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This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

- Agenda / Roumanie, Région parisienne

- Agenda / Albanie, France - Régions

- Agenda / Albanie, France - Régions

Au début du 18e siècle, la France, la Suède et l'Empire ottoman nouent un réseau d'alliances où la diplomatie ouvre la voie à l'imaginaire. À travers peintures, dessins, estampes et aquarelles, l'exposition explore ces circulations artistiques et culturelles.
Au 18ᵉ siècle, les relations entre Occident et Orient s'apaisent après de longs siècles marqués par les conflits armés. La France, la Suède et l'Empire ottoman s'allient contre les ennemis communs que sont la Russie et l'Autriche. Les (…)

- Agenda

Lors de cet atelier, nous étudierons des airs et des chants de la région élargie d'Asie Mineure et la manière dont le répertoire correspondant a été intégré et domestiqué, principalement dans les îles du nord-est de la mer Égée et des Cyclades.
À travers le répertoire et la pratique, nous étudierons les points communs et les différences stylistiques de ces régions spécifiques. Parallèlement, l'analyse des chants et des airs nous permettra d'identifier les caractéristiques (développement (…)

- Agenda / France - Régions, Turquie

The Council gave its final green light to new EU rules enabling more effective returns for those with no right to stay in the EU.

Amid democratic backsliding, Generation Z (GenZ1) protests have emerged as major regime challengers. Yet, social movements do not mobilize in isolation. They draw from and collaborate with a larger ecosystem of civil society organizations (CSOs). This policy brief looks at the cases of Kenya and Madagascar, where GenZ movements and CSOs initially played complementary roles. Yet, in Madagascar, the movement parted ways with CSOs quickly after the protests ended. In Kenya, collaboration prevailed, even though frictions appeared in GenZ groups. The brief concludes that social movements draw their legitimacy from acting autonomously from CSOs, the state and donors. Donor support should focus on pro-democratic CSOs who work complementarily and can translate demands into concrete reform proposals.

Amid democratic backsliding, Generation Z (GenZ1) protests have emerged as major regime challengers. Yet, social movements do not mobilize in isolation. They draw from and collaborate with a larger ecosystem of civil society organizations (CSOs). This policy brief looks at the cases of Kenya and Madagascar, where GenZ movements and CSOs initially played complementary roles. Yet, in Madagascar, the movement parted ways with CSOs quickly after the protests ended. In Kenya, collaboration prevailed, even though frictions appeared in GenZ groups. The brief concludes that social movements draw their legitimacy from acting autonomously from CSOs, the state and donors. Donor support should focus on pro-democratic CSOs who work complementarily and can translate demands into concrete reform proposals.

Amid democratic backsliding, Generation Z (GenZ1) protests have emerged as major regime challengers. Yet, social movements do not mobilize in isolation. They draw from and collaborate with a larger ecosystem of civil society organizations (CSOs). This policy brief looks at the cases of Kenya and Madagascar, where GenZ movements and CSOs initially played complementary roles. Yet, in Madagascar, the movement parted ways with CSOs quickly after the protests ended. In Kenya, collaboration prevailed, even though frictions appeared in GenZ groups. The brief concludes that social movements draw their legitimacy from acting autonomously from CSOs, the state and donors. Donor support should focus on pro-democratic CSOs who work complementarily and can translate demands into concrete reform proposals.

Alle registrierten Datennutzer*innen können die neueste Datenedition v42 (DOI: 10.5684/soep.core.v42eu) ab sofort über unser Online-Bestellformular bestellen.   Auf Deutsch: http://www.diw.de/SOEPbestellungAuf Englisch: http://www.diw.de/SOEPorder Die wichtigsten Neuigkeiten für die v42: ...

Alle registrierten Datennutzer*innen können die neueste Datenedition v42 (DOI: 10.5684/soep.core.v42eu) ab sofort über unser Online-Bestellformular bestellen.   Auf Deutsch: http://www.diw.de/SOEPbestellungAuf Englisch: http://www.diw.de/SOEPorder Die wichtigsten Neuigkeiten für die v42: ...

Spokespersons for Parliament and for the political groups will hold a briefing on the 5 – 8 October plenary session, on Friday at 11.00 in Parliament’s Anna Politkovskaya press room.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Alessia ist seit 2025 Doktorandin an der Berlin School of Economics und dem DIW Graduate Center und verstärkt unser Team in der Abteilung Kriminalität, Arbeit und Ungleichheit als wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin. Sie hat ihren M.Sc. in Economic and Social Sciences an der Bocconi-Universität in ...

Newsletter - 5-8 October 2026 - Strasbourg plenary session

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP