European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Enrico D’Ambrogio.

Japan’s culture of national resilience is one of the most advanced in the world. The UN-backed definition of preparedness was adopted in 2017 in Japan, a country highly exposed to natural hazards, under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). Through national resilience, the country aims to prevent human loss by any means, avoid fatal damage to important functions for maintaining administration as well as social and economic systems, mitigate damage to private property and public facilities, and achieve swift recovery and reconstruction.

The COVID-19 pandemic made Japan an early mover in the implementation of economic security policies, including reducing the dependence of its supply chains on China. Japan appointed the world’s first minister for economic security and adopted legislation to protect the country from coercion by others through economic dependency. Japan’s initiatives also made it a leader in global green supply chains. The adoption of three main documents in December 2022 helped Japan reshape its approach to national security and defence and become better equipped to face the current complex geopolitical environment.

In March 2025, the European Commission launched the preparedness union strategy. The EU and Japan are increasing cooperation in several aspects related to preparedness and resilience, including in economic security, cybersecurity and foreign information manipulation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Japan’s preparedness strategies: Lessons for the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Parliament’s first October plenary session featured a formal address by Jens-Frederik Nielsen, Prime Minister of Greenland. Members discussed the European Union’s relations with countries outside the Union in various debates, including on the EU’s role in supporting peace efforts for Gaza and a two-state solution; a united EU response to Russian violation of EU Member States’ airspace; an EU strategy to face Iran’s nuclear threat and on EU sanctions; the situation in Afghanistan; and the Second World Summit for Social Development. Members also considered and rejected two motions of censure of the Commission. A debate addressed rising antisemitism in Europe. Members also debated intergenerational fairness; completing the single market; and promoting EU digital rules. Finally, a debate marked World Mental Health Day (10 October), and Members debated the public health risks exacerbated by global warming.

This is Europe debate

The October I 2025 session featured the first ‘This is Europe‘ debate of the current term, with the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Luc Frieden.

Visa suspension mechanism

Many non-EU nationals can visit the Schengen area for 90 days without having to apply for a visa. To protect the system from abuse, the visa suspension mechanism allows the EU to temporarily end the visa exemption for citizens of certain countries for security reasons. A proposal to strengthen the mechanism has been on the table since 2023. Members held a debate and adopted the text agreed between Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Council, which emphasises the links between the EU’s external relations and the need to revise the visa suspension mechanism to cover, for instance, cases of state-sponsored instrumentalisation of migrants, investor-citizenship schemes and human rights violations.

Common agricultural policy simplification

Following a debate on the common agricultural policy (CAP), Members approved a report on the European Commission proposal to amend the current rules on payments to farmers, aimed at cutting red tape, one of the farming community’s key demands. Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development proposes the CAP simplification include more flexibility on environmental rules, easier access to crisis payments and increased support for small and medium-sized farms. The vote sets Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

European works councils

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement reached by Parliament’s negotiators on a revision of the European Works Councils Directive. European works councils represent workers employed by multinationals operating in at least two EU countries. The revision of the legislation aims at strengthening the enforcement of transnational information and consultation rights, excluding trivial issues and including stronger provisions on gender balance. Parliament has succeeded in including rules to ensure penalties will be dissuasive, effective and proportionate.

Amending budget No 2/2025

Members adopted amending budget No 2/2025, updating the revenue side of the current year’s EU budget. The report from Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) endorsed the Council position on the Commission proposal to take revised revenue forecasts into account and notes the need for increased gross national income contributions from the Member States. The committee also reiterates that the EU must endeavour to find fresh funding streams for new EU policy priorities.

Inland waterway transport: River Information Services

Members adopted an agreed revision to the legislation ensuring safety and environmental protection on the EU’s inland waterways. Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) reached an agreement with the Council that the revision should establish a single digital information platform, ensure harmonised reporting, introduce a feedback mechanism and update privacy and security requirements. The committee would, however, prefer that the scope of the revision of harmonised river information services apply only to waterways and ports that are part of a cross-border network.

Extension of the derogation for heavy-duty vehicles with zero emissions

The EU aims at reducing CO2 emissions from heavy-duty vehicles by 43 % by 2030, with higher targets to follow. However, as zero-emission heavy-duty vehicles remain expensive, EU law allows governments to encourage their use by granting reductions or exemptions to road charges for such vehicles. Members approved, under the urgent procedure, an extension of the derogation for heavy-duty vehicles with zero emissions to June 2031.

New strategic EU-India agenda

Members held a debate on Council and Commission statements on a joint communication, which lays out the path for negotiations on a new strategic EU-India agenda, set for adoption at a bilateral summit in 2026. The debate covered progress on a free trade agreement, financial supervision arrangements and security and defence ties.

EU-Côte d’Ivoire Fisheries Partnership Agreement

Following a recommendation from Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries (PECH), Members granted Parliament’s consent for the conclusion of a new protocol covering the EU’s fisheries agreement with Côte d’Ivoire. The protocol sets opportunities for EU vessels from Spain, France and Portugal to fish for tuna in Côte d’Ivoire’s waters, in exchange for a financial contribution to the country’s sustainable fisheries sector.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Four decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, from: the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) and Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) Committees on the public interface connected to the Internal Market Information System for the declaration of posting of workers; from the EMPL committee on improving and enforcing working conditions of trainees and combating regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships (‘Traineeships Directive’); from the IMCO committee on market availability of measuring instruments: electric vehicle supply equipment, compressed gas dispensers, and electricity, gas and thermal energy meters; and from the Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) Committee on incentivising defence-related investments in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan were approved without a vote.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – October I 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

When asked how many microcontrollers they have on their desk, most people would only consider the one in their laptop, whereas in fact, a laptop alone contains several. Besides the microprocessor hosting the Control Processing Unit (CPU), which is not a microcontroller properly speaking, microcontrollers govern laptop functions such as communications, drivers, the power supply, touchpad and screen. There may also be another microcontroller (or several) in their smartphone, plus those in their landline phone, watch, earphones, mouse, calendar, thermometer, printer, chargers, external screen – and even in the coffee machine and the desk lamp. Microelectronics technology is everywhere: it includes semiconductors and components, but is far broader than that. It ranges from the control units for cars, planes and drones to small appliances, medical equipment or mobile phones, reaching over US$600 billion in revenue, up by 19.7 % year-on-year, excluding software development for artificial intelligence (AI).

The microelectronics industry is a strategic asset for Europe, which the European Commission ranks as one of the most research and development (R&D) intensive sectors. The sector supports around 200 000 jobs directly and more than 1 000 000 indirect jobs in Europe. However, the EU share in global chip capacity has decreased from 13 % in 2010 to 7‑8 % in 2025. This can be attributed to factors such as growing manufacturing costs – including energy – and low public investment in the required R&D to deploy the complex supply chain and to support initial investment in manufacturing equipment.

The major manufacturers of semiconductor chips are based in the USA (Intel, Micron), Taiwan (TSMC) and South Korea (Samsung, SK Hynix), and most designers (or Fabless semiconductor companies) are also based in the USA (NVIDIA, AMD). Nevertheless, the EU has traditionally been at the forefront of the global semiconductor value chain, holding specific know-how, such as in the production of equipment for manufacturing semiconductors (e.g. ASML in the Netherlands). Furthermore, and although they are decreasing and insufficiently widespread, Europe retains the basic skills for non-advanced everyday (but highly strategic) versions of microelectronics technology.

Potential impacts and developments

Microelectronic components are complete miniaturised circuits composed of standard electronic parts, such as transistors, capacitors, diodes, and resistors, which operate at microscopic scale. These circuits are designed to perform specific functions and, therefore, are closely linked to optimisation in the assembly of new products and devices. Modern versions of technological products rely on microelectronics technology to the extent that no product can compete in the market today without it, which risks excluding the small and medium-sized enterprises that are – and will remain – vital to the EU and usually lack the required skills and resources. This is not always about the newest technologies and the highest levels of integration for big production series, it is also about everyday components in a broad variety of industrial sectors. The competitive advantage of already strong microelectronic players has become overwhelming.

According to the European Semiconductor Industry Association (ESIA), in the EU this sector has a multiplier effect of around 2.5 (meaning that every euro invested in the industry generates an additional €2.5 in economic activity), whereas this same factor is 4.3 in the USA and 3.5 in China. Microelectronics accounts for around 1.4 % to 1.6 % of the EU’s GDP (€230 billion to €250 billion), 2.2 % to 2.5 % of the USA’s GDP (€380 billion to €440 billion) and 2.5 % to 3.0 % of China’s GDP (€390 billion to €480 billion).

Strategic sectors such as the automotive industry, AI, telecommunications and defence are fast evolving to models that are ever more dependent on microelectronics to provide new functionalities, which are becoming key market assets. The European Chips Act entered into force on 21 September 2023, together with the Critical Raw Materials Act; they have become key pillars for EU open strategic autonomy, setting a reliable foundation for a competitive EU.

Anticipatory policymaking

While addressing competitiveness in her 2025 State of the Union speech, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stressed the need to ‘keep up the speed’. The Commission will therefore ‘propose an industrial accelerator act for key strategic sectors and technologies’. Von der Leyen concluded that, ‘when it comes to digital and clean tech’, the EU aims to be ‘faster, smarter and more European’. However, and although she particularly referred to critical raw materials and this was implicit in her speech, she did not specifically mention microelectronics or semiconductors. However, they are fundamental to achieving the proposed goals of a competitive knowledge economy and enhanced defence capacity.

Pillar I of the European Chips Act establishes the chips for Europe initiative, which will support technological capacity building and innovation in the Union by bridging the gap between the Union’s advanced research and innovation capabilities and their industrial (and dual-use) exploitation. Horizon Europe allocates significant funding for R&D in the microelectronics sector, while the Chips Joint Undertaking (Chips JU) aims to support its development. Related technologies such as the internet of things, edge computing and AI benefit from complementary initiatives such as smart anything everywhere (SAE) and the European processor initiative (EPI). The EU is addressing the skills shortage through programmes such as the digital education action plan and the more specific large-scale partnership (LSP) in microelectronics, which promotes specialised training. Additionally, the Important Project of Common European Interest (IPCEI) in microelectronics allows EU Member States to support related projects with State aid, and initiatives such as Eurostack aim to improve the EU’s strategic autonomy.

While the Chips Act is a definite step forward, the strong strategic aspect of this sector requires continued monitoring and sustained action. Policymakers and industry leaders can work together to promote public and private investment and the development of a sustainable business environment suitable for the microelectronics industry, including to support the development of skills, talent, innovation and risk-taking that will bolster European prosperity and security.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if the EU ran on microelectronics?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai and Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Raffaele Ventura, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides insight into the economic performance of Ukraine compared with the European Union (EU) and examines the trade dynamics between them. In 2024, Ukraine experienced an economic growth rate of 3.5%, while the EU-27 recorded a growth rate of only 1.1%. Both regions continue to see declining inflation rates. However, increasing exchange rate of the Ukrainian hryvnia reveals a weakening currency, alongside a rise in the country’s public net debt, which has climbed to 89.8%. The EU-27 is Ukraine’s primary trading partner, accounting for 53.6% of its trade share, with Poland being the leading country with trade value €17.8 billion. In 2024, while overall EU exports are on the rise, imports from Ukraine to the EU are experiencing a declining trend.

Read this ‘infographic’ on ‘Ukraine: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

GDP growth
(annual change, %) Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
(at PPP 1 in thousands of international dollars) Female labour force participation rate
(% of female population aged 15+) Total unemployment rate
(% of total labour force) FDI and remittances Public finances, monetary and financial data EU trade with Ukraine Main trade partners (2024) Top EU partners (2024) EU exports of goods to Ukraine (2024) EU imports of goods from Ukraine (2024)

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout.

Background

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines mental health as ‘a state of mental well-being that enables people to cope with the stresses of life, realise their abilities, learn well and work well, and contribute to their community’. Multiple individual, social and structural factors may combine to protect or undermine mental health. Individual psychological and biological factors such as emotional skills and substance use can make people more vulnerable. Exposure to unfavourable social, economic, geopolitical and environmental circumstances (such as a pandemic, rising living costs, conflicts and war) increases people’s vulnerability to poor mental health. In addition, digitalisation and climate anxiety are among major trends that could contribute to a ‘perfect storm‘ for young Europeans’ mental health, in particular.

Risks to mental health at work can include: being overqualified or underqualified for the role; excessive workloads or work pace, or understaffing; long, unsocial or inflexible hours; lack of control over job design or workload; unsafe or poor physical working conditions; an organisational culture that enables negative behaviour; violence, harassment or bullying; discrimination; an unclear job role; job insecurity, inadequate pay, or poor investment in career development; and conflicting demands of work and home.

World Mental Health Day was first celebrated on 10 October 1992 on the initiative of the World Federation for Mental Health. The theme for 2025 – ‘Mental health in humanitarian emergencies‘ – emphasises the need for readily available mental health support in times of crises. Conflicts, disasters and health emergencies exert a significant impact on mental health. It is estimated that approximately one in five individuals living in conflict-affected areas experiences a mental health condition, often characterised by fear, anxiety or sadness. Nearly everyone affected experiences emotional distress and disrupted community ties. Alongside the provision of food, water and medicine, access to mental health and psychosocial support is deemed essential to enable survivors to cope, recover and rebuild their lives.

Facts and figures

According to data released by the WHO in September 2025, more than 1 billion people worldwide (around one in eight) are living with mental health disorders, including conditions such as anxiety and depression. Globally, one in seven adolescents (10- to 19-year-olds) experiences a mental disorder.

In the EU, mental health problems affected an estimated 84 million people (one in six) in 2019, and those figures have worsened since. Data on mental health collected at national level are not always comparable, as the survey instruments used to measure anxiety, for instance, differ between countries; moreover, some surveys have small sample sizes or exhibit differences in the openness of populations to discussing their mental state. Eurostat issues the ‘Health in the European Union – facts and figures‘ online publication and provides data on public health. The European Commission has announced its intention to strengthen data collection on mental health, notably through the European health interview survey, allowing for better comparability across the EU.

According to a 2023 survey on mental health, 46 % of respondents have experienced an emotional or psychosocial problem, such as feeling depressed or anxious, in the past 12 months; 54 % of respondents with a mental health issue have not received help from a professional.

In 2022, EU hospitals had 321 500 psychiatric care beds, accounting for 14 % of all hospital beds. In 2021, in the 24 EU countries for which data were available, 3.1 million in‑patients with mental and behavioural disorders were discharged from hospitals.

Several drivers are at play. Stress at work can impact employees’ mental health, with an estimated 27 % of workers in the EU suffering from stress, depression or anxiety in 2022. A September 2025 study commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens, Equality and Culture examines how structural labour market inequalities affect women’s mental health in the EU.

The COVID-19 pandemic put additional pressure on mental health, particularly among young people. An increased state of loneliness can be observed among younger generations, sometimes leading to suicide: 5 017 young people aged 15 to 29 years died in 2022 in the EU as a result of intentional self-harm.

Furthermore, a 2025 study published by the WHO Regional Office for Europe shows the complex and multifaceted relationship between social media use and mental health. Problematic social media and gaming use among adolescents is on the rise: in 2024, 11 % of adolescents showed signs of problematic social media behaviour and gaming, struggling to control their use and experiencing negative consequences; 34 % of adolescents played digital games daily, with 22 % playing for at least four hours on days when they engage in gaming.

EU action on mental health

Policies and services addressing mental health are the individual Member States’ responsibility. Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides the legal basis for EU action in the field of health. The EU complements national policies while also fostering cooperation between Member States (notably through projects under the Horizon Europe and EU4Health programmes).

In June 2023, the European Commission adopted a communication on a comprehensive approach to mental health, adding another pillar to the European health union. According to that new approach, EU action will focus on three guiding principles: every EU citizen should have access to adequate and effective prevention, have access to high-quality and affordable mental healthcare and treatment, and be able to reintegrate into society after recovery. The cross-sectoral approach recognises that mental health involves many policy areas, from education and employment to digitalisation, research, environment and climate. The communication’s 20 flagship initiatives – with financing opportunities worth €1.23 billion under the EU’s long-term budget, the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) – support Member States and stakeholders in their actions promoting good mental health, helping those most in need and vulnerable groups (e.g. children, young people, the elderly, victims of gender-based violence, homeless people, migrants and refugee populations). The Expert Group on Public Health advises the Commission on the implementation of the flagship initiatives, and the Commission provides regular updates on their implementation.

On 20 June 2025, the Council of the EU called for greater efforts to protect the mental health of children and teenagers in the digital era, by promoting the safe and healthy use of digital tools, and by creating a healthier, safer and more age-appropriate digital environment.

The European Parliament has consistently supported the promotion of good mental health and the need to put mental health at the heart of EU policymaking (e.g. July 2022 resolution on mental health in the digital world of work; December 2023 resolution on mental health).

In May 2025, Parliament debated ways to improve mental health at work with Roxana Mînzatu, Executive Vice-President of the Commission and Commissioner for Social Rights and Skills, Quality Jobs and Preparedness. MEPs stressed prevention (rather than just treatment), awareness-raising and employer responsibility as key to achieving progress. Among other issues,they urged the Commission to propose minimum requirements for telework; legislation on psychosocial risks and wellbeing at work; and a long-term, comprehensive and integrated European mental health strategy, linking employment, health, social inclusion and equality policies.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘World Mental Health Day: 10 October 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

EU Member States’ defence expenditure rose significantly between 2021 and 2024. The EU has introduced several initiatives to complement national efforts in order to boost defence spending and collaboration.

Member States’ defence budgets

After severely under-investing in defence for years, EU Member States have significantly increased their defence spending since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In 2021, the combined defence budgets of the 27 EU Member States amounted to around €218 billion. In 2024, defence spending across the EU-27 already amounted to €343 billion, or 1.9 % of the EU’s gross domestic product. Projections indicate that in 2025. expenditure could reach €392 billion at current prices (€381 billion in 2024 prices), or 2.1 % of GDP. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states agreed to a new defence investment commitment of 5 % of GDP at the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague. By 2035, they vowed to dedicate a minimum of 3.5 % of GDP each year, to fund core defence needs and fulfil capability targets. In addition, they will allocate up to 1.5 % of GDP annually to tasks such as safeguarding critical infrastructure, securing networks, enhancing civil preparedness and resilience, fostering innovation, and reinforcing the defence industrial base. Increasing the guideline from 2 % to 3.5 % of GDP will demand significant additional spending for the 23 NATO member states that are also EU members, requiring an extra €254 billion and raising total defence expenditure to around €635 billion, according to the European Defence Agency.

Despite EU Member States’ sustained efforts to enhance readiness and strengthen their armed forces, they continue to lag behind other major powers in overall defence spending. The United States has consistently devoted over 3 % of GDP to defence since 2008; in 2024, it spent €845 billion, or 3.1 % of GDP – nearly two and a half times the combined EU total of €343 billion. EU defence budgets are set nationally, leading to fragmentation, duplication of effort and reduced efficiency. Although EU spending exceeds that reported by Russia (€107 billion) and China (€250 billion) – and those amounts are probably much higher than officially communicated – these countries are likely to achieve greater cost-effectiveness due to centralised planning, lower prices and less fragmentation. Russia’s defence budget reached an estimated €234 billion in 2024 in purchasing power parity terms (about 5.5 % of GDP) and is projected to rise further.

EU defence funding programmes

While defence remains a national competence, the EU plays a complementary role by reinforcing Member States’ efforts through both support for higher national defence spending and the use of EU budgetary resources. The EU has launched a range of programmes to encourage stronger collaboration:

• the European Defence Fund (EDF), a €8 billion fund (2021-2027) to boost the competitiveness of the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) by incentivising joint research and development of defence equipment. The EDF received a €1.5 billion increase through the mid-term review of the multiannual financial framework (MFF); however, rather than being used for additional projects under the EDF, these funds were earmarked for the future European defence industry programme (EDIP). By March 2025, the European Commission had adopted five annual EDF work programmes, committing a total of €5.4 billion to collaborative defence research and capability development (around €6 billion including the precursor programmes EDIDP and PADR);
• the 2023 Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), with a budget of €500 million. Through ASAP, the EU offered funding to strengthen industrial production capacities for ground-to-ground and artillery ammunition, as well as missiles;
• the 2023 European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), an EU instrument with a budget of €310 million aimed at incentivising cooperation in defence procurement between Member States to jointly coordinate and acquire the most urgent defence product needs. Five projects were selected, e.g. Mistral air defence systems;
• the proposed €1.5 billion European defence industry programme, which is still under negotiation and would run until the end of 2027. EDIP translates the objectives of the European defence industrial strategy into concrete action. It consolidates two existing EU initiatives – EDIRPA and ASAP – and introduces new rules designed to strengthen security of supply and promote sustained armaments cooperation;
• theEuropean Peace Facility (EPF), a fund worth over €17 billion financed outside the EU budget for a seven-year period (2021 to 2027) that aims to enhance the EU’s ability to prevent conflicts, build and preserve peace, and strengthen international security. Between 2022 and 2024, the EU mobilised €6.1 billion under the EPF to address Ukraine’s pressing military and defence needs. Together with the military support provided by EU Member States, overall EU support for the Ukrainian army is estimated at €63.2 billion;
• the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030. Member States aim to mobilise €800 billion under the plan to finance a massive ramp-up of defence spending through:
  • activation of the national escape clause under the stability and growth pact, allowing Member States to increase defence spending. The Commission estimates that a €650 billion fiscal space could be achieved if all EU Member States gradually increase their defence spending, reaching the maximum of 1.5 % of GDP by the end of the four-year national escape clause activation period. The Council has activated flexibility in EU fiscal rules at the request of only 15 Member States so far to increase defence spending; this is EU Member States’ defence spending;
  • the €150 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) loan instrument. The funds will be raised on capital markets and disbursed to interested Member States on demand, based on national plans. SAFE was adopted in May 2025; 19 Member States have so far requested a SAFE loan;
  • contributions from the European Investment Bank Group (EIB): the EIB, which has revised its lending policy and created a Security and Defence Office, plans to allocate 3.5 % of its 2025 financing (about €3.5 billion) to security and defence projects. Through the Defence Equity Facility, the European Investment Fund will invest €175 million between 2024 and 2027 to mobilise about €500 million for private funds targeting innovative dual-use defence technologies;
  • making existing EU instruments more flexible to allow greater defence investment: for instance, the European Parliament and the Council have adopted amendments to the EU cohesion policy to better address current and emerging strategic challenges, including security and defence;
• military mobility budget: the EU has a dedicated budget of €1.7 billion for military mobility projects under the Connecting Europe Facility for the 2021-2027 period. Three calls for proposals in the field of military mobility were carried out in 2021, 2022 and 2023. In total, 95 projects were selected (all funds in the current MFF have already been allocated);

Moreover, the Commission has proposed €131 billion for defence and space in the 2028-2034 MFF.

European Parliament position

Parliament has repeatedly urged higher defence spending, supporting both increased national budgets and greater funding for EU defence programmes alongside deeper cooperation among Member States.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU defence funding‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens are calling on the European Parliament to recognise and strengthen the role of women in building and sustaining peace. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject since September 2025, asking her to actively support women’s participation in all peace and security decision-making processes.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in English, French and Romanian):

Main elements of our reply English

The European Parliament and its President strongly support the active participation of women in peace processes.

At the European Parliament’s meeting on the occasion of International Women’s Day, President Metsola said that ‘peace is stronger when women have a voice’. She pointed out that despite their suffering and sacrifices, women are too often excluded from decision-making about war and peace. President Metsola said that Parliament had always championed the United Nations’ women, peace and security agenda. ‘Working with the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and partners worldwide, we continue to push for women’s full participation in shaping peace and security’, she added.

European Parliament position

In its resolution of July 2025 on the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, the European Parliament calls for women’s full, equal and meaningful participation and leadership in decision-making roles, including in the areas of peace and security. Parliament also emphasises the vital role of women in peacebuilding, as outlined in the UN women, peace and security agenda.

The European Parliament’s May 2025 resolution underlines that the EU must ensure consistent financing for initiatives that promote gender-sensitive leadership, protect women’s rights, and fight sexual and gender‑based violence in conflict and post-conflict settings.

In its resolution of April 2025 on the common security and defence policy, the European Parliament states that including gender perspectives in external relations and implementing the women, peace and security agenda are long-standing priorities for the EU. Parliament highlights that it is important to strengthen women’s participation in conflict prevention and resolution, peace negotiations, peacebuilding and peacekeeping, humanitarian action and post-conflict reconstruction.

Further information

You may find the following information useful:

• The UN women, peace and security agenda has been integrated into the EU’s Gender Action Plan III (GAP III). The 2023 mid-term review concluded that the action plan has helped to increase the EU’s engagement with women, peace and security, but further dedicated resources are needed. GAP III has been extended until 2027. For more details, you can consult the EU diplomatic service’s website.
• In March 2025, Parliament’s in-house research service published an analysis of women’s participation in foreign policy.
• On 22 September 2025, Parliament held a hearing on an EU feminist foreign policy. You can watch the hearing on the Parliament website.
• On 9 October 2025, the European Parliament is expected to hold a debate on the European Commission’s 2025 roadmap for women’s rights and its declaration of principles for a gender-equal society. The declaration contains a principle (principle 7) on women’s political participation and equal representation. You can stream the debate or watch it later.

French

Le Parlement européen et sa Présidente soutiennent fermement la participation active des femmes aux processus de paix.

Au cours de la réunion du Parlement européen organisée à l’occasion de la Journée internationale des femmes, Roberta Metsola, Présidente du Parlement européen, a affirmé que «la paix est plus solide lorsque les femmes peuvent faire entendre leur voix». Elle a souligné que, malgré leurs souffrances et leurs sacrifices, les femmes sont trop souvent exclues des processus de décision en matière de guerre et de paix. Madame Metsola a déclaré que le Parlement avait toujours défendu le programme des Nations unies concernant les femmes, la paix et la sécurité. Elle a ajouté qu’ « en collaboration avec les Nations unies, l’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN) et nos partenaires dans le monde entier, nous continuons d’œuvrer pour la pleine participation des femmes à l’instauration de la paix et de la sécurité ».

Position du Parlement européen

Dans sa résolution de juillet 2025 sur les objectifs de développement durable des Nations unies, le Parlement européen réclame la participation pleine, égale et significative des femmes et la possibilité pour elles d’accéder à des fonctions de direction et de prise de décision, y compris dans les aspects de la paix et de la sécurité. Le Parlement souligne également le rôle essentiel des femmes dans la consolidation de la paix, comme le souligne le programme des Nations unies concernant les femmes, la paix et la sécurité.

Dans sa résolution de mai 2025, le Parlement européen insiste sur le fait que l’Union doit garantir un financement cohérent des initiatives visant à promouvoir une gouvernance sensible au genre, à protéger les droits des femmes et à lutter contre les violences sexuelles et sexistes dans les situations de conflit et d’après-conflit.

Dans sa résolution d’avril 2025 sur la politique de sécurité et de défense commune, le Parlement européen affirme que l’intégration d’une perspective de genre dans les relations extérieures et la mise en œuvre du programme concernant les femmes, la paix et la sécurité constituent des priorités de longue date pour l’Union. Le Parlement précise qu’il importe de renforcer la participation des femmes aux activités de prévention et de résolution des conflits, aux négociations de paix, à la consolidation et au maintien de la paix, à l’action humanitaire et à la reconstruction au lendemain des conflits.

Pour en savoir plus

Les informations suivantes pourraient vous être utiles :

• Le programme des Nations unies concernant les femmes, la paix et la sécurité a été intégré dans le troisième plan d’action de l’Union sur l’égalité des sexes (GAP III). L’examen à mi-parcours, effectué en 2023, a conclu que le plan d’action avait contribué à renforcer l’engagement de l’Union en faveur des femmes, de la paix et de la sécurité, mais que d’autres ressources spécifiques étaient nécessaires. Le GAP III a été prolongé jusqu’en 2027. Pour en savoir plus, vous pouvez consulter le site internet du service diplomatique de l’Union européenne.
• En mars 2025, le service de recherche interne du Parlement a publié une analyse de la participation des femmes à la politique étrangère.
• Le 22 septembre 2025, le Parlement a organisé une audition sur une politique étrangère féministe de l’Union. Vous pouvez visionner l’audition sur le site internet du Parlement.
• Le 9 octobre 2025, le Parlement européen devrait organiser un débat sur la feuille de route 2025 de la Commission européenne pour les droits des femmes et sa déclaration de principes pour une société égalitaire du point de vue du genre. La déclaration prévoit un principe (principe nº 7) sur la participation politique et une représentation égale des femmes. Vous pouvez suivre le débat en direct ou le regarder plus tard.

Romanian

Parlamentul European și președinta acestuia sprijină ferm participarea activă a femeilor la procesele de pace.

La reuniunea Parlamentului European organizată cu ocazia Zilei Internaționale a Femeii, Roberta Metsola a declarat că „pacea este mai durabilă atunci când femeile își fac auzită vocea”. Președinta a subliniat că, în ciuda suferințelor prin care trec și a sacrificiilor pe care le fac, femeile sunt prea adesea excluse din procesul prin care se iau deciziile legate de război și pace. Roberta Metsola a declarat că Parlamentul a susținut întotdeauna Agenda ONU privind femeile, pacea și securitatea. „În cadrul colaborării noastre cu Națiunile Unite (ONU), cu Organizația Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord (NATO) și cu diverși parteneri din întreaga lume, milităm în continuare pentru participarea deplină a femeilor la construirea păcii și securității”, a adăugat.

Poziția Parlamentului European

În rezoluția sa din iulie 2025 referitoare la obiectivele de dezvoltare durabilă ale ONU, Parlamentul European a solicitat participarea deplină, egală și semnificativă a femeilor și posibilitatea ca ele să aibă acces la funcții decizionale și de conducere, inclusiv în toate aspectele referitoare la pace și securitate. Parlamentul a evidențiat și rolul vital al femeilor și fetelor în consolidarea păcii, astfel cum se subliniază în Agenda ONU privind femeile, pacea și securitatea.

Rezoluția Parlamentului European din mai 2025 subliniază că Uniunea trebuie să asigure finanțarea solidă a inițiativelor care promovează o conducere ce ia în considerare dimensiunea de gen, care protejează drepturile femeilor și care combat violența sexuală și bazată pe gen în situații de conflict și post-conflict.

În rezoluția sa din aprilie 2025 referitoare la politica de securitate și apărare comună, Parlamentul European a declarat că integrarea perspectivelor de gen în relațiile externe și punerea în aplicare a Agendei privind femeile, pacea și securitatea sunt priorități de lungă durată pentru Uniunea Europeană. Parlamentul a scos în evidență cât este de important să se îmbunătățească participarea femeilor la prevenirea și soluționarea conflictelor, la negocierile de pace, la consolidarea și menținerea păcii, la acțiunile umanitare și la acțiunile de reconstrucție după conflicte.

Informații suplimentare

Următoarele informații v-ar putea fi utile:

• Agenda ONU privind femeile, pacea și securitatea a fost integrată în Planul de acțiune pentru egalitatea de gen III (GAP III) al Uniunii Europene. Revizuirea la mijlocul perioadei din 2023 a concluzionat că planul de acțiune a contribuit la îmbunătățirea nivelului de implicare a Uniunii, dar trebuie dedicate mai multe resurse în domeniu. GAP III a fost prelungit până în 2027. Pentru a afla mai multe detalii, puteți consulta site-ul serviciului diplomatic al Uniunii Europene.
• În martie 2025, serviciul de cercetare al Parlamentului European a publicat o analiză privind participarea femeilor la elaborarea politicii externe.
• Pe 22 septembrie 2025, Parlamentul a organizat o audiere pe tema unei politici externe feministe a UE. Puteți viziona audierea pe site-ul Parlamentului European.
• Pe 9 octombrie 2025, Parlamentul European va susține o dezbatere pe marginea foii de parcurs privind drepturile femeilor, publicată de Comisia Europeană în 2025, și a Declarației Comisiei privind principiile pentru o societate bazată pe egalitatea de gen. Al șaptelea principiu cuprins în declarație se referă la participarea politică și reprezentarea egală a femeilor. Puteți viziona dezbaterea pe internet în direct sau ulterior.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President and the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

As announced by the European Council President, António Costa, the core theme of the informal European Council meeting on 1 October 2025 was to safeguard the security of the European continent. Amid repeated violations of European airspace by Russian fighter jets and drones in recent weeks, the discussions focused on two elements: ‘strengthening European common defence readiness and reinforcing our support for Ukraine’. Based on a scoping paper presented by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the High Representative, Kaja Kallas, EU leaders discussed initial flagship projects aiming at a 360-degree security approach covering all EU borders, notably a ‘Drone Wall project’. On Ukraine, Heads of State or Government discussed the mobilisation of further funds, the 19th sanctions package against Russia, and ways of advancing the enlargement process.

‘A good discussion today and [we] are now ready to take the next steps’, was the summary of Mette Frederiksen, the Prime Minister of Denmark, which currently holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. The informal European Council meeting prepared the ground for the formal 23-24 October meeting, which will be ‘decision time’, in the words of President Costa.

Following the European Council, leaders of 47 European countries, 20 of which are non-EU partners, participated in the seventh meeting of the European Political Community (EPC) on 2 October 2025. As on the previous day, the EPC focused on two central topics: i) strengthening Ukraine; ii) a strong and secure Europe in the current geopolitical situation. The EPC also highlighted disinformation and electoral manipulation, tackling traditional and hybrid threats, economic security, and migration.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders, 1-2 October 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gabija Leclerc.

Greenland is a self-governing Arctic island within the Kingdom of Denmark, which strives for economic self-sufficiency and future independence. In the context of a – literally and figuratively – heating Arctic, this representative democracy of 56 542 inhabitants is a focus of geopolitical competition and growing confrontation between major powers – the United States (US), Russia and China. The island has high strategic importance, due to its proximity to the emerging Arctic shipping routes, its strategic location in relation to security and defence activities, and its vast untapped natural resources, including mineral reserves.

According to its foreign policy strategy, Greenland is open to enhanced cooperation and dialogue with partners, including the US. Indeed, the US has been an important ally of Greenland and security guarantor since 1951. Relations have strengthened and widened during the last two decades, with cooperation now encompassing not only security, but also environment, science, health, technology, trade, tourism, education, and culture. However, US President Donald Trump’s rhetoric on acquiring Greenland has shocked Greenlanders, Danes and Europeans alike.

Upon the island’s withdrawal from the European Economic Community (EEC, now European Union) in 1985, Greenland became an Overseas Country and Territory, associated through Denmark. The main areas of cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Greenland are fisheries, education, and, lately, green growth. The EU has recently stepped up its engagement with Greenland by opening an office in Nuuk in March 2024 and signing a Memorandum of Understanding for a strategic partnership to develop sustainable raw materials value chains in November 2023.

The European Parliament engages with its counterparts from Greenland through meetings with the Nordic Council and West Nordic Council. In October 2021, the European Parliament called for the EU to establish an enhanced political dialogue on bilateral cooperation with Greenland.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Greenland: Caught in the Arctic geopolitical contest‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mario Damen.

On 9 September 2025, the European Commission presented its latest strategic foresight report – ‘Resilience 2.0: empowering the EU to thrive amid turbulence and uncertainty’ – the first such report of the second von der Leyen Commission. Building on established trends, it provides updates on global and EU-specific challenges. The four EU-specific challenges outlined in the report require balancing competitiveness and strategic autonomy, technological innovation and appropriate safeguards, sustained well-being and adaptation to demographic and climate change, and democracy and algorithm-based use of (social) media. Addressing these challenges arguably requires a transformative, proactive and forward-looking approach to resilience, called ‘resilience 2.0’.

The report identifies eight areas of action for increased EU resilience: global vision, amplified security, enhanced technology and research, economic resilience, sustainable and inclusive well-being, a new perspective on education, strengthened democracy, and intergenerational fairness. These areas echo the political guidelines of the second von der Leyen Commission and the European Council Strategic Agenda, and read more like a political agenda or a set of intentions than a foresight analysis. The European Economic and Social Committee is to draft an opinion on the report, while the European Parliament and the Council do not typically take positions on such reports. However, Parliament might draw inspiration from national parliamentary foresight practices to do so in the future.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Strategic Foresight Report 2025: Resilience 2.0‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai and Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Raffaele Ventura, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides insight into the economic performance of Moldova compared with the European Union (EU) and examines the trade dynamics between them. In 2024, Moldova recorded an economic growth rate of 0.5%, compared to 1.1% for the EU-27. Both countries continue to record decreasing inflation rates. Trade between the two economies continues to grow. The EU-27 is Moldova’s primary trade partner, representing 54% of total goods trade. Romania has the largest value among EU member states at €3.4 billion, followed by Germany at €0.8 billion and Italy at €0.6 billion. The main EU exports to Moldova are oil, gas, coal, mechanical appliances and electrical equipment, and agri-food products.

Read this ‘infographic’ on ‘Moldova: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

GDP growth
(annual change, %) Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
(at PPP 1 in thousands of international dollars) Female labour force participation rate
(% of female population aged 15+) Total unemployment rate
(% of total labour force) FDI and remittances Public finances, monetary and financial data EU trade with Moldova Main trade partners (2024)
Trade in goods, exports plus imports Top EU partners (2024)
Trade in goods EU exports of goods to Moldova (2024) EU imports of goods from Moldova (2024) Moldova business environment and socio-economic indicators

Written by Clare Ferguson.

With a substantial agenda for the first session to be held this October, Members gather in plenary to debate – among other things – European Union growth and prosperity, the EU’s response to Russian violations of EU countries’ airspace, the situation in Gaza and rising antisemitism, and two motions of censure against the European Commission. Members are also scheduled to attend a ‘This is Europe‘ debate with the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Luc Frieden on Tuesday, and. the Prime Minister of Greenland, Jens-Frederik Nielsen is due to make a formal address on Wednesday.

Following a debate on the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP) on Tuesday, Members are expected to vote on amending the current rules on payments to farmers. The proposal aims at cutting red tape, one of the farming community’s key demands. Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development proposes the CAP simplification include more flexibility on environmental rules, easier access to crisis payments and increased support for small and medium-sized farms. The vote will set Parliament’s position for its negotiations with the Council.

On Wednesday, Members are set to vote on draft amending budget No 2/2025, updating the revenue side of the current year’s EU budget. A report from Parliament’s Committee on Budgets endorses the Council position on the Commission proposal to take revised revenue forecasts into account and notes the need for increased gross national income contributions from the Member States. The committee also reiterates that the EU must endeavour to find fresh funding streams for new EU policy priorities.

Many non-EU nationals can visit the Schengen area for 90 days without having to apply for a visa. To protect the system from abuse, the visa suspension mechanism allows the EU to temporarily end the visa exemption for citizens of certain countries for security reasons. A proposal to strengthen the EU visa suspension mechanism has been on the table since 2023, and Members are expected to return to the debate on Monday evening. Parliament is set to vote on a text agreed between Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Council which emphasises the links between the EU’s external relations and the need to revise the visa suspension mechanism to cover, for instance, cases of state-sponsored instrumentalisation of migrants, investor citizenship schemes and human rights violations.

The Council and Commission are  scheduled to make statements on Tuesday afternoon on a recent joint communication, laying out the path for negotiations on a new strategic EU-India agenda, set for adoption at a bilateral summit in 2026. The debate is expected to cover progress on a free trade agreement, financial supervision arrangements – and not least in view of today’s difficult geopolitics – security and defence ties.

Members are scheduled to debate a provisional agreement reached by Parliament’s negotiators on a revision of the European Works Councils Directive on Wednesday. European Works Councils represent workers employed by multinationals operating in at least two EU countries. The revision of the legislation aims at strengthening the enforcement of transnational information and consultation rights, excluding trivial issues and including stronger provisions on gender balance. Parliament has succeeded in including rules to ensure penalties will be dissuasive, effective and proportionate.

The EU aims at reducing CO2 emissions from heavy-duty vehicles by 43 % by 2030, with higher targets to follow. However, as zero-emission heavy-duty vehicles remain expensive, EU law allows governments to encourage their use by granting reductions or exemptions to road charges for such vehicles. On Tuesday morning, Members are due to vote on extending the derogation for heavy-duty vehicles with zero emissions, to June 2031, under the procedure used for urgent matters.

On Tuesday morning, Members are set to debate a proposed revision to the legislation ensuring safety and environmental protection on the EU’s inland waterways. Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism has reached an agreement with Council that the revision should establish a single digital information platform, ensure harmonised reporting, introduce a feedback mechanism and update privacy and security requirements. The committee would, however, prefer that the scope of the revision of harmonised river information services apply to waterways and ports that are part of a cross-border network.

Following a recommendation from Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries, Members are set to vote on Wednesday on granting Parliament’s consent for the conclusion of a new protocol covering the EU’s fisheries agreement with the Côte d’Ivoire. The protocol sets opportunities for EU vessels from Spain, France and Portugal to fish for tuna in Côte d’Ivoire’s waters, in exchange for a financial contribution to the country’s sustainable fisheries sector.

Quick links to all our publications for this plenary session:

• CAP simplification
• Draft amending budget No 2/2025
• Revision of the visa suspension mechanism
• A new strategic EU-India agenda
• European Works Councils and enforcement of transnational information and consultation rights
• Extension of the derogation for heavy-duty vehicles with zero emissions
• Revision of the Harmonised River Information Services Directive
• EU-Côte d’Ivoire fisheries agreement

Written by Pieter Baert.

Taxing the digital economy raises complex challenges, as traditional tax rules struggle to keep pace with new business models and technologies. The Subcommittee on Tax Matters (FISC) will organise an Inter-parliamentary Committee Meeting (ICM) on digital taxation on 18 October 2025, bringing together counterparts from national parliaments across the EU.

Scale without mass: The challenge of taxing digital value creation

Designing effective tax policies for the digital economy is particularly challenging, given its rapid evolution and the rise of diverse activities such as streaming, e-commerce, online gaming, and cloud computing. Each of these areas may carry distinct tax implications that traditional tax frameworks may struggle to address. At the same time, the wider economy is becoming increasingly digitalised, blurring the boundaries between digital and non-digital sectors.

One of the most fundamental challenges stems from the difficulty (national and international) tax systems have in capturing the phenomenon often described as ‘scale without mass’. Since the 1920s, international corporate taxation has been built around the principle of physical presence: once a company is deemed to have a sufficient level of physical presence in a country, that country gains the right to tax the profits attributable to that company. This model fitted well into the 20th-century ‘bricks and mortar’ economy, where business growth in a country was strongly tied to greater physical presence (such as offices, employees, and machinery). However, the digital economy disrupted this logic, allowing companies to reach vast foreign markets with minimal physical infrastructure.

Another distinct feature is how digital companies leverage user-generated value to varying extents, with user data shaping sales and marketing strategies. Users may contribute passively (e.g. by browsing) or actively (e.g. by uploading content), which is crucial for algorithms and network effects-driven models, such as social media or online marketplaces. By providing data and content in return, users are seen as playing an unprecedented role in companies’ value-creation process.

Together, these shifts raise the question of whether current tax rules align with the realities of where value is created in the digital economy, fuelling debate on how to reform international taxation.

The rise of digital services taxes

To address these challenges, several countries have introduced a digital services tax (DST). Although there is no universally agreed definition, DSTs are generally understood as taxes on turnover – rather than profit – with revenues allocated to the jurisdiction in which customers or users are located, rather than where the company is established. These measures generally target large multinational enterprises and primarily apply to revenues derived from activities closely linked to user participation, such as the sale/monetisation of user data, targeted online advertising, and providing digital intermediation services (i.e. online platforms that connect users, such as social media), though the precise scope and definitions may differ between countries. Several countries have already implemented DSTs with revenues steadily increasing over time, showcasing the continuous growth of the digital economy. The United States (US) administration has strongly criticised DSTs and their use in Austria, France, Italy, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom (UK).

Table 1 – Revenue of DSTs (€ million), 2019-2023

Revenue (€ million)20192020202120222023Spain  166295323France277375474621668Italy 233303394434

Data source: Data on Taxation Trends – European Commission (latest data updated in March 2025).

Three EU countries apply a 3 % DST on revenue from online advertising, user data sales and providing digital platforms, with a €750 million global revenue threshold and varying domestic thresholds: €3 million (Spain), €25 million (France), and €5.5 million (Italy; lowered to €0 in 2025) – see Table 1.

Although categories such as social media, online search engines, and online marketplaces may appear conceptually straightforward – and are often associated with well-known global firms – the task of formulating clear and robust legal definitions for these activities in a fast-evolving digital landscape is considerably more complex, with legislation often leaving some leeway for the ‘facts and circumstances’ of each service. Countries may issue technical guidance on in-scope services, and the calculation of taxable revenues, etc. (see, for example, France, Italy, Spain and the UK).

For instance, defining what counts as a ‘social media service’ is not straightforward. Authorities may distinguish whether a service’s main purpose is to promote interaction between users (or with user-generated content), or whether such interaction is incidental. But terms like ‘interaction’ may be left undefined, and it can be difficult to tell apart services that truly promote interaction and those that simply enable it in the background. For multinational enterprises, the challenge can be compounded by subtle differences in guidance and interpretation across countries with DSTs, creating uncertainty and disputes.

Similarly, identifying in-scope revenues can be difficult when companies have revenues from both in-scope and out-of-scope activities, requiring them to separate and attribute revenues accordingly. Moreover, companies need to include those revenues that are related to a taxable digital service and that are related to a user in the jurisdiction introducing a DST. However, an online advert on a search engine or social media platform may normally be shown to multiple users. This means the revenues could be related to both users from a DST jurisdiction and a non-DST jurisdiction. In such cases, companies would need to apportion those revenues correctly.

‘Pillar One’ – A new approach to international taxation?

In October 2021, nearly 140 countries from around the world rallied behind a historic overhaul of international corporate tax rules to modernise taxation for the digital era through a ‘two-pillar’ solution. Pillar One puts in place a new tax regime that would allocate taxing rights over a portion of the profits to countries in which companies’ products are consumed (known as ‘market jurisdictions’), regardless of whether the company has a physical presence in those market jurisdictions. Pillar One exclusively targets the world’s largest and most profitable (digital and non-digital) companies.

Pillar One has yet to be enforced, pending the stalled signing of a Multilateral Convention. The US administration has repeatedly criticised Pillar One, arguing that it disproportionately targets US firms.

During the September 2025 European Parliament plenary session, in response to questions from Members of the European Parliament on the state of play of Pillar One and the prospects for a European DST, the European Commission acknowledged that Pillar One discussions were ‘on hold’ but could resume later this year. To give the OECD-led process space and time to deliver, the Commission stated that it does not intend to table a new proposal for a DST at this stage.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Taxing the digital economy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alina-Alexandra Georgescu.

Access to culture is a fundamental human right according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: cultural rights are indispensable for the dignity and the free development of the personality, and ‘everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, [and] to enjoy the arts’. Despite this legal underpinning, not everyone in the EU has equal access to culture. People with disabilities, and people living in rural, remote and disadvantaged areas, face a complex set of barriers to participation in cultural life: financial, physical, digital, legal and psychological.

Culture plays a vital role in fostering a European sense of belonging and social cohesion. It enhances Europe’s resilience for safeguarding democracy, particularly in today’s increasingly polarised societies. Therefore, barriers to participation in culture should be eliminated. Various studies have identified barriers to accessing culture for people with disabilities and those living in rural, remote and disadvantaged areas, and made recommendations on how such barriers can be removed. The EU has taken various measures to promote participation in culture, together with funding programmes for people with disabilities and people living in rural, remote and disadvantaged areas.

The ambitious framework placing culture at the centre of EU policies, the new Culture Compass for Europe, should ensure that culture becomes more accessible. The European Parliament has played a crucial role in advancing discussions on equal and obstacle-free access to cultural participation for all EU citizens. It has pointed out that any kind of barriers to full participation by individuals and communities in culture impede the development of truly democratic and inclusive societies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Access to culture for people with disabilities and people living in rural, remote and disadvantaged areas‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Stefano De Luca and Clément Evroux.

Satellite services play a key role across our economies – from enabling Earth observation to ensuring the resilience of several sectors such as mobility, finance and defence – thanks to navigation, timing and positioning systems. In the future, they are expected increasingly to provide connectivity services, including coverage in remote areas and secure connectivity for public authorities.

This situation comes with a set of threats and challenges. While the number of satellites in orbit is growing exponentially, to more than 10 000 in 2024, the congestion of orbits increases the risk of disruption through collision. In addition, geopolitical tensions are materialising in space, highlighting countries’ satellite sovereign capabilities and cybersecurity risks there. On the one hand, the weaponisation of the space domain adds further pressure to the risks of space congestion. On the other hand, space systems also face challenges on Earth, as they are underpinned by a complex supply chain, which requires sourcing of both raw materials and several technological components – from chips to launchers.

Against this backdrop, the EU is harnessing its space policy to develop, deploy and curate its space assets to deliver key services: positioning navigation and timing (Galileo), Earth observation (Copernicus), and secure connectivity (IRIS²). The EU’s space policy also relies on the single market and EU industrial policy to ensure a resilient space supply chain, as well as space industry competitiveness. The proposed EU space act is an important step in this regard.   

This briefing outlines the basics of satellite functioning and functionalities, presents the main challenges the EU space sector faces and the main EU space initiatives, and identifies possible related EU policy developments.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Satellites: State of play and challenges for the EU’ Initiative‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

The world produces enough food to feed everyone, and yet over 700 million people faced hunger in 2023. Worryingly, at least one billion meals are being wasted in households worldwide every day, thus exacerbating the problem by reducing the amount of food available for consumption.  This is the equivalent of 1.3 meals served every day to every single person in the world suffering from hunger. Importantly, when food is discarded, all the embedded energy and resources and their environmental consequences, such as greenhouse gas emissions, that accumulate along the food chain still materialise with no benefit for human nutrition.

In the European Union (EU), nearly 60 million tonnes of food – representing 132 kilogrammes per person – were wasted in 2022, of which over half (54 %) was in households. The environmental impact of this amount of food waste accounts for 254 million tonnes of CO2 and 342 billion cubic meters of water, used in the production process.  

The United Nations (UN) General Assembly designated 29 September as the International Day of Awareness of Food Loss and Waste. Committed to reaching the UN Sustainable Development Goal target to halve per capita food waste by 2030, Parliament and Council agreed on binding reduction targets of 10 % in food processing and manufacturing and 30 % per capita in retail, catering, food services and households, by the end of 2030 compared to the annual average generated between 2021 and 2023. 

In the EU, priority is given to preventing waste and encouraging the donation or redistribution of food for human consumption over animal feed and other uses. A 2023 analysis of 332 food waste prevention actions carried out in the 27 EU countries shows that 93 % of actions are targeted at the highest level of the ‘food use hierarchy’, thus witnessing the countries’ ongoing efforts to fight food waste. However, efforts are mainly focused on awareness-raising and education (62%), while market-based measures (4%) and regulatory interventions (1%) remain limited.

Read this infographic on ‘International Day of Awareness of Food Loss and Waste 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf.

International Safe Abortion Day, observed annually on 28 September, draws attention to global disparities in access to safe and legal abortion. It also provides an occasion to examine the legal and policy framework within the European Union. While competence in public health lies primarily with the Member States, EU institutions – most notably the European Parliament – have increasingly engaged with sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR).

International Safe Abortion Day

Abortion remains a global public health issue, with an estimated 73 million induced abortions taking place each year – equivalent to approximately 29 % of all pregnancies worldwide (World Health Organization – WHO). Nearly 45 % of these procedures are considered unsafe, predominantly occurring in countries with restrictive legal frameworks, and contribute to between 4.7 % and 13.2 % of all maternal deaths globally. Conversely, it is reported that, where abortion is legal, most procedures – nearly 90 % in high-income countries – are conducted safely (Guttmacher Institute).

International Safe Abortion Day has emerged as a recognised occasion for raising awareness of these global disparities and advocating for access to safe abortion. First established in 1990 by feminist networks in Latin America and the Caribbean as a regional day of action for the decriminalisation of abortion, it was adopted globally by the Women’s Global Network for Reproductive Rights (WGNRR) in 2011. It is now acknowledged by the WHO and numerous civil society organisations as an opportunity to affirm that access to safe abortion is a component of SRHR. The 28 September 2025 edition addresses the growing international opposition to abortion rights and related human rights movements, such as LGBTQI and feminist advocacy. It highlights the need for collaboration across generations and communities to counter misinformation, legal restrictions, and attacks on those providing or supporting reproductive healthcare.

Access to safe abortion in the European Union

The EU’s limited legislative competence in public health matters means that abortion remains primarily a national prerogative, governed by Article 168(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the principle of subsidiarity (Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union).

Many Member States have progressively liberalised their abortion legislation, aligning more closely with international health recommendations, including those issued by the WHO and the Council of Europe. Still, some countries maintain restrictive or prohibitive legal regimes.

Legal frameworks across the EU vary significantly. While countries such as Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark provide abortion on request and have comprehensive reproductive health policies, others –including Malta and Poland – retain more restrictive laws. In Malta, abortion is only allowed in cases where the woman’s life is at risk, and in Poland access is limited to cases involving serious threats to the pregnant woman’s life or pregnancy resulting from sexual violence.

Beyond legal access, many Member States impose additional barriers that hinder timely and equitable access to abortion care. These include mandatory waiting periods, compulsory counselling, gestational limits, and the use of conscientious objection by healthcare providers. Twelve EU countries require a waiting period – ranging from three days (Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain) to seven days (Italy) – between the initial request and the procedure. Twelve Member States mandate counselling, which in some cases, such as Hungary and Germany, is framed in prescriptive terms. The majority of Member States also require third-party authorisation for minors, further limiting their reproductive rights.

The use of the conscience clause by medical professionals, while grounded in international protections for freedom of belief, can also severely restrict access to abortion. In Italy, for instance, it is estimated that up to 70 % of healthcare providers invoke conscientious objection, resulting in limited availability of services even where abortion is legal. Similar patterns have been observed in Croatia and Romania. The cumulative effect of these barriers is particularly pronounced for women in marginalised or vulnerable situations, such as those with disabilities, migrants, and young women.

In terms of cost and public coverage, provision also varies. France remains the only EU Member State where abortion is entirely free of charge for all women. Other countries restrict public funding to residents, or limit coverage to medically indicated abortions, excluding on-request procedures. In many Member States, non-resident, undocumented, or migrant women may not be eligible for publicly funded abortion care.

Freedom to choose abortion enshrined in the French constitution

Almost 50 years after the legalisation of abortion in France, the freedom to choose to have an abortion (‘liberté garantie … d’avoir recours à une interruption volontaire de grossesse’) was officially enshrined in the French constitution on 8 March 2024. Taking the form of a one-line addition to Article 34 (the list of matters upon which Parliament may legislate), the amendment received final approval in the Congrès du Parlement (National Assembly and Senate) on 4 March 2024. President Emmanuel Macron signed the result of the overwhelming 780-72 vote in favour (which received a standing ovation) on 8 March (International Women’s Day). This amendment to the 1958 constitution designates a ‘guaranteed freedom’ to choose to terminate a pregnancy.

Since its legalisation in 1975 through a law supported by then Minister for Health Simone Veil (later the European Parliament’s first female president, and the first president of the directly elected Parliament), the right to choose to terminate a pregnancy has consistently gathered support from the political community, civil society and public opinion in France. The law has been updated nine times – on each occasion with the aim of extending access to abortion. The right to choose abortion has evolved from a public health measure, which motivated its decriminalisation, to a fundamental right. France is the first country in the world to make access to abortion an explicit constitutional right. Similar initiatives have been considered in other Member States, such as Sweden, while Member States such as Spain have reformed the law to improve access to safe and legal abortion.

European Parliament position

During the ninth legislative term, the European Parliament has consistently advocated the decriminalisation of abortion and the removal of legal, financial, social and practical barriers to access. In various resolutions adopted between 2021 and 2024, Parliament called for the inclusion of abortion rights in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and condemned restrictive measures in EU Member States, such as Poland, and in the US. On 11 April 2024, Parliament adopted a resolution on including the right to choose an abortion in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The resolution affirmed that access to SRHR, including safe and legal abortion, is a fundamental right. Parliament called on the European Council to revise the Treaties to include these rights in the EU Charter. It urged Member States to fully decriminalise abortion in line with WHO guidelines and to remove legal and practical barriers, specifically calling on Poland and Malta to repeal restrictive laws. MEPs also condemned the denial of abortion based on the conscience clause, especially when it endangers patients’ health or lives.

Read the complete briefing on ‘International Safe Abortion Day‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig.

For more than four decades, Iran has faced various international sanctions designed to modify its regime’s conduct across multiple areas of concern. These areas include nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and proliferation, support for terrorism, regional destabilisation and human rights abuses. Since 1979, the United States’ (US) sanctions on Iran have evolved into a complex and comprehensive regime. Between 2006 and 2010, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed multilateral sanctions specifically targeting Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation activities. The European Union (EU) has implemented the UNSC measures and, since 2010, has developed its own restrictive measures on Iran. The EU’s sanctions extend beyond non-proliferation concerns to encompass measures for Iran’s human rights violations, support for terrorism and assistance to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) established an agreement between Iran, the five permanent members of the UNSC, plus Germany and the EU’s High Representative. This agreement provided for the gradual lifting of sanctions against Iran in exchange for limitations on its nuclear programme. Following the US’s withdrawal from the deal in 2018 and the subsequent re-imposition of previously lifted US sanctions, Iran began violating its JCPOA commitments. On 28 August 2025, the three European parties to the JCPOA – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – triggered the procedure to restore all UNSC sanctions on Iran, which were originally set to definitively expire on 18 October 2025. Although diplomatic efforts were complicated by Israeli and US military strikes against Iran in June 2025, and despite the UNSC’s rejection on 19 September of a draft resolution to extend the lifting of sanctions, dialogue between Iran and the European powers continues in search of a diplomatic solution to prevent the re-imposition of comprehensive UNSC sanctions scheduled for 28 September 2025.

Read the complete briefing on ‘International sanctions on Iran: Overview of the main regimes and recent events‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf.

Maternity leave and voting procedures for Members of parliaments differ widely across the European Union (EU). Maternity-related absences are considered justified for Members of the European Parliament, but the current rules do not permit remote voting, proxy voting or temporary substitution. Maternity leave for parliamentarians is generally permitted across the EU’s Member States, although legal frameworks and practical arrangements differ. Some national parliaments only allow for temporary substitution in committee work, while others rely on informal agreements. Only a small number of countries, including Spain, Greece and Luxembourg, have formal provisions enabling Members on maternity leave to vote in absentia.

While several parliaments temporarily expanded remote participation during the COVID‑19 pandemic, such measures were typically limited in scope and duration. In most cases, voting in plenary continues to require physical presence in the chamber.

Discussions are ongoing at both European and national level to explore ways of supporting Members in reconciling their parliamentary duties with family responsibilities. Most recently, President Roberta Metsola proposed revisions to the European Electoral Act and the Parliament’s implementing measures, including the potential introduction of proxy voting for Members on maternity leave, aimed at aligning parliamentary rules more closely with evolving expectations around work-life balance. This briefing focuses exclusively on maternity leave and does not cover other types of family-related absence, such as paternity or parental leave.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Maternity leave and voting procedures in the European Parliament and EU national parliaments‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp and Martin Höflmayr with Falk Vambrie.

The European defence industry is highly fragmented, with limited collaborative investment and procurement, divergent national regulations, and protectionist tendencies that undermine efficiency, interoperability and competitiveness. The Letta report makes the case for a concerted effort to advance towards the development of a ‘Common Market for the Security and Defence Industry’, which focuses on regulatory simplification, pooled procurement, and cross-border industrial integration. While the Draghi report puts its finger on the EU defence sector’s fragmentation, under-investment, and external dependencies, it urges coordinated action to strengthen the industrial base, boost joint innovation, and align national efforts through common policies and incentives. According to the White Paper for European Defence, a truly integrated EU defence market would be among the largest globally, strengthening competitiveness, readiness and industrial scale. It would enable firms from the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) to expand across the Union and stimulate cross-border cooperation, mergers and new ventures, increasing the availability of EU-made defence products.

The new Defence Readiness Omnibus aims to remove procedural bottlenecks and facilitate up to €800 billion in defence investment under the Rearm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan, combining streamlined procurement rules, simplified intra-EU transfers, and revised financial instruments. Achieving readiness and autonomy requires predictable joint planning, harmonised standards, and public-private coordination. Without genuine market reform, Europe’s rising defence spending risks being absorbed by inefficiencies rather than delivering real capability gains. A functioning common defence market is therefore essential not only for competitiveness, but also for deterrence, resilience and strategic sovereignty in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment.

The European Parliament advocates a fully integrated internal market for defence to overcome fragmentation, urging regulatory reform, joint procurement, and cross-border industrial cooperation as essential steps towards greater efficiency, competitiveness, and strategic autonomy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Building a common market for European defence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU members of NATO: Composition of defence spending