You are here

Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Honoring Warren Hoge, Former IPI Vice President of External Relations

European Peace Institute / News - Fri, 05/01/2024 - 18:00

“He was a consummate professional, a dear friend to so many and so wonderfully decent. He will be sorely missed.” – Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President & CEO of the International Peace Institute

By profession, Warren was a journalist, but by nature he was a diplomat—fully aware of the power of words to engage, to inform, to inspire, to change the world,” said Gillian Sorensen, former Assistant-Secretary-General for External Relations at the UN, when she spoke at Warren’s Celebration of Life on November 29th. The event brought together Warren’s beautiful family, friends, and colleagues to remember and honor Warren Hoge, and the positive impact he had on so many lives.

Warren came to the International Peace Institute as the first Vice President of External Relations following his extraordinary, event-filled 32-year career at The New York Times. Prior to coming to IPI he was the Chief UN Correspondent for the Times. He joined IPI in 2008—the same year IPI opened its own, dedicated event space, The Trygve Lie Center for Peace, Security & Development. I had recently joined the organization at that time, and I was fortunate to have him as my supervisor.

When I first met Warren, I was pregnant with my first child. Not long after meeting him, I experienced what many first-time mothers do and was rushed to the hospital thinking something was wrong, only to find I had Braxton Hicks (false labor). It happened so quickly that my husband called the office to let them know I had to miss work to go to the hospital. Not long after I was admitted, the phone rang in my hospital room and – to my surprise – I heard a kind, radio-quality voice coming through the receiver. It was my new supervisor, Warren Hoge, who was calling to check on how I was doing and make sure I was OK. I was moved by his thoughtfulness and the concern he showed. This is one of countless stories that exemplify the compassion Warren had for his colleagues. His management style centered around kindness and care. He was deeply committed to the importance of family life and his face would light up whenever he spoke of his family. I am forever thankful for the opportunity to have learned from him, a person who valued connection and consistently acted with empathy and compassion—the building blocks of peace.

It was very fitting that he came to work at IPI after retiring from journalism. It was at a moment when IPI was beginning to reach out beyond the UN community and organize more events to bring together different sectors working toward our goal of creating a more peaceful and sustainable planet. Warren’s vast knowledge of world affairs, his deep conviction for the importance of international cooperation, coupled with his way of being in the world, informed how the organization evolved.

Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, IPI President and CEO reflected that, “He was a consummate professional, a dear friend to so many, and so wonderfully decent. He will be sorely missed.”

In her speech about Warren’s work with the UN, Gillian Sorensen rightly said, “He was an idealist without illusion. A caring critic of the UN. Never demeaning, never dismissive.” She also said, “He knew its [the UN] potential and its limits. He knew its impact on New York City and its many functions beyond peace and security, including health and human rights, and so much more… He believed the UN was imperfect but indispensable. That it was there … as a location for representatives from every nation on earth to come to be heard, to connect, to engage. He believed in the power of diplomacy to make a better world.”

During his time at IPI, Warren spearheaded the original redesign of the organization’s website, wrote NYT-quality coverage of our events, and created the “Distinguished Authors Event Series,” a series of evening receptions featuring authors of recently published books connected to pressing international relations concerns and peace. He co-produced and narrated IPI’s 40th Anniversary film; conducted interviews with world leaders and experts—including almost all of the 2016 candidates for UN Secretary-General; and was the most well-prepared of moderators for countless IPI panel discussions. He was also a devoted mentor to interns and junior staff, and someone who always took the time to provide advice and guidance to those who sought it.

He had a zest for life that uplifted those around him. Being from Manhattan, he developed throughout his life a great love for music, good food, and the theater. He also loved to sing and often filled the office with music, bringing a spirit of joy to the work.

After Warren’s passing, the UN Secretary-General’s Spokesperson, Stephane Dujarric, announced to the UN press core, “After retiring from the Times, Warren moved to the International Peace Institute, where he remained deeply involved in international affairs, and kept in touch with so many of you. As we extend our condolences to his wife Olivia and their children, we remember Warren as a true gentleman reporter who was unfailing in his kindness, his easy grace, and detailed reporting of the ups and downs of this institution.”

Following this announcement, American journalist and UN Correspondent for the Associated Press, Edie Lederer, stated: “On behalf of the United Nations Correspondents Association, we would also like to send condolences to the family and many friends of Warren Hoge around the world. He was a terrific journalist who reported from South America, Brazil, London, and many global hotspots before coming to the UN. As you so rightly said, he was a charming man and a great raconteur. And he will be greatly missed by all of us who knew him.”

Warren elevated IPI’s work beyond the UN community and into the broader international affairs community around the globe. He exemplified what peace means in practice. He had a natural way of connecting at a heart-level with all those he worked with and interacted with. He led IPI’s External Relations to new heights, broadening its audience and reach – always with sincerity, kindness, and respect. IPI is deeply grateful for his extraordinary contributions.

IPI’s Vice President and COO, Adam Lupel, who worked with Warren for 15 years said it well: “He was among the most memorable of characters imaginable—genuinely kind and generous to all, the greatest of storytellers, a gentleman of capacious heart and warm smile. He will be dearly missed.”

His life lives on in the stories he told, the lives he influenced with his wisdom and wit, and his compassion and care. His empathy, genuine kindness, and contributions to creating a more peaceful world will always be remembered.

~ Mary Anne Feeney, IPI Senior Director for External Relations

Marcel Fratzscher: „Auch im Jahr 2024 dürfte die Inflation weiterhin sehr unsozial sein“

Das Statistische Bundesamt hat heute die vorläufige Inflationsrate für das Jahr 2023 veröffentlicht. Dies kommentiert DIW-Präsident Marcel Fratzscher:

Die Inflation war mit 5,9 Prozent im Jahr 2023 noch immer viel zu hoch. Wir erleben nach wie vor eine höchst unsoziale Inflation, denn Menschen mit geringen Einkommen erfahren eine zwei- bis dreimal höhere Inflation als Menschen mit hohen Einkommen. Das liegt daran, dass in den vergangenen beiden Jahren besonders die Dinge teurer geworden sind, für die Menschen mit geringen Einkommen einen viel höheren Anteil ihres monatlichen Einkommens aufbringen müssen als andere Menschen. Dies sind insbesondere Energie und Lebensmittel.

Das größte Problem für die Bürgerinnen und Bürger ist nicht die Inflation per se, sondern die Tatsache, dass für die meisten Menschen in den vergangenen beiden Jahren die Preise für ihren Lebensunterhalt stärker gestiegen sind als ihre Löhne und Einkommen. Vor allem Menschen mit geringen und mittleren Einkommen haben heute eine geringere Kaufkraft als noch vor zwei Jahren und müssen deshalb den Gürtel enger schnallen. Dies wirkt sich auch negativ auf die Konjunktur und gesamtwirtschaftliche Entwicklung in Deutschland aus. Denn weniger Nachfrage bedeutet auch weniger Wachstum und Umsatz für die Unternehmen. 

Die Chancen stehen gut, dass die Inflation 2024 deutlich abnehmen wird und – nach neuster Prognose des DIW Berlin – bei 2,4 Prozent liegen könnte. Gleichzeitig ist eine solche Prognose mit viel Unsicherheit behaftet, denn eine Eskalation der Kriege in der Ukraine und im mittleren Osten, zunehmende Handelskonflikte oder Naturkatastrophen können schnell wieder zu stark steigenden Preisen führen. Zudem dürfte 2024 die Inflation wiederum sehr unsozial sein und Menschen mit geringen Einkommen deutlich härter treffen. Vor allem die Mieten könnten weiter deutlich steigen. Und auch die Energiekosten könnten wieder steigen, da steuerliche Entlastungen wegfallen und der CO2-Preis weiter zunehmen wird.  

Die Politik kann die Inflation nicht kontrollieren. Aber sie kann besonders hart betroffene Menschen finanziell gezielt entlasten. Die Bundesregierung sollte daher 2024 ihr Hauptaugenmerk auf eine stärkere Erhöhung des Mindestlohns und die Umsetzung des Klimageldes legen. Dies sind die effektivsten Instrumente und vor allem Menschen mit geringen Einkommen zu entlasten und ihre Einkommen zu stärken.

Marcel Fratzscher: „Die Hochwasserkatastrophe in Niedersachsen zeigt die Unsinnigkeit der Schuldenbremse“

Wegen der Hochwasserkatastrophe in Niedersachsen und anderen Bundesländern wird aktuell diskutiert, die Schuldenbremse auszusetzen. DIW-Präsident Marcel Fratzscher kommentiert diesen Vorschlag wie folgt:

Die Hochwasserkatastrophe in Teilen Deutschlands wird wohl eine Ausnahme von der Schuldenbremse, sowohl für den Bund als auch für einige Länder wie Niedersachsen, notwendig machen. Diese Katastrophe wird den Staat voraussichtlich einen erheblichen Milliardenbetrag kosten, der nicht aus den laufenden Haushalten gedeckt werden kann. Die Alternative zu einer Ausnahme der Schuldenbremse wäre ein noch härterer Sparkurs, der die deutsche Wirtschaft in eh schon schwierigen Zeiten weiter schwächen und Wohlstand kosten würde.

Die Hochwasserkatastrophe in Niedersachsen zeigt die Unsinnigkeit der Schuldenbremse, so wie sie nun durch das Bundesverfassungsgericht noch weiter eingegrenzt wurde. Es wird voraussichtlich künftig kein Jahr in Deutschland ohne Naturkatastrophe oder eine andere Notsituation vergehen, die erhebliche Ausgaben des deutschen Staates erfordert. Ein Festhalten an der Schuldenbremse wird daher bedeuten, dass der deutsche Staat künftig fast jedes Jahr eine Ausnahme von der Schuldenbremse erklären muss. Eine so definierte Schuldenbremse ist kontraproduktiv und schädlich, weil sie Unsicherheit schafft und immer wieder zu politischen Konflikten führen wird.

Wenn in Zukunft nicht fast jedes Jahr eine Ausnahme von der Schuldenbremse erklärt werden soll, dann muss der deutsche Staat erhebliche Überschüsse einplanen, damit er den nötigen finanziellen Spielraum hat, um auf Krisen reagieren zu können. Alternativ könnte der Staat versuchen, vorbeugend ein Sondervermögen für Naturkatastrophen zu schaffen mit Verfassungsrang – so wie das Sondervermögen für die Bundeswehr –, um schnell und flexibel auf künftige Krisen reagieren zu können. Allerdings gibt es viele andere Notsituationen und besondere Finanzierungsbedarfe für den Staat, so dass dies letztlich die Schuldenbremse sinnlos macht. Daher sollte die Politik dringend die gegenwärtige Schuldenbremse reformieren und bis dahin weitere Sondervermögen schaffen, um notwendige Ausgaben finanzieren und vor allem auch schnell und flexibel auf Notsituationen reagieren zu können.

Studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) für die Abteilung Klimapolitik

Die Abteilung Klimapolitik des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt

eine studentische Hilfskraft (m/w/div)

für 10 Wochenstunden.


Marcel Fratzscher: „Härtere Sanktionen beim Bürgergeld wären eher Symbolpolitik“

Ein Gesetzentwurf aus dem Bundesarbeitsministerium sieht offenbar vor, die Sanktionen beim Bürgergeld zu verschärfen. So sollen Personen, die wiederholt zumutbare Jobangebote ablehnen, künftig vorübergehend kein Bürgergeld erhalten. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Der Vorschlag von Bundesarbeitsminister Heil, härtere Sanktionen beim Bürgergeld gegenüber jenen auszusprechen, die Arbeitsangebote ablehnen, ist richtig. Er wird aber nichts grundlegend an der Tatsache ändern, dass viel zu viele Menschen auf das Bürgergeld angewiesen sind. Der effektivste Weg, um mehr Menschen in Arbeit zu bringen, ist ein stärkeres Fördern, mehr Qualifizierung und eine direktere Unterstützung. 

Die härteren Sanktionen würden eine sehr kleine Minderheit treffen. Die große Mehrheit derer, die Bürgergeld beziehen, bemüht sich. Die Maßnahme ist eher Symbolpolitik, um die Reputation des Bürgergelds – nach den Attacken von manchen aus FDP und CDU – wieder zu verbessern. Ich habe Zweifel, dass diese Symbolpolitik funktionieren und stattdessen nicht vielmehr von populistischen Politiker*innen genutzt werden wird, um weiterhin die falsche These vom Missbrauch des Bürgergelds zu verbreiten. Eine deutlich bessere Vorbeugung, eine effektivere Förderung durch Qualifizierung sowie bessere Perspektiven und Hilfen bei der Integration von Geflüchteten sind die einzig effektiven Maßnahmen, um die Anzahl der Bezieher*innen von Bürgergeld mittelfristig deutlich zu reduzieren.

ለስደተኞች እና ለስደተኛ ተቀባይ ማህበረሰቦች የስራ እድል እና ማህበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሻሻል የቴክኒክና ሙያ ስልጠና (TVET) ያለው ሚና፡፡ በኢትዮጵያ ከተካሄደው የተፅዕኖ ግምገማ (Impact Assessment) የተገኘ ማስረጃ

መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች በቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና (ቴሙትስ) አማካኝነት የሥራ ዕድሎችን እና
ምርታማነትን የማሳደግ ከፍተኛ ምኞት አላቸው። ሥልጠናው በዋናነት የሥራ ገበያው የሚፈልገውን ሙያ
በማስተማር ብቃት ያለው የሰው ኃይል አቅርቦትን ማመቻቸት ይጠበቅበታል። እነዚሁ አካላት የቴክኒክና ሙያ
ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከሥራ ስምሪት ባሻገር አካታችነትን፣ የፆታ እኩልነትን እና ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን (social
cohesion) በኅብረተሰቡ ውስጥ እንደሚያሻሽል ይገምታሉ።
የሥራ እድል ተደራሽነት ፤ ማኅበራዊ እና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ውህደትን በማጎልበት እንዲሁም ተፈናቃዮችን መልሶ
በማቋቋም ረገድ ወሳኝ ሚናን ይጫወታል። በስደት ረዥም ጊዜ መቆየት እና ወደሶስተኛ አገር የሚደረጉ የቋሚ
መፍትሄ እድሎች ማሽቆልቆል፤ የስደተኞች የመጀመርያ መዳረሻ አገሮች ውስጥ ማኅበራዊ ውህደት (local
integration) ፍለጋን አነሳስቷል። ባለፉት አስርት ዓመታት የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከፍተኛ ትኩረትን
የሳበው ከዚህ አንፃር ነው።
የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና የእነዚህን መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች ምኞቶች ያሟላ ነው? በአጠቃላይ
በቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ላይ ያሉ ተጨባጭ ማስረጃዎች ውስን እና በአብዛኛው ወጥነት የሌላቸው
ናቸው። ከሥራና ከገቢ አንፃር ሲታይ ትንሽ አወንታዊ ውጤት እንዳለ መረጃዎች ቢጠቁሙም በአብዛኛው ውጤቶች
የሚታዩት ከመካከለኛ እስከ ረዥም ጊዜ (Medium and long term) ሲሆን፣ በአጠቃላይ ፕሮግራሞቹ ለረጅም ጊዜ
ሥራ አጦች በተሻለ ሁኔታ ይሰራሉ። ይህ በእንዲህ እንዳለ፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና በማኅበራዊ ትስስር ዙሪያ
ሊያመጣ የሚችለውን ውጤት በተመለከተ ትልቅ የእውቀት ክፍተት አለ። በፖሊሲው ከተቀመጠው የገንዘብ
መጠን እና ከሚጠበቀው ከፍተኛ ግምት አንፃር፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና የተቀመጠለትን ዓላማ እንዴት
እንደሚያሳካ መረዳት አስፈላጊ ነው።
በዚህ የፖሊሲ ምክረ ሃሳብ በጀርመን ዓለም አቀፍ ትብብር ኤጀንሲ (ጂአይዜድ) አማካኝንት በኢትዮጵያ
የተተገበረውን ሁሉን አቀፍ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (TVET) ጥናት ውጤት አቅርበናል። በዚህ ፕሮግራም ስደተኞችን
ተቀባይ ሀገር ነዋሪዎች እና ስደተኞች በጋራ ስልጠናውን የተከታተሉ ሲሆን፣ ዓላማውም ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን
ማጎልበት እና የሥራ እድሎችን ማመቻቸት ነው።
የጥናቱ ውጤቶቹ እንደሚያመለክቱት፣ በማኅበራዊ ትስስር በኩል የታዩ ተፅእኖዎች በብዙ ገፅታ ጥሩ ቢሆኑም፣
ከገቢ እና ከሥራ እድል አንጻር ውጤቶቹ ዝቅተኛ እና የተወሰኑ ግለሰቦች ላይ ያተኮሩ ናቸው። አሃዛዊ እና አሃዛዊ
ያልሆኑ (quantitative and qualitative) ማስረጃዎች የሚጠቁሙት ስልጠናው የማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሳደግ
እንደሚረዳ ነው፡፡ ከፕሮግራም ዲዛይን ወይም ከአፈጻጸም ችግሮች በላይ እንደ የሥራ እድሎች ውስንነት፣ የሕግ
ማቆዎች እና የፆታ እኩልነትን መሰረት ያደረገ እድል ያለመኖር እና የመሳሰሉ በመዋቅራዊ ችግሮች ስልጠናው
በስራ እድል ፈጠራ በኩል ውጤታማ እንዳይሆን ዋና መሰናክል ሆነው ይታያሉ።
የጥናቱ ዋና ዋና ምክረ ሃሳቦች፥

  •  የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) ሲታቀድ ጥንቃቄ በተሞላበት ጥናት ማለትም፤ ከጉልበት

ገበያው አቅም እና ከህግ ማእቀፉ አንጻር በበቂ ሁኔታ መታየት አለበት፡፡ በተለይ የሥራ እድሎችን
ከመፍጠር አንጻር ይህ በጣም ወሳኝ ነው፡፡

  • ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሻሻል ፤ አካታች የሆነ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና ውጤታማ መሣሪያ ሆኖ

ይስተዋላል። ነገር ግን ማኅበራዊ ትስስር ፣ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እንደ ተጨማሪ ውጤት ብቻ ሳይሆን
የስልጠናው ዋና ዓላማ ሆኖ የሚውሰድ ከሆነ፤ “ሌሎች የተሻሉ አማራጮች አልነበሩም ወይ?” የሚል
ጥያቄ ያስነሳል፡፡ በተለይ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እና ከገቢ አንጻር በተያያዘ ባለን ማስረጃ መሰረት ጥያቄውን
የበለጠ አስፈላጊ ያደርገዋል።

  •  አካታች የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) መርሃ ግብር የሚያመጣውን ለውጥ በተመለከተ፣ ሰፋ ያሉ

ተጨማሪ ጥናቶችን ይፈልጋል። መሞላት ካለባቸው የእውቀት ክፍተቶች መካከል የቴክኒክና ሙያ ሥልጠና
በስደተኞች ላይ የሚያሳድረው ተጽዕኖ፣ ሊያስከትል የሚችለውን አሉታዊ እና አወንታዊ ተጽዕኖ፤ ሊያስከትል
የሚችለው ማኅበራዊ ተጽዕኖ፣ እንዲሁም በፆታ በኩል እና ከመካከለኛ እስከ የረዥም ጊዜ ያለው የሥራ እድል
ፈጠራ እና ገቢ ላይ የሚኖሩት ውጤቶች ይገኙበታል።

ለስደተኞች እና ለስደተኛ ተቀባይ ማህበረሰቦች የስራ እድል እና ማህበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሻሻል የቴክኒክና ሙያ ስልጠና (TVET) ያለው ሚና፡፡ በኢትዮጵያ ከተካሄደው የተፅዕኖ ግምገማ (Impact Assessment) የተገኘ ማስረጃ

መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች በቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና (ቴሙትስ) አማካኝነት የሥራ ዕድሎችን እና
ምርታማነትን የማሳደግ ከፍተኛ ምኞት አላቸው። ሥልጠናው በዋናነት የሥራ ገበያው የሚፈልገውን ሙያ
በማስተማር ብቃት ያለው የሰው ኃይል አቅርቦትን ማመቻቸት ይጠበቅበታል። እነዚሁ አካላት የቴክኒክና ሙያ
ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከሥራ ስምሪት ባሻገር አካታችነትን፣ የፆታ እኩልነትን እና ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን (social
cohesion) በኅብረተሰቡ ውስጥ እንደሚያሻሽል ይገምታሉ።
የሥራ እድል ተደራሽነት ፤ ማኅበራዊ እና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ውህደትን በማጎልበት እንዲሁም ተፈናቃዮችን መልሶ
በማቋቋም ረገድ ወሳኝ ሚናን ይጫወታል። በስደት ረዥም ጊዜ መቆየት እና ወደሶስተኛ አገር የሚደረጉ የቋሚ
መፍትሄ እድሎች ማሽቆልቆል፤ የስደተኞች የመጀመርያ መዳረሻ አገሮች ውስጥ ማኅበራዊ ውህደት (local
integration) ፍለጋን አነሳስቷል። ባለፉት አስርት ዓመታት የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከፍተኛ ትኩረትን
የሳበው ከዚህ አንፃር ነው።
የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና የእነዚህን መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች ምኞቶች ያሟላ ነው? በአጠቃላይ
በቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ላይ ያሉ ተጨባጭ ማስረጃዎች ውስን እና በአብዛኛው ወጥነት የሌላቸው
ናቸው። ከሥራና ከገቢ አንፃር ሲታይ ትንሽ አወንታዊ ውጤት እንዳለ መረጃዎች ቢጠቁሙም በአብዛኛው ውጤቶች
የሚታዩት ከመካከለኛ እስከ ረዥም ጊዜ (Medium and long term) ሲሆን፣ በአጠቃላይ ፕሮግራሞቹ ለረጅም ጊዜ
ሥራ አጦች በተሻለ ሁኔታ ይሰራሉ። ይህ በእንዲህ እንዳለ፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና በማኅበራዊ ትስስር ዙሪያ
ሊያመጣ የሚችለውን ውጤት በተመለከተ ትልቅ የእውቀት ክፍተት አለ። በፖሊሲው ከተቀመጠው የገንዘብ
መጠን እና ከሚጠበቀው ከፍተኛ ግምት አንፃር፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና የተቀመጠለትን ዓላማ እንዴት
እንደሚያሳካ መረዳት አስፈላጊ ነው።
በዚህ የፖሊሲ ምክረ ሃሳብ በጀርመን ዓለም አቀፍ ትብብር ኤጀንሲ (ጂአይዜድ) አማካኝንት በኢትዮጵያ
የተተገበረውን ሁሉን አቀፍ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (TVET) ጥናት ውጤት አቅርበናል። በዚህ ፕሮግራም ስደተኞችን
ተቀባይ ሀገር ነዋሪዎች እና ስደተኞች በጋራ ስልጠናውን የተከታተሉ ሲሆን፣ ዓላማውም ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን
ማጎልበት እና የሥራ እድሎችን ማመቻቸት ነው።
የጥናቱ ውጤቶቹ እንደሚያመለክቱት፣ በማኅበራዊ ትስስር በኩል የታዩ ተፅእኖዎች በብዙ ገፅታ ጥሩ ቢሆኑም፣
ከገቢ እና ከሥራ እድል አንጻር ውጤቶቹ ዝቅተኛ እና የተወሰኑ ግለሰቦች ላይ ያተኮሩ ናቸው። አሃዛዊ እና አሃዛዊ
ያልሆኑ (quantitative and qualitative) ማስረጃዎች የሚጠቁሙት ስልጠናው የማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሳደግ
እንደሚረዳ ነው፡፡ ከፕሮግራም ዲዛይን ወይም ከአፈጻጸም ችግሮች በላይ እንደ የሥራ እድሎች ውስንነት፣ የሕግ
ማቆዎች እና የፆታ እኩልነትን መሰረት ያደረገ እድል ያለመኖር እና የመሳሰሉ በመዋቅራዊ ችግሮች ስልጠናው
በስራ እድል ፈጠራ በኩል ውጤታማ እንዳይሆን ዋና መሰናክል ሆነው ይታያሉ።
የጥናቱ ዋና ዋና ምክረ ሃሳቦች፥

  •  የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) ሲታቀድ ጥንቃቄ በተሞላበት ጥናት ማለትም፤ ከጉልበት

ገበያው አቅም እና ከህግ ማእቀፉ አንጻር በበቂ ሁኔታ መታየት አለበት፡፡ በተለይ የሥራ እድሎችን
ከመፍጠር አንጻር ይህ በጣም ወሳኝ ነው፡፡

  • ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሻሻል ፤ አካታች የሆነ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና ውጤታማ መሣሪያ ሆኖ

ይስተዋላል። ነገር ግን ማኅበራዊ ትስስር ፣ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እንደ ተጨማሪ ውጤት ብቻ ሳይሆን
የስልጠናው ዋና ዓላማ ሆኖ የሚውሰድ ከሆነ፤ “ሌሎች የተሻሉ አማራጮች አልነበሩም ወይ?” የሚል
ጥያቄ ያስነሳል፡፡ በተለይ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እና ከገቢ አንጻር በተያያዘ ባለን ማስረጃ መሰረት ጥያቄውን
የበለጠ አስፈላጊ ያደርገዋል።

  •  አካታች የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) መርሃ ግብር የሚያመጣውን ለውጥ በተመለከተ፣ ሰፋ ያሉ

ተጨማሪ ጥናቶችን ይፈልጋል። መሞላት ካለባቸው የእውቀት ክፍተቶች መካከል የቴክኒክና ሙያ ሥልጠና
በስደተኞች ላይ የሚያሳድረው ተጽዕኖ፣ ሊያስከትል የሚችለውን አሉታዊ እና አወንታዊ ተጽዕኖ፤ ሊያስከትል
የሚችለው ማኅበራዊ ተጽዕኖ፣ እንዲሁም በፆታ በኩል እና ከመካከለኛ እስከ የረዥም ጊዜ ያለው የሥራ እድል
ፈጠራ እና ገቢ ላይ የሚኖሩት ውጤቶች ይገኙበታል።

ለስደተኞች እና ለስደተኛ ተቀባይ ማህበረሰቦች የስራ እድል እና ማህበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሻሻል የቴክኒክና ሙያ ስልጠና (TVET) ያለው ሚና፡፡ በኢትዮጵያ ከተካሄደው የተፅዕኖ ግምገማ (Impact Assessment) የተገኘ ማስረጃ

መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች በቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና (ቴሙትስ) አማካኝነት የሥራ ዕድሎችን እና
ምርታማነትን የማሳደግ ከፍተኛ ምኞት አላቸው። ሥልጠናው በዋናነት የሥራ ገበያው የሚፈልገውን ሙያ
በማስተማር ብቃት ያለው የሰው ኃይል አቅርቦትን ማመቻቸት ይጠበቅበታል። እነዚሁ አካላት የቴክኒክና ሙያ
ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከሥራ ስምሪት ባሻገር አካታችነትን፣ የፆታ እኩልነትን እና ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን (social
cohesion) በኅብረተሰቡ ውስጥ እንደሚያሻሽል ይገምታሉ።
የሥራ እድል ተደራሽነት ፤ ማኅበራዊ እና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ውህደትን በማጎልበት እንዲሁም ተፈናቃዮችን መልሶ
በማቋቋም ረገድ ወሳኝ ሚናን ይጫወታል። በስደት ረዥም ጊዜ መቆየት እና ወደሶስተኛ አገር የሚደረጉ የቋሚ
መፍትሄ እድሎች ማሽቆልቆል፤ የስደተኞች የመጀመርያ መዳረሻ አገሮች ውስጥ ማኅበራዊ ውህደት (local
integration) ፍለጋን አነሳስቷል። ባለፉት አስርት ዓመታት የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ከፍተኛ ትኩረትን
የሳበው ከዚህ አንፃር ነው።
የቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና የእነዚህን መንግስታት እና ለጋሾች ምኞቶች ያሟላ ነው? በአጠቃላይ
በቴክኒክና ሙያ ትምህርትና ሥልጠና ላይ ያሉ ተጨባጭ ማስረጃዎች ውስን እና በአብዛኛው ወጥነት የሌላቸው
ናቸው። ከሥራና ከገቢ አንፃር ሲታይ ትንሽ አወንታዊ ውጤት እንዳለ መረጃዎች ቢጠቁሙም በአብዛኛው ውጤቶች
የሚታዩት ከመካከለኛ እስከ ረዥም ጊዜ (Medium and long term) ሲሆን፣ በአጠቃላይ ፕሮግራሞቹ ለረጅም ጊዜ
ሥራ አጦች በተሻለ ሁኔታ ይሰራሉ። ይህ በእንዲህ እንዳለ፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና በማኅበራዊ ትስስር ዙሪያ
ሊያመጣ የሚችለውን ውጤት በተመለከተ ትልቅ የእውቀት ክፍተት አለ። በፖሊሲው ከተቀመጠው የገንዘብ
መጠን እና ከሚጠበቀው ከፍተኛ ግምት አንፃር፣ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና የተቀመጠለትን ዓላማ እንዴት
እንደሚያሳካ መረዳት አስፈላጊ ነው።
በዚህ የፖሊሲ ምክረ ሃሳብ በጀርመን ዓለም አቀፍ ትብብር ኤጀንሲ (ጂአይዜድ) አማካኝንት በኢትዮጵያ
የተተገበረውን ሁሉን አቀፍ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (TVET) ጥናት ውጤት አቅርበናል። በዚህ ፕሮግራም ስደተኞችን
ተቀባይ ሀገር ነዋሪዎች እና ስደተኞች በጋራ ስልጠናውን የተከታተሉ ሲሆን፣ ዓላማውም ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን
ማጎልበት እና የሥራ እድሎችን ማመቻቸት ነው።
የጥናቱ ውጤቶቹ እንደሚያመለክቱት፣ በማኅበራዊ ትስስር በኩል የታዩ ተፅእኖዎች በብዙ ገፅታ ጥሩ ቢሆኑም፣
ከገቢ እና ከሥራ እድል አንጻር ውጤቶቹ ዝቅተኛ እና የተወሰኑ ግለሰቦች ላይ ያተኮሩ ናቸው። አሃዛዊ እና አሃዛዊ
ያልሆኑ (quantitative and qualitative) ማስረጃዎች የሚጠቁሙት ስልጠናው የማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሳደግ
እንደሚረዳ ነው፡፡ ከፕሮግራም ዲዛይን ወይም ከአፈጻጸም ችግሮች በላይ እንደ የሥራ እድሎች ውስንነት፣ የሕግ
ማቆዎች እና የፆታ እኩልነትን መሰረት ያደረገ እድል ያለመኖር እና የመሳሰሉ በመዋቅራዊ ችግሮች ስልጠናው
በስራ እድል ፈጠራ በኩል ውጤታማ እንዳይሆን ዋና መሰናክል ሆነው ይታያሉ።
የጥናቱ ዋና ዋና ምክረ ሃሳቦች፥

  •  የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ትምህርትና ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) ሲታቀድ ጥንቃቄ በተሞላበት ጥናት ማለትም፤ ከጉልበት

ገበያው አቅም እና ከህግ ማእቀፉ አንጻር በበቂ ሁኔታ መታየት አለበት፡፡ በተለይ የሥራ እድሎችን
ከመፍጠር አንጻር ይህ በጣም ወሳኝ ነው፡፡

  • ማኅበራዊ ትስስርን ለማሻሻል ፤ አካታች የሆነ የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና ውጤታማ መሣሪያ ሆኖ

ይስተዋላል። ነገር ግን ማኅበራዊ ትስስር ፣ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እንደ ተጨማሪ ውጤት ብቻ ሳይሆን
የስልጠናው ዋና ዓላማ ሆኖ የሚውሰድ ከሆነ፤ “ሌሎች የተሻሉ አማራጮች አልነበሩም ወይ?” የሚል
ጥያቄ ያስነሳል፡፡ በተለይ ከሥራ እድል ፈጠራ እና ከገቢ አንጻር በተያያዘ ባለን ማስረጃ መሰረት ጥያቄውን
የበለጠ አስፈላጊ ያደርገዋል።

  •  አካታች የቴክኒክ እና ሙያ ስልጠና (ቴሙትስ) መርሃ ግብር የሚያመጣውን ለውጥ በተመለከተ፣ ሰፋ ያሉ

ተጨማሪ ጥናቶችን ይፈልጋል። መሞላት ካለባቸው የእውቀት ክፍተቶች መካከል የቴክኒክና ሙያ ሥልጠና
በስደተኞች ላይ የሚያሳድረው ተጽዕኖ፣ ሊያስከትል የሚችለውን አሉታዊ እና አወንታዊ ተጽዕኖ፤ ሊያስከትል
የሚችለው ማኅበራዊ ተጽዕኖ፣ እንዲሁም በፆታ በኩል እና ከመካከለኛ እስከ የረዥም ጊዜ ያለው የሥራ እድል
ፈጠራ እና ገቢ ላይ የሚኖሩት ውጤቶች ይገኙበታል።

Improving employment and social cohesion among refugee and host communities through TVET: evidence from an impact assessment in Ethiopia

In pursuit of employment opportunities and increased productivity, governments and donors have the highest ambitions for technical and vocational education and training (TVET) systems. Most prominently, TVET is expected to facilitate access to employment and a qualified workforce by offering its graduates skills that the labour market demands. Beyond its employment impacts, TVET supporters also anticipate that it will improve societal outcomes such as inclusion, gender equality and social cohesion.

Access to the labour market plays an essential role in allowing displaced populations to sustain their livelihoods and to foster socio-economic integration. Long-term displacement situations and a decline in resettlement opportunities have spurred the quest for local integration in countries of first asylum. It is in this context that TVET has gained additional salience in the past decade.

Does TVET live up to these promises? Overall, systematic empirical evidence on the impact of TVET is limited and often inconsistent. In terms of employment and income, evidence suggests that there is a small positive effect, but time plays an important factor. Often, impacts are only seen in the medium- to long-term, and in general, programmes tend to work better for the long-term unemployed. Evidence of societal effects is even more limited; there is a large gap of knowledge on the potential social cohesion impacts of TVET. Given the amount of funding and the high expectations found in the policy discourse, it is essential to better understand if and how TVET measures contribute to achieving their self-declared goals.

In this brief, we present the results of an accompanying research study of an inclusive TVET programme implemented by the German development cooperation organisation Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Ethiopia. In this programme, host and refugee participants are jointly trained, with the explicit goals of fostering social cohesion and improving employment opportunities.

The results indicate that while the social cohesion effect seems remarkable on several dimensions, the income and employment effect is at best weak and materialises only for specific groups of individuals. Qualitative and quantitative evidence supports the validity of the approach to achieve social cohesion. More than design or implementation problems, the lack of stronger employment effects appears to be driven by structural context conditions like limited labour market absorption capacity, legal work permission constraints, gender barriers and similar hindering factors.

We derive the following main recommendations from the analysis:

  • TVET measures need a careful context analysis (including labour market capacities, legal work barriers) to ensure that the necessary conditions for TVET to succeed are in place. This is particularly relevant in terms of employment effects, which appear to be elusive.
  • Inclusive TVET measures seem to be an effective tool to improve social cohesion. However, if social cohesion effects are valued not just as an “add-on” to employment effects but as primary goals, the question arises if alternative interventions might be more efficient. This question is particularly salient given the modest evidence regarding employment and income effects.
  • The evidence base of the impact of (inclusive) TVET programmes needs to be expanded. Knowledge gaps that need to be closed include TVET’s impact on displaced populations, its potential societal effects, differential gender effects, and medium- to long-term employment and income effects.

Improving employment and social cohesion among refugee and host communities through TVET: evidence from an impact assessment in Ethiopia

In pursuit of employment opportunities and increased productivity, governments and donors have the highest ambitions for technical and vocational education and training (TVET) systems. Most prominently, TVET is expected to facilitate access to employment and a qualified workforce by offering its graduates skills that the labour market demands. Beyond its employment impacts, TVET supporters also anticipate that it will improve societal outcomes such as inclusion, gender equality and social cohesion.

Access to the labour market plays an essential role in allowing displaced populations to sustain their livelihoods and to foster socio-economic integration. Long-term displacement situations and a decline in resettlement opportunities have spurred the quest for local integration in countries of first asylum. It is in this context that TVET has gained additional salience in the past decade.

Does TVET live up to these promises? Overall, systematic empirical evidence on the impact of TVET is limited and often inconsistent. In terms of employment and income, evidence suggests that there is a small positive effect, but time plays an important factor. Often, impacts are only seen in the medium- to long-term, and in general, programmes tend to work better for the long-term unemployed. Evidence of societal effects is even more limited; there is a large gap of knowledge on the potential social cohesion impacts of TVET. Given the amount of funding and the high expectations found in the policy discourse, it is essential to better understand if and how TVET measures contribute to achieving their self-declared goals.

In this brief, we present the results of an accompanying research study of an inclusive TVET programme implemented by the German development cooperation organisation Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Ethiopia. In this programme, host and refugee participants are jointly trained, with the explicit goals of fostering social cohesion and improving employment opportunities.

The results indicate that while the social cohesion effect seems remarkable on several dimensions, the income and employment effect is at best weak and materialises only for specific groups of individuals. Qualitative and quantitative evidence supports the validity of the approach to achieve social cohesion. More than design or implementation problems, the lack of stronger employment effects appears to be driven by structural context conditions like limited labour market absorption capacity, legal work permission constraints, gender barriers and similar hindering factors.

We derive the following main recommendations from the analysis:

  • TVET measures need a careful context analysis (including labour market capacities, legal work barriers) to ensure that the necessary conditions for TVET to succeed are in place. This is particularly relevant in terms of employment effects, which appear to be elusive.
  • Inclusive TVET measures seem to be an effective tool to improve social cohesion. However, if social cohesion effects are valued not just as an “add-on” to employment effects but as primary goals, the question arises if alternative interventions might be more efficient. This question is particularly salient given the modest evidence regarding employment and income effects.
  • The evidence base of the impact of (inclusive) TVET programmes needs to be expanded. Knowledge gaps that need to be closed include TVET’s impact on displaced populations, its potential societal effects, differential gender effects, and medium- to long-term employment and income effects.

Improving employment and social cohesion among refugee and host communities through TVET: evidence from an impact assessment in Ethiopia

In pursuit of employment opportunities and increased productivity, governments and donors have the highest ambitions for technical and vocational education and training (TVET) systems. Most prominently, TVET is expected to facilitate access to employment and a qualified workforce by offering its graduates skills that the labour market demands. Beyond its employment impacts, TVET supporters also anticipate that it will improve societal outcomes such as inclusion, gender equality and social cohesion.

Access to the labour market plays an essential role in allowing displaced populations to sustain their livelihoods and to foster socio-economic integration. Long-term displacement situations and a decline in resettlement opportunities have spurred the quest for local integration in countries of first asylum. It is in this context that TVET has gained additional salience in the past decade.

Does TVET live up to these promises? Overall, systematic empirical evidence on the impact of TVET is limited and often inconsistent. In terms of employment and income, evidence suggests that there is a small positive effect, but time plays an important factor. Often, impacts are only seen in the medium- to long-term, and in general, programmes tend to work better for the long-term unemployed. Evidence of societal effects is even more limited; there is a large gap of knowledge on the potential social cohesion impacts of TVET. Given the amount of funding and the high expectations found in the policy discourse, it is essential to better understand if and how TVET measures contribute to achieving their self-declared goals.

In this brief, we present the results of an accompanying research study of an inclusive TVET programme implemented by the German development cooperation organisation Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Ethiopia. In this programme, host and refugee participants are jointly trained, with the explicit goals of fostering social cohesion and improving employment opportunities.

The results indicate that while the social cohesion effect seems remarkable on several dimensions, the income and employment effect is at best weak and materialises only for specific groups of individuals. Qualitative and quantitative evidence supports the validity of the approach to achieve social cohesion. More than design or implementation problems, the lack of stronger employment effects appears to be driven by structural context conditions like limited labour market absorption capacity, legal work permission constraints, gender barriers and similar hindering factors.

We derive the following main recommendations from the analysis:

  • TVET measures need a careful context analysis (including labour market capacities, legal work barriers) to ensure that the necessary conditions for TVET to succeed are in place. This is particularly relevant in terms of employment effects, which appear to be elusive.
  • Inclusive TVET measures seem to be an effective tool to improve social cohesion. However, if social cohesion effects are valued not just as an “add-on” to employment effects but as primary goals, the question arises if alternative interventions might be more efficient. This question is particularly salient given the modest evidence regarding employment and income effects.
  • The evidence base of the impact of (inclusive) TVET programmes needs to be expanded. Knowledge gaps that need to be closed include TVET’s impact on displaced populations, its potential societal effects, differential gender effects, and medium- to long-term employment and income effects.

Development finance at a turning point: effects and policy recommendations

Development finance is at a turning point, as the macroeconomic environment has changed profoundly and the financing gap for low- and middle-income countries has widened. The events that led to this new situation are the multiple crises that the global economy is facing, such as the climate crisis, the COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine. As a result, interest rates have risen sharply over the past year and are not expected to decline anytime soon. High interest rates further restrict low- and middle-income countries’ access to international financial markets by making borrowing more expensive. At the same time, debt levels in several countries are rising to levels that are almost impossible to repay. Poorer countries find themselves in a trap where financing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) becomes a distant goal for them.
To “get back on track” in financing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, a number of reform proposals have been put forward within several processes and initiatives, including the Financing for Development (FfD) process, the Bridgetown Initiative and the Macron-led Paris Summit. Despite being initiated by different actors, these proposals all highlight the importance of reforming the international financial architecture in view of the changed macroeconomic environment. The Hamburg Sustainability Conference in June 2024, the United Nation’s Summit of the Future in 2024 and the next FfD Conference in 2025 should be used to strengthen and accelerate ongoing reform processes and come up with new, innovative and bold proposals to reshape development finance in these challenging times. Against the background of the multiple crises and its effects, our key recommendations for the reform of development finance are as follows.
First, new initiatives and frameworks are needed to provide urgent debt relief and restructuring for highly indebted countries. The international community should promote a reformed G20 Common Framework for debt restructuring and discuss a green Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)-like initiative for debt relief for low-income countries as a solution on a case-by-case basis, integrating short-term shock remedies with long-term sustainable development finance. Debt and climate risks should be addressed simultaneously by better incorporating climate risks in debt sustainability analyses conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and by considering the volume of investments in climate adaptation because these investments reduce the risks associated with climate change.
Second, tax revenues – the most important source of development finance – need to increase and countries need to expand their fiscal space by reforming their tax administrations and policies. Building fiscal buffers can help countries to become more resilient to future crises. In the short run, eliminating unnecessary tax expenditures such as fossil fuel subsidies is the lowest-hanging fruit to increase tax revenues, while in the long run, more green fiscal reforms (e.g. carbon pricing and environmental taxes) are needed, as well as more effective international tax cooperation. In addition, donor funds should be increased to provide technical assistance and capacity-building to tax and customs administrations.
Third, the Development Assistance Committee member countries should at least halve the gap between their current contributions and the official development assistance (ODA) contribution target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income by 2026, and reach the full attainment of the target by 2030. In particular, donors need to provide ODA in addition to (not as a substitute for) climate finance and channel more ODA to the poorest countries. In this regard, donors should report climate and development finance separately to mitigate the risk of over-reporting.
Fourth, we recall the need to reform multilateral development banks (MDBs). The multiple crises have made the role of MDBs in closing the development financing gap even more important than before. As attracting private capital is becoming more difficult for low- and middle-income countries, MDBs should harness their proven ability to leverage private finance for financing the SDGs. MDBs should substantially increase their lending capacity, for example by lowering their equity to loan thresholds and raising additional capital from shareholders or private investors. MDBs should be reformed to include in their vision the provision of global public goods, such as tackling the climate crisis and preparing for pandemics. Development banks and private creditors should include clauses on natural disasters and pandemics in their financing instruments.

Development finance at a turning point: effects and policy recommendations

Development finance is at a turning point, as the macroeconomic environment has changed profoundly and the financing gap for low- and middle-income countries has widened. The events that led to this new situation are the multiple crises that the global economy is facing, such as the climate crisis, the COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine. As a result, interest rates have risen sharply over the past year and are not expected to decline anytime soon. High interest rates further restrict low- and middle-income countries’ access to international financial markets by making borrowing more expensive. At the same time, debt levels in several countries are rising to levels that are almost impossible to repay. Poorer countries find themselves in a trap where financing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) becomes a distant goal for them.
To “get back on track” in financing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, a number of reform proposals have been put forward within several processes and initiatives, including the Financing for Development (FfD) process, the Bridgetown Initiative and the Macron-led Paris Summit. Despite being initiated by different actors, these proposals all highlight the importance of reforming the international financial architecture in view of the changed macroeconomic environment. The Hamburg Sustainability Conference in June 2024, the United Nation’s Summit of the Future in 2024 and the next FfD Conference in 2025 should be used to strengthen and accelerate ongoing reform processes and come up with new, innovative and bold proposals to reshape development finance in these challenging times. Against the background of the multiple crises and its effects, our key recommendations for the reform of development finance are as follows.
First, new initiatives and frameworks are needed to provide urgent debt relief and restructuring for highly indebted countries. The international community should promote a reformed G20 Common Framework for debt restructuring and discuss a green Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)-like initiative for debt relief for low-income countries as a solution on a case-by-case basis, integrating short-term shock remedies with long-term sustainable development finance. Debt and climate risks should be addressed simultaneously by better incorporating climate risks in debt sustainability analyses conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and by considering the volume of investments in climate adaptation because these investments reduce the risks associated with climate change.
Second, tax revenues – the most important source of development finance – need to increase and countries need to expand their fiscal space by reforming their tax administrations and policies. Building fiscal buffers can help countries to become more resilient to future crises. In the short run, eliminating unnecessary tax expenditures such as fossil fuel subsidies is the lowest-hanging fruit to increase tax revenues, while in the long run, more green fiscal reforms (e.g. carbon pricing and environmental taxes) are needed, as well as more effective international tax cooperation. In addition, donor funds should be increased to provide technical assistance and capacity-building to tax and customs administrations.
Third, the Development Assistance Committee member countries should at least halve the gap between their current contributions and the official development assistance (ODA) contribution target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income by 2026, and reach the full attainment of the target by 2030. In particular, donors need to provide ODA in addition to (not as a substitute for) climate finance and channel more ODA to the poorest countries. In this regard, donors should report climate and development finance separately to mitigate the risk of over-reporting.
Fourth, we recall the need to reform multilateral development banks (MDBs). The multiple crises have made the role of MDBs in closing the development financing gap even more important than before. As attracting private capital is becoming more difficult for low- and middle-income countries, MDBs should harness their proven ability to leverage private finance for financing the SDGs. MDBs should substantially increase their lending capacity, for example by lowering their equity to loan thresholds and raising additional capital from shareholders or private investors. MDBs should be reformed to include in their vision the provision of global public goods, such as tackling the climate crisis and preparing for pandemics. Development banks and private creditors should include clauses on natural disasters and pandemics in their financing instruments.

Development finance at a turning point: effects and policy recommendations

Development finance is at a turning point, as the macroeconomic environment has changed profoundly and the financing gap for low- and middle-income countries has widened. The events that led to this new situation are the multiple crises that the global economy is facing, such as the climate crisis, the COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine. As a result, interest rates have risen sharply over the past year and are not expected to decline anytime soon. High interest rates further restrict low- and middle-income countries’ access to international financial markets by making borrowing more expensive. At the same time, debt levels in several countries are rising to levels that are almost impossible to repay. Poorer countries find themselves in a trap where financing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) becomes a distant goal for them.
To “get back on track” in financing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, a number of reform proposals have been put forward within several processes and initiatives, including the Financing for Development (FfD) process, the Bridgetown Initiative and the Macron-led Paris Summit. Despite being initiated by different actors, these proposals all highlight the importance of reforming the international financial architecture in view of the changed macroeconomic environment. The Hamburg Sustainability Conference in June 2024, the United Nation’s Summit of the Future in 2024 and the next FfD Conference in 2025 should be used to strengthen and accelerate ongoing reform processes and come up with new, innovative and bold proposals to reshape development finance in these challenging times. Against the background of the multiple crises and its effects, our key recommendations for the reform of development finance are as follows.
First, new initiatives and frameworks are needed to provide urgent debt relief and restructuring for highly indebted countries. The international community should promote a reformed G20 Common Framework for debt restructuring and discuss a green Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)-like initiative for debt relief for low-income countries as a solution on a case-by-case basis, integrating short-term shock remedies with long-term sustainable development finance. Debt and climate risks should be addressed simultaneously by better incorporating climate risks in debt sustainability analyses conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and by considering the volume of investments in climate adaptation because these investments reduce the risks associated with climate change.
Second, tax revenues – the most important source of development finance – need to increase and countries need to expand their fiscal space by reforming their tax administrations and policies. Building fiscal buffers can help countries to become more resilient to future crises. In the short run, eliminating unnecessary tax expenditures such as fossil fuel subsidies is the lowest-hanging fruit to increase tax revenues, while in the long run, more green fiscal reforms (e.g. carbon pricing and environmental taxes) are needed, as well as more effective international tax cooperation. In addition, donor funds should be increased to provide technical assistance and capacity-building to tax and customs administrations.
Third, the Development Assistance Committee member countries should at least halve the gap between their current contributions and the official development assistance (ODA) contribution target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income by 2026, and reach the full attainment of the target by 2030. In particular, donors need to provide ODA in addition to (not as a substitute for) climate finance and channel more ODA to the poorest countries. In this regard, donors should report climate and development finance separately to mitigate the risk of over-reporting.
Fourth, we recall the need to reform multilateral development banks (MDBs). The multiple crises have made the role of MDBs in closing the development financing gap even more important than before. As attracting private capital is becoming more difficult for low- and middle-income countries, MDBs should harness their proven ability to leverage private finance for financing the SDGs. MDBs should substantially increase their lending capacity, for example by lowering their equity to loan thresholds and raising additional capital from shareholders or private investors. MDBs should be reformed to include in their vision the provision of global public goods, such as tackling the climate crisis and preparing for pandemics. Development banks and private creditors should include clauses on natural disasters and pandemics in their financing instruments.

Contextualising social cohesion I: an overview of concepts in Africa

The social fragmentation of societies is one of the greatest challenges for peace, democracy and human rights worldwide. For some years now, observers have been witnessing ever-stronger tendencies towards social division, also in Western societies, which had been believed to be united for so long. Rising inequality, the rejection of previously shared values and growing scepticism towards public institutions suggest that social cohesion is at risk. Against this background, it seems more important than ever to understand what factors hold a society together – and when such cohesion is most vulnerable. Protecting and strengthening social cohesion has therefore become an objective of many activities at the local, national and international levels, and academics have started to develop methodologies on how to measure social cohesion (see, with further references: Leininger et al., 2021).
This paper aims:
• to give a systematic overview of the literature on African concepts of social cohesion;
• to introduce the discourse around African concepts and to see which relevant concepts of social cohesion can be located in African societies;
• to analyse in more detail some key African concepts and their core elements and to see which conceptual dimensions and insights on determinants of social cohesion differ from the mainstream, while inviting scholars to add further to this listing; and, in particular
• to gain a better understanding of the academic discourse on social cohesion in Africa by analysing the concepts, determinants, origins and context of social cohesion theories as well as the risk of Western bias in identifying concepts for social cohesion in the African context.
One of the questions that inspired the present research project is how we could better understand which relevant concepts of social cohesion in African societies are particularly emphasised by African scholars and how “Western” concepts of social cohesion relate to the various African academic approaches to the topic. Further research questions that were raised in the context of the present paper are:
• How can traditional knowledge and African social theories contribute towards contextualising the debate on social cohesion in Africa?
• What are the key aspects of the concepts of social cohesion in selected African countries, and how can these be analysed?
• How did pre-colonial societies in Africa understand social cohesion, and what insights can be gained from this?
Methodologically, we identify and analyse concepts within the African context in order to gain insights into basic elements of social cohesion. This literature review draws on different sources such as ethnophilosophy, political philosophy, religion, culture, economics and international discourses. This literature review is the first part of an assessment of concepts of social cohesion in Africa. It is followed by a systematic comparison of social cohesion concepts in specific African countries.
The academic benefit is to identify the current state of research on social cohesion in Africa, to identify the need for further research and to deepen the understanding of the phenomenon of social cohesion. In addition, we aim to deliver developmental value through these publications by helping decision-makers come to evidence-based decisions and synthesise as well as make use of scientific evidence for development practice.

Contextualising social cohesion I: an overview of concepts in Africa

The social fragmentation of societies is one of the greatest challenges for peace, democracy and human rights worldwide. For some years now, observers have been witnessing ever-stronger tendencies towards social division, also in Western societies, which had been believed to be united for so long. Rising inequality, the rejection of previously shared values and growing scepticism towards public institutions suggest that social cohesion is at risk. Against this background, it seems more important than ever to understand what factors hold a society together – and when such cohesion is most vulnerable. Protecting and strengthening social cohesion has therefore become an objective of many activities at the local, national and international levels, and academics have started to develop methodologies on how to measure social cohesion (see, with further references: Leininger et al., 2021).
This paper aims:
• to give a systematic overview of the literature on African concepts of social cohesion;
• to introduce the discourse around African concepts and to see which relevant concepts of social cohesion can be located in African societies;
• to analyse in more detail some key African concepts and their core elements and to see which conceptual dimensions and insights on determinants of social cohesion differ from the mainstream, while inviting scholars to add further to this listing; and, in particular
• to gain a better understanding of the academic discourse on social cohesion in Africa by analysing the concepts, determinants, origins and context of social cohesion theories as well as the risk of Western bias in identifying concepts for social cohesion in the African context.
One of the questions that inspired the present research project is how we could better understand which relevant concepts of social cohesion in African societies are particularly emphasised by African scholars and how “Western” concepts of social cohesion relate to the various African academic approaches to the topic. Further research questions that were raised in the context of the present paper are:
• How can traditional knowledge and African social theories contribute towards contextualising the debate on social cohesion in Africa?
• What are the key aspects of the concepts of social cohesion in selected African countries, and how can these be analysed?
• How did pre-colonial societies in Africa understand social cohesion, and what insights can be gained from this?
Methodologically, we identify and analyse concepts within the African context in order to gain insights into basic elements of social cohesion. This literature review draws on different sources such as ethnophilosophy, political philosophy, religion, culture, economics and international discourses. This literature review is the first part of an assessment of concepts of social cohesion in Africa. It is followed by a systematic comparison of social cohesion concepts in specific African countries.
The academic benefit is to identify the current state of research on social cohesion in Africa, to identify the need for further research and to deepen the understanding of the phenomenon of social cohesion. In addition, we aim to deliver developmental value through these publications by helping decision-makers come to evidence-based decisions and synthesise as well as make use of scientific evidence for development practice.

Contextualising social cohesion I: an overview of concepts in Africa

The social fragmentation of societies is one of the greatest challenges for peace, democracy and human rights worldwide. For some years now, observers have been witnessing ever-stronger tendencies towards social division, also in Western societies, which had been believed to be united for so long. Rising inequality, the rejection of previously shared values and growing scepticism towards public institutions suggest that social cohesion is at risk. Against this background, it seems more important than ever to understand what factors hold a society together – and when such cohesion is most vulnerable. Protecting and strengthening social cohesion has therefore become an objective of many activities at the local, national and international levels, and academics have started to develop methodologies on how to measure social cohesion (see, with further references: Leininger et al., 2021).
This paper aims:
• to give a systematic overview of the literature on African concepts of social cohesion;
• to introduce the discourse around African concepts and to see which relevant concepts of social cohesion can be located in African societies;
• to analyse in more detail some key African concepts and their core elements and to see which conceptual dimensions and insights on determinants of social cohesion differ from the mainstream, while inviting scholars to add further to this listing; and, in particular
• to gain a better understanding of the academic discourse on social cohesion in Africa by analysing the concepts, determinants, origins and context of social cohesion theories as well as the risk of Western bias in identifying concepts for social cohesion in the African context.
One of the questions that inspired the present research project is how we could better understand which relevant concepts of social cohesion in African societies are particularly emphasised by African scholars and how “Western” concepts of social cohesion relate to the various African academic approaches to the topic. Further research questions that were raised in the context of the present paper are:
• How can traditional knowledge and African social theories contribute towards contextualising the debate on social cohesion in Africa?
• What are the key aspects of the concepts of social cohesion in selected African countries, and how can these be analysed?
• How did pre-colonial societies in Africa understand social cohesion, and what insights can be gained from this?
Methodologically, we identify and analyse concepts within the African context in order to gain insights into basic elements of social cohesion. This literature review draws on different sources such as ethnophilosophy, political philosophy, religion, culture, economics and international discourses. This literature review is the first part of an assessment of concepts of social cohesion in Africa. It is followed by a systematic comparison of social cohesion concepts in specific African countries.
The academic benefit is to identify the current state of research on social cohesion in Africa, to identify the need for further research and to deepen the understanding of the phenomenon of social cohesion. In addition, we aim to deliver developmental value through these publications by helping decision-makers come to evidence-based decisions and synthesise as well as make use of scientific evidence for development practice.

Pages