European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by David Kemp.

The ability of generative AI (‘GenAI’) to generate plausible text, images, music and computer code in response to human prompts is impressive. GenAI promises huge productivity gains in many domains, and large amounts of financial and political capital are staked on its success. Nevertheless, the current generation of models exhibit well-publicised weaknesses that might not simply disappear by using more data and processing power or smarter training. This paper looks at those limitations, and the lower-profile alternative approaches to AI that could overcome them and even provide the EU with a competitive advantage.

Since the unveiling of ChatGPT in 2022, we have witnessed what many commentators consider to be the most rapid adoption of new technology in recent times in virtually all segments of society. One cannot fail to be impressed by the speed at which it can produce outputs that some say can be ‘PhD-level’.

At the same time, there is growing awareness that these algorithms often produce plausible but demonstrably false outputs (‘hallucinations‘) or outputs that are inconsistent with logic, maths or ‘how the real world works’; they regurgitate problematic biases present in their training data and cannot provide a reliable explanation of how the outputs were derived. ‘GenAI-optimists’ believe that accuracy and tractability will emerge through scaling up the data and processing power available and adding external (human or automated) processes to fine-tune the models. ‘GenAI-pessimists’, on the other hand, point to the fact that finding solutions to the above problems is slowing down, strongly suggesting that the approach is reaching its limits. In addition, the very high energy and resource consumption of the infrastructure necessary for training and running these ‘brute force’, data-driven applications is putting pressure on already stretched supplies. Given the several trillions of private and public capital invested, now and over the next few years, in the geopolitically strategic race for an ‘all-purpose’ artificial general intelligence (AGI), it is worth asking where GenAI’s limits lie and what other approaches might be explored to put Europe at the forefront of AI innovation.

Potential impacts and developments

GenAI models, in essence, generate a multi-dimensional map of statistical relationships in the training data between ‘tokens‘ – digital representations of linguistic, graphical, musical or other data. The models can then be prompted to produce new combinations of text, images, music, etc. that are consistent with those relationships. In contrast to traditional statistical regression analysis, these models contain billions of parameters and make almost no assumptions about the form of the relationships between tokens. This gives GenAI its enormous advantage in finding the subtle, multivariate patterns that allow it to output plausible text, code, music, images, etc. in response to prompts.

The flip side of this underlying design, however, is that GenAI (like traditional statistical regression) is prone to mistaking ‘noise’ in the training sample for meaningful patterns and producing bizarre results when it is applied to data outside the training set. In addition, pure GenAI trades transparency of ‘reasoning’ for power: a printout of the billion-parameter map of relationships provides no explanation. This is a problem for the required ‘human in the loop’: how can one have confidence in the result if no one knows exactly how it was reached?

Clearly, these design weaknesses limit mission-critical uses of AI. Scaling GenAI does not appear to eliminate these problems, all the while adding additional problems linked to resource usage. Ideally, we would make the most of the powerful pattern detection that GenAI offers, and overcome some of the limitations of a purely data-driven approach. This requires boostingresearch into ‘hybrid’ approaches which, like the human brain, leverage GenAI’s pattern extraction and matching abilities using built-in, explicit models of efficient reasoning strategies and the real world, as well as strategies formaintaining and developingthose models. These approaches provide a reality check to improve the reliability of GenAI’s probabilistic outputs. They are also more efficient (algorithmically and energetically) as they directly encode readily available, fundamental knowledge rather than requiring everything to be extracted by brute force from the data. Finally, the use of explicit representations and strategies allows their reasoning to be inspected.

Neuro-symbolic approaches, such as IBM’s neuro-symbolic concept learner, combine GenAI with explicit rules for symbolic reasoning (for logic, abstraction and generalisation) to enhance reasoning and explainability. Embodied AI – such as Meta’s Habitat – involves training agents in virtual or physical environments where they are designed to learn through perception, action and feedback, promoting causal learning and the development of sensorimotor intelligence. Cognitive architectures, such as Soar, ACT-R and OpenCog, include explicit models of human cognitive processes, integrating perception, memory, learning, planning and reasoning in a modular way. This enables continuity of learning, goal-directed behaviour and long-term memory. World model learning approaches such as DeepMind’s MuZero, Ha & Schmidhuber’s world model agents and DreamerV3 focus on training agents to derive compact, predictive models of their environment to support causal reasoning, generalisation and efficient planning. Finally, it must be underlined that, regardless of the underlying technology, the pursuit of artificial general intelligence is not necessarily the most efficient route to useful applications. Artificial specific intelligence (AI approaches focused on a specific domain, such as the Nobel prize-winning, protein-folding algorithm, AlphaFold2) gives more reliable and transparent results by combining the subtle pattern detection at which GenAI excels with explicitly encoded, domain-specific knowledge.

Anticipatory policymaking

The reliability issues mentioned above call into question GenAI’s ability to deliver the ‘trustworthy and human centric AI … pivotal for economic growth and … [preserve] the fundamental rights and principles that underpin our societies’, as promised in the AI continent action plan. Most AI initiatives from the European Commission have so far concentrated on the implementation of GenAI rather than on research and development of alternative and complementary AI approaches. The €700 million flagship GenAI4EU programme, for example, states its aim as being to ‘integrate generativeArtificial Intelligence (AI) in Europe’s strategic sectors, and keep their competitive edge’. Consequently, most of the calls for projects focus on applying GenAI in particular sectors and providing the data and computing power it needs. The pursuit of artificial general intelligence has attracted an enormous amount of political and economic interest, potentially to the detriment of equally interesting and possibly more efficient and effective alternatives, including those mentioned above.

To best serve the EU’s goals of competitivity and innovation in AI, EU policy and funding could be targeted more directly to support the wholevalue chain of alternative and complementary approaches to GenAI.It is also important to actively further domain-specific AI (artificial specific intelligence)applications alongside GenAI. This can be achieved through proactively promoting such projects for existing funding programmes and by policy guidance in the next multiannual financial framework and the Competitiveness Fund for Digital Leadership.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if generative AI is reaching its limits?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The key moments of the November II 2025 plenary session included the adoption of the 2026 EU budget and a debate on the EU position on the proposed plan and EU engagement towards a just and lasting peace for Ukraine. Members also debated statements on the EU response to Russian and Belarusian violations of EU airspace and infrastructure sabotage and on tackling China’s export restrictions. Members debated Parliament’s statement marking the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women and exchanged views with the Commission on the outcome of the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Brazil (COP30). Further debates were held on the Democracy Shield, the digital package, sustainable aviation and maritime fuel, citizens’ right to make cash payments, and fishing opportunities for 2026. Debates were also held on the 30th anniversary of the Barcelona Process marking its development into today’s Pact for the Mediterranean, the war in Sudan, and the political situation in Myanmar.

2026 EU budget

Parliament’s negotiators reached a provisional agreement on next year’s budget on 15 November, which reflects Parliament’s priorities, particularly increased funding for competitiveness, research and defence initiatives. The budget for the year sets commitment appropriations at €192.77 billion and payments at €190.1 billion. Following the Council’s approval, Members considered and adopted the agreed text. The vote on the 2026 EU budget concludes the budgetary procedure for 2026, and enabled Parliament’s President to sign the budget into law immediately.

European defence industry programme (EDIP)

Seeking to strengthen Europe’s defence industry, and guarantee reliable access to defence equipment when needed, Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement reached with the Council on the European defence industry programme (EDIP). The negotiators succeeded in maintaining the €1.5 billion budget for 2025 to 2027, including €300 million to support Ukraine. The agreement on EDIP also sets a 35 % limit on non-EU components, and excludes suppliers who pose a risk to EU security, a key Parliament priority.

Defence of democracy package

Members debated and adopted two reports from the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) on new lobbying rules, including a proposed directive setting harmonised transparency requirements, as part of a package aimed at tackling covert foreign influence. The vote sets Parliament’s position for negotiations on addressing third-country interference in democratic processes.

Stronger role for Europol to fight migrant smuggling and human trafficking

Migrant smugglers are responsible for over 90 % of irregular external EU border crossings. And migrants smuggled this way are at higher risk of falling victim to trafficking in human beings. Members debated and adopted an agreement reached with the Council on a proposal to strengthen Europol’s role in combating migrant smuggling and trafficking. The agreement would establish a permanent European Centre against Migrant Smuggling within Europol. It also introduces greater information-sharing in immigration operations and strengthens biometric data processing capabilities through additional staff and funding.

InvestEU

Members debated and adopted an agreement reached between the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) negotiators and the Council to amend and simplify the InvestEU Regulation. The changes would mobilise a further €55 billion in investment through InvestEU, the EU’s public-private risk-sharing instrument, supporting greater competitiveness and innovation.

Toy safety regulation

Parliament adopted an interinstitutional agreement at second reading on the proposed new toy safety regulation. Following negotiations between the co-legislators, the revised proposal strengthens customs checks on imported toys and requires that safety assessments of digitally connected toys consider risks to children, including their mental health. It also bans additional harmful chemicals in toys.

EU strategy and cooperation in the Arctic

Competition between global powers for influence in the Arctic region is contributing to a growing sense of instability. Members debated and adopted a report from Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), calling for a security-oriented strategy in the Arctic. The report recommends deeper partnerships with Arctic countries – and supports future EU enlargement prospects and increased EU funding for the region.

Digital safety for minors

Parliament debated and adopted an IMCO report, recommending measures to address the growing problem of children bypassing uneven age-verification in the EU to access adult content online. The own-initiative report on digital safety for minors warns of the risks of addiction, mental health problems and exposure to illegal content, and calls for stronger enforcement of the Digital Services Act (DSA), for the expected digital fairness act to close legislative gaps in online child safety, and for an EU-wide digital age limit.

European disabilities strategy

People with disabilities still face disadvantages in income, access to jobs, inclusive education, housing and healthcare. Parliament debated and adopted a report from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, aimed at addressing these disadvantages in the remaining years of the European disability strategy. The report also highlights the situation of women and girls with disabilities, who face multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination and violence.

Subsidiarity, proportionality and the role of national parliaments in the EU

The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which ensure the EU only acts where appropriate and where national governments cannot, is fundamental to the EU legislative process. Members adopted a report from the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) calling for improved definition and application of subsidiarity and proportionality and extending the deadline for national parliaments in the Member States to engage in the EU legislative process.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – November II 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Astrid Worum and Ralf Drachenberg.

After ‘constructive discussions’ in Geneva on 23 November between representatives of the US, Ukraine, France, Germany and the UK to ‘update and refine’ the 28-point Russia–Ukraine peace plan proposed by US President Donald Trump, the President of the European Council, António Costa, called an informal meeting of EU leaders to take stock of the latest developments. The aim was to draw on the ‘new momentum for peace negotiations’ by carrying out ‘additional work’ on major issues left unresolved. EU leaders stressed that the solution should be just and lasting, and expressed their readiness to support the process by working closely with Ukraine, the US and NATO. While reiterating their commitment to provide Ukraine with all the diplomatic, military, economic and financial support it needs, they also insisted that issues concerning the EU directly, such as sanctions and immobilised assets, required an EU decision and its full involvement.

General

Since the COVID crisis, videoconferences have become a useful tool for EU leaders to convene at short notice to discuss urgent developments, and were used most recently in February and August 2025). However, for this meeting about half of the EU leaders were physically present in the same location, Luanda (Angola), while the other half were connected remotely, making it the first fully hybrid European Council meeting.

The meeting was a ‘meeting of the 27 EU leaders with the President of the European Commission’ and did not include the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, as is often the case when EU Heads of State or Government meet in the videoconference format. However, Costa briefed the European Parliament’s Conference of Presidents (Parliament’s President and political group leaders) on the discussions at the informal EU leaders’ meeting, as he had done on 10 November for the 23 October 2025 European Council meeting.

Background US 28-point Russia-Ukraine peace plan

The US 28-point Russia-Ukraine peace plan leaked on 20 November – which the White House claimed was the result of a month of work between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US special envoy Steve Witkoff, ‘along with input from both Ukrainians and Russians’ – is considered by many observers to be too favourable to Russia. On the sidelines of the G20 summit in Johannesburg, 12 leaders – from Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the UK, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain and the Netherlands – as well as the European Council and Commission Presidents, adopted a statement expressing support for the ‘US efforts to bring peace in Ukraine’, but also concern at certain aspects of the draft. The statement notably underlines that ‘the initial draft of the 28-point plan includes important elements that will be essential for a just and lasting peace’, but that this ‘draft is a basis, which will require additional work’.

Concerns mainly relate to four points: i) territorial concessions; ii) limitation of Ukrainian military capacities; iii) sanctions and post-war reparations; and iv) NATO-related provisions.

Firstly, the statement recalls the principle that borders cannot be changed by force, representing a rebuke to the 28-point plan, which envisages significant territorial concessions from Ukraine to Russia, notably Donetsk.

Secondly, the proposal to limit Ukraine’s armed forces to 600 000 personnel ‘would leave Ukraine vulnerable to future attack’. EU leaders have only recently reiterated that ‘a Ukraine that is capable of defending itself effectively is seen as an integral part of any future security guarantees’; the provisions of the US plan are vague on security guarantees from the US and other Western allies – a point which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has repeatedly demanded as a condition for peace.

Thirdly, the statement stresses that ‘elements relating to the EU and NATO would need the consent’ of their respective members. Thus, the proposals cannot prejudice decisions relating to EU sanctions and the use of immobilised Russian assets, which are largely held in Europe, notably by Euroclear, and which EU leaders are considering using for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Even if the details are vague, the US plan seeks to unblock immobilised assets and place them into two investment funds, one for Ukraine and the other for Russia. The US would benefit economically from both funds, while the EU would be called on to pay €100 billion for Ukraine’s reconstruction.  

Fourthly, the US plan includes a ban on NATO membership for Ukraine, which is a matter for consensus between NATO members – not a decision for third parties, such as Russia – and for which there is no precedent. In that context, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz expressed scepticism that an agreement could be reached on the US plan in time for the deadline set by President Trump, and also rejected the re-integration of Russia into the G8, stating that ‘among the six current G7 members who are not the US, there is no willingness to readmit Russia’. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez called for a revision of the plan, stressing that ‘Ukrainians and Europeans must feel fully represented in any peace plan’, which affects the entire European security architecture.

Even if President Trump later said that the US 28-point plan was not ‘his final offer’, considerable pressure was put on Ukraine to accept the plan by Thanksgiving – 27 November. In a video address, President Zelenskyy told the Ukrainian people that ‘Ukraine may find itself facing a very difficult choice: Either loss of dignity, or the risk of losing a key partner. Either a difficult 28 points, or an extremely difficult winter.’ Russia indicated that the US plan was a potential basis for a peace agreement, and warned that, if Ukraine were to turn it down, Russian forces would advance further.

European counter-proposal

In that context, a group of countries led by France, Germany and the UK submitted a counter- proposal. While taking the US plan as a basis, it amends the draft on key points: i) the timing of territorial discussions, with a ceasefire to be reached first and the current front line to be set as the basis for any future discussions on territory; ii) on security guarantees, the counter-proposal envisages a NATO Article 5-like US security guarantee for Ukraine; iii) regarding Ukrainian sovereignty (which implies the right to choose alliances and make choices on its armed forces), the language on restrictions to NATO membership are softened and the number of personnel increased to 800 000 in peacetime; and iv) references to territorial concessions and recognition of occupation are removed, with European allies strongly rejecting the idea that Ukraine should be required to give up land by force. Russia, whose core demands were included in the US plan, rejected the counter-proposal.

Geneva meeting on 23 November

The Geneva meeting on 23 November, which gathered together national security advisers from the US and Ukraine, as well as France, Germany and the UK, drew up an ‘updated and refined peace plan’. The heads of cabinet of the European Commission and European Council presidents, Bjoern Seibert and Pedro Lourtie, also attended. After the meeting, Secretary of State Rubio praised the ‘tremendous amount of progress’ made in Geneva. Having spoken with Zelenskyy ahead of the EU leaders’ summit, Finnish President Alexander Stubb described the Geneva negotiations as a ‘step forward’, but cautioned that ‘major issues remain to be resolved’, adding that decisions falling under the EU or NATO’s remit would be discussed ‘in a separate track’.

The informal meeting of EU leaders on 24 November

Emphasising the ‘new momentum for peace negotiations’, President Costa convened a special meeting of EU leaders on the sidelines of the EU-Africa Summit in Luanda, Angola, to take stock of the latest developments. The purpose was to discuss the state of play as well as ‘major issues, which still remain to be resolved’, to develop the peace plan into a sustainable solution. The meeting took place in a hybrid format, with 15 EU leaders attending in person, including Chancellor Merz, the Irish Taoiseach, Micheál Martin, the prime ministers of Croatia, Andrej Plenković, Poland, Donald Tusk, Slovakia, Robert Fico, and Spain, Pedro Sánchez, and Presidents Costa and von der Leyen, while other EU leaders joined by videoconference. Since the meeting was an informal one, no conclusions were adopted, but Costa and von der Leyen held a joint press conference afterwards outlining the main discussion points.

In his report after the meeting, Costa stressed that ‘peace cannot be a temporary truce, it must be a lasting solution’. Thus, while commending ‘the efforts of Presidents Zelenskyy and Trump and their teams’ and welcoming the ‘progress achieved [in Geneva] on several issues’, EU leaders underlined that ‘some issues remain to be resolved’.

EU leaders conveyed two central messages. Firstly, ‘the issues that concern directly the EU, such as sanctions, enlargement or immobilised assets, require the full involvement and decision by the EU’. Thus, certain points included in the draft peace plan cannot be decided by third parties in a peace treaty, but will need to be discussed in a separate framework. At the same time, they expressed their readiness to support the process by working closely with Ukraine, the US and NATO. Secondly, EU leaders reiterated the EU’s commitment to providing ‘President Zelenskyy with all the support he needs’ – diplomatic, military, economic and, in particular, financial support. On the latter point, Costa recalled the commitment made at the 23 October meeting, stressing that ‘we will [deliver] at the December European Council’, and said that ‘Ukraine has chosen Europe, and Europe will stand by Ukraine’. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėdastressed the ‘need for the EU to actively participate in the discussions on the future of Ukraine, and also to keep pressuring Russia – the only side responsible for this unjust war’.

EU leaders also set three ‘core principles’ outlined by von der Leyen regarding the substance of a future peace deal, which is also ‘about the security of the entire [European] continent, now and in the future’. Firstly, Ukraine’s territory and sovereignty must be respected. Secondly, only Ukraine as a sovereign country can make decisions regarding its armed forces, and the choice of their destiny is in their own hands. Thirdly, Europe is central to Ukraine’s future. As Romanian President Nicușor Dan emphasised at the EU-27 meeting, ‘there is a direct link between the security of Ukraine and that of the Republic of Moldova and the region as a whole, and the current peace talks need to take this aspect into consideration’. Likewise, Bulgarian Prime Minister Rosen Jeliazkov emphasised that ‘the security of Ukraine is essential for EU security – close coordination between the US, the EU and Ukraine, and reliable long-term guarantees for Ukraine’s future, are key’.

Mirroring the principles set by EU leaders, in their joint statement on the same day, the chairs of the foreign affairs committees of 20 European countries’ parliaments emphasised that a just and lasting peace cannot be achieved by yielding to the aggressor; instead, it must be grounded in international law and respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty. On 26 November, the European Parliament held a debate on the proposed plan and the EU’s engagement for a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, with von der Leyen outlining again the core principles of the EU’s position in favour of a sustainable peace. These principles – together with the full involvement of EU and NATO members on decisions concerning them – also reflect the main lines set in the statement adopted by G20 and European partners, as well as the amendments made in the counter-proposal to the 28-point plan. They also served as a ‘solid basis’ for the 25 November videoconference call of leaders of the countries comprising the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ supporting Ukraine, whose co-chairs, French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, issued a strong statement after the meeting.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the informal EU leaders’ meeting of 24 November 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens called on the European Union to take action to ensure the release and safe return of Europeans detained by Israel for their participation in the Gaza-bound Global Sumud Flotilla. Many citizens wrote to the President of the European Parliament on this subject from October 2025 onwards. They asked her to take the necessary action to guarantee that European citizens are protected and receive full consular assistance.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President:

English

The European Parliament has been closely monitoring the situation and has been in contact with the relevant national authorities. However, the responsibility to provide consular assistance to citizens of the European Union (EU) lies with individual EU countries.

Opening the Parliament’s sitting on 6 October 2025, President Metsola spoke of the need to ‘finally bring about an end to the intergenerational cycle of bloodshed, terror and violence’ in the Middle East.

The President welcomed the agreement on the first phase of the Gaza peace deal and called for the deal to now be respected and implemented.

The protection and wellbeing of Members of the European Parliament, anywhere in the world, is and will always be of the utmost priority for this Parliament. Please see the Parliament Spokesperson’s June statement on this.

The European Parliament adopted a resolution in September 2025 on the situation in Gaza. Moreover, on 7 October 2025, the European Parliament held a debate on the EU’s role in supporting the recent peace efforts for Gaza and a two-state solution.

French

Le Parlement européen suit la situation de près et est en contact avec les autorités nationales compétentes. Toutefois, la responsabilité de fournir une assistance consulaire aux citoyens de l’Union européenne incombe aux différents États membres.

Lors de l’ouverture de la séance du Parlement le 6 octobre 2025, la Présidente Roberta Metsola a souligné la nécessité d’«enfin mettre un terme au cycle intergénérationnel d’effusions de sang, de terreur et de violence» au Moyen-Orient.

La Présidente a accueilli favorablement l’accord sur la première phase du plan de paix pour Gaza et a demandé son respect et sa mise en œuvre.

La protection et le bien-être des députés au Parlement européen, partout dans le monde, sont et seront toujours la priorité absolue de ce Parlement. Veuillez consulter la déclaration de la porte-parole du Parlement à ce sujet.

Le Parlement européen a adopté en septembre 2025 une résolution sur la situation à Gaza. En outre, le 7 octobre 2025, il a tenu un débat sur le rôle de l’UE dans le soutien aux efforts de paix en faveur de Gaza et une solution fondée sur la coexistence de deux États.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Laurence Amand Eeckhout.

Rare diseases, often underdiagnosed and overlooked, affect over 36 million people in the EU and around 300 million worldwide. The EU supports numerous initiatives to improve diagnosis, care, data sharing and research. The European Parliament is advocating for a comprehensive action plan at EU level to address persistent challenges such as fragmented research, lengthy diagnosis times, limited access to innovative treatment, and the overall quality of life for patients.

Background

There is no formal definition of rare disease. In the EU, rare diseases are those that meet a prevalence threshold of no more than 5 affected persons per 10 000 (i.e. 1 in 2 000). Around 36 million people in the EU therefore live with a rare disease (about 8 % of the EU population). Approximately 6 000 to 8 000 rare diseases have been identified, though the exact number fluctuates as new conditions continue to be discovered and classified. According to the European Medicines Agency (EMA), fewer than 1 000 diseases benefit from an even minimal level of scientific knowledge, and despite scientific advances, about 95 % of the known rare diseases still lack approved treatment. Diagnostic odysseys remain long for many patients: the average time for an accurate diagnosis in the EU is between four and five years. Common symptoms can also sometimes mask underlying rare diseases, resulting in misdiagnosis and delayed treatment. Around 80 % of rare diseases have a genetic cause.

Rare diseases significantly affect a person’s quality of life. Additionally, stigma and a lack of public awareness can deepen feelings of isolation and negatively impact the wellbeing of both individuals living with a rare disease and their families.

EU action on rare diseases

Member States are responsible for their own healthcare policies (Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU). However, the EU can play a supporting role and add value to national action. In the pharmaceutical sector, the EU offers incentives to encourage companies to research and develop medicines for rare diseases at EU scale, which otherwise would not be developed (known as orphan drugs or orphan medicinal products). The European Commission grants ‘orphan designation’ following a recommendation from the Committee for Orphan Medicinal Products at the EMA. In 2023, the EU launched the ongoing revision of its pharmaceutical legislation (including revision of the ‘EU Orphan Regulation’), which was followed in March 2025 by a proposed critical medicines act, which would also address the needs of patients with rare diseases. Directive 2011/24/EU currently facilitates cross-border healthcare, including for these patients. The EU supports the codification and inventory of rare diseases through the Orphanet portal, the ORPHAcode classification system and the European Platform on Rare Disease Registration.

Research is essential to better understand the causes and characteristics of rare diseases and develop new diagnostics and therapies; the EU has supported rare disease research through successive framework programmes. Given the limited knowledge available, sharing data at EU level is vital. A European partnership on research on rare diseases was launched in 2024, co-funded by the EU (Horizon Europe) and counting 180 partners from 37 countries: ERDERA will drive research in prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of rare diseases, with an estimated overall budget of €380 million to 2031, of which approximately €150 million will come from the EU.The EU life sciences strategy, adopted by the Commission in July 2025, places a strong emphasis on advancing research and innovation in rare diseases. This strategy is closely linked to the expected EU biotech act, to be proposed in mid-December 2025, which aims to strengthen the EU’s competitiveness in biotechnology, including on rare disease therapies, while enhancing patient outcomes. The EU also contributes to research coordination on rare diseases through the European reference networks, which enable specialists to discuss cases of patients affected (see textbox).

The European reference networks (ERNs) were established in 2017 and are evaluated regularly. As of 2024, the 24 ERNs include more than 1 600 specialised centres located in around 380 hospitals across 27 Member States and Norway. They cover the main clusters of rare disease: bone, skin, craniofacial anomalies and ear-nose-throat or intellectual and other neurodevelopmental disorders, inherited and congenital (digestive and gastrointestinal) anomalies, epilepsies, adult solid and paediatric (haemato-oncology) cancers, genetic tumour risk or malformation syndromes, kidney, uro-recto-genital, neuromuscular, heart, hepatological or haematological, eye, respiratory, neurological, multisystemic vascular and connective tissue and musculoskeletal disease, as well as immunodeficiency-autoinflammatory-autoimmune and paediatric rheumatic disease and hereditary metabolic disorders and transplantation in children.

In March 2024, the Commission launched the three-year JARDIN joint action to integrate ERNs into national health systems, with a total funding of €18.75 million (€15 million from the EU and €3.75 million from the Member States). A few months later, the Commission launched a new IT platform to better support the ERNs (Clinical Patients Management System 2.0). Since 2017, ERNs have conducted more than 4 500 virtual panels on patients suffering from rare diseases. In 2023, the Commission extended funding for the ERNs, via the EU4Health programme, for another four years (2023-2027), at €77.4 million.

Many patient organisations (including EURORDIS, a non-profit alliance of over 1 000 rare-disease patient organisations from 74 countries) have repeatedly called for an EU action plan on rare diseases. In 2024, the Council invited the Commission to adopt a comprehensive EU-level approach to rare diseases, including a European action plan. The European Economic and Social Committee has supported this call. It also adopted an exploratory opinion on AI, big data and rare diseases in September 2025.

Patients’ organisations have expressed concern that the proposed multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2028-2034 does not envisage a standalone health programme (to succeed EU4Health) and that health priorities, including rare diseases, could be diluted, once integrated into a broader comprehensive competitiveness fund.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has been a driving force behind more coherent and ambitious health policies, consistently advocating for equal access to diagnosis and treatment, improved data sharing, and the advance of research and innovative medicines. This commitment was reflected in its 2020 resolution calling for an action plan for rare diseases as part of a post-pandemic public health strategy and its 2021 resolution on the EU’s pharmaceutical strategy. Throughout the current legislative term, Parliament has submitted several written questions to the Commission, addressing key issues such as orphan drugs, critical medicines, the development of a European action plan on rare diseases and adequate funding in the next MFF. Most recently, in April 2025, during a plenary debate attended by Olivér Várhelyi, Commissioner for Health and Animal Welfare, Members of Parliament voiced broad cross-party support for the establishment of a comprehensive EU-level action plan on rare diseases.

Parliament’s Committee on Public Health (SANT) is preparing a legislative own-initiative report (INL) on an EU rare disease action plan (rapporteur Nicolás González Casares, Spain, S&D). It will take into consideration the input provided by more than 4 000 respondents to a public consultation launched in February 2025.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Rare diseases – strengthening EU action‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Branislav Stanicek.

The Pact for the Mediterranean was announced in the Commission political guidelines for 2024-2029 and adopted on 16 October 2025. It is a new strategic framework proposed by the European Union (EU) to strengthen cooperation with southern Mediterranean partners and build a more integrated, stable, and prosperous Common Mediterranean Space. Launched on the 30th anniversary of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, this Pact was presented as an ‘ambitious paradigm shift’ in Euro-Mediterranean relations – moving towards deeper integration based on co-ownership, co-creation and joint responsibility. The Pact sets out a comprehensive agenda across three interlinked pillars, each with actionable initiatives: people; sustainable and integrated economies; and security, preparedness and migration management.

By scaling up existing programmes and launching new joint initiatives, the Pact for the Mediterranean offers a blueprint to turn common challenges into shared opportunities. It calls on policymakers to unite their efforts in a spirit of partnership. By following through on these recommendations – investing in people, integrating economies, bolstering security, and collaborating across borders and tiers of government – the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours aim to co-create a future of peace, prosperity and stability for the region.

On 20 November, the Council approved conclusions on the Pact for the Mediterranean. A Pact for the Mediterranean ministerial meeting is scheduled for 28 November, in Barcelona, to launch the Pact formally and commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration. The meeting will also launch the Union for the Mediterranean Regional Forum.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Pact for the Mediterranean: Co-creating a space of peace, prosperity and stability through a genuine partnership‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

In response to United States (US) tariffs, and citing national security interests as a reason, China introduced two waves of export controls for rare-earth elements (REEs) in April and October 2025 respectively. The second wave has been suspended until November 2026. The EU has been negatively affected by the controls on REEs, which are indispensable for its digital, green and defence industries. While the partial suspension has been widely welcomed, China’s move highlighted major vulnerabilities of the EU supply chains that remain hard to mitigate.

Importance of rare-earth elements

REEs have featured on all five EU lists of critical raw materials published since 2014 that contain materials of high economic importance for the EU economy. They are shortlisted for being both indispensable and having a high risk of supply disruption – because of highly concentrated sources and lack of adequate, affordable substitutes.

REEs comprise a group of 17 elements necessary for both the green and digital transition and the defence industry. They are used, for example, in wind turbines, artificial intelligence hardware, electric vehicles and fighter jets. Similarly to the rest of the world, the EU is heavily dependent on China for its supply, as China controls 60 % of global REE production and 90 % of their refining, a position that is unlikely to change (Figure 1). The EU sources all of its heavy REEs and 85 % of its light REEs from China, as well as 98 % of its rare-earth magnets. According to scientists, it is difficult – and often impossible – to replace REEs because of their unique properties.

Figure 1 – Expected REE supply

Data source: International Energy Agency, 2025. Graphic by Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, EPRS. China’s export controls

On 4 April 2025, as one of the responses to US President Donald Trump’s administration’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs, China introduced export controls on seven heavy REEs (with licensing requirements), as well as on all related compounds, metals and magnets. Exporters are required to obtain a licence, and need to provide information on the end users of REEs; however, this information is considered sensitive by some firms. The licensing process is considered by many exporters to be opaque, selective and slow on purpose.

This was followed by a second wave of restrictions on 9 October 2025, which added a further five REEs, related products, equipment and technologies, as well as the use of personnel expertise on the subject. Most of the measures were to take effect on 8 November. Citing national security concerns, China widened the scope beyond physical goods, seeking to control technological know-how and even foreign-made products using Chinese inputs. Foreign firms would need to obtain approval to export magnets containing even trace amounts (0.1 %) of Chinese-sourced REEs or those that were produced using Chinese mining, processing or magnet-making technologies.

This means that, for the first time, the Chinese law has extraterritorial reach, with far-reaching implications for many critical supply chains. On 7 November 2025, the Chinese government announced the temporary suspension of the second wave of export controls until 10 November 2026.

Consequences for the EU

Economists from the European Central Bank (ECB) estimated that over 80 % of large European firms are no more than three intermediaries away from a Chinese REE producer. This exposure, coupled with high integration into complex global value chains, makes the EU vulnerable to any restrictions on REEs. The manufacturing sector and the defence, electronics, automotive and energy industries are particularly affected, and the ECB found that the firms in general had not stockpiled on REEs. Possible consequences include higher input costs (the International Energy Agency reported REE prices in the EU of up to six times higher after the restrictions) and shortages of materials, possibly leading to delays and even stoppages of production, reported for instance in the automotive sector. The Merics think tank showed that EU rearmament is in danger, while a paper by the World Economic Forum noted that the EU simply does not have control over the supply of REEs necessary for its green and digital transition.

The main EU policies to address the REE issue include the Critical Raw Materials (CRMs) Act, which entails risk monitoring as well as support for strategic projects, diversifying imports and incentivising technological progress and resource efficiency. In March 2025, the Commission selected the first batch of projects under the act, five of which – located in France, Italy, Poland and Sweden – are focused on the different stages of the REE value chain: extraction, processing, manufacturing and recycling. The EU has also set up the European Raw Materials Alliance, which works on resilience of rare-earth magnet supply chains. In October 2025, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced the RESourceEU initiative for joint purchasing and stockpiling of REEs, supporting domestic ‘strategic’ projects (for production and processing of CRMs) and diversifying suppliers with new CRM partnerships. In November 2025, Commission Vice-President Stéphane Séjourné announced plans to set up an EU critical minerals centre to fund and coordinate EU purchases of CRMs, set aside stocks and ingrain economic security into firms’ supply chains.

Expert views

The European Council of Foreign Relations warns that Chinese export controls pose a serious threat to the EU and need to be met with a strong response: possible escalatory measures include the use of the EU anti-coercion instrument and curtailing access to speciality machinery such as that used in chips and aircraft manufacturing. Merics advocates policy actions to incentivise recycling of REEs, as well as public funding to support domestic mining and processing projects. Experts also suggest embedding REE policies into those that fund the boosting of defence supply chains, collective investments with allies such as Japan, and funding research that could mitigate the environmental impact of REE mining and processing in the EU.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has consistently supported strengthening the EU’s strategic autonomy and resilience in the supply of CRMs. It favours an integrated approach encompassing multiple polices (such as industrial and trade policy) and the whole value chain (including recycling and circularity) to increase and diversify supply. To manage shortages, it has called on the Commission to improve efficiency in the use of industrial side streams in order to recover and separate RREs.

In July 2025, Parliament adopted a resolution on REE export controls urging the Commission and the Member States to speed up implementation of the CRMs Act. MEPs deemed China’s action to be unjustified and that it was intended to be coercive, given the country’s quasi-monopolistic position in supply chains. They also expressed concern about requirements to disclose sensitive data when applying for export permits, which could endanger the EU’s security and technological leadership. According to the resolution, the EU needs to activate domestic mining projects and determine the minimum level of strategic REE stocks. MEPs also want to see swift progress in concluding bilateral partnerships on raw materials with countries that meet high sustainability and human rights standards.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘China’s rare-earth export restrictions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anne Altmayer.

CONTEXT

The purpose of the proposed regulation is to implement into EU law a number of measures adopted by several regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) by amending the respective existing legislation. The proposal aims to speed up the implementation procedure by bundling amendments to several regulations into one legislative text. Moreover, in view of certain future amendments, the proposal includes requests to empower the European Commission to adopt delegated acts.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0106 (COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2107 laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Convention area of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), Regulation (EU) 2018/975 laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) Convention Area, Regulation (EU) 2019/833 laying down conservation and enforcement measures applicable in the Regulatory Area of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation, Regulation (EU) 2021/56 laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention, Regulation (EU) 2022/2056 laying down conservation and management measures applicable in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention Area, Regulation (EU) 2022/2343 laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) Area of Competence, and Regulation (EU) 2023/2053 establishing a multiannual management plan for bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean – COM(2025) 195, 12.5.2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule:2025/0106(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Regional fisheries management organisations: Implementation of measures into Union law‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

On 25 November each year, the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women seeks to raise awareness globally about this serious social issue. On this day, the European Union is due to submit its first evaluation report on compliance with the Istanbul Convention, which it ratified in 2023. For the EU, gender-based violence remains a priority for action. The European Parliament is calling for further measures, such as making gender-based violence an ‘EU crime’.

Violence against women around the world and in the European Union

According to UN Women, one in three women in the world aged 15 and over have suffered sexual or physical violence at least once. Often, this violence was perpetrated by a current or former partner. Digital violence also affects women globally, with the most prevalent forms including misinformation and defamation, deep fakes, and digital threats against women with an active public profile.

Violence against women is defined as violence having a direct link with their gender. It includes physical, psychological and economic forms of violence and takes place both off and online. It is a severe human rights violation and, given its prevalence and role in the subordination of women, is a systemic form of discrimination against women. It has a long-lasting and damaging impact on women and on society as a whole.

The most recent EU-wide survey found that 31 % of women in the EU have suffered violence – including sexual violence and threats of violence – at least once in their lifetime. One in ten said they had been a victim during the last five years (see Figure 1). Although the number of cases of violence reported to the police is on the rise in the EU, the majority of such crimes still go unreported.

Violence against women can also take the form of trafficking. Almost two thirds of trafficking victims in the EU are women, of whom many are trafficked for sexual exploitation. Another extreme form is femicide: the murder of a woman due to her gender. Two thirds of the more than one thousand victims murdered by an intimate partner or family member in 2023, in the 17 EU countries reporting this type of data to Eurostat, were women. To address it, several Member States have adopted specific legal provisions (Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Italy, and Malta).

Figure 1 – Share of women who said they had experienced violence by any perpetrator in the five years before the survey EU action

Fighting gender-based violence is a priority of the EU’s 2020-2025 gender equality strategy. An EU directive adopted in May 2024 on combating violence against women and domestic violence criminalises female genital mutilation and forced marriage, and several forms of cyber-violence. It enhances protection, access to justice and prevention measures for all victims of gender-based violence. Other EU laws also tackle gender-based violence in their areas. For example, the directive on trafficking in human beings, after its 2024 review, makes knowingly using the services of trafficking victims a crime.

The EU took another important step to fight violence against women with the ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention) in 2023. Now, two years later, the EU is conducting its first report as a party to the Convention. On 25 November, the European Commission is due to submit the EU’s ‘baseline evaluation report’ on legislative and other measures that give effect to the Convention’s provisions. The Convention applies to the EU in matters falling within its ‘exclusive external competence’ (as defined in the Treaties) relating to the Union’s institutions and public administration, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, asylum and non-refoulement. It becomes binding on all Member States regarding those matters, including the five which have not yet ratified the Convention. In April 2025, the Commission published a communication outlining the evaluation procedure. Parliament’s LIBE and FEMM committees exchanged views with the Commission on 6 November.

The EU also funds numerous initiatives to combat violence against women through its Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme (2021-2027), particularly its Daphne component. For the budget period after 2027, the Commission proposes to incorporate the fight against gender-based violence in a new Agora programme with a broader focus.

European Parliament position

Parliament has called repeatedly for EU action to combat violence against women. It advocated a comprehensive directive on violence against women and played a pivotal role in the ratification of the Istanbul Convention, by asking the European Court of Justice to clarify the procedure. Parliament has also repeatedly called for a Council decision to make gender-based violence an EU crime in Article 83 TFEU.

In the current term, Parliament has worked on several relevant initiatives. The LIBE and FEMM committees are working jointly on an own-initiative report on the importance of consent-based rape legislation in the EU, which aims to reaffirm the importance of legal reform on the matter in all EU countries in line with the Istanbul Convention requirements. They are expected to adopt the report in the coming weeks.

In a resolution adopted on 13 November 2025, Parliament outlined its vision for a new EU gender equality strategy post-2025. It proposes to make gender-based violence a crime within the EU’s competence, and calls on the Commission to recognise femicide as a ‘distinct and stand-alone crime’; to address the specific needs of victims; and to give special attention, in cooperation with the Member States, to vulnerable victims and those at risk of intersectional discrimination. It also calls on the Commission to propose legislation to tackle gender-based violence at work.

In a resolution adopted in October 2025, Parliament endorsed the roadmap for women’s rights, which declares the fight against gender-based violence to be one of the principles for a gender-equal society.

The International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women is marked each year on 25 November. This year, a UN Women initiative – UNiTE campaign – will aim to mobilise various stakeholders around this issue in the run-up to the international Human Rights Day on 10 December.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Elimination of violence against women: Two years since the EU ratified the Istanbul Convention‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

Women continue to be under-represented in EU countries at all levels of political decision-making as well as in political parties. The origins of this situation are complex, but one reason stands out: violence against women active in politics discourages many women from entering the political arena. Female politicians are exposed to two severe and intersecting forms of violence: political violence and gender-based violence.

Violence against people active in politics, whether men or women, is a major obstacle to the exercise of political rights and freedoms, and a serious violation of basic human rights. Increasing polarisation in liberal societies has led to rising violence against political actors. However, violence against women in politics is more than a symptom of political polarisation. It targets women because they are women, takes sexist and sexualised forms, and seeks to discourage women generally from taking part in political life. Women surveyed tend to consider its impact significant and feel less ready to defend certain positions and to continue their political career.

At EU level, ensuring safe participation of women in politics is a priority of gender equality policies. The European Parliament has recognised the seriousness of the phenomenon in numerous resolutions, has adapted its internal rules to prevent sexist and hate speech in its debates, and has established specific mechanisms to deal with harassment.

This briefing updates an earlier version from February 2024.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Violence against women active in politics in the EU: A serious obstacle to political participation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Types of violence experienced by female local politicians in the EU (% of those who reported having experienced violence) Percentage of women in elected assemblies and in the leadership of major political parties in EU countries, 2025 Types of violence experienced by female parliamentarians in Europe (% of all respondents)

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Raja.

Members gather for the second plenary session of November, with an agenda that underlines the European Union’s efforts to defend and protect our democracies, our trade and our borders. The European Commission is expected to make a statement on the proposed Democracy Shield, and the Council and Commission are expected to make statements on tackling China’s export restrictions, on continued Russian border aggressions, and on the situation in Sudan and in Myanmar. Members are also set to adopt the EU’s 2026 budget.

Parliament’s negotiators have reached a provisional agreement on next year’s budget. The final text reflects Parliament’s priorities, particularly increasing funding for competitiveness, research and defence initiatives. The budget for the year sets commitment appropriations at €192.77 billion and payments at €190.1 billion. Following the Council’s approval of the text, expected on Monday, Members are scheduled to consider the file on Tuesday afternoon. The vote on the 2026 EU budget will conclude the budgetary procedure for 2026, allowing Parliament’s President to sign the budget into law.

Seeking to strengthen Europe’s defence industry and guarantee reliable access to defence equipment when needed, Members are due to debate approval of a provisional agreement reached with the Council on the European defence industry programme (EDIP) on Tuesday morning. The negotiators succeeded in maintaining the €1.5 billion budget for 2025 to 2027, including €300 million to support Ukraine. The agreement on EDIP also sets a 35 % limit on non-EU components and excludes suppliers who pose a risk to EU security, a key Parliament priority.

Another security issue, third-country interference in democratic processes, is due for debate on Wednesday morning. The Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) has tabled two reports on proposed new lobbying rules, including a proposed directive setting harmonised transparency requirements. The proposal is part of a broader package aimed at protecting democracy from covert foreign influence. The IMCO report recommends a narrower definition of such activities and proposes strengthening enforcement through fully interoperable national registers and by withdrawing registration for serious or repeated infringements. Once voted, this will form the Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

Migrant smugglers are responsible for over 90 % of irregular external EU border crossings. And migrants smuggled this way are at higher risk of falling victim to trafficking in human beings. On Monday, Members are set to consider an agreement reached with the Council on a proposal to strengthen Europol’s role in combating migrant smuggling and trafficking. The agreement proposes to establish a permanent European Centre against Migrant Smuggling within Europol. It also introduces greater information-sharing in immigration operations, strengthens Europol’s biometric data processing capabilities and provides additional staff and funding. As Parliament’s substitute impact assessment on the file raises serious concerns, the report seeks to clarify the situation.

On Tuesday, Members are set to consider an agreement reached between the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) negotiators and the Council to amend and simplify the InvestEU Regulation. The changes would mobilise a further €55 billion in investment through InvestEU, the EU’s public-private risk-sharing instrument, supporting greater competitiveness and innovation. Cost savings made by reducing the frequency and scope of reporting obligations could reach €350 million.

Parliament is expected to debate an IMCO report on Tuesday afternoon, recommending measures to address the growing problem of children accessing adult content online. Age-verification methods are uneven in the EU and often easy to bypass, putting children at risk of seeing harmful content, or encountering abusive adults. The report on digital safety for minors warns of the risks of addiction, mental health problems and exposure to illegal content and calls for stronger enforcement of the Digital Services Act (DSA), for the expected digital fairness act to close legislative gaps in online child safety, and for an EU-wide digital age limit.

Continuing in its efforts to protect children, Parliament is also scheduled to vote on Tuesday on an interinstitutional agreement on the proposed new toy safety regulation, replacing the current Toy Safety Directive. Following negotiations between the co-legislators, the revised proposal requires that assessing the safety of digitally connected toys considers children’s vulnerabilities, including risks to mental health. It also bans additional harmful chemicals including per- and polyfluorinated alkyl substances (PFAS) in toys. The IMCO committee recommends that Parliament approve the Council’s position, bringing the legislative procedure to conclusion.

Although the current European disability strategy runs until 2030, in the face of persistent inequalities Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) is calling for an updated framework. People with disabilities still face disadvantages in income, access to jobs, inclusive education, housing and healthcare. On Wednesday, Members are set to consider a report from EMPL, aimed at addressing these disadvantages in the remaining years of the European disability strategy. The report also highlights the situation of women and girls with disabilities, who face multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination and violence.

As ice melts rapidly due to climate change, previously inaccessible land areas and sea routes in the Arctic are opening up. This has led to increases in natural resource extraction, and security and defence activities, affecting local populations and the fragile environment. Competition between global powers for influence in the region is contributing to a growing sense of instability. Members are due to consider a report on Tuesday from Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), calling for a security-oriented strategy in the Arctic. The report recommends deeper partnerships with Arctic countries including Canada, Iceland, Norway, and self-governing Greenland – and supports future EU enlargement prospects and increased EU funding for the region.

The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which ensure the EU only acts where appropriate and where national governments cannot, is fundamental to the EU legislative process. Members are set to vote on a report from the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) on Thursday, which calls for improved definition and application of subsidiarity and proportionality and extending the deadline for national parliaments in the Member States to engage in the EU legislative process.

Further reading:

• European Parliament Plenary Session, November I 2025, agenda
• European defence industry programme (EDIP)
• Adoption of the European Union’s 2026 budget
• Interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries
• Stronger role for Europol to fight migrant smuggling and human trafficking
• InvestEU: New measures to unlock investment
• Online protection of minors
• Toy safety regulation
• EU strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities post-2024
• EU strategy and cooperation in the Arctic
• Subsidiarity, proportionality and the role of national parliaments in the EU

Written by Tristan Marcelin.

Following Mario Draghi’s report on the future of European competitiveness, the EU has started proposing ways to simplify EU laws governing the digital space. The goal is to reduce administrative burdens on companies. However, simplifying EU digital laws may not be sufficient to boost innovation, and thus competitiveness.

EU competitiveness as a new priority Future of European competitiveness

Following a request by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Mario Draghi – former European Central Bank President – drafted a report in 2024 on the future of European competitiveness. In his report, Draghi suggests, among other things, increasing EU digitalisation and the development of advanced technologies to boost EU competitiveness. The report notes that the EU should develop its connectivity, computing infrastructures, and electronics value chain, as all three are essential for EU citizens and businesses. It also suggests a number of ways to strengthen EU governance, including by simplifying rules. It warns that ‘excessive regulatory and administrative burden can hinder the ease of doing business in the EU and the competitiveness of EU companies’. The unclear overlaps between the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) are given as an example.

New EU political priorities

Since the publication of the Draghi report, the European political landscape has changed. In 2024, a new legislative term started in the European Parliament, and a new College of Commissioners was appointed for the European Commission. The Commission’s new leadership chose competitiveness as one of its 2024‑2029 priorities, and laid down objectives including ‘making business easier’ and ‘boosting productivity with digital tech diffusion’ to achieve this goal. Both objectives follow Mario Draghi’s recommendations. The latter appears even more relevant in 2025, as this year’s Nobel prize in economic sciences was awarded to three economists for showing ‘how new technology can drive sustained growth’.

From strategic objectives to concrete proposals Digital simplification on the Council’s agenda

In a June 2025 document, the Polish Presidency of the Council noted its priority of simplifying digital regulations, listing the initiatives it undertook. The current Danish Presidency aims for a similar priority. The Danish programme notes that ‘the Presidency will place focus on regulatory simplification and better regulation in the EU to ease daily operations for businesses and other stakeholders’. Under Denmark’s Presidency, the Council defined its position on a Commission proposal, known as the ‘omnibus IV‘ simplification package, to reduce administrative burdens for small and medium-sized enterprises and small mid-cap enterprises (SMCs). The proposal includes modifications to the GDPR: SMCs would no longer need, under certain conditions, to maintain records of activities involving the processing of personal data.

Forthcoming proposal for a digital omnibus

An omnibus dedicated to the EU digital rulebook is reportedly expected for 19 November 2025. The call for evidence, published by the Commission on 16 September 2025, hints at an omnibus focusing notably on simplifying data legislation, cybersecurity incident reporting obligations, and the smooth application of AI Act rules. The forthcoming omnibus is aimed at reducing ‘the administrative costs for compliance for businesses, administrations and citizens in the European Union in application of several regulations of the Union’s digital acquis without compromising the objectives of the underlying rules’. It follows a period of intense political discussions over a pause or simplification of parts of the AI Act, owing to its difficult transposition into technical guidance and standards, and its interplay with other rules.

Burden of a fragmented EU digital rulebook Fragmented EU digital rulebook

The EU digital rulebook is composed of several pieces of legislation that all have different purposes and scopes. Among the horizontal digital laws, (i) several are related to data, while (ii) others focus on specific digital activities. The first include the GDPR, which has created rights for EU citizens over their data. Further laws such as the Data Act and the Data Governance Act set rules for private, public and non-personal data. The second include laws creating obligations for certain types of digital activities, such as the Digital Markets Act for practices relating to digital markets, the Digital Services Act for digital services, and the AI Act for AI systems and models. It also includes technical and organisational cybersecurity obligations relating to software, hardware and entities, such as the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) and the NIS 2 Directive. In addition to the horizontal digital laws, sectoral laws may apply. For instance, in 2024, experts divided the 154 EU ‘information security’ and ‘cybersecurity’ policies (including non-legislative texts) into eight policy areas including energy, economic, education, and security and justice.

Administrative burden on companies

The administrative tasks companies must undertake to comply with EU laws depend on their activities. Companies handling personal data must comply with GDPR rules. Once enforced, companies distributing and manufacturing devices might need to comply with the CRA, and those providing general-purpose AI (GPAI) might need to comply with the AI Act. A company could need to comply with all three. However, each law has different deadlines, reporting procedures and authorities. The GDPR and the CRA are enforced at Member State level, while the exclusive power to enforce GPAI rules rests with the Commission. If a company provided high-risk AI systems instead of GPAI, enforcement would be at the national level. The GDPR, CRA and AI Act thus all rely on different enforcers. Depending on the law and its implementation, Member States may have added requirements on top of the initial EU law – this is known as ‘gold plating‘. The Draghi report associates it with a loss in competitiveness, mentioning the GDPR as an example: its enforcement is uneven among the Member States, limiting cross-border innovation.

Beyond simplifying the EU digital rulebook

While simplifying the EU digital rulebook is a first step, it is unlikely to be sufficient to boost EU innovation, and thus competitiveness. In 2024, Anu Bradford – known for theorising the Brussels effect, whereby the EU’s regulatory power influences other regions – published a research paper, ‘The False Choice Between Digital Regulation and Innovation’. As reported by the Oxford Institute for Ethics in AI, she ‘noted that there was very little technological regulation in Europe before 2010, at the time when the likes of Meta and Google have been founded. This suggests that regulation was not the major obstacle preventing the rise of similar companies in Europe.’ Experts often mention the absence of a digital single market and of a unified capital market in Europe as one of the root causes of the EU’s technological gap.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Simplifying EU digital laws for competitiveness‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Issam Hallak.

The EU is facing the challenge of mobilising massive investments required to meet its strategic priorities and must find effective ways to finance them. In response, the European Commission published the savings and investments union (SIU) action plan on 19 March 2025, designed to channel EU savings into productive investments. This briefing presents an overview of the plan.

The SIU was launched in the context of the Draghi and Letta reports, which set out recommendations for strengthening the EU’s single market and competitiveness. Announced in the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass (the January 2025 roadmap to restore and boost the EU’s economic dynamism), it places strong importance on mobilising private financing for key EU priorities such as innovation, digitalisation, defence and the green transition. The SIU seeks to further integrate the EU’s financial system and make its capital markets more attractive to investors.

The SIU is structured around four work strands. The first focuses on the demand side – savers and investors – promoting effective savings instruments that link citizens’ savings with productive investments. The second targets the supply side by expanding financing options for firms. The remaining two strands aim to strengthen market infrastructure and advance supervisory convergence, which could, in specific areas, evolve towards a single supervisory framework. Key proposals include amendments to securitisation rules (ongoing), revised rules and products for supplementary pensions, and measures to improve financial market infrastructure. The SIU has received support from the European Parliament through its September 2025 resolution on EU competitiveness, which also makes some remarks and offers further directions for action.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Savings and investments union: Overview and state of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martina Prpic, Ioannis Stefanou, Ingeborg Odink.

Adopted in 1989, the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was the first international instrument to explicitly recognise children as human beings with innate rights. As of 2025, it has been ratified by 196 countries, including all EU Member States, and it has become the landmark treaty on children’s rights, outlining universal standards for the care, treatment, survival, development, protection and participation of all children.

The promotion and protection of children’s rights is one of the key objectives embedded in Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Moreover, Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU recognises that children are entitled to ‘protection and care as is necessary for their well-being’. The same article recognises that the child’s best interests should be the primary consideration for public authorities and private institutions.

Over the years, the EU has moved from a sectoral approach towards a more coherent policy approach. Whereas initially, children’s rights were developed in relation to specific areas – such as the free movement of persons – since 2000 the EU has taken a more coordinated line. The European Parliament has been especially vocal in advocating for children. This briefing offers an overview of the most relevant actions at European level to address and promote children’s rights before looking at upcoming challenges.

This briefing is an update of a 2022 briefing written by Rosamund Shreeves.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Children’s rights in the EU in the light of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Pieter Baert.

Achieving ambitious climate objectives while supporting robust economic growth and safeguarding tax revenue requires simple and well-targeted tax incentives that encourage sustainable investment. The European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Tax Matters (FISC) is due to hold a public hearing on this topic on 20 November 2025.

Clean industrial deal – tax recommendations

Launched in February 2025, the clean industrial deal is a package of wide-ranging actions aimed at ensuring that decarbonisation is a driver of economic growth for the European economy. Next to concrete action to lower energy prices, the European Commission published a (non-binding) recommendation to guide Member States when introducing and designing tax incentives to support the clean industrial deal objectives.

Firstly, the Commission recommends that Member States allow companies to deduct investment in green technology from their taxable income more quickly (‘accelerated depreciation‘), or even immediately (‘full or immediate expensing’). By enabling companies to deduct the cost of the asset faster – rather than spreading the cost evenly over time – accelerated depreciation effectively raises the after-tax rate of return on investment and helps mitigate distortions caused by inflation. While this incentive does not ultimately increase the nominal value of deductions, it does enhance their real value by allowing firms to claim them earlier, thereby improving businesses’ cash flow.

FranceInvestment in renewable energy equipment or energy-saving technologies can be depreciated at 2, 2.5 or 3 times the normal rate.Germany75 % of costs on electric company vehicles acquired after 30 June 2025 and before 1 January 2028 can be deducted in their first year.IrelandThe Accelerated Capital Allowance (ACA) scheme allows companies to deduct the full cost of investment in energy-efficient equipment in the year of purchase, rather than over the standard eight-year period.SpainSince 2023, Spain allows companies to apply accelerated depreciation for new electric and hydrogen company vehicles, at twice the standard depreciation rate. This also applies to investment in new electric vehicle charging infrastructure, both normal and high-power.

Accelerated depreciation for green assets – Member State examples (non-exhaustive)

Secondly, the Commission recommends that Member States, where feasible, use cost-effective and targeted tax credits for investment that creates sufficient manufacturing capacity in clean technologies, supports industrial decarbonisation, or strengthens the EU’s strategic resilience (for example, the production of a net-zero product where the EU is currently highly dependent on a single third country). The Commission notes that empirical evidence generally ranks input-based tax credits – for example, those covering R&D costs for green investment – higher than income-based credits, such as patent boxes, arguing that the former are more cost-effective in stimulating additional investment.

Action on these recommendations should be combined with other policy measures, such as the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies, whether provided through tax expenditure or direct grants.

The Council welcomed the Commission’s recommendations, but underlined the need for flexibility, allowing Member States to adapt tax incentives to their specific fiscal contexts and budgets.

Revision of the Energy Taxation Directive

The proposal to revise the Energy Taxation Directive (ETD) remains the only unfinished file in the Commission’s ‘fit for 55‘ package, tabled in 2021, aiming to reduce emissions by 55 % by 2030.

The ETD lays down EU-wide minimum excise duty rates on motor/heating fuels and electricity. Member States are free to set their own tax rates as long as they respect the ETD’s minimum rates. The Commission’s proposal aims to update the directive – unchanged since 2003 – to bring it into line with the EU’s climate objectives and modern green technology, while maintaining Member States’ capacity to raise tax revenue. While reducing greenhouse gas emissions and preserving tax revenues are not inherently contradictory objectives, concern is growing about potential long-term future revenue erosion for national budgets, as excise duties on fossil fuels decline with the green transition.

Some of the proposal’s key provisions to revise the ETD include:

• Shifting from volume- to energy content-based taxation: Minimum rates would no longer be expressed per litre or kilogram, but rather per gigajoule of energy content, removing the existing tax bias against low-energy-content biofuels.
• Environmental ranking of minimum rates: A new structure would tax energy products according to their environmental performance, ensuring that electricity is always taxed at the lowest rate and fossil fuels at the highest.
• Gradual rate increases: Minimum rates for certain energy products, such as natural gas, would rise by one-tenth each year over a ten-year transitional period, to balance social costs, climate objectives, and fiscal stability.
• Annual indexation: Minimum rates would be automatically adjusted each year to preserve their real value over time and prevent erosion through inflation.
• Phasing out exemptions and reductions: The proposal removes several existing tax advantages, including the mandatory exemptions currently granted to maritime and aviation fuels.

Over the four years of negotiation, reaching the required unanimous support in the Council has proven difficult, aggravated by the energy cost crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and rising concerns about the resilience of European industry. Several Council presidencies have tried to break the impasse by proposing prolonged transitional periods and the possibility for Member States to provide total or partial exemptions for certain sectors and services, or the installation of an ’emergency brake’ on the increase in taxation rates when countries are faced with a sudden increase in energy prices.

The Danish Council Presidency had invited ministers to reach a general approach on the proposal on 13 November 2025, but a number of Member States expressed reservations about the proposed compromise text. Consultation on the file (2021/0213(CNS)) in the European Parliament continues.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Encouraging clean investment: The role of tax incentives‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ioannis Stefanou and Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou.

Child sexual exploitation and sexual abuse are among the worst forms of violence against children and know no borders. The rise in these crimes is exacerbated by the use of digital technology. Harmonised national laws and international cooperation are essential to improve prevention and protect victims.

Background

The European Day for the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, an initiative of the Council of Europe, is observed every 18 November to highlight the importance of preventing child sexual exploitation and abuse. The 2025 edition focuses on strengthening the protection of children against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse through evidence-based policymaking. At the EU level, in 2020 the European Commission launched a strategy for a more effective fight against child sexual abuse. Similarly, child sexual exploitation is a priority in the fight against serious and organised crime within the context of the 2020‑2025 EU security union strategy and the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT).

According to a 2024 UNICEF report, one in five girls and women and one in seven boys and men alive today globally have experienced sexual violence as children, while in Europe one in five children is estimated to be a victim of sexual violence, with 70-85 % knowing their abuser. Child sexual abuse and exploitation are increasingly occurring online. In 2024, the United States’ National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) received 20.5 million reports of suspected child sexual exploitation.

International and EU efforts to combat child sexual abuse International legal framework

The 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child laid the foundation for an international framework to combat child sexual abuse and exploitation. In 2007, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS No 201), or ‘Lanzarote Convention‘. This was the first international instrument to categorise different forms of child sexual abuse as criminal offences. It entered into force on 1 July 2010 and has since been ratified by all EU Member States.

EU legal framework

The main EU legal instrument to combat sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children, as well as child pornography, is Directive 2011/93/EU (the Combating Child Sexual Abuse Directive), which criminalises various forms of child sexual abuse and exploitation, harmonises laws across the EU, and sets minimum sanctions. Article 25 requires the removal of websites containing or disseminating child sexual abuse material and allows blocking access where needed, helping combat online child sexual exploitation and abuse. Directive 2012/29/EU (the 2012 Victims’ Rights Directive) complements this framework with a child-sensitive approach prioritising the best interests of the child. The 2021 EU strategy on the rights of the child offers a policy framework to combat violence against children and protect them from all forms of abuse.

Recent developments

On 6 February 2024, as part of the EU strategy to more effectively combat child sexual abuse, the Commission proposed a revision of the 2011 Combating Child Sexual Abuse Directive. The updated rules would broaden the definitions of offences to include new forms of online child sexual abuse, introduce higher penalties, and establish more specific requirements for the prevention of offences and the provision of assistance to victims. Additionally, minimum statutes of limitation would be set to enable victims to seek justice more effectively. The Commission has also launched the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive. On 23 April 2024, it adopted a recommendation on integrated child protection systems – a key deliverable under the children’s rights strategy to better protect children from violence.

Work has also continued on the 2022 legislative proposal that would require providers of online communication services to detect, report and remove child sexual abuse material. The proposal includes the establishment of an EU centre to prevent and combat child sexual abuse. Pending agreement in the Council of the EU (the Council), the European Parliament and the Council have agreed to extend the 2021 interim regulation, which temporarily exempts providers from electronic data protection rules, to allow for voluntary detection, reporting and removal. Furthermore, the Commission has launched a public consultation on an action plan to address cyberbullying, with a focus on minors.

International cooperation through EU agencies, initiatives and networks

Various EU agencies, such as Europol, support law enforcement cooperation among Member States to combat online sexual exploitation and abuse of children within the EU and globally. One example is the Stop Child Abuse – Trace an Object initiative, designed to help trace the origin of objects linked to criminal investigations. In addition, the European Commission has adopted the Decision to formally launch the Network for the Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse at the end of 2025.

Eurojust supports judicial cooperation among Member States for the cross-border prosecution of perpetrators. The Commission funds several initiatives and networks, including the Better Internet for Kids (BIK) portal, which raises awareness of risks, and INHOPE, a network of hotlines combating online child sexual abuse material. The WePROTECT Global Alliance develops political and practical solutions to protect children online and prevent online sexual abuse and long-term harm. The Internet Watch Foundation provides a hotline for reporting online sexual abuse content globally. ChildSafetyON brings together children’s rights organisations to end child sexual abuse and exploitation in the EU, as does the European Child Sexual Abuse Legislation Advocacy Group (ECLAG).

European Parliament position
In June 2025, Parliament adopted its position on the revision of the Combating Sexual Abuse Directive, proposing to increase maximum penalties for several offences and remove limitation periods. Since its first assessment in 2017 on implementation, Parliament and its Children’s Rights Coordinator have repeatedly called for full transposition of the directive and action in key areas. In November 2023, Parliament adopted its position on the proposed regulation to prevent and combat child sexual abuse; negotiations with the Council are ongoing. Moreover, a report from the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) on the protection of minors online is planned to be voted in the plenary of 25 November 2025. In addition, a draft report from the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) is expected to be voted in committee in April 2026.
Parliament has also demanded better child protection and victim support and a greater focus on prevention and awareness raising; stressed that information and communications technology companies and online platforms should take some responsibility in the fight against child sexual abuse material; and called for more national investment in digital education. Parliament has welcomed Europol’s prevention and awareness-raising work, and supported the establishment of an EU centre to prevent and counter child sexual abuse.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘European Day for the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Highlights of the November I plenary session included debates on the architecture and governance of the new 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework, and on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 23 October 2025. Further debates concerned Parliament’s statement commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Islamist attacks of 13 November 2015 in Paris; Council and Commission statements on the illegal unilateral declaration of the secessionist entity created by Türkiye in Cyprus and the continued Turkish military occupation; and protecting EU consumers against the practices of certain e-commerce platforms.

European annual asylum and migration report

Members debated Council and Commission statements on the first European Annual Asylum and Migration report and the setting up of the Annual Solidarity Pool. Published on 11 November, the report identified animprovement in the migratory situation in the EU between July 2024 and June 2025. Challenges remain however in relation to irregular arrivals and unauthorised movements within the EU, hosting refugees from Ukraine, weaponisation of migration by Russia and Belarus, and cooperation on returns and readmission. The proposed Council implementing act on an Annual Solidarity Pool (to be established, in principle, by the end of 2025) outlines that 4 Member States are under migratory pressure (Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Spain), and 12 others are at risk of migratory pressure, with 6 facing a significant migratory situation due to the cumulative effects of movements over the past five years. The solidarity pool would allocate solidarity contributions such as relocations and financial support, in priority, to Member States under migratory pressure. While Parliament does not have a formal role in implementing measures under the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, it supported the establishment of the solidarity mechanism.

European Climate Law

Members debated a report on the proposal to set a 2040 EU emissions reduction target as a step towards ensuring a cost-efficient and realistic pathway to climate neutrality by 2050. Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) urged higher ambition on environmental and human rights and to safeguard against funding for projects that contradict EU strategic interests, in relation to international credits which can be used for 2040 but not for the other targets of the climate law. The committee also proposes to delay the new ETS2 emissions trading system for one year (currently set to start in 2027). Parliament adopted the ENVI report on amending the European Climate Law, setting its position for negotiations with the Council.

Conservation of marine biological diversity

The landmark 2023 United Nations High Seas Treaty, or Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement, aims at the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond national borders. Members debated and adopted an ENVI report on the proposal to establish rules on international management of the high seas, which introduced clarifications for closer alignment with the BBNJ text. The changes proposed aim at improving transparency by requiring that Member States publish the measures they take on biodiversity in the high seas, and at greater flexibility in the reporting process, especially in emergencies. The vote sets Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations.

European Maritime Safety Agency

Members considered and adopted the provisional agreement reached in second reading on a proposal to revise the regulation founding the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). The revision, supported by Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN), would expand EMSA’s mandate, strengthening its contribution to the green and digital transitions and enhancing its ability to tackle emerging security risks, including cyber and hybrid threats. In addition, it updates governance rules to balance oversight and efficiency in the EU’s efforts to improve maritime safety and prevent pollution from shipping.

Framework for Income Taxation (BEFIT)

Businesses that operate across EU borders face different corporate tax systems and rules in every Member State. To tackle the issue at EU level, the Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation (BEFIT) aims at creating a common corporate tax framework for large EU multinational businesses. Parliament considered and adopted a report on BEFIT from the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), under the consultation procedure. The report calls for improvements to address the challenges of taxing the digital economy. It recommends that a business be treated as tax resident in any Member State in which it generates a substantial level of sales, ensuring it pays fair taxes to the community that supports its operations. The file requires a unanimous vote in the Council.

Gender equality strategy

The EU plans to adopt a new gender equality strategy in early 2026. Parliament debated and adopted an own-initiative report from its Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) outlining priorities for the 2026 strategy. The report calls for a comprehensive and ambitious approach to tackling violence against women, including its possible definition as a ‘euro-crime’, and to close gaps in political representation, pay and the sharing of care responsibilities. Members also voted in favour of a change to the Electoral Act which would enable Members who are pregnant or who have recently given birth to vote by proxy, with another Member casting their vote. This change now needs to be adopted by the Council unanimously and approved by each Member State before it may come into force.

EU-Singapore DTA

The Parliament gave its consent to a digital trade agreement (DTA) between the EU and Singapore. Digital trade agreements can contribute to securing access to new markets, simplifying electronic transactions, protecting consumers, removing administrative obstacles to trade and increasing legal certainty. The EU-Singapore DTA ensures electronic contracts and signatures are legally valid, duty-free online transmissions and promotes open access to government data. Any disputes will be settled under the same rules that already apply under the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Two decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, from the Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) Committee on amending certain agricultural products regulations as regards certain market rules and sectoral support measures in the wine sector and for aromatised wine products; and from the Foreign Affairs and Development (AFET/DEVE) Committees on amending Regulation (EU) 2021/947 as regards increased efficiency of the External Action Guarantee were announced. As no challenges to these mandates were received by the deadline, the committees may now launch negotiations with the Council.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – November I 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eric Pichon.

African and European Heads of State or Government will meet in Luanda (Angola) on 24 and 25 November 2025 for the Seventh European Union (EU)-African Union Summit. The Africa-EU partnership faces significant challenges, including global geopolitical shifts and shrinking development finance. Central to the EU’s new approach, the Global Gateway strategy aims to mobilise €150 billion by 2027 to boost Africa’s digital connectivity, transport infrastructure, and energy transition. However, questions remain over ownership and whether African priorities are genuinely reflected. To ensure the partnership remains effective, it must deliver on the commitments made at the 2022 summit and strengthen accountability mechanisms. This means addressing persistent challenges in implementation, such as lack of coordination, inconsistent reporting, and data gaps.

The European Parliament has consistently advocated for a people-centred partnership that genuinely benefits both Europeans and Africans.

This briefing provides an insight into the broad context that will set the scene for discussions. Detailed specifics of the four pillars of the partnership are discussed in separate publications: Prosperity (economy and connectivity; natural resources, health, research and education), Peace (security and governance), People (migration and mobility) and Planet (multilateralism).

It is crucial for the next summit to embody a partnership of equals, supporting sustainable development, peace, and prosperity for both continents.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-African Union Summit 2025: Setting the scene – Delivering on commitments in a shifting global landscape‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Raja.

Members gather in Brussels this week for the first plenary session of November, with an agenda featuring plans for the new 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework, among other issues. Members are also set to hear Council and Commission statements on the conclusions of the European Council meeting held on 23 October 2025.

On Wednesday, Members will hear Council and Commission statements on the first European Annual Asylum and Migration report and the setting up of the Annual Solidarity Pool. This regular report, still to be published by the Commission at the time of writing, aims to describe the migration and asylum situation in the Member States and is accompanied by a decision determining which Member States are under migratory pressure, at risk of migratory pressure or facing a significant migratory situation. The Annual Solidarity Pool is aimed at allocating solidarity contributions, like relocations and financial support, to Member States facing migratory pressure. While Parliament does not have a formal role in its implementation, it supported the establishment of the solidarity mechanism under the migration pact.

The EU plans to adopt a new gender equality strategy in early 2026. Based on feedback on the current strategy gathered in 2025, citizens, civil society and public institutions want a binding and inclusive EU framework that prioritises protection from gender-based violence, ensures equal pay and economic participation and improves access to quality healthcare. On Wednesday, Parliament is scheduled to debate a report from its Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) outlining priorities for the 2026 strategy. The report calls for a comprehensive and ambitious approach to tackling violence against women, including its possible definition as a ‘euro-crime’, and to close gaps in political representation, pay and the sharing of care responsibilities. On Thursday, Members are set to address an amendment to the European Electoral Act which would allow Members to benefit from proxy voting in plenary during pregnancy and after giving birth.

Businesses that operate across EU borders face different corporate tax systems in every Member State, with varying rules on depreciation, tax deductibility of losses, treatment of interests and more. As a result, EU businesses have to spend time and resources on complying with complex distinct local corporate tax rules, which is a significant administrative burden. To tackle the issue at EU level, the Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation (BEFIT) aims to create a common corporate tax framework for large EU multinational businesses. On Wednesday, Parliament is due to vote on a (non-binding) report on BEFIT from the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON). The report strongly supports the proposal’s overall objectives but calls for improvements to address the challenges of taxing the digital economy. It recommends that a business be treated as tax resident in any Member State in which it generates a substantial level of sales, ensuring it pays fair taxes to the community that supports its operations. Once Parliament has been consulted, the file requires a unanimous vote in the Council.

On Thursday, Members are set to consider a digital trade agreement (DTA) between the EU and Singapore. Digital trade agreements can contribute to securing access to new markets, simplifying electronic transactions, protecting consumers, removing administrative obstacles to trade and increasing legal certainty. Under the EU-Singapore DTA, citizens will benefit from privacy and data protection rules, safeguards against online fraud, and limits on spam. The agreement ensures electronic contracts and signatures are legally valid, duty-free online transmissions and promotes open access to government data. It also supports secure, affordable cross-border digital payments and cooperation to combat cyber threats. Any disputes will be settled under the same rules that already apply under the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.

In a debate on Wednesday afternoon, Members are set to consider a report on the proposal to set a 2040 EU emissions reduction target as a step towards ensuring a cost-efficient and realistic pathway to climate neutrality by 2050. Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) would like to see higher ambition on environmental and human rights and to safeguard against funding for projects that contradict EU strategic interests, in relation to international credits which can be used for 2040 but not for the other targets of the climate law. The committee also proposes to delay the new ETS2 emissions trading system for one year (currently set to start in 2027). The vote on amending the European Climate Law will set Parliament’s position for negotiations with the co-legislators.

Almost two thirds of the world’s oceans are outside any national jurisdiction. These marine areas play a vital role in supporting ecosystems, regulating the climate and sustaining economic activities such as fisheries and tourism, but they face threats from overfishing, pollution and climate change. The landmark 2023 United Nations High Seas Treaty, or Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement, aims to address the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond national borders. Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) has adopted a report on a proposal to establish rules on international management of the high seas, which introduces clarifications for closer alignment with the BBNJ text. The proposed changes aim to improve transparency by requiring that Member States publish the measures they take regarding biodiversity in the high seas and improve flexibility in the process of submitting measures taken related to area-based management tools to the BBNJ secretariat, especially in emergencies. Parliament is set to consider the report on Wednesday.

On Wednesday, Members are set to vote on a provisional agreement on a proposal to revise the founding regulation of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). The revision, supported by Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN), would expand EMSA’s mandate, strengthening its contribution to the green and digital transitions and enhancing its ability to tackle emerging security risks, including cyber and hybrid threats. It also establishes a flexibility mechanism that allows EMSA to take on new tasks at the request of the Commission or Member States. In addition, it updates governance rules to ensure a better balance between oversight and efficiency in the EU’s efforts to improve maritime safety and prevent pollution from shipping.

• European Parliament Plenary Session, November I 2025, agenda
• Conclusions of the European Council meeting held on 23 October 2025
• The first European Annual Asylum and Migration report and the Annual Solidarity Pool
• Gender equality strategy post-2025
• Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation (BEFIT)
• The EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement
• Amending the European Climate Law
• Protecting marine biodiversity in the high seas
• Revision of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) founding regulation

Written by Eric Pichon.

The Sudanese are caught in a devastating civil war, driven by deep political fragmentation, with far-reaching humanitarian and human rights consequences. While President Al-Bashir’s ousting in 2019 had raised hopes for a democratic transition, deep divisions between the regular Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) derailed power-sharing attempts. This has triggered violent conflict across the country since April 2023, exacerbating hostilities between communities and resulting in competing administrations, further weakening prospects for reconciliation.
Many thousands of civilians have been killed in the conflict, while abuses such as sexual violence and forced recruitment of children to armed groups are widespread. Natural disasters compound the impact of violence, leaving the majority of Sudan’s population in urgent need of assistance. International humanitarian law is routinely violated, by restrictions on humanitarian access, attacks on aid workers, destruction of health facilities, and the weaponisation of hunger. The conflict has unleashed massive displacement, with millions forced to flee their homes both within Sudan and across borders, overwhelming neighbouring states and threatening to further destabilise the Horn of Africa.
Regional and international players back rival factions according to complex geostrategic interests in this resource-rich country on the Red Sea. These external alliances fuel the conflict, notably contributing to the proliferation of arms, and make it particularly difficult to achieve consensus or pursue a sustainable solution at the United Nations level. Several competing peacemaking initiatives have been launched with little progress, although a roadmap agreed on 12 September 2025 has raised cautious optimism among international mediators.
The European Union (EU) has intensified its humanitarian response and plays a leading role in coordinating peace initiatives. The European Parliament has consistently urged the EU and other stakeholders to maintain pressure on all parties to cease hostilities and to ensure that Sudanese civil society is genuinely included in dialogue towards a sustainable solution.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding the war in Sudan: The human cost of geopolitics‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.