Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for March 2025.

According to Vassilis Nedos (Kathimeri), Greece may receive more than the originally agreed 600 US-made Switchblade drones as increased production has lowered costs, defense officials say. As mentioned in earlier versions of the Transatlantic Periscope brief, the Greek military had secured a deal for Switchblade 300 block 20 and Switchblade 600 loitering munitions worth $75 million, with $50 million funded through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. However, with manufacturer AeroVironment ramping up production, the US has informed Athens that more drones could be acquired under the existing budget.

On March 18, 2025, a bilateral meeting was held between a delegation of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff (HNDGS) and the U.S. Marine Forces Europe and Africa (MFEA) at “Papagos” camp, in Athens. The HNDGS delegation was headed by 1st Infantry Division (1st ID) Commander, Major General Dimitrios Drosos, representing the Commander of the Hellenic Special Warfare Command (SWC), while on behalf of the US MFEA, the meeting was attended by its Commander, Major General Robert B. Sofge, accompanied by members of his staff and officials from the U.S. Embassy in Greece. The discussions focused on the framework and opportunities for joint training of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) with the Greek marine in Greece, with the aim to further enhance the close cooperation between the Special Operations Forces of both countries in the near future.

National Defense Minister Nikos Dendias met on March 19 with US Embassy Chargé d’Affaires Maria Olson at the Hellenic Ministry of National Defense. Dendias posted on X that they discussed “bilateral defence relations and the ways they could be further strengthened. We also exchanged views on the regional and international security challenges.”

US president Donald Trump celebrated Greek Independence Day, hosting an event at the White House on March 24. “The legacy of the Greeks is all around us. It surrounds us,” he told a group from the Greek-American community gathered at the White House before signing a proclamation recognizing March 25 as Greek Independence Day in the US, “celebrating 204 years of glorious Greek sovereignty and freedom.” “Perhaps the greatest gift we have inherited from this amazing culture is our incredible Greek-American community, now more than 3 million strong,” he added. The US president was accompanied by Archbishop Elpidophoros of America, who congratulated him on his re-election.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

Migration management has become a critical axis of foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, moving beyond its traditional framing as a humanitarian or administrative challenge. Within Greek–Turkish relations, human mobility now functions as a means of exerting pressure, projecting power, and renegotiating geopolitical roles. The 2020 Evros crisis underscored this dynamic, triggering strategies that transcend the bilateral level and involve both European and regional actors. This report analyses the Evros crisis and the broader strategic approaches of Turkey and Greece through the lens of migration diplomacy, drawing on concepts such as issue-linkage and rent-seeking. It examines both coercive and cooperative tactics employed by the two states and the European Union’s often contradictory or defensive role. Finally, the report calls for a more resilient and institutionally coherent strategy that respects humanitarian principles and integrates migration into a broader vision of foreign policy and regional cooperation.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy Paper by Gerasimos Tsourapas, Professor of International Relations at the University of Glasgow; Non-Resident Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

Event Video 
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IPI and the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN cohosted a policy forum on April 10th on “Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Peace Operations Settings: Multilateral Responses.”

Since 2020, there have been at least a dozen military coups d’état and other unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs) around the world. These include takeovers by armed groups in Afghanistan and Syria and coups in Mali, Myanmar, Chad, Guinea, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Gabon. This presents a challenge for the United Nations. Member states in the General Assembly and Security Council need to decide whether and how to condemn the UCGs and whether to recognize the new de facto authorities. In the field, UN peace operations and UN country teams face the task of continuing to carry out their work in the midst of a political crisis and of deciding how to engage with the new authorities. This rise in UCGs has also increasingly put to the test regional organizations’ anti-UCG mechanisms, particularly in Africa.

Panelists shared lessons from the multilateral response to UCGs, with a focus on UN peace operations. The event also launched the IPI policy paper on “UN Peace Operations and Unconstitutional Changes of Government” co-authored by Albert Trithart and Bitania Tadesse. Building on the insights of the report and the insights of the panelists, the forum brought together representatives of the UN Secretariat, member states, and civil society organizations to discuss how the UN can most effectively respond to UCGs and engage with de facto authorities alongside other actors such as regional organizations.

Welcome and Opening Remarks:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute
Djeyhoun Ostowar, Counsellor, Deputy Head of Political Affairs Section, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations

Speakers:
Albert Trithart, Senior Fellow and Head of Publications, International Peace Institute
Renato Mariani, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Team Leader, Policy Planning Unit, Policy and Mediation Division, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)
Ramiz Alakbarov, Assistant Secretary-General, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Ethiopia, former DSRSG/RC/HC, UNAMA (Virtual)
Bitania Tadesse, Policy Specialist for Africa, International Peace Institute (Virtual)
Katharine Brooks, Partnership Specialist, Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions, UNDP (Virtual)

Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute

The post Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Peace Operations Settings: Multilateral Responses appeared first on International Peace Institute.

The White Paper on the Future of European Defence, released in March 2025, represents a landmark initiative by the European Commission to articulate a cohesive vision for strengthening the EU’s defence posture amid mounting geopolitical instability. Acting as a framework for the ReArm Europe plan, the document proposes mobilising hundreds of billions of EUR in defence investments, making use of national and EU resources.

The ReArm Europe Plan and the White Paper clearly succeed in politically signalling the EU’s renewed commitment to defence investment and military readiness. However, despite their rhetorical strength, four major concerns could undermine their transformative potential:

1. Coordination gaps: Without a robust coordination mechanism, national funds may be allocated to less pressing areas and may serve other – national and/or domestic – objectives and interests. In the meantime, the Union will not achieve effectiveness and efficiency unless it focuses on standardisation and interoperability.
2. Financial markets’ sensitivity: While the activation of the national escape clause offers fiscal leeway, it is unclear how the financial markets will react to increased national debts. Alternative instruments, such as the Defence Eurobonds or the European Defence Mechanism, could be examined.
3. Creative ambiguity: The Proposal for a SAFE Regulation includes references presented vaguely enough to allow for multiple interpretations and thus avoid frictions. In view of the negotiations in the Council, the issue of a third country’s participation in a procurement consortium must be further elaborated and clarified.
4. Democratic legitimacy and parliamentary oversight: Article 122 TFEU sidesteps the European Parliament, despite the latter’s willingness to further support the EU defence initiatives. Without adequate parliamentary involvement, defence investments risk alienating public opinion in a policy area which requires broad societal consensus.

All the aforementioned shortcomings reflect a deeper structural issue: the absence of a common threat perception and a truly common foreign and security policy. Without a coherent strategic vision at the EU level, member-states remain inclined to prioritise national over collective objectives and interests.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Spyros Blavoukos, Senior Research Fellow, Head, EU Institutions & Policies Programme, ELIAMEP; Head of the ‘Ariane Condellis’ European Programme; Professor, Athens University of Economics & Business and Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, EU Policies and Institutions Programme, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

In response to the new geopolitical and geoeconomic realities – including but not limited to the protracted Russian war on Ukraine and the Trump 2.0 administration – and following the earlier announcement of the ReArm Europe Plan, the White Paper on the Future of European Defence was published in March 2025. The White Paper outlines the path to enhanced EU defence capabilities and aims to mobilise hundreds of billions of EUR, detailing measures to finance and strengthen the EU’s military readiness.

The White Paper features well-intentioned objectives and its communication strategy was well orchestrated. It does provide answers to two key questions: first, where the money will come from and second, in what defence capabilities the EU is going to invest. Starting from the former, in the best-case scenario, national resources up to €650 billion will be mobilised through the activation of the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which defines the fiscal governance framework for the EU member-states and sets rules for constraining national government deficit and debt. In essence, this clause will allow member-states to accommodate additional defence spending. The €650 billion will be topped by EU resources of up to €150 billion that will be gathered through the common issuance of bonds, as envisaged by the new SAFE instrument. In addition to these €800 billion, the White Paper proposes four additional -but rather vague and not quantified- ways to step up defence spending: a) redirecting existing EU funds towards defence (e.g., cohesion funds), b) contributions from the European Investment Bank (EIB), c) private investments, and d) ensuring financial predictability for the European defence industry in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), currently under negotiation. Overall, the resources envisaged in the White Paper are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Envisaged resources for EU defence in the White Paper

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Regarding the capability needs, the White Paper identifies seven priority areas: Air and missile defence, Artillery systems, Ammunition and missiles, Drones and counter-drone systems, Military Mobility, AI, Quantum, Cyber & Electronic Warfare and strategic enablers & critical infrastructure protection. Additionally, the Proposal for a SAFE Regulation (i.e., the €150 billion funding instrument mentioned above that accompanies the White Paper) refers to the following two categories of defence products, the common procurement of which will be funded:

1. Category One: ammunition and missiles, artillery systems, small drones and related anti-drone systems, critical infrastructure protection, cyber and military mobility, and
2. Category Two: air and missile defence, drones (other than small ones) and related anti-drone systems, strategic enablers, space assets protection, AI and electronic warfare.

 ‘Money Makes the World Go Round’: Financing EU Defence

National resources for defence

In 2023, the EU member-states spent €279 billion on defence, marking an almost 10% increase in defence spending compared to 2022 (€254 billion). Approximately one fourth of this expenditure (26%) was directed to research, development and procurement of defence equipment.[1] In 2024, the total defence expenditure made by the EU member-states reached (provisionally) €326 billion, an almost 17% rise compared to 2023, which amounts to 1.9% of the EU’s GDP and is very close to the 2% NATO requirement. These figures are in line with the broader, decade-long trend of increased military spending, especially fuelled by the Russian invasion into Ukraine in 2022.

Still, Europe is lagging in military deterrence and defence, and much more money needs to be poured to close the gap in terms of military capabilities, especially should the US truly reconsider its military presence in Europe. This is the underlying logic behind the proposal to create additional fiscal space for member-states to invest more in defence, bypassing the strict framework of the EU’s macroeconomic governance. The ReArm Europe plan calls for such a fiscal margin for higher defence expenditures (of up to €650 billion) through the coordinated activation of the national escape clause by the member-states. The national escape clause will apply from 2025 to 2028, for expenditure up to 1.5% of GDP.  The reference year is 2021, i.e., the last pre-war year when the EU member-states had spent €214 billion on defence. In other words, if the national escape clause has been activated and a member-state’s increase of military expenditure remains within the 1.5% ceiling, the excessive deficit procedure will not be launched, even if the total budget deficit exceeds the limits set by the revised rules of the fiscal and macroeconomic governance framework. The EU’s executive branch has invited all – interested – member-states to submit a request to activate this escape clause by the end of April 2025. The member-states’ requests will be coordinated by the Council in order to accelerate the process, and the recommendations activating the national escape clause(s) will be adopted by qualified majority voting (QMV).

On- and Off-EU Budget resources for defence

Besides the financial resources under the full control of each member-state’s government at the national level, there are two main channels of financing defence-related activities at the EU level: first, a direct budget line from the EU budget and second, off-EU budget resources that are collectively managed by EU member-states. As regards the former, Article 41 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) forbids, in principle, the use of the Union budget for operations having military or defence implications. Hence, the Commission’s main defence-related initiatives have focused primarily on strengthening the European defence industry and supporting the development of dual use infrastructure, with an allocated budget of approximately €10.55 billion in the current MFF.[2] These initiatives comprise the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Military Mobility, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). The European Defence Industry Programme, which falls in this category and is agreed to provide 1.5 billion over the period 2025-2027, has yet to be adopted. The legal basis for financing the European defence industry lays primarily in Article 173(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which touches upon the industry’s competitiveness. Other relevant TFEU articles that could be used to finance European defence-related projects comprise Article 179, on the improvement of the EU’s scientific and technological base, Article 170 on the development and interconnection of trans-European networks, and Title XIX on research, technological development and space policy. As far as the second channel is concerned, the largest defence-related, off-EU budget tool is the European Peace Facility (EPF). As depicted in Figure 2, comparing the two categories, the biggest part of the funds allocated to EU defence remain under full member-states’ control.[3]

Figure 2: EU budget and off-budget major defence-related tools

 

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The Proposal for a SAFE Regulation has the potential to make available up to €150 billion, a huge upgrade compared to the current situation, as shown in Figure 3. The SAFE Instrument operationally looks very similar to the EDIRPA, as it focuses on providing the necessary financial resources to procure eligible defence equipment jointly. However, financially, the two instruments are totally different as SAFE, in its current format at least, will operate through loans (and subsequently debt), whereas EDIRPA provides grants. Consistent with the general approach of EU defence funding mechanisms, the SAFE Instrument promotes a cooperative format. In this context, common procurement under SAFE requires at least the involvement of one member-state in conjunction with either another member-state or an eligible third country.

Figure 3: EU Budget funding for defence(-related) initiatives

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From Reports to Action: Shaping the Future of EU Defence

A 2024 briefing from the European Parliamentary Research Service brought together the various proposals for the future of EU defence that were put forward in four different documents: a) the Mission Letter to the then Commissioner-designate for Defence and Space, b) Von der Leyen’s Political Guidelines, c) Draghi Report and d) Letta Report. The great majority of the proposals mentioned in the four documents have been integrated into the White Paper and the Proposal for a SAFE Regulation, as clearly shown in Figure 4. The interconnection between defence policy and economic competitiveness and the extent to which these two areas are mutually reinforcing are evident. The defence industrial policy aims to enhance military readiness, while also seeking to bolster economic growth, job creation and innovation. This relationship is highlighted in the Letta and Draghi Reports, both of which focus primarily on the economy, albeit emphasising the importance of a robust EU Defence Technological and Industrial Base. Most of their insights and proposals found their way into the White Paper.

The proposals that did not get through refer to sensitive political issues, such as the issuance of “Defence Eurobonds”, or older initiatives and/or institutional arrangements that are already in place, like, for example, EDIRPA & ASAP and the proposal for a Defence Commissioner. In addition, Letta’s proposal for the creation of a European Stability Mechanism (ESM)-like specialised credit line was not outrightly rejected but rather treated in a non-committing way. The White Paper vaguely notes that if the demand by member-states for funds for defence-related investments outstrips supply, then “the Commission will continue to explore innovative instruments, such as in relation to the European Stability Mechanism”.    

Figure 4: Proposals integrated into the White Paper/Proposal for a SAFE Regulation

 

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Critical Assessment and the Road Ahead

‘ReArm Europe’ and the White Paper have managed to raise awareness about the need to further invest in EU defence. Politically, they have sent a strong message about the Union’s commitment to security and enhancing defence capabilities. They have emphasised the necessity to direct money towards defence, reflecting a proactive approach and have signalled a level of readiness to act, especially in combination with the publication of the Preparedness Union Strategy. However, there are four main concerns that are hard to ignore:

• First, as discussed above, the lion’s share of the ReArm Europe plan will come from the national budgets. While the flexibility to use additional national resources is a positive first step, it remains unclear to what extent member-states will actually decide to invest in defence and, more importantly, whether those investments will be directed towards what is truly needed. In particular, the International Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG), which will be used to measure the member-states’ defence expenditures, includes a very broad set of different sub-categories. For example, COFOG Category 02 – Defence entails expenditure on military personnel, other non-combat defence forces and military aid. There is a genuine concern that, without a robust coordination mechanism, funds may be allocated to less pressing areas and may serve other – national and/or domestic– objectives and interests. To be more specific, there is a possibility that additional defence spending may predominantly be allocated to cover personnel costs rather than addressing critical needs, such as the development of advanced military capabilities or training. Achieving the right balance in order to guarantee long-term strategic readiness is crucial. Furthermore, efficiency and effectiveness in defence cannot be assessed solely in financial terms. Without a clear focus on standardisation and interoperability, progress will likely remain incremental rather than transformative. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has underscored the critical importance of ensuring that national armed forces are capable of operating together effectively and efficiently. As such, the European family has yet to decide how to foster standardisation and interoperability. To achieve this goal, different options exist:

1. Alignment of EU defence initiatives with established NATO standards, and/or
2. Strengthening the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the Capability Development Plan (CDP) to improve alignment between member-states’ defence planning and capabilities, and/or
3. Use/strengthening of existing mechanisms (for example, the European Defence Agency) or launch of new – potentially pan-European – initiatives (for example, the European Defence Mechanism, see below).

• Regarding the fiscal space that the national escape clause may provide, an issue not addressed is how the (already destabilised due to the tariff war) financial markets will respond to potential increases in debt levels across the EU member-states. Southern EU member-states have already expressed their doubts on the possibility of further indebting themselves, which will undermine – or further derail – the long-term sustainability of their sovereign debt. Instead, they favour the issuance of “Defence Eurobonds”, which practically entails the EU borrowing money from the capital markets and then distributing it to member-states in the form of grants. Needless to say, in this case, the identification of the distribution criteria will be challenging. Another option would be the establishment of an ESM-like intergovernmental mechanism, called the European Defence Mechanism (EDM), as described in a Bruegel proposal prepared for the Polish Presidency. To be more precise, this extra-EU intergovernmental organisation could act as a “planner, funder and potentially owner of strategic enablers”, allowing the debt incurred to acquire certain defence assets to remain on the EDM’s books instead of national accounts.
• Although “implementation, implementation, implementation” is important, one of the key criticisms lies in the creative ambiguity that characterises parts of the White Paper. Given diverging views among member-states, certain concepts are not fully clarified and allow for multiple interpretations. For example, the Proposal for a SAFE Regulation contains a European preference clause for the procurement source (at least 65% of the costs of the final product must originate from within the Union, Ukraine or EEA/EFTA states). However, the text seems to adopt an extremely wide definition vis-à-vis the potentially eligible third countries that may participate in a procurement consortium. In particular, it states that ‘the Union may conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements with like-minded countries, namely acceding countries, candidate countries other than Ukraine and potential candidates’. In that sense, all current and potential candidate countries constitute like-minded partners for the Union, which is – at least – disputable in the current geopolitical context.
• Finally, issues of implementation are closely linked to (the lack of) legitimacy. It is crucial to encourage public understanding and support for the need to boost defence investments. By having Article 122 TFEU as a legal basis, the Commission bypasses the European Parliament, although the latter has repeatedly positioned itself in favour of enhanced defence cooperation. For example, the European Parliament has recently proposed a higher budget for EDIP, indicating that it is ready to constructively back such defence-related initiatives. It has also called on the European Commission and the member-states “to enable and strengthen parliamentary oversight of EU external action…by involving Parliament in the proper further implementation and scrutiny of the EPF and the Strategic Compass”, thus highlighting its willingness and readiness to oversee key defence tools. The exclusion of the European Parliament from the legislative process could lead to mounting public criticism and a growing negative public disposition to increased defence spending.
• All the aforementioned arguments are deeply interconnected with the absence of a truly common threat perception and, by extension, the member-states’ unwillingness to establish a truly Common Foreign and Security Policy. As such, it becomes nearly impossible to effectively align national defence (industrial) strategies and investments. Obviously, in the absence of such a unified vision and foreign policy framework, governments prioritise national needs over broader pan-European strategic objectives. Can we realistically expect EU defence to emerge in such a political vacuum?

 

 

 

 

[1] Official data from the European Defence Agency (EDA).

[2] Different numbers may also appear due to inflation and changes in currency exchange rates.

[3] Other relevant expenditures comprise the national contributions to CSDP military missions and operations as well as EU Battlegroups. Although these are EU-led initiatives, the associated costs are, in principle, borne by the participating member-states under the ‘costs-lie-where-they-fall’ principle.

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Mehr als nur Essenslieferanten: Wie Inder*innen Berlin mitgestalten

Der umstrittene Tech-Milliardär Elon Musk zieht sich möglicherweise als Berater von US-Präsident Donald Trump zurück. Das berichtet zumindest das US-Magazin "Politico". Trump habe seinem engsten Beraterkreis mitgeteilt, dass Elon Musk in den kommenden Wochen aussteigen werde. Trump-Sprecherin Karoline Leavitt wies die Berichte als "garbage" - "Müll" - zurück. Ein hartes Dementi lieferte sie jedoch nicht.

Volkswirtschaftlich sei Trumps Politik "völliger Unsinn". Doch "ganz ohne Zugeständnisse" würde es "nicht gehen."

US-Präsident Donald Trump hat massive Zollerhöhungen angekündigt. Auf Importe aus der EU sollen künftig Zölle in Höhe von 20 Prozent erhoben werden. Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), kommentiert dies wie folgt:

Donald Trump hat mit seinen Strafzöllen gegen die Welt einen möglicherweise fatalen Fehler gemacht. Trump überschätzt sich selbst und die globale Macht der US-Wirtschaft. Er kann einen Handelskonflikt gegen die gesamte Welt nicht gewinnen, solange Europa, China, Mexiko und Kanada koordiniert agieren. Dieser Konflikt ist die Chance für die EU, das Heft des Handels zurückzugewinnen.Gleichzeitig bedeutet Trumps Handelskonflikt das endgültige Ende für die multilaterale Weltordnung in Bezug auf Wirtschaft und Handel.

Trump hat die zentralen Versprechen und Abkommen aufgekündigt, die dem Welthandel und der Welthandelsorganisation WTO zugrunde liegen. Der Handelskonflikt schafft nur Verlierer; die größten Verlierer sind die US-Wirtschaft und insbesondere die Wählerinnen und Wähler von Trump. Sie dürften eine durch die Zölle ausgelöste Preissteigerung von mehr als fünf Prozent und einen empfindlichen Verlust ihres Lebensstandards erfahren. Da US-Produkte mittelfristig weniger wettbewerbsfähig werden, dürften viele Arbeitsplätze in den USA verloren gehen. Die Frustration vieler Trump-Anhängerinnen und -Anhänger zeichnet sich bereits jetzt ab und könnte dazu führen, dass die Republikaner bei den Midterm-Wahlen zum US-Kongress im nächsten Jahr ihre Mehrheiten einbüßen.

Die Erwartung Donald Trumps, dass ausländische Unternehmen ihre Produktion in die USA verlagern, dürfte nicht aufgehen. Europäische Unternehmen sind bei einer so erratischen Politik klug beraten, ihre Produktion nicht in die USA zu verlagern. Die EU muss nun einen kühlen Kopf bewahren und konzertiert – und nach Möglichkeit koordiniert mit China, Mexiko und Kanada – auf den Handelskonflikt antworten. Die beste Antwort dürfte die Einführung gleichhoher Zölle sein. Dies schützt die Glaubwürdigkeit der EU und signalisiert, dass Europa zu deeskalieren bereit ist, wenn Trump seinen Kurs korrigiert.

Jetzt ist der richtige Zeitpunkt für die EU, endlich gegen den Marktmissbrauch einiger mächtiger US-Digitalkonzerne vorzugehen: mit einer fairen Besteuerung in Europa und die Einhaltung europäischer Regeln – von Datenschutz über ethische Standards bis hin zu Transparenz und Wettbewerb. Das Vorgehen gegen US-Digitalkonzerne wird Europa wirtschaftlich weh tun, da es häufig wenig oder keine Alternativen für deren digitalen Dienstleistungen gibt. Aber es ist deutlich besser für die EU, jetzt diesen notwendigen Schritt zu gehen als noch weitere Zeit zu vergeuden und die Abhängigkeit und den Marktmissbrauch weiter zu vergrößern.

Ob und wann der Gazastreifen wiederaufgebaut wird, ist angesichts der neuer­lichen Kämpfe zwischen Israel und der Hamas ungewiss. Sollte es dazu kommen, dürf­te der von Ägypten vorgelegte Wiederaufbauplan die zentrale Grundlage bilden. Besonders profitieren könnte dann ein Netzwerk aus Wirtschafts- und Sicherheits­akteuren rund um Ibrahim al-Argani – einen Unternehmer mit engen Verbindungen zum Umfeld von Präsident Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, der bereits in der Vergangenheit Geschäfte mit der prekären Lage im Gazastreifen gemacht hat. Daher sollten Deutschland und seine europäischen Partner, die den ägyptischen Plan unterstützen, auf größtmögliche Transparenz und Rechenschaftspflicht drängen. Andernfalls drohen nicht nur eine unzureichende Berücksichtigung palästinensischer Interessen sowie überhöhte Kosten, sondern auch eine weitere Stärkung des autoritären Herrschaftssystems in Ägypten.

Die Ukraine hindert Russland seit drei Jahren daran, seinen völkerrechtswidrigen Angriffskrieg siegreich zu beenden. Über lange Phasen des Krieges befanden sich die Konfliktparteien in einem militärischen und diplomatischen Patt. Nun hat US-Präsi­dent Donald Trump sich mit dem Aggressor Russland solidarisiert. Der Grundsatz »Nichts über die Ukraine ohne die Ukraine«, der die westliche Politik seit Februar 2022 anleitete, gilt für Washington nicht mehr. Trump hat das internationale Umfeld des Krieges und das Gleichgewicht zwischen den Parteien fundamental verändert und den Weg zu einem russischen Diktatfrieden geöffnet. Um einen solchen zu ver­hindern, ist schnelles und entschiedenes europäisches Handeln nötig. Die nächste Bundesregierung muss dabei aus dem Stand eine Schlüsselrolle übernehmen.

Zusammenfassung:

Die USA haben in ihrer Handelspolitik eine deutliche Abkehr vom Multilateralismus vollzogen. Neue, weitreichende Zölle stellen eine ernsthafte Bedrohung für die globalen Lieferketten dar. Da die USA nach wie vor der größte Warenexportmarkt der Europäischen Union (EU) sind, haben diese Maßnahmen erhebliche Auswirkungen auf die EU-Staaten. Die Exporte in die USA hängen in hohem Maße von einer kleinen Anzahl von Unternehmen und guten Geschäftsbeziehungen ab, was die EU besonders anfällig für gezielte Handelsmaßnahmen macht. In Deutschland entfallen allein ein Fünftel der maritimen Exporte in die USA auf die zehn wichtigsten Geschäftsbeziehungen zwischen EU-Exporteuren und US-Importeuren. Auch der unternehmensinterne Handel spielt eine entscheidende Rolle: Ein Viertel der Automobilexporte aus Deutschland in die USA erfolgt zwischen Tochterunternehmen gemeinsamer Eigentümer. Simulationen deuten zudem darauf hin, dass ein transatlantischer Zollkonflikt die EU-Exporte in die USA halbieren und weitreichende Produktionseinbußen auslösen würde, wobei das Bruttoinlandsprodukt Deutschlands langfristig um etwa 0,33 Prozent schrumpfen würde. Um diese wirtschaftlichen Schäden zu begrenzen und eine langfristige Widerstandsfähigkeit aufzubauen, sollte die EU ihre Exporte verstärkt diversifizieren, indem sie ihre Handelsbeziehungen mit Freihandelspartnern vertieft und die Integration innerhalb des EU-Binnenmarkts verbessert.

Bundesinnenministerin Nancy Faeser hat heute die Polizeiliche Kriminalitätsstatistik 2024 vorgestellt. Es folgt eine Einschätzung von Anna Bindler, Leiterin der Abteilung Kriminalität, Arbeit und Ungleichheit im DIW Berlin:

Die Statistik zeigt insgesamt einen Rückgang in registrierten Straftaten im Vergleich zu 2023 beziehungsweise eine Stagnation, wenn man die Teillegalisierung von Cannabis mit einbezieht. Auffällig ist ein Anstieg in Kinder- und Jugendkriminalität, deren Anteil unter Tatverdächtigen bei Gewaltkriminalität bei 7,0 beziehungsweise 15,9 Prozent liegt. Die Gründe hierfür sollten sorgfältig analysiert werden und gesamtpolitische Konzepte, zum Beispiel durch eine Stärkung von Bildung und Jugendeinrichtungen, diskutiert werden. Auch registrierte Fälle im Bereich der Sexualdelikte sind gestiegen: im Vergleich zu 2023 um 9,3 Prozent. Ob dies ein Anstieg in Sexualdelikten oder eine Veränderung in der Anzeigenbereitschaft der Betroffenen (vorwiegend Frauen) ist, kann nicht aus der Statistik abgeleitet werden. Entsprechend sollte diese Entwicklung genau analysiert werden, um zielgenau Maßnahmen treffen zu können. Sehr präsent im derzeitigen politischen und gesellschaftlichen Diskurs ist die Frage, inwieweit sich Migration auf Kriminalität auswirkt. Die Polizeiliche Kriminalitätsstatistik (PKS) weist den Anteil an Zuwanderinnen und Zuwanderern unter den Tatverdächtigen (ohne ausländerrechtliche Verstöße) insgesamt mit 8,8 Prozent aus – im Vergleich zu 8,9 Prozent im Jahr 2023 ist der Anteil damit leicht gesunken.

Allerdings: Die Ergebnisse der PKS müssen insgesamt mit Vorsicht interpretiert werden. Erstens: Die PKS ist eine Ausgangsstatistik – sie erfasst Verdachtsfälle vor der Bearbeitung durch die Staatsanwaltschaft und Gerichte. Eine Verlaufsstatistik, in der über die Zeit verfolgt werden könnte, wie sich diese Fälle konkret entwickeln, steht derzeit nicht zur Verfügung. Zweitens: Sie erfasst das Hellfeld der Kriminalität – diejenigen Fälle, die durch die Polizei erfasst werden. Das bedeutet, dass nicht nur die Kriminalitätsentwicklung per se einen Einfluss auf die Statistik hat, sondern auch das Meldeverhalten in der Bevölkerung (was wird als Kriminalität wahrgenommen, was wird zur Anzeige gebracht) oder die Prioritätensetzung in der polizeilichen Arbeit (etwa durch einen Fokus auf bestimmte Risikogruppen, Delikte oder Gegenden/Städte).

Insgesamt bietet die PKS damit nur eine Annäherung an die reale Kriminalitätsentwicklung. Die Ergebnisse der Dunkelfeldstudien, die voraussichtlich noch in diesem Jahr vom Bundeskriminalamt veröffentlicht werden, werden bezüglich der realen Kriminalitätsentwicklung aussagekräftiger sein.

DIW-Studie untersucht Sprach- und Mathekompetenzen von Schulanfänger*innen in Deutschland im Vergleich zu anderen Ländern – Stärkerer Zusammenhang mit sozialer Herkunft als anderswo – Frühkindliche Bildung und Betreuungsangebot sollten ausgebaut werden Sprach- und Mathekompetenzen von Schulanfänger ...

Over the past eighty years, the evolution of UN peace operations has encountered several critical junctures. Now, UN peace operations have arguably reached another turning point with the decline in the number of UN-led multidimensional missions and a growing role for partners, including regional and subregional organizations. This has led to calls to examine how peace operations are conceived, mandated, structured, and led, and several review processes are ongoing. It is important that these processes consider not only the supply side of peace operations but also the demand side—in other words, to take conflict settings as the starting point and work backward to determine the type of intervention needed.

Within this context, IPI organized a series of scenario-based workshops to brainstorm potential responses to a mix of real and hypothetical scenarios. The first workshop was held over two days in Addis Ababa in January 2025 in partnership with the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). A second workshop was held in New York in March 2025. The workshops brought together civilian, military, and police representatives of the UN, African Union (AU), subregional organizations, and member states, as well as independent experts.

This paper reflects on several key considerations that emerged from these workshops:

• The UN Security Council and UN Secretariat should work together to ensure that mandates and mission activities are driven by clear political strategies that address politics at the local, national, regional, and international levels.
• The Secretariat should establish a standing and integrated operational planning team in the shared regional divisions to facilitate a shift from templated approaches to context-specific, demand-driven approaches.
• Field missions should have enhanced capacity to develop operational responses to scenarios based on their current mandate or possible changes to their mandate.
• Member states and the Secretariat should explore how to operationalize modular approaches to mission configurations to foster more flexible and targeted mission mandates.
• Troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs) should provide more specialized and targeted contributions to match missions’ capabilities to new mission approaches and current demands.
• Building on their commitments in the Pact for the Future, member states should demonstrate leadership by actively contributing to the ongoing reviews of peace operations and by providing a clear political direction to the work of the Secretariat.

These lessons can feed into several ongoing and upcoming policy processes, including the UN peacekeeping ministerial, the review on the future of peace operations, the ten-year review of the report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), and the review of the UN peacebuilding architecture.

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The post Scenario-Based Planning and the Future of Peace Operations appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Der politische Kurswechsel der USA unter Donald Trump, der Rückzug aus vielen Bereichen internationaler Kooperation, die Abwicklung der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, aber auch die offenen Angriffe auf Südafrika machen es notwendig: Viele afrikanische Staaten werden ihre außenpolitischen Beziehungen überprüfen. 

Auch wenn der Kontinent für Trump keine große Bedeutung hat, sind die politischen Auswirkungen seiner Agenda deutlich spürbar. Das sind gute Voraussetzungen für Deutschland und Europa, sich aus normativen wie pragmatischen Gründen als stabile und verlässliche Partner zu positionieren. 

Auf dem jüngsten Südafrika-EU-Gipfel in Kapstadt brachte die EU-Kommissionspräsidentin Ursula von der Leyen diese Haltung auf den Punkt: »Wir wissen, dass andere sich zurückziehen, deshalb wollen wir unsere Unterstützung ganz klar zum Ausdruck bringen. Wir verstärken unser Engagement, und wir sind hier, um zu bleiben.«

Allerdings ist der Rückzug der USA nicht gleichbedeutend mit einer Abkehr vom amerikanischen Einfluss. Vielmehr zeigt sich, dass Trumps chauvinistischer, autoritärer, machtbewusster und transaktionaler Stil durchaus Sympathisanten in Afrika findet – selbst dort, wo seine Politik unmittelbare Nachteile mit sich bringt wie das Ende der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zeigt. Insbesondere autokratische Regime werden darauf hoffen, mit ihm politische Deals schließen zu können.

Wie diese Geschäfte aussehen könnten, zeigt das Beispiel der Demokratischen Republik Kongo. Präsident Félix Tshisekedi hat den USA privilegierten Zugang zu kritischen Rohstoffen angeboten – im Gegenzug für Schutz vor Ruanda und dessen verbündeten Rebellen. So ungewiss die Erfolgsaussichten eines solchen Deals sind, so klar ist die Logik dahinter: Trump bei seinen eigenen Zielen abholen – also Rohstoffe sichern und Chinas Einfluss zurückdrängen.

Gemeinsames Interesse: Eine reformierte, regelbasierte Ordnung

Hinzu kommt: Die meisten afrikanischen Regierungen navigieren außenpolitisch mit großem Geschick und reagieren flexibel auf sich verändernde internationale Rahmenbedingungen. Afrikanische Staaten begreifen internationale Multipolarität nicht als Risiko, sondern als Chance. 

Multipolarität bedeutet aber nicht Regellosigkeit und Anarchie. Auch wenn manche Staatschefs Hoffnungen in Trump setzen: Für die meisten Staaten – in Afrika und in Europa – geht von der Machtpolitik à la Trump eine existentielle Gefahr aus. Nicht nur von ihm selbst, sondern ebenso von den Nachahmern, die er finden wird. Ein Szenario, in dem allein harte militärische und wirtschaftliche Machtressourcen die internationalen Beziehungen bestimmen, wird für Europa und erst recht für Afrika zum Problem. Die seit Jahren wachsenden Bemühungen afrikanischer Staaten, sich in Foren wie UN und G20 Gehör und Mitsprache zu verschaffen, würden angesichts eines solchen Politikmodells kollabieren. 

Afrika und Europa haben ein gemeinsames Interesse an einer regelbasierten Ordnung. Darin liegt – trotz aller gegenwärtigen Widrigkeiten – die Chance für einen Schulterschluss zwischen Afrika und Europa. Dabei darf Europa aber nicht dem Irrtum erliegen, der Erhalt des Status quo reiche aus. Aus der afrikanischen Perspektive ist klar: Die multilaterale Ordnung muss nicht nur bewahrt, sondern ihre Regeln und Institutionen müssen reformiert werden. Das ist seit Jahren die Kernforderung der afrikanischen Staaten. Hier muss Europa entschlossener Position beziehen.

Ein gemeinsames Interesse an der multilateralen Ordnung bedeutet aber nicht, dass substantielle Reibungspunkte im afrikanisch-europäischen Verhältnis in den Hintergrund treten. Dazu zählen die Migrationspolitik, eine gerechte Klima- und Energiepolitik, der Umgang mit der kolonialen Vergangenheit, die Bewertung von Russlands Angriff auf die Ukraine oder der Gaza-Krieg.

Dennoch kann der Trump-Schock eine Chance für Europa sein, die Beziehungen zu Afrika deutlich zu verbessern. Das gemeinsame Interesse an der Verteidigung und der Reform der multilateralen Ordnung kann ein Sprungbrett sein, um Vertrauen aufzubauen und Fortschritte auch in anderen Bereichen zu erzielen. Dann wäre Trump der unfreiwillige Katalysator für eine echte Partnerschaft zwischen Afrika und Europa. Das anstehende Außenministertreffen zwischen der Afrikanischen Union und EU am 21. Mai – bietet eine gute Gelegenheit, diesen Weg einzuschlagen.

The techno-geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States has intensified in recent years. Turkey’s souring relations with the US over the past decade has pre­vented the former from reaping the spoils of the Sino-US tech war as an American ally. Ankara has its own ambitions in the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution and is prioritising gaining access to advanced technology under affordable price arrange­ments in which Chinese tech companies offer important opportunities. Since Turkey is a NATO member and an EU candidate, its incremental move towards China’s tech­nology ecosystem should be of concern to EU decision-makers. Brussels should pro­mote policies to foster collaboration with Turkey so that today’s geoeconomic chal­lenges can be tackled together.