Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Senior Research Fellow and Head, Turkey Programme, ELIAMEP; Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Bilkent University
The Greek 5×5 initiative aims to upgrade Greece’s regional role in the Eastern Mediterranean and extend a hand of friendship to Libya and Turkey. Until recently, Greece undertaking trilateral initiatives in the Eastern Mediterranean with Egypt and Cyprus, or Israel and Cyprus, allowed Turkey to claim that the purpose of such initiatives was to “encircle” Turkey, and that they took place without taking Turkey’s own vital interests in the Eastern Mediterranean into account. Nonetheless, it is considered unlikely that Turkey will participate without the issue of Turkish Cypriot representation in the talks being settled first. And since it is given that the occupied territories will not be represented, and as Turkey does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus, the success of the initiative will depend on finding a way for the Turkish Cypriots to be represented via bi-communal committees within the structures of the Republic of Cyprus. This effort may be the first sign that the parties intend to resume inter-communal talks for the resolution of the Cyprus Issue following Erhürman’s election.
Constantine Kapsaskis, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP
The answer depends on the goal of the initiative. If it is a bone fide attempt to delimit the maritime zones of the countries involved, the difficulties in solving this equation continue to seem insurmountable. Convergence between the participants seems no more likely within the structure of a forum than without, as even with boundless optimism it is unlikely to expect that Turkey and Libya will move away significantly from the Turkish-Libyan Memorandum of Understanding and their claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. Additionally, before the difficult negotiations have even begun, Greece’s proposal has met a roadblock in the form of Turkish resistance to the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in the forum without an equivalent representative of the Turkish Cypriot community leadership.
If Greece’s goal, however, is to set the terms of a future discussion, before they are imposed by others, then initiative’s dynamic may be appraised under different terms. The approach of the current United States administration to critical international problems is at the same time fluid, as it often fluctuates, but also decisive. Thus, if the decision to resolve the issue is a fait accompli, against a backdrop of increased interest by US energy giants of operating in the region, the crucial question is how can the Greek proposal persuade the administration in Washington DC, and primarily President Trump himself, that delimitation can and must take place within the framework of a multilateral forum and international law, and not as a business deal governed by complementary economic and geopolitical gains.
Triantafyllos Karatrantos, Research Associate, ELIAMEP
Maritime zones, migration, energy, managing the environment, and civil protection—the issues around which the five-party initiative announced by the Greek Prime Minister is being planned—are matters that require multilateral cooperation, understanding and dialogue. Without them, all we get are parallel monologues and unilateral moves which reproduce disagreements and fail to create a climate of trust—and, through trust, cooperation. Greece is, in any case, a country that invests in multilateral cooperation and dialogue-based processes, primarily in the context of respect for international law and national sovereignty.
The regional coordination initiative is therefore a logical and ambitious endeavour aimed at fostering conditions favourable to stability.
However, it is clear both from the countries that seem likely to participate (Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, Egypt, Libya) and those that have not been announced as participants (Israel and Syria), that the undertaking will be a difficult one, and that multiple challenges will have to be faced which could, in a worst-case scenario, evolve into problems.
Consequently, if the momentum the initiative has built up is to be transformed into a positive impact, a clear framework is required, along with sincerity on the part of all the countries participating and faith in the logic of multilateral cooperation. The latter, in particular, cannot be taken for granted.
Finally, the role played by the EU and the US is another aspect that will have to be factored in.
Panayotis Tsakonas, Senior Research Fellow and Head, Foreign Policy & Security Programme, ELIAMEP; Professor, University of Athens
Greece has rightly taken the initiative to advance a proposal concerning the Eastern Mediterranean—effectively reviving an earlier initiative (September 2020) originally put forward by the President of the European Council, which Athens had opposed at the time, arguably as a knee-jerk reaction to President Erdoğan’s endorsement of it. There remain, however, a number of obstacles to overcome and several contentious issues to resolve if the Forum on the Eastern Mediterranean is to materialize—among them, the participation of the Turkish Cypriot community, which Turkey will advocate for, and the question of Libya’s representation. From this perspective, the prospects of the initiative being realized in the near term appear limited.
Greece’s—albeit not yet fully developed—decision to reintroduce this proposal comes at a time of heightened activity in the Eastern Mediterranean: the recent ceasefire agreement in Gaza following a decisive intervention by the U.S. President; Turkey’s geopolitical upgrading; and Tufan Erhürman’s victory in the elections of the Turkish Cypriot community. These developments coincide with a shift in Greek–Turkish relations away from the “calm waters” of recent years toward stagnation or relative turbulence.
Against this backdrop, and given the possibility of President Trump becoming involved in Greek–Turkish relations and the Cyprus question, Greece has a vested interest in promoting initiatives that address key shared challenges—such as environmental protection, civil protection, and migration—facing the coastal states of the Eastern Mediterranean. Chief among these challenges is, of course, the delimitation of maritime zones. Such issues should be tackled within a regulatory framework capable of coordinating and supporting bilateral engagement through the timely notification of all parties and in full compliance with the provisions of UNCLOS (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). Within this framework, projects such as the Cyprus–Crete electricity interconnector could proceed more smoothly and with reduced risk of tension.
As for the next steps, it would be useful—indeed, perhaps essential—for the proposed five-state format to be expanded to include the European Union itself (the originator of the initial idea and a principal party to UNCLOS). The Forum could be also linked to certain institutional initiatives recently announced by the EU for the region, such as the “Pact for the Mediterranean”.
Die Rückkehr von Macht auf den Markt ist das Wesensmerkmal einer geoökonomischen Zeitenwende, wie sie die internationale Politik derzeit erlebt. Damit wurde der alten Erkenntnis neue Aufmerksamkeit verschafft, wonach wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit nicht nur Wohlstand erzeugen, sondern auch außen- und sicherheitspolitische Zielsetzungen befördern kann. Für die Analyse und eine Strategie der Außen-, Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftspolitik bedarf es einer klaren Konzeptionalisierung des Begriffs der Geoökonomie. Dies ist nicht zuletzt deshalb erforderlich, um Kosten und Nutzen geoökonomischer Maßnahmen fundiert abwägen und deren Erfolgsaussichten realistischer einschätzen zu können. Die Beiträge dieser Sammelstudie fokussieren sich auf die theoretisch-konzeptionellen Grundlagen geoökonomischen Denkens und untersuchen in funktional definierten Politikfeldern ausgewählte empirische Fallbeispiele geoökonomischen Handelns. Damit die deutsche Politik mehr Effektivität und Kohärenz in ihrem geoökonomischen Handeln erreichen kann, empfehlen sich folgende Vorgehensweisen: erstens der Aufbau ressortübergreifender Strukturen für die Querschnittsaufgabe Geoökonomie, zweitens der Ausbau von Kommunikation und Koordination mit relevanten Stakeholdern aus Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft sowie drittens die Intensivierung der internationalen Zusammenarbeit mit gleichgesinnten Partnern.
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IPI and the International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN) cohosted an interactive event on “The Ghosts of 1325: Past, Present, Future” followed by a reception, on October 29th.
Bringing together women peacebuilders, civil society leaders, member states, UN agencies, and media, this event was hosted in partnership with the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, the Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nation, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), Legal Action Worldwide (LAW), the PAIMAN Alumni Foundation, the Association for War Affected Women (AWAW), the Center for Civil Society and Democracy (CCSD), the Coalition for the UN We Need (C4UN), and Wo=Men Dutch Gender Platform.
Speakers invoked “The Ghosts of 1325”—carrying the voices of the past, present, and future to confront the Security Council with its unfilled promises. The event provided an opportunity for reflecting on, reckoning with, and renewing collective commitment to the vision of Resolution 1325.
On October 31, 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security (WPS)—the first resolution to recognize women’s leadership and participation as critical to peace and security. From the outset, civil society has driven the WPS agenda, setting its vision, pushing governments to act, and holding them accountable while leading implementation on the ground.
Twenty-five years later, despite normative progress, women’s inclusion in peace processes remains the exception rather than the rule. Implementation has too often lagged behind rhetoric, and the WPS agenda risks being sidelined in transactional geopolitics. An agenda rooted in the prevention of war and humanization of security stands in contrast to current trends of rising violence and militarization. Marking the 25th anniversary offers an opportunity not merely to commemorate, but to provoke urgent reflection: What if 1325 were fully realized? What if it fades into irrelevance?
Speakers:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of Women, Peace, and Security, International Peace Institute
Andreas Løvold, Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations
Paul Shrubsole, Acting WPS Focal Point, Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations
Sanam Anderlini, Founder and CEO, International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN)
Visaka Dharmadasa, Founder and Chair, Association of War Affected Women
Cerue Garlo, Women’s Alliance for Security Leadership
Mossarat Qadeem, Founder and President PAIMAN Alumni Trust
Helena Gronberg, Program Director, ICAN
France Bognon, Managing Director and Co-CEO, ICAN
Rajaa Altalli, Co-Founder, Center for Civil Society and Democracy
Adam Lupel, Executive Director, Coalition for the UN We Need
Mobina S.B. Jaffer, Former Canadian Senator representing British Columbia
Anwarul K. Chowdhury, Founder of Global Movement for the Culture of Peace
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