European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by David De Groot.

On 18 March 2025, a law was adopted in Hungary restricting the freedom of assembly, by connecting it to a previous controversial law from 2021 that prohibited the public portrayal to children of ‘divergence from self-identity corresponding to sex at birth, sex change or homosexuality’. An amendment to the Hungarian Constitution adopted on 14 April 2025 further reinforced this.

On the basis of this law, Budapest police decided to ban Budapest Pride. While at first some of the police’s decisions were annulled by the Hungarian Supreme Court on procedural grounds and required new decisions, the Supreme Court later upheld these decisions and refused to check the law against the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The Supreme Court considered that this case is not within the CJEU’s jurisdiction.

The mayor of Budapest announced that Budapest Pride will be held as a municipal event, but the Budapest police have issued a decision prohibiting this.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Hungary’s Pride ban‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Hendrik Mildebrath with Bente Daale.

While Europeans are adopting TikTok at a remarkable pace, recent headlines on addictive design, data protection violations, election interference, incendiary content and child sexual exploitation incidents are casting a shadow over its success. This briefing maps the key issues associated with the platform and outlines the European Union’s (EU) legal framework to facilitate parliamentary discussions on recent developments, inform debates on future legislation such as the digital fairness act, and support the European Parliament’s scrutiny of regulatory enforcement.

EU investigations into TikTok are ongoing, yet few final decisions are available, and reliable information is sparse. A review of incidents and initiatives in the United States and the United Kingdom provides relevant insights on topical issues relating to TikTok. For instance, hearings and lawsuits linked to the US divest-or-ban law reveal possible national security risks arising from TikTok granting Chinese affiliates access to user data. Lawsuits from at least 16 US attorneys general demonstrate TikTok’s potentially addictive features. Parliament will review the results and formulate its position once EU enforcement actions and regulatory preparations conclude.

More than 10 EU laws regulate social media operations and services. For instance, rules in the Artificial Intelligence Act, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and the General Data Protection Regulation on non-manipulation can be invoked to mitigate risks like addictive design. However, precise legal applications remain unclear without established case law. This creates broad enforcement possibilities, but it also suggests a need for clearer guidelines or additional regulation. While enforcement actions may escalate geopolitical tensions with China, these issues could be eased through collaboration on shared priorities such as child protection, enhancing strategic and operational interdependence, and exploring privacy-enhancing middleware solutions.

Read the complete briefing on ‘TikTok and EU regulation: Legal challenges and cross-jurisdictional insights‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tim Peters and Jakub Przetacznik with Ana Luisa Melo Almeida.

In response to Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, which started in February 2022, the European Union (EU) and its Member States have provided unprecedented financial, military and humanitarian support to Ukraine. According to European Commission figures, Team Europe, consisting of the EU and its Member States, has made available around €150 billion in support to Ukraine. This support encompasses macro-financial assistance, financial support through the Ukraine Facility, humanitarian aid and military assistance from Member States and the European Peace Facility, as well as support to Ukrainian refugees in the EU.

The overall support of Team Europe for Ukraine is now greater than the support provided by the United States (US), except in terms of military support allocation. However, Team Europe has provided 83 % of the tanks and 76 % of the air defence systems given to Ukraine since the start of the full-scale war.

The disbursement of EU payments under the Ukraine Facility is conditional on Ukraine implementing the Ukraine Plan – an ambitious reform and investment plan drafted by Ukraine’s government and endorsed by the EU. The Commission and the Ukrainian government publish updates on the progress of the reforms and on the disbursal of payments.

In addition to the Ukraine Facility, the G7 have agreed upon a further €45 billion loan, with €18.1 billion to be financed by the EU. For this purpose, a Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism has been established, which uses extraordinary revenues originating from Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the G7 member states to repay loans and associated interest costs. The rights, responsibilities and obligations provided for under the Ukraine Facility will apply to the G7 loan to ensure seamless management of both. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for confiscating the immobilised Russian sovereign assets to finance further support for Ukraine and the country’s reconstruction, instead of just relying on extraordinary revenues. International financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, play a key role in addressing external financing needs and supporting the country’s macroeconomic stability.

Read the complete briefing on ‘State of Play: EU support to Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU Member States’ total bilateral and EU budget contributions to Ukraine, 2022–2025, in € billion and as a % of GNI Team Europe financial, humanitarian and military support for Ukraine, February 2022 to May 2025, in € billion

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso, Martin Höflmayr and Giulio Sabbati.

The EU’s trade-dependent economy faces uncertainty from global trade policy shifts, prompting calls to strengthen domestic demand. Economic growth forecasts for the years ahead have been downgraded, reflecting this uncertainty. Anticipatory trade to avoid US tariffs peaked in March 2025, as EU exports to the US rose by 59 % in the first quarter of 2025, but has subsided since. The final phase of the Next Generation EU recovery instrument is expected to support public investment and economic activity, but EU countries must step up efforts – in some cases significantly – to ensure full implementation of their national recovery and resilience plans by 31 August 2026.

Read this infographic on ‘Economic Outlook Quarterly: Fragmented trade, untapped potential at home‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

RRF milestones and targets still to be assessed GDP growth in the EU
Quarterly, % change compared to same period in previous year EU-27 goods exports to the US
€ billion Cumulative growth prospects 2025-26
2024 = 100 Fiscal balance, % of GDP Government consolidated gross debt
Change Q4-2019 vs Q2-2024, percentage points of GDP EU inflation
Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) monthly data, annual rate of change % Total unemployment rate in the EU EU/US economic and domestic demand growth
2010Q4 = 100, 4-quarter moving average Average annual contribution to economic growth
Contribution to real GDP, percentage points Next Generation EU (NGEU) Proposed 2025 CSRs on the RRF

Written by Rebecca Zamponi and Annastiina Papunen.

The European Council meeting on 26-27 June has a full agenda. One year into the new institutional cycle, global affairs have grown tense and unpredictable. Although a discussion on the Middle East was not originally envisaged for the June European Council meeting, the rapidly developing situation in the region will require the EU leaders’ attention. EU leaders are also expected to discuss Ukraine, European defence and security, the EU in the world, competitiveness, migration, Moldova, the Western Balkans, internal security and EU preparedness. Some further items, such as the rules-based international order, may also feature on the agenda.

The discussion on internal reforms in the context of enlargement, envisaged in the Leaders’ Agenda for June, seems to have been postponed to a later date. Despite a full agenda, in his invitation letter European Council President António Costa stressed his intention to keep the meeting to one day.

General

The meeting will start with the customary opening address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, followed by an exchange of views with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. With Poland’s six-month EU Council presidency coming to an end, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk is likely to provide an overview of its results. Denmark will assume Council leadership on 1 July for six months.

Ahead of the meeting, several key gatherings have taken place: the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Kananaskis, Canada on 16-17 June, the EU-Canada Summit in Brussels on 23 June, and the NATO Summit in The Hague on 24-25 June. The reflections and conclusions are likely to feed into the European Council discussions.

European Council meeting Ukraine

At the two most recent European Council meetings (6 March 2025 and 20 March 2025), EU leaders failed to reach a unanimous agreement on Ukraine. Hungary blocked the conclusions, which resulted in the other EU leaders releasing conclusions on Ukraine, agreed to by 26 of the 27 EU Member States. Sanctions is one aspect that the Hungarian Prime Minister has regularly threatened to veto. On 10 June 2025, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the High Representative Kaja Kallas proposed an 18th package of sanctions against Russia. The package will notably target the oil price cap, the Russian shadow fleet, the banking sector and Nord Stream 1 and 2. As with previous rounds of sanctions against Russia, the European Council is likely to welcome the 18th package if it receives approval from ministers in the Council before the EU leaders meet.

At their meeting, EU leaders are likely to reiterate their condemnation of Russia’s continued attacks against civilian infrastructure in Ukraine and those who support Russia’s war – following reports from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that Russia was using ballistic missiles made by North Korea. At the May 2025 Council meeting, foreign affairs ministers discussed possible EU security guarantees and military support to Ukraine, namely the initiative by the High Representative to provide Ukraine with 2 million rounds of large calibre ammunition in 2025. It is likely that EU leaders will discuss the military support needs of Ukraine, and maybe also debate possible security guarantees. In March 2025, MEPs adopted a resolution stating that the EU must ‘contribute to robust security guarantees for Ukraine’. In addition, EU leaders may also restate their support for Ukraine’s European path.

Middle East

The European Council is expected to discuss developments between Israel and Iran. Tensions reignited on 13 June 2025, when Israel launched an attack targeting Iran’s nuclear programme and military targets. Since then, both parties have exchanged attacks – despite calls for restraint. On 22 June, the United States launched strikes against three Iranian nuclear facilities. EU foreign ministers and President Costa called for diplomacy and negotiation.

The European Council will discuss the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza and reiterate some of their previous calls for rapid, safe and unhindered distribution of aid, the unconditional release of all hostages, and a return to the ceasefire, leading to a just and lasting peace based on a two-state solution. EU leaders may welcome the outcome of the Paris Peace Forum, where civil society organisations promoted a two-state solution and peace and security in the region. Moreover, EU leaders may react to the interception by Israeli naval forces of a vessel bringing aid to Gaza. MEP Rima Hassan was onboard, and President Metsola was in contact with Israeli authorities to ensure the safety of Hassan and others on the boat. The Left group, of which Hassan is a member, has called for the immediate release of those who were on the intercepted boat, the immediate suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, and an arms embargo on Israel. Back in February 2024, the leaders of Ireland and Spain had sent a letter to the Commission calling for an urgent review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. On 7 May 2025, a formal request by the Netherlands, supported by 17 Member States, requested a review of Israel’s compliance with Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. EU foreign affairs ministers met and discussed developments in the Middle East on 23 June. The outcome of those discussions and the review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement may feed into the European Council discussion on the Middle East.

EU leaders may again discuss the situation in Syria, reiterating previous calls for a ‘peaceful and inclusive transition’ in Syria. They may also welcome the agreement reached in the Council on the lifting of economic sanctions and the introduction of restrictive measures against human rights violators and those driving instability in Syria.

European security and defence

At the European Council meeting on 20 March 2025, EU leaders committed to discussing all strands of work on the issue of European security and defence at this June meeting. In March, they also invited the Commission and the High Representative to report regularly on progress made in implementing European Council conclusions on defence. Therefore, EU leaders are likely to discuss the implementation of conclusions thus far and give further input where needed.

The four main aspects on security and defence addressed at recent European Council meetings were i) mobilising funding, ii) identifying and addressing capability gaps, iii) strengthening the EU’s defence technological and industrial base, and iv) partnerships. EU leaders are likely to discuss any further developments in these areas. Ahead of the European Council meeting, NATO members met in The Hague. Commitments on defence spending were set to be a key aspect of the meeting; with 23 of the 27 EU Member States also being members of NATO, it is quite likely that discussions in The Hague may feed into the European Council’s security and defence discussions.

EU in the world

The European Council may discuss other high-level international summits that have taken place in recent days, such as the G7 summit in Canada – the first G7 summit for Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. EU leaders may also discuss upcoming summits and conferences such as the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, to be held in Seville from 30 June to 3 July 2025 and the Ukraine recovery conference in Rome in July. EU leaders will consider their relations with partners across the globe and reiterate their commitment to effective multilateralism and to the rules-based international order with the United Nations at its core. In addition, President Costa will brief EU leaders on his recent visits to Western Balkan countries, which took place in the lead-up to the most recent European Political Community meeting in Albania. Moreover, the European Council is likely to welcome the Commission and the High Representative’s presentation of the joint communication on the European Union’s strategic approach to the Black Sea region, and is expected to reiterate its support for Moldova in connection with the accession process. An EU-Moldova summit will take place in early July 2025. Finally, EU leaders may also discuss developments in Libya and the Sahel region.

Competitiveness

EU leaders are expected to discuss the latest economic developments and their impact on EU competitiveness. The spring economic forecast predicts moderate growth in times of global economic uncertainty: 1.1 % GDP growth in the EU and 0.9 % in the euro area in 2025 – figures similar to 2024. EU leaders are likely also to discuss the strengthening of the international role of the euro. ECB President Christine Lagarde argued recently that this is ‘Europe’s global euro moment’, meaning that the euro could gain greater international prominence. In addition, EU leaders are expected to endorse the Commission’s proposal on Bulgaria adopting the euro on 1 January 2026.

In April 2024, the European Council asked for ‘a new horizontal strategy for a modernised single market’ by June 2025 and reiterated this request in the Budapest Declaration with more specific wording. The strategy, published in May, builds on the Letta and Draghi reports’ recommendations. In this context, EU leaders may also mention the EU startup and scaleup strategy. Furthermore, to strengthen the EU single market in a strategic and quickly developing area, space, ahead of the European Council meeting the Commission is expected to publish an EU space act proposal and a strategy on the space economy. Back in April 2024, the European Council defined space as a sensitive sector in which dependencies should be reduced.

EU leaders are expected to mention simplification and better regulation as means to strengthen competitiveness. Furthermore, securing the supply of affordable and clean energy, also discussed at the March meeting, is essential to making Europe more competitive.

The current global trading situation might also be discussed, as the tariffs by the new US administration are causing disturbance on the markets. The EU is currently negotiating with the US with the aim of reaching ‘zero-for-zero’ tariffs before the 9 July deadline; on that date, the 50 % tariffs which US President Trump has threatened to impose – already postponed from their initial starting date of 1 June – would take effect. However, according to reports, there seems to be no appetite for zero tariffs on the US side, which is considering a 10 % tariff as the baseline for US trading partners. Recently, there has also been a dispute between the US and China concerning rare earth minerals and magnets, which are essential for sectors such as cars, defence and electronics.

In the Budapest Declaration, EU leaders asked the Commission to submit, by June 2025, proposals on ways of strengthening the EU’s technological capabilities and of accelerating the digital transformation, among other things. Some related proposals have been published, such as the AI continent action plan in April, and some are upcoming, such as the EU quantum strategy due in July, the Data Union Strategy in Q3 and the Digital Networks Act in Q4 of 2025. Furthermore, the Commission and the High Representative have published their new joint EU international digital strategy, requested by the European Council at its April 2024 special meeting. The strategy aims to boost both EU competitiveness on key technologies and support EU partners globally in their digital transition.

The European Semester spring package, which provides EU Member States with tailored recommendations to improve their economic performance, was published on 4 June. The European Council usually discusses the country-specific recommendations at its June meeting, to allow the conclusion of the European Semester.

Migration

EU leaders are expected to take stock of progress in implementing its previous conclusions on migration. An important development in this field is the fall in irregular EU border crossings by 20 % in the first five months of 2025, to 63 700, as announced by Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Despite this, EU leaders are likely to encourage intensification of work on migration. Following the discussions at the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 13 June, the European Council is expected to invite the co-legislators to work on the Commission’s proposal on returns, on the establishment at Union level of a list of safe countries of origin, and on the application of the ‘safe third country’ concept.

As has been the case on previous occasions, President von der Leyen’s letter on migration will inform the discussion. In addition, the European Commission’s progress report on the state of play on the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, published on 11 June, will also feed into the EU leaders’ debate. Nevertheless, despite progress, migration remains a divisive topic at European and national level, as illustrated by the recent collapse of the Dutch coalition government over a disagreement on migration policy.

Internal security

For the first time since 2021, internal security – which includes the fight against serious and organised crime, terrorism, radicalisation and violent extremism, as well as hybrid threats by state and non-state actors – will be discussed as an own agenda point by EU leaders. On 1 April 2025, the Commission published a new multiannual strategy, ProtectEU, for this policy area. The European Council is expected to call upon EU institutions and Member States to take further action, notably regarding the strengthening of law enforcement and judicial cooperation.

Preparedness

Following the publication of the EU Preparedness Union Strategy, on 26 March 2025, EU leaders will return to the issue. In line with previous conclusions, EU leaders will encourage further work to enhance the EU’s and its Member States’ resilience, preparedness, and crisis prevention.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council meeting on 26-27 June 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Current Membership European Council-June 2025

Written by Katrien Luyten.

The EU’s temporary protection regime has provided predictability and legal certainty to both displaced people from Ukraine and the EU Member States. The situation in Ukraine, as a result of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression, still requires a common European response. The EU has therefore decided to extend temporary protection for a fifth year, until 4 March 2027. Moreover, the European Commission has proposed a coordinated approach to a smooth transition out of temporary protection, when the circumstances allow.

Background

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, over 5.6 million people have been forced to seek refuge, mostly in the EU and its neighbouring countries. Reacting swiftly when the invasion began, the EU decided to grant Union-wide protection to people arriving from Ukraine by triggering – for the first time ever – the Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC, TPD). The TDP allowed EU Member States swiftly to offer protection and rights to people in urgent need of assistance, while also preventing national asylum systems from becoming overwhelmed during mass arrivals of displaced people. As of April 2025, over 4.26 million displaced people from Ukraine benefit from temporary protection in the EU, of which 27.9 % are in Germany, 23.2 % in Poland and 8.7 % in Czechia. Compared with the population of each EU country, the highest ratios of beneficiaries of temporary protection (BTPs) are seen in Czechia (34.0 per 100 000 inhabitants), Poland (26.9) and Estonia (24.7), while the EU level is 9.5. Since the start of the war, the EU has allocated around €15 billion to support Member States hosting displaced people from Ukraine, and an additional €4 billion are being made available from the EU’s Home Affairs funds.

Temporary protection was initially granted for one year and later extended twice, until March 2025, reaching the duration of three years, as laid down in the TPD. However, given the continued Russian attacks on civil and critical infrastructure across Ukraine, the temporary protection regime for displaced people from Ukraine was extended for another year, until March 2026. This was done on the basis of Article 4(2) TPD, according to which the Council of the EU, acting by qualified majority and on a proposal from the Commission, can extend temporary protection by up to one year where reasons for temporary protection persist. The Commission argued that safe and durable conditions for the return of displaced people to Ukraine were not in place. It referred to the ongoing uncertainty and volatility in Ukraine to show the need to continue protecting BTPs. Despite the emergence of divergent practices and policies owing to different interpretations of the TPD – such as scope and eligibility, reception support, access to rights, freedom of movement in the EU, and how to deal with circular movements to and from Ukraine –implementation of the directive has been assessed positively overall.

Extension of temporary protection until March 2027

With no end in sight to the war in Ukraine and the reasons for temporary protection persisting, the Commission proposed extending temporary protection for a fifth year, until 4 March 2027. According to the Commission, it is still not possible to return to Ukraine in safe and durable conditions. Moreover, further arrivals at scale cannot be excluded, owing to the difficult humanitarian conditions, broader volatility and the uncertainty of the situation in Ukraine. At the same, the risk to the efficient operation of the national asylum systems remains. The EU’s Home Affairs ministers unanimously agreed to the extension on 13 June, pending final adoption of the implementing decision by the Council.

The extension does not change the terms of the March 2022 decision as regards the categories of individuals to whom the temporary protection applies or the rights they enjoy. However, the Commission insisted on the need to ensure balanced responsibility-sharing among Member States, acknowledging that some Member States have been more impacted than others by the need to continue providing protection, particularly in terms of the numbers of BTPs hosted, often combined with large numbers of applicants for international protection or with housing shortages. Referring to the ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU in Case C-753/23 – Krasiliva of 27 February 2025, the new Council implementing decision states that Member States should now reject an application for temporary protection when it is apparent that the person concerned already benefits from temporary protection in another Member State. The extension – again based on Article 4(2) TPD – provides clarity to BTPs and allows Member States to undertake the necessary administrative and legal steps at national level, such as the renewal of BTPs’ residence permits. If there were to be a sustainable ceasefire before March 2027, which would make a safe and durable return of BTPs to Ukraine possible, the Commission could submit a proposal to the Council to bring temporary protection to an end.

Transition out of the temporary protection regime

In parallel with the need for continued protection of displaced people, the Commission seeks to pave the way for a smooth transition out of temporary protection. The idea is to ensure long-term and sustainable solutions for BTPs, take Ukraine’s capacity and reconstruction needs into account, and continue to avoid risks to the Member States’ national asylum systems. Those currently enjoying temporary protection need time to transition to other legal statuses that better represent their actual situation, and those who want to return to Ukraine – when the situation allows – need support. To help BTPs make informed decisions about their future, the Commission has therefore proposed a Council recommendation on a coordinated exit strategy and adopted a communication on a predictable and common European path for the future of the Ukrainians present today in the EU.

The Commission recommends, in particular, that Member States allow BTPs to transition towards national legal residence statuses, particularly those relating to employment, education, research or family reasons, or a long-term resident status where applicable. Moreover, it encourages them to enable BTPs who do not have access to national legal statuses to apply for a legal migration status governed by EU law, if they qualify for it. More specifically, the Commission refers to the EU Blue Card Directive, the Single Permit Directive and the Students and Researchers Directive. Although the proposal for a recommendation does not mention the possibility for BTPs to apply for asylum, the TPD provides for this possibility (Article 17), stating that the general laws on protection and aliens in the Member States apply when temporary protection ends (Article 20).

For those who are eligible and choose to stay in the EU, it is in the interest of both the BTPs and the Member States that inclusion and integration happen in the best way possible, as access to the labour market and to education brings benefits to those who wish to stay and to those who will return to Ukraine. The Commission therefore commits to continued funding and to the establishment of ‘unity hubs’ in the Member States, where BTPs can get information, referrals and advice. A Special Envoy for Ukrainians in the EU – former Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson – will support the setting-up of the hubs. Further funding and technical assistance, in addition to what has already been provided, will support the reintegration of both those returning home and those who decided to stay in Ukraine. Moreover, the Commission recommends that the Member States prepare for gradual and orderly return and reintegration, as Ukraine needs its people back to rebuild the country. Furthermore, the possibility of exploratory visits to Ukraine should be offered, in order for BTPs to check on their families, homes, or the situation in their communities, before deciding to return. Voluntary return programmes – with a limited and fixed duration of possibly up to one year – should be crafted to help people go back home safely and with dignity, without them ending up in a legal limbo once temporary protection ends. Rather than being individualised benefit packages, these voluntary return programmes should maintain social cohesion in Ukraine and bring benefits to the local community. In addition, options for vulnerable people, such as those undergoing medical treatment, and children who need to complete their education, should be devised. Finally, for all this to work, according to the proposal, it is important to have an accurate picture of the evolving situation.Member States are therefore encouraged to update their temporary protection data regularly and in a timely manner, and to exchange information with the other Member States and the Ukrainian authorities. The proposal still needs to be adopted by the Council; the European Parliament does not have a formal co-decision power for recommendations.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Transitioning out of temporary protection for displaced people from Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Barbara Nicoletti.

The Ispra site of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) is European Commission’s third-largest site. Originally established for nuclear research, it has evolved into one of Europe’s leading research campuses today, with cutting-edge laboratories and unique research infrastructure. The site provides science-based responses to policy challenges related to sustainable resources and transport, space, security, energy efficiency and climate change, as well as nuclear safeguards and security.

The STOA Panel and the JRC have a unique partnership that enhances the crucial role of evidence-informed policy-making at EU level. Interaction includes regular exchanges of views, co-organised events and visits, through which the STOA Panel and the JRC cooperate to share knowledge between the institutions, providing opportunities for debate, and supporting evidence-based EU policymaking.

The visit began with a welcome address by Bernard Magenhann, JRC Director-General, and an introductory presentation on the JRC’s mission, organisation, and activities at the JRC Europa Science Experience, an interactive entry point to the research site.

JRC experts provided specific examples of JRC’s scientific work in support of policymaking by presenting the JRC activities related to the circular and bio-based economy, from raw materials, to products and waste, and the ‘Sevilla Process‘, through which the European Commission leads the science-based co-creation of environmental norms for and with European industry.

The visit continued with a tour of the Nanobiotechnology Laboratory, where interdisciplinary studies are conducted on nanomaterials, nanomedicines and therapies, as well as health surveillance technologies, advanced materials, and micro(nano)plastics. The delegation also visited the European Interoperability Centre for Electric Vehicles and Smart Grids, which combines four laboratories gathering knowledge and test facilities on energy efficiency, hybrid exhaust emissions, electromagnetic compatibility, smart grids and battery testing.

The afternoon programme included visits to additional cutting-edge laboratories. At the Microwave Signature Laboratory, the delegation learned about the JRC’s research into space, connectivity and quantum. The visit to the European Crisis Management Laboratory provided direct experience of the monitoring, modelling, analysis and estimation work done by the JRC to enhance crisis responses to various types of emergencies, including security issues, natural and man-made hazards, or health crises.

These visits gave the STOA members the opportunity to witness the innovative research shaping EU policies and address questions directly to JRC experts. Inspiring discussion took place in a cooperative and informal setting about some of the most pressing challenges facing the EU, helping to explore ways in which research and technology can help address these issues.

The STOA delegation greatly appreciated JRC’s warm welcome, confirmed the importance of the visit in deepening the longstanding STOA-JRC cooperation, and emphasised the relevance of independent scientific advice in informing EU policymaking.

Participants: European Parliament

• Christian Ehler, Chair of STOA Panel
• Lina Galvez, Vice-Chair of STOA Panel
• Pierfrancesco Maran, STOA member – EMPL
• Brando Benifei, STOA member – INTA
• Barbara Nicoletti, STOA Unit

Joint Research Centre

• Bernard Magenhann, Director-General
• Matthias Oel, Deputy Director-General
• Sabine Henzler, Director for Strategy and Impact:
• Alessandra Zampieri, Director for Sustainable Resources
• Ciaran Nicholl, Director Health and Food
• Francesca Campolongo, Director for Digital Transformation and Data

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

The cooperation between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has deepened significantly in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has reshaped Europe’s security environment and highlighted the complementary roles of both organisations. NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence, backed by United States (US) capabilities, while the EU has emerged as a key actor in financial aid, military assistance and sanctions. Both institutions have formalised their partnership through joint declarations and strategic documents, including NATO’s Strategic Concept, the EU’s Strategic Compass and White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030.

Practical cooperation now spans a wide range of areas including cyber defence, countering hybrid threats, military mobility, critical infrastructure protection, and joint crisis preparedness. Regular staff-level coordination, shared exercises, and technical arrangements – such as the NATO–EU task force on critical infrastructure – have improved resilience and interoperability. The EU has also significantly ramped up its defence role. It has delivered €50.8 billion in military aid to Ukraine (EU plus Member State contributions). It has introduced industrial policies such as EDIRPA, ASAP, and the ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan to reinforce the European defence industrial base. Despite progress, persistent challenges remain. Political tensions – in particular between Cyprus and Türkiye  – continue to block intelligence sharing and formal joint planning. The EU still relies heavily on NATO, particularly US assets, for operational capabilities. Growing uncertainty over US commitments under the second Trump Presidency has reinforced the EU’s drive to strengthen strategic autonomy and ensure greater burden-sharing within NATO.

The European Parliament supports stronger, complementary EU–NATO ties focused on interoperability, resilience and avoiding duplication, while stressing the need for Europe to take greater responsibility for its own security. At the NATO summit on 24-25 June in The Hague (the Netherlands), key challenges include agreeing on higher defence spending targets, maintaining alliance unity, managing the Russia threat, and rapidly scaling up Europe’s defence capabilities.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU–NATO cooperation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Meenakshi Fernandes and Lenka Jančová with Maxim Baumgaertel.

The European Union (EU) is seeking to boost its competitiveness to help ensure the well-being of its society in the face of global challenges. Central to this objective is the EU’s innovation ecosystem, which has fallen behind the United States (US) and China. As innovative European companies grow, they struggle to attract the necessary technical and financial support within the continent.

The European Commission plans to put forward a legislative proposal for a 28th regime as part of a programme of measures to boost the EU’s innovation ecosystem. The European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) is preparing a legislative-initiative report to inform the development of this proposal. This briefing, produced at the request of the committee, seeks to support its work on the file.

The research identified four issues that are relevant for EU action: (1) the EU financial system has a low appetite for risk; (2) innovative companies struggle to attract workers (within the EU and beyond) with the relevant skills; (3) innovative companies face a high cost of failure and/or restructuring; and (4) there is high variation in laws affecting companies across the EU.

While the proposed Savings and Investments Union could help to address the immediate and pressing demand for capital from innovative European companies, other measures such as the 28th regime could be complementary and offer European added value. Establishing one common set of EU-wide rules and introducing an EU stock option plan could boost the regime’s attractiveness for innovative European companies. Embedding links to the EU innovation ecosystem and ‘European preference’ incentives could also be beneficial. Levelling the playing field for innovative European companies, particularly by reducing the period of time to establish a company, complete funding rounds and advance through the lifecycle, could help to attract venture capital and boost the number of innovative scale-ups. 

Read the complete briefing on ‘Scaling up European Innovation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Innovation ecosystem of the EU-27 compared with China and the US Innovation hubs in EU Member States The EU is still at the centre of global co-patenting trends There is significant variation in legal frameworks affecting innovative companies across Member States The innovative company lifecycle: Challenges and funding requirements Share of research publication citations on critical technologies Innovation ecosystem of the EU-27 compared with China and the US

Written by Sidonia Mazur, updated on 12 June 2025

On 4 June 2025, Piotr Serafin, Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration, presented the Commission’s draft budget for 2026 to the Members of the Parliament’s Committee on Budgets. The proposal sets the 2026 EU budget commitments at €193.26 billion, complemented by €105.32 billion under NextGenerationEU. The Commission underlined that the ‘next year’s draft budget is designed to support strategic objectives, including support for Ukraine, competitiveness, migration management, security and defence, and strategic investments, while maintaining momentum on green and digital priorities’.

Background – 2026 budget procedure

The European Parliament is one of the two arms of the European Union’s budgetary authority, the Council being the other. The two institutions, assisted by the European Commission, decide on the budget in the annual EU budget procedure, within the limits of the long-term EU budget – the multiannual financial framework (MFF). Although it is the Commission’s right and duty to propose a draft budget for the upcoming year, the two arms of the EU budgetary authority, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU, play their part in the run-up to its presentation by submitting their views. The Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) agreed on its guidelines for the 2026 EU budget on 18 February 2025. The European Parliament adopted its guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III, on 2 April 2025.

Next steps

On 9 July, the Commission plans to formally adopt the 2026 draft budget and publish it in all official languages. More information on performance is presented in the Annual Management and Performance Report published on 17 June.

By mid-July COREPER (the Committee of Permanent Representatives, made up of Member States’ Ambassadors) is expected to come to an agreement on Council’s position on the 2026 draft budget.

Parliament, Council and Commission are then expected to meet for a budgetary trilogue on 17 July.

Further reading

• For key issues in EU budget see the EPRS flagship publication: Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2025
• For key dates see: Timeline for the three key EU budgetary procedures in 2025
• For Parliament’s guidelines for the 2026 budget: Parliament’s guidelines for the 2025 EU budget; Section III – European Commission
• For more on Parliament’s role in the EU annual budgetary procedure see: Annual EU budgetary procedure: An introduction to the steps in the European Parliament

Written by Pieter Baert.

Financing defence spending

Following Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, defence spending by EU Member States rose sharply, from 1.2 % of GDP to an estimated 1.9 % in 2024. Nevertheless, the protracted war in Ukraine and other security challenges, including evolving US foreign policy priorities, have forced EU Member States to double down on rearmament and the development of a robust defence industrial base. With an elevated defence spending target expected to be agreed upon at the forthcoming NATO summit in June, this task arrives at a challenging time for many EU Member States, marked by muted economic growth, high deficits and competing spending priorities such as an ageing population and the green transition. To respond to this new geopolitical reality, several options are being considered, including issuing joint or national debt, reallocating budget funds (national or EU), or generating additional revenue through (new) taxes. Given the uncertain outlook, such financing will be structural rather than temporary. The EU’s economic governance framework permits a degree of flexibility through the national escape clause, enabling Member States to deviate from fiscal rules under exceptional circumstances beyond their control; in this case, it would be to accommodate increased defence spending while ensuring overall fiscal sustainability.

Against this backdrop, taxation represents a key policy instrument. EU Member States have significant autonomy to adjust their tax systems as they see fit, as taxation is an area of national competence. They can choose to adjust their direct taxes, such as personal and corporate income taxes, or rely on indirect taxes, such as VAT or excise duties, taking into account their own national tax mix, tax burden and policy preferences. Aside from implementing new or elevated taxes, strengthening the fight against tax fraud and avoidance, and improving tax collection efficiency may also significantly bolster tax receipts (for instance, EU Member States lose €89 billion in VAT revenue each year). Naturally, strengthening the EU defence industrial base would also generate additional fiscal and economic effects through tax revenues and overall economic activity.

Some Member States have recently introduced dedicated tax measures, in order to boost financing for military support (see Table 1 below).

Table 1 – Tax measures adopted by selected Member States to support defence spending

Member StateTax measuresEstoniaThe national parliament adopted a Security Tax Act in December 2024, introducing tax increases to finance additional military support: The standard VAT rate will be increased from 22 % to 24 %, effective from July 2025.A 2 % security surcharge will be levied on corporate profits and personal income from January 2026. However, the new Estonian coalition government has announced its intention to abolish this measure.LatviaThe country has imposed a mandatory ‘solidarity contribution‘ requirement on credit institutions to help bolster its defence efforts. The measure covers the period from 2025 to 2027.LithuaniaA defence fund package, agreed upon in June 2024, comprises several tax measures aimed at increasing defence funding. These measures, which have been in force since January 2025, include: raising the corporate income tax rate by one percentage point to 16 % for businesses, and to 6 % for small businessesraising the excise duties on alcohol, tobacco and energy products such as petrol and diesel;extending by one year the application period for a temporary solidarity contribution by credit institutions.

The urgency of these measures also raises the question of how swiftly tax systems can be adjusted to meet sudden increases in revenue requirements. Changes to the income tax framework are typically introduced at the start of a fiscal year to ensure consistency with accounting practices and to avoid political and legal concerns about retroactive taxation. Adjusting VAT rates is somewhat easier to implement at shorter notice, as companies remit VAT on a monthly or quarterly basis. While VAT rate increases carry significant revenue potential, they may also give rise to concerns about their regressive impact. Health or environmental taxes can generate substantial short-term revenue and support broader national objectives, but their long-term reliability may be uncertain due to behavioural changes that result in reduced taxable activities.

However, securing sustainable financing is just one aspect of the challenge at hand. The production of weapons, military technology and related infrastructure will require significant strengthening of the defence industrial base in Europe. In this context, the fiscal needs of the defence sector may align with broader calls from corporate taxpayers in general for a simplified, more efficient tax compliance framework. In March 2025, the Council of the EU called on the European Commission to present a road map by the end of the third quarter of 2025 aimed at reducing reporting burdens for taxpayers, eliminating outdated and overlapping tax provisions, improving the clarity of tax legislation and streamlining the application of tax rules and procedures, and thereby enhancing the business environment across all sectors.

Additionally, given the defence industry’s heavy reliance on research and development (R&D), ensuring that existing R&D tax incentives are both effective and easy to administer will be crucial for supporting innovation capacity within the sector.

VAT provisions

As a general rule, the supply of goods or services to, or the import of goods by defence authorities or their armed forces for their activities is subject to VAT in the EU. However, subject to certain conditions, Article 151(1) of the EU VAT Directive provides for a VAT exemption on supplies made to the armed forces (and the civilian staff accompanying them) of one NATO member state stationed in an EU country that is another NATO member state, whenever these armed forces and civilian staff are participating in a common NATO defence effort. The exemption also applies to the armed forces (and the civilian staff accompanying them) of an EU Member State involved in an activity under the EU common security and defence policy in another Member State. Cooperative defence projects and programmes run in the European Defence Agency are also exempt from VAT, subject to certain conditions. Additionally, the recently adopted Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument – a €150 billion financial tool to boost EU Member States’ defence industrial production – includes provisions for VAT exemption on defence products procured through this instrument.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Tax challenges facing the European defence union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The European Union (EU) aims to reduce, and eventually eradicate poverty. It is the world’s largest donor of development aid. In 2023, the EU and its member countries provided €95.9 billion for official development assistance to support long-term economic, social, environmental and political development around the world.

EU development aid policies

The EU is committed to implementing the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals to eradicate poverty, find sustainable and inclusive development solutions, and ensure everyone’s human rights by 2030.

In 2021, the EU adopted its Global Gateway strategy. It aims to boost smart, clean and secure connections in the digital, energy and transport sectors, and to strengthen health, education and research systems across the world. Up to €300 billion in public and private investment will be mobilised between 2021 and 2027 to achieve these goals. More information is available in the related press release.

EU action follows the principle of policy coherence for development, which means that EU policies should not have negative effects on developing countries. Under this principle, the EU aims to minimise inconsistencies and improve synergies between different EU policies, for instance in trade, agriculture or on climate action.

The EU therefore supports the private sector through public funding and several initiatives aiming to leverage investment in developing countries. For instance, the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) promotes sustainable investment in the EU’s partner countries. It aims at mobilising up to €135 billion of public and private financing to help partner countries achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.

To help improve people’s lives and the economy by fighting hunger and protecting natural resources, the EU also engages in international partnerships with countries in need, providing assistance through financial grants, public procurement contracts and budgetary support. In June 2021, the EU adopted the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, which aims to promote stronger partnerships with non-EU countries, including with the European neighbourhood.

European Parliament’s position

In a March 2023 resolution, the European Parliament called to prevent EU policies from negatively impacting poor and vulnerable people in developing countries. Parliament also stressed the need to clarify, strengthen and promote policy coherence for development in line with the Sustainable Development Goals.

In a December 2023 resolution, the European Parliament reaffirmed that everyone has the right to education. It also stressed that, if we are to meet the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030, education – notably basic education – must be free, quality, inclusive, and accessible without discrimination.

In a May 2025 resolution about the updated long-term budget for the Union, the European Parliament emphasised that the EU should aim to remain the world’s leading provider of development aid and climate finance. Parliament also noted that the EU and its member countries have jointly pledged to allocate 0.7 % of their gross national income (GNI) to official development assistance, and stressed that reducing poverty must remain the main goal.

Further information

• Understanding the triple nexus: The challenges of creating synergies between humanitarian, development and security policies, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, April 2025
• The EU Aid Strategy: A Gateway to Human Development?, European Parliament External Policies Analysis and Support Unit, Study, March 2025
• Assessing policy coherence for development across internal and external EU policies: A call for action – Ex-post evaluation, European Parliamentary Research Service, Study, November 2024
• Understanding policy coherence for development, European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2023
• Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

One focus of the June 2025 plenary session was the situation in the Middle East, with Members debating statements from Kaja Kallas, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, on the risk of further instability in the Middle East following the Israel-Iran military escalation, and the review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement and the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan addressed Parliament in a formal sitting, and spoke in particular on the implications of the crisis in the Middle East.

Members held further debates on international questions, including debating with Kallas on the upcoming NATO summit, on 24-26 June 2025. They also debated the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression, the rise in violence and the deepening humanitarian crisis in South Sudan, and the assassination attempt on Senator Miguel Uribe and the threat to the democratic process and peace in Colombia.

Inside the EU, Members debated the state of play on illegal use of spyware and the follow-up two years after the PEGA inquiry committee recommendations, freedom of assembly in Hungary and the need for the Commission to act, safeguarding the rule of law in Spain, the institutional and political implications of the EU enlargement process, and the latest developments on the revision of the air passenger rights and airline liability regulations.

Roberta Metsola, the President of the European Parliament, opened the session with a statement marking the 40th anniversary of the Schengen Area agreement.

Revision of the Child Sexual Abuse Directive

Today’s criminal law rules on child sexual abuse and exploitation are no longer fit for purpose. Members debated the proposed directive on combating child sexual abuse and endorsed the report from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) which urges increased maximum penalties for such offences, including recruiting children for prostitution and possessing or distributing child sexual abuse material, and proposes to remove limitation periods so that victims can claim compensation indefinitely. The committee also calls for criminalising the use of artificial intelligence systems for child sexual abuse. The vote sets Parliament’s negotiating mandate on the legislative proposal.

Welfare of dogs and cats

Members adopted the Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) Committee report on a proposal for new rules on the welfare and traceability of dogs and cats, setting the mandate for trilogue negotiations. The initiative would establish EU-wide minimum standards for the first time, covering – among other things – the accommodation, care, and treatment of these animals. It puts forward uniform EU rules for the welfare of dogs and cats in breeding establishments, pet shops, and shelters, introducing minimum standards for their housing, care, and handling. It also includes strict traceability requirements and automated checks to control the breeding and trade of these animals.

Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

The main investment tool underpinning the EU’s Next Generation EU (NGEU) response to COVID-19, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), finances reform and investment in EU countries. Members held a debate and adopted a joint report from the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), which looks at how the RRF has been implemented to date. The report acknowledges the RRF’s stabilising effect and notes that the Member States even exceeded their green and digital targets. However, implementation delays are a key concern, particularly in the impact on repaying NGEU debt. To boost transparency and traceability, the report calls for improved data on the use of RRF funding, and greater Parliament involvement in ensuring scrutiny and accountability.

Strengthening rural areas in the EU through cohesion policy

Home to a quarter of Europe’s population and occupying the majority of the EU’s territory, rural areas face economic, social, demographic and structural challenges that affect their economic growth and development. Members debated an own-initiative report from the Committee on Regional Development (REGI) on strengthening rural areas through cohesion policy. The report underlines the demographic and structural challenges facing these regions, vital for food and water supplies. It emphasises the need for investment in transport, digital connectivity, agriculture, tourism and essential public services. It also underlines that young people, and women in particular, need more support to thrive in rural areas. The report urges the Commission to prepare a new rural strategy and to secure sufficient funding for rural areas.

Commission’s fifth rule of law report

Members adopted a resolution drafted by the LIBE committee on the Commission’s fifth annual rule of law report, which looks at the state of the rule of law in all Member States plus four candidate countries. The LIBE report on the Commission’s work highlights gaps on prison conditions and the quality of administrative justice. It also regrets that some non-governmental organisations face restrictions, and urges all Member States to support media freedom and implement the Anti-SLAPP Directive and Parliament’s PEGA inquiry committee recommendations. The report highlights the continued need for EU governments to act on LGBTIQ rights, anti-Semitism, islamophobia, and equality and non-discrimination for third-country nationals legally residing in the EU.

Commission reports on Montenegro and Moldova

Members debated and adopted reports from the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on the Commission’s 2023 and 2024 reports on EU accession prospects for Montenegro and Moldova. Montenegro’s EU accession negotiations began in 2012, and AFET’s report welcomes the country’s ambitious plan to join the EU in 2028, recognising its commitment to EU accession and confirming Parliament’s full support for future EU membership. To ensure progress however, the report stresses the need for political stability and the effective implementation of adopted reforms. While the report underlines Montenegro‘s full alignment with EU common foreign and security policy, it also outlines malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns as central concerns. Moldova also faces significant challenges, not least the impact of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and interference in its democratic processes. AFET’s report on Moldova underlines the need for authorities to deal with fundamental issues such as money laundering and corruption, and calls for EU support for justice reform. While Moldova‘s EU accession negotiations began more recently, in 2024, the AFET report nevertheless emphasises the country’s steady progress on its reforms.

The United Kingdom’s accession to the Hague Judgments Convention

Members posed an oral question to the Commission on the United Kingdom’s planned accession to the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention. Parliament adopted a resolution welcoming the UK’s accession, recognising its benefit for citizens and companies alike by ‘simplifying the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters’.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, from the LIBE committee on a proposal on enhancing police cooperation in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings; and enhancing Europol’s support to preventing and combating such crimes, was approved without vote.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – June II 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Steven Blaakman.

In December 2000, the United Nations General Assembly designated 20 June as World Refugee Day, to mark the 50th anniversary of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

A refugee is a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution in their country of origin based on race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular social group or political opinion, receives international protection from another state on its territory.

A call for solidarity with refugees

The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates that 120 million people worldwide were forcibly displaced by May 2024, with over 43.4 million of them being refugees. In addition to that, at least 4.4 million people are stateless. With growing numbers of people being forced to flee their homes, the international day serves as a reminder that refugees need support more than ever. This year, World Refugee Day is focusing on solidarity with refugees. According to UNHCR, this means not only ending conflict so they can return home in safety, but also ensuring they have opportunities to thrive in the communities that have welcomed them and providing countries with the resources they need to include and support refugees.

Looking for protection in the European Union

Many displaced people around the world seek protection in the European Union (EU). After a peak in migrant arrivals in 2015 and 2016, followed by a decrease due to the pandemic, arrival numbers began rising again in 2021. In 2023, over a million first-time asylum-seekers applied for international protection in the EU, up 20 % from 2022 and the highest number since the peak in the 2015-2016 period. Additionally, over 4 million Ukrainians in the EU had received support under the Temporary Protection Directive by the end of March 2025. In addition to asylum-seekers arriving at EU borders, the EU has set up a system for all of its Member States to directly receive refugees from non-EU countries, such as Türkiye, Lebanon and Jordan, currently hosting large numbers of asylum-seekers. This scheme is primarily based on EU cooperation with the UNHCR, which assists in resettling refugees directly from refugee camps. For the 2024-2025 period, 14 Member States have pledged to secure over 60 735 places for resettlement and humanitarian admission.

Solidarity and inclusion in the EU

The European Parliament has consistently called for solidarity with refugees. In its 2016 resolution on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration, Parliament emphasised that hosting Member States ‘must offer refugees support and opportunities to integrate and build a life in their new society’. While the responsibility for integration policies lies primarily with the Member States, the EU has established its guiding principles in the EU action plan on integration and inclusion (2021-2027) on support for national, regional and local authorities, as well as civil society. In December 2023, a permanent solidarity framework was established when Parliament and the Council reached an agreement on the asylum and migration pact, which included the Regulation on Asylum and Migration Management, adopted in 2024.

The new rules, which will start to apply in July 2026, combine mandatory solidarity to support Member States that cannot cope with the number of irregular arrivals on their territory with flexibility for Member States in choosing how they contribute. Countries will not be required to relocate asylum seekers, but will have the option to provide financial contributions or help with capacity-building, such as providing staff and equipment.

This is an update of a 2024 At a Glance note written by Anita Orav.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘World Refugee Day 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lucia Vesnic-Alujevic with Georgios Saitis.

Driven by the rapid pace of technological change and the need for a human-centric approach to the development of artificial intelligence (AI), AI skills have a significant role in shaping the future European workforce. The growing skills gap in the EU, with almost half of the population lacking basic digital skills, including AI skills, poses a significant challenge for the future that needs to be addressed for the EU to maintain its competitiveness and manage regional disparities.

Several EU initiatives are under way, including the recently adopted union of skills communication and AI continent action plan. Fostering anticipatory governance, a culture of innovation, supporting diversity and inclusiveness in the AI workforce, and strengthening digital infrastructure are all critical to ensuring that the benefits of AI are shared by all, while minimising its negative impacts. Aligning with European values will be important to ensure fairness in this process. The EU’s future prosperity depends on using AI’s potential while basing it on a human-centric approach and ethical development, ensuring transparency and accountability, as well as prioritising people’s wellbeing.

Targeted investment in EU-wide digital infrastructure and education that emphasises lifelong learning and skills development could ensure balanced economic growth and competitiveness in the global talent market. By examining the multifaceted interaction between AI, skills and jobs, a way forward may be identified that focuses on the needs of EU citizens and ensures that the future European workforce – and citizens in general – are equipped to succeed in an increasingly automated and AI-driven economy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘What role for AI skills in (re-)shaping the future European workforce‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Computer science in education Potential impact of GenAI on jobs in different regions of the world

Written by Clément Evroux and annastiina Papunen.

Issues at stake

• The combined global revenues of Earth observation and positioning-navigation-timing solutions revenues are expected to double between 2023 and 2035, making space services one of the fastest growing economic sectors. According to the European Commission, around 10 % of EU GDP is enabled by satellite signals. However, space congestion hampers further development.
• The probability of a new global ‘space race’ led the European Council to identify space as a sensitive sector where strategic EU dependencies need to be reduced. A legislative initiative on an EU space law is planned in the European Commission’s 2025 work programme (Q2).
• While there is a broad consensus on the relevance of collective EU space assets and services for competitiveness and strategic autonomy, Member States hold different views on the most appropriate legal basis and legislative format for EU action.
• Most stakeholders in the EU are supportive of an EU space act that would address the safety, security and sustainability of space operations and facilitate the creation of a single market for space services, provided it does not hamper the competitiveness of EU space actors by creating additional burdens, and would apply to any entity delivering space services in the EU.
• This situation presents a strategic opportunity for the European Parliament to be proactive and use its tools to shape the proposal (see below), aiming to complement the act with the required financing for space investment in the next EU multiannual financial framework.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European space act‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Frederik Scholaert.

On 5 June 2025, the European Commission published the European ocean pact. The world’s seas and oceans are under severe and increasing pressure from pollution, climate change, and overexploitation. The deterioration of the environment, coupled with the growing demand for maritime space and marine resources, has emphasised the necessity of coherent ocean governance — a goal that the ocean pact aims to achieve.

The pact is a non-legislative strategy intended to serve as a unified reference framework for all ocean-related EU policies. It was announced as one of the key deliverables within the Commission’s fisheries and oceans portfolio. Actions and initiatives in this pact are grouped under six priorities: ocean health; a sustainable blue economy; coastal communities and islands; ocean research, skills and literacy; maritime security and defence; and ocean governance. To support implementation, a high-level stakeholder-led ocean board would be established as well as a ‘ocean pact scoreboard’ to monitor achievement of the objectives. Member States will be encouraged to designate and manage marine protected areas in order to meet the 2030 target of protecting 30 % of their seas. In order to achieve all targets set out in the ocean pact, the Commission will table an ocean act in 2027. This legislative act, which has been requested by various stakeholders, will be based on a revision of the maritime spatial planning directive. It would strengthen and modernise maritime planning and bring relevant ocean-related targets together in one place.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The European ocean pact: And an ocean act by 2027‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Olga Dunderberg.

The agenda for the European Parliament’s June 2025 plenary session has a strong focus on the rule of law and advances several important files through the legislative procedure. The Commission will make statements on the following week’s NATO summit, and on the recently adopted European Oceans Pact. His Majesty King Abdullah II, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, is scheduled to address Parliament in a formal sitting on Tuesday morning.

The main investment tool underpinning the EU’s Next Generation EU (NGEU) response to COVID‑19, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), finances reform and investment in EU countries. Members are due to discuss a joint report from the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) on Tuesday, which looks at how the RRF has been implemented to date. The report acknowledges the RRF’s stabilising effect and notes that the Member States even exceeded their green and digital targets. However, implementation delays are a key concern, particularly in the impact on repaying the NGEU debt. To boost transparency and traceability, the report calls for improved data on the use of RRF funding, and greater Parliament involvement in ensuring scrutiny and accountability.

Today’s criminal law rules on child sexual abuse and exploitation are no longer fit for purpose. Members are therefore set to debate the European Commission’s proposed directive on combating child sexual abuse on Tuesday morning. A report from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on the proposal urges increased maximum penalties for such offences, including recruiting children for prostitution or possessing or distributing child sexual abuse material and proposes to remove limitation periods so that victims can claim compensation indefinitely. The committee also calls to criminalise the use of artificial intelligence systems for child sexual abuse. The vote on the report will set Parliament’s negotiating mandate on the legislative proposal.

On Tuesday afternoon, Members are to debate a resolution drafted by the LIBE committee on the Commission’s fifth annual rule of law report, which looks at the state of the rule of law in all Member States plus four candidate countries. The LIBE report on the Commission’s work highlights gaps on prison conditions and the quality of administrative justice. It also regrets that some non-governmental organisations face restrictions, and urges all Member States to support media freedom and implement the Anti-SLAPP Directive and Parliament’s PEGA inquiry committee recommendations. The report highlights the continued need for EU governments to act on LGBTIQ rights, anti-Semitism, islamophobia and equality and non-discrimination for third-country nationals legally residing in the EU.

Turning to future EU enlargement on Tuesday afternoon, Members are expected to debate reports from the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on the Commission’s 2023 and 2024 reports on EU accession prospects for Montenegro and Moldova. Montenegro’s EU accession negotiations began in 2012, and AFET’s report welcomes the country’s ambitious plan to join the EU in 2028, recognising its commitment to EU accession and confirming Parliament’s full support for future EU membership. To ensure progress however, the report emphasises the need for political stability and the effective implementation of adopted reforms. While the report underlines Montenegro‘s full alignment with EU common foreign and security policy, it also outlines malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns as central concerns. Also facing significant challenges, not least the impact of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and interference in Moldova’s democratic processes, AFET’s report on Moldova underlines the need for authorities to deal with fundamental issues such as money laundering and corruption, and calls for EU support for justice reform. While Moldova‘s EU accession negotiations began more recently, in 2024, the AFET report nevertheless emphasises the country’s steady progress on its reforms.

Home to a quarter of Europe’s population and occupying a majority of the EU’s territory, rural areas face economic, social, demographic and structural challenges that affect their economic growth and development. On Monday evening, Members are scheduled to debate an own-initiative report from the Committee on Regional Development (REGI) on strengthening rural areas through cohesion policy. The REGI report underlines the demographic and structural challenges facing these regions, vital for food and water supplies. The REGI report emphasises the need for investment in transport, digital connectivity, agriculture, tourism and essential public services. It underlines that young people, and women in particular, need more support to thrive in rural areas, through a decentralised and place-based cohesion policy with simplified access to funding. The committee urges the Commission to prepare a new rural strategy and to secure sufficient EU funding for rural areas.

Finally, on Thursday, Members are due to pose oral questions to the Commission on the United Kingdom’s planned accession to the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention. Parliament welcomes the UK’s accession, recognising its benefit for citizens and companies alike by ‘simplifying the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters’. Members are also expected to vote on a resolution, which is likely to remind the Commission of its obligation to respect Parliament’s right to be involved in the procedure.

Further reading

• European Parliament Plenary Session June 2025 – agenda
• Strengthening rural areas in the EU through cohesion policy
• Revision of the Child Sexual Abuse Directive
• Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)
• 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro
• 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova
• Commission’s fifth rule of law report
• The United Kingdom’s accession to the Hague Judgments Convention

Written by Dessislava Yougova.

The European Union is currently legally bound to reach climate neutrality by 2050 and has agreed on targets and legislation to reduce net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 55 % by 2030 compared with 1990 levels. The EU raised its’ ambitions after Parliament declared a climate emergency in 2019 and asked the European Commission to align the EU’s climate legislation with the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C. Having become the world’s fastest-warming continent, Europe is now facing increasing and stronger climate-related hazards, including heatwaves, prolonged droughts, extreme flooding, and rising sea levels. However, there is scope to significantly reduce climate risks by applying existing EU and national policies and action that rapidly reduce emissions and prepare countries to adapt to the impacts of a changing climate.

The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) launched a series of briefings in 2024, based on statistical data, to take stock of each Member State’s progress towards climate neutrality and the EU-wide and national targets set in the ‘fit for 55’ package. Building on national energy and climate plans and using additional sources, the briefings provide an overview of a Member State’s current situation with regard to GHG emissions and removals and its energy system, national objectives and targets, as well as existing and planned measures to deliver on national commitments.

European countries’ energy mix and renewable energy share in final energy consumption are of particular interest, as reducing energy-related emissions by phasing out fossil fuels and transitioning to renewables and energy efficiency is the way to achieve the EU’s climate neutrality objective. Member States are therefore required to contribute to the EU-wide target of a 42.5 % share of renewable energy sources by 2030. However, for several Member States, decarbonising the energy system remains the most challenging issue.

The overview of sectoral challenges and strategies reveals limited progress in most countries in addressing emissions from transport, buildings, waste and agriculture. As EU legislation sets binding national targets for reducing emissions from these sectors, Member States would need to implement additional national measures, particularly in the transport, buildings and industry sectors.

The EU land use, land-use change and forestry sector, which plays an important role as a carbon sink thanks to forests’ capacities to absorb carbon from the atmosphere, is also subject to national targets set by EU legislation. However, Member States’ latest projections show that the EU is likely to miss its collective 2030 target in this sector.

In addition, the EPRS briefings give an overview of each Member State’s climate and energy strategy and climate action governance, as well as the latest policy developments, using available country information. They also shed light on the climate-related spending under the national recovery and resilience plans, as Member States are required to invest at least 37 % of EU Recovery and Resilience Facility Funds on climate objectives.

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig.

On 20 May 2025, the European Union (EU) High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) announced the launch of a review of Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. The review will assess Israel’s compliance with human rights and democratic principles, which is an essential element of the agreement. This is the first step in a procedure that could eventually lead to the suspension of the agreement.

The EU-Israel Association Agreement

The Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part (EU-Israel AA), provisionally applied since 1996 and in force since 2000, provides the framework for political and economic cooperation between the EU and Israel. It includes provisions on regular political dialogue, and establishes a free trade area between the parties, including the progressive liberalisation of the provision of services, of capital movements and of public procurement. It also includes rules on fair competition and the protection of intellectual property. Furthermore, under the AA, the parties commit to strengthening their cooperation in various economic sectors, in research and technology, and in audiovisual, cultural and social matters. The agreement sets up governing bodies, most importantly an Association Council, made up of representatives of the Council of the EU and the Commission, on the one side, and Israel on the other, meeting at ministerial level and having the power to take decisions binding on the parties and to make recommendations, as well as an Association Committee meeting at officials’ level.

The EU-Israel action plan, adopted in 2005 and extended several times by the Association Council, implements the Association Agreement. On 26 March 2025, the Commission issued a proposal for a Council decision on the extension of the action plan, which expired in January 2025.

Reviewing Israel’s compliance with Article 2 of the Association Agreement

Respect for human rights and democratic principles constitutes an essential element of the EU-Israel AA, Article 2 of which states: ‘Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement.’ This is a standard human rights clause reflecting the EU’s longstanding poli cy on human rights conditionality in its external policy. The violation of the human rights (or essential elements) clause by one party to the agreement enables the other to take ‘appropriate measures’, including ultimately the suspension of the agreement. However, the human rights clause does not contain any explicit provisions about the grounds for its activation, leaving the Parties with a wide margin for interpretation.

On 20 May 2025, Kaja Kallas said there was ‘a strong majority in favour of [the] review of Article 2 of our Association Agreement with Israel. So, we will launch this exercise and, in the meantime, it is up to Israel to unblock the humanitarian aid.’ The formal request to review Israel’s compliance with Article 2 (backed by 17 EU Member States) was made by the Netherlands, citing Israel’s blockade of humanitarian aid deliveries to the Gaza Strip and the proposed new system for aid distribution as seemingly being incompatible with international humanitarian law and principles. Pending the review, the Netherlands will withhold its approval of the extension of the EU-Israel Action Plan.

The review is being led by the European External Action Service, possibly with the Commission’s participation, but its timeline is undefined. Reports point to the next meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council on 23 June 2025 as an opportunity to present the review to Member States.

Should the review conclude that Israel has breached Article 2, the likely outcome would be a Commission and/or HR/VP proposal to the Council to open consultations with Israel on the matter, in accordance with Article 79 of the EU-Israel AA (the non-execution clause) which sets out the provisions applicable in case a party fails to fulfil obligations under the agreement, including in relation to human rights.

Article 79 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement
1. The Parties shall take any general or specific measures required to fulfil their obligations under the Agreement. They shall see to it that the objectives set out in the Agreement are attained.
2. If either Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Agreement, it may take appropriate measures. Before so doing, except in cases of special urgency, it shall supply the Association Council with all relevant information required for a thorough examination of the situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties. In the selection of measures, priority shall be given to those which least disturb the functioning of the Agreement.

Article 79 outlines a gradual procedure whereby the alleged breach must first be discussed within the Association Council, in order to find an acceptable solution (i.e. consultations). If a solution is not found, then the aggrieved party may take appropriate measures – for the EU, these would be reflected in a Council decision. Moreover, preference should be given to those measures that would least disturb the functioning of the agreement, thus making suspension a measure of last resort. Nevertheless, Article 79 provides that, in cases of special urgency, appropriate measures may be adopted immediately without prior submission of the matter to the Association Council. Appropriate measures, including suspension, may be subject to the dispute settlement provisions in the agreement (Article 75 of the EU-Israel AA). According to the Commission, this would not prevent suspension.

Suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement or other ‘appropriate measures’?

The suspension by the EU of an international agreement is governed by Article 218(9) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which states that the Council, on a proposal from the Commission or the HR/VP (depending on the areas covered by the agreement), shall adopt a decision suspending application of an agreement. According to Article 218(8) TFEU, the Council ‘shall act unanimously … for association agreements’. Article 218(9) TFEU also applies to ‘establishing the positions to be adopted on the Union’s behalf in a body set up by an agreement’ regarding the adoption of ‘acts having legal effects’. The unanimity requirement would make full suspension of the EU-Israel AA challenging. However, the EU could decide to halt cooperation in specific areas, for example by suspending the free trade area, excluding Israel from research funding programmes (Horizon) or suspending the political dialogue with Israel. Depending on the measures considered, the Council would have to act by unanimity (e.g. suspension of political dialogue) or qualified majority (e.g. trade, research cooperation).

Precedents

The EU has so far invoked the human rights clause of an international agreement only under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. Article 96 of that agreement (detailing the procedure for opening consultations and adopting appropriate measures) has been applied about 17 times since 2000, following violent government overthrows, election irregularities or human rights violations. While, in some of these cases, EU action did not go beyond opening consultations, in others the EU took appropriate measures, such as cutting development aid and suppressing some forms of cooperation. There is no case to date where the EU has activated the non-execution clause leading to the suspension or termination of the agreement on grounds of the ‘essential elements’ clause being breached. In 2011, the EU partially suspended the application of the 1977 Cooperation Agreement with Syria, invoking the United Nations Charter, as that agreement did not contain a human rights clause.

The European Parliament’s role

Parliament would have to be informed if a proposal were made for a Council decision to suspend fully or partially the EU-Israel AA, in accordance with Article 218(10) TFEU. Parliament’s Framework Agreement with the Commission confirms that Parliament has to be fully and immediately informed of decisions concerning the suspension of agreements and EU positions in a body set up by an agreement (e.g. Association Council). Such decisions are adopted in accordance with the procedure in Article 218(9) TFEU. The Commission also undertakes to ‘inform the Council and Parliament simultaneously and in due time of its intention to propose to the Council the suspension of an international agreement and of the reasons therefor’. In such cases, Parliament may organise a debate and invite the Commission, the HR/VP or the Council to give statements; it may also issue recommendations (Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure).

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.