A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, it has become apparent that the “post–Cold War” international order is in its death throes. For three decades, global affairs have been shaped by a system dominated by the United States as the world’s only genuinely global power. American power was embedded in a “rules-based” international order founded on respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, alongside liberal-democratic norms such as “free” global economic exchange and institutionalised governance. Led by the United States and its Western allies, this order was considered by some in the early 1990s to be the “end of history”, a supposedly final stage in human ideological, political and economic evolution (Fukuyama, 1989). While the order was never without its practical and moral failings, and although many countries did not benefit from its protection, it was widely considered an improvement over past systems for organising international interdependence. Today, however, the liberal internationalist project faces a profound crisis and is being challenged by geopolitical competition and a hollowing out from within (Ikenberry, 2024).
Caught between weak employment opportunities and widespread informal employment, Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge. Existing incentives in the labour market encourage both firms and workers to engage in informal employment arrangements. Firms benefit from lower labour costs and greater flexibility, while workers often seek higher take-home pay, driven by limited confidence in the benefits associated with formal employment. Many workers perceive tax and social insurance deductions as offering few tangible benefits or effective safety nets that would compensate for the reduction in current income. At the same time, policies aimed at promoting formal job creation that rely exclusively on stricter enforcement may backfire by increasing hiring costs, thereby creating an additional obstacle for job creation as well as for policymakers.
Caught between weak employment opportunities and widespread informal employment, Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge. Existing incentives in the labour market encourage both firms and workers to engage in informal employment arrangements. Firms benefit from lower labour costs and greater flexibility, while workers often seek higher take-home pay, driven by limited confidence in the benefits associated with formal employment. Many workers perceive tax and social insurance deductions as offering few tangible benefits or effective safety nets that would compensate for the reduction in current income. At the same time, policies aimed at promoting formal job creation that rely exclusively on stricter enforcement may backfire by increasing hiring costs, thereby creating an additional obstacle for job creation as well as for policymakers.
Caught between weak employment opportunities and widespread informal employment, Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge. Existing incentives in the labour market encourage both firms and workers to engage in informal employment arrangements. Firms benefit from lower labour costs and greater flexibility, while workers often seek higher take-home pay, driven by limited confidence in the benefits associated with formal employment. Many workers perceive tax and social insurance deductions as offering few tangible benefits or effective safety nets that would compensate for the reduction in current income. At the same time, policies aimed at promoting formal job creation that rely exclusively on stricter enforcement may backfire by increasing hiring costs, thereby creating an additional obstacle for job creation as well as for policymakers.
The changing global order is reshaping the domestic politics of foreign aid. As many OECD governments shift their focus towards defence spending and narrower national interests, contributions to global public goods and development are declining. Development budgets, in particular, are traditionally among the first casualties of public spending cuts. Germany is no exception. Its core development budget has fallen from €12.4 billion in 2021 to €9.9 billion in 2026 – a decline of around 20 per cent. This decrease is driven by overall pressure on public spending and a decisive shift towards defence. A recent study projects a contested but illustrative estimate, suggesting that aid cuts could lead to an additional 9.4 million deaths by 2030 (da Silva et al., 2026). In January 2026, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) presented a reform strategy that directly addresses these pressures. The strategy advocates a shift towards a more targeted approach, shaped in part by these budget cuts. However, it also addresses long-standing reform needs that predate them. Three aspects are particularly noteworthy: a clear focus on least developed countries (LDCs), where aid can have relatively high impact; explicit thematic prioritisation that recognises over-fragmentation as a key problem; and a stronger commitment to evidence and results, anchored in the statement that “effectiveness and evidence are central principles for steering German development cooperation” (BMZ, 2026). Possible concrete steps towards achieving these goals can be found in a joint CGD–IDOS policy paper on prioritisation (Hughes, Janus, Mitchell, & Röthel, 2025). However, questions remain about the strategy, most notably the apparent tensions between the focus on LDCs and ambitions to promote German business interests, the vague implementation plans and the fundamental question of political viability: Can these reforms generate meaningful change within the German development cooperation system and its wider political authorising environment?
The changing global order is reshaping the domestic politics of foreign aid. As many OECD governments shift their focus towards defence spending and narrower national interests, contributions to global public goods and development are declining. Development budgets, in particular, are traditionally among the first casualties of public spending cuts. Germany is no exception. Its core development budget has fallen from €12.4 billion in 2021 to €9.9 billion in 2026 – a decline of around 20 per cent. This decrease is driven by overall pressure on public spending and a decisive shift towards defence. A recent study projects a contested but illustrative estimate, suggesting that aid cuts could lead to an additional 9.4 million deaths by 2030 (da Silva et al., 2026). In January 2026, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) presented a reform strategy that directly addresses these pressures. The strategy advocates a shift towards a more targeted approach, shaped in part by these budget cuts. However, it also addresses long-standing reform needs that predate them. Three aspects are particularly noteworthy: a clear focus on least developed countries (LDCs), where aid can have relatively high impact; explicit thematic prioritisation that recognises over-fragmentation as a key problem; and a stronger commitment to evidence and results, anchored in the statement that “effectiveness and evidence are central principles for steering German development cooperation” (BMZ, 2026). Possible concrete steps towards achieving these goals can be found in a joint CGD–IDOS policy paper on prioritisation (Hughes, Janus, Mitchell, & Röthel, 2025). However, questions remain about the strategy, most notably the apparent tensions between the focus on LDCs and ambitions to promote German business interests, the vague implementation plans and the fundamental question of political viability: Can these reforms generate meaningful change within the German development cooperation system and its wider political authorising environment?
The changing global order is reshaping the domestic politics of foreign aid. As many OECD governments shift their focus towards defence spending and narrower national interests, contributions to global public goods and development are declining. Development budgets, in particular, are traditionally among the first casualties of public spending cuts. Germany is no exception. Its core development budget has fallen from €12.4 billion in 2021 to €9.9 billion in 2026 – a decline of around 20 per cent. This decrease is driven by overall pressure on public spending and a decisive shift towards defence. A recent study projects a contested but illustrative estimate, suggesting that aid cuts could lead to an additional 9.4 million deaths by 2030 (da Silva et al., 2026). In January 2026, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) presented a reform strategy that directly addresses these pressures. The strategy advocates a shift towards a more targeted approach, shaped in part by these budget cuts. However, it also addresses long-standing reform needs that predate them. Three aspects are particularly noteworthy: a clear focus on least developed countries (LDCs), where aid can have relatively high impact; explicit thematic prioritisation that recognises over-fragmentation as a key problem; and a stronger commitment to evidence and results, anchored in the statement that “effectiveness and evidence are central principles for steering German development cooperation” (BMZ, 2026). Possible concrete steps towards achieving these goals can be found in a joint CGD–IDOS policy paper on prioritisation (Hughes, Janus, Mitchell, & Röthel, 2025). However, questions remain about the strategy, most notably the apparent tensions between the focus on LDCs and ambitions to promote German business interests, the vague implementation plans and the fundamental question of political viability: Can these reforms generate meaningful change within the German development cooperation system and its wider political authorising environment?
La Côte d’Ivoire célébrera prochainement la restitution par la France d’une pièce d’importance : un tambour à fentes, long de 3,30 mètres et pesant 430 kg. Connue sous le nom de Djidji Ayôkwé, cette pièce était officiellement réclamée depuis 2019 par les autorités ivoiriennes. Après une phase de restauration et de longs mois d’atermoiements, l’objet a regagné la Côte d’Ivoire le 13 mars dernier, 110 ans après avoir été pillé par les colons français. Sa restitution témoigne de l’importance que revêt le retour de pièces à forte teneur symboliques pour les populations africaines. Elle pointe aussi la lenteur de ces processus : rendre ce tambour aura pris… quatre ans et demi !
Pour accélérer et généraliser ces restitutions, le Parlement français vient d’adopter une loi-cadre, un texte majeur – longtemps repoussé – qui vient concrétiser la promesse formulée par Emmanuel Macron en novembre 2017 à Ouagadougou de rendre possible ces restitutions. Mais, avec la création d’une commission nationale de restitutions, en sus de comités scientifiques bilatéraux, et en l’absence de trajectoire financière pour développer la recherche de provenance, la France entretient le flou quant à sa réelle ambition en matière de restitutions de biens culturels à l’Afrique.
À téléchargerL’article Restitution des biens culturels pillés durant la colonisation : la France de retour au premier plan ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
Haiti leidet seit Jahrzehnten unter zahlreichen humanitären, politischen, wirtschaftlichen und sicherheitspolitischen Krisen, die einander überlagern und verheerende Folgen für die lokale Bevölkerung haben. Bisherige Stabilisierungsversuche waren kaum erfolgreich. Die 5.500 Mann starke sogenannte »Einheit zur Bekämpfung von Banden« (Gang Suppression Force, GSF) hat am 1. April 2026 die Nachfolge der von Kenia geführten Multinationalen Sicherheitsunterstützungsmission (MSS) angetreten. Es ist die zwölfte Friedens- und Stabilisierungsmission, die Haiti seit 1990 erlebt. Die GSF wird als VN-mandatierte Mission geführt und operiert vor allem mit zunächst 800 Militärkräften aus dem Tschad. Damit unternehmen die Vereinten Nationen einen gewagten Versuch, die Bekämpfung der organisierten Kriminalität zum zentralen Ansatzpunkt ihrer Missionen nach Kapitel VII der VN-Charta zu machen – und das in einer extrem komplexen politischen, sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Lage in Haiti.
Das System internationaler Konfliktbearbeitung befindet sich in einer tiefen Krise. Entsprechende Instrumente wie UN-Friedensmissionen werden abgezogen, normative und machtpolitische Voraussetzungen wie eine US-garantierte internationale Ordnung gelten nicht mehr, und bisherige Abkommen haben zu oft eine Vertiefung gewaltsamer autoritärer Systeme statt deren Transformation bewirkt. Am Horn von Afrika zeigt sich diese Krise besonders deutlich. Stabilität brachten dort weder international erzwungene Friedensabkommen wie in Südsudan noch solche, die wie in Sudan 2020 praktisch ohne Mediation zwischen bewaffneten Akteuren ausgehandelt wurden. Regierungen wie die äthiopische haben Friedensprozesse vielmehr regelmäßig instrumentalisiert, um die eigene Herrschaft zu sichern. Jüngere Vermittlungsprozesse sind primär eine Funktion regionaler Rivalitäten und diplomatischer Interessen von beteiligten externen Akteuren, wie in Sudan seit Kriegsbeginn im April 2023. Ist wie hier ausländische Unterstützung verfügbar, haben Konfliktparteien weniger Anreize, sich auf Kompromisse einzulassen. Weil Mechanismen zur Umsetzung von Abkommen nur schwach ausgestattet sind und politisch wenig unterstützt werden, gibt es nach Waffenstillständen keinen inklusiven politischen Prozess, um die Konfliktursachen anzugehen. Erneute Waffengänge sind früher oder später die Folge. Für europäische Beiträge zur Konfliktbewältigung am Horn von Afrika sollten Lehren aus dieser Krise gezogen werden. Es gilt weder nostalgisch auf die weitgehend untergegangene Art der Konfliktbearbeitung zu blicken noch frustriert rein sicherheitsdominierten Ansätzen zu folgen. Vielmehr sollte Europa zivile Friedensinitiativen unterstützen, politische Gewaltökonomien auszutrocknen helfen und die eigene Zusammenarbeit mit konfliktverschärfenden Regierungen wie den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) überdenken.
8. Mai 2026 – In der rentenpolitischen Debatte gewinnt ein aktueller Vorschlag viel Zuspruch: das Renteneintrittsalter an die Zahl der geleisteten Beitragsjahre zu koppeln. Als Kriterium für den Renteneintritt werden in der Regel 45 Beitragsjahre genannt. Die Idee dahinter ist intuitiv einleuchtend: Wer früh berufstätig war und lange eingezahlt hat, soll auch früher in Rente gehen dürfen. Doch so plausibel diese Logik auf den ersten Blick erscheint, so komplex sind die Fragen, die sich für eine Umsetzung ergeben würden. Entscheidend ist, welche Zeiten überhaupt als anrechenbare Wartezeiten gelten. Denn Versicherungsbiografien verlaufen selten geradlinig. Für viele Versicherte wechseln sich Erwerbsphasen mit Zeiten der Arbeitslosigkeit, Krankheit, Kindererziehung oder Pflege ab. Um diese Vielfalt näher zu beleuchten, betrachtet diese Kurzstudie empirische Versicherungszeiten nach verschiedenen rentenrechtlichen Definitionen für die Geburtskohorte 1957. Die Analyse der Versicherungsdaten zeigt, dass unter der aktuellen Definition der Wartezeit von 45 Jahren nur 40 Prozent der Versicherten dieses Jahrgangs die 45-Jahres-Schwelle bis zum Renteneintritt erreicht hatten. Würde man diese Schwelle für alle Versicherten verbindlich einführen, würden vor allem zwei Gruppen erst später als bisher in Rente gehen können: einerseits Akademiker*innen, die später ins Erwerbsleben eintreten, andererseits Personen mit unterbrochenen Erwerbsbiografien. Zu letzteren zählen insbesondere Frauen mit Kindern und Personen mit Phasen längerer Arbeitslosigkeit.