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Massive Russian air strikes on Ukraine's energy infrastructure have left hundreds of thousands of people without electricity or heating in freezing temperatures. According to the government, 1.2 million households are currently without power. What is Russia trying to achieve with its unremitting attacks on energy facilities?

Germany and Italy plan to work more closely together. During German Chancellor Friedrich Merz's visit to Rome on Friday, he and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni signed agreements on closer cooperation in the areas of security, migration and defence, and announced joint initiatives in economic policy. Commentators speculate on where this could lead.

Credit: Abubaker Lubowa/Reuters via Gallo Images

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jan 26 2026 (IPS)

When Ugandans went to the polls on 15 January, the outcome was never in doubt. As voting began, mobile internet services ground to a halt, ensuring minimal scrutiny as President Yoweri Museveni secured his seventh consecutive term. Far from offering democratic choice, the vote reinforced one of Africa’s longest-running presidencies, providing a veneer of democratic legitimacy while stifling competition.

Four decades in power

Museveni’s four-decade grip on power began with the Bush War, a guerrilla conflict that brought him to office in 1986. Single-party rule lasted for almost two decades, deemed necessary for national reconstruction. The 1995 constitution granted parliament and the judiciary autonomy and introduced a two-term presidential limit and age cap of 75, but maintained the ban on political parties.

With one-party rule increasingly called into question, Museveni restored multi-party politics in 2005. However, he simultaneously orchestrated a constitutional amendment to remove term limits. In 2017 he abolished the age restriction, allowing him to run for a sixth term in 2021.

Recent elections have been marked by state violence. Museveni’s 2021 campaign against opposition challenger Bobi Wine was defined by government brutality, with over a hundred people killed in protests following Wine’s arrest in November 2020. Another opposition leader, Kizza Besigye, has been arrested or detained more than a thousand times over the years.

Museveni promoted his son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, to Chief of Defence Forces in 2024. Kainerugaba has openly boasted on social media about torturing political opponents, reflecting a regime that no longer bothers to conceal its brutality. His rise signals a potential hereditary handover.

Civic space shutdown

In the face of a credible opposition challenge, this year’s election required more than constitutional tinkering: it demanded the systematic restriction of civic space. The Trump administration’s dissolution of USAID in early 2025 helped Museveni here, because it was catastrophic for Ugandan civil society. Almost all US-funded Good Governance and Civil Society programmes were cancelled, hollowing out the civic education networks that once reached first-time and rural voters. State propaganda filled the vacuum.

A coordinated assault on dissent followed. Between June and October, climate and environmental activists were repeatedly denied bail, spending months in prison for peacefully protesting against the East African Crude Oil Pipeline. The regime’s reach extended beyond borders: in November 2024, Besigye was abducted in Nairobi and appeared days later at a military court in Kampala, charged with capital offences despite a Supreme Court ruling declaring military trials for civilians unconstitutional. Museveni simply legalised the practice in June 2025.

Intimidation intensified as the vote neared. Authorities arrested Sarah Bireete, executive director of the Center for Constitutional Governance, without a warrant, holding her for four days in violation of constitutional limits. In his New Year’s Eve address, Museveni explicitly instructed security forces to use more teargas against opposition supporters, whom he called criminals. In the days that followed, security forces used teargas, along with pepper spray and physical violence, to disperse opposition rallies. Hundreds of Wine supporters were abducted or detained.

The government dismantled the infrastructure needed for independent monitoring. Authorities suspended five prominent human rights organisations, and two days before voting, the Uganda Communications Commission implemented a nationwide internet shutdown, ostensibly to prevent disinformation. The blackout ensured election day irregularities would go undocumented.

Election irregularities and violence

Election day was plagued by technical failures, but Wine, again the major challenger, also claimed wholesale ballot stuffing and the abduction of polling agents. The Electoral Commission head admitted receiving private warnings from senior government figures against declaring some opposition candidates as winners.

International observers attempted diplomatic language, noting the environment was ‘relatively peaceful’ compared to 2021 while expressing serious concerns about harassment, intimidation and arrests. They recognised that the internet blackout hindered their ability to document irregularities.

Post-election violence claimed at least 12 lives. The deadliest incident occurred in Butambala district, where security forces killed between seven and 10 opposition supporters. Wine was placed under house arrest while the count was held in opaque conditions. Results were announced by region rather than polling station, limiting monitors’ ability to validate them. According to the official count, Museveni won with around 71 per cent, while Wine’s tally dropped to 25 per cent from 35 per cent in 2021. Turnout stood at just 52 per cent, meaning over 10 million eligible voters stayed home.

A generational breaking point

Ugandans’ median age is 17; 78 per cent of people are under 35. Most have known only one president. Wine, a 44-year-old singer turned politician whose music had long resonated with young Ugandans’ frustrations, campaigned on promises of change. But he’s now been defeated twice in a highly uneven race.

Young people have sought other ways to make their voices heard. In 2024, they took to the streets to protest against corruption, but they were met with security force violence and mass arrests.

Avenues for change appear blocked. Opposition parliamentary representation is insufficient for meaningful reform. Civil society groups face restrictive laws and lack international support. International partners are quiet because Uganda is strategically valuable: it provides troops for regional operations, shelters two million refugees, facilitates Chinese and French oil drilling and recently agreed to accept US deportees.

Given his advanced age, Museveni is unlikely to run again in 2031. But with authority increasingly concentrated on a tight inner circle of relatives, democratic transition may be less likely than an eventual transfer of power to his son. Uganda’s young majority faces a difficult choice: accept a status quo that offers no prospects or confront a security apparatus that has spent years perfecting its use of violence.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 

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TASR: A házszabály módosítása lesz az első napirendi pont a kedden (január 27.) kezdődő januári parlamenti ülésszakon – jelentette be hétfői sajtótájékoztatóján Richard Raši (Hlas) házelnök. Indoklása szerint a cél a törvényhozás alapvető funkciójának biztosítása.

Barbara Kyagulanyi, married to the opposition leader, says she refused to reveal her husband's whereabouts.

Credit: White House
 
Trump’s proposed “Board of Peace” built around heads of state, including Russia, is structurally ill-suited to end the Israel–Hamas war and to govern postwar Gaza in any sustainable way.

By Alon Ben-Meir
NEW YORK, Jan 26 2026 (IPS)

At a press conference at the World Economic Forum in Davos last week, Trump unveiled his newly formed Board of Peace to end the Israel-Hamas war. During a press conference in the White House, he explained that he created the board because “The UN should have settled every one of the wars that I settled. I never went to them. I never even thought to go to them.”

He claimed that the Board of Peace will be dealing with ending the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. He invited many heads of state to join the Board and threatened to impose heavy tariffs on the countries of those who refused. Paradoxically, he also invited Russian President Putin to join the pack.

Even a cursory review of the Board’s structure—its executive make-up, role, and responsibilities—makes it glaringly clear that he placed himself at the forefront of everything, from operations to ultimate decision-making. He basically codified US dominance, as long as he ran it.

He granted himself the authority to veto any decision he did not like, to invite or remove any board member, to approve the agenda, to designate his successor, and even dissolve the board entirely. Furthermore, he reserved a central role for himself even after leaving the presidency.

Shortcomings of the Board and its Structure

In more than one way, the creation of this board dissolves the American-built post-war international system and builds a new one with himself at the center. And while Trump is striving to consolidate authoritarian power domestically, he now wants to project himself on the international stage as if he were an Emperor, presiding over a board composed largely of heads of state. Although board members can have their say, they are nevertheless structurally subordinated to him.

No Seat for the Primary Stakeholders

The Board of Peace and the parallel Gaza Executive Board are designed to sit above a technocratic Palestinian committee, with no Palestinian political representative given a seat at the top table, despite their being primary stakeholders. Hamas is required to disarm, without specifying how, and to withdraw from administrative governance.

The Palestinian Authority is relegated to an “apolitical” managerial role, which in effect reproduces the long-standing problem of trying to impose solutions over Palestinians instead of negotiating with them. This has repeatedly undermined past peace frameworks and offers no pathway towards sustainable regional or world peace.

Conflict of Interests

The board is chaired by Trump himself, with membership effectively bought via a $1 billion “permanent seat” fee, creating apparent conflicts between profit, prestige, and peacemaking. Russia, Israel, Gulf monarchies, and others who have direct stakes in arms sales, regional influence, and energy routes, are not neutral guarantors but interested parties likely to instrumentalize Gaza for their own strategic agendas.

Colonial-Style Trusteeship

The architecture explicitly envisions international figures and heads of state supervising Gaza’s reconstruction, security, and governance, effectively turning Gaza into a protectorate administered by external powers.

Human rights advocates and regional observers are already criticizing this as a colonial-style trusteeship that denies genuine sovereignty, which is already generating local resistance, delegitimizing the arrangement, and providing ideological fuel for militant spoilers.

Israeli and Regional Objections

Israel’s leadership has publicly objected to the composition and design of the Gaza bodies. It is enraged over the role of Turkey and Qatar, forcing Netanyahu to distance himself from aspects of the plan even while joining the board under pressure from Trump.

Nevertheless, the Israeli government views key members of the Board and mechanisms as hostile or at odds with its security principles. Israel will either hinder implementation or hollow it out in practice, turning the board into an arena for intra-allied conflict rather than conflict resolution.

Great Power Rivalry Inside the Board

Ironically, the board anticipates concurrent participation by rivals such as Russia, the EU, and US-aligned states, while at the same time, Moscow is resisting US-backed peace terms in Ukraine and leveraging Middle East crises to weaken Western influence. This arrangement invites the board to become another theater of great power competition, where Russia, Hungary, Belarus, and others can obstruct or dilute measures that do not serve their broader geopolitical interests.

This is not to speak, of course, about the widespread concerns and suspicions among European leaders about Putin’s adversarial relations at the table, which is a recipe for discord and prevents concrete action.

Unclear Legal Basis

Another big hole in Trump’s Board is its framing as an alternative to, and possible replacement for, the United Nations, without any legal foundation, universal membership, or binding authority under international law.

A self-selected club by Trump of mostly invited heads of state, tied to a particular US administration and anchored in significant financial contributions, lacks the procedural legitimacy to impose security arrangements, adjudicate disputes, or credibly guarantee Palestinian rights over the long term, to which Trump pays no heed at all.

Overambitious, Under-Specified Mandate

The board’s responsibilities have already expanded from supervising a Gaza ceasefire to a broad charter “promoting stability” and “resolving global conflict,” which is ostentatious and will never come to fruition, while indicating mission creep before it even begins.

Such a variable mandate, with multiple overlapping structures (Board of Peace, Gaza Executive Board, Founding Executive Board), is almost guaranteed to generate bureaucratic turf wars, paralysis, and incoherence—particularly once crises beyond Gaza compete for attention and resources.

To be sure, this is just another of Trump’s stunts, always pretending that he is the only one who can come up with out-of-the-box ideas. Like many of his initiatives, this so-called Board of Peace one falls into the same category—transactional and reversible.

It is a grandiose idea that cannot be sustained structurally, has no enforcement capability, and relies on a contradictory algorithm to allow it to fulfill its mission, which, in any case, remains open-ended and unrealistic.

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a retired professor of international relations, most recently at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He taught courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Január 27-én, kedden Tatiana Bucci holokauszttúlélő az Európai Parlament képviselőihez szól a holokauszt nemzetközi emléknapja alkalmából tartott rendkívüli plenáris ülésen.

Forrás : © Európai Unió, 2026 - EP

On Tuesday 27 January, Holocaust survivor Tatiana Bucci will address MEPs at a special plenary session for International Holocaust Remembrance Day.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On Tuesday 27 January, Holocaust survivor Tatiana Bucci will address MEPs at a special plenary session for International Holocaust Remembrance Day.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Am Dienstag, 27. Januar, wird die Holocaust-Überlebende Tatiana Bucci anlässlich des Internationalen Holocaust-Gedenktages vor dem Europäischen Parlament sprechen.

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Der Wirtschaftsflügel der CDU hat vorgeschlagen, das Recht auf Teilzeitarbeit abzuschaffen, um dem Fachkräftemangel entgegenzuwirken. Dies kommentiert Katharina Wrohlich, Leiterin der Forschungsgruppe Gender Economics im DIW Berlin, wie folgt: 

Die Abschaffung des Rechtsanspruchs auf Teilzeit würde den Fachkräftemangel in Deutschland nicht lösen. Besser wäre es, an anderer Stelle anzusetzen: Zum einen müssten das Angebot und die Qualität der Kinderbetreuung deutlich verbessert werden, denn nicht alle Frauen arbeiten freiwillig in Teilzeit – manche würden gerne ihre Arbeitszeit erhöhen, können dies aber aufgrund mangelnder Kinderbetreuung nicht.

Zum anderen müssten die finanziellen Anreize zur Mehrarbeit speziell für die Gruppe erhöht werden, die derzeit besonders häufig in Teilzeit ist: verheiratete Frauen. Eine Reform des Ehegattensplittings könnte eine höhere Wochenarbeitszeit für Frauen finanziell deutlich attraktiver machen. Das jetzige Steuersystem belohnt vor allem die Aufteilung, dass einer Vollzeit arbeitet und (meist) eine im Minijob. Dementsprechend sollte auch die Minijob-Regelung reformiert und auf Schüler*innen, Studierende und Rentner*innen begrenzt werden. Durch eine solche Reform wäre eine gleichmäßigere Aufteilung der Erwerbs- und Sorgearbeit für Paare attraktiver. Dies wäre nicht nur aus arbeitsmarktpolitischer, sondern auch aus gleichstellungspolitischer Perspektive wichtig: Es würde die ökonomische Eigenständigkeit von Frauen erhöhen und hätte nicht zuletzt auch einen positiven Einfluss auf deren Alterseinkünfte."