Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Lors de la présentation de sa stratégie nationale, mercredi 8 avril à Kinshasa, le Programme de désarmement, démobilisation, relèvement communautaire et stabilisation (PDDRCS) a affirmé avoir démobilisé au moins 5 605 ex-miliciens en quatre ans.

Cette institution publique a indiqué avoir récupéré, au cours de cette même période, plus de 1 200 armes, 5 000 munitions ainsi que 50 explosifs.

Debeka Versicherungsgruppe: Koblenz (ots) - Versicherungsgruppe steigert Beitragseinnahmen um mehr als 13 Prozent auf fast 15 Milliarden Euro / 17 Milliarden Euro an direkten und indirekten Leistungen für Versicherte / Marktführer in der privaten Krankenversicherung und ...

Besins Healthcare Germany: Berlin (ots) - Die Zahl der Männer mit diagnostiziertem Testosteronmangel ist in Deutschland zwischen 2015 und 2021 in der Altersgruppe der 30- bis 69-Jährigen deutlich gestiegen. Meist wurde als Ursache eine Funktionsstörung der Hoden ...

Jahreszeiten Verlag, MERIAN: Hamburg (ots) - Sie sind die große Liebe deutscher Urlauber, und dass die niemals eintönig wird, dafür sorgt die aktuelle Ausgabe des Reisemagazins MERIAN (#2/2026). Das Heft nimmt die Inselgruppe in den Fokus, mit großen Reportagen und 65 ...

La durabilité change de statut. Elle ne relève plus d’un engagement progressif ni d’un exercice de conformité : elle s’impose désormais comme un vecteur de compétitivité. C’est le constat central de la nouvelle étude réalisée par l’Institut Choiseul et BDO France, De la stratégie à l’exécution : intégrer la durabilité au cœur des modèles économiques. […]

KiKA - Der Kinderkanal ARD/ZDF: Erfurt (ots) - KiKA bietet ab sofort ein vollständig überarbeitetes Smart-TV- und HbbTV-Angebot und setzt damit neue Standards für kindgerechte Streaming-Erlebnisse. Eine an Nutzungsgewohnheiten und -wünschen von Kindern und Familien orientierte ...

ECOVACS GLOBAL PTE. LTD.: Neuss (ots) - Wer einmal mit einem Nass-Trocken-Sauger gewischt hat, kennt das Problem: Am Ende bleibt ein feuchter Streifen genau dort, wo das Gerät abgestellt wurde. Tineco hat auch das gelöst. Mit der neuen FLOOR ONE S9 Scientist Serie startet ...

Verband der Osteopathen Deutschland e.V.: Wiesbaden/Bad Alexandersbad/Berlin (ots) - Die Empfehlungen der FinanzKommission Gesundheit setzen das Gesundheitssystem unter Druck - insbesondere Angebote ohne klare gesetzliche Basis. Die Osteopathie-Allianz warnt: Ohne ein Berufsgesetz stehen ...

BNP Paribas Real Estate Holding GmbH: Frankfurt/Main (ots) - Der deutsche Investmentmarkt ist mit einem Transaktionsvolumen von gut 8,8 Mrd. EUR in das Jahr 2026 gestartet. Damit konnte das Vorjahresergebnis um rund 5 % übertroffen werden. Stärkste Assetklasse bleibt weiterhin das ...

KfW IPEX-Bank: Frankfurt am Main (ots) - - 100 Mio. EUR CAPEX-Fazilität für Bestellung von neuen Lokomotiven - Einsatz eines Förderdarlehens des KfW-Programms 269 (Investitionskredit Nachhaltige Mobilität Individualvariante) - Stärkt nachhaltigen und ...

Research Industrial Systems Engineering (RISE) GmbH: Wien/Berlin/Leipzig (ots) - Gemeinsame Realisierung des Einsatzes von HSM-B (kartenlose Institutions-Identität) von RHÖN-KLINIKUM AG, DKTIG, D-Trust & RISE liefert wichtige Erkenntnisse für weiteren Rollout Seit Anfang Dezember 2025 führen ...

The European Union (EU) and southern Medi-terranean partners launched the Pact for the Mediter-ranean in November 2025 to reset relations with the EU’s “Southern Neighbourhood” in an increasingly challenging regional context. The Pact comes 30 years after the 1995 Barcelona Process promised to foster economic – and to a lesser degree political – integration in the Mediterranean Basin. The Pact’s declared objective is to “achieve deeper integration within the common Mediterranean space” (EC & HR, 2025). This policy brief discusses the Pact’s prospects for achieving this goal, which previous efforts have failed to reach. For long-time observers of Euro-Mediterranean rela-tions, the Pact appears to be a “back to the future” approach. Its three substantive “pillars” (people, econo-mies and security) echo the three “baskets” (political/ security, economic and socio-cultural) of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Structurally, it relies on the same mix of differentiated bilateral agreements (now termed “comprehensive partnerships”) within a multilateral regional framework. The Pact’s success depends on whether the EU and Mediterranean partner countries can resolve four core dilemmas that have long challenged their relations:
• The “autocracy dilemma”: balancing the need to work with authoritarian governments with European interests in supporting democracy.
• The “migration dilemma”: securing borders while respecting human rights.
• The “rentierism dilemma”: finding solutions to immediate economic, social and environmental challenges while making necessary reforms to rentier political economies.
• The “regionalism dilemma”: cutting bilateral deals while trying to build regional structures to address collective action problems.
The term “pact” is normally used to describe an agree-ment between two partners, setting out agreed objec-tives and actions for both sides. The Pact for the Mediterranean is an EU policy framework that, at most, represents a tacit agreement with southern Mediter-ranean governments, without committing either side to policy changes or reforms that might have long-term implications. The Pact for the Mediterranean has potential to strengthen sectoral cooperation, for example on renew-able energy, connectivity infrastructure and labour mobility. If accompanied by sufficient resources and mutual trust-building, this functional cooperation may create incentives for deeper integration. This, in turn, will still depend on whether the EU and southern Mediterranean governments can move beyond trans-actionalism and invest in partnerships between their societies: support for democratic movements and institutions, investment in public goods, protection of the natural environment and investment in collective regionalism. Thus far, there is little indication that the EU and southern Mediterranean governments will take advantage of this opportunity.

The European Union (EU) and southern Medi-terranean partners launched the Pact for the Mediter-ranean in November 2025 to reset relations with the EU’s “Southern Neighbourhood” in an increasingly challenging regional context. The Pact comes 30 years after the 1995 Barcelona Process promised to foster economic – and to a lesser degree political – integration in the Mediterranean Basin. The Pact’s declared objective is to “achieve deeper integration within the common Mediterranean space” (EC & HR, 2025). This policy brief discusses the Pact’s prospects for achieving this goal, which previous efforts have failed to reach. For long-time observers of Euro-Mediterranean rela-tions, the Pact appears to be a “back to the future” approach. Its three substantive “pillars” (people, econo-mies and security) echo the three “baskets” (political/ security, economic and socio-cultural) of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Structurally, it relies on the same mix of differentiated bilateral agreements (now termed “comprehensive partnerships”) within a multilateral regional framework. The Pact’s success depends on whether the EU and Mediterranean partner countries can resolve four core dilemmas that have long challenged their relations:
• The “autocracy dilemma”: balancing the need to work with authoritarian governments with European interests in supporting democracy.
• The “migration dilemma”: securing borders while respecting human rights.
• The “rentierism dilemma”: finding solutions to immediate economic, social and environmental challenges while making necessary reforms to rentier political economies.
• The “regionalism dilemma”: cutting bilateral deals while trying to build regional structures to address collective action problems.
The term “pact” is normally used to describe an agree-ment between two partners, setting out agreed objec-tives and actions for both sides. The Pact for the Mediterranean is an EU policy framework that, at most, represents a tacit agreement with southern Mediter-ranean governments, without committing either side to policy changes or reforms that might have long-term implications. The Pact for the Mediterranean has potential to strengthen sectoral cooperation, for example on renew-able energy, connectivity infrastructure and labour mobility. If accompanied by sufficient resources and mutual trust-building, this functional cooperation may create incentives for deeper integration. This, in turn, will still depend on whether the EU and southern Mediterranean governments can move beyond trans-actionalism and invest in partnerships between their societies: support for democratic movements and institutions, investment in public goods, protection of the natural environment and investment in collective regionalism. Thus far, there is little indication that the EU and southern Mediterranean governments will take advantage of this opportunity.

The European Union (EU) and southern Medi-terranean partners launched the Pact for the Mediter-ranean in November 2025 to reset relations with the EU’s “Southern Neighbourhood” in an increasingly challenging regional context. The Pact comes 30 years after the 1995 Barcelona Process promised to foster economic – and to a lesser degree political – integration in the Mediterranean Basin. The Pact’s declared objective is to “achieve deeper integration within the common Mediterranean space” (EC & HR, 2025). This policy brief discusses the Pact’s prospects for achieving this goal, which previous efforts have failed to reach. For long-time observers of Euro-Mediterranean rela-tions, the Pact appears to be a “back to the future” approach. Its three substantive “pillars” (people, econo-mies and security) echo the three “baskets” (political/ security, economic and socio-cultural) of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Structurally, it relies on the same mix of differentiated bilateral agreements (now termed “comprehensive partnerships”) within a multilateral regional framework. The Pact’s success depends on whether the EU and Mediterranean partner countries can resolve four core dilemmas that have long challenged their relations:
• The “autocracy dilemma”: balancing the need to work with authoritarian governments with European interests in supporting democracy.
• The “migration dilemma”: securing borders while respecting human rights.
• The “rentierism dilemma”: finding solutions to immediate economic, social and environmental challenges while making necessary reforms to rentier political economies.
• The “regionalism dilemma”: cutting bilateral deals while trying to build regional structures to address collective action problems.
The term “pact” is normally used to describe an agree-ment between two partners, setting out agreed objec-tives and actions for both sides. The Pact for the Mediterranean is an EU policy framework that, at most, represents a tacit agreement with southern Mediter-ranean governments, without committing either side to policy changes or reforms that might have long-term implications. The Pact for the Mediterranean has potential to strengthen sectoral cooperation, for example on renew-able energy, connectivity infrastructure and labour mobility. If accompanied by sufficient resources and mutual trust-building, this functional cooperation may create incentives for deeper integration. This, in turn, will still depend on whether the EU and southern Mediterranean governments can move beyond trans-actionalism and invest in partnerships between their societies: support for democratic movements and institutions, investment in public goods, protection of the natural environment and investment in collective regionalism. Thus far, there is little indication that the EU and southern Mediterranean governments will take advantage of this opportunity.

Revue de presse kinoise du jeudi 9 avril 2026.

Deux sujets se disputent la tribune dans les colonnes des journaux parus ce jeudi dans la capitale congolaise. Le premier est celui de la conférence sur les infrastructures et le second sur le débat relatif à l’accueil temporaire des migrants en provenance des Etats Unies d’Amérique.

Le chef du secteur de Walendu Djatsi,  Justin Gudza, exhorte la jeunesse de l'Ituri à s'abstenir de toute forme de violence après les récentes incursions attribuées à la milice CRP et qui ont fait plusieurs morts. Lors d'un point de presse tenu mercredi 7 avril à Bunia, l'autorité coutumière a mis en garde contre les manipulations qui menacent le vivre-ensemble dans le territoire de Djugu.

Le ministre de la Justice, Guillaume Ngefa, a annoncé mercredi 7 avril la relance imminente du processus d’indemnisation des victimes de la "guerre de six jours" à Kisangani (Tshopo). Cette reprise est toutefois conditionnée par un audit rigoureux du fichier des bénéficiaires afin d’écarter les cas de victimes fictives.