal focuses mainly on energy-intensive industries and clean technologies (clean tech). Both sectors face high energy prices, intense global competition and complex regulations.

The Clean Industrial Deal includes several solutions to address this situation. It aims to bring energy costs down, boost demand for clean products, reduce EU dependency on raw materials, improve circularity and restore domestic manufacturing. Planned legislative initiatives in the energy field include a new electricity grids package, revisions of the energy security framework and Energy Union governance, as well as an Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act and a delegated act on low-carbon hydrogen. Recommendations and guidance documents are also planned, for instance on network charges, energy taxation and the design of long-term instruments for electricity supply.

In the short term, the Clean Industrial Deal aims to mobilise over €100 billion through boosting EU-level funding, leveraging private investments and enhancing State aid. The key EU funding sources will be the Innovation Fund, Horizon Europe, InvestEU and a new Industrial Decarbonisation Bank. In the next long-term EU budget, the Competitiveness Fund will support EU investments in research and innovation, industrial deployment and scale-up, manufacturing, clean tech and industrial decarbonisation. The European Parliament is currently working on a resolution on the Clean Industrial Deal. The vote in the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) is expected in June 2025, while the plenary vote is planned for July 2025.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Energy dimension of the Clean Industrial Deal‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Barbara Nicoletti

Both genetic and environmental factors contribute to the risks of developing chronic diseases. However, scientists acknowledge that 70 to 90 % of disease risks are linked to environmental exposure. The scientific field of exposomics has developed from the recognition that people are rarely exposed to single environmental factors in isolation, rather they are subject to simultaneous exposures that accumulate over time and interact within specific social and biological contexts. A new STOA study contributes to a better understanding of the environmental factors shaping human health and the options available to policymakers to support human exposome research and connected interventions in public health policies.

Human exposome research

Recent advances in technology, methodologies, and substantial investment have brought significant progress in genetic research. The same cannot be said for environmental health research, which often looks at one environmental factor at a time to assess how it affects human health (i.e., air pollution, noise, chemicals in water and food). By integrating data from a variety of interdisciplinary methodologies and streams, exposomics investigates the effects of the complex interactions between physical, chemical, biological, and psychosocial environmental exposures on an individual, from conception to death, and how those exposures affect that person’s biology and health.

Exposome research can help more accurate and targeted identification of risk factors – including previously unknown factors – that contribute to the development of certain diseases, such as cancers, neurological disorders, respiratory disorders, cardiovascular diseases and obesity. Identifying these factors improves our understanding of diseases’ cause, development, prevention and treatment and offers new lenses through which to study sensitive population groups or critical life periods such as childhood.

Potential impacts and developments

With EU healthcare systems under growing pressure (with average per capita healthcare expenditure in 2022 increased by 38.6 % since 2014) and rising disease rates that cannot be fully explained by an ageing population (i.e. the global rise in early-onset cancers), a shift from a curative to a preventive model is urgently needed. Exposomics plays a key role in supporting this transition, by providing the scientific knowledge needed to understand how environmental factors shape human health and how we can mitigate risks before they translate into disease.

Initiatives such as the European Human Exposome Network (EHEN), the environmental exposure assessment in Europe research infrastructure (EIRENE) and the International Human Exposome Network (IHEN) have placed the European Union in a leading position in exposomics research. However, significant challenges remain, including the need for improved comprehensive exposure assessment, progress on measurement of bodily responses, and integration of fragmented health research ‘silos’. A critical step forward would be the development of large-scale population studies, to provide the statistical power and population diversity required to investigate environmental determinants of health across the life course. This would enable more robust evidence to inform policies in key areas, such as urban planning, chemical safety, climate adaptation, child and occupational health.

The STOA study

The European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) recently published ‘Human exposome research: Potential, limitations and public policy implications’. This study aims to contribute by highlighting the connection between environmental exposure and disease risks and understanding the role of exposomics in generating valuable knowledge that can inform policy decisions, guide public health interventions, and empower individuals to make informed choices about their health.

This study provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of human exposome research, its relevance for addressing pressing environmental health challenges and policy contexts in Europe, and the scientific and technological advances needed to drive progress in this rapidly evolving field. It concludes by identifying operational scenarios to further develop exposomics research and programmes. It also enumerates policy considerations to use exposomics’ comprehensive and discovery-driven approach in implementing EU policy commitments across selected key areas, such as cities, chemicals, climate, child health, career, clinical practice, and citizens’ engagement.

Read the full STOA study to find out more. The study was presented to the STOA Panel on 13 March 2025, followed by a European Science-Media Hub interview with Roel Vermuelen, Professor of Environmental Epidemiology and Exposome Science at Utrecht University and the University Medical Center Utrecht, author of the study.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Highlights of the May I 2025 plenary session included the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe, and Parliament statements on freedom, democracy and security as Europe’s heritage. Parliament also observed a minute of silence in memory of the late Pope Francis.

Members held several debates on Council and Commission statements: on European Union support for a just, sustainable and comprehensive peace in Ukraine; a unified EU response to unjustified US trade measures; and preparation of the EU-UK summit. Debates also followed statements by High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Vice-President of the European Commission, Kaja Kallas, on protecting Greenland’s right to decide its own future and maintain the rules-based world order, and an urgent assessment of the applicability of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with Cuba. A debate also took place on President Erdoğan’s illegal visit to the occupied areas of Cyprus.

Members also debated Council and Commission statements on the resilience and interconnection of energy grid infrastructure in the EU; high retail food prices; Malta’s ‘golden passport’ scheme; the fine against TikTok and citizens’ rights on social media platforms; EU action on treating and preventing diseases such as cancer, cardiovascular neurological diseases and measles.

Long-term budget for the Union in a changing world

The EU’s current long-term budget, or multiannual financial framework (MFF), is set to end in 2027. The time has therefore come to start setting the boundaries for EU spending for the following seven years. Members considered and adopted a report from the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) proposing to revamp the MFF to prepare the EU to face the challenges ahead. The report lists competitiveness; security, defence and preparedness; global peace, security and prosperity; and promotion of fundamental rights, EU values and the rule of law as the priorities for EU spending to 2034. It also calls on the Council to adopt new own resources to cover increased spending needs, and for a simpler, more transparent design for the next MFF.

Discharge 2023

As every year, Members held a debate on granting discharge for the implementation of the annual EU budget, for the year 2023. Members considered and followed all the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) recommendations on discharge for the EU’s 2023 accounts. The first CONT recommendation was to grant discharge for the Commission, six executive agencies and for the Recovery and Resilience Facility grants, plus separate decisions for the European Development Funds, representing over 95 % of the EU budget. However, the CONT committee highlighted the need to reduce the rising error rate, speed up disbursement of a record number of outstanding commitments, and effect stricter controls. The committee also recommended granting discharge for eight other EU institutions and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, suggesting improvements in transparency and human resources. However, CONT once again recommended postponing the decision on granting discharge to the European Council and the Council of the EU, as the Council’s continued refusal to cooperate prevents CONT from fulfilling its oversight role on behalf of EU citizens. Finally, CONT recommended granting discharge for 32 EU decentralised agencies and 11 joint undertakings, welcoming their improvement on the previous year’s results. The CONT committee proposed to postpone the decision on granting discharge to the European Union Asylum Agency, due to serious issues identified by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and a continued lack of transparency.

European water resilience strategy

Access to water is essential for everyone, yet growing demand; climate change and pollution are putting severe pressure on water resources in the EU. Ahead of a planned EU water resilience strategy, Members debated and adopted a Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) report, which calls for all new legislation to consider impacts on water resources. The report specifically highlights the need for better monitoring, phasing out PFAS chemicals and better shared management of river basins.

2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye

Countries applying to join the EU must respect democratic values, the rule of law and human rights. Members debated and adopted a report from the Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) noting that Türkiye, despite its reiterated commitment to EU accession in the long term, is moving further from aligning with the EU. The committee nevertheless recognises Türkiye‘s support for Ukraine in the context of the war and that the EU is exploring an updated framework for EU-Türkiye relations.

Democratic legitimacy of the GMO authorisation procedure

To uphold EU law ensuring a high level of protection of human life and health, Parliament has consistently objected to proposals to authorise use of genetically modified organisms in agriculture. The European Commission has nevertheless continued to authorise such GMOs, in the face of deadlock amongst Member States. Members held a debate on the democratic legitimacy of the Commission’s decisions to override Parliament’s objections.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Three decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, from the committees on: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on an Entry/Exit System; Fisheries (PECH) on conservation of fish stocks: measures in relation to countries allowing non-sustainable fishing; and Security and Defence (SEDE)/Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) jointly on a European Defence Industry Programme and framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products (‘EDIP’); were all approved without vote.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – May I 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Aiming to secure peace in Europe after the horrors of the Second World War, the Schuman Declaration proposed cooperation among European countries in two key economic areas central to rearmament and warfare: coal and steel. As an institutional framework for this cooperation, the Schuman Declaration proposed the creation of the first supranational organisation in Europe, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Established in 1952, the ECSC laid the foundations for today’s European Union (EU). The Schuman Declaration is therefore seen as the EU’s founding act. Presented by the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, on 9 May 1950, the anniversary of this key date in European integration is marked on 9 May each year in the EU.

Europe in the mid-20th century

In the middle of the last century, coal and steel played a significant political and economic role in Europe. As essential elements in national defence industries, in the potential to wage war, and in economic growth, they were seen as indicators of state power. After the Second World War, however, coal, one of the most important energy sources for steel production, was a scarce resource. American and British intentions to lift production limits for the German steel industry from mid-May 1950 therefore put pressure on France to find a swift solution to the ‘German issue’. In other words, France had to define a strategy to safeguard itself against potential German aggression and to make sure to benefit in political and economic terms from the German economic resurgence. From the end of the war, France had followed a policy aimed at preventing Germany from getting back on its feet, through territorial fragmentation and disarmament. From 1949 on, however, French foreign policy on the ‘German issue’ became increasingly shaped by moves towards Western European integration. Similarly, in Germany, plans for Western European integration were also discussed, as a way to abolish the Occupation Statute and to obtain sovereignty for the Federal Republic founded in 1949. The Schuman Declaration provided a simple but convincing answer as to how to secure peace in Europe by combining the difficult ‘German issue’ with thinking on the new political architecture of post-war Europe.

Schuman Declaration: Monnet’s supranational innovation

Jean Monnet, guiding light of the Schuman Declaration and first President of the ECSC High Authority, alerted Schuman and French Prime Minister George Bidault to the possible consequences for the French economy of an unimpeded German economic recovery, in an urgent appeal in early May 1950. At that time, Monnet was Head of the French Planning Committee and familiar with contemporary thinking on transnational cooperation in the coal and steel sectors. He worked from mid-April 1950 on the text, which later became the Schuman Declaration. There are a total of nine recognised versions of the text. Its main objectives were to ensure peace, security, European unification, modernisation of the French economy, and improvement of industrial production conditions, especially for steel production. This was to be achieved by the establishment of a common market for coal and steel, and equivalent production conditions for France and Germany. The really innovative element of the Schuman Declaration, however, was the institutional creation of a new European political organisation. This encompassed a supranational design in the form of the High Authority (today’s European Commission), equipped with real competence and independent of any direct influence from the participating Member States.

Monnet could not convince Bidault to agree to his plan. Schuman, in contrast, saw it as an opportunity for French foreign policy. Having obtained agreement in principle from German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Schuman presented the Declaration in a press conference at the Quai d’Orsay on 9 May 1950. As the text, marking a turning point in European history, was read out by Schuman, it was thereafter known as the Schuman Declaration.

Objective: Peace in Europe

To find a way to secure peace in Europe in the post-war era was a difficult task. Nevertheless, it was precisely this task to which the Schuman Declaration attempted to find an answer. The declaration’s first two sentences made this absolutely clear. They read: ‘World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The contribution which an organised and living Europe can bring to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations.’ It is thus safe to say that the Schuman Declaration was, in essence, a peace project. This was furthermore underlined by the day chosen to present the declaration, 9 May 1950, exactly one day after the fifth anniversary of the capitulation of Nazi Germany. Without the establishment of a common market for coal and steel, the creation of a strong supranational institution and the possibility for mutual monitoring, it is possible that European countries might have sleepwalked into another war. The 1951 Paris Treaty founding the ECSC adopted the essence of the Schuman Declaration, putting securing peace in Europe first and foremost.

Negotiating the European Coal and Steel Community

On 3 June 1950, the six participating countries – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – announced the launch of an intergovernmental conference to flesh out the Schuman Declaration. The countries’ agreement to start negotiations was due to both political and economic reasons. Politically, no country wanted to remain outside the newly developing Europe represented by the ECSC. Economically, Italy and the Benelux countries especially sought solutions to energy issues due to the lack of coal and emerging globalisation, which put European energy sectors under pressure from cheaper energy sources coming from non-European countries. 

Intensive negotiations started in June 1950 in Paris and took almost one year. For example, various changes to the ECSC’s institutional form were made during the negotiations. While Monnet had designed the High Authority as a small, completely independent and highly powerful body, the Benelux countries in particular demanded the creation of various control bodies. Therefore, further entities were added to the institutional set-up, including the Court of Justice, a special Council of Ministers (equivalent to today’s Council of the European Union), and the ECSC Common Assembly, the forerunner of the European Parliament. The High Authority’s competences softened, the Paris Treaty establishing the ECSC is not therefore identical to the institutional framework envisaged by Monnet when preparing the Schuman Declaration. Signed on 18 April 1951, the Paris Treaty entered into force after ratification on 23 July 1952. (Concluded for a fixed period of 50 years, the Treaty expired in July 2002, although its provisions had by then largely been subsumed into the EU Treaties.)

Historical significance

By creating the ECSC, for the first time in European history, participating states voluntarily gave up part of their sovereignty to an organisation at European level. The Schuman Declaration thereby allowed the establishment of the present-day EU by preparing its historical institutional framework. This included, as one of the most important Schuman Declaration achievements, the breakthrough in Franco-German reconciliation. Clearly its most important legacy, however, is that the supranational institutions for which the declaration paved the way have contributed a great deal to guaranteeing the peaceful co-existence of European Union Member States for many decades. It is therefore fitting to call the Schuman Declaration an innovative and visionary peace treaty.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Schuman Declaration, May 1950‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has been a wake-up call for many EU Member States’ defence budgets. Rising from €218 billion in 2021 to €326 billion in 2024, a further increase of at least €100 billion is projected by 2027. Despite these significant increases, most experts note that current geopolitical developments will require much more.

Defence budget definition
The EU uses the Classification of Functions of Government (COFOG) definition of defence spending, which includes ‘Military defence; civil defence; foreign military aid, R&D related to defence; defence not elsewhere classified’. NATO’s definition of defence spending is broader, as it includes military pensions, military healthcare (COFOG includes salaries but not healthcare) and, in some cases, spending on forces such as police or coast guards, but excludes civil defence, which COFOG includes. Moreover, discrepancies may arise from the timing of expenditure recording, particularly for military equipment, since NATO reporting does not adhere to national accounts rules on when such expenditure is recorded. Significant differences exist at national level: for example, NATO member Spain wants to include investment in cyber security, counterterrorism and curbing climate change in its defence spending definition.

EU Member States’ defence budgets

The 23 EU Member States that are also NATO members (now Sweden and Finland have joined NATO) have long been guided by NATO’s 2 % of GDP defence spending commitment formalised at the 2014 Wales Summit. Allies agreed to ‘move towards’ the 2 % ‘guideline within a decade’, but in 2021 only 7 of the 21 Member States that were also NATO members spent 2 % of GDP on defence. EU Member States participating in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO – all except Malta) also agreed to ‘regularly increase defence budgets in real terms’ under their PESCO commitments.

While defence budgets have increased in real terms since 2018/2019 (previously they had not even reached pre-2008 financial crisis levels), this follows years of chronic underinvestment in defence in most Member States. In 2021, their combined defence budgets stood at €218 billion. Meanwhile, strategic rivals such as Russia and China increased their defence budgets by 300 % and 600 % respectively over the last decade, compared to a collective 20 % increase in EU countries (to 2022). The European Commission notes that, if all Member States had spent 2 % of GDP on defence from 2006 to 2020, this would have amounted to an extra €1.1 trillion for defence spending.

The Russian war on Ukraine was a wake-up call for the EU. At the March 2022 Versailles Summit, EU leaders agreed to spend ‘more and better’ on defence. The Strategic Compass, a concrete plan of action for EU security and defence to 2030, reaffirmed this. At the 2023 Vilnius Summit, NATO leaders adopted a new Defence Investment Pledge, committing to allocate a minimum of 2 % of GDP annually to defence on a lasting basis. They also acknowledged that, in many cases, spending above the 2 % threshold will be necessary to address current capability gaps and meet current security demands. Significantly, the second von der Leyen Commission (2024-2029) has made defence a key EU priority. The first-ever Commissioner for Defence and Space was appointed and the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence was elevated to a full Standing Committee. The Commission also pledged to advance the European Defence Union, launched significant initiatives to boost the European defence industry (such as the first-ever European defence industrial strategy), and proposed a defence industry programme. The EU also legislated to boost ammunition production and incentivise joint procurement of urgent defence equipment.

On 4 March 2025, Commission President von der Leyen presented the ReArm Europe plan/Readiness 2030. This aims to leverage €800 billion in defence spending to 2029, including €150 billion in proposed EU-backed loans through a new Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument and measures to encourage national defence spending by activating the National Escape Clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for an additional 1.5 % of GDP spending on defence, redeployment of EU cohesion funds, European Investment Bank support and private capital mobilisation. So far, 16 Member States have requested activation of the escape clause. On 19 March 2025, the Commission presented its white paper for European defence, outlining a strategic plan to close critical capability gaps, strengthen the defence industry and readiness, support Ukraine, and boost innovation and partnerships to ensure the continent’s long-term security.

Defence spending increases EU Member State defence expenditure, 2024, in % of GDP

In 2022, collective annual EU defence budgets had already increased to €240 billion, of which €58 billion (+24.2 % compared to 2021) was for defence investment (defence R&D and defence procurement), a real increase of more than 6 % compared to 2021. In 2023, Member States reached a combined €279 billion (1.6 % of GDP) and €326 billion in 2024 (1.9 % of GDP). Defence spending increased by over 30 % in real terms from 2021 to 2024. Additional spending of more than €100 billion is projected in real terms by 2027. The defence expenditure of the 23 EU countries that are also NATO members amounted to 1.99 % of their combined GDP in 2024, with a forecasted rise to 2.04 % in 2025. Of NATO’s 32 members, 23 were expected to meet the 2 % benchmark in 2024 (16 of which are also in the EU). However, there are significant regional differences in the EU; while growth has been steady and has gained momentum in most of Europe, it has remained more subdued in southern European countries.

Given the size of its economy, Germany is the top spender in Europe in absolute terms, spending €90.6 billion (2.12 % of GDP) in 2024, driven more by expanded allocations from the €100 billion Sondervermögen (special fund for defence) than a core budget rise. In March 2025, German lawmakers approved a historic shift to exempt defence and security spending beyond 1 % of GDP from debt limits, enabling a €500 billion fund for defence and infrastructure. France also continued to raise defence spending, to €59.6 billion (2.06 % of GDP) in the 2024 defence budget. President Macron intends to increase French defence spending to 3.5 % of GDP, but has not given a timeframe. In Poland, spending has skyrocketed since 2022 (up 52.3 % in 2023 and 16.9 % in 2024), bringing the budget to PLN151 billion (€34 billion, or 4.12 % of GDP). Poland has thus become NATO’s top defence spender by GDP, with plans to reach 4.7 % in 2025. The largest southern European economies, Italy and Spain, have not followed the trend. Spain’s defence budget remained flat for over a decade, with 2022 spending matching 2008 levels in real terms. Although an 18 % real-terms increase began in 2023, growth stalled again in 2024 when the country failed to pass a new budget, resulting in a real-terms decline. Italy also had a decade of stagnation until moderate growth resumed in 2022, bringing spending back to 2008 levels in real terms. However, Italy plans to double its spending over four years and Spain has also vowed to reach 2 % in 2025.

Meanwhile, Russia and China have continued to raise their defence budgets. Russia spends an estimated 9 % of GDP (up from 6 % in 2023) and is projected to exceed EU Member State defence spending in purchasing power parity terms (PPP) in 2025. China announced a 7.2 % rise in its defence budget to €220 billion for 2025 (an estimated €515 billion in PPP), though experts believe actual spending may be much higher.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned ‘we are going to need a lot more than 2 %’. The United States advocates an increased spending target to 5 % of GDP. The US spent an estimated US$967 billion or 3.38 % of its GDP in 2024. Reports note ongoing talks suggest a potential compromise at around 3 % to 3.5 %, with a final decision expected at the NATO leaders’ summit at the end of June 2025. One study notes that defence spending may need to rise from 2 % to 3.5 % GDP in the short term to deter Russia without the US.

European Parliament position

Parliament has consistently called for an increase in defence spending and its 2024 Common Security and Defence Policy implementation report welcomed Member States’ increased defence spending. It urged all EU countries to boost their defence budgets beyond NATO’s 2 % of GDP benchmark and to significantly increase defence collaboration.

Read the complete ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU Member States’ defence budgets‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

In 1958, Robert Schuman was elected president of the European Parliamentary Assembly, predecessor to the European Parliament. This French politician, who was particularly sensitive to the tensions between France and Germany, is regarded as one of the ‘founding fathers’ of what is now the European Union. After the Second World War, he supported the establishment of the Council of Europe and helped to bring many other European projects to fruition.

With his declaration of 9 May 1950, considered the founding act of the European integration process, Robert Schuman assumed political responsibility for a common coal and steel market that would later become the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The declaration underlines the role of France in building a strong, prosperous and peaceful Europe, starting with France and Germany. Going far beyond mere objectives, the declaration also sets out the precise basis upon which the negotiations should begin.

Robert Schuman was president of the European Parliamentary Assembly from 1958 to 1960. This institution was the political institution par excellence of the Communities: at once a democratic organ representing the peoples of Europe, a body invested with the power of executive scrutiny, and a unifying element between the three Communities.

Highly influenced by Christian values, Robert Schuman campaigned to build a strong and united Europe step by step, and to establish institutionalised solidarity between European countries. Robert Schuman’s legacy continues to influence and shape the European Union to this day.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Robert Schuman‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Gemma Patterson.

The agenda for the Parliament’s February plenary session reflects gathering impetus to face the challenges of the current geopolitical upheaval affecting both international relations more widely and people’s human rights and aspirations both at home and overseas.

Members are due to hear the Commission’s long-awaited plans for this year’s legislative work on Wednesday morning, with a debate following Ursula von der Leyen’s presentation of the 2025 Commission work programme, due to be adopted the previous afternoon. Many of the planned initiatives – some 47 legislative and non-legislative proposals to come by the end of 2026 – have already been included in the Commission’s ‘competitiveness compass’, which focuses on boosting productivity through innovation, accelerating the green transition while maintaining industrial competitiveness, and reducing foreign dependencies in sectors such as raw materials. Later on Wednesday, Members are expected to debate a Commission statement on the work set out in the compass, including on simplifying legislation, improving access to venture capital, and introducing a competitiveness fund.

Tackling labour shortages in the EU is a cornerstone of efforts to increase competitiveness. Parliament has long sounded the alarm regarding worsening shortages in the healthcare sector, with an estimated deficit of 1.2 million healthcare workers in 2022, driven by an ageing population and frequent burnout. Members are due to hold a debate on Tuesday afternoon on urgent labour shortages in the healthcare sector following a Commission statement. The Commission is expected to propose solutions to ensure quality healthcare jobs, including improved retention strategies, better working conditions, a focus on attracting third-country nationals and digital transformation for healthcare efficiency. To tackle labour market shortages more generally, the Council and Commission are due to make statements in plenary on Tuesday afternoon on boosting vocational education and training (VET). Parliament had already called for VET to be modernised to help people match their skills to new developments, especially in technology, in 2022.

The EU currently depends on foreign providers for some key elements of its communications infrastructure. Rising concern over foreign influence, particularly from China and Russia, have led Parliament to call for greater technological sovereignty, stricter ICT supply chain security and reduced reliance on high-risk vendors. On Thursday morning, Members are set to debate a Commission statement on threats to EU sovereignty in communications infrastructure, focusing on strategic dependencies in submarine cables, 5G networks, and satellite connectivity, among other things.

Geopolitical tensions abound in 2025 – and feature widely on the plenary agenda. The Council and Commission are expected to make statements on Tuesday morning on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, as we approach three full years of Russia’s war of aggression. On the EU’s own doorstep, regions bordering Russia face economic decline, job losses, and migration challenges due to Russia’s war on Ukraine and border closures. Following Council and Commission statements on Wednesday, Members are set to debate the need to extend critical targeted support to EU regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.

Parliament is monitoring the implications for transatlantic relations of Donald Trump’s second term as US President. On Wednesday, Members are due to debate a Commission statement on the US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, the WHO, and the suspension of US aid. The Council and Commission are also expected to make statements on preparedness for a new trade era for a debate on Tuesday.

Members are set to debate the EU’s need for a wider comprehensive strategy towards the Middle East on Tuesday evening. With ongoing instability in the region, including fragile ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon, and heightened tensions between Israel and Iran, the Commission has announced a stronger, more coherent approach. Parliament has acknowledged the complexity facing such a strategy, given the multidimensional challenge.

Finally, on Tuesday morning, Members are expected to vote on giving consent to the conclusion of a new protocol to the EU fisheries agreement with Cabo Verde, ensuring continued tuna fishing access for EU vessels while supporting Cabo Verde’s fisheries sector. The agreement provides fishing opportunities for 56 vessels from Spain, Portugal, and France, alongside an annual €780 000 financial contribution for access rights and to support the sector.

• A competitiveness compass for the EU
• Healthcare in the EU: Addressing urgent labour shortages and ensuring quality jobs
• Boosting vocational education and training in a changing labour market
• Strategic dependencies: Threats to EU sovereignty in communication infrastructure
• EU regions bordering Russia: Targeted support
• US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement and from the WHO
• Wider comprehensive EU Middle East strategy
• EU fisheries agreement with Cabo Verde: Conclusion of a new protocol (2024-2029)

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud.

Batteries, widely used in the transport and energy sectors, are central to the global energy system. They will be key to the EU’s clean energy transition, industrial future and strategic autonomy. Boosting the industrial base for battery production is therefore a key task for the EU.

While the EU battery sector enjoys strong support for its research and development activities, it also faces significant challenges such as dependencies on third countries and high energy and labour costs. Developing battery recycling or implementing more sustainable value chains could help address some of these challenges. However, significant threats, such as competition from countries with lower environmental standards, may hinder progress and require strategic action.

Projections around battery manufacturing in the EU remain highly uncertain. Many reports claim that the EU is on track to meet its future battery needs, yet also highlight significant risks that could prevent this from happening. Factors such as rising energy and labour costs, incentives offered by third countries, slower-than-expected market developments, or difficult access to critical raw materials, could undermine the sector’s competitiveness. Mastering the complexities of battery manufacturing technologies remains another major challenge. Delays or cancellations of gigafactory projects have already been announced across Europe. The recent collapse of Northvolt, once hailed as Europe’s flagship home-grown battery manufacturer, has raised serious concerns about the future of batteries ‘made in Europe’.

The EU has long recognised batteries as one of its strategic technological sectors. To make its battery supply chains secure, resilient and sustainable, the EU uses three approaches. First, it seeks to inject strategic impetus into the sector, using its convening power to improve cooperation among stakeholders. Second, it is working on a comprehensive regulatory framework. Third, it provides the sector with funding. The development of the battery sector provides an instructive case study for shaping an effective EU industrial policy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Powering the EU’s future: Strengthening the battery industry‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jérôme Saulnier, Aleksandra Heflich and Lenka Jančová with Iulia-Maria Florea and Karla Grosse Kohorst.

As highlighted by the recent Letta and Draghi reports, it is now imperative for the European Union (EU) to boost investment and to start acting more strategically and collectively to compete on global markets. This requires clear political priorities, budgetary means, lower rates of waste in public spending at Member State level, and crucially a transnational pro-innovation perspective. Although largely elusive at this point, such an agenda could bring substantial economic benefit. Compared with Member States acting alone, an EPRS study finds a coordinated approach at EU level could add 0.9 % gross domestic product (GDP) by 2035. A more ambitious integrated approach would be of even higher benefit, estimated at 2.6 % of GDP by 2035.

What could be done?

Thanks to the visionary compromises achieved by generations of previous leaders, the EU was in a good position to compete in an open and rules-based global arena. However, geopolitical considerations are now challenging this status quo. The return of protectionist tendencies and the action of large and dominant global players, some with strong ties to government, are a reality test for the future of the level playing field.

Figure 1 – Share of international patents (most challenging areas – % in 2022)

To remain competitive while continuing to ensure progress on environmental, social and fundamental rights, it is now imperative for the EU to update and upgrade its strategic approach. Considerable investment in infrastructure, manufacturing, scaling up and in research and development could boost high-tech digital and low-carbon innovation. EU businesses could then harness the full potential of the single market and economic and monetary union and challenge competitors in fast-growing and future-oriented fields.

One of the most pressing challenges is that, while the EU’s focus on tackling the green and digital transformation might be correct, the EU lacks key elements, in particular sufficient common budgetary resources and fiscal tools. Reinforced EU action could help EU legislation to become harder-hitting, more credible and effective. Without such incentives, the opportunity to become an innovation leader in some high added-value areas might never materialise.

The need to increase support and investment for research development and innovation (RDI) substantially is well-documented, particularly as the EU’s self-imposed 25-year-old key priority target of spending 3 % of GDP on RDI is still far from being achieved (RDI expenditure currently stands at around 2.2 % of GDP in the EU). Public expenditure on RDI is also of particular concern, as the EU increasingly falls behind. A gap of more than €30 billion per year has now widened with the United States and China. The EU also needs to address inefficiency and duplication in research, while complementary top-down investment is almost non‑existent.

The EU could encourage greater private investment, public-private partnerships and provide public investment in manufacturing, scaling-up and infrastructure, to ensure modernisation and adaptation to rapid ongoing transformation. Public investment would be more efficient at EU level, as public finances in Member States face significant consolidation challenges.

Recent studies highlight how acting together could help Member States here, while also helping to reduce inefficiency and the budgetary waste rate. The 2015 Juncker investment plan and 2020 Next Generation EU, provide examples to build on, as they have already had a positive, albeit insufficient, impact.

As the Draghi report recommends, moving towards a strategic pro-innovation EU agenda is therefore necessary. The EU’s current institutions are under-resourced compared to global competitors and sometimes entangled in complex inter-related organisational structures that focus primarily on administrative and governance reform rather than on innovation. This situation is of particular concern as the EU is increasingly ranked at best as a marginal player in key fast-growing technologies of the future (see Figure 1).

What is the potential economic benefit?

Ambitious and strategic EU-level action is essential to the EU’s position as a global actor. This is especially true given geopolitical shifts and the breakthrough technologies that are reshaping the distribution of added value.

Figure 2 – Strategic action in HTDI and LCI – Cost of non-Europe in three scenarios (GDP difference in percent relative to Member State-led action)

The EPRS study finds that were Member States to act alone, this could add +1.4 % of GDP in 2035, compared to the baseline (Scenario 1).

Reinforced coordination and cooperation and embryonic EU complementary action could add 2.2 % of GDP in 2035, compared to the baseline (Scenario 2).

A more ambitious integrated approach (Scenario 3) could add an estimated 4 % of GDP in 2035 compared to the baseline.

As illustrated in Figure 2, the cost of non-Europe, which compares the results of the three scenarios, is therefore estimated at between +0.9 % and +2.6 % of GDP in 2035.

Read the complete study on ‘Benefit of an EU strategic innovation agenda – Cost of non Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rosamund Shreeves.

As part of broader efforts to combat all forms of violence against women and girls, the European Union (EU) is committed to working collectively to eradicate female genital mutilation (FGM) and to supporting its Member States’ efforts in this field. The European Commission assesses EU measures to combat FGM every year, on or around 6 February – the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation.

Facts and figures

Female genital mutilation (FGM) includes all procedures that intentionally alter or cause injury to the female genital organs for non-medical purposes. FGM is carried out for cultural, religious and social reasons, mostly on young girls between infancy and the age of 15. It has no health benefits and can result in serious effects on health and wellbeing, even death, while generating considerable healthcare costs.

The exact number of girls and women affected by FGM is not known, but the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that, worldwide, at least 200 million women and girls have been ‘cut’, while around 4 million girls are at risk of undergoing FGM every year. The practice, most common in 28 African countries, is also prevalent in parts of the Middle East and Asia, and reported to a lesser extent elsewhere. Analysis by UNICEF and the UN Population Fund shows that it has declined strongly in some countries over the past decade, but stagnated in others. Population growth in high-risk areas, multiple crises and pushbacks against efforts to combat FGM threaten progress. FGM performed by health professionals is gaining traction in some countries. This does not reduce harm and is contrary to medical ethics.

FGM is not covered in the EU-wide survey on violence against women. Data on FGM prevalence in Europe are lacking. Four studies conducted by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) between 2012 and 2020, found that there are victims (or potential victims) in at least 16 EU countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland and Sweden. The European End FGM network estimates that there are over 600 000 FGM survivors living in Europe and that 180 000 girls are at risk in 13 European countries alone. Around 20 000 women and girls from FGM-practising countries seek asylum in the EU every year, with an estimated 1 000 asylum claims relating directly to FGM. This number has grown steadily since 2008.

Commitments and action to combat FGM

FGM is a form of child abuse and gender-based violence, and is recognised internationally as a violation of the human rights of girls and women. The practice also violates a person’s rights to health, security and physical integrity; the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; and the right to life in cases where the procedure results in death. Measures have been adopted at international, EU and national level to prevent FGM and to protect FGM victims.

Instruments and action at international level

At international level, United Nations (UN), African Union and Council of Europe standards are benchmarks for work to combat FGM. Key treaties, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Geneva Convention, all cover FGM indirectly, with specific guidance on protection and asylum for victims. In Africa, the 15 parties to the Maputo Protocol have committed to eliminate FGM (Article V). The Council of Europe’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) is the first treaty to recognise that FGM exists in Europe (Article 38). It sets out specific obligations on preventing and combating the practice and providing support for victims and those at risk.

The UN’s longstanding efforts to end the practice culminated in its first specific resolution on FGM in 2012. The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development identifies FGM as a harmful practice, to be eliminated by 2030 (SDG 5, target 5.3). The UN has named 6 February the International Day of Zero Tolerance for FGM. The European Commission takes stock annually, around that day, of EU efforts to combat FGM.

EU legislation, policy and funding

The EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights affirm the principles of gender equality and non-discrimination, guaranteeing the right to dignity and including provisions on the right to physical and mental integrity. In 2024, the EU adopted a Directive on combating violence against women, to be transposed into national law by June 2027. It requires Member States to criminalise FGM as a specific offence, sets a maximum prison sentence of no less than five years for perpetrators and improves support for victims. It also aims to implement the Istanbul Convention in areas of EU competence, including judicial cooperation in criminal matters and asylum policy. EU asylum law is relevant for asylum-seekers affected by or at risk of FGM. The current legislation recognises FGM victims as vulnerable asylum applicants requiring specific support. New legislation on reception conditions and qualification for international protection, due to enter into application in 2026, also recognises FGM victims as asylum applicants with special needs, and stipulates that specific forms of support should be provided. The proposed revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive would also strengthen support for victims of FGM.

Combating gender-based violence, including FGM, is one of the priorities of the EU’s external action and its internal strategies on children’s rights and gender equality. The EU has recognised the need for a coordinated approach to combating FGM. In 2013, it set a framework for action across the fields of justice, police, health, social services, child protection, education, immigration and asylum and external relations. The objectives include: developing reliable EU-level data, improving access to support and justice for victims, raising awareness among relevant professionals and communities, ensuring that EU asylum and victim protection legislation is implemented effectively, and promoting the elimination of FGM worldwide. To complement this framework and the Directive on combating violence against women, the Commission has committed to tabling a recommendation on preventing and combating FGM and other harmful practices.

Funding for tackling FGM is provided through the joint EU-UN Spotlight Initiative and EU funding programmes, notably the longstanding Daphne strand, which continues under the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme for 2021 to 2027. In 2023, the Commission accepted the need for more effective tracking of Spotlight Initiative funding allocated to fighting FGM. It also recognised the need for further action to raise awareness in the communities concerned within the EU.

National-level instruments against FGM

Many of the actions needed to end FGM lie within the competences of the Member States. FGM is a prosecutable offence under national law in all Member States, either as a specific criminal act or as an act of bodily harm or injury. However, very few cases are brought to court. Some Member States have developed national action plans on FGM. Continuing issues of concern include barriers to reporting and successful prosecution, victim support, and ways to ensure long-term, sustainable cultural change. Civil society organisations urge the Member States and the EU institutions to use the Directive on violence against women, the reform of asylum legislation and the next multiannual EU budget as a spur to improve FGM prevention and support for survivors. They also call on the Commission to adopt the recommendation on harmful practices in 2025.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has played an important role in raising awareness and pushing for firm action on FGM, including through the work of its Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM). Parliament adopted resolutions on FGM in 2001, 2009, 2012, 2014, and 2018, calling on the Commission and Member States to provide the legal and other means required to raise awareness, protect and support victims and ensure that offenders are prosecuted. Parliament has called for appropriate protection for women and girls seeking asylum on grounds of FGM. In 2020, it set out its own recommendations for an EU strategy to put an end to FGM around the world and, in 2021, called for coordination of external and internal action. In 2024, Parliament pledged its support for efforts to eradicate FGM where progress was at risk. It pushed for strong provisions on accessible specialist support for FGM victims in the Directive on combating violence against women. Parliament has also welcomed the Commission’s plan to table a recommendation on preventing and combating harmful practices.

This publication is a further update of an ‘at a glance’ note originally published in January 2015.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Zero tolerance for female genital mutilation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Pieter Baert.

Value added tax (VAT) is a crucial revenue stream for both EU and national budgets. However, substantial losses resulting from domestic and cross-border VAT fraud make its enforcement an essential priority amid growing financial demands. Fraudsters, who are regularly part of organised criminal networks, exploit weaknesses in the VAT system, causing government revenue losses worth billions of euros.

Over the years, the EU and its Member States have taken a variety of measures to close VAT loopholes, adopting innovative digital tools to facilitate exchange of information and detect and stop fraudulent transactions as fast as possible. Member States have also committed to cooperating more closely, through bodies such as the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and Eurofisc; this has led to the successful dismantling of major VAT fraud networks responsible for billions of euros of damage. While progress has been made, the involvement of multiple actors in combating VAT fraud has raised questions about how to optimise cooperation between these bodies.

European Commissioner for Taxation, Wopke Hoekstra, has been tasked with maintaining ambitious efforts to combat tax fraud in the EU, while the Commissioner for Budget, Piotr Serafin, is leading a review of the EU’s anti-fraud structures with a view to enhancing efficiency and cooperation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Filling the gap: The EU’s fight against VAT fraud‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Example of MTIC fraud

Citizens are calling on the European Union to curtail the influence of the platform X on the federal election in Germany. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject since January 2025, asking her to act now to ensure that X meets its obligations concerning transparency, content moderation and risk mitigation during elections.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President:

Main elements of our reply Enforcing the Digital Services Act (DSA)

The European Commission is responsible for overseeing the enforcement of the Digital Services Act. In December 2023, the Commission opened formal proceedings against X to assess whether it is meeting its obligations concerning transparency, content moderation and risk mitigation during elections.

Further action may also be taken at national level by the German Digital Services Coordinator.

What is the European Parliament doing?

The European Parliament is committed to safeguarding democracy and ensuring that online platforms operate responsibly.

In December 2024, the European Parliament set up a Special committee on the European Democracy Shield. The committee will assess policies aimed at preserving the fairness and integrity of elections. It will focus on interference in democracy and elections through very large online platforms, such as X.

On 21 January 2025, the European Parliament held a debate on the need to enforce the Digital Services Act to protect democracy on social media platforms, including against foreign interference and biased algorithms. You can watch the debate in all official EU languages and access the full text of the debate in the original language of the speakers.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Citizens are calling on the European Union to sanction Iceland for its whaling practices. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject since January 2025 to express their concerns regarding the impact of whaling in the environment. They are also calling on the EU to impose sanctions on Iceland, push for sustainable alternatives like ecotourism, and encourage Iceland to prioritize marine conservation.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President:

Main elements of our reply EU laws protecting whales

Iceland’s decision to allow the hunting of whales falls outside the EU’s jurisdiction. However, whalesare protected from hunting within EU waters. The EU has always defended the full implementation of the moratorium on commercial whaling, in place since 1986.

Parliamentary debate

As mentioned in your message, on 22 January 2025 the European Parliament held a debate on stepping up international action to protect whales following Iceland’s decision to extend commercial whaling until 2029.

Members of the European Parliament raised concern about Iceland’s decision. They underlined the vital role that whales play in maintaining the marine ecosystem and the need for stronger, enforceable action under updated international frameworks. Members also highlighted that ecotourism such as whale watching can protect tradition, ecosystems and the economy.

You can read the full text of the debate in the original language of the speakers.

European Parliament position on whaling

In its October 2022 resolution, the European Parliament strongly supports the continuation of the global moratorium on commercial whaling as well as the ban on international trade in whale products. Parliament calls on Japan, Norway and Iceland to cease their whaling operations. The European Parliament also notes the critical importance of whale populations to marine ecosystems and carbon sequestration.

Decision on EU sanctions

The European Parliament is not involved in the process of adopting sanctions against non-EU countries. Following a proposal from the Head of EU diplomacy, decisions on EU sanctions are taken in a unanimity at the Council.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout.

Three years after its launch, Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan is positively impacting lives by fostering collaboration and advancing prevention, early detection, treatment and care while enhancing the quality of life for cancer patients. Nevertheless, cancer remains a major public health challenge, with cancer cases continuing to rise, reflecting population ageing as well as changes to people’s exposure to risk factors.

World Cancer Day

World Cancer Day was established on 4 February 2000 at the ‘World Summit Against Cancer for the New Millennium’, on the initiative of the Union for International Cancer Control. The three-year ‘United by unique’ campaign (2025-2027) aims to raise awareness about the need for people-centred care. Behind every cancer diagnosis, there is a unique human story, but people touched by cancer are united in a shared ambition to see cancer treated successfully and lead better lives with cancer.

Background

As defined by the World Health Organization (WHO), cancer is a generic term for a large group of diseases that can affect any part of the body. One defining feature of cancer is the rapid creation of abnormal cells that grow beyond their usual boundaries, which can then invade adjoining parts of the body and spread to other organs (metastasis). Cancer arises from the transformation of normal cells into tumour cells in a multistage process that generally progresses from a pre-cancerous lesion to a malignant tumour.

According to the WHO’s International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), at least 40 % of all cancer cases could be prevented with effective primary prevention measures. Tobacco use, alcohol consumption, unhealthy diet, obesity, lack of physical activity, hormones, environmental exposures, occupational exposures, ultraviolet radiation exposure, infections (e.g. hepatitis B and C viruses and some types of human papillomavirus) are the main risk factors for cancer. The impact of cancer can also be reduced through early detection and appropriate treatment.

Facts and figures

The European Cancer Information System (ECIS) provides indicators on cancer across the EU. Mainly driven by an ageing population, the burden of cancer is increasing: in 2022, 2.7 million people in the EU were diagnosed with cancer; cancer deaths also went up and were estimated to be at 1.3 million. Cancer is currently the second leading cause of mortality in the EU on average (after cardiovascular diseases), although it is already the leading cause of death in five Member States (Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Spain). Cancer diagnoses are expected to increase by 19 % by 2040 in EU countries; in the same period, cancer deaths are expected to increase by 27 %, making cancer the leading cause of death in the EU. The four most common cancer causes of death in the EU are estimated to be lung (19.5 % of all cancer deaths), followed by colorectal (12.3 %), breast (7.5 %), and pancreatic cancer (7.4 %). Among men, the main diagnoses are prostate cancer, followed by lung cancer and colorectal cancer. Among women, breast cancer is the main diagnosis. As underlined in the 2024 report on ‘Beating Cancer Inequalities in the EU‘, published jointly by the European Commission and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), not everyone has the same risk of dying from cancer, even within the same country.

The economic burden of cancer across the EU is difficult to calculate. In 2021, the Commission estimated the overall economic impact of cancer to exceed €100 billion annually. In its November 2024 report on ‘Tackling the impact of cancer on health, the economy and society‘, the OECD estimates that – assuming that the incidence and survival rates of cancer per age group remain unchanged – per capita cancer health expenditure would grow by 67 % between 2023 and 2050 on average across the OECD.

EU action on cancer

EU Member States are responsible for their own healthcare policies. However, according to Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the EU can complement and add value to national actions by encouraging the sharing of information and best practices and by fostering cooperation.

As far back as 1985, the EU has been fighting cancer alongside Member States, in collaboration with the WHO, the Joint Research Centre and the IARC. The EU focuses on prevention, research and information while also fostering cooperation between Member States. It also complements Member States’ efforts by adopting legislation to address cancer risk factors (such as exposure to environmental pollution or hazardous substances and radiation, obesity, alcohol-related harm, tobacco consumption and smoke- and aerosol-free environments) and ensuring specific policy rules reflect cancer-related concerns.

In February 2021, as part of the European Health Union, the European Commission adopted the Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan to address cancer-related inequalities and help improve prevention, treatment and care. The plan is structured around four key action areas (prevention; early detection; diagnosis and treatment; and quality of life) and supported by 10 flagship initiatives, currently under implementation:

1. The Knowledge Centre on Cancer
2. The European Network of Comprehensive Cancer Centres (which, by 2028, should link 100 multidisciplinary structures that manage all aspects of cancer care, research and specialised medical training)
3. Cancer diagnosis and treatment for all
4. The European Cancer Inequalities Registry
5. The EU Cancer Screening Scheme (a Council recommendation was adopted in 2022)
6. The European Initiative to Understand Cancer
7. Better quality of life for cancer patients (smart card application)
8. Eliminate cancers caused by the human papillomavirus (a Council recommendation on vaccine-preventable cancers was adopted in 2024)
9. The European Cancer Imaging Initiative (to create digital infrastructure linking cancer imaging data resources across the EU)
10. Helping children with cancer

The EU has invested continuously in cancer research through successive framework programmes for research and innovation. Under Horizon Europe (2021-2027), the EU Mission on Cancer aims to offer a comprehensive approach by bringing together research, innovation and policy development.

European Parliament

In June 2020, the European Parliament set up a Special Committee on Beating Cancer (BECA), which completed its mandate in December 2021. The final report (‘Strengthening Europe in the fight against cancer – towards a comprehensive and coordinated strategy‘) was adopted by Parliament in February 2022. The recommendations focus on cancer prevention, equal access to cancer care across borders, and a European approach addressing medicine shortages.

In its resolution of 13 December 2023 on non-communicable diseases (NCDs), Parliament pointed out that many people living with NCDs (including cancer) are undiagnosed and unaware of their illness, and thus fail to get proper, timely treatment. It invited the Commission to collect examples of best practices regarding screening for and early detection of NCDs.

Since the start of the current legislature, Parliament has submitted several written questions to the Commission regarding cancer-related issues. They include questions on the reintegration of cancer patients into the workplace (E-002497/2024), addressing ageism in cancer-related healthcare (E-001125/2024), and providing support to Member States lagging behind in screening programmes (E-002125/2024). Additional questions have focused on the Commission’s efforts to achieve a tobacco-free generation by 2040 (E-001618/2024), tackling unequal access to medicinal products (E-002559/2024), introducing labelling on all alcoholic beverages (E-002418/2024), and abolishing taxes on domestic fruit and vegetable production as a measure to tackle child obesity, cancer and diabetes (E-002474/2024). The new standing Committee on Public Health (SANT) – succeeding the SANT subcommittee – will continue to monitor the implementation of the Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘World Cancer Day 2025 – 4 FebruaryThe burden of cancer is increasing‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.