European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

In response to United States (US) tariffs, and citing national security interests as a reason, China introduced two waves of export controls for rare-earth elements (REEs) in April and October 2025 respectively. The second wave has been suspended until November 2026. The EU has been negatively affected by the controls on REEs, which are indispensable for its digital, green and defence industries. While the partial suspension has been widely welcomed, China’s move highlighted major vulnerabilities of the EU supply chains that remain hard to mitigate.

Importance of rare-earth elements

REEs have featured on all five EU lists of critical raw materials published since 2014 that contain materials of high economic importance for the EU economy. They are shortlisted for being both indispensable and having a high risk of supply disruption – because of highly concentrated sources and lack of adequate, affordable substitutes.

REEs comprise a group of 17 elements necessary for both the green and digital transition and the defence industry. They are used, for example, in wind turbines, artificial intelligence hardware, electric vehicles and fighter jets. Similarly to the rest of the world, the EU is heavily dependent on China for its supply, as China controls 60 % of global REE production and 90 % of their refining, a position that is unlikely to change (Figure 1). The EU sources all of its heavy REEs and 85 % of its light REEs from China, as well as 98 % of its rare-earth magnets. According to scientists, it is difficult – and often impossible – to replace REEs because of their unique properties.

Figure 1 – Expected REE supply

Data source: International Energy Agency, 2025. Graphic by Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, EPRS. China’s export controls

On 4 April 2025, as one of the responses to US President Donald Trump’s administration’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs, China introduced export controls on seven heavy REEs (with licensing requirements), as well as on all related compounds, metals and magnets. Exporters are required to obtain a licence, and need to provide information on the end users of REEs; however, this information is considered sensitive by some firms. The licensing process is considered by many exporters to be opaque, selective and slow on purpose.

This was followed by a second wave of restrictions on 9 October 2025, which added a further five REEs, related products, equipment and technologies, as well as the use of personnel expertise on the subject. Most of the measures were to take effect on 8 November. Citing national security concerns, China widened the scope beyond physical goods, seeking to control technological know-how and even foreign-made products using Chinese inputs. Foreign firms would need to obtain approval to export magnets containing even trace amounts (0.1 %) of Chinese-sourced REEs or those that were produced using Chinese mining, processing or magnet-making technologies.

This means that, for the first time, the Chinese law has extraterritorial reach, with far-reaching implications for many critical supply chains. On 7 November 2025, the Chinese government announced the temporary suspension of the second wave of export controls until 10 November 2026.

Consequences for the EU

Economists from the European Central Bank (ECB) estimated that over 80 % of large European firms are no more than three intermediaries away from a Chinese REE producer. This exposure, coupled with high integration into complex global value chains, makes the EU vulnerable to any restrictions on REEs. The manufacturing sector and the defence, electronics, automotive and energy industries are particularly affected, and the ECB found that the firms in general had not stockpiled on REEs. Possible consequences include higher input costs (the International Energy Agency reported REE prices in the EU of up to six times higher after the restrictions) and shortages of materials, possibly leading to delays and even stoppages of production, reported for instance in the automotive sector. The Merics think tank showed that EU rearmament is in danger, while a paper by the World Economic Forum noted that the EU simply does not have control over the supply of REEs necessary for its green and digital transition.

The main EU policies to address the REE issue include the Critical Raw Materials (CRMs) Act, which entails risk monitoring as well as support for strategic projects, diversifying imports and incentivising technological progress and resource efficiency. In March 2025, the Commission selected the first batch of projects under the act, five of which – located in France, Italy, Poland and Sweden – are focused on the different stages of the REE value chain: extraction, processing, manufacturing and recycling. The EU has also set up the European Raw Materials Alliance, which works on resilience of rare-earth magnet supply chains. In October 2025, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced the RESourceEU initiative for joint purchasing and stockpiling of REEs, supporting domestic ‘strategic’ projects (for production and processing of CRMs) and diversifying suppliers with new CRM partnerships. In November 2025, Commission Vice-President Stéphane Séjourné announced plans to set up an EU critical minerals centre to fund and coordinate EU purchases of CRMs, set aside stocks and ingrain economic security into firms’ supply chains.

Expert views

The European Council of Foreign Relations warns that Chinese export controls pose a serious threat to the EU and need to be met with a strong response: possible escalatory measures include the use of the EU anti-coercion instrument and curtailing access to speciality machinery such as that used in chips and aircraft manufacturing. Merics advocates policy actions to incentivise recycling of REEs, as well as public funding to support domestic mining and processing projects. Experts also suggest embedding REE policies into those that fund the boosting of defence supply chains, collective investments with allies such as Japan, and funding research that could mitigate the environmental impact of REE mining and processing in the EU.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has consistently supported strengthening the EU’s strategic autonomy and resilience in the supply of CRMs. It favours an integrated approach encompassing multiple polices (such as industrial and trade policy) and the whole value chain (including recycling and circularity) to increase and diversify supply. To manage shortages, it has called on the Commission to improve efficiency in the use of industrial side streams in order to recover and separate RREs.

In July 2025, Parliament adopted a resolution on REE export controls urging the Commission and the Member States to speed up implementation of the CRMs Act. MEPs deemed China’s action to be unjustified and that it was intended to be coercive, given the country’s quasi-monopolistic position in supply chains. They also expressed concern about requirements to disclose sensitive data when applying for export permits, which could endanger the EU’s security and technological leadership. According to the resolution, the EU needs to activate domestic mining projects and determine the minimum level of strategic REE stocks. MEPs also want to see swift progress in concluding bilateral partnerships on raw materials with countries that meet high sustainability and human rights standards.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘China’s rare-earth export restrictions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anne Altmayer.

CONTEXT

The purpose of the proposed regulation is to implement into EU law a number of measures adopted by several regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) by amending the respective existing legislation. The proposal aims to speed up the implementation procedure by bundling amendments to several regulations into one legislative text. Moreover, in view of certain future amendments, the proposal includes requests to empower the European Commission to adopt delegated acts.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0106 (COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2107 laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Convention area of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), Regulation (EU) 2018/975 laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) Convention Area, Regulation (EU) 2019/833 laying down conservation and enforcement measures applicable in the Regulatory Area of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation, Regulation (EU) 2021/56 laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention, Regulation (EU) 2022/2056 laying down conservation and management measures applicable in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention Area, Regulation (EU) 2022/2343 laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) Area of Competence, and Regulation (EU) 2023/2053 establishing a multiannual management plan for bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean – COM(2025) 195, 12.5.2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule:2025/0106(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Regional fisheries management organisations: Implementation of measures into Union law‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

On 25 November each year, the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women seeks to raise awareness globally about this serious social issue. On this day, the European Union is due to submit its first evaluation report on compliance with the Istanbul Convention, which it ratified in 2023. For the EU, gender-based violence remains a priority for action. The European Parliament is calling for further measures, such as making gender-based violence an ‘EU crime’.

Violence against women around the world and in the European Union

According to UN Women, one in three women in the world aged 15 and over have suffered sexual or physical violence at least once. Often, this violence was perpetrated by a current or former partner. Digital violence also affects women globally, with the most prevalent forms including misinformation and defamation, deep fakes, and digital threats against women with an active public profile.

Violence against women is defined as violence having a direct link with their gender. It includes physical, psychological and economic forms of violence and takes place both off and online. It is a severe human rights violation and, given its prevalence and role in the subordination of women, is a systemic form of discrimination against women. It has a long-lasting and damaging impact on women and on society as a whole.

The most recent EU-wide survey found that 31 % of women in the EU have suffered violence – including sexual violence and threats of violence – at least once in their lifetime. One in ten said they had been a victim during the last five years (see Figure 1). Although the number of cases of violence reported to the police is on the rise in the EU, the majority of such crimes still go unreported.

Violence against women can also take the form of trafficking. Almost two thirds of trafficking victims in the EU are women, of whom many are trafficked for sexual exploitation. Another extreme form is femicide: the murder of a woman due to her gender. Two thirds of the more than one thousand victims murdered by an intimate partner or family member in 2023, in the 17 EU countries reporting this type of data to Eurostat, were women. To address it, several Member States have adopted specific legal provisions (Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Italy, and Malta).

Figure 1 – Share of women who said they had experienced violence by any perpetrator in the five years before the survey EU action

Fighting gender-based violence is a priority of the EU’s 2020-2025 gender equality strategy. An EU directive adopted in May 2024 on combating violence against women and domestic violence criminalises female genital mutilation and forced marriage, and several forms of cyber-violence. It enhances protection, access to justice and prevention measures for all victims of gender-based violence. Other EU laws also tackle gender-based violence in their areas. For example, the directive on trafficking in human beings, after its 2024 review, makes knowingly using the services of trafficking victims a crime.

The EU took another important step to fight violence against women with the ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention) in 2023. Now, two years later, the EU is conducting its first report as a party to the Convention. On 25 November, the European Commission is due to submit the EU’s ‘baseline evaluation report’ on legislative and other measures that give effect to the Convention’s provisions. The Convention applies to the EU in matters falling within its ‘exclusive external competence’ (as defined in the Treaties) relating to the Union’s institutions and public administration, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, asylum and non-refoulement. It becomes binding on all Member States regarding those matters, including the five which have not yet ratified the Convention. In April 2025, the Commission published a communication outlining the evaluation procedure. Parliament’s LIBE and FEMM committees exchanged views with the Commission on 6 November.

The EU also funds numerous initiatives to combat violence against women through its Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme (2021-2027), particularly its Daphne component. For the budget period after 2027, the Commission proposes to incorporate the fight against gender-based violence in a new Agora programme with a broader focus.

European Parliament position

Parliament has called repeatedly for EU action to combat violence against women. It advocated a comprehensive directive on violence against women and played a pivotal role in the ratification of the Istanbul Convention, by asking the European Court of Justice to clarify the procedure. Parliament has also repeatedly called for a Council decision to make gender-based violence an EU crime in Article 83 TFEU.

In the current term, Parliament has worked on several relevant initiatives. The LIBE and FEMM committees are working jointly on an own-initiative report on the importance of consent-based rape legislation in the EU, which aims to reaffirm the importance of legal reform on the matter in all EU countries in line with the Istanbul Convention requirements. They are expected to adopt the report in the coming weeks.

In a resolution adopted on 13 November 2025, Parliament outlined its vision for a new EU gender equality strategy post-2025. It proposes to make gender-based violence a crime within the EU’s competence, and calls on the Commission to recognise femicide as a ‘distinct and stand-alone crime’; to address the specific needs of victims; and to give special attention, in cooperation with the Member States, to vulnerable victims and those at risk of intersectional discrimination. It also calls on the Commission to propose legislation to tackle gender-based violence at work.

In a resolution adopted in October 2025, Parliament endorsed the roadmap for women’s rights, which declares the fight against gender-based violence to be one of the principles for a gender-equal society.

The International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women is marked each year on 25 November. This year, a UN Women initiative – UNiTE campaign – will aim to mobilise various stakeholders around this issue in the run-up to the international Human Rights Day on 10 December.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Elimination of violence against women: Two years since the EU ratified the Istanbul Convention‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

Women continue to be under-represented in EU countries at all levels of political decision-making as well as in political parties. The origins of this situation are complex, but one reason stands out: violence against women active in politics discourages many women from entering the political arena. Female politicians are exposed to two severe and intersecting forms of violence: political violence and gender-based violence.

Violence against people active in politics, whether men or women, is a major obstacle to the exercise of political rights and freedoms, and a serious violation of basic human rights. Increasing polarisation in liberal societies has led to rising violence against political actors. However, violence against women in politics is more than a symptom of political polarisation. It targets women because they are women, takes sexist and sexualised forms, and seeks to discourage women generally from taking part in political life. Women surveyed tend to consider its impact significant and feel less ready to defend certain positions and to continue their political career.

At EU level, ensuring safe participation of women in politics is a priority of gender equality policies. The European Parliament has recognised the seriousness of the phenomenon in numerous resolutions, has adapted its internal rules to prevent sexist and hate speech in its debates, and has established specific mechanisms to deal with harassment.

This briefing updates an earlier version from February 2024.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Violence against women active in politics in the EU: A serious obstacle to political participation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Types of violence experienced by female local politicians in the EU (% of those who reported having experienced violence) Percentage of women in elected assemblies and in the leadership of major political parties in EU countries, 2025 Types of violence experienced by female parliamentarians in Europe (% of all respondents)

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Raja.

Members gather for the second plenary session of November, with an agenda that underlines the European Union’s efforts to defend and protect our democracies, our trade and our borders. The European Commission is expected to make a statement on the proposed Democracy Shield, and the Council and Commission are expected to make statements on tackling China’s export restrictions, on continued Russian border aggressions, and on the situation in Sudan and in Myanmar. Members are also set to adopt the EU’s 2026 budget.

Parliament’s negotiators have reached a provisional agreement on next year’s budget. The final text reflects Parliament’s priorities, particularly increasing funding for competitiveness, research and defence initiatives. The budget for the year sets commitment appropriations at €192.77 billion and payments at €190.1 billion. Following the Council’s approval of the text, expected on Monday, Members are scheduled to consider the file on Tuesday afternoon. The vote on the 2026 EU budget will conclude the budgetary procedure for 2026, allowing Parliament’s President to sign the budget into law.

Seeking to strengthen Europe’s defence industry and guarantee reliable access to defence equipment when needed, Members are due to debate approval of a provisional agreement reached with the Council on the European defence industry programme (EDIP) on Tuesday morning. The negotiators succeeded in maintaining the €1.5 billion budget for 2025 to 2027, including €300 million to support Ukraine. The agreement on EDIP also sets a 35 % limit on non-EU components and excludes suppliers who pose a risk to EU security, a key Parliament priority.

Another security issue, third-country interference in democratic processes, is due for debate on Wednesday morning. The Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) has tabled two reports on proposed new lobbying rules, including a proposed directive setting harmonised transparency requirements. The proposal is part of a broader package aimed at protecting democracy from covert foreign influence. The IMCO report recommends a narrower definition of such activities and proposes strengthening enforcement through fully interoperable national registers and by withdrawing registration for serious or repeated infringements. Once voted, this will form the Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

Migrant smugglers are responsible for over 90 % of irregular external EU border crossings. And migrants smuggled this way are at higher risk of falling victim to trafficking in human beings. On Monday, Members are set to consider an agreement reached with the Council on a proposal to strengthen Europol’s role in combating migrant smuggling and trafficking. The agreement proposes to establish a permanent European Centre against Migrant Smuggling within Europol. It also introduces greater information-sharing in immigration operations, strengthens Europol’s biometric data processing capabilities and provides additional staff and funding. As Parliament’s substitute impact assessment on the file raises serious concerns, the report seeks to clarify the situation.

On Tuesday, Members are set to consider an agreement reached between the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) negotiators and the Council to amend and simplify the InvestEU Regulation. The changes would mobilise a further €55 billion in investment through InvestEU, the EU’s public-private risk-sharing instrument, supporting greater competitiveness and innovation. Cost savings made by reducing the frequency and scope of reporting obligations could reach €350 million.

Parliament is expected to debate an IMCO report on Tuesday afternoon, recommending measures to address the growing problem of children accessing adult content online. Age-verification methods are uneven in the EU and often easy to bypass, putting children at risk of seeing harmful content, or encountering abusive adults. The report on digital safety for minors warns of the risks of addiction, mental health problems and exposure to illegal content and calls for stronger enforcement of the Digital Services Act (DSA), for the expected digital fairness act to close legislative gaps in online child safety, and for an EU-wide digital age limit.

Continuing in its efforts to protect children, Parliament is also scheduled to vote on Tuesday on an interinstitutional agreement on the proposed new toy safety regulation, replacing the current Toy Safety Directive. Following negotiations between the co-legislators, the revised proposal requires that assessing the safety of digitally connected toys considers children’s vulnerabilities, including risks to mental health. It also bans additional harmful chemicals including per- and polyfluorinated alkyl substances (PFAS) in toys. The IMCO committee recommends that Parliament approve the Council’s position, bringing the legislative procedure to conclusion.

Although the current European disability strategy runs until 2030, in the face of persistent inequalities Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) is calling for an updated framework. People with disabilities still face disadvantages in income, access to jobs, inclusive education, housing and healthcare. On Wednesday, Members are set to consider a report from EMPL, aimed at addressing these disadvantages in the remaining years of the European disability strategy. The report also highlights the situation of women and girls with disabilities, who face multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination and violence.

As ice melts rapidly due to climate change, previously inaccessible land areas and sea routes in the Arctic are opening up. This has led to increases in natural resource extraction, and security and defence activities, affecting local populations and the fragile environment. Competition between global powers for influence in the region is contributing to a growing sense of instability. Members are due to consider a report on Tuesday from Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), calling for a security-oriented strategy in the Arctic. The report recommends deeper partnerships with Arctic countries including Canada, Iceland, Norway, and self-governing Greenland – and supports future EU enlargement prospects and increased EU funding for the region.

The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which ensure the EU only acts where appropriate and where national governments cannot, is fundamental to the EU legislative process. Members are set to vote on a report from the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) on Thursday, which calls for improved definition and application of subsidiarity and proportionality and extending the deadline for national parliaments in the Member States to engage in the EU legislative process.

Further reading:

• European Parliament Plenary Session, November I 2025, agenda
• European defence industry programme (EDIP)
• Adoption of the European Union’s 2026 budget
• Interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries
• Stronger role for Europol to fight migrant smuggling and human trafficking
• InvestEU: New measures to unlock investment
• Online protection of minors
• Toy safety regulation
• EU strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities post-2024
• EU strategy and cooperation in the Arctic
• Subsidiarity, proportionality and the role of national parliaments in the EU

Written by Tristan Marcelin.

Following Mario Draghi’s report on the future of European competitiveness, the EU has started proposing ways to simplify EU laws governing the digital space. The goal is to reduce administrative burdens on companies. However, simplifying EU digital laws may not be sufficient to boost innovation, and thus competitiveness.

EU competitiveness as a new priority Future of European competitiveness

Following a request by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Mario Draghi – former European Central Bank President – drafted a report in 2024 on the future of European competitiveness. In his report, Draghi suggests, among other things, increasing EU digitalisation and the development of advanced technologies to boost EU competitiveness. The report notes that the EU should develop its connectivity, computing infrastructures, and electronics value chain, as all three are essential for EU citizens and businesses. It also suggests a number of ways to strengthen EU governance, including by simplifying rules. It warns that ‘excessive regulatory and administrative burden can hinder the ease of doing business in the EU and the competitiveness of EU companies’. The unclear overlaps between the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) are given as an example.

New EU political priorities

Since the publication of the Draghi report, the European political landscape has changed. In 2024, a new legislative term started in the European Parliament, and a new College of Commissioners was appointed for the European Commission. The Commission’s new leadership chose competitiveness as one of its 2024‑2029 priorities, and laid down objectives including ‘making business easier’ and ‘boosting productivity with digital tech diffusion’ to achieve this goal. Both objectives follow Mario Draghi’s recommendations. The latter appears even more relevant in 2025, as this year’s Nobel prize in economic sciences was awarded to three economists for showing ‘how new technology can drive sustained growth’.

From strategic objectives to concrete proposals Digital simplification on the Council’s agenda

In a June 2025 document, the Polish Presidency of the Council noted its priority of simplifying digital regulations, listing the initiatives it undertook. The current Danish Presidency aims for a similar priority. The Danish programme notes that ‘the Presidency will place focus on regulatory simplification and better regulation in the EU to ease daily operations for businesses and other stakeholders’. Under Denmark’s Presidency, the Council defined its position on a Commission proposal, known as the ‘omnibus IV‘ simplification package, to reduce administrative burdens for small and medium-sized enterprises and small mid-cap enterprises (SMCs). The proposal includes modifications to the GDPR: SMCs would no longer need, under certain conditions, to maintain records of activities involving the processing of personal data.

Forthcoming proposal for a digital omnibus

An omnibus dedicated to the EU digital rulebook is reportedly expected for 19 November 2025. The call for evidence, published by the Commission on 16 September 2025, hints at an omnibus focusing notably on simplifying data legislation, cybersecurity incident reporting obligations, and the smooth application of AI Act rules. The forthcoming omnibus is aimed at reducing ‘the administrative costs for compliance for businesses, administrations and citizens in the European Union in application of several regulations of the Union’s digital acquis without compromising the objectives of the underlying rules’. It follows a period of intense political discussions over a pause or simplification of parts of the AI Act, owing to its difficult transposition into technical guidance and standards, and its interplay with other rules.

Burden of a fragmented EU digital rulebook Fragmented EU digital rulebook

The EU digital rulebook is composed of several pieces of legislation that all have different purposes and scopes. Among the horizontal digital laws, (i) several are related to data, while (ii) others focus on specific digital activities. The first include the GDPR, which has created rights for EU citizens over their data. Further laws such as the Data Act and the Data Governance Act set rules for private, public and non-personal data. The second include laws creating obligations for certain types of digital activities, such as the Digital Markets Act for practices relating to digital markets, the Digital Services Act for digital services, and the AI Act for AI systems and models. It also includes technical and organisational cybersecurity obligations relating to software, hardware and entities, such as the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) and the NIS 2 Directive. In addition to the horizontal digital laws, sectoral laws may apply. For instance, in 2024, experts divided the 154 EU ‘information security’ and ‘cybersecurity’ policies (including non-legislative texts) into eight policy areas including energy, economic, education, and security and justice.

Administrative burden on companies

The administrative tasks companies must undertake to comply with EU laws depend on their activities. Companies handling personal data must comply with GDPR rules. Once enforced, companies distributing and manufacturing devices might need to comply with the CRA, and those providing general-purpose AI (GPAI) might need to comply with the AI Act. A company could need to comply with all three. However, each law has different deadlines, reporting procedures and authorities. The GDPR and the CRA are enforced at Member State level, while the exclusive power to enforce GPAI rules rests with the Commission. If a company provided high-risk AI systems instead of GPAI, enforcement would be at the national level. The GDPR, CRA and AI Act thus all rely on different enforcers. Depending on the law and its implementation, Member States may have added requirements on top of the initial EU law – this is known as ‘gold plating‘. The Draghi report associates it with a loss in competitiveness, mentioning the GDPR as an example: its enforcement is uneven among the Member States, limiting cross-border innovation.

Beyond simplifying the EU digital rulebook

While simplifying the EU digital rulebook is a first step, it is unlikely to be sufficient to boost EU innovation, and thus competitiveness. In 2024, Anu Bradford – known for theorising the Brussels effect, whereby the EU’s regulatory power influences other regions – published a research paper, ‘The False Choice Between Digital Regulation and Innovation’. As reported by the Oxford Institute for Ethics in AI, she ‘noted that there was very little technological regulation in Europe before 2010, at the time when the likes of Meta and Google have been founded. This suggests that regulation was not the major obstacle preventing the rise of similar companies in Europe.’ Experts often mention the absence of a digital single market and of a unified capital market in Europe as one of the root causes of the EU’s technological gap.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Simplifying EU digital laws for competitiveness‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Issam Hallak.

The EU is facing the challenge of mobilising massive investments required to meet its strategic priorities and must find effective ways to finance them. In response, the European Commission published the savings and investments union (SIU) action plan on 19 March 2025, designed to channel EU savings into productive investments. This briefing presents an overview of the plan.

The SIU was launched in the context of the Draghi and Letta reports, which set out recommendations for strengthening the EU’s single market and competitiveness. Announced in the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass (the January 2025 roadmap to restore and boost the EU’s economic dynamism), it places strong importance on mobilising private financing for key EU priorities such as innovation, digitalisation, defence and the green transition. The SIU seeks to further integrate the EU’s financial system and make its capital markets more attractive to investors.

The SIU is structured around four work strands. The first focuses on the demand side – savers and investors – promoting effective savings instruments that link citizens’ savings with productive investments. The second targets the supply side by expanding financing options for firms. The remaining two strands aim to strengthen market infrastructure and advance supervisory convergence, which could, in specific areas, evolve towards a single supervisory framework. Key proposals include amendments to securitisation rules (ongoing), revised rules and products for supplementary pensions, and measures to improve financial market infrastructure. The SIU has received support from the European Parliament through its September 2025 resolution on EU competitiveness, which also makes some remarks and offers further directions for action.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Savings and investments union: Overview and state of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martina Prpic, Ioannis Stefanou, Ingeborg Odink.

Adopted in 1989, the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was the first international instrument to explicitly recognise children as human beings with innate rights. As of 2025, it has been ratified by 196 countries, including all EU Member States, and it has become the landmark treaty on children’s rights, outlining universal standards for the care, treatment, survival, development, protection and participation of all children.

The promotion and protection of children’s rights is one of the key objectives embedded in Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Moreover, Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU recognises that children are entitled to ‘protection and care as is necessary for their well-being’. The same article recognises that the child’s best interests should be the primary consideration for public authorities and private institutions.

Over the years, the EU has moved from a sectoral approach towards a more coherent policy approach. Whereas initially, children’s rights were developed in relation to specific areas – such as the free movement of persons – since 2000 the EU has taken a more coordinated line. The European Parliament has been especially vocal in advocating for children. This briefing offers an overview of the most relevant actions at European level to address and promote children’s rights before looking at upcoming challenges.

This briefing is an update of a 2022 briefing written by Rosamund Shreeves.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Children’s rights in the EU in the light of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Pieter Baert.

Achieving ambitious climate objectives while supporting robust economic growth and safeguarding tax revenue requires simple and well-targeted tax incentives that encourage sustainable investment. The European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Tax Matters (FISC) is due to hold a public hearing on this topic on 20 November 2025.

Clean industrial deal – tax recommendations

Launched in February 2025, the clean industrial deal is a package of wide-ranging actions aimed at ensuring that decarbonisation is a driver of economic growth for the European economy. Next to concrete action to lower energy prices, the European Commission published a (non-binding) recommendation to guide Member States when introducing and designing tax incentives to support the clean industrial deal objectives.

Firstly, the Commission recommends that Member States allow companies to deduct investment in green technology from their taxable income more quickly (‘accelerated depreciation‘), or even immediately (‘full or immediate expensing’). By enabling companies to deduct the cost of the asset faster – rather than spreading the cost evenly over time – accelerated depreciation effectively raises the after-tax rate of return on investment and helps mitigate distortions caused by inflation. While this incentive does not ultimately increase the nominal value of deductions, it does enhance their real value by allowing firms to claim them earlier, thereby improving businesses’ cash flow.

FranceInvestment in renewable energy equipment or energy-saving technologies can be depreciated at 2, 2.5 or 3 times the normal rate.Germany75 % of costs on electric company vehicles acquired after 30 June 2025 and before 1 January 2028 can be deducted in their first year.IrelandThe Accelerated Capital Allowance (ACA) scheme allows companies to deduct the full cost of investment in energy-efficient equipment in the year of purchase, rather than over the standard eight-year period.SpainSince 2023, Spain allows companies to apply accelerated depreciation for new electric and hydrogen company vehicles, at twice the standard depreciation rate. This also applies to investment in new electric vehicle charging infrastructure, both normal and high-power.

Accelerated depreciation for green assets – Member State examples (non-exhaustive)

Secondly, the Commission recommends that Member States, where feasible, use cost-effective and targeted tax credits for investment that creates sufficient manufacturing capacity in clean technologies, supports industrial decarbonisation, or strengthens the EU’s strategic resilience (for example, the production of a net-zero product where the EU is currently highly dependent on a single third country). The Commission notes that empirical evidence generally ranks input-based tax credits – for example, those covering R&D costs for green investment – higher than income-based credits, such as patent boxes, arguing that the former are more cost-effective in stimulating additional investment.

Action on these recommendations should be combined with other policy measures, such as the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies, whether provided through tax expenditure or direct grants.

The Council welcomed the Commission’s recommendations, but underlined the need for flexibility, allowing Member States to adapt tax incentives to their specific fiscal contexts and budgets.

Revision of the Energy Taxation Directive

The proposal to revise the Energy Taxation Directive (ETD) remains the only unfinished file in the Commission’s ‘fit for 55‘ package, tabled in 2021, aiming to reduce emissions by 55 % by 2030.

The ETD lays down EU-wide minimum excise duty rates on motor/heating fuels and electricity. Member States are free to set their own tax rates as long as they respect the ETD’s minimum rates. The Commission’s proposal aims to update the directive – unchanged since 2003 – to bring it into line with the EU’s climate objectives and modern green technology, while maintaining Member States’ capacity to raise tax revenue. While reducing greenhouse gas emissions and preserving tax revenues are not inherently contradictory objectives, concern is growing about potential long-term future revenue erosion for national budgets, as excise duties on fossil fuels decline with the green transition.

Some of the proposal’s key provisions to revise the ETD include:

• Shifting from volume- to energy content-based taxation: Minimum rates would no longer be expressed per litre or kilogram, but rather per gigajoule of energy content, removing the existing tax bias against low-energy-content biofuels.
• Environmental ranking of minimum rates: A new structure would tax energy products according to their environmental performance, ensuring that electricity is always taxed at the lowest rate and fossil fuels at the highest.
• Gradual rate increases: Minimum rates for certain energy products, such as natural gas, would rise by one-tenth each year over a ten-year transitional period, to balance social costs, climate objectives, and fiscal stability.
• Annual indexation: Minimum rates would be automatically adjusted each year to preserve their real value over time and prevent erosion through inflation.
• Phasing out exemptions and reductions: The proposal removes several existing tax advantages, including the mandatory exemptions currently granted to maritime and aviation fuels.

Over the four years of negotiation, reaching the required unanimous support in the Council has proven difficult, aggravated by the energy cost crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and rising concerns about the resilience of European industry. Several Council presidencies have tried to break the impasse by proposing prolonged transitional periods and the possibility for Member States to provide total or partial exemptions for certain sectors and services, or the installation of an ’emergency brake’ on the increase in taxation rates when countries are faced with a sudden increase in energy prices.

The Danish Council Presidency had invited ministers to reach a general approach on the proposal on 13 November 2025, but a number of Member States expressed reservations about the proposed compromise text. Consultation on the file (2021/0213(CNS)) in the European Parliament continues.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Encouraging clean investment: The role of tax incentives‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ioannis Stefanou and Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou.

Child sexual exploitation and sexual abuse are among the worst forms of violence against children and know no borders. The rise in these crimes is exacerbated by the use of digital technology. Harmonised national laws and international cooperation are essential to improve prevention and protect victims.

Background

The European Day for the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, an initiative of the Council of Europe, is observed every 18 November to highlight the importance of preventing child sexual exploitation and abuse. The 2025 edition focuses on strengthening the protection of children against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse through evidence-based policymaking. At the EU level, in 2020 the European Commission launched a strategy for a more effective fight against child sexual abuse. Similarly, child sexual exploitation is a priority in the fight against serious and organised crime within the context of the 2020‑2025 EU security union strategy and the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT).

According to a 2024 UNICEF report, one in five girls and women and one in seven boys and men alive today globally have experienced sexual violence as children, while in Europe one in five children is estimated to be a victim of sexual violence, with 70-85 % knowing their abuser. Child sexual abuse and exploitation are increasingly occurring online. In 2024, the United States’ National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) received 20.5 million reports of suspected child sexual exploitation.

International and EU efforts to combat child sexual abuse International legal framework

The 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child laid the foundation for an international framework to combat child sexual abuse and exploitation. In 2007, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS No 201), or ‘Lanzarote Convention‘. This was the first international instrument to categorise different forms of child sexual abuse as criminal offences. It entered into force on 1 July 2010 and has since been ratified by all EU Member States.

EU legal framework

The main EU legal instrument to combat sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children, as well as child pornography, is Directive 2011/93/EU (the Combating Child Sexual Abuse Directive), which criminalises various forms of child sexual abuse and exploitation, harmonises laws across the EU, and sets minimum sanctions. Article 25 requires the removal of websites containing or disseminating child sexual abuse material and allows blocking access where needed, helping combat online child sexual exploitation and abuse. Directive 2012/29/EU (the 2012 Victims’ Rights Directive) complements this framework with a child-sensitive approach prioritising the best interests of the child. The 2021 EU strategy on the rights of the child offers a policy framework to combat violence against children and protect them from all forms of abuse.

Recent developments

On 6 February 2024, as part of the EU strategy to more effectively combat child sexual abuse, the Commission proposed a revision of the 2011 Combating Child Sexual Abuse Directive. The updated rules would broaden the definitions of offences to include new forms of online child sexual abuse, introduce higher penalties, and establish more specific requirements for the prevention of offences and the provision of assistance to victims. Additionally, minimum statutes of limitation would be set to enable victims to seek justice more effectively. The Commission has also launched the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive. On 23 April 2024, it adopted a recommendation on integrated child protection systems – a key deliverable under the children’s rights strategy to better protect children from violence.

Work has also continued on the 2022 legislative proposal that would require providers of online communication services to detect, report and remove child sexual abuse material. The proposal includes the establishment of an EU centre to prevent and combat child sexual abuse. Pending agreement in the Council of the EU (the Council), the European Parliament and the Council have agreed to extend the 2021 interim regulation, which temporarily exempts providers from electronic data protection rules, to allow for voluntary detection, reporting and removal. Furthermore, the Commission has launched a public consultation on an action plan to address cyberbullying, with a focus on minors.

International cooperation through EU agencies, initiatives and networks

Various EU agencies, such as Europol, support law enforcement cooperation among Member States to combat online sexual exploitation and abuse of children within the EU and globally. One example is the Stop Child Abuse – Trace an Object initiative, designed to help trace the origin of objects linked to criminal investigations. In addition, the European Commission has adopted the Decision to formally launch the Network for the Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse at the end of 2025.

Eurojust supports judicial cooperation among Member States for the cross-border prosecution of perpetrators. The Commission funds several initiatives and networks, including the Better Internet for Kids (BIK) portal, which raises awareness of risks, and INHOPE, a network of hotlines combating online child sexual abuse material. The WePROTECT Global Alliance develops political and practical solutions to protect children online and prevent online sexual abuse and long-term harm. The Internet Watch Foundation provides a hotline for reporting online sexual abuse content globally. ChildSafetyON brings together children’s rights organisations to end child sexual abuse and exploitation in the EU, as does the European Child Sexual Abuse Legislation Advocacy Group (ECLAG).

European Parliament position
In June 2025, Parliament adopted its position on the revision of the Combating Sexual Abuse Directive, proposing to increase maximum penalties for several offences and remove limitation periods. Since its first assessment in 2017 on implementation, Parliament and its Children’s Rights Coordinator have repeatedly called for full transposition of the directive and action in key areas. In November 2023, Parliament adopted its position on the proposed regulation to prevent and combat child sexual abuse; negotiations with the Council are ongoing. Moreover, a report from the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) on the protection of minors online is planned to be voted in the plenary of 25 November 2025. In addition, a draft report from the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) is expected to be voted in committee in April 2026.
Parliament has also demanded better child protection and victim support and a greater focus on prevention and awareness raising; stressed that information and communications technology companies and online platforms should take some responsibility in the fight against child sexual abuse material; and called for more national investment in digital education. Parliament has welcomed Europol’s prevention and awareness-raising work, and supported the establishment of an EU centre to prevent and counter child sexual abuse.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘European Day for the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Highlights of the November I plenary session included debates on the architecture and governance of the new 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework, and on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 23 October 2025. Further debates concerned Parliament’s statement commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Islamist attacks of 13 November 2015 in Paris; Council and Commission statements on the illegal unilateral declaration of the secessionist entity created by Türkiye in Cyprus and the continued Turkish military occupation; and protecting EU consumers against the practices of certain e-commerce platforms.

European annual asylum and migration report

Members debated Council and Commission statements on the first European Annual Asylum and Migration report and the setting up of the Annual Solidarity Pool. Published on 11 November, the report identified animprovement in the migratory situation in the EU between July 2024 and June 2025. Challenges remain however in relation to irregular arrivals and unauthorised movements within the EU, hosting refugees from Ukraine, weaponisation of migration by Russia and Belarus, and cooperation on returns and readmission. The proposed Council implementing act on an Annual Solidarity Pool (to be established, in principle, by the end of 2025) outlines that 4 Member States are under migratory pressure (Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Spain), and 12 others are at risk of migratory pressure, with 6 facing a significant migratory situation due to the cumulative effects of movements over the past five years. The solidarity pool would allocate solidarity contributions such as relocations and financial support, in priority, to Member States under migratory pressure. While Parliament does not have a formal role in implementing measures under the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, it supported the establishment of the solidarity mechanism.

European Climate Law

Members debated a report on the proposal to set a 2040 EU emissions reduction target as a step towards ensuring a cost-efficient and realistic pathway to climate neutrality by 2050. Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) urged higher ambition on environmental and human rights and to safeguard against funding for projects that contradict EU strategic interests, in relation to international credits which can be used for 2040 but not for the other targets of the climate law. The committee also proposes to delay the new ETS2 emissions trading system for one year (currently set to start in 2027). Parliament adopted the ENVI report on amending the European Climate Law, setting its position for negotiations with the Council.

Conservation of marine biological diversity

The landmark 2023 United Nations High Seas Treaty, or Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement, aims at the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond national borders. Members debated and adopted an ENVI report on the proposal to establish rules on international management of the high seas, which introduced clarifications for closer alignment with the BBNJ text. The changes proposed aim at improving transparency by requiring that Member States publish the measures they take on biodiversity in the high seas, and at greater flexibility in the reporting process, especially in emergencies. The vote sets Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations.

European Maritime Safety Agency

Members considered and adopted the provisional agreement reached in second reading on a proposal to revise the regulation founding the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). The revision, supported by Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN), would expand EMSA’s mandate, strengthening its contribution to the green and digital transitions and enhancing its ability to tackle emerging security risks, including cyber and hybrid threats. In addition, it updates governance rules to balance oversight and efficiency in the EU’s efforts to improve maritime safety and prevent pollution from shipping.

Framework for Income Taxation (BEFIT)

Businesses that operate across EU borders face different corporate tax systems and rules in every Member State. To tackle the issue at EU level, the Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation (BEFIT) aims at creating a common corporate tax framework for large EU multinational businesses. Parliament considered and adopted a report on BEFIT from the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), under the consultation procedure. The report calls for improvements to address the challenges of taxing the digital economy. It recommends that a business be treated as tax resident in any Member State in which it generates a substantial level of sales, ensuring it pays fair taxes to the community that supports its operations. The file requires a unanimous vote in the Council.

Gender equality strategy

The EU plans to adopt a new gender equality strategy in early 2026. Parliament debated and adopted an own-initiative report from its Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) outlining priorities for the 2026 strategy. The report calls for a comprehensive and ambitious approach to tackling violence against women, including its possible definition as a ‘euro-crime’, and to close gaps in political representation, pay and the sharing of care responsibilities. Members also voted in favour of a change to the Electoral Act which would enable Members who are pregnant or who have recently given birth to vote by proxy, with another Member casting their vote. This change now needs to be adopted by the Council unanimously and approved by each Member State before it may come into force.

EU-Singapore DTA

The Parliament gave its consent to a digital trade agreement (DTA) between the EU and Singapore. Digital trade agreements can contribute to securing access to new markets, simplifying electronic transactions, protecting consumers, removing administrative obstacles to trade and increasing legal certainty. The EU-Singapore DTA ensures electronic contracts and signatures are legally valid, duty-free online transmissions and promotes open access to government data. Any disputes will be settled under the same rules that already apply under the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Two decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, from the Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) Committee on amending certain agricultural products regulations as regards certain market rules and sectoral support measures in the wine sector and for aromatised wine products; and from the Foreign Affairs and Development (AFET/DEVE) Committees on amending Regulation (EU) 2021/947 as regards increased efficiency of the External Action Guarantee were announced. As no challenges to these mandates were received by the deadline, the committees may now launch negotiations with the Council.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – November I 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eric Pichon.

African and European Heads of State or Government will meet in Luanda (Angola) on 24 and 25 November 2025 for the Seventh European Union (EU)-African Union Summit. The Africa-EU partnership faces significant challenges, including global geopolitical shifts and shrinking development finance. Central to the EU’s new approach, the Global Gateway strategy aims to mobilise €150 billion by 2027 to boost Africa’s digital connectivity, transport infrastructure, and energy transition. However, questions remain over ownership and whether African priorities are genuinely reflected. To ensure the partnership remains effective, it must deliver on the commitments made at the 2022 summit and strengthen accountability mechanisms. This means addressing persistent challenges in implementation, such as lack of coordination, inconsistent reporting, and data gaps.

The European Parliament has consistently advocated for a people-centred partnership that genuinely benefits both Europeans and Africans.

This briefing provides an insight into the broad context that will set the scene for discussions. Detailed specifics of the four pillars of the partnership are discussed in separate publications: Prosperity (economy and connectivity; natural resources, health, research and education), Peace (security and governance), People (migration and mobility) and Planet (multilateralism).

It is crucial for the next summit to embody a partnership of equals, supporting sustainable development, peace, and prosperity for both continents.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-African Union Summit 2025: Setting the scene – Delivering on commitments in a shifting global landscape‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Raja.

Members gather in Brussels this week for the first plenary session of November, with an agenda featuring plans for the new 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework, among other issues. Members are also set to hear Council and Commission statements on the conclusions of the European Council meeting held on 23 October 2025.

On Wednesday, Members will hear Council and Commission statements on the first European Annual Asylum and Migration report and the setting up of the Annual Solidarity Pool. This regular report, still to be published by the Commission at the time of writing, aims to describe the migration and asylum situation in the Member States and is accompanied by a decision determining which Member States are under migratory pressure, at risk of migratory pressure or facing a significant migratory situation. The Annual Solidarity Pool is aimed at allocating solidarity contributions, like relocations and financial support, to Member States facing migratory pressure. While Parliament does not have a formal role in its implementation, it supported the establishment of the solidarity mechanism under the migration pact.

The EU plans to adopt a new gender equality strategy in early 2026. Based on feedback on the current strategy gathered in 2025, citizens, civil society and public institutions want a binding and inclusive EU framework that prioritises protection from gender-based violence, ensures equal pay and economic participation and improves access to quality healthcare. On Wednesday, Parliament is scheduled to debate a report from its Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) outlining priorities for the 2026 strategy. The report calls for a comprehensive and ambitious approach to tackling violence against women, including its possible definition as a ‘euro-crime’, and to close gaps in political representation, pay and the sharing of care responsibilities. On Thursday, Members are set to address an amendment to the European Electoral Act which would allow Members to benefit from proxy voting in plenary during pregnancy and after giving birth.

Businesses that operate across EU borders face different corporate tax systems in every Member State, with varying rules on depreciation, tax deductibility of losses, treatment of interests and more. As a result, EU businesses have to spend time and resources on complying with complex distinct local corporate tax rules, which is a significant administrative burden. To tackle the issue at EU level, the Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation (BEFIT) aims to create a common corporate tax framework for large EU multinational businesses. On Wednesday, Parliament is due to vote on a (non-binding) report on BEFIT from the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON). The report strongly supports the proposal’s overall objectives but calls for improvements to address the challenges of taxing the digital economy. It recommends that a business be treated as tax resident in any Member State in which it generates a substantial level of sales, ensuring it pays fair taxes to the community that supports its operations. Once Parliament has been consulted, the file requires a unanimous vote in the Council.

On Thursday, Members are set to consider a digital trade agreement (DTA) between the EU and Singapore. Digital trade agreements can contribute to securing access to new markets, simplifying electronic transactions, protecting consumers, removing administrative obstacles to trade and increasing legal certainty. Under the EU-Singapore DTA, citizens will benefit from privacy and data protection rules, safeguards against online fraud, and limits on spam. The agreement ensures electronic contracts and signatures are legally valid, duty-free online transmissions and promotes open access to government data. It also supports secure, affordable cross-border digital payments and cooperation to combat cyber threats. Any disputes will be settled under the same rules that already apply under the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.

In a debate on Wednesday afternoon, Members are set to consider a report on the proposal to set a 2040 EU emissions reduction target as a step towards ensuring a cost-efficient and realistic pathway to climate neutrality by 2050. Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) would like to see higher ambition on environmental and human rights and to safeguard against funding for projects that contradict EU strategic interests, in relation to international credits which can be used for 2040 but not for the other targets of the climate law. The committee also proposes to delay the new ETS2 emissions trading system for one year (currently set to start in 2027). The vote on amending the European Climate Law will set Parliament’s position for negotiations with the co-legislators.

Almost two thirds of the world’s oceans are outside any national jurisdiction. These marine areas play a vital role in supporting ecosystems, regulating the climate and sustaining economic activities such as fisheries and tourism, but they face threats from overfishing, pollution and climate change. The landmark 2023 United Nations High Seas Treaty, or Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement, aims to address the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond national borders. Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) has adopted a report on a proposal to establish rules on international management of the high seas, which introduces clarifications for closer alignment with the BBNJ text. The proposed changes aim to improve transparency by requiring that Member States publish the measures they take regarding biodiversity in the high seas and improve flexibility in the process of submitting measures taken related to area-based management tools to the BBNJ secretariat, especially in emergencies. Parliament is set to consider the report on Wednesday.

On Wednesday, Members are set to vote on a provisional agreement on a proposal to revise the founding regulation of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). The revision, supported by Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN), would expand EMSA’s mandate, strengthening its contribution to the green and digital transitions and enhancing its ability to tackle emerging security risks, including cyber and hybrid threats. It also establishes a flexibility mechanism that allows EMSA to take on new tasks at the request of the Commission or Member States. In addition, it updates governance rules to ensure a better balance between oversight and efficiency in the EU’s efforts to improve maritime safety and prevent pollution from shipping.

• European Parliament Plenary Session, November I 2025, agenda
• Conclusions of the European Council meeting held on 23 October 2025
• The first European Annual Asylum and Migration report and the Annual Solidarity Pool
• Gender equality strategy post-2025
• Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation (BEFIT)
• The EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement
• Amending the European Climate Law
• Protecting marine biodiversity in the high seas
• Revision of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) founding regulation

Written by Eric Pichon.

The Sudanese are caught in a devastating civil war, driven by deep political fragmentation, with far-reaching humanitarian and human rights consequences. While President Al-Bashir’s ousting in 2019 had raised hopes for a democratic transition, deep divisions between the regular Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) derailed power-sharing attempts. This has triggered violent conflict across the country since April 2023, exacerbating hostilities between communities and resulting in competing administrations, further weakening prospects for reconciliation.
Many thousands of civilians have been killed in the conflict, while abuses such as sexual violence and forced recruitment of children to armed groups are widespread. Natural disasters compound the impact of violence, leaving the majority of Sudan’s population in urgent need of assistance. International humanitarian law is routinely violated, by restrictions on humanitarian access, attacks on aid workers, destruction of health facilities, and the weaponisation of hunger. The conflict has unleashed massive displacement, with millions forced to flee their homes both within Sudan and across borders, overwhelming neighbouring states and threatening to further destabilise the Horn of Africa.
Regional and international players back rival factions according to complex geostrategic interests in this resource-rich country on the Red Sea. These external alliances fuel the conflict, notably contributing to the proliferation of arms, and make it particularly difficult to achieve consensus or pursue a sustainable solution at the United Nations level. Several competing peacemaking initiatives have been launched with little progress, although a roadmap agreed on 12 September 2025 has raised cautious optimism among international mediators.
The European Union (EU) has intensified its humanitarian response and plays a leading role in coordinating peace initiatives. The European Parliament has consistently urged the EU and other stakeholders to maintain pressure on all parties to cease hostilities and to ensure that Sudanese civil society is genuinely included in dialogue towards a sustainable solution.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding the war in Sudan: The human cost of geopolitics‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tim Peters.

The European Parliament is fully committed to ensuring an ambitious European Union budget that meets the Union’s many challenges in the years to come. The European Commission presented its proposals for the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF) on 16 July 2025. The Commission proposes a budget amounting to a total of almost €1.8 trillion in commitments over seven years (in constant 2025 prices). The MFF constitutes the EU’s long-term budgetary plan setting a maximum level of spending (‘ceilings’) for each major category of expenditure (‘heading’) in accordance with Article 312 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

The proposed 2028-2034 budget corresponds to 1.26 % of the EU’s gross national income (GNI). This includes 0.11 % of EU GNI for the repayment of the debt created by NextGenerationEU (NGEU) grants. Excluding the NGEU repayment, the proposed post-2027 MFF reflects, in nominal terms, an increase of €367.2 billion (+29 %). However, in real terms, the increase is only 0.02 percentage points of GNI.

2028-2034 MFF overview

The national and regional partnership plans (NRPPs) proposed by the European Commission have proven particularly controversial throughout the European Parliament, as they are seen as a risk of ‘renationalising’ the EU budget. Parliament’s four pro-European groups have threatened to reject the Commission’s draft regulation on the NRPPs if it does not substantially amend its proposal.

An overview of the main components of the proposed 2028-2034 MFF and an initial comparison with the 2021-2027 budget framework illustrates the Commission’s proposed division of the €1.763 trillion in commitments, which Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) finds lacks ambition.

Academia, think tanks, other EU institutions and bodies, and a variety of stakeholders are publishing a wealth of analysis and commentary on the proposed 2028-2034 MFF as it proceeds through negotiations (see our monthly digest).

FURTHER READING:

• EU budget 2028-2034: Overview of the Commission’s proposal
• Background information on the post-2027 MFF
• Brief, up-to-date assessments on all legislative proposals of the MFF package: Legislative Train Schedule
• European Commission draft legislative proposals: The 2028-2034 EU budget for a stronger Europe

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Annastiina Papunen with Diogo Vieira Ferreira.

‘Delivered on all fronts’ was the main message from European Council President António Costa on the results of the 23 October European Council meeting. On defence, the European Council defined a timeline and priorities for achieving EU defence readiness in 2030 – the more immediate priorities being air defence and Europe’s eastern flank. On competitiveness, EU leaders strongly pushed the simplification agenda, and stressed the need for a competitive and pragmatic green transition and for decisive progress towards EU digital sovereignty. On Ukraine, however, the outcome was mixed: even though EU leaders adopted the 19th sanctions package against Russia, and committed to covering Ukraine’s financial needs for 2026-2027, they failed to agree on methods for doing so, postponing a decision on the matter to December 2025. In addition to the three core topics, the European Council discussed housing for the first time, stressing the need to focus on European citizens’ daily concerns and to launch complementary initiatives at EU level to promote affordable housing.

1.   General

The day of the European Council meeting began with pre-summits of European political parties, as well as plurilateral meetings such as the Nordic-Baltic-Irish-Polish meeting. As usual, the formal meeting itself started with an address by European Parliament President Roberta Metsola, who updated EU leaders on developments in Parliament, notably on the rejection of the negotiation mandate for the sustainability omnibus package, and assured them that Parliament would deliver nevertheless.

Slovenian Prime Minister Robert Golob, who had to cancel his attendance due to illness, was represented by French President Emmanuel Macron. Portuguese Prime Minister Luís Montenegro, who arrived late to the meeting due to a period of national mourning for the death of former Prime Minister Francisco Pinto Balsemão, was represented by Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who also arrived late because of a national holiday commemorating the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, was represented by Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico.

2.   European Council meeting Ukraine

The European Council conclusions only mention that EU leaders discussed the situation in Ukraine and had an exchange of views with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. For the fourth time, a separate text on Ukraine – ‘firmly supported’ by 26 Member States’, with Hungary refusing to endorse it – reiterates the ‘unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity’. The EU-26 pointed to Russia’s increased drone strikes targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, and urged a ‘full, unconditional and immediate ceasefire’, while repeating their support for ‘a comprehensive, just and lasting peace’ based on the principles of the UN Charter.

As Costa stated, the major focus was on Ukraine’s pressing financial needs for 2026-2027. EU leaders discussed at length the use of up to €140 billion of Russia’s immobilised assets for interest-free reparation loans to Ukraine, a plan backed by the UK and Canada. Belgium, which holds €183 billion of immobilised assets through Euroclear, sought guarantees on the mutualisation of the risks, but considered them insufficient, as no finalised proposal or legal basis for the use of these assets was provided. Thus, the Commission and the Council were asked to ‘work on the technical, legal and financial aspects of Europe’s support’, with a view to a decision at the December European Council meeting. The adopted text on Ukraine states that Russia’s assets ‘should remain immobilised until Russia ceases its war of aggression against Ukraine and compensates it for the damage caused by its war’. Separately, EU leaders stressed the importance of a distinct €14 billion of funding from the G7 through the ERA initiative to ensure coordination and burden-sharing.

The second topic was military needs. Since a Ukraine that is capable of defending itself effectively is seen as an integral part of any future security guarantees, EU leaders also called on Member States to continue addressing these needs, including ‘air defence, anti-drone systems and large-calibre ammunition’. They welcomed the ongoing revisions of the mandates of EUAM (EU civilian advisory mission in Ukraine) and EUMAM (European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine) to include cyber-defence and ‘strengthening Ukraine’s combat power by investing €2 billion in drones’.

Thirdly, EU leaders reaffirmed the EU’s determination to increase pressure on Russia and to further damage its war machine. Thus, they welcomed the adoption of the 19th sanctions package, which targets Russia’s oil revenues, gas, banks and crypto-currencies. Despite Hungary and Slovakia’s continued imports, the former decided to drop its objections to the gas ban, while the latter, after initially considering vetoing the sanctions, ultimately supported the 19th package, with conditions.

Fourthly, the 26 Member States agreed to reinforce anti-circumvention measures and to coordinate action to disrupt Russia’s shadow fleet.

Main message of the EP President: The EU continues to stand with Ukraine, welcomes the adoption of the 19th package of sanctions, and supports proper use of Russian frozen assets.

Middle East

The European Council met a day after the inaugural EU-Egypt summit in Brussels, and hailed both the agreement on the initial phase of the peace plan between the Israelis and Palestinians proposed by US President Trump and the outcome of the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit for Peace. They welcomed the immediate release of the hostages held by Hamas and called for unimpeded humanitarian access to Gaza. Costa confirmed that the EU ‘is fully committed to actively engage with all parties involved on the implementation of this Peace Plan’, while Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides stated that Cyprus was well-positioned to help in its implementation, notably with the Cyprus Maritime Corridor.

EU leaders also agreed that the EU missions EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS would be reinforced. Recalling previous conclusions, they called for de-escalation in the West Bank, notably in East Jerusalem, and an end to settler violence and to the expansion of illegal settlements, especially project E1. Moreover, the meeting reaffirmed the EU’s support for the Lebanese people and for the new government’s efforts to achieve stability, advocating a monopoly on weapons. On Syria, EU leaders emphasised a peaceful and inclusive political transition, free from foreign interference, guaranteeing the rights of Syrians from all ethnic and religious backgrounds, while ensuring reconstruction.

Main message of the EP President: The EU must be active to ensure stability in the Middle East, urging full implementation of the peace plan in Israel-Gaza, and avoid being ‘relegated to silence’.

European defence and security

As Costa emphasised after the meeting, the European Council reaffirmed its determination to ‘decisively ramp up Europe’s defence readiness by 2030’ and stressed the need for a 360 ° approach, allowing the EU to tackle both immediate as well as future threats, in full coherence with NATO. Condemning the violation of the airspace of several Member States, EU leaders stressed the importance of ensuring the defence of all EU land, air and maritime borders. With the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 as a building block, the European Council defined priorities and a timeline. Immediate priorities were set to tackle the EU’s most direct threats: i) anti-drone and air defence capabilities; and ii) the eastern flank. On the timeline, the European Council called on Member States to: 1) set up capability coalitions by the end of the year; and 2) advance on concrete projects to be launched in the first half of 2026, while implementing work on the priority areas at national level. Costa specified that ‘Member States will be in the driving seat to push our joint efforts forward’, and that the governance of and reporting on defence readiness would be increased, with ‘a bigger role for Ministers of defence’ and stronger involvement of the European Defence Agency.

The European Council also called on the Commission and the High Representative to put forward proposals to strengthen military mobility in the EU, and on the Commission to submit a roadmap for transforming the defence industry. On defence expenditure, it stressed that: i) Member States should orient their investment towards ‘joint development, production and procurement’; ii) an agreement should be found by the end of 2025 on the Defence Readiness Omnibus so as to simplify defence investment, while calling on the Commission to put forward ‘new proposals on simplification as soon as possible’; and iii) the European Investment Bank should ‘explore ways to finance industries and companies and help start-ups to scale up’ in the defence sector.

Competitiveness and the twin transition

Competitiveness was a central topic on the European Council agenda. EU leaders focused on three themes: i) simplification; ii) competitive green transition; and iii) sovereign digital transition. In a letter to EU leaders from 20 October, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen outlined the challenges and possible solutions.

Simplification, seen as crucial for EU competitiveness, dominated the debate. Ahead of the meeting, 19 EU leaders sent a letter to Costa requesting ‘a systematic review of all EU regulations to identify rules that are superfluous, excessive or unbalanced’ and an examination of the entire EU acquis to see if the rules were still ‘fit for purpose’, and calling for a special meeting on competitiveness in February 2026. Against this backdrop, the European Council urged an ‘ambitious and horizontally driven simplification and better regulation agenda at all levels – European, national and regional’, thereby following the simplicity-by-design approach while avoiding the creation of new administrative burdens. Furthermore, EU leaders requested the General Affairs Council to assess the Commission’s new work programme ‘in the light of these objectives’.

Regarding the ongoing omnibus simplification packages, EU leaders requested the co-legislators to accelerate the work and to swiftly adopt the sustainability omnibus package. On the latter, Metsola assured them that, if a majority ‘from the centre out’ was not possible, Parliament would ‘deliver regardless’. EU leaders called for further simplification packages in other areas, and for a review of the REACH Regulation.

‘The competitive green transition’ heading highlighted a shift in the approach to green issues, now emphasising the competitiveness angle. EU leaders insisted on the ‘urgent need to intensify collective efforts to ensure Europe’s industrial renewal, modernisation and decarbonisation in a technologically neutral manner’, while lowering energy prices. Discussing the EU’s intermediate climate target for 2040 ahead of COP30 in Brazil, EU leaders tasked the Environment Council meeting of 4 November with finding a pragmatic compromise that takes into account the realistic contribution of carbon removals, the uncertainties of natural removals and adds a revision clause. China’s move to restrict rare earths exports and its economic dumping were also discussed, but no united approach was agreed.

Reiterating previous conclusions on the need to advance Europe’s digital transformation, EU leaders took note of recent initiatives on artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum technology, calling for ambition. They discussed the protection of minors in the digital world, but did not set an age limit for the use of social media.

Housing

The high increase in house prices has created a pressing challenge across the EU, which Costa wanted EU leaders and the Tripartite Social Summit to discuss. As housing is a national competence, EU leaders considered possible support measures at EU level to complement national efforts, and asked the Commission to swiftly publish a European affordable housing plan.

Migration

Before the European Council meeting, 13 EU leaders met to discuss ‘innovative solutions’ on migration. The European Council itself spent little time on this topic, and it was not mentioned by either Costa or von der Leyen. The co-legislators were asked to ‘take work forward on relevant legislative proposals as a matter of priority’.

Moldova

As flagged up in the EPRS outlook, EU leaders addressed the elections in Moldova, pledging their support for the country’s resilience and stability. They reaffirmed the EU’s steadfast support for the Republic of Moldova on its accession path and welcomed the significant progress achieved so far.

Main message of the EP President: Roberta Metsola told EU leaders that ‘if we want to be ready for an enlarged European Union, we need to get serious about our own internal reforms’, hoping that Member States and institutions would finally have an ‘honest discussion on the topic’.

3.   Euro Summit

The Euro Summit, in inclusive format, discussed the current economic situation with European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde and Eurogroup President Paschal Donohoe. The summit statement reflects the topics raised by Donohoe in his letter to Costa (international role of the euro, digital euro, capital markets union, maintaining resilient public finances, and a stronger EU voice internationally).

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders, 23 October 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Pieter Baert.

As many women and girls continue to face barriers in accessing affordable menstrual products, menstrual poverty remains a significant socioeconomic issue. To combat it, the EU Value Added Tax (VAT) Directive now allows Member States to apply reduced or zero VAT rates to sanitary products. On 4 November 2025, the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Tax Matters (FISC) will hold a public hearing on this issue in light of the Parliament’s Gender Equality Week.

VAT rates on feminine hygiene products

Over the years, the tax cost of menstrual products has been a topic of growing public debate. Since these products are used exclusively by women, the issue has drawn attention for its gendered economic impact. Advocates of lowering or removing VAT on menstrual products argue that the tax places an unfair, systematic financial burden on women, and contributes to menstrual poverty. Unlike other consumer products, these goods are considered a biological necessity rather than a matter of choice.

In April 2022, a revision of the EU VAT Directive introduced greater flexibility for Member States to reduce VAT rates on female sanitary products. This change allowed Member States to lower the VAT rate to as little as 0 %, compared with the previous minimum rate of 5 % (Annex III, paragraph 3). The European Parliament urged Member States to take advantage of this increased flexibility. However, while several Member States have since reduced their VAT rates on such goods, levels remain divergent.

VAT rate on tampons (EU, July 2025)

Tax policy experts are generally cautious about VAT rate reductions, citing the likelihood for suppliers to bypass these reductions by increasing their profit margins instead. However, a recent study by academics from the Vienna University of Economics and Business, which looked at VAT rate cuts on menstrual products in Belgium, Germany, France and Austria, found that the tax reduction had been fully passed on to consumers over time. Moreover, low-income households had increased their purchase volume of menstrual products, highlighting the potential of such reforms to improve access for disadvantaged groups. Another recent study examining Germany’s 2020 VAT rate reduction on female hygiene products found that the tax cut was fully passed on to consumers, suggesting a perfectly inelastic demand. The VAT rate cut was estimated to have cost Germany 0.02 % of VAT revenue.

While reducing VAT rates can be one approach to making female hygiene products more affordable, some Member States and local governments have chosen to provide these goods for free in schools, public restrooms and other public spaces.

Gender-based price discrimination

A related phenomenon is that of gender-based price discrimination. Although not an explicit tax issue as such, this refers to the situation where women sometimes incur extra costs for products and services marketed to them compared with similar items for men, with the products differing often only in superficial aspects, such as colour, name or description. Common examples include shampoo, razors and hairdressing services. While no comprehensive EU-wide research has been conducted to assess the prevalence of such practices, a study by the German Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency examined over 1 500 products in Germany and found that female variants were priced higher in 2.3 % of cases, while male variants were more expensive in 1.4 % of cases.

EU Directive 2004/113 already prohibits discrimination in access to goods and services based on gender. In 2023, in an answer to a parliamentary question, the European Commission said it had no plans at the time to introduce additional measures in that directive to address gender price discrimination.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘VAT policy and menstrual poverty in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens are calling on the European Union to boost the European railway sector. Many citizens have written to the European Parliament’s Transport Committee on this subject since October 2025, asking for more subsidies for railways, the development of high-speed rail networks and tax reductions for rail.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the Transport Committee.

EU support for rail travel

One goal of the European Union’s (EU) Green Deal is to reduce emissions in the transport sector by 90 % by 2050.

To achieve this, the EU has adopted a sustainable and smart mobility strategy and an action plan for rail to boost long-distance and cross-border travel. The action plan aims to double high-speed rail traffic by 2030 and treble it by 2050, using targeted investments, standardisation of European rail systems and better connectivity for rural and remote regions.

In 2023, the European Commission proposed new rules to better manage railway tracks, increase reliability and help reduce transport-related emissions. The European Parliament adopted its position on the proposal in 2024.

In 2025, the EU invested €2.8 billion through its Connecting Europe Facility programme, mostly for rail, to modernise the railways and improve cross-border transport across the trans-European transport network (TEN‑T).

In 2025, the Commission announced it would develop a sustainable transport investment plan to support cleaner transport in Europe. One of the aims is to encourage more people to use the railways.

European Parliament position

In June 2025, the European Parliament addressed railway transport in the EU in two separate resolutions.

In the first resolution, Parliament said that road, rail and maritime (sea) transport links needed to be developed through EU co-funded programmes, to reduce the isolation of rural areas and facilitate the sustainable mobility of people and goods. In the second resolution, Parliament regretted the shortage of viable cross-border measures, including high-speed railways, that are essential for completing the TEN‑T network.

In an earlier resolution adopted in 2022, Parliament recognised the crucial role of rail in decarbonising mobility. It supported the EU’s sustainable and smart mobility strategy and welcomed the Commission’s action plan.

Aviation fuel tax exemption

In 2021, as part of the Green Deal, the Commission tabled a proposal to review the Energy Taxation Directive. The proposal would remove the mandatory tax exemption for aviation (aeroplane) fuels.

The proposal is subject to the ‘special legislative procedure’, which means the European Parliament is only consulted, and national governments must reach unanimous agreement in the Council. So far, the national governments have not reached an agreement. Further information is available in this briefing from the European Parliament’s Research Service.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Sidonia Mazur, updated on 23 October 2025.

On 22 October 2025, Parliament voted on amendments to the Council’s position and thus adopted its reading of the Union budget for 2026, aiming at a higher budget that better matches the EU’s key priorities than the European Commission’s draft. Parliament proposes an overall level of commitments at €193.9 billion and €192.6 billion in payments, including special instruments such as the Ukraine Facility or European Solidarity Reserve. To reach an agreement, a 21-day conciliation period runs until 17 November 2025. These negotiations aim at finding a compromise between Parliament and Council, without which the Commission will need to present a new budget proposal.

Background – 2026 budget procedure

The European Parliament is one of the two arms of the European Union’s budgetary authority, the Council being the other. The two institutions, assisted by the European Commission, decide on the budget in the annual EU budget procedure, within the limits of the long-term EU budget – the multiannual financial framework (MFF). Although it is the Commission’s right and duty to propose a draft budget for the upcoming year, the two arms of the EU budgetary authority, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU, play their part in the run-up to its presentation by submitting their views. The Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) agreed on its guidelines for the 2026 EU budget on 18 February 2025. The European Parliament adopted its guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III, on 2 April 2025.

On 9 July 2025, the Commission adopted the 2026 draft EU budget (DB). The Commission proposed 2026 EU budget commitments of €193.26 billion, and €192.20 billion in payments. The Commission in its General introduction to the DB underlined that ‘the draft budget 2026 will continue to provide the necessary funding for the agreed priorities of the Union, but the limited remaining availabilities leave virtually no space for any further unforeseen events or new initiatives’.

The Council adopted its position on the 2026 draft budget on 5 September, proposing to cut the proposed commitments by €1.3 billion and payments by €696.7 million.

Parliament’s rapporteur for the 2026 budget, Andrzej Halicki (EPP, Poland), presented his analysis of the Commission’s proposals and his assessment of the Council’s position in two working documents.

Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) adopted amendments to the Council’s position on 6 October, and adopted an explanatory motion for a resolution on 13 October. BUDG set the overall level of commitments at €193.9 billion and payments at €192.6 billion, thereby restoring the 2026 draft budget appropriations on all lines cut by the Council. Moreover, BUDG proposed specific increases ‘to boost research, competitiveness, and defence’ for:

• Horizon Europe;
• transport and energy networks;
• support for small and medium-sized enterprises;
• health (EU4Health);
• education and youth (Erasmus+);
• Creative Europe;
• the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme;
• the European Social Fund Plus;
• young farmers;
• the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund, including the wine sector;
• the LIFE programme;
• the Civil Protection Mechanism;
• the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund;
• the Border Management and Visa Instrument;
• military mobility;
• the Southern Neighbourhood;
• the Eastern Neighbourhood; and
• humanitarian aid.

The BUDG committee drew attention to the fact that repayment of the EU Recovery Instrument (EURI) borrowing costs is a legal obligation for the Union and a non-discretionary expenditure item in the EU budget; and stressed that the Council cuts in sub-heading 2b are particularly disconcerting, as the only motivation is to use the money to cover the financing cost of the Recovery Instrument. The committee also remarked that the most affected programmes – Horizon Europe, CEF digital and Erasmus+ – are flagship Union programmes.

The Commission published Amending letter No 1/2026 on 8 October, lowering draft 2026 budget expenditure by €386.1 million in commitments and by almost €1.89 billion in payments. On 22 October 2025, Parliament voted on amendments to the Council’s position and thus adopted its reading of the Union budget for 2026 in line with the Committee on Budgets’ position.

Next steps

Parliament’s adoption of amendments to the Council’s position has triggered a conciliation procedure. The Conciliation Committee will seek to reach a compromise between Parliament and Council. The 21-day conciliation period will run until 17 November 2025, with the first conciliation meeting scheduled for 4 November. If conciliation fails to result in an agreement, the Commission is obliged to present a new draft budget.

Further reading

• For Parliament’s reading of 2026 budget see: Parliament’s reading of the 2026 EU budget
• For key issues in EU budget see the EPRS flagship publication: Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2025
• For key dates see: Timeline for the three key EU budgetary procedures in 2025
• For Parliament’s guidelines for the 2026 budget: Parliament’s guidelines for the 2025 EU budget; Section III – European Commission
• For more on Parliament’s role in the EU annual budgetary procedure see: Annual EU budgetary procedure: An introduction to the steps in the European Parliament

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This blogpost is an update of a publication of 23 June 2025.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

The United States (US) Defense Industrial Base (DIB) is the world’s largest, comprising over 60 000 companies and 1.17 million employees. It is dominated by five major corporations – Lockheed Martin, RTX, General Dynamics, Boeing and Northrop Grumman – which together account for around one third of US Department of Defense (DoD) contracts and half of the revenue of the top 100 defence companies in the world. While the DIB sustains US technological dominance, it faces challenges linked to market consolidation, supply chain resilience and workforce shortages. The 2023 Biden administration’s National Defense Industrial Strategy seeks to address these issues, among other things, through enhanced supply chain resilience, workforce development and flexible acquisition. However, experts expect vast changes, including for the DIB, in strategy under the new Trump administration’s national defence strategy that is currently being developed.

By contrast, the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) remains fragmented, and has been under-invested in for decades. In 2024, EU defence spending reached €343 billion, roughly 2.5 times less than the US level (around €864 billion in 2024), with a large part of procurement sourced from the US. The 2024 European defence industrial strategy and the European defence industry programme aim to strengthen European defence industrial sovereignty, promote collaborative procurement, and emphasise a ‘Buy European’ approach. The European Parliament supports close EU–US cooperation but insists that EU programmes must primarily reinforce the EDTIB and increase strategic autonomy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘United States Defense Industrial Base: How does it differ from the European defence technological and industrial base?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.