Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Trotz der Budgetkürzungen für 2025 und 2026 bleibt Deutschland der größte Geber öffentlicher Entwicklungsleistungen (Official Development Assistance, ODA) unter den 27 EU-Mitgliedstaaten und trägt aufgrund seiner Wirtschaftskraft den größten Anteil am ODA-Budget der EU. Die laufenden Diskussionen zur Neuausrichtung der deutschen Entwicklungspolitik fokussieren sich bisher primär auf die bilaterale Zusammenarbeit, ohne die europäische Entwicklungspolitik genügend zu berücksichtigen. Letztere leistet jedoch zentrale Beiträge, um die entwicklungs- und außenpolitischen Ziele der Bundesregierung umzusetzen. Sie sollte daher stärker in die Reformdebatten miteinbezogen werden. Die gegenwärtige weltpolitische Lage erfordert es, europäische entwicklungspolitische Expertise und Prioritäten gezielt zu bündeln und insbesondere auch in die gemeinsame Strategiefindung einzubinden.
In den kommenden Jahren stehen die EU und Deutschland vor der dreifachen Herausforderung, gleichzeitig die sicherheitspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit auszubauen, die wirtschaftliche Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu sichern und die Nachhaltigkeitsprioritäten des European Green Deals zu verwirklichen. Um diese Ziele zu erreichen, muss Entwicklungspolitik von einem Randthema zu einem strategischen und sichtbaren Pfeiler einer wertebasierten Außenpolitik werden, die geopolitische wie geoökonomische Realitäten reflektiert. Damit dies gelingt, schlagen wir fünf Schlüsselbereiche vor, welche Deutschland gemeinsam mit Brüssel ausgestalten und priorisieren sollte:
1. Wohlstandssicherung und Wirtschaftsförderung: Vier Jahre nach dem Start von Global Gateway sollte sich Deutschland für eine stärkere Partnerorientierung und für eine Konkretisierung der Initiative hinsichtlich ihrer formalen Ziele und Prioritäten stark machen – auch in den bevorstehenden EU-Haushaltsverhandlungen.
2. Sicherheitspolitische Beiträge von Entwicklungspolitik: Die EU und Deutschland sollten gezielt entwicklungspolitische Bereiche und Initiativen fördern, die einen sicherheitspolitischen Mehrwert entfalten. Dies ist insbesondere im Fall der zivilen Unterstützung der Ukraine und im Bereich der Krisenprävention in fragilen Kontexten möglich.
3. Migration: Die EU sollte ihre externe Migrationspolitik im Hinblick auf Wirksamkeit und unbeabsichtigte Folgen kritisch überprüfen. Sie sollte mehr Transparenz und klare Standards bei Migrationspartnerschaften schaffen und Konditionalität als begrenztes, kontextabhängiges Instrument einsetzen. Um gegenseitigen Nutzen für die EU und ihre Partner zu sichern, ist ein ausgewogenes Zusammenspiel von kurzfristiger Krisenbewältigung und langfristiger Ursachenbekämpfung entscheidend, das von Investitionen in legale Mobilitätsoptionen flankiert wird.
4. Team Europe im multilateralen Kontext: Die derzeit laufenden Reformdiskussionen in den Vereinten Nationen (VN) erfordern das Engagement der EU und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten und eine starke gemeinsame Position – auch angesichts der Verpflichtung des EU-Vertrags, multilaterale Lösungen für globale Herausforderungen zu suchen.
5. Demokratieförderung, transnationale Netzwerke und politische Bildung: Deutschland und Europa sollten ihre Demokratieförderung gemeinsam überdenken und priorisieren. Insbesondere zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen, die sich für die Förderung von Demokratie und Menschenrechten einset-zen, sollten stärker unterstützt werden.

Trotz der Budgetkürzungen für 2025 und 2026 bleibt Deutschland der größte Geber öffentlicher Entwicklungsleistungen (Official Development Assistance, ODA) unter den 27 EU-Mitgliedstaaten und trägt aufgrund seiner Wirtschaftskraft den größten Anteil am ODA-Budget der EU. Die laufenden Diskussionen zur Neuausrichtung der deutschen Entwicklungspolitik fokussieren sich bisher primär auf die bilaterale Zusammenarbeit, ohne die europäische Entwicklungspolitik genügend zu berücksichtigen. Letztere leistet jedoch zentrale Beiträge, um die entwicklungs- und außenpolitischen Ziele der Bundesregierung umzusetzen. Sie sollte daher stärker in die Reformdebatten miteinbezogen werden. Die gegenwärtige weltpolitische Lage erfordert es, europäische entwicklungspolitische Expertise und Prioritäten gezielt zu bündeln und insbesondere auch in die gemeinsame Strategiefindung einzubinden.
In den kommenden Jahren stehen die EU und Deutschland vor der dreifachen Herausforderung, gleichzeitig die sicherheitspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit auszubauen, die wirtschaftliche Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu sichern und die Nachhaltigkeitsprioritäten des European Green Deals zu verwirklichen. Um diese Ziele zu erreichen, muss Entwicklungspolitik von einem Randthema zu einem strategischen und sichtbaren Pfeiler einer wertebasierten Außenpolitik werden, die geopolitische wie geoökonomische Realitäten reflektiert. Damit dies gelingt, schlagen wir fünf Schlüsselbereiche vor, welche Deutschland gemeinsam mit Brüssel ausgestalten und priorisieren sollte:
1. Wohlstandssicherung und Wirtschaftsförderung: Vier Jahre nach dem Start von Global Gateway sollte sich Deutschland für eine stärkere Partnerorientierung und für eine Konkretisierung der Initiative hinsichtlich ihrer formalen Ziele und Prioritäten stark machen – auch in den bevorstehenden EU-Haushaltsverhandlungen.
2. Sicherheitspolitische Beiträge von Entwicklungspolitik: Die EU und Deutschland sollten gezielt entwicklungspolitische Bereiche und Initiativen fördern, die einen sicherheitspolitischen Mehrwert entfalten. Dies ist insbesondere im Fall der zivilen Unterstützung der Ukraine und im Bereich der Krisenprävention in fragilen Kontexten möglich.
3. Migration: Die EU sollte ihre externe Migrationspolitik im Hinblick auf Wirksamkeit und unbeabsichtigte Folgen kritisch überprüfen. Sie sollte mehr Transparenz und klare Standards bei Migrationspartnerschaften schaffen und Konditionalität als begrenztes, kontextabhängiges Instrument einsetzen. Um gegenseitigen Nutzen für die EU und ihre Partner zu sichern, ist ein ausgewogenes Zusammenspiel von kurzfristiger Krisenbewältigung und langfristiger Ursachenbekämpfung entscheidend, das von Investitionen in legale Mobilitätsoptionen flankiert wird.
4. Team Europe im multilateralen Kontext: Die derzeit laufenden Reformdiskussionen in den Vereinten Nationen (VN) erfordern das Engagement der EU und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten und eine starke gemeinsame Position – auch angesichts der Verpflichtung des EU-Vertrags, multilaterale Lösungen für globale Herausforderungen zu suchen.
5. Demokratieförderung, transnationale Netzwerke und politische Bildung: Deutschland und Europa sollten ihre Demokratieförderung gemeinsam überdenken und priorisieren. Insbesondere zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen, die sich für die Förderung von Demokratie und Menschenrechten einset-zen, sollten stärker unterstützt werden.

Trotz der Budgetkürzungen für 2025 und 2026 bleibt Deutschland der größte Geber öffentlicher Entwicklungsleistungen (Official Development Assistance, ODA) unter den 27 EU-Mitgliedstaaten und trägt aufgrund seiner Wirtschaftskraft den größten Anteil am ODA-Budget der EU. Die laufenden Diskussionen zur Neuausrichtung der deutschen Entwicklungspolitik fokussieren sich bisher primär auf die bilaterale Zusammenarbeit, ohne die europäische Entwicklungspolitik genügend zu berücksichtigen. Letztere leistet jedoch zentrale Beiträge, um die entwicklungs- und außenpolitischen Ziele der Bundesregierung umzusetzen. Sie sollte daher stärker in die Reformdebatten miteinbezogen werden. Die gegenwärtige weltpolitische Lage erfordert es, europäische entwicklungspolitische Expertise und Prioritäten gezielt zu bündeln und insbesondere auch in die gemeinsame Strategiefindung einzubinden.
In den kommenden Jahren stehen die EU und Deutschland vor der dreifachen Herausforderung, gleichzeitig die sicherheitspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit auszubauen, die wirtschaftliche Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu sichern und die Nachhaltigkeitsprioritäten des European Green Deals zu verwirklichen. Um diese Ziele zu erreichen, muss Entwicklungspolitik von einem Randthema zu einem strategischen und sichtbaren Pfeiler einer wertebasierten Außenpolitik werden, die geopolitische wie geoökonomische Realitäten reflektiert. Damit dies gelingt, schlagen wir fünf Schlüsselbereiche vor, welche Deutschland gemeinsam mit Brüssel ausgestalten und priorisieren sollte:
1. Wohlstandssicherung und Wirtschaftsförderung: Vier Jahre nach dem Start von Global Gateway sollte sich Deutschland für eine stärkere Partnerorientierung und für eine Konkretisierung der Initiative hinsichtlich ihrer formalen Ziele und Prioritäten stark machen – auch in den bevorstehenden EU-Haushaltsverhandlungen.
2. Sicherheitspolitische Beiträge von Entwicklungspolitik: Die EU und Deutschland sollten gezielt entwicklungspolitische Bereiche und Initiativen fördern, die einen sicherheitspolitischen Mehrwert entfalten. Dies ist insbesondere im Fall der zivilen Unterstützung der Ukraine und im Bereich der Krisenprävention in fragilen Kontexten möglich.
3. Migration: Die EU sollte ihre externe Migrationspolitik im Hinblick auf Wirksamkeit und unbeabsichtigte Folgen kritisch überprüfen. Sie sollte mehr Transparenz und klare Standards bei Migrationspartnerschaften schaffen und Konditionalität als begrenztes, kontextabhängiges Instrument einsetzen. Um gegenseitigen Nutzen für die EU und ihre Partner zu sichern, ist ein ausgewogenes Zusammenspiel von kurzfristiger Krisenbewältigung und langfristiger Ursachenbekämpfung entscheidend, das von Investitionen in legale Mobilitätsoptionen flankiert wird.
4. Team Europe im multilateralen Kontext: Die derzeit laufenden Reformdiskussionen in den Vereinten Nationen (VN) erfordern das Engagement der EU und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten und eine starke gemeinsame Position – auch angesichts der Verpflichtung des EU-Vertrags, multilaterale Lösungen für globale Herausforderungen zu suchen.
5. Demokratieförderung, transnationale Netzwerke und politische Bildung: Deutschland und Europa sollten ihre Demokratieförderung gemeinsam überdenken und priorisieren. Insbesondere zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen, die sich für die Förderung von Demokratie und Menschenrechten einset-zen, sollten stärker unterstützt werden.

Das Bundeskabinett will heute die Aktivrente beschließen. Menschen, die über das reguläre Rentenalter hinaus in abhängiger Beschäftigung arbeiten, dürfen dann ab 2026 bis zu 2000 Euro im Monat steuerfrei hinzuverdienen. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Peter Haan, Leiter der Abteilung Staat am DIW Berlin:

Es ist richtig, die Beschäftigung älterer Menschen zu fördern. Aktuell sind in Deutschland circa 20 Prozent der 65- bis 69-Jährigen erwerbstätig - in der Regel in Minijobs. Hier liegt also ein wichtiges Potenzial, um den Fachkräftemangel zu reduzieren und das Rentensystem zu stabilisieren.

Der Effekt der Aktivrente dürfte aber überschaubar sein. Dazu kommt, dass negative fiskalische Effekte zu erwarten sind und dass verteilungspolitische sowie verfassungsrechtliche Fragen bleiben. Insbesondere die Nichtberücksichtigung von Selbständigen könnte zu Problemen führen. Finanzielle Anreize sind nur ein Faktor, warum ältere Menschen arbeiten. Wichtiger sind Arbeitsbedingungen, Sinn und Befriedigung durch Arbeit, aber auch Weiterbildung und Gesundheit. Hier muss die Politik investieren.

Gleichzeitig sollte das Rentensystem so reformiert werden, dass es keine Anreize gibt, früher aus der Beschäftigung zu gehen. Reformen bei der Rente für besonders langjährig Versicherte („Rente mit 63“) oder bei der steuerlich geförderte Altersteilzeit sollten an erster Stelle stehen.

Hohe Inflation hat den Anstieg der Bruttostundenlöhne und Haushaltsnettoeinkommen gebremst – Einkommensungleichheit und Armutsrisikoquote stagnieren seit 2020 – Unter Geflüchteten und Erwerbslosen ist Armutsrisiko weit überdurchschnittlich hoch und deutlich gestiegen Die hohe Inflation der Jahre 20 ...

De nombreuses personnes souhaitant investir dans l’immobilier freinent des 2 pieds au moment où la perspective de gérer des locataires pointe le bout de son nez. Dans d’autres cas, il s’agit de travaux ou encore d’un imprévu qui peuvent freiner cette démarche. Pourtant, il existe une solution permettant de profiter des avantages de l’immobilier sans ...

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Am 17. und 18. November organisieren wir einen zweitägigen Präsenz-Workshop zum Sozio-oekonomischen Panel (SOEP) am DIW Berlin. Neben Vorträgen zu Aufbau, Datenstruktur, Ziehungsdesign und Gewichtungsstrategie bieten hands-on Sessions eine praxisorientierte Annäherung an die Daten und ihre ...

Bonn, 14. Oktober 2025.  Während Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten eine entscheidende Rolle in der Landwirtschaft und in Ernährungssystemen spielen, werden sie in Datenerhebungen und Entscheidungsprozessen allzu oft vergessen.

Am 15. Oktober begehen wir den Internationalen Tag der Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten und würdigen damit „die zentrale Rolle von Frauen [...] und ihren Beitrag zur Förderung der landwirtschaftlichen und ländlichen Entwicklung, zur Verbesserung der Ernährungssicherheit und zur Beseitigung der ländlichen Armut“. Das Thema für 2025, „Der Aufstieg der Frauen auf dem Land: Mit Beijing+30 eine resiliente Zukunft aufbauen“, unterstreicht die Ungleichheit, mit der ländliche Frauen nach wie vor konfrontiert sind, und ihre entscheidende Rolle für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung.

Zahlreiche Fakten belegen die entscheidende Rolle von Frauen in der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion. Zum Beispiel das Anpflanzen, Ernten und Verarbeiten von Feldfrüchten, das Sichern der Ernährung ihrer Haushalte und das Hüten der natürlichen Ressourcen für künftige Generationen. Allerdings gehören Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten oft zu den Ärmsten und stellen den Großteil der Analphabet*innen weltweit. Schätzungen zufolge wäre das Potenzial von Frauen enorm, wenn sie nur denselben Zugang und die gleichen Chancen wie Männer hätten. Millionen von Menschen würden so aus der Armut herauskommen.

Eines ist klar: Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sind Multiplikatorinnen in ihren Gemeinschaften. Damit dieses Potenzial ausgeschöpft werden kann, müssen politische Maßnahmen jedoch auf einem differenzierten Verständnis der vielfältigen Lebensrealitäten von Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten beruhen. Hinter der öffentlichen Anerkennung von „ländlichen Frauen“ steht eine vereinfachende Zuschreibung. Wer verbirgt sich tatsächlich hinter dieser Bezeichnung? Datenlücken zeigen, dass ihre Lebensrealitäten bislang nur unzureichend abgebildet werden.

Das Wissen um die bestehenden Lücken hat verschiedene Datensysteme mit geschlechtsspezifischer Differenzierung hervorgebracht. Die Gender Disaggregated Labor Database der Weltbank liefert detaillierte Einblicke in die Erwerbsbeteiligung in unterschiedlichen Berufsfeldern. Der UN Women Data Hub erhebt Daten, um die Überwachung der Nachhaltigkeitsziele (SDG-Monitoring) aus einer Geschlechterperspektive zu unterstützen. Ebenso misst der Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI), die Handlungsfähigkeit und Mitbestimmung von Frauen in landwirtschaftlichen Entscheidungsprozessen. Doch auch wenn die Verfügbarkeit solcher Daten zunimmt, zeigen die bisherigen Erkenntnisse klar: Geschlechtsspezifische Ungleichheiten bestehen fort und unser Wissen bleibt begrenzt.

Trotz erzielter Fortschritte bilden unsere Datensysteme die Vielfalt der Lebensrealitäten von Frauen noch immer nicht umfassend ab. Wir sind uns der strukturellen Benachteiligung und Mehrfachdiskriminierung von Frauen bewusst. Sie manifestiert sich in ungleichen Voraussetzungen für den Zugang zu, die Kontrolle über und den Besitz von grundlegenden Ressourcen, in asymmetrischen Machtverhältnissen, dem Ausschluss von Frauen aus Entscheidungsprozessen sowie der geschlechtsspezifischen Arbeitsteilung. Hinzu kommen Gewalt und soziale Normen, die dem Empowerment von Frauen entgegenstehen. Während die Diskriminierung von Frauen gut dokumentiert ist, bleiben intersektionale Diskriminierungen weitgehend unsichtbar. Denn die Überschneidung von Geschlecht mit Alter, ethnischer Zugehörigkeit, Familienstand, Klasse oder geografischem Kontext schafft jeweils eigene Muster von Privileg und Ausgrenzung. Hier beginnen die Datenlücken sichtbar zu werden.

In vielen Fällen verschleiern unsere Annahmen über „die Frauen“ jene Vorurteile, die schon bei der Datenerhebung und -interpretation zum Tragen kommen. Viele Erhebungen erfolgen auf Haushaltsebene oder aus öffentlichen Quellen, meist aus einer männlich geprägten Perspektive. So mag ein Haushalt Land besitzen, ohne dass Frauen Einfluss auf dessen Nutzung haben. Der Kauf moderner Landmaschinen bedeutet nicht automatisch, dass Frauen sie auch bedienen können, da ihnen die entsprechende Ausbildung fehlt.

Darüber hinaus existieren Dimensionen der Lebenswirklichkeit von Frauen, die gänzlich außerhalb unseres derzeitigen Wissens liegen. Wer fundierte politische Empfehlungen für Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten entwickeln und ihre zentrale Rolle sichtbar machen will, muss sich bewusst mit diesen blinden Flecken auseinandersetzen. Die bloße Aufnahme einer Geschlechtsvariable in eine Umfrage genügt nicht mehr. Echte Inklusivität erfordert einen tiefgreifenden Wandel in Forschungsdesign und Methodik. Partizipative Ansätze – etwa gemeinschaftliche Lernplattformen, Fokusgruppendiskussionen oder kooperative Forschungsprozesse – können helfen, die verborgenen Dynamiken innerhalb von Haushalten und Gemeinschaften offenzulegen.

Am Internationalen Tag der Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sollten sich Entwicklungsorganisationen, Regierungen, Forschende und Gemeinschaften gleichermaßen dazu verpflichten, Frauen in all ihrer Vielfalt als zentrale Akteurinnen ländlicher Entwicklung anzuerkennen und das Bewusstsein für das zu schärfen, was wir noch nicht wissen. Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sichtbar zu machen, bestehende Lücken bei Ressourcen, Rechten und Daten zu schließen und ihre vielfältigen Perspektiven einzubeziehen, sind konkrete Schritte auf dem Weg zu Geschlechtergerechtigkeit, ökologischer Nachhaltigkeit und einer inklusiveren ländlichen Wirtschaft.

Bonn, 14. Oktober 2025.  Während Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten eine entscheidende Rolle in der Landwirtschaft und in Ernährungssystemen spielen, werden sie in Datenerhebungen und Entscheidungsprozessen allzu oft vergessen.

Am 15. Oktober begehen wir den Internationalen Tag der Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten und würdigen damit „die zentrale Rolle von Frauen [...] und ihren Beitrag zur Förderung der landwirtschaftlichen und ländlichen Entwicklung, zur Verbesserung der Ernährungssicherheit und zur Beseitigung der ländlichen Armut“. Das Thema für 2025, „Der Aufstieg der Frauen auf dem Land: Mit Beijing+30 eine resiliente Zukunft aufbauen“, unterstreicht die Ungleichheit, mit der ländliche Frauen nach wie vor konfrontiert sind, und ihre entscheidende Rolle für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung.

Zahlreiche Fakten belegen die entscheidende Rolle von Frauen in der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion. Zum Beispiel das Anpflanzen, Ernten und Verarbeiten von Feldfrüchten, das Sichern der Ernährung ihrer Haushalte und das Hüten der natürlichen Ressourcen für künftige Generationen. Allerdings gehören Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten oft zu den Ärmsten und stellen den Großteil der Analphabet*innen weltweit. Schätzungen zufolge wäre das Potenzial von Frauen enorm, wenn sie nur denselben Zugang und die gleichen Chancen wie Männer hätten. Millionen von Menschen würden so aus der Armut herauskommen.

Eines ist klar: Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sind Multiplikatorinnen in ihren Gemeinschaften. Damit dieses Potenzial ausgeschöpft werden kann, müssen politische Maßnahmen jedoch auf einem differenzierten Verständnis der vielfältigen Lebensrealitäten von Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten beruhen. Hinter der öffentlichen Anerkennung von „ländlichen Frauen“ steht eine vereinfachende Zuschreibung. Wer verbirgt sich tatsächlich hinter dieser Bezeichnung? Datenlücken zeigen, dass ihre Lebensrealitäten bislang nur unzureichend abgebildet werden.

Das Wissen um die bestehenden Lücken hat verschiedene Datensysteme mit geschlechtsspezifischer Differenzierung hervorgebracht. Die Gender Disaggregated Labor Database der Weltbank liefert detaillierte Einblicke in die Erwerbsbeteiligung in unterschiedlichen Berufsfeldern. Der UN Women Data Hub erhebt Daten, um die Überwachung der Nachhaltigkeitsziele (SDG-Monitoring) aus einer Geschlechterperspektive zu unterstützen. Ebenso misst der Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI), die Handlungsfähigkeit und Mitbestimmung von Frauen in landwirtschaftlichen Entscheidungsprozessen. Doch auch wenn die Verfügbarkeit solcher Daten zunimmt, zeigen die bisherigen Erkenntnisse klar: Geschlechtsspezifische Ungleichheiten bestehen fort und unser Wissen bleibt begrenzt.

Trotz erzielter Fortschritte bilden unsere Datensysteme die Vielfalt der Lebensrealitäten von Frauen noch immer nicht umfassend ab. Wir sind uns der strukturellen Benachteiligung und Mehrfachdiskriminierung von Frauen bewusst. Sie manifestiert sich in ungleichen Voraussetzungen für den Zugang zu, die Kontrolle über und den Besitz von grundlegenden Ressourcen, in asymmetrischen Machtverhältnissen, dem Ausschluss von Frauen aus Entscheidungsprozessen sowie der geschlechtsspezifischen Arbeitsteilung. Hinzu kommen Gewalt und soziale Normen, die dem Empowerment von Frauen entgegenstehen. Während die Diskriminierung von Frauen gut dokumentiert ist, bleiben intersektionale Diskriminierungen weitgehend unsichtbar. Denn die Überschneidung von Geschlecht mit Alter, ethnischer Zugehörigkeit, Familienstand, Klasse oder geografischem Kontext schafft jeweils eigene Muster von Privileg und Ausgrenzung. Hier beginnen die Datenlücken sichtbar zu werden.

In vielen Fällen verschleiern unsere Annahmen über „die Frauen“ jene Vorurteile, die schon bei der Datenerhebung und -interpretation zum Tragen kommen. Viele Erhebungen erfolgen auf Haushaltsebene oder aus öffentlichen Quellen, meist aus einer männlich geprägten Perspektive. So mag ein Haushalt Land besitzen, ohne dass Frauen Einfluss auf dessen Nutzung haben. Der Kauf moderner Landmaschinen bedeutet nicht automatisch, dass Frauen sie auch bedienen können, da ihnen die entsprechende Ausbildung fehlt.

Darüber hinaus existieren Dimensionen der Lebenswirklichkeit von Frauen, die gänzlich außerhalb unseres derzeitigen Wissens liegen. Wer fundierte politische Empfehlungen für Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten entwickeln und ihre zentrale Rolle sichtbar machen will, muss sich bewusst mit diesen blinden Flecken auseinandersetzen. Die bloße Aufnahme einer Geschlechtsvariable in eine Umfrage genügt nicht mehr. Echte Inklusivität erfordert einen tiefgreifenden Wandel in Forschungsdesign und Methodik. Partizipative Ansätze – etwa gemeinschaftliche Lernplattformen, Fokusgruppendiskussionen oder kooperative Forschungsprozesse – können helfen, die verborgenen Dynamiken innerhalb von Haushalten und Gemeinschaften offenzulegen.

Am Internationalen Tag der Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sollten sich Entwicklungsorganisationen, Regierungen, Forschende und Gemeinschaften gleichermaßen dazu verpflichten, Frauen in all ihrer Vielfalt als zentrale Akteurinnen ländlicher Entwicklung anzuerkennen und das Bewusstsein für das zu schärfen, was wir noch nicht wissen. Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sichtbar zu machen, bestehende Lücken bei Ressourcen, Rechten und Daten zu schließen und ihre vielfältigen Perspektiven einzubeziehen, sind konkrete Schritte auf dem Weg zu Geschlechtergerechtigkeit, ökologischer Nachhaltigkeit und einer inklusiveren ländlichen Wirtschaft.

Bonn, 14. Oktober 2025.  Während Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten eine entscheidende Rolle in der Landwirtschaft und in Ernährungssystemen spielen, werden sie in Datenerhebungen und Entscheidungsprozessen allzu oft vergessen.

Am 15. Oktober begehen wir den Internationalen Tag der Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten und würdigen damit „die zentrale Rolle von Frauen [...] und ihren Beitrag zur Förderung der landwirtschaftlichen und ländlichen Entwicklung, zur Verbesserung der Ernährungssicherheit und zur Beseitigung der ländlichen Armut“. Das Thema für 2025, „Der Aufstieg der Frauen auf dem Land: Mit Beijing+30 eine resiliente Zukunft aufbauen“, unterstreicht die Ungleichheit, mit der ländliche Frauen nach wie vor konfrontiert sind, und ihre entscheidende Rolle für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung.

Zahlreiche Fakten belegen die entscheidende Rolle von Frauen in der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion. Zum Beispiel das Anpflanzen, Ernten und Verarbeiten von Feldfrüchten, das Sichern der Ernährung ihrer Haushalte und das Hüten der natürlichen Ressourcen für künftige Generationen. Allerdings gehören Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten oft zu den Ärmsten und stellen den Großteil der Analphabet*innen weltweit. Schätzungen zufolge wäre das Potenzial von Frauen enorm, wenn sie nur denselben Zugang und die gleichen Chancen wie Männer hätten. Millionen von Menschen würden so aus der Armut herauskommen.

Eines ist klar: Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sind Multiplikatorinnen in ihren Gemeinschaften. Damit dieses Potenzial ausgeschöpft werden kann, müssen politische Maßnahmen jedoch auf einem differenzierten Verständnis der vielfältigen Lebensrealitäten von Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten beruhen. Hinter der öffentlichen Anerkennung von „ländlichen Frauen“ steht eine vereinfachende Zuschreibung. Wer verbirgt sich tatsächlich hinter dieser Bezeichnung? Datenlücken zeigen, dass ihre Lebensrealitäten bislang nur unzureichend abgebildet werden.

Das Wissen um die bestehenden Lücken hat verschiedene Datensysteme mit geschlechtsspezifischer Differenzierung hervorgebracht. Die Gender Disaggregated Labor Database der Weltbank liefert detaillierte Einblicke in die Erwerbsbeteiligung in unterschiedlichen Berufsfeldern. Der UN Women Data Hub erhebt Daten, um die Überwachung der Nachhaltigkeitsziele (SDG-Monitoring) aus einer Geschlechterperspektive zu unterstützen. Ebenso misst der Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI), die Handlungsfähigkeit und Mitbestimmung von Frauen in landwirtschaftlichen Entscheidungsprozessen. Doch auch wenn die Verfügbarkeit solcher Daten zunimmt, zeigen die bisherigen Erkenntnisse klar: Geschlechtsspezifische Ungleichheiten bestehen fort und unser Wissen bleibt begrenzt.

Trotz erzielter Fortschritte bilden unsere Datensysteme die Vielfalt der Lebensrealitäten von Frauen noch immer nicht umfassend ab. Wir sind uns der strukturellen Benachteiligung und Mehrfachdiskriminierung von Frauen bewusst. Sie manifestiert sich in ungleichen Voraussetzungen für den Zugang zu, die Kontrolle über und den Besitz von grundlegenden Ressourcen, in asymmetrischen Machtverhältnissen, dem Ausschluss von Frauen aus Entscheidungsprozessen sowie der geschlechtsspezifischen Arbeitsteilung. Hinzu kommen Gewalt und soziale Normen, die dem Empowerment von Frauen entgegenstehen. Während die Diskriminierung von Frauen gut dokumentiert ist, bleiben intersektionale Diskriminierungen weitgehend unsichtbar. Denn die Überschneidung von Geschlecht mit Alter, ethnischer Zugehörigkeit, Familienstand, Klasse oder geografischem Kontext schafft jeweils eigene Muster von Privileg und Ausgrenzung. Hier beginnen die Datenlücken sichtbar zu werden.

In vielen Fällen verschleiern unsere Annahmen über „die Frauen“ jene Vorurteile, die schon bei der Datenerhebung und -interpretation zum Tragen kommen. Viele Erhebungen erfolgen auf Haushaltsebene oder aus öffentlichen Quellen, meist aus einer männlich geprägten Perspektive. So mag ein Haushalt Land besitzen, ohne dass Frauen Einfluss auf dessen Nutzung haben. Der Kauf moderner Landmaschinen bedeutet nicht automatisch, dass Frauen sie auch bedienen können, da ihnen die entsprechende Ausbildung fehlt.

Darüber hinaus existieren Dimensionen der Lebenswirklichkeit von Frauen, die gänzlich außerhalb unseres derzeitigen Wissens liegen. Wer fundierte politische Empfehlungen für Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten entwickeln und ihre zentrale Rolle sichtbar machen will, muss sich bewusst mit diesen blinden Flecken auseinandersetzen. Die bloße Aufnahme einer Geschlechtsvariable in eine Umfrage genügt nicht mehr. Echte Inklusivität erfordert einen tiefgreifenden Wandel in Forschungsdesign und Methodik. Partizipative Ansätze – etwa gemeinschaftliche Lernplattformen, Fokusgruppendiskussionen oder kooperative Forschungsprozesse – können helfen, die verborgenen Dynamiken innerhalb von Haushalten und Gemeinschaften offenzulegen.

Am Internationalen Tag der Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sollten sich Entwicklungsorganisationen, Regierungen, Forschende und Gemeinschaften gleichermaßen dazu verpflichten, Frauen in all ihrer Vielfalt als zentrale Akteurinnen ländlicher Entwicklung anzuerkennen und das Bewusstsein für das zu schärfen, was wir noch nicht wissen. Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sichtbar zu machen, bestehende Lücken bei Ressourcen, Rechten und Daten zu schließen und ihre vielfältigen Perspektiven einzubeziehen, sind konkrete Schritte auf dem Weg zu Geschlechtergerechtigkeit, ökologischer Nachhaltigkeit und einer inklusiveren ländlichen Wirtschaft.

Populisten inszenieren Klimaschutz als Klassenkampf und schüren so Ängste. Fakt ist: Das Aus für den Verbrennungsmotor ist sozial, wenn die Kosten fair verteilt werden., Die Bundesregierung streitet über das geplante Verbrenner-Aus ab 2035. Dabei geht es nicht nur um Klimapolitik, sondern auch um soziale Gerechtigkeit: Wer trägt die Kosten – und wer profitiert? In Deutschland instrumentalisieren populistische Kräfte diese Debatte zunehmend, indem sie Klimaschutz als ...

Während Europa über China als „systemischen Rivalen“ diskutiert, agiert ein einflussreicher Akteur fast unbemerkt im Hintergrund: die Internationale Abteilung der Kommunistischen Partei (CCP-ID). Hinter diesem bürokratisch klingenden Namen verbirgt sich ein zentraler Akteur chinesischer Außenbeziehungen mit klarem Auftrag: internationale Netzwerke aufbauen, Fürsprecher für China mobilisieren und politische Diskurse in anderen Ländern gezielt beeinflussen. Eine systematische Analyse zeigt, wie sich die Aktivitäten des CCP-ID in Europa seit Anfang der 2000er Jahre verändert haben.

Während Europa über China als „systemischen Rivalen“ diskutiert, agiert ein einflussreicher Akteur fast unbemerkt im Hintergrund: die Internationale Abteilung der Kommunistischen Partei (CCP-ID). Hinter diesem bürokratisch klingenden Namen verbirgt sich ein zentraler Akteur chinesischer Außenbeziehungen mit klarem Auftrag: internationale Netzwerke aufbauen, Fürsprecher für China mobilisieren und politische Diskurse in anderen Ländern gezielt beeinflussen. Eine systematische Analyse zeigt, wie sich die Aktivitäten des CCP-ID in Europa seit Anfang der 2000er Jahre verändert haben.

Während Europa über China als „systemischen Rivalen“ diskutiert, agiert ein einflussreicher Akteur fast unbemerkt im Hintergrund: die Internationale Abteilung der Kommunistischen Partei (CCP-ID). Hinter diesem bürokratisch klingenden Namen verbirgt sich ein zentraler Akteur chinesischer Außenbeziehungen mit klarem Auftrag: internationale Netzwerke aufbauen, Fürsprecher für China mobilisieren und politische Diskurse in anderen Ländern gezielt beeinflussen. Eine systematische Analyse zeigt, wie sich die Aktivitäten des CCP-ID in Europa seit Anfang der 2000er Jahre verändert haben.

• Since landing ships, made in Turkish shipyards in order to enable the invasion of Cyprus, reached their designated beachheads on the 20th of July of 1974, the Turkish defence technological industrial base (TDTIB) has been locked in a see saw pattern.
• From the late 1960’s to today the TDTIB has advanced in order to enable Turkey to exercise strategic autonomy. The very exercise of this strategic autonomy has recurrently caused ruptures with Turkey’s western allies. These ruptures have, in turn, disrupted the industrial partnerships on which the TDTIB depends.
• This pattern is experiencing a historic high currently with the TDTIB’s product range, which includes sophisticated UAVs and naval ships being employed by Turkey in support of an aggressive challenge of European interests, and most prominently in a comprehensive challenge of Greek rights, solidly established under UNCLOS, to an exclusive economic zone and to the laying of a subsea electricity cable linking Greece with Cyprus.
• At the same time, due to the European Union’ s (EU) rearmament effort, and the possibility of third countries participating in it, already provided from in the SAFE funding facility, the TDTIB has the opportunity to further grow in volume and sophistication.
• This policy paper will argue that this opportunity should be denied to the TDTIB both on the basis of past behavior of Turkey but also on solid evidence of the current and future priorities of the Erdogan regime.
• As in the past nearly sixty years, it is clear that the current Turkish leadership prioritises the exercise of its strategic autonomy, facilitated by the TDTIB, and not the TDTIB’s participation in the EU’s rearmament. Such a prioritization makes structurally unstable the relationship, and in particular highly prone to disruption, between the TDTIB and the EU’s rearmament effort.
• Additionally, the participation of the TDTIB in the EU’s rearmament effort by boosting the capacity of Turkey to challenge Greece’s and Cyprus’ sovereign rights, corrodes the principles of collective security, and thus undermines the ability of the EU to mobilise the collective resources necessary for its own strategic autonomy.
• Thus the TDTIB neither can nor should participate in the EU’s rearmament effort.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Antonis Kamaras, ELIAMEP Research Associate.

Introduction

This policy paper will posit that the Turkish defence technological industrial base (TDTIB) neither can nor should benefit from the EU’s collective rearmament effort and for the same set of reasons.  Turkey’s internal repression and external aggression make participation of the TDTIB in the EU’s rearmament both highly vulnerable to disruption and corrosive to the intra-EU consensus that collective rearmament requires for its realization.

The first section will chart the evolution of the TDTIB, from the effort to prepare for military intervention in Cyprus, culminating in the invasion of the island in 1974, to today’s integration of Turkish-made UAVs either in the cross border operations of the Turkish Armed Forces or in the military operations of Turkey’s proxies and allies.  The pattern will emerge of a see saw movement whereby strategic autonomy enabled by the TDIB creates bilateral or multilateral ruptures which in turn derail the TDTIB’s partnerships with key western partners.

The second section will argue that the interaction of the TDTIB with Turkey’s striving for a strategic autonomy that is mostly antithetical to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), as well as increasing domestic repression, will continue to be a mainstay of the Erdogan regime. Consequently, even if the TDTIB is allowed to benefit from the EU’s collective defence funding, the participation of the TDTIB in the EU’s rearmament effort is bound to be a structurally unstable, and thus an inherently unreliable proposition.

The third section will explore the way in which the EU’s collective rearmament effort is both constitutive and reliant upon the construction of a new EU polity, as it involves greater collective mobilisation of resources in the service of the defence needs of all EU members. These defence needs are already more diverse than the Russo-Ukrainian war suggests and bound to get more so in the future, due to the size and diversity of the Union. By extension, this polity, the ‘geopolitical Europe’ as it has been called, cannot privilege one threat over another, nor one or more member-states’ threat perception over the threat perceptions of other member-states, if it is to achieve the cohesion and mobilisational capacity that are indispensable to its viability.  Yet the participation of the TDTIB in the EU’s rearmament, by undermining the Greek and Cypriot deterrence over Turkish aggression, discriminates in terms of which threat is considered to be important, and for which member-states, at the EU-collective level and which is less so.

The fourth section will review arguments made in favour of the participation of the TDTIB in Europe’s rearmament, and policies recommended to that effect, and evaluate whether they can indeed supersede the considerable disadvantages of such participation indentified by the author.

The concluding section will, on the basis of the above, argue that the TDTIB should be excluded from participating in the EU’s collective rearmament effort.

The evolution of the relationship between the TDTIB and Turkey’s strategic autonomy

On the 20th of July 1974 Turkish landing ships reached the designated beachheads in Cyprus out of which poured Turkish infantry, tanks and armoured personnel carriers.  As the authors of the definitive study of the Turkish invasion to Cyprus point out this was the commencement of “the only successfully completed amphibious and airborne landing against a determined defender since 1945”[1]. The invasion of Cyprus was also one of the largest, in terms of the proportion of territory lost by a sovereign state via military means, partial conquests in the post WW II era, partial as opposed to total conquests being the dominant form of territorial conquest in this period[2].     It is worthwhile mentioning that as a result of this military operation 36 % of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus is still occupied by Turkey whereas Russia, today and after more than three years of war, occupies approximately 20 % of Ukrainian territory.

Preparation for the invasion also included the founding act of the creation of the TDTIB, in the post WW II era, in the service of Turkey’s strategic autonomy.   Although discussions among Turkish civilian and military policy makers on a possible invasion of Cyprus started as early as 1955 it was after the Cyprus crisis of 1964 and the humiliating Johnson letter, in which the US President explicitly forbade Turkey from employing US equipment to invade Cyprus, that Turkey set itself on a path to acquire its own technical means necessary for such a successful invasion. Specifically, a US embargo on the sale of landing ships, tank (LSTs), led Turkey to convert ships to this configuration, acquired by other countries, and more importantly for Turkish shipyards to acquire the capability to construct 600-ton LSTs in the 1970S, twelve of which had joined the Turkish navy by 1974[3].

Importantly, the invasion of Cyprus set in motion a see saw pattern which has exercised, still today, a bit more than half a century, determinative influence over the interaction between the TDTIB and Turkey’s strategic autonomy. In essence, the TDTIB by enabling Turkey’s strategic autonomy would contribute to the implementation of weapons embargoes by Turkey’s main Western weapon systems suppliers, subsequent to the exercise of such an autonomy. In return these embargoes would both disrupt the evolution of the TDTIB while also pushing Turkish policy makers to double down in developing the TDTIB, with Turkey’s own resources, albeit subject to the structural and fiscal constraints of the country[4].

The invasion of Cyprus catalysed the mobilization of the politically influential Greek-American community which, in the aftermath of Watergate, managed to convince the US Congress to impose a weapons embargo to Turkey on all US weapons sales, which lasted for three years. This ‘rule of law’ lobby successfully argued that the invasion of Cyprus was not simply a Greek and Greek-Cypriot matter but constituted a gross violation of the universal norm of sovereignty, and as such warranted Congressional restrictions placed on the US Administration, regarding the management of the US-Turkey relationship[5].  Analysts of the TDTIB are in agreement, that the US embargo catalyzed the determination of Turkey’s policy makers to invest in a long term effort to develop comprehensively their defence industrial capacity such that a future embargo would not threaten to cripple the Turkish Armed Forces, considering for example that Turkey’s Air Force in 1974 was completely depended on US spare parts[6].

A brief review[7] of the key incidents that negatively affected Turkey’s access to Western weapon systems, including the provision of such access via bilateral or multilateral DTIB partnerships, demonstrate continuity with the pivotal Cyprus invasion and its aftermath.

The repression of the Kurds in the 1990’s, at a time when Turkey was under military tutelage, resulted in suspension of weapon sales from Western European suppliers, particularly land systems. The 1996 Imia crisis with Greece had a similar effect. Both the repression of the Kurds, which entailed massive violations of human rights, and the Imia incident which was accompanied and justified by a baseless challenge of Greek sovereignty of the Imia as well as other Aegean islets constituted norm breaking behavior to Western perceptions[8].

The Mavi Marmara crisis in 2010 which led to a complete breakdown of the defence relationship between Israel and Turkey, including the cessation of a productive for the TDTIB relationship with leading Israeli defence firms, also constituted an exception, in terms of a European and North American canon. This canon mandates that Europeans at the country and EU level, due to the status of the Holocaust as a genocide implemented in European soil, by Nazi Germany and the active collaboration of important societal forces in Nazi-occupied countries, from Lithuania to Greece,  will make allowances to the Jewish state (with suspension of weapons sales imposed on Israel in the 1960’s  by France and the UK driven solely by commercial and geopolitical considerations and in particular the need to sustain relationships with the Arab world).  Turkey, as a predominantly Muslim country which did not fall under Nazi occupation and was not a combatant in WW II, is clearly outside this canon.   The point here is not whether the EU and its constituent member-countries are in the right in not taking a more robust attitude towards the death and destruction visited upon Gaza at the time of writing by Israel’s armed forces – but rather to underline that EU member states, their diversity notwithstanding, share in a historical past and normative preferences to a greater degree among themselves than they do with Turkey.

The acquisition of the Russian S400 ground to air system, and the resulting expulsion of the TDTIB from the dominant, globally, 5th generation aircraft’s supply chain also reflects Turkish exceptionalism. In effect, Turkey struck such a close defence relationship with a country, Russia, presenting a clear threat to European security already two years prior, as the conquest of Crimea which reanimated fears of Russian intent in the Western camp had already taken place in 2014. Indicatively, France had to revisit its 2011 decision, under the Sarkozy Presidency, to sell two Mistral helicopter carriers to Russia, cancelling the sale by 2014, under the Hollande Presidency. The decision to sell the Mistrals to Russia was misaligned, to say the least, with the strategic interests of the western alliance France was a member of, which furthermore threatened its overall defence relationship with front line states of the EU and NATO[9]. To the extent that the S400 decision was motivated by Erdogan’s suspicion that the US instigated the 2016 coup attempt against him and he had to, in effect, acquire a ground to air defence system that could guard him against his own US-equipped and trained Air Force[10], this procurement decision also points to an exceptional distrust of the US by a fellow NATO-member country, exceptional even by the standards set by the second Trump Presidency.

In 2018 Turkey’s deliberated-upon partnership with Italy and France for the co-production of SMT missiles was suspended due to Turkey’s divergent interests in Syria and the Mediterranean[11].  Turkey’s aggressive challenging in the field of Greek and Greek-Cypriot sovereign rights led to Turkey’s exclusion from the PESCO and EDF R&D defence funds in the early 2020’s to today. Turkey’s military operations in Syria, against Kurdish forces, its human rights record, and other such issues, also generated opposition to weapon sales in Holland which has a strong lobby arguing for a normative-informed weapons export policy[12].    Last but not least, the sale of Eurofighter aircraft to Turkey was suspended, in early 2025, due to the opposition of the previous German government, engendered by the imprisonment of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglou and Erdogan’s most formidable challenger for the office of the Presidency. This decision was reversed by the succeeding CDU-led government while there is ongoing speculation on whether Greece will manage to impose commitments by the government of Turkey that the Typhoons will not be used against her.

Importantly, Turkey’s policy in Libya which has alienated France was also induced by the former’s need to challenge Greek sovereign rights in the Mediterranean, by advancing through an agreement with Libya, the notion that Greece’s islands, even such large ones as Crete do not produce sovereign rights in terms of the delineation of exclusive economic zones, a notion widely accepted as contravening the international law of the seas[13]. We also mention that Greece exerted pressure, albeit unsuccessfully, to freeze the partnership between Spain and Germany and Turkey, involving respectively, the manufacturing under license of an aircraft carrier and advanced T214 submarines.

Overshadowing Turkey’s relationships with Western counterparts, is the contributing role itself of TDTIB in Turkey’s geopolitical exceptionalism. Turkish-made UAVs, and more largely their integration in combined arms operations initially in Southern Turkey and subsequently in Syria, Libya and Nagorno Karabach, have been a contributing factor in counter mobilization against Turkey by influential ethnic communities in Germany (Turkish Kurds) and the US (Greek-Americans, Armenian-Americans, Jewish-Americans).  In an action-reaction dynamic techno-nationalism, namely the vested interest of the Erdogan regime to demonstrate to domestic audiences the superiority of Turkish arms, the martial virtues of the Turkish soldier being leveraged by the indigenous technical means at his disposal, has been adding fuel to the fire[14].  Additionally, the ambitious naval shipbuilding programme of the Turkish Navy has fueled Turkish aggression in the Mediterranean, encapsulated in the Mavi Vatan doctrine, with parochial but influential economic and Service (Turkish Navy) interests being vested in Turkey’s geopolitical aggrandizement.      This package gets wrapped up in Turkey’s emergence as a classic middle power, its geopolitical ambitions informed by reimaginings of its imperial past and propelled forward by the US’s profound ambivalence of its role as a global policeman[15]. To top it all, the return of ‘Big War, as evidenced in Ukraine, has reinforced the link between a country’s ability to achieve escalation dominance and the size and capability of its DTIB, with even war gaming now including defence industrial capacity in the context of a sustained war effort[16].  As such the TDTIB, depending on its evolution, can very well contribute to the ‘war optimism’ of Turkeys’ leadership under an ever expanding range of military conflict scenarios.

All in all, what is observed in Turkey is a recurrent pattern over a period of approximately sixty years of divergent geopolitical interests, informed by geography, history and identity, as well as of impossible to dislodge for long domestic authoritarianism, derailing bilateral or multilateral defence relationships. Domestic and international Western norm breaking, or even lack of sharing of historically-informed western preferences, as in the case of Israel, are also an important factor. Geopolitical divergence and norm breaking also create fertile ground for the seeding and growth of coalitions in Europe and North America which prioritise the breaking up of such bilateral and multilateral defence relationships between Turkey and the West.  Such a counter-reaction is assisted by the fact that Erdogan has now been entrenched in a gallery of rogues, right next to Putin, of leaders willing to employ force to impose their will both to their own citizens and to neighbouring states[17].

Furthermore, the more capable the TDTIB has become and the greater a share of a sophisticated supply chain of a weapon system it can claim, the more disruptive the subsequent rupture becomes for its western partner(s).  This highly volatile relationship of weapons manufacturing and sales by the West to Turkey, of sixty years standing, started with the denial and then suspension of sales of weapon systems for which the nascent TDTIB would provide limited  maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) support services, such as the technologically simple, WW II-vintage LSTs, and culminated in the need by Lockheed Martin, the US manufacturer of F35s, the world’s leading fifth-generation fighter jet,  to replace in short order a total of 12 billion USD’s worth of supply chain production  by those Turkish firms which were expelled from the F35 manufacturing programme, after Erdogan’s  decision to procure the S400s[18]. Indeed, if the F35 imbroglio demonstrates anything is that the participation of the TDTIB to valuable for the Turkish economy supply chains, as much as to the its Western partners, will and can be sacrificed if domestic imperatives and or strategic autonomy rationales mandate so.

Can the Erdogan regime strike a viable partnership between the TDTIB and the EDTIB?

There is no doubt that the TDTIB stands to gain a lot in turns of both volume of sales and innovation capabilities were it to be incorporated in the European Defence Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB), in terms similar to those accessible to the UK and Norway. As with the case of South Korea, industrialised nations which doubled down in the development of their DTIBs due to geopolitical circumstances different from those enjoyed by most EU-members, are now in a position to meet rapidly increasing demand for everything military[19]. More largely, Turkey’s robust manufacturing base together with the geographic proximity to the EU, make the country one of the potential greatest beneficiaries of the EU’s need to build up resilient supply chains via near-shoring partnerships. Naturally such a geopolitically driven partnership between the EU and Turkey can also be translated in political leverage in terms of the enhanced ability of Turkish policy makers to make what EU interlocutors, including Greek ones, would consider as legitimate Turkish interests and policy priorities appreciated and respected both in Brussels and the chancelleries of Europe.

Equally, such an alignment of industrial and geopolitical interests is simply not realistic if Turkey, under Erdogan and his potential regime successors, stays on the same course, of a) geopolitical heterodoxy, a heterodoxy which includes the attempt to challenge the sovereignty of EU member-countries, namely Greece and Cyprus, as well as b) to effectively suspend democracy in Turkey, and go, as international commentators have noted, for ‘full autocracy’[20].  As with the previous instances of the disruption in TDTIB bilateral and multilateral partnerships which we briefly reviewed above, sooner or later this domestic and foreign policy mix, catalyzed by any one or more future incidents that it is bound to generate, will derail Turkey’s DTIB relationship with the EU.  Simply put, this Turkish comportment will, as it has so often done in the past, create the coalitions between pressure groups and states, the mutually reinforcing loop between norms and interests that will compel the EU to show the door to TDTIB, notwithstanding any defence industrial partnerships that may have been struck in the meantime. Indeed, several EU reports recurrently produced long lists of policy items where there is massive divergence between Turkey and the EU, a veritable minefield of unbridgeable gaps in interests and norms that can explode at any moment[21].

In the estimation of this policy paper, in the timeframe of any possible decision by the EU and its member-states, say the next 2-3 years, the second possibility of continuous divergence from CFSP is the most realistic one and not the first.

The fact that Erdogan is determined to hold on to power, despite the near certainty that any under conceivable scenario of free and competitive elections he will lose by any one of his  most formidable opponents, among CHP’s leadership roster, mandates repression at home and aggression abroad. The economic benefits of a geopolitically-based industrial partnership between the EU and Turkey are not enough, and cannot come fast enough, to make him prevail over any of his more charismatic opponents in the 2027 Presidential elections.   So he has to throw his opponents into prison, causing further trouble to the Turkish economy which has already eroded his popularity irrevocably.  Indeed, the more times passes, the more inexorable the process of eliminating the regime’s main political foe, CHP, as a viable political competitor becomes, with accretive imprisonments and suspensions from public life, directed against an ever widening circle of key CHP personalities[22].

Increased domestic repression, in turn, is legitimized by aggressive assertion abroad.  The militarization of Turkish foreign policy as a pillar of Erdogan’s effort to checkmate his domestic opponents has been well-documented, particularly through Turkish military operations in Syria[23].  Turkey’s currently ongoing challenge in the field, of Greece’s effort to lay an electric energy interconnecting cable between Crete and Cyprus, the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI), a project of Common European Interest, partly funded by the EU, and executed by a leading French manufacturer with an expertise in subsea electricity cable laying, has reanimated Greece’s objections to the TDTIB benefiting from the EU rearmament. These objections were most prominently demonstrated in Greek efforts to eliminate the possibility that Turkish defence firms will benefit, as subcontractors, from EU defence procurement orders funded by the concessionary rates of the 150-billio euro SAFE programme[24]

The bigger picture is one of a Turkish leader who, from the 2010’s onwards, has grounded his hegemonic enterprise on extracting geopolitical rents and prestige from unilateral force projection as opposed through economic and geopolitical integration with the EU.

This strategic choice of Erdogan has nullified politically most if not all of the advantages that accrued to the New Democracy (ND) Greek Government by the ‘calm waters’ Greco-Turkish agreement  of 2023, namely the containment of illegal migration flows from the Turkish coast to the east Aegean islands, the visa facilitation of tourist flows from the Turkish  coast  to the East Aegean islands (essentially the agreement exchanged politically destabilizing migratory flows to Greece with politically beneficial tourist flows), the cessation of violations of the Greek air space by the Turkish Air Force and the containment of the geopolitical risk, as a factor which could derail  Greece’s still painfully gradual recovery from the ten year fiscal crisis and in particular threaten the lucrative for the Greek economy tourist season.

It is illuminating that at the present juncture, when Turkey has every interest to ‘play nice’ with Greece on the basis of this ‘calms water’ agreement, in view of the potential benefits that may accrue to her from a partnership with the EU, it is challenging as we mentioned above in the field the right of Greece, according to the international law of the seas, to explore the seabed and proceed to lay the GSI cable between Crete and Cyprus.  Turkish activism in Libya and Syria also aim at maintaining the idiosyncratic challenge, according to the international law of the seas, to Greece’s right for an exclusive economic zone, based on the position and size of its island territories, most prominently, but not exclusively, the largest such island territory, Crete.

This course of action pursued by Erdogan has created a dynamic in Greece in favour of a creation of yet another nationalistic party, threatening to eat into ND support, enabled the major opposition party, PASOK, to put the government on the spot on the issue of if and when the GSI will actually be implemented and has engendered critique, both within and outside ND, that primarily SAFE betrays the promise of collective European defence, by potentially benefiting the TDTIB.

Considering the above, and the fact that elections are to be held in Greece in 2027 at the latest, we may as well take for granted that Greece and Cyprus will energetically lobby against any type of participation by the TDITB in the rearmament of Europe.   While disagreements between Greece and the Republic of Cyprus on the financial viability of GSI have cast a shadow over the project’s viability, Greek policy makers have also provided assurances that Greece is determined to proceed with the laying of the cable, even if that means a testing of wills, militarily, in the field.

Indeed the fact that the Erdogan is being so reckless in pressing his claims against Greece, through diplomacy and force deployment, itself underlines the fragility of any future partnership between the EU’s rearmament effort and the TDTIB – it is proof positive that for the Erdogan regime such a partnership is a ‘nice to have’ whereas aggression against two EU member countries, Greece and Cyprus, are politically speaking ‘must haves’.      As it is, it is only because the Greek government has refrained, thus far, from forcing this issue via military means, in the field, as she is perfectly entitled and capable of doing so, that its fellow EU member-countries have not been compelled to admit the incongruity of Turkey’s participation in the EU’s rearmament effort.

Should the Erdogan regime be given the opportunity to strike a partnership between the TDTIB and Europe’s rearmament?

National commitments reached in NATO’s Hague summit, of a rise to 3.5 % of GDP to defence spending, and an additional 1.5 % of GDP spending to domains supporting NATO’s collective defence, should not be discounted as implausible. They reflect, on the one hand, the structural trend of the US to prioritise deterring a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which could be tantamount to nothing short of terminating US hegemony in Asia and the Pacific.  And, on the other hand, they illuminate Europe’s need to secure continued US fealty to NATO’s Article 5, premised on European countries picking up an ever greater share of the bill for conventional deterrence in Europe and, in exchange, retaining the US nuclear guarantee, as the ultimate deterrent against Russian aggression.

That being said, it is also commonly acknowledged that European states are determined to develop and deploy their own strategic enablers so that they do not become hostages to diverging US priorities, relating to collective European defence, or to US determination to leverage its military indispensability to extract rents from Europe via its trade and/or monetary policy[25].

Such enablers refer, first, to achieving economies of scale in the production of weapon platforms that are already within the technological reach of EU member-states, via EDTIB consolidation. Economies of scale in already available technologies would underpin strategic autonomy by producing enough quantities of limited in number platforms, by a consolidated EDTIB, so that the EU can deter against Russia, with the massive quantities of war materiel that the return of peer to peer conflict necessitates.

Second, strategic enablers are for the EU those technologies and weapon platforms which are currently provided by the US, as EU countries have not developed comparable capabilities. They refer, mainly, to strategic lift, ISR based on an extensive satellite network, sixth generation aircraft and long range ground to air and ground to ground missile systems.

Obtaining such enablers is a profoundly political exercise, the success of which would be constitutive of an essentially evolved European polity, which has already received the relevant coined terms, such as ‘a geopolitical Europe’ of a European ‘defence community’ and so on[26].  While EU member countries have indeed sacrificed the important for the sake of the urgent, as in the case of covering capability gaps which have accumulated over two decades by procuring US and Israeli weapon systems, setting back the cause of the EUs strategic autonomy, the direction of travel towards a European defence polity is still clear.

Such a polity, to come into being, requires achieving consensus, as per the Draghi Report recommendations[27], on a massive, recurrent programme of debt issuance by the European Commission. Such issuance would fund, among other priority domains, the research, development and production of the EU’s strategic enablers as well as provide the fiscal incentivisation of joint procurement necessary for the EDTIB’s drive for economies of scale through industrial consolidation.  The alternative, and more modest policy suggestion, is based on shifting resources from cohesion funding and the Common Agricultural Policy to collective European defence spending.

Both courses of action are highly contestable politically[28]. The former course of action needs to overcome the reluctance of net contributors among EU member states to underwrite fiscal issuance by the EU while the latter course of action means overcoming the reluctance of the net recipients, among EU member countries, to see a substantial decline in fiscal resources directed to those socioeconomic groups and regions most depended on EU transfers.

That being said, either exercise can also command a unique common ground among EU member states which were only recently, during the euro’s fiscal crisis, in opposing camps.  Strengthening the EU’s collective defence is a shared priority from the very end of both the North and the South, in the EU’s eastern periphery, from Lithuania to Cyprus.    Defence has shortened if not collapsed the policy distance separating the ‘frugals’ from the ‘spendthrifts’ with leading members of both cohorts facing existential threats due to the partial disengagement and growing unreliability of the US security guarantee.   To illustrate, when the US Department of Defence starts considering withdrawing military aid from the Baltics[29], Denmark, Sweden and Finland have every reason to boost the EU’s common defence and entertain financial arrangements, such as common bond issuance, that a fiscally constrained Greece would most welcome.

Significantly, the blatant assertion by the Trump Administration that Greenland will, one way or another, fall under US sovereignty, has universalized the perception of threat, cutting its unbiblical cord from Russia, and impressing on all member-states that the capacity for collective defence needs to be developed against all threat contingencies.  Simply put, it makes it that much easier for Greek policy makers to relate to their EU colleagues how serious as much as unacceptable is Turkey’s comportment on the basis of ‘might is right’ and, as such, deserving of a common European response. And once threat loses its specificity, threat representation becomes important, as each and every threat is entitled to be addressed and no threat posed to a member-states’ national security can be airily dismissed as an unrealistic obsession, as a mere domestic perception as opposed to a geopolitical fact.  Arguably, as the recommendations of the Niinisto report are implemented, particularly with regard to a common EU intelligence function, that will have the effect of Europeanising each member country’s valid threat perceptions[30], rendering ever more untenable defence industrial and other policies that are incompatible with such Europeanised threat perceptions. Suffice it to say here that Turkey’s gray zone playbook vis a vis Greece and Cyprus is starkly similar to that of Russia in CEE and in the Baltics and China in the South China Sea.

Denmark is emblematic in that regard, a small Scandinavian country, one of the ‘frugals’ during the Eurozone crisis, now in favour of rising defence expenditures, in order to deter Russia, as in the case of all Scandinavian countries which are with the exception of Finland in the second line of defence against Russia, while also being the first EU member country to have its sovereignty challenged by the US[31].

Τhe drive of the EU for strategic autonomy, tantamount to the construction of a new European polity, both puts the importance of the TDTIB, but also of the Turkish Armed Forces, in its appropriate scale, as important but by no stretch of imagination indispensable, in terms of providing scarce material and human resources to Europe’s collective defence. It is the intra-European consensus necessary for collective mobilization that is indispensable, not the contribution to such a vast mobilization of any one third party, Turkey included.

This is even more the case when such a third party participation is corrosive of the consensus that needs to be achieved. For that level of consensus to be generated, all member states need to be convinced that collective defence is one and indivisible, just as within any nation-state one region bordering to a third country has an absolutely equal claim to its integrity and rights, conferred by its inclusion in the sovereign entity, to all other regions of that country bordering with other third countries.  It is that foundational assumption that is indispensable to the project of the EU’s strategic autonomy.

It is also important to note that it is inevitable that the more the EU develops its strategic autonomy the less this autonomy will come to be limited to countering the Russian threat.  Military capabilities, as much as the modalities of their acquisition, will expand the domains of their application, commensurately with their growth.  These capabilities may be deployed in a massive operation to stabilize sub-Saharan Africa. On another occasion, they could embolden the EU to risk rupture with the US, by imposing punitive regulations to US IT titans operating in the EU, in case of a forceful acquisition of Greenland by the US.  In yet another possibility, the EU’s military capabilities could provide leverage to the EU to exert moderating influence over Israel’s behaviour in the West Bank due to the growing reliance of Israel’s DTIB on the rapidly growing EDTIB.

Greece together with Cyprus are not stowaways in this exciting European voyage but rather key members of the crew. Greece is the only country in the EU to be so physically distant to Moscow that in 2024 spent above 3 % of its GDP in defence – as much or nearly as much as those EU member countries close to Moscow.  Through the port of Alexandroupolis it has proven its significance, in terms of military logistics, for the integrity of the Southern part of the EU’s collective defence against the Russian Federation as well as for the support of the energy needs of Bulgaria and Romania through the Alexandroupolis FSRU.  Greece has also taken the lead in the setting up of EUNAVFPOR ASPIDES which seeks to mitigate Houthi attacks against the merchant marine in the Red Sea – where the Turkish navy has been conspicuously absent[32].  Needless to say in the years ahead, as the Hellenic Navy renews its fleet and as other EU Mediterranean Fleets similarly get strengthened, Greece will be a pillar of freedom of navigation in the critical seaways linking Asia with Europe.

Both Greece and Cyprus reaffirmed their strategic importance due to the wars of the Middle East with the heavy use respectively of the US Suda Bay base in Crete and the UK Akrotiri base in Cyprus.  Greece, as already suggested enjoys important leverage in the US, considering that US engagement will continue to be important for the EU’s collective defence.  The Suba Bay base is critical to the operations of the US Navy and Air Force in the Mediterranean. Alexandroupolis is a point of entry for US natural gas servicing Southern European energy needs, the defence relationship with Israel is growing as it involves strategic Israeli investments in the GDTIB and the Greek-American lobby, in alignment with the Jewish-American lobby enjoys considerable influence in the US Congress[33].

All in all, Greece, both on its own and together with Cyprus, as a typically medium-sized EU member country, with its contribution to the ongoing defence effort against Russian aggression, its participation in mitigating the negative consequences of the Middle East wars, its exceptionally high defence spending and its military and geopolitical contributions that it will be able to make in the future strategically autonomous Europe –  a Europe that will have to confront a threat diversity  commensurate with its growing strategic autonomy – represents  precisely the type of EU member country that needs to have its own threat environment acknowledged and addressed if there is to be a successful construction of a European polity that guarantees the safety of all its member-states. And in such a European polity there is no place for defence firms of a non-EU member that persists in threatening an EU member country, such as Turkey.

The TDTIB and the EU’s Rearmament: Simply not worth the trouble

A flurry of policy papers and press coverage have presented the TDITB as indispensable to the EU’s rearmament and/or, more largely, argued for the vital role that Turkey needs to play in Europe’s collective defence[34].

This advocacy is grounded in three claims.  First, that the TDITB is critical both in terms of filling the need of the EU for manufacturing of mass, reliable quality, NATO-standard defence articles as well as in addressing important niche capabilities as in the UAV domain. Second, such an TDTIB participation will enable the EU to avail itself of the Turkey’s Armed Forces manpower in case it decides to sent a peacekeeping force to Ukraine, considering that it is the second largest Army in NATO and that the Turkish government has a high tolerance, at least compared to European governments, for casualties in the field of battle. Third that such a package – TDTIB and the contribution of troops – will anchor Turkey in the Western alliance.

None of these arguments are to be easily dismissed but rather carefully weighted in the cost benefit calculations and robust risk assessments that are attendant to any difficult policy choice.

On the TDTIB aspect what is essential to point out is that its relative contribution to the EU’s rearmament effort is a declining rather than a rising asset, precisely because of the mobilisation of resources in EU member countries catalyzed by country-member, EU funding and strategic and portfolio investments in the EDTIB as well as in parallel developments taking place in key EU-allied countries, European and non-European, such as the UK, Ukraine, Norway and Canada.  On mass what we see in the EU is a combination of investment in new plants and machinery, investments in older plants including reactivation, with a special focus on the Central Eastern European defence industry which had not attracted FDI in the transition period, due to peace dividend dynamics. We can expect that German and CEE experience in activating industrial supply chains in the post – 1989 period in the civilian sector where it has excelled, will now prove its worth in the military domain.  In niche capabilities such as UAVs, innovation’s baton has been decisively transferred from Turkey to Ukraine with a variety of European defence firms operating in Ukraine and / or partnering with Ukrainian firms in order to be able to be innovative.   What is striking in the latest assessment of defence manufacturing in Europe[35] is the common playbook, on top of increases in defence spending, adopted by all significant, in defence manufacturing terms, European countries, all geared to increasing the supply of defence platforms, systems and materiel: relaxation of regulatory environment relating to defence manufacturing, the speeding up of procurement through reform, increased funding for innovation in defence, investing in the defence sector’s skills base, and so on.   Relatedly, the TDTIB is identified as a meaningful contributor only in one capability gap of collective European defence, in medium altitude long endurance (MALE) UAVs and, potentially, in land attack systems up to 1,000 kms[36].  This rather marginal role of the TDTIB in Europe’s capability building is also reflected in its export record of defence systems to European countries which mostly involves low or middle range technologies such as MALE UAVs, corvettes and armoured personnel carriers[37]. Inevitably Turkey’s mid size economy, with its mediocre innovation record, cannot rise to the challenge of contributing, let alone replacing, such US-originating capabilities as space-based ISR, integrated air and missile defence, battle management systems and long range attack systems[38].

Relatedly, the increasingly well-funded defence industrial strategies of those EU member state’s that have them, also focus on the UAVs and other niches so as to spur innovation in their own defence sectors.   Their twin motive is both to provide a qualitative edger to their own armed forces via homegrown innovation and to be able to leverage this edge to commercial success throughout Europe.  Indeed, the TDTIB itself partakes in this process with the industrial  presence in Ukraine of its most prominent UAV manufacturer, Bayraktar.    In the end nobody intimated this decline in relative terms of the TDTIB than one of its most fervent advocates, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. Pointing out that Europe in seeking to prevail militarily over Russia, needs  to prevail, by mobilising its economic prowess, over an “economy [that] is not bigger than Texas. So can you imagine that Texas, the State of Texas, producing more ammunition than the whole of NATO?”[39]. By the same token, how credible is to argue that the whole of the EDTIB cannot, when effectively mobilized, cannot produce the defence materiel necessary to deter against Russian aggression, without the participation of an economy, namely Turkey’s, which is just a bit larger  than that of the state of Illinois, which is to say 1/17th of the EU’s GDP?

Similar dynamics are operative in terms of the availability of sufficiently manned units to be fielded by EU and non-EU countries, most prominently the UK, in the much discussed prospect of a European peace keeping force in Ukraine.  The advisability of such a mission has been contested but that is not the issue. As with the EDTIB there is an ongoing effort across Europe to both hire more professional soldiers and reintroduce conscription[40].    We do not believe that higher tolerance of casualties, on the part of the Turkish government, and more largely polity and society is a valid argument for two reasons.  First, European states have demonstrated in Afghanistan, through participation in ISAF, that they are willing to suffer casualties in the service of vital allied goals (in this case supporting US operations in Afghanistan not least so as to help preserve US commitment to the collective defence of Europe).  It is worth pointing out that eight EU member countries, from Denmark (population 5.5. million) to Germany (population 82 million), suffered more casualties, both relative to their population and in absolute terms, through their ISAF participation, than Turkey did[41].  More generally the west’s democracies have demonstrated their ability to generate parliamentary consensus when invoking allied commitments in order to put troops in harm’s way[42].  Indeed, the rise of the EU as a collective provider has added a case example in this canon by enabling the Greek government to participate in the high risk EUNAVFOR ASPIDES freedom of navigation mission where the Hellenic Navy employed its guns for the first time since WW II, in an allied operation. Nor is it credible to suggest that in any such operation in Ukraine Turkey would play the role of the mercenary, putting at risk of death of injury a disproportionate number of its soldiers than other European states, in a mission that is definitive for the collective will of Europe and more specifically for the EU and its member states to defend themselves.  So, as in the case of the TDTIB, we are talking about a useful but not indispensable contribution in risk-taking troops.   As with the Rutte evocation of the disparity between collective European versus Russian economic-industrial mobilization, so with force generation we recall Poland’s PM rhetorical evocation of the EU’s collective population preponderance: ‘500 million Europeans are asking 300 million Americans help fight 140 million Russians’[43]. To suggest that such a Europe, of 500 million Europeans, cannot muster a peacekeeping force in the tens of thousands, for the defence of Ukraine, without Turkey’s troop contribution is simply risible.

The third argument of the TDTIB’s participation in the EU’s rearmament is about Turkey’s geopolitical and economic importance, and the importance of TDTIB participation in Europe’s rearmament as a means of engaging with Turkey, of in effect ‘not losing’ Turkey. It is important to note that within Turkish opinion, there is a diversity of opinion. We do have Imamoglou’s own advocacy in favour of lifting the embargo to the sale of Typhoons to Turkey[44]  as well as arguments of critics of the Erdogan regime to the effect that an EDTIB-TDTIB relationship will affirm Turkey’s European vocation and is bound to outlive Erdogan’s authoritarian turn[45]. Equally, we have voices arguing that the EU should not reward Turkey’s authoritarian backsliding, due to its potential contribution to the EU’s rearmament, as this backsliding no more entrenched it becomes there more bound it is to make Turkey even more of an unreliable security partner to the EU[46].

The position of this paper is that the imperative of Erdogan’s maintaining himself in power privileges further internal repression and external aggression and that the opportunity of the TDTIB to participate in the EU’s rearmament is not a sufficient incentive for him to abandon this twin track approach.   At the point of writing developments on both tracks prove our point, with further politically-engineered court actions seeking to neutralize CHP as an effective political force and the threat of military brinkmanship hanging over Greece’s and Cyprus’ perfectly legitimate plans to connect themselves energy-wise by laying the GSI undersea cable.  It is indeed hard to see how Turkey, even if its TDTIB is definitively excluded from the EU’s rearmament, can be lost to Europe more than it already has. It is, however, much more plausible to envisage a situation whereby a growing reliance ofEurope on the TDTIB could lead Erdogan to miscalculate his personal importance, and that of his country, and make him even more reckless vis a vis Greece and Cyprus.

Concluding Remarks

Turkey neither can nor should participate, through the TDTIB, in Europe’s rearmament effort and for the same set of reasons.

Under Erdogan’s leadership and in the current geopolitical juncture Turkey has reaffirmed a pattern in its relations with the West that has rendered partnering with the TDTIB highly unstable as much as undesirable.  Unstable because the combination of internal repression and external aggression, by the Turkish leadership, mobilises an influential counter-reaction by western states and influential lobby groups in these states, which prioritises the cut-off of bilateral or multilateral defence industrial relationships. Undesirable, because allowing for such defence industrial relationships to continue, despite Turkey’s internal and external comportment, is bound to be corrosive to the norms and interests binding collective security arrangements among EU member-states.

Greek-Turkish relations, from this ‘neither can nor should’ prism are both illuminating and definitive, historically and currently.  Historically, the birth of TDITB in the post WWII period was due to the need of Turkey to invade and partly conquer Cyprus, an act that destabilised NATO, led to an unprecedented US embargo of weapons sales to Turkey and which has as its only peer event in the European continent, in the entire post WW II period, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022.  Currently, Erdogan’s determination to challenge Greek sovereign rights through actions in the field and diplomatically, even more so if they are successful, they are bound to either create insurmountable blocks to the entry or generate risks in the ongoing participation of the TDITB in Europe’s rearmament effort. Appropriately enough such an incongruity is addressed by the SAFE regulation conditionalities, as in the case of article 17[51]. We have argued in these pages that Erdogan has, through his policy choices, to let these roadblocks in place, because doing so is a ‘must have’ whereas participation of the TDITB in Europe’s rearmament is only a ‘nice to have’.

This calculation between the ‘must have’ and ‘nice to have’ is even more pronounced in the case of Erdogan’s uninhibited suppression of democratic contestation, as allowing such contestation would be equal to his loss of power. Inevitably, external aggression and internal repression compound each other, strengthening both the ‘cant’ and ‘shouldn’t’ of the participation of the TDTIB in Europe’s rearmament.

Finally, we have argued that the resource mobilization necessary for the EU to gain strategic autonomy, both in the ambitious scenario (Draghi recommendations) and the modest scenario (reordering of the EU budget), would render the TDIB contribution to Europe’s rearmament if not marginal definitely not critical. At the same time such a participation, under the ‘can’t and shouldn’t’ perspective would be both highly uncertain in its implementation and much more trouble than its worth, due to the resulting corrosion of the intra-EU consensus on which this mobilization needs to rest upon.

As for the icing of the European cake, a strategically autonomous Europe would substantially fill the vacuum left from an Asia-oriented US, put an end to Turkey’s geopolitical heterodoxy and convince its leadership to integrate Turkey with the EU’s CS

[1] Erickson, Edward J., and Mesut Uyar. Phase Line Attila: The Amphibious Campaign for Cyprus, 1974. Marine Corps University Press, 2020, p. 90.

[2] See, Altman, Dan. “The evolution of territorial conquest after 1945 and the limits of the territorial integrity norm.” International Organization 74.3 (2020): 490-522.

[3]Erickson, Edward J., and Mesut Uyar. Phase Line Attila: The Amphibious Campaign for Cyprus, 1974. Marine Corps University Press, 2020, p. 55.

[4]Turkey belongs to the emerging innovator category, the lowest category of the European Innovation Scoreboard, dedicating modest resources to R&D, being ranked 31st among 39 EU member states and neighbouring countries, see European Commission, European Innovation Scoreboard 2024, 2024, p. 104.

[5] Kitroeff, Alexander. “Diaspora-Homeland Relations and Greek-American Lobbying: the Panhellenic Emergency Committee, 1974–78.” Journal of Modern Hellenism 11 (1994): 19-40.

[6] See indicatively, Bağcı, Hüseyin, and Çağlar Kurç. “Turkey’s strategic choice: buy or make weapons?.” Defence Studies 17.1 (2017): 38-62 and Mevlütoğlu, Arda, et al. “Adapting security: The intersection of Turkiye’s foreign policy and defence industrialisation.” Center for foreign policy and peace research and international institute for strategic studies (2024).

[7] This overview draws from Mevlütoğlu, Arda, et al. “Adapting security: The intersection of Turkiye’s foreign policy and defence industrialisation.” Center for foreign policy and peace research and international institute for strategic studies (2024).

[8]Domestic repression and external aggression, singly or jointly, engendered official and unofficial weapons embargoes by Switzerland, Norway, Germany and the US, see, Egeli, Sıtkı, et al. “From client to competitor: The rise of Turkiye’s defence industry.” Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research and International Institute for Strategic Studies (2024). US diplomatic sources have confirmed that the Imia islets were Greek and should have not been contested by Turkey notwithstanding the fact that the US State Department did not communicate this conviction in public so as to not alienate Turkey, see Kostoulas, Vassilis, Fascinating revelations about the 1996 Imia crisis, Kathimerini, English edition, 14 February 2025.

[9] See, for a discussion Kamaras, Antonis. “Greece’s call for an embargo on weapons sales to Turkey.” ELIAMEP, (2020).

[10] See, T. Karako, Coup proofing? Making sense of Turkey’s S-400 Decision, Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 28.4.22

[11] Mevlütoğlu, Arda, et al. “Adapting security: The intersection of Turkiye’s foreign policy and defence industrialisation.” Center for foreign policy and peace research and international institute for strategic studies (2024).

[12] Waldwyn, Tom. “Turkiye’s Defence-industrial Relationships with Other European States.” Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research and International Institute for Strategic Studies  (2024).

[13]  For an analysis of these forces in play shaping Turkey’s naval strategy see, R. Gingeras, The Turkish Navy in an era of great power competition, War on the Rocks, 30.4. 2019

[14] See, Soyaltin-Colella, Digdem, and Tolga Demiryol. “Unusual middle power activism and regime survival: Turkey’s drone warfare and its regime-boosting effects.” Third World Quarterly 44.4 (2023): 724-743.

[15] See J. Mankof, The war in Ukraine and Eurasia’s new imperial moment, The Washington Quarterly, 2022

[16] Ministry of Defence, Defence Indiustrial Strategy 2025: Making Defence an Engine for Growth, UK, 8 September 2025.

[17]See, typically, Rachman, Gideon. The age of the strongman: How the cult of the leader threatens democracy around the world. Other Press, LLC, 2022.

[18] See, https://www.statista.com/chart/17557/details-about–the-turkish-companies-supporting-f-35-development/

[19] For a discussion of South Korea’s DTIB see, Nemeth, Bence. “South Korean Military Power: Lessons Europe Can Learn from Seoul on Spending Defence Budgets Efficiently.” The RUSI Journal 169.1-2 (2024): 92-101.

[20] See, typically of solidifying international consensus on Erdogan’s power grab, Tol, Gonul, Turkey is now a full-blown autocracy. Foreign Affairs, March 21 2025.

[21] See, indicatively Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Turkyie, European Parliament, 15 4 2025.

[22] See, indicatively, the analysis of Erdogan’s attempt to reinstate at CHP’s helm the ineffective Kimal Kilicdaroglou, through a court case that would put of action more capable CHP figures, GZERO Daily Newsletter, Is democracy doomed in Turkey?, 16 September 2025.

[23] See, H. Zengin, Instrumentalising the army before elections in Turkey, Third World Quarterly, 2023 and S. Adar, Understanding Turkey’s Increasingly Militaristic Foreign Policy, APSA MENA Politics Newsletter, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 2020.

[24] See indicatively Nedos, Vasillis, Turkish corvette off Crete signals Turkish intent, Kathimerini, English edition, 4,2.2025 and newsroom, SAFE could be a ‘backdoor’ for Turkish aspirations, warns Greek defence minister, Kathimerini, English edition, 29.05.2025.

[25] The discussion on Europe’s strategic enablers, and the modaliti4es of their acquisition, is based on Wolff, Guntram, Steinbach, Armin and Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, The governance and funding of European Rearmament, Policy Brief 15/25, Bruegel, April 2025 and International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Building Defence Capacity in Europe: An Assessment. Routledge, 2024.

[26] The debate on the EU’s defence vocation having as its starting point the first Trump Presidency and accelerating with the ongoing war in Ukraine, see indicatively President of the EU Commission acceptance speech reference to a Geopolitical Commission,  European Commission, Speech by President-elect von der Leyen in the European Parliament Plenary on the occasion of the presentation of her College of Commissioners and their programme, 27 November 2019 and the discussion, post Brexit, of the UK being an integral part of Europe’s defence community, Leonard, Mark, Britain and Europe are Changing together, European Council of Foreign Relations,  July 15 2025.

[27] Draghi, Mario. “The Future of European Competitiveness Part A: A competitiveness strategy for Europe.” (2024).

[28] See the op-ed article of the Prime Minister of Sweden arguing, as an alternative to joint issuance of debt, the restructuring of the EU Budget, Kristerson, Ulf, The next EU budget cannot be business as usual, Politico, July 14 2025.

[29] Nicholas Oakes, Baltic allies brace as US prepares to slash security assistance, Modern Diplomacy, 6 September 2025.

[30] The author makes that point in European Defence covers Greece, Ta Nea, 12 4 2025 (Η Ευρωπαϊκή άμυνα καλύπτει την Ελλάδα, Τα Νέα).

[31] Power, Jack, A frugal no more: Russian threat shifts Denmark’s thinking on defence spending,  July 7 2025.

[32] Cafiero, George, NATO member Turkey takes role of ‘active neutrality’ in Red Sea crisis’ Responsible Statecraft, March 24 2025.

[33] Greek lobby succeeds in US efforts, Ekathimerini, https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1189218/greek-lobby-succeeds-in-us-efforts/, 18 July 2022; Greek and Jewish Diaspora team up for Cyprus security, Knews, https://knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/greek-and-jewish-diaspora-team-up-for-cyprus, 7 May 2018.

[34] See indicatively, John Paul Rathbone and Henry Foy, Military Briefing: How Turkey became vital to European Security, Financial Times, 14.5.2025, Kadri Tastan, et al, EU-Turkiye Defense cooperation: Why now – and how far?, German Marshall Fund, Ilke Toygur, et al.,  Turkey, Europe and the quest for security, CEPS, June 2025, Sinem Adar, et al, Alignment of Necessity, Centre for Applied Turkish Studies, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, August 2025.

[35] Progress and Shortfalls in Europe’s Defence – An Assessment, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 2025.

[36] Ibid.

[37] See, Tom Waldwyn, Turkiye’s defence industry charts a growth for European Growth,International Institute for Strategic Studies, 20 January 2025.

[38] Progress and Shortfalls in Europe’s Defence – An Assessment, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 2025.

[39] Rutte, Mark, Specch by the NATO Secretary General at the IISS Prague Defence Summit, 4 September 2025

[40] See, Lazarou, Eleni and Politis Lamprou, Panagiotis, Conscription as an element in European Union preparedness, European Parliamentary Research Service, March 2025.

[41] Wikipedia, Coalition casualties in Afghanistan.

[42] Wagner, Wolfgang. “Is there a parliamentary peace? Parliamentary veto power and military interventions from Kosovo to Daesh.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20.1 (2018): 121-134.

[43]See his statement in the following youtube segment,  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yX06zhJf20o

[44] Imamoglu calls on Germany to lift veto on Eurofighter – “Turkey is not only Erdogan”

[45] Gonul Tol, Don’t cut Turkey out of European defence efforts because of Erdogan, Financial Times, 23 June 2024.

[46] Hurjan Asli Aksoy and Salim Cevik, Turkey’s authoritarian turn: Imamoglu’s arrest and Europe’s strategic dilemma, Centre for Applied Turkish Studies, 25 March 2025.

[47] Ruth Michaelson and Nevin Sungar, Turkish opposition leader criticizes Starmer for ingoring arrest of Istanbul Mayor, Guardian, 11 April 2025.

[48] Ekrem Imamoglou, Why Turkey’s democratic future matters for the world, Financial Times, April 16 2025.

[49] Sinem Adar, et al, Alignment of Necessity, Centre for Applied Turkish Studies, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, August 2025.

[50]

[51] Council Regulation (EU) 2-25/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument, Official Journal of the European Union, 28.5.2025

Networks as relational infrastructure play an important role in strengthening cooperative efforts toward sustainable development. This paper analyses the Managing Global Governance (MGG) Network – a transnational, multi-stakeholder network that employs collaborative training, knowledge cooperation and policy dialogue instruments. The network includes members from Brazil, China, the EU, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa. To understand how the implementation of Agenda 2030 through cooperation in networks can be fostered, this paper examines the conditions under which global governance networks create impact.
Using a literature review, external evaluation studies and 27 qualitative interviews, the paper categorises impact across four levels: individual, organisational, network and systemic–institutional. Additionally, it analyses the impact on the network itself – not only as an enabler of impact but also as a subject affected by cooperation within the network. In this context, several types of impact can be distinguished, ranging from improved international cooperation structures to behaviour change and the reorientation of organisational policies.
We conclude that three dimensions of a network’s setup are key to enabling social innovation for sustainable development:
1.    the composition of network members
2.    the cooperation infrastructure
3.    the cooperation culture.
These insights contribute to the ongoing debate on how to link change at the individual level with transformation in more institutionalised structures – particularly in organisations and broader systemic contexts. The paper is especially relevant for scholars engaged in network analysis and development, decision-makers involved in transnational multi-stakeholder networks, and international cooperation actors aiming for sustainable development impact.

Networks as relational infrastructure play an important role in strengthening cooperative efforts toward sustainable development. This paper analyses the Managing Global Governance (MGG) Network – a transnational, multi-stakeholder network that employs collaborative training, knowledge cooperation and policy dialogue instruments. The network includes members from Brazil, China, the EU, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa. To understand how the implementation of Agenda 2030 through cooperation in networks can be fostered, this paper examines the conditions under which global governance networks create impact.
Using a literature review, external evaluation studies and 27 qualitative interviews, the paper categorises impact across four levels: individual, organisational, network and systemic–institutional. Additionally, it analyses the impact on the network itself – not only as an enabler of impact but also as a subject affected by cooperation within the network. In this context, several types of impact can be distinguished, ranging from improved international cooperation structures to behaviour change and the reorientation of organisational policies.
We conclude that three dimensions of a network’s setup are key to enabling social innovation for sustainable development:
1.    the composition of network members
2.    the cooperation infrastructure
3.    the cooperation culture.
These insights contribute to the ongoing debate on how to link change at the individual level with transformation in more institutionalised structures – particularly in organisations and broader systemic contexts. The paper is especially relevant for scholars engaged in network analysis and development, decision-makers involved in transnational multi-stakeholder networks, and international cooperation actors aiming for sustainable development impact.

Networks as relational infrastructure play an important role in strengthening cooperative efforts toward sustainable development. This paper analyses the Managing Global Governance (MGG) Network – a transnational, multi-stakeholder network that employs collaborative training, knowledge cooperation and policy dialogue instruments. The network includes members from Brazil, China, the EU, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa. To understand how the implementation of Agenda 2030 through cooperation in networks can be fostered, this paper examines the conditions under which global governance networks create impact.
Using a literature review, external evaluation studies and 27 qualitative interviews, the paper categorises impact across four levels: individual, organisational, network and systemic–institutional. Additionally, it analyses the impact on the network itself – not only as an enabler of impact but also as a subject affected by cooperation within the network. In this context, several types of impact can be distinguished, ranging from improved international cooperation structures to behaviour change and the reorientation of organisational policies.
We conclude that three dimensions of a network’s setup are key to enabling social innovation for sustainable development:
1.    the composition of network members
2.    the cooperation infrastructure
3.    the cooperation culture.
These insights contribute to the ongoing debate on how to link change at the individual level with transformation in more institutionalised structures – particularly in organisations and broader systemic contexts. The paper is especially relevant for scholars engaged in network analysis and development, decision-makers involved in transnational multi-stakeholder networks, and international cooperation actors aiming for sustainable development impact.