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Conformément aux déclarations de candidatures validées pour les élections communales du 11 janvier 2026, la liste des élus (titulaires et suppléants) a été établie par commune et arrondissement. Voici la liste par département rendue publique par la Commission électorale nationale autonome (CENA).

Un texte publié récemment au Journal officiel Journal officiel vient poser un cadre inédit pour encourager les start-up, les projets innovants et les structures d’accompagnement. […]

L’article Jusqu’à 3 millions DA à la clé : une nouvelle récompense présidentielle actée par décret est apparu en premier sur .

L’Office national de la météorologie (ONM) a émis mardi une alerte de vigilance accrue en raison d’une tempête d’une forte intensité. Cette perturbation, marquée par […]

L’article Vents violents : Air Algérie et Domestic Airlines perturbées, plusieurs vols annulés est apparu en premier sur .

A l'instar de la dernière mandature de la décentralisation, le prochain conseil municipal de la mairie d'Abomey-Calavi, sera dirigé par un conseiller élu sur la liste du parti Union progressiste le renouveau (UP-R). La formation politique de la mouvance présidentielle arrive en tête au terme des élections communales du 11 janvier 2026, avec 30 sièges sur 49.

Attendus depuis quelques jours, les résultats des élections communales et municipales du 11 janvier 2026, ont été proclamés dans la soirée de ce mardi 27 janvier 2026, par la Commission électorale nationale autonome (CENA). A Abomey-Calavi, dans le département de l'Atlantique, le parti Union progressiste le renouveau, majoritaire à l'échelle nationale avec 39 mairies, remporte le plus grands nombre de conseillers municipaux, et totalise 30 conseillers contre 19 pour le parti Bloc républicain (BR).
Une majorité écrasante qui lui permet de prendre le contrôle de l'équipe municipale.

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La route des Balkans reste toujours l'une des principales voies d'accès l'Union européenne, pour les exilés du Proche et du Moyen Orient, d'Afrique ou d'Asie. Alors que les frontières Schengen se ferment, Frontex se déploie dans les Balkans, qui sont toujours un « sas d'accès » à la « forteresse Europe ». Notre fil d'infos en continu.

- Le fil de l'Info / Bosnie-Herzégovine, Albanie, Kosovo, Bulgarie, Questions européennes, Populations, minorités et migrations, Migrants Balkans, Courrier des Balkans, Croatie, Turquie, Grèce, Moldavie, Macédoine du Nord, Monténégro, Slovénie, Roumanie, Serbie, Gratuit, Grèce immigration

La route des Balkans reste toujours l'une des principales voies d'accès l'Union européenne, pour les exilés du Proche et du Moyen Orient, d'Afrique ou d'Asie. Alors que les frontières Schengen se ferment, Frontex se déploie dans les Balkans, qui sont toujours un « sas d'accès » à la « forteresse Europe ». Notre fil d'infos en continu.

- Le fil de l'Info / Bosnie-Herzégovine, Albanie, Kosovo, Bulgarie, Questions européennes, Populations, minorités et migrations, Migrants Balkans, Courrier des Balkans, Croatie, Turquie, Grèce, Moldavie, Macédoine du Nord, Monténégro, Slovénie, Roumanie, Serbie, Gratuit, Grèce immigration

From construction and hotel workers to kitchen and restaurant staff—estimates of the numbers of Myanmar migrants living in Thailand range up to six million, with a surge of new arrivals since the 2021 military coup. Many are building new lives in the vast metropolis of Bangkok, ranked by the UN among the world’s top 15 […]

Le Bloc Républicain (BR) prend le contrôle de 38 communes sur les 77 que compte le pays. Les résultats des élections communales ont été proclamés ce mardi 27 janvier 2026 par la Commission électorale nationale autonome.

Le BR consolide son implantation territoriale à travers plusieurs départements, aussi bien dans le Nord que dans le Centre et le Sud du pays. Les 38 communes contrôlées par le Bloc Républicain sont : Banikora, Gogounou, Boukoumbé, Cobly, Kérou, Matéri, Natitingou, Ouassa-Péhunco, Allada, Zè, Bembéréké, Kalalé, N'Dali, Nikki, Parakou, Pèrèrè, Sinendé, Tchaourou, Bantè, Glazoué, Ouèssè, Savè, Aplahoué, Dogbo, Klouékanmè, Lalo, Toviklin, Bassila, Copargo, Djougou, Ouaké, Houéyogbé, Lokossa, Aguégués, Akpro-Missérété, Bonou, Porto-Novo et Adja-Ouèrè.

Cette répartition montre une forte présence du Bloc Républicain dans les départements de l'Atacora, de la Donga, du Borgou, de l'Alibori, avec notamment la conquête de Porto-Novo, capitale politique du pays, qui constitue un symbole politique majeur. L'Union Progressiste le Renouveau conserve une position dominante dans le reste du pays notamment dans 39 communes.

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La Commission électorale nationale autonome (CENA) a proclamé, ce mardi 27 janvier 2026, les résultats officiels des élections communales du 11 janvier 2026 au Bénin. À l'issue de ce scrutin, l'Union Progressiste le Renouveau (UP-R) s'impose en prenant le contrôle de 39 communes sur les 77 que compte le pays.

Selon les chiffres rendus publics par la CENA, l'UP-R contrôle notamment plusieurs grandes communes stratégiques, dont Cotonou, Abomey-Calavi, Ouidah, Dassa-Zoumè, Savalou et Abomey. Les 39 communes contrôlées par l'UP-R sont : Kandi, Karimama, Malanville, Ségbana, Kouandé, Tanguiéta, Toucountouna, Abomey-Calavi, Kpomassè, Ouidah, So-Ava, Toffo, Tori-Bossito, Dassa-Zoumè, Savalou, Djakotomey, Cotonou, Athiémé, Bopa, Comè, Grand-Popo, Adjarra, Adjohoun, Avrankou, Dangbo, Sèmè-Podji, Ifangni, Kétou, Pobè, Sakété, Abomey, Agbangnizoun, Bohicon, Covè, Djidja, Ouinhi, Za-Kpota, Zagnanado et Zogbodomey.

Cette répartition place l'UP-R à 39 communes sur 77, soit plus de la moitié des collectivités territoriales, lui offrant une position stratégique dans la gestion de la gouvernance locale pour les prochaines années.
Le Bloc Républicain de son côté s'impose dans les 38 autres communes. Ce qui témoigne d'un équilibre politique presque parfait entre les deux grands partis de la mouvance présidentielle.

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Dans le département de l'Ouémé, l'Union Progressiste le Renouveau (UP-R) s'impose largement en tête avec 111 sièges, contre 88 pour le Bloc Républicain (BR). Malgré cette domination départementale de l'UP-R, la capitale du pays bascule sous le contrôle du Bloc Républicain.

À Porto-Novo, le Bloc Républicain obtient 18 sièges contre 15 pour l'UP-R et prend ainsi la tête du Conseil communal.
Dans plusieurs communes de l'Ouémé, l'UP-R confirme sa suprématie :
Adjarra : UP-R 13 sièges contre 6 pour le BR
Adjohoun : UP-R 13 sièges contre 6 pour le BR
Avrankou : UP-R 17 sièges contre 8 pour le BR
Dangbo : UP-R 12 sièges contre 7 pour le BR
Sèmè-Podji : UP-R 21 sièges contre 12 pour le BR

Voici les communes où le BR s'impose

Aguégués : BR 8 sièges contre 5 pour l'UP-R
Akpro-Missérété : BR 14 sièges contre 11 pour l'UP-R
Bonou : BR 9 sièges contre 4 pour l'UP-R
Porto-Novo : BR 18 sièges contre 15 pour l'UP-R

Si l'UP-R ressort comme le grand vainqueur dans l'ensemble du département de l'Ouémé en nombre de sièges, le Bloc Républicain réalise une performance politique majeure en remportant Porto-Novo, capitale du Bénin.

À Cotonou, département du Littoral, l'Union Progressiste le Renouveau (UP-R) s'impose largement en tête et confirme sa domination politique sur la capitale économique.

Selon les chiffres rendus publics par la CENA ce mardi, l'UP-R a remporté 34 sièges sur l'ensemble des postes à pourvoir dans la commune de Cotonou, contre 15 pour le Bloc Républicain (BR). Ce résultat place sans équivoque l'Union Progressiste le Renouveau en position majoritaire au sein du conseil communal. Cette victoire traduit une fois de plus l'ancrage solide de l'UP-R à Cotonou, où le parti conserve une influence politique déterminante.

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Après la reprise du contrôle du camp d'Al-Hol par l'armée syrienne, des dizaines de femmes et d'enfants originaires des Balkans, notamment de Bosnie-Herzégovine, vivent dans l'incertitude. Les espoirs de rapatriement s'éloignent, tandis que les ONG dénoncent les conditions de détention.

- Le fil de l'Info / Balkans Syrie, Relations internationales, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Populations, minorités et migrations, Radio Slobodna Evropa, Une - Diaporama - En premier, Une - Diaporama

La Commission électorale nationale autonome (CENA) a proclamé, ce mardi 27 janvier 2026, les résultats officiels des élections communales et municipales du 11 janvier 2026 au Bénin. Dans le département de l'Atlantique, l'Union progressiste le renouveau (UP-R) sort grand vainqueur du scrutin avec un total de 133 sièges, confirmant ainsi sa large domination politique dans cette partie du pays.

Abomey-Calavi, l'une des plus grandes communes du département de l'Atlantique bascule nettement sous le contrôle de l'UP-R. Le parti y obtient 30 sièges contre 19 pour le Bloc Républicain (BR), s'assurant la majorité au sein du Conseil communal. Une victoire stratégique dans cette commune à forte densité démographique.

Les résultats montrent également la nette suprématie de l'UP-R dans plusieurs autres communes du département.

À Kpomassè, l'UP-R rafle 15 sièges contre seulement 2 pour le BR.

À Ouidah, le parti obtient 22 sièges contre 7 pour le Bloc Républicain.

À Sô-Ava, l'UP-R totalise 16 sièges contre 9 pour le BR.

À Toffo, l'UP-R gagne 14 sièges contre 11 pour le BR.

À Tori-Bossito, l'UP-R s'impose largement avec 12 sièges contre 3 pour le Bloc Républicain.

Ces différentes performances permettent à l'Union progressiste le renouveau de consolider son ancrage dans la majorité des communes du département de l'Atlantique et d'y affirmer son leadership politique.

Le Bloc Républicain a réussi à tirer son épingle du jeu dans deux communes. À Allada, le BR obtient 13 sièges contre 12 pour l'UP-R. Même configuration à Zè, où le Bloc Républicain s'impose également avec 13 sièges contre 12 pour l'UP-R.

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Le parti Union progressiste le renouveau (UP-R), majoritaire au terme des élections communales du 11 janvier 2026, aura le contrôle de 39 Conseils communaux sur les 77 que compte le Bénin, selon les résultats proclamés par le Commission électorale nationale autonome (CENA), ce mardi 27 janvier 2026.

Les résultats des élections communales du 11 janvier 2026, sont désormais disponibles. La Commission électorale nationale autonome a situé les candidats et toute la population béninoise dans la soirée de ce mardi 27 janvier 2026. Ces résultats accordent la majorité au parti Union progressiste le renouveau qui obtient sur le plan national, 1 328 475 voix, contre 1 206 390 voix pour le Bloc républicain (BR). Ces deux formations politiques de la mouvance présidentielle, conformément aux dispositions de l'article 180 du Code électoral se partagent les conseils communaux des 77 communes du Bénin.
L'UP-R selon la CENA, a remporté la majorité dans 39 communes dont il pourra diriger les conseils communaux, contre 38 pour le Bloc républicain.
Les deux autres formations politiques ayant participé à cette élection à savoir, le MOELE BENIN et la Force cauris pour un Bénin émergent (FCBE), n'ont pu atteindre le seuil légal de 10% au plan national, et donc disqualifiés pour être éligibles à l'attribution des sièges.

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By CIVICUS
Jan 28 2026 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS speaks to the Business and Human Rights Centre (BHRC) about labour rights abuses in Myanmar’s garment industry since the 2021 military coup.

Myanmar’s garment sector, which employs hundreds of thousands of workers, is in deep crisis. Since the coup, labour protections have collapsed, independent unions have been dismantled and workers who try to organise face intimidation, dismissal and arrest. Inside factories, reports show multiple cases of child labour, forced overtime, harassment, poverty wages and unsafe conditions. At the same time, rising living costs and US tariffs are pushing many workers further into insecurity as factories close and layoffs become more common. Garment workers, most of them women, are trapped between exploitation, repression and a rapidly shrinking industry.

How have conditions inside Myanmar’s garment factories changed since the coup?

Our monitoring between February 2021 and October 2024 shows a sharp rise in both the number and severity of pre-existing labour rights abuses. Since the coup, factory employers have increasingly worked with the military to restrict organising and silence workers. This collaboration has led to threats, arrests and violent attacks against workers. In one case, security forces carried out joint military and police raids on the homes of workers who demanded unpaid wages and limits on overtime.

Factories have also expanded surveillance. Workers report invasive searches, phone confiscation and installation of CCTV inside factories, including near toilets. Employers also force workers to lie during audits. These practices aim to hide abuses and have exacerbated the abuses workers already faced.

What abuses do garment workers suffer in the workplace?

Factories force workers to meet extreme production targets through excessive and often unpaid overtime. Many workers must stay overnight until dawn, often without enough food, water or ventilation, leading to exhaustion and health problems. Managers threaten and abuse workers who refuse to work overtime or fail to meet targets. We have documented a case where supervisors denied workers food and water as punishment for not meeting targets.

Health and safety conditions have worsened. Workers report dirty, insufficient toilets, poor food quality and unsafe drinking water. They’ve also reported blocked emergency exits, inadequate ventilation and leaking roofs that put lives at risk. Factory-provided transport creates further dangers, as they are often overcrowded and suffer frequent road accidents. In one case, a major crash involving a worker shuttle left several workers badly hurt, including one who needed abdominal surgery.

Women workers face particularly severe abuses, including hair-pulling, physical assault, sexual harassment and verbal attacks. In one case, supervisors punched and kicked women workers and called them ‘dogs’.

What happen to workers who try to speak out or organise?

Workers who dare speak out face brutal reprisals. After the military declared 16 labour unions and labour rights organisations illegal, arrests, home raids and surveillance increased, particularly against union leaders and activists linked to the Civil Disobedience Movement. The movement began after the coup and brings together workers who refuse to cooperate with military rule through strikes and other forms of non-violent resistance.

Inside factories, employers threaten and dismiss union leaders on false grounds. In one case, a factory reopened and refused to reinstate union members and publicly humiliated them. Employers have also created Workplace Coordination Committees to replace independent unions, denying workers the right to choose their representatives and silencing their complaints. Prominent union leaders such as Myo Myo Aye have been arrested multiple times simply for continuing to organise.

What should international brands be doing in this context?

Under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, brands operating in conflict settings must carry out heightened, conflict-sensitive due diligence and demonstrate, with independent and verifiable evidence, that it works. In Myanmar’s current context, where surveillance and violent repression run through all the supply chain, this standard is exceptionally hard to meet.

Any brand that stays must deliver clear and demonstrable improvements in working conditions. Brands that can’t meet this threshold must carry out a responsible exit, working with workers and their representatives and taking steps to reduce harm, rather than adding to the instability garment workers already face under military rule.

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SEE ALSO
Myanmar’s junta tightens its grip CIVICUS Lens 12.Dec.2025
Historic wins and hard truths at International Labour Conference CIVICUS Lens 27.Jun.2025
Business and Human Rights Treaty: a decade of struggle for corporate accountability CIVICUS Lens 08.Mar.2025

 

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Carlos Ruiz Massieu, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, briefs reporters at UN Headquarters. Credit: UN Photo/Evan Schneider

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Jan 28 2026 (IPS)

As Haiti’s Transitional President Council (TPC) approaches its February 7 expiration date and the country remains without a newly elected president, humanitarian experts warn the nation risks further sliding into insecurity, raising fears of broader collapse.

The United Nations (UN) notes that escalating violence by entrenched armed coalitions, persisting impunity for human rights abuses, political instability, and mass civilian displacement are straining aid operations to their breaking point, leaving millions with dwindling access to essential services and pushing hopes for stability and national self-sufficiency further out of reach.

“Violence has intensified and expanded geographically, exacerbating food insecurity and instability, as transitional governance arrangements near expiry and overdue elections remain urgent,” said UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres in his latest report on the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH). “Gang violence affects communities nationwide, with particularly devastating consequences for women, children and youth, undermining the country’s social fabric over the long term.”

Currently, it is estimated that armed gangs now exert near-total control over approximately 90 percent of Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, as well as large parts of the surrounding provinces, severely undermining government authority and humanitarian operations. Presidential elections have not been held in a decade, and ongoing political instability, coupled with the continual adaptive reshaping of gang networks, has made establishing security increasingly difficult.

Gangs continue to launch coordinated attacks, seize control of critical economic corridors and agricultural areas, and drive mass displacement—exhausting both law enforcement and humanitarian systems. In 2025, Haiti’s murder rate rose by roughly 20 percent compared with the previous year, with Guterres informing reporters that more than 8,100 killings were recorded across Haiti between January and November 2025.

Child trafficking and recruitment have surged, with children and youth now making up roughly 50 percent of all gang members. They are being forced into a range of roles and to participate in violent attacks. Sexual violence – particularly against women and girls- has also escalated sharply, leaving deep and lasting trauma for survivors with limited access to psychosocial support, while perpetrators face widespread impunity.

Approximately 6.4 million people—more than half of Haiti’s population—are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. The World Food Programme (WFP) warns that a record 5.7 million people are currently facing acute hunger, which is expected to rise to 5.9 million by March without prompt intervention. This hunger crisis is largely driven by rampant insecurity across key transport routes and agricultural regions, which has severely disrupted crop production and movement to markets. Food prices remain extremely high and increasingly beyond reach for many households.

Civilians continue to live in overcrowded, unsanitary shelters marked by widespread malnutrition, disease outbreaks, limited access to clean water, and escalating insecurity, with women and children being disproportionately impacted. Additionally, internal displacement has reached record highs, with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimating that roughly 1.4 million Haitians are internally displaced, including over 741,000 children.

At Jean Marie César School, now serving as a displacement site in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, UNICEF continues to provide psychosocial activities to help children cope with trauma. Credit: UNICEF/Herold Joseph

Humanitarian experts remain deeply concerned about the continued adaptive reorganizing and restructuring of gangs to bypass national security measures and expand their influence. John Brandolino, Acting Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), has said that gangs have transformed into more structured criminal networks with defined leadership, territorial ambitions, and diversified streams of revenue.

The Viv Ansanm coalition has carried out large-scale attacks on police forces, prisons, and critical economic infrastructure, enabling gangs to tighten their grip over the capital and key corridors into Artibonite and Plateau Central. Extortion, as well as the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and ammunition, have become major sources of revenue, further entrenching gang control and undermining state authority.

Despite this, notable progress has been made in recent months through police operations supported by the UN Security Council-authorized Gang Suppression Force, which was deployed in October 2025. These efforts have yielded significant early results, including the reopening of key roads in parts of Port-au-Prince and the Artibonite Department, as well as the restoration of government presence around the capital’s Champ de Mars. These gains demonstrate that sustained, coordinated pressure on armed groups can weaken gang control and yield meaningful improvements in security.

However, Carlos Ruiz-Massieu, UN Special Representative and Head of BINUH, warned that these gains remain extremely fragile and it is imperative to address the root cause of insecurity—political instability. Haiti currently stands at a precarious crossroads as it nears the end of its TPC, with a newly issued electoral decree and calendar calling for the inauguration of an elected president by early 2027. Despite this, humanitarian experts and civilians have raised concerns on whether such elections are realistically feasible amid the country’s entrenched insecurity.

“Haiti has entered a critical juncture in its process of restoring democratic institutions,” Ruiz Massieu told the Security Council on January 21. “Let us be clear: the country has no time to lose to prolonged internal conflict,” he warned, emphasizing that it is imperative for national stakeholders to set aside differences and uphold their political responsibilities, and maintain momentum on security efforts.

The following day during a press briefing, Ruiz-Massieu emphasized to reporters in New York that improving security conditions is essential for Haitians to have freedom of movement and the ability to participate in society, which paves the way for eventual, credible elections. He stressed that Haiti’s recovery will depend on close cooperation between national authorities and the international community.

“What we need is an authority that can work with the international community and manage the public forces in a way that can really increase security in different areas,” said Ruiz-Massieu. “How you measure success is by improving security in certain areas of Port-au-Prince that can enable Haitians to walk freely, to work freely, and the country to be able to organize elections in a meaningful way. We expect authorities to continue after February 7 and work with the international community to improve security.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Together against the shift in power: the Global South forms strategic alliances. Credit: Picture Alliance / ZUMAPRESS.com | Prime Minister’s Office/Press Information

By Alexandra Sitenko
BERLIN, Germany, Jan 28 2026 (IPS)

The United States’ attack on Venezuela marks a key watershed in the world order. We still cannot predict how this violation of another state’s sovereignty will ultimately play out.

But it has called into question the global order that is founded on sovereign equality. Experts talk of ‘imperialist imitation dynamics’ and a return to spheres of influence — a world where the major powers call the shots and smaller states have no choice but to toe the line.

There is one dynamic fuelled by the US intervention in Venezuela that we can’t ignore: countries in the Global South, especially middle powers, have begun to stand up for their interests more assertively, more strategically and in a more coordinated way. Not through open confrontation, but through a combination of flexibility, adaptation, diversification and tactical pushback.

Far from all countries in the Global South have openly condemned the American attack on Venezuela, but they have all at least expressed concern about what happened in South America. These events made clear how quickly military force can now be used to enforce a country’s interests, without any regard for the fundamental principles of the international order — and how limited their own options, especially military ones, actually are.

Containment and political autonomy

Alexandra Sitenko

That is exactly why Latin America’s strategy is one of diplomatic containment, making efforts to reach a pragmatic agreement with the United States. Last year, Donald Trump and Colombian President Gustavo Petro engaged in a fierce war of words. The tensions only worsened after the US attack on Venezuela, and Trump threatened Colombia with military action.

Once the two leaders spoke over the phone, the situation began to cool. Petro is now preparing to meet Trump face-to-face in the United States. This shift from public confrontation to direct dialogue reflects a deliberate strategy of containment in the face of an imbalanced power relationship: pressure should be funnelled into managed, personal diplomacy to prevent things from escalating.

Alongside Colombia, Cuba and Mexico have found themselves in the American firing line, with the US adopting a noticeably harsher tone towards both countries. Cuba responded with a carefully calibrated strategy, showing it was willing to engage in dialogue and improve bilateral relations, while emphasising the importance of treating each other with respect on an equal footing.

Political concessions were explicitly ruled out. This can be seen as a sensible two-pronged approach — easing tensions while firmly defending sovereignty.

The Mexican President took a more pragmatic course when under pressure from Washington. Claudia Sheinbaum made only some targeted concessions, especially on key security and trade policy issues, such as taking tougher action against smuggling rings and raising tariffs on Chinese imports, to avoid escalation.

But she stuck to her guns on the judicial reform that was criticised by the United States and on increasing energy subsidies for Cuba. With its government openly condemning the US intervention in Venezuela, Mexico is pursuing a steady, measured path in its diplomatic relations: limited concessions coupled with political autonomy. But whether this strategy will work in the long term remains to be seen, not least in view of Trump’s unpredictable and erratic nature.

Diversifying foreign relations has become the Global South’s core strategy to reduce dependency and shore up political autonomy in times of global uncertainty.

There is no reason to think that China and Russia – as the other great powers – could be relied on as military counterweights in the Western Hemisphere. Neither has any military bases there, nor are they bound by any explicit mutual defence obligations involving military action.

Russia’s cooperation with Venezuela was limited to providing political support and supplying weapons and air-defence systems. This has given Latin America little choice other than de-escalation and dialogue with the United States, combined with asserting their right to make their own decisions.

The situation is similar in India. New Delhi responded to the American attack on Venezuela with a strikingly restrained statement, expressing ‘deep concern’. This drew sharp criticism domestically, with the opposition warning of setting such a precedent and that what happened to Venezuela could happen to any other country, including India itself.

The Global South is known for pursuing this diplomatic flexibility, deliberately diversifying its foreign and economic relations. This is not dissimilar from the multi-vector strategy that Central Asian states under the influence of Russia and China have successfully practised for decades.

India is a prime example, maintaining strategic relations with the United States while remaining closely tied to Russia on defence policy. New Delhi is currently on the verge of concluding a free-trade agreement with the EU and is stepping up its security and defence cooperation with European countries.

These trends can be seen in Latin America, too. It is no coincidence that the EU–Mercosur agreement – recently signed after more than 20 years of negotiations – comes at a time when both the EU and South America are under pressure from US trade and tariff policies. In the same vein, Colombia joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2025.

The Colombian President recently travelled to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt, and articulated the strategic logic behind this: Latin America’s path does not lie in joining a power bloc, but in building its own autonomous growth pole. Diversifying foreign relations has become the Global South’s core strategy to reduce dependency and shore up political autonomy in times of global uncertainty.

A notably independent stance

The clearest pushback so far has come from Africa. Several states there responded to the US attack not with open confrontation, but by taking symbolic and politically meaningful steps to distance themselves. South Africa’s ruling party condemned the aggression against Venezuela, with the country’s representative to the United Nations criticising the breach of core principles of the UN Charter and stressing the importance of sovereignty, non-interference and conflict resolution through diplomacy.

This message was underlined by conducting joint naval exercises almost simultaneously off the South African coast with several BRICS states, including Russia, China and Iran. At the opening ceremony, the commander of the South African joint task force stated that the drills were more than just a military exercise; they were also a political declaration of their intent to work more closely together in an increasingly complex maritime environment.

BRICS could well take a tougher position on security policy in the future — not necessarily in the form of a military alliance, but by expressing their strategic autonomy in the face of Western dominance.

As much as US behaviour might bring 19th-century gunboat diplomacy to mind, the world is a very different place today.

Ghana, a country that has traditionally maintained close relations with the United States, also took a notably independent stance. Accra voiced clear reservations about the unilateral military action and warned of setting a dangerous precedent that could undermine the security of smaller states in particular.

The African Union argued along similar lines and is so far the only regional organisation to have agreed on a common position. It is no surprise that African countries have taken a relatively forthright stance, given that so many of them have been deliberately broadening their security and economic partnerships for years.

China is now a key economic player in Africa, while Russia has expanded its military presence and security cooperation. Moscow is currently preparing to host this year’s third Russia-Africa summit — a special form of cooperation previously reserved for Russia’s Central Asian neighbours.

As much as US behaviour might bring 19th-century gunboat diplomacy to mind, the world is a very different place today. The traditional concept of spheres of influence assumes that weaker states will remain passive, something that the Global South is increasingly proving wrong: these countries are flexible and adaptable in their diplomatic relations, they consciously hedge their strategic bets, and they cooperate with multiple major powers at the same time, without allying themselves too closely with any one of them.

The spheres-of-influence narrative also underestimates the role of regional organisations, such as ASEAN, Mercosur, the African Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, as well as transregional groups like BRICS. These unions increasingly function as collective platforms that act as a buffer from external pressure, create greater leverage in negotiations for smaller states and throw a spanner in the works of great powers trying to assert their dominance.

The Global South is not a homogeneous bloc, nor is it merely a playing field for geopolitical rivalries. Many countries are exploiting the chaotic and fragmented world order to express and pursue their interests more assertively. The American operation may work as a power play in the short term, but in the long run, it could end up creating a more pluralistic and less hierarchical world order much more quickly.

Dr Alexandra Sitenko is an independent political consultant and researcher. She focuses on global peace and security, geopolitics in Eurasia and relations between Russia and the Global South.

Source: International Politics and Society, published by the Global and European Policy Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin.

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