Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Analysen

Bus rapid transit (BRT) has been widely adopted in emerging economies for its affordability and incremental implementation potential. Yet, many cities are now starting to implement urban rail as a higher-quality mass-transit alternative. This raises the question of the role of existing BRT networks once rail arrives, particularly regarding their land-value effects. This paper examines how BRT-related land value uplift (LVU) evolves after rail begins operation, using Jakarta as a case study. The study analyses residential land values around Transjakarta BRT and MRT Jakarta stations for 2017 (pre-rail) and 2021 (post-rail) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR). The findings reveal that (1) proximity to Transjakarta stations was associated with uplift in 2017, particularly in South Jakarta; (2) by 2021, BRT proximity penalties were reported citywide, especially in the north and east, but also in Central Jakarta; and (3) proximity to MRT Jakarta stations was associated with consistent uplift in 2021, with strongest effects at upgraded interchange nodes in South Jakarta. The timing and spatial coherence of these patterns are consistent with a rail-led substitution mechanism in which urban policy attention and developer actions concentrate willingness-to-pay near rail, while stand-alone BRT corridors increasingly reflect proximity penalties in prices. Policy recommendations include strategic co-location and integration of BRT-MRT stations, mitigating BRT proximity effects with context-sensitive station design, and timely transit-oriented development (TOD) and land value capture (LVC) at integrated hubs to harness value where market signals are strongest.

In Mexico, tax expenditures refer to all fiscal measures that reduce public revenue by granting preferential tax treatment relative to the benchmark system. These include deductions, exemptions, tax credits, differentiated rates and tax incentives (SHCP, 2024b).
While tax incentives are conceptually equivalent to tax expenditures, in Mexico the former are a component of the latter, as per the structure of the SHCP’s tax expenditures document. As such, tax incentives constitute a specific subset of tax expenditures and are typically created by presidential decree, unlike other benefits which are incorporated directly into tax legislation (SHCP, 2024b).
Transparency: Mexico fell from 42nd to 51st place in the Global Tax Expenditures Transparency Index (GTETI)’s 2024 ranking, reflecting a decline in the availability, quality and clarity of information pertaining to tax expenditures. While the country still meets the minimum standards for publication of tax expenditure information (as regards such things as estimates, methodology, legal basis and beneficiary analysis), there is still significant room for improvement, particularly when it comes to defining the benchmark, incorporating assessments and strengthening the role of Mexico’s parliament, the Congress of the Union. With publication of the tax expenditures document (Documento de Renuncias Recaudatorias) having resumed in 2024, there is now an opportunity to make up lost ground in terms of tax transparency and promote more proactive oversight by the legislative branch and civil society.
Complex fiscal landscape: tax expenditures amounted to some MXN 1.42 trillion in 2024, which equates to 4.2% of gross domestic product (GDP) and 19.4% of tax revenue. The primary tax expenditures pertain to the 0% value added tax (VAT) rate and the income tax system. Additionally, tax incentives, most of which are granted by presidential decree, account for approximately 25% of total tax expenditure. These measures have different objectives, legal foundations and timeframes, reflecting a Mexican tax expenditure system that is fragmented and inconsistent in design.
Evaluation challenges: despite advances in incidence analysis and disaggregation by tax type, there is no systematic model in place to evaluate compliance with the objectives of this public policy. In the absence of ex-ante and ex-post evaluations and performance indicators, it is difficult to determine the effectiveness and relevance of the different tax expenditures. At the same time, a time lag between publication of tax decrees and the tax expenditures document limits assessment of the impact of these expenditures.
Fiscal sustainability: tax expenditures account for almost 20% of tax revenue. Their scale poses a challenge to the sustainability of public finances. Against the backdrop of the energy transition, demographic transition and structural pressure on welfare spending and public investment, it is essential to review the permanence and effectiveness of these tax expenditures to prevent them from becoming a structural source of inefficiency and regression.

Many sub-Saharan African countries are increasingly adopting national health insurance policies to improve access to essential services. Informal sector workers, however, often lack coverage because their earnings are typically not low enough to qualify for government subsidies but insufficient to cover insurance premiums, resulting in a phenomenon known as "missing middle". This paper examined socioeconomic inequalities in national health insurance enrolment and determinants of participation among informal sector workers in Kenya. We used nationally representative cross-sectional household survey data (n = 5168) collected from informal sector workers in Kenya in December 2020. First, we examined levels of national health insurance enrolment among informal sector workers. Second, we examined socioeconomic inequalities in national health insurance enrolment using concentration curves and the Wagstaff index. Third, we employed a three-level mixed effects logistic regression model to assess the determinants of national health insurance enrolment. Overall, 21.75% (95% Confidence Interval 20.63–22.89) of informal sector workers in Kenya were enrolled in the national health insurance scheme. We observed pro-rich inequalities in national health insurance enrolment, with a concentration index of 0.35 (95% CI 0.30–0.41). Older age (adjusted odds ratio (AOR) = 1.66, 95% CI 1.31–2.10), employment in the non-agricultural sector (AOR = 1.96, 95% CI 1.60–2.39), microfinance institutional membership (AOR = 1.44, 95% CI 1.23–1.69), higher education level (AOR = 2.49, 95% CI 1.99–3.11), household’s prior positive experience with healthcare (AOR = 1.45, 95% CI 1.22–1.72), and higher socioeconomic status based on the wealth asset index (AOR = 3.87, 95% CI 2.97–5.05) were all significantly positively associated with national health insurance enrolment. Larger households had lower odds of enrollment (AOR = 0.76, 95% CI 0.60–0.96). Our findings suggest that enrollment rates among informal sector workers remain low, and important pro-rich inequalities prevail. Economic factors, education, and prior experience with healthcare services were key drivers of national health insurance enrollment. Further policies are needed to increase enrollment among informal sector workers, including differential premium levels, reliance on expanded targeted subsidies, and enhanced awareness campaigns. Our findings are also applicable to other low-resource settings experiencing conditions similar to those in Kenya as they transition toward national health insurance policies, with the goal of achieving universal health coverage.

Los gastos tributarios (o gastos fiscales) en México se conocen como renuncias recaudatorias y se refieren al conjunto de medidas fiscales que reducen los ingresos públicos al otorgar un tratamiento preferencial frente a la estructura tributaria de referencia. Estas incluyen deducciones, exenciones, créditos fiscales, tasas diferenciadas y estímulos fiscales (SHCP, 2024b).
Aunque el concepto de gastos tributarios es equivalente al de estímulos fiscales, en México, los estímulos fiscales son, siguiendo la estructura del documento de renuncias recaudatorias de la SHCP, uno de los componentes de dichas renuncias. Así, los estímulos fiscales conforman un subconjunto específico de las renuncias recaudatorias y suelen establecerse mediante decretos presidenciales, a diferencia de otros beneficios incorporados directamente en las leyes tributarias (SHCP b, 2024).
Transparencia: México pasó del lugar 42 al 51 en la edición más reciente del Índice Global de Transparencia en Gastos Tributarios (GTETI, por su nombre en inglés), lo que refleja un retroceso en la disponibilidad, calidad y claridad de la información relacionada con las renuncias recaudatorias. Si bien el país aún cumple con los elementos mínimos de publicación —como estimaciones, metodología, base legal y análisis de beneficiarios—, persisten áreas de mejora relevantes, en particular en la definición del sistema de referencia (benchmark), la incorporación de evaluaciones y el fortalecimiento del papel del Congreso. La reanudación de la publicación del Documento de Renuncias Recaudatorias en 2024 representa una oportunidad para recuperar terreno en transparencia fiscal y promover una supervisión más activa por parte del poder legislativo y la sociedad civil.
Contexto complejo: Las renuncias recaudatorias representaron en 2024 alrededor de 1,42 billones de pesos, equivalentes al 4,2% del Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) y al 19,4% de los ingresos tributarios. Las renuncias recaudatorias se concentran principalmente en el Impuesto al Valor Agregado (IVA) con tasa cero y en el Sistema de Renta. Además, los estímulos fiscales, otorgados en su mayoría mediante decretos presidenciales, representaron cerca de una cuarta parte del total. Estas medidas tienen distintos objetivos, fundamentos jurídicos y horizontes temporales, lo que refleja un diseño heterogéneo y fragmentado de las renuncias recaudatorias en México.
Desafíos de evaluación: A pesar de los avances en el análisis de incidencia y desagregación por tipo de impuesto, no existe una evaluación sistemática del cumplimiento de objetivos de esta política pública. La ausencia de evaluaciones ex ante y ex post, así como de indicadores de desempeño, impide conocer la eficiencia y pertinencia de varias renuncias recaudatorias. Asimismo, existe un desfase entre la publicación de los decretos fiscales y el Documento de Renuncias Recaudatorias, lo que limita la evaluación de su impacto.
Sostenibilidad fiscal: La magnitud de las renuncias recaudatorias, equivalente a casi una quinta parte de los ingresos tributarios, representa un desafío para la sostenibilidad de las finanzas públicas. En un contexto de presiones estructurales sobre el gasto social, inversión pública, transición energética y transición demográfica es indispensable revisar la permanencia y efectividad de las medidas que implican estas renuncias, ya que si no son evaluadas pueden convertirse en una fuente estructural de ineficiencia y regresividad.

At IDOS, we are committed to the sustainable development of our organisation – ecologically, socially and economically – and we contribute to sustainable transformations worldwide through research, policy advice and training. For us, sustainability is not a one-off objective but an ongoing process that we aim to shape with responsibility and foresight. Acting sustainably in our day-to-day operations is a self-imposed obligation that we pursue with conviction and consistency. Our ambition is to act today in such a way that good working conditions and the responsible use of natural resources remain possible in the future. With this report, we are presenting for the first time an account of our greenhouse gas emissions for the period 2022 to 2023.

تُبرز الواحات المغربية كيف تُفاقِم ندرة المياه أعباء النساء اليومية وتؤثر في سبل عيشهن وأنشطتهن التنموية في المناطق القروية القاحلة، في وقت يضطلعن فيه دور محوري في التنمية القروية والتكيف مع تغيّر المناخ، مما يستدعي دعمًا موجَّهًا يستجيب لاحتياجاتهن

How do e-government tools that enable direct online communication with the executive affect citizens’ support for autocracy? On the one hand, such centralised digital government tools may sway public opinion in favour of strongman rule at the expense of autocratic institutions; on the other hand, such participation and responsiveness may unintentionally unveil a wide range of issues in the country, undermining trust in the regime. We examine an electronic platform in Turkey, CIMER, that allows citizens to submit petitions and complaints, send messages to the president, and propose policies and programmes. We conducted a well-powered online survey experiment with a nationally representative sample (N≈4,600) that estimates the effects of different types of regime propaganda around this e-portal on attitudinal and quasi-behavioural outcomes. The results suggest that propaganda through CIMER improves diffuse support for the regime and generates behavioural compliance, even among opposition voters. However, these positive effects accrue to regime institutions rather than to Erdoğan personally as the executive’s personalistic leader. On certain dimensions, the propaganda backfires among the regime’s core support groups, eroding their perceptions of Erdoğan’s popularity as a leader. These results have major implications for the expected downstream effects of these types of digital tools on regime stability and legitimacy, and they add to the growing warnings about holding overly optimistic views concerning the effects of digitalisation on democracy.

Sanitation and proper disposal of human waste are key to a dignified life. The importance of maintaining reasonable standards of sanitation is acknowledged in the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDG target 6.2) as well as in the Art. 43, I b from the Constitution of Kenya (Government of Kenya, 2010). However, the integration of sanitation policies, their associated legislations and lived practices, and their implications for the environment and human health remain opaque. Understanding is particularly limited regarding sanitation governance in Kenya’s fast-growing secondary cities, where responsibility for sanitation has only recently been devolved from the national to the county level. Our study examines these complex interactions, shedding light on how power relations constitute a determining factor in shaping the access to sanitation and its unequal socio-environmental hybridities. Empirically, we focus on three sub-locations in Nakuru City. Nakuru City has been described as a role model in the Kenyan context. Our research design combines both a quantitative, georeferenced household survey and qualitative, semi-structured interviews with actors at various levels. Our descriptive, regression and qualitative content analyses of the collected data reveal that levels of political interest vary considerably. Collaboration along the on-site sanitation service chain and with other sectors, such as solid waste management, presents numerous challenges, and a significant discrepancy exists in degrees of access to safe sanitation between and within sub-locations. As value-driven leadership at a time of heightened political attention has made Nakuru’s role as a “sanitation champion” possible, we believe that many of these challenges can be overcome with increased collective awareness and a more substantial political commitment to realise the constitutionally guaranteed right to sanitation.

Marius Bug, Maria Gerlspeck, Aline-Victoria Grassl, Saskia Metz, Johannes S. Vogel and Carolin Wicke were junior researchers and participants in the 58th Postgraduate Training Programme 2022/2023 of the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

Die von der zweiten Administration unter US-Präsident Donald Trump getroffenen Entscheidungen zur weitgehenden Auflösung der US-amerikanischen Entwicklungspolitik sind tiefgreifend. Die Tragweite der Kursänderung lässt sich allerdings erst abschätzen, wenn man das Fundament des Politikfeldes betrachtet, das wesentlich mit den USA verknüpft ist.

Transparency portals in development cooperation serve two main functions: accountability to a specialist audience and communication with the wider public. In this policy brief, we conduct an international comparison to demonstrate how transparency portals could better fulfil these requirements.
As part of a broader effectiveness agenda, donors are pursuing the goal of greater transparency. In line with this international agenda, transparency is intended to promote learning and improve predictability for partner countries, as well as combatting corruption and fulfilling accountability requirements. Taken together, these factors can contribute to greater development effectiveness.
Donors also hope that their work will receive greater public support. By providing detailed information, experts will be better able to assess the quality of development projects. The aim is to initiate a process of learning and improvement, and to convince the general public that taxpayers’ money is being used effectively. Citizens can use the portals to understand project content and develop their own views.
However, current debates suggest a more complex dynamic. The “Bike Lanes in Peru” project caused a scandal in Germany. Against the backdrop of the closure of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), individual projects became politicised. Accordingly, transparency portals can also have unintended consequences. For example, information can be taken out of context, leading to misunderstandings and legitimate criticism of individual projects going unanswered.
Donors can mitigate these negative effects by redesigning transparency portals. In times of declining approval ratings and cuts to development budgets, they should use the portals to communicate in a targeted manner and demonstrate a greater willingness to engage in honest debate. The following recommendations could help with this:
• Even greater transparency of impact data: Although progress is being made in transparent reporting on project content and financial data, detailed project data on impact measurement and results, as set out in logical frameworks (logframes), is lacking. Increasing transparency in this area could improve development effectiveness.
• Additional investment in communication: Information that is provided in accordance with internationally comparable standards must be translated for a lay audience. In many donor countries, a large proportion of the population has no fixed positive or negative attitude towards development cooperation. Targeted, group-oriented communication should appeal to these people more directly.
• Openness to criticism and discourse: Development policy actors often resist critical examination of their work in public debate. They tend to respond defensively to criticism, whether general or specific. However, informed discussions based on project data from the portals offer an opportunity to openly discuss ineffective projects and, if necessary, replace them with effective ones.

The global development landscape entering 2026 is shaped by deep geopolitical disruptions, significantly intensified by the return of President Trump and the acceleration of systemic rivalry, conflict and multipolar competition. Development policy now unfolds in an environment where multilateral norms are weakening, Western cohesion is fracturing and Global South actors increasingly exercise greater agency through strategies of multi-alignment. Cuts to ODA budgets across traditional donor countries, paralysis in the UN development system and US hostility towards Agenda 2030 have collectively unsettled the development architecture, prompting a proliferation of commissions and processes seeking to rethink future cooperation. We identify four issues that we think will be of high importance for global development policy in 2026 and beyond and situate these within the context outlined above.
Issue I. China’s transition towards high-income status and the implications for its evolving role in global development debates Economically, China is approaching graduation from the list of ODA-eligible countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), yet politically it continues to claim “developing country” status as part of a deliberate strategy to anchor itself within Global South coalitions. This duality provides significant diplomatic and narrative leverage. China’s expanding suite of global initiatives – from the Belt and Road Initiative to the new Global Governance Initiative – gives it increasing influence over international agenda-setting, especially as some Western actors retreat from traditional development roles. OECD countries must, therefore, craft engagement strategies that can accommodate China’s hybrid positioning while defending coherent standards for global responsibility-sharing.
Issue II. Russia’s influence in the Global South Although Russia lacks a credible development model, it wields significant spoiler power through arms provision, disinformation operations and especially nuclear energy cooperation. Rosatom’s integrated nuclear packages are appealing to many African countries, creating long-term dependencies and expanding Moscow’s geopolitical reach – an area largely overlooked in Western development strategies.
Issue III. The rise of non-democratic governance across much of the Global South and its consequences for global governance With the majority of the population now living in electoral autocracies or closed autocracies, democratic backsliding undermines the foundations of global governance. Normative contestation, institutional fragmentation, legitimacy deficits, geopolitical bargaining and uneven provision of global public goods increasingly shape multilateral cooperation.
Issue IV. How both Southern middle powers and smaller countries are adjusting to the changing environment Countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa and the Gulf states are capitalising on systemic volatility to expand influence through multi-alignment, new coalitions and diversified cooperation instruments. For external actors, accepting multi-alignment as a stable feature will be essential for building effective, issue-based partnerships in areas such as climate, health, food systems and digital public infrastructure.

Professor Andy Sumner is a professor of International Development at King’s College London and President of the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.

The outcome of the Belém climate conference can be compared to a watered-down cocktail, a weak COPirinha, if you will: plenty of crushed ice, little substance to give it strength, and missing sugar in the form of climate finance to sweeten the deal. Hence, while the tumbler of climate diplomacy was well filled, its content hardly lifted spirits of anyone hoping for decisive climate action.

Bonn, 08. Dezember 2025. Vor genau einem Jahr floh der langjährige syrische Gewaltherrscher Baschar al-Assad außer Landes. Die Macht übernahm der umstrittene HTS-Milizenführer Ahmad al-Sharaa. Syriens politische Führung und sein internationales Image haben sich stark gewandelt, doch die Wirtschaft bleibt marode und die humanitäre Lage der Bevölkerung katastrophal. Deutschland und die EU sollten sich trotz aller Unwägbarkeiten stärker für einen gerechten Wiederaufbau und wirtschaftliche Teilhabe aller engagieren.

Mit großen – vielleicht zu großen? – Hoffnungen und Erwartungen hatten Syrer*innen weltweit den Machtwechsel am 8. Dezember 2024 verfolgt und die Freilassung zehntausender politischer Gefangener bejubelt. Ein Jahr später ist die Bilanz der neuen syrischen Regierung allerdings durchwachsen: Zwar wurden wichtige politische Prozesse angepackt – Übergangsverfassung, Übergangsregierung, indirekte Parlamentswahlen – diese jedoch als intransparent und undemokratisch harsch kritisiert. Die syrische Armee wurde kernsaniert und ehemals regimetreue Milizen entwaffnet, doch die Sicherheitslage bleibt angespannt und die Rolle islamistischer Strömungen in der Armee unklar: Übergriffe auf Minderheiten, etwa in der Küstenregion und in Suwayda, gingen durch die Medien; es kommt vermehrt zu Entführungen, die Zahl der zivilen Todesopfer steigt im Vorjahresvergleich sogar an, die Täter blieben meist straffrei.

Gleichzeitig ist die außenpolitische Strahlkraft von Präsident al-Sharaa immens: So wurde er in den Golfstaaten, der Türkei, Frankreich, Russland sowie den USA empfangen und er sprach in der UN-Vollversammlung – als erster syrischer Staatschef seit fast 60 Jahren. Doch regionalpolitisch ist Syrien schwach und im Norden und Süden durch die Türkei bzw. Israel in seiner Souveränität eingeschränkt.

Besonders schwer wiegt die katastrophale Wirtschaftslage, und hier treten die Versäumnisse und falschen Weichenstellungen der al-Sharaa Regierung deutlich zutage: Der einzige Erfolg war die sukzessive Aufhebung der meisten Sanktionen – was sich aber wegen Over-Compliance der Banken und Unsicherheit über gültige Vorschriften noch wenig auswirkt. Es gibt keine umfassenden Wiederaufbaupläne oder wirtschaftspolitische Roadmaps. Entscheidungen werden hinter geschlossenen Türen getroffen, oft vom Übergangspräsidenten selbst oder einem Vertrauten. Kostenreduzierung durch Privatisierung und die Akquise von Großinvestitionen stehen im Vordergrund, doch Herkunft und Modalitäten der bislang meist nur angekündigten Investitionen werfen oft Fragen auf. Darüber hinaus handelt es sich zumeist um Prestigeprojekte in der Hauptstadt – etwa einen neuen Flughafen oder eine Metrolinie – die für weniger wohlhabende Syrer*innen und auf dem flachen Land kaum von Bedeutung sind. Ein wirtschaftlich solider, auf lokalen Wertschöpfungsketten beruhender Wiederaufbau lässt sich so nicht erreichen.

Die notleidende Bevölkerung wartet bislang vergeblich auf eine ‚Friedensdividende‘, also darauf, dass sich der Machtwechsel positiv auf ihre unmittelbaren Lebensverhältnisse auswirkt. Noch immer leben zwei Drittel in Armut, ein Großteil ist auf Hilfen angewiesen. Schlimmer noch, angesichts des angespannten Staatshaushalts sind viele Reformauswirkungen auf die Bevölkerung negativ: Kündigungen und Jobunsicherheit im öffentlichen Dienst, Streichung von Subventionen und deutlich höhere Strompreise trotz hoher Lebenshaltungskosten betreffen große Teile der Bevölkerung. Zudem gibt es Hinweise auf Bodenspekulation und erneute Enteignungen. Proteste mehren sich. Bislang ist es Syrien nicht gelungen, ein menschenwürdiges neues System zu schaffen, das alle Bürger*innen in den gemeinsamen Wiederaufbau einbezieht. 

Syrer*innen benötigen eine echte Perspektive, wann wichtige Basisdienstleistungen wiederhergestellt sind, und syrische Unternehmen brauchen Planungssicherheit. Deutschland und die EU sollten sich für eine bessere Geberkoordination und einen differenzierten Wiederaufbauplan mit verbindlichen Zielmarken einsetzen. Eine transparente Wiederaufbau-Koordinationsplattform zu öffentlichen Investitionen könnte, nach dem Vorbild der ukrainischen DREAM-Plattform, Vertrauen von Investoren und lokale Teilhabe stärken. Zudem würde ein deutsch- oder europäisch-syrischer Wiederaufbaurat, inklusive Vertreter*innen aus Zivilgesellschaft und Kommunen, wichtige Impulse setzen.

Gerade Deutschland sollte angesichts seiner großen syrischen Diaspora eine größere Rolle im Wiederaufbau spielen, und sich nicht in verunsichernden und kurzsichtigen Rückkehr-Debatten verlieren. Es leistet Hilfe in humanitär wichtigen Bereichen wie Gesundheit und Bildung, doch es setzt seinen einmaligen Zugang und strategischen Vorteil bisher nicht in Wert. Mangels gezielter Förderprogramme und Investitionsgarantien überlassen deutsche Unternehmen das Feld risikobereiteren Wettbewerbern. Doch diese Pioniere, meist aus der Türkei und den Golfstaaten, gestalten Syriens neue Wirtschaftsordnung zugunsten eigener Interessen. Es bedarf einer vorausschauenden Syrien-Politik, die auf langfristige Austauschbeziehungen und das Anwerben und Halten von Fachkräften ausgelegt ist – nicht nur für einen inklusiven Wiederaufbau in Syrien, sondern auch für einen besseren sozialen Zusammenhalt zwischen Deutschen und Deutschsyrer*innen hierzulande.

Progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is increasingly hampered by insufficient funding. This Policy Brief, drawing on insights from a roundtable held in the context of the Hamburg Sustainability Conference (HSC) with experts from the Americas, Africa, Europe, and Asia, examines how sustainable development financing can be safeguarded in an era of economic disruptions, global conflicts, and political shifts. It situates these recommendations within the context of the outcomes of the fourth Financing for Development (FfD4) Conference, with a view to informing the follow-up process.
An estimated USD 4.2 trillion are needed for the implementation of SDG policies. Notwithstanding this, economic insecurity, slow growth, and waning political commitment reduce private and public investments in sustainability. Rising conflicts lead to a redistribution of budgets towards military expenditures and away from environmental and social objectives. This includes reductions in Official Development Aid, further limiting funding for sustainability transformations in low- and middle-income countries.
In order to sustain and increase financing for SDG implementation, taking the challenging framework conditions into account, a series of actions is needed: 
–    Alignment of public spending with the SDGs and planetary boundaries by phasing out harmful subsidies and integrating sustainability into credit ratings and investment strategies.
–    Strengthening domestic revenue mobilisation through improved and efficient tax systems, tax transparency, and reduction of harmful tax expenditures.
–    Building institutional capacity in transitioning sectors, including sustainable finance, digitalised tax systems, and data provision for and engagement with credit-rating agencies.
–    Translating FfD4 outcomes into concrete actions in platforms like the G20, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank meetings, and the HSC, aligning them with social and environmental priorities. But also filling the gaps on issues neglected in FfD4 by supporting future multilateral agreements and voluntary initiatives on tax, SDRs, cost of capital, and debt restructuring.

Tax expenditures (TEs) – i.e. deviations from a benchmark tax system that lower the tax burden of specific groups, economic sectors or activities – can be powerful tools to promote public policies. However, their effectiveness is often in doubt. The present report discusses the determinants and explores the empirical evidence of TE effectiveness.

Autocratisation has become a defining global trend, replacing decades of democratisation and forcing demo­cracy promoters to rethink their approaches. Democracy promoters must adapt to several challenges, including autocratisation in target countries, the rise of powerful autocratic competitors in the global arena, and challenges to democracy in some of the very countries promoting it. Moreover, the crisis in development aid fuelled by the withdrawal of funding by the United States (US) and other countries, and their prioritisation of security, pose further structural challenges. This Policy Brief examines the effects of the global trend of autocratisation on international democracy promotion, summarising findings from a collaborative research project (Grimm et al., 2025).

The findings show that democracy promoters respond to these shifts in four ways: 1) choosing to “carry on and observe” by continuing existing programmes and main­taining cooperation rather than risking confronta­tion; 2) reinforcing rhetorical and diplomatic efforts for demo­cracy, to signal continued commitment; 3) selec­tively adapting policies and strategies, with renewed focus on civil society, education and targeted funding, yet rarely making substantive policy changes; 4) disen­gaging by shifting cooperation toward less politicised fields or withdrawing entirely. So far, however, we lack evidence on the effectiveness of these responses to counter autocratisation.

Given the new challenges to democracy promotion arising from the changed international context, demo­cracy promoters should consider taking the following actions:

Ramping up efforts to counter the rise of autocratic powers: Democracy promoters should proactively deepen their pro-democracy cooperation, reaffirm democratic alliances and maintain a clear normative profile. They should invest in long-term partnerships with governments and civil societies committed to democratic reform.

Revitalising the norm of democracy: Democracy pro­moters must make a case for why democracy matters, highlighting that it delivers rights and freedoms, as well as stability, prosperity, and peace – at least as effectively as autocratic regimes. Em­pha­sising its tangible benefits can help restore faith in its long-term value, and counter the appeal of autocratic alternatives.

Coordinating strategies and combining strengths: Joint frameworks for action among democracy pro­moters are needed that allow for the simultaneous use of different instruments, e.g. political dialogue, develop­ment cooperation, human rights advocacy and eco­nomic incentives. Combining direct and indirect demo­cracy promotion increases adaptability.

Adapting democracy promotion to the context: In contexts where democracy is being eroded, prioritise the defence of current democratic institutions, actors and practices rather than pushing for rapid reforms. Strengthen local actors who uphold democratic values, protect them against repression and maintain spaces for civic participation.

Restoring credibility: Democracy-promoting states and organisations should openly discuss challenges to democracy at home in order to rebuild trust, strengthen legitimacy and facilitate collaboration in defence of democracy. Reinforcing own democratic institutions and upholding the rule of law contributes to restoring the credibility of democracy promoters.

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) poses a critical threat to global health, with environmental transmission pathways – pharmaceutical waste, wastewater effluents, agricultural runoff – increasingly recognised as significant yet inadequately governed. Despite international calls for One Health approaches integrating human, animal and environmental sectors, coordination across these domains remains weak, particularly for environmental dimensions. This paper examines why environmental integration lags in Kenya’s AMR governance, despite sophisticated formal architecture that includes national and county coordination platforms (NASIC, CASICs), tech-
nical working groups and the One Health AMR Surveillance System (OHAMRS). We investigate two research questions: (i) What are the enablers and barriers to effective governance of interlinkages among human health, animal health and environmental sectors in mitigating AMR? (ii) What are the options for effectively integrating the environmental dimension into AMR governance?
Drawing on polycentric governance theory, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and the concept of Networks of Adjacent Action Situations (NAAS), we analyse how authority, information and resources shape interactions among overlapping decision centres across constitutional, collective-choice and operational levels. Through 12 semi-structured interviews with government officials, fisheries officers and environmental regulators, supplemented by policy document analysis, we map six action situations spanning planning, resource allocation, surveillance, stewardship, wastewater treatment and regulation. Findings reveal that constitutional-choice rules create formal overlaps intended to foster coordination, yet systematic asymmetries in authority, information and resources perpetuate the marginalisation of environmental issues. Boundary and position rules concentrate agenda setting in health sectors; information rules exclude AMR parameters from environmental permits and inspections; payoff rules reward clinical outputs while environmental investments compete with higher priorities; and scope rules omit environmental accountability targets. These rule configurations attenuate feedback loops between environmental action situations and upstream planning, maintaining system stability but at sub-optimal performance for One Health objectives. We identify rule-focused interventions – mandating environmental representation with voting authority, embedding AMR parameters in regulatory instruments, institutionalising joint inspection protocols, ring-fencing environmental budgets, and establishing explicit environmental targets – that would realign coordination toward genuine environmental integration. 

Morris Buliva is an independent researcher based in Nairobi, and Governance and Partnerships Consultant for the Fleming Fund Country Grant in Kenya.

The international context is changing profoundly, owing to rising autocratisation and the return of international war. These transformations also impact the long-standing problem of state fragility.
The IDOS Constellations of State Fragility (CSF) provides a differentiated model to measure state fragility along the three dimensions of authority, capacity and legitimacy. Rather than aggregating scores in these dimensions on a one-dimensional scale, the CSF identifies eight constellations of how deficits in these three dimensions occur jointly in reality. The CSF was launched in 2018 and was recently updated for the second time, now covering the period 2005 to 2024.
In this Policy Brief, we pursue three objectives. First, we briefly present the CSF model. Second, we describe the methodological adjustments of the 2025 update. This includes the use of a new measure for “battle-related deaths” – one indicator to assess the state’s monopoly on the use of force (authority). The modification became necessary due to a real-world development: the return of international war and, in particular, Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine. Third, we elaborate on the main empirical trend that emerges from the 2025 update: the global rise of deficits in the legitimacy dimension, reflected in the increase of “illiberal functioning” and “low legitimacy” states. This development is in line with wider autocratisation trends. We derive the following recommendations for policy and policy-related research:
• Use multidimensional models to assess state fragility. Foreign and development policymakers as well as academics should employ multidimensional approaches to conceptualise and measure state fragility. Not only are such models better suited for adequately capturing the complexity of state fragility, but they also provide better starting points for designing tailored policy interventions sensitive to context.
• Acknowledge that deficits in the legitimacy dimension are also rising in Europe. Rather than considering state fragility a phenomenon limited to the Global South, German and European policy-makers would be well advised to acknowledge that deficits in the legitimacy dimension are also growing in Europe, including countries of the European Union (EU). Studying developments in the Global South and mutual learning with Southern policy-makers and civil society actors may contribute to enhanced resilience in Europe as well.
• Explore the relationship between state fragility and international war. Future research should explore how international war and state fragility are related, including investigating the relationship between internal fragility dimensions and vulnerabilities to external shocks, and whether defence capabilities matter in determining whether and to what extent a state is fragile.
• Explore and address the relationship between state fragility and autocratisation. Investigating how state fragility and autocratisation are interrelated is a promising research agenda. This comprises exploring whether and how changes in fragility patterns and autocratisation trends are correlated as well as under what conditions autocratisation acts as a driver of state fragility by prompting violent resistance. Foreign and develop-ment policymakers could build on the findings to design coherent policy interventions.

Dr Sebastian Ziaja is Team Lead for Survey Data Curation at GESIS (Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) in Cologne.

Bonn, 01. Dezember 2025. Auf der COP30 in Belém haben politische Entscheidungsträger*innen, Wissenschaftler*innen und die Zivilgesellschaft internationale Verpflichtungen und nationale Beiträge diskutiert und aktualisiert, um sie stärker an den Klimazielen des Pariser Abkommens auszurichten. Zum ersten Mal haben mehrere Staaten sowie die EU Klimaschutzmaßnahmen ausdrücklich mit der Bekämpfung von Hunger, dem Zugang zu Nahrungsmitteln und sozialer Sicherheit verknüpft. Doch obwohl dieses Thema zu den Kernpunkten der Konferenz zählte, erkennen Länder mit hohem Einkommen die zentrale Rolle der Ernährungssysteme für globale Transformationsprozesse weiterhin unzureichend an – und ihre Umgestaltung ist weiterhin unterfinanziert.

Ohne nachhaltige Ernährungssysteme gibt es keine nachhaltige Zukunft. Die Landwirtschaft – inklusive Fischerei und Forstwirtschaft – ist Grundlage der Ernährungssysteme und beansprucht 40 % der globalen Landflächen und Ökosysteme. Ernährungssysteme nutzen 70 % der weltweiten Süßwasservorräte, verursachen einen erheblichen Teil der Wasserverschmutzung und bis zu 30 % der Treibhausgasemissionen. Gleichzeitig schaffen sie Jobs für 40 % der Weltbevölkerung und versorgen 8 Milliarden Menschen mit Nahrung. Eine nachhaltige Bioökonomie könnte Treibhausgasemissionen senken und zugleich produktive Flächen und Ökosysteme erhalten.

Eine nachhaltige, bezahlbare und gesunde Ernährung für alle ist das oberste Ziel von Ernährungssystemen. Diese umfassen sämtliche Aktivitäten und Akteure entlang der Wertschöpfungskette und berücksichtigen die wirtschaftlichen, sozialen, kulturellen und ökologischen Rahmenbedingungen, die diese Aktivitäten prägen und beeinflussen. Dazu gehören auch die Auswirkungen von Lebensmittelverarbeitung, -handel, -konsum sowie der Umgang mit Verlusten und Verschwendung auf die Nachhaltigkeit. Ernährungssysteme beziehen zudem weitere Dimensionen ein – von Kaufkraft bis hin zu Inflation und Gesundheit –, insbesondere im Hinblick auf marginalisierte und vulnerable Gruppen.

Dabei unterliegen Ernährungssysteme einem ständigen Wandel und sind aufgrund verschiedener externer Einflüsse und interner Dynamiken besonders anfällig. Zu den externen Faktoren gehören etwa Klimawandel und öffentliche Gesundheit, während die internen Dynamiken auf Effekte wie Produktivitätssteigerungen durch Innovationen, neue Verarbeitungstechnologien, Transportkosten oder sich verändernde Konsumtrends zurückgehen. Auch Machtverhältnisse innerhalb des Systems, die politische Ökonomie verschiedener Teilsysteme und globale politische Veränderungen wirken auf sie ein. Zugleich haben Ernährungssysteme nicht nur für die Versorgung mit Nahrungsmitteln, sondern auch für Gesundheit, Umwelt, Sicherheit und Wirtschaft strategische Bedeutung.

Ernährungssysteme dürfen in Debatten über nachhaltige gesellschaftliche Transformationen nicht länger ausgeblendet werden. Ernährungssysteme verursachen bereits heute jährliche Kosten von 10 bis 20 Billionen US-Dollar durch Gesundheitsrisiken, Produktivitätsverluste, Umweltzerstörung und Armut – nahezu zehn Prozent des globalen Bruttoinlandsprodukts. Die Folgen des Klimawandels auf Lebensgrundlagen sind schon jetzt sichtbar, vor allem für die ländliche Bevölkerung. Setzt sich die derzeitige Politik fort, werden laut Global Policy Report im Jahr 2050 rund 640 Millionen Menschen unterernährt und 1,5 Milliarden übergewichtig sein.

Eine umfassende Transformation der Ernährungssysteme kann dazu beitragen, diesen Kurs zu verlassen und die externen Effekte deutlich zu reduzieren. Dafür braucht es eine Kombination aus Verhaltensänderungen, politischen Anpassungen, institutionellen Reformen, technologischen Innovationen und sofortigen Maßnahmen zur Unterstützung gefährdeter Gruppen. Eine Ernährungsumstellung hin zu mehr pflanzlichen Nahrungsmitteln kann ernährungsbedingte Ungleichheiten, Mangelernährung und die mit Ernährungssystemen verbundenen ökologischen Folgen verringern. Die Agrarpolitik muss sich von umweltschädlichen Produktionsanreizen und Preiskontrollen, die zu Marktverzerrungen führen, lösen und den Zugang zu nachhaltiger und gesunder Ernährung für alle gewährleisten. Außerdem ist der Ausbau von Sozialsystemen und Transferleistungen unverzichtbar. Zugleich sind steigende Investitionen in Klimaanpassung und -schutz erforderlich, denn derzeit macht die Klimafinanzierung für Ernährungssysteme nur einen kleinen Teil der globalen Klimafinanzierung aus.

Einerseits müssen die externen Effekte der Ernährungssysteme in Marktpreisen sichtbar werden. Damit nachhaltige Veränderungen gelingen, müssen sämtliche Aktivitäten innerhalb der Ernährungssysteme anhand ihrer positiven und negativen externen Effekte neu bewertet werden.

Andererseits erfordert die Transformation der Ernährungssysteme erhebliche zusätzliche Investitionen. Die Politik muss die bestehende Finanzierungslücke schließen, denn trotz ihrer zentralen Bedeutung für die globalen Nachhaltigkeitsziele sind Ernährungssysteme weiterhin stark unterfinanziert.

Daher müssen: Ernährungssysteme ins Zentrum der Nachhaltigkeitsagenda rücken. Globale Debatten zur Nachhaltigkeitstransformation müssen ihre Rolle – ebenso wie jene der Bioökonomie – umfassend berücksichtigen. Sofortige Maßnahmen, wie der Ausbau einer klimafreundlichen Landwirtschaft und die Stärkung sozialer Sicherungssysteme, sind unverzichtbar, um notwendige Transformationen auf den Weg zu bringen.

Die gesamte IDOS-Arbeitsgruppe Landwirtschaft hat zu dieser Kolumne beigetragen. Sie ist eine Gruppe von Forscher*innen aller Fachrichtungen am IDOS, die zu allen Themen rund um die Landwirtschaft in Ländern mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen arbeiten und darüber diskutieren.

• Clara Brandi
• Katharina Molitor
• Theodore Asimeng
• George Mudimu
• Charlotte Reich
• Srinivasa Srigiri
• Andreas Stamm

Despite the growing demand for gender-disaggregated statistics on poverty, there is hardly any cross-country evidence of gender disparities in poverty. The paper contributes to filling this gap, by using two novel individual-level indices of multidimensional poverty. Relying on data from 78 low- and middle-income countries, it finds that almost everywhere female poverty exceeds male poverty. In the median country, female poverty is 58%–85% higher than male poverty. The highest gender disparities in poverty were detected in the MENA, Latin America and South Asia regions. Finally, the majority of countries experienced an increase in the female/male poverty ratio, thus a feminization of poverty.