This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.
Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.
Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.
Au début du 18e siècle, la France, la Suède et l'Empire ottoman nouent un réseau d'alliances où la diplomatie ouvre la voie à l'imaginaire. À travers peintures, dessins, estampes et aquarelles, l'exposition explore ces circulations artistiques et culturelles.
Au 18ᵉ siècle, les relations entre Occident et Orient s'apaisent après de longs siècles marqués par les conflits armés. La France, la Suède et l'Empire ottoman s'allient contre les ennemis communs que sont la Russie et l'Autriche. Les (…)
Lors de cet atelier, nous étudierons des airs et des chants de la région élargie d'Asie Mineure et la manière dont le répertoire correspondant a été intégré et domestiqué, principalement dans les îles du nord-est de la mer Égée et des Cyclades.
À travers le répertoire et la pratique, nous étudierons les points communs et les différences stylistiques de ces régions spécifiques. Parallèlement, l'analyse des chants et des airs nous permettra d'identifier les caractéristiques (développement (…)
Zwei Wochen nach Einführung des Tankrabatts zieht Wettbewerbsexperte Tomaso Duso, Leiter der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte im Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), Zwischenbilanz. Täglich verfolgt der Tankrabatt-Monitor des DIW Berlin die Preisentwicklung für Benzin und Diesel an den Tankstellen.
Nach zwei Wochen Tankrabatt zeigt sich in unserem Tankrabatt-Monitor, dass nur rund zwei Drittel der Preissenkung von 16,7 Cent bei den Verbraucher*innen ankommen. Seit dem 1. Oktober sind die Preise in Deutschland im Durchschnitt um 10 bis 11 Cent je Liter stärker gesunken als in Frankreich, wo es keinen Rabatt gibt.
Noch deutlicher ist die Entwicklung über die Zeit. In den ersten Tagen sind die Preise um rund 12 Cent stärker gefallen als in Frankreich, beim Diesel um bis zu 13,6 Cent. Die Weitergabe ist über die Zeit kleiner geworden und liegt seit dem 8. Oktober bei durchschnittlich nur noch 9 Cent. Auch beim Tankrabatt im Frühjahr hat die sie mit der Zeit nachgelassen, damals allerdings erst gegen Ende.
Wie viel genau ankommt, hängt auch davon ab, welchen Tag vor dem Rabatt man als Referenzpunkt nimmt. Vergleicht man die Entwicklung mit dem 27. September statt mit dem 30. September, liegt die Weitergabe bei über 80 Prozent, da die Preise in Deutschland schon im September stärker gefallen sind als in Frankreich. An der Entwicklung seit dem 1. Oktober ändert der Vergleichstag aber nichts: Die Weitergabe nimmt ab.
Die Steuersenkung kommt zuerst bei Raffinerien und Großhändlern an. Ob sie weitergegeben wird, hängt vom Wettbewerb auf dieser Stufe ab. Und dort gibt es deutliche Hinweise, dass der Wettbewerb schwach ist. Das Bundeskartellamt sollte seine Untersuchungen auf der Raffinerie- und Großhandelsstufe konsequent fortführen, denn der dortige mangelnde Wettbewerb ist nicht nur in Zeiten des Tankrabatts ein Problem.