Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

In recent years, global production of plastics has surged and is expected to increase further over the following years, with over a quarter being attributed to plastic packaging. Plastic packaging poses environmental risks due to the fossil fuels consumed in its production and the impact on eco-systems due to its inappropriate disposal. A large share of mismanaged plastic waste can be attributed to a few developing and emerging countries (DECs) in Asia. Their expected income and population growth, as well as associated increase in consumption and urbanisation, is expected to further strain inadequate waste management systems. In response, young ventures offering circular business models in packaging have emerged to tackle plastic packaging pollution. These ventures are embedded in an entrepreneurial ecosystem in which policies are, among others, determining enablers, and policy-makers have a key role in setting optimal framework conditions for circular business models in packaging to succeed. At the same time, policy agendas that address resource efficiency and the circular economy are on the rise in multiple DECs. For this reason, this paper addresses the question of the extent to which existing policies are supporting and enabling circular business models. This paper first discusses opportunities, risks, and challenges of existing circular business models in packaging in terms of waste hierarchy levels – reducing and dematerialising, reusing and refilling, replacing, and recycling – before examining the entrepreneurial ecosystems in which they operate. With a focus on policy as an enabler for circular business models in packaging, a holistic overview of possible policies in the circular packaging context is provided. Against this conceptual background, India is examined as a case-study. In recent years, multiple Indian start-ups have emerged, offering reusable packaging solutions or bio-based packaging alternatives, while other ventures seek to improve waste management and recycling. India’s previously introduced policies, including the Plastic Waste Management Rules, Swacch Bharat Mission, extended producer responsibility and a ban on single-use plastic, are the first stepping stones towards an enabling ecosystem for circular business models in packaging. However, this paper points out further opportunities – so far, India’s key policies have been addressing the downstream on the macro level. This study showed that macro-level policies need further enforcement and should be complemented by upstream policies. Meanwhile, meso-level and micro-level policies have been rather neglected. Policy-makers and development cooperation are encouraged to take action now, given the limited window of opportunity to establish a supporting framework for circular economies in development policy.

Die Wasser-Konferenz der Vereinten Nationen will Wege zur nachhaltigen Nutzung der Ressource aufzeigen. Dazu ein Statement von Astrid Cullmann, wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im DIW Berlin:

 

Die Tatsache, dass sich die Vereinten Nationen mit ihrem Wassergipfel zum ersten Mal seit fast 50 Jahren ausschließlich mit der wertvollen Ressource Wasser beschäftigen, zeigt: Wir stehen vor enormen Herausforderungen. Nicht nur im globalen Süden ist die Lage alarmierend, auch in Deutschland wird Wasser durch einen Überverbrauch und Schadstoffbelastungen in manchen Regionen immer knapper.

Zahlreiche Regionen wie unter anderem Brandenburg müssen sich darauf einstellen, dass es durch den Klimawandel trockener und heißer wird. Dadurch steigt zum Beispiel der Wasserbedarf für die landwirtschaftliche Bewässerung, während das -angebot sinkt. Um künftig Wassernutzungskonflikte zu vermeiden, müssen gezielte Maßnahmen ergriffen werden. Dazu zählen mehr Transparenz und Kontrolle der Wasserentnahme. Insbesondere sollte die Vorzugsbehandlung der Industrie, die derzeit große Mengen Wasser zu sehr niedrigen Preisen verbraucht, aufgehoben werden.

Ein weiteres Problem ist die Wasserverschmutzung durch Spuren- und Nährstoffe von Düngemitteln und Kläranlagenabläufen. Die intensive Landwirtschaft ist Hauptverursacher der Nährstoffeinträge, die durch stickstoffhaltigen Dünger auf landwirtschaftlichen Flächen in die Umwelt gelangen. Um die Nitratbelastung zu reduzieren, müssen bereits bestehende verschärfte Vorgaben zur Düngung konsequent umgesetzt werden, insbesondere in den ohnehin schon nitratbelasteten Zonen. Zudem kann Ökolandbau einen Beitrag leisten, Überdüngung zu reduzieren, wie Studien des DIW Berlin gezeigt haben.

Auch in der wissenschaftlichen Forschung finden Wasserknappheit und Wasserverschmutzung überraschend wenig Beachtung – vor allem im Vergleich zur Luftverschmutzung. Es bleibt zu hoffen, dass der UN-Wassergipfel wachrüttelt und Impulse zur nachhaltigen Nutzung gibt.

Rebuilding Ukraine starts now – even if it is being undertaken against a backdrop of conflict, violence and destruction, with Russia continuing to wage its war of aggression. In granting Ukraine European Union (EU) candidate status, the EU has also made the country’s recovery one of its own priorities. If this reconstruction project is to succeed, then it is necessary to take into account specific contextual conditions, along with experiences from other recovery processes, such as those in the Western Balkans and Iraq.
• Functional statehood: Ukraine is better placed in this regard than many other countries, particularly given the functional and widely accepted statehood throughout much of its territory. Reconstruction assistance can kick-start a forward-looking, sustainable green transformation in the economy and society. At the same time, there is a risk that massive external cash flows could feed old networks of corruption and patronage and create new ones. Clear accountability structures are required, along with sanctions for the misuse of funds, if this is to be counteracted.
• Agile planning over linear phase model: Rebuilding work is taking place in an atmosphere of great uncertainty. Consequently, planning processes must be flexible in order to adapt to different war scenarios. A linear sequence of recovery phases fails to properly address the situation. This is already visible when it comes to efforts to secure critical infrastructure. Its proper functioning is essential to people’s daily lives and to all forms of reconstruction, yet this infrastructure could become a target for attacks again at any time.
• Ukraine as a self-confident partner: As a result of the war’s trajectory, the Ukrainian Government is adopting a self-assured demeanour in its dealings with international donors. While this is essentially a positive thing, it can also give rise to a resistance to reform. The prospect of EU accession creates a common objective to work towards and can also establish coherent criteria for the recovery process, but only as long as accession remains a credible prospect.
• Managing reconstruction assistance: Recovery funds have proven an effective means of coordination, though it remains to be seen whether there will be a single fund or several complementary ones. A central Ukraine fund should be (co-)managed on the donor end by the European Commission, as it has at its disposal the strongest reform incentive, namely EU accession. In the meantime, the EU needs to ensure that the Commission and the member states also provide the majority of the funding between them.
• Diversity and inclusion: The governance structures of the reconstruction project should be designed to afford participation and a say to pluralist political institutions and civil society voices, and strengthen gender equality. In order to counter brain-drain, it is also imperative that young, mobile population groups (including refugees abroad) feel included.
• Social equity: Incorporating social factors into the recovery process will also be essential. Vulnerable groups will require particular support, given the alarming level of impoverishment among the population as a result of the war.
• Investment incentives: Essential reconstruction services have to be provided by the private sector. This requires that clear incentives be created, not least by providing investment guarantees.
• Developing trauma sensitivity: The rebuilding work is taking place in a context of violence and trauma. This requires that all stakeholders develop a particular sensitivity in dealing with survivors of violence and engaging with a traumatised society. 

Rebuilding Ukraine starts now – even if it is being undertaken against a backdrop of conflict, violence and destruction, with Russia continuing to wage its war of aggression. In granting Ukraine European Union (EU) candidate status, the EU has also made the country’s recovery one of its own priorities. If this reconstruction project is to succeed, then it is necessary to take into account specific contextual conditions, along with experiences from other recovery processes, such as those in the Western Balkans and Iraq.
• Functional statehood: Ukraine is better placed in this regard than many other countries, particularly given the functional and widely accepted statehood throughout much of its territory. Reconstruction assistance can kick-start a forward-looking, sustainable green transformation in the economy and society. At the same time, there is a risk that massive external cash flows could feed old networks of corruption and patronage and create new ones. Clear accountability structures are required, along with sanctions for the misuse of funds, if this is to be counteracted.
• Agile planning over linear phase model: Rebuilding work is taking place in an atmosphere of great uncertainty. Consequently, planning processes must be flexible in order to adapt to different war scenarios. A linear sequence of recovery phases fails to properly address the situation. This is already visible when it comes to efforts to secure critical infrastructure. Its proper functioning is essential to people’s daily lives and to all forms of reconstruction, yet this infrastructure could become a target for attacks again at any time.
• Ukraine as a self-confident partner: As a result of the war’s trajectory, the Ukrainian Government is adopting a self-assured demeanour in its dealings with international donors. While this is essentially a positive thing, it can also give rise to a resistance to reform. The prospect of EU accession creates a common objective to work towards and can also establish coherent criteria for the recovery process, but only as long as accession remains a credible prospect.
• Managing reconstruction assistance: Recovery funds have proven an effective means of coordination, though it remains to be seen whether there will be a single fund or several complementary ones. A central Ukraine fund should be (co-)managed on the donor end by the European Commission, as it has at its disposal the strongest reform incentive, namely EU accession. In the meantime, the EU needs to ensure that the Commission and the member states also provide the majority of the funding between them.
• Diversity and inclusion: The governance structures of the reconstruction project should be designed to afford participation and a say to pluralist political institutions and civil society voices, and strengthen gender equality. In order to counter brain-drain, it is also imperative that young, mobile population groups (including refugees abroad) feel included.
• Social equity: Incorporating social factors into the recovery process will also be essential. Vulnerable groups will require particular support, given the alarming level of impoverishment among the population as a result of the war.
• Investment incentives: Essential reconstruction services have to be provided by the private sector. This requires that clear incentives be created, not least by providing investment guarantees.
• Developing trauma sensitivity: The rebuilding work is taking place in a context of violence and trauma. This requires that all stakeholders develop a particular sensitivity in dealing with survivors of violence and engaging with a traumatised society. 

Rebuilding Ukraine starts now – even if it is being undertaken against a backdrop of conflict, violence and destruction, with Russia continuing to wage its war of aggression. In granting Ukraine European Union (EU) candidate status, the EU has also made the country’s recovery one of its own priorities. If this reconstruction project is to succeed, then it is necessary to take into account specific contextual conditions, along with experiences from other recovery processes, such as those in the Western Balkans and Iraq.
• Functional statehood: Ukraine is better placed in this regard than many other countries, particularly given the functional and widely accepted statehood throughout much of its territory. Reconstruction assistance can kick-start a forward-looking, sustainable green transformation in the economy and society. At the same time, there is a risk that massive external cash flows could feed old networks of corruption and patronage and create new ones. Clear accountability structures are required, along with sanctions for the misuse of funds, if this is to be counteracted.
• Agile planning over linear phase model: Rebuilding work is taking place in an atmosphere of great uncertainty. Consequently, planning processes must be flexible in order to adapt to different war scenarios. A linear sequence of recovery phases fails to properly address the situation. This is already visible when it comes to efforts to secure critical infrastructure. Its proper functioning is essential to people’s daily lives and to all forms of reconstruction, yet this infrastructure could become a target for attacks again at any time.
• Ukraine as a self-confident partner: As a result of the war’s trajectory, the Ukrainian Government is adopting a self-assured demeanour in its dealings with international donors. While this is essentially a positive thing, it can also give rise to a resistance to reform. The prospect of EU accession creates a common objective to work towards and can also establish coherent criteria for the recovery process, but only as long as accession remains a credible prospect.
• Managing reconstruction assistance: Recovery funds have proven an effective means of coordination, though it remains to be seen whether there will be a single fund or several complementary ones. A central Ukraine fund should be (co-)managed on the donor end by the European Commission, as it has at its disposal the strongest reform incentive, namely EU accession. In the meantime, the EU needs to ensure that the Commission and the member states also provide the majority of the funding between them.
• Diversity and inclusion: The governance structures of the reconstruction project should be designed to afford participation and a say to pluralist political institutions and civil society voices, and strengthen gender equality. In order to counter brain-drain, it is also imperative that young, mobile population groups (including refugees abroad) feel included.
• Social equity: Incorporating social factors into the recovery process will also be essential. Vulnerable groups will require particular support, given the alarming level of impoverishment among the population as a result of the war.
• Investment incentives: Essential reconstruction services have to be provided by the private sector. This requires that clear incentives be created, not least by providing investment guarantees.
• Developing trauma sensitivity: The rebuilding work is taking place in a context of violence and trauma. This requires that all stakeholders develop a particular sensitivity in dealing with survivors of violence and engaging with a traumatised society. 

Die Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft Verdi und die Eisenbahn- und Verkehrsgewerkschaft (EVG) haben für kommenden Montag zu einem gemeinsamen bundesweiten Warnstreik aufgerufen. Die aktuellen Arbeitskämpfe kommentiert Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

 

Wir erleben zurzeit eine Wende auf dem Arbeitsmarkt: Die Zeiten eines Arbeitgebermarktes, in dem Arbeitgeber*innen Löhne und Arbeitsbedingungen mehr oder weniger diktieren konnten, scheinen vorbei. Der Arbeitsmarkt entwickelt sich zu einem Arbeitnehmer*innenmarkt. Bereits heute gibt es in Deutschland zwei Millionen offene Stellen und eine riesige Fachkräftelücke, die sich in den kommenden zehn Jahren noch vergrößern wird. Viele Arbeitgeber*innen wollen diese Tatsache noch nicht wahrhaben und fordern mehr „Bock auf Arbeit“, höhere Arbeitszeiten und geringere Lohnsteigerungen.  

Der Arbeitskampf und der Mega-Streik im Verkehrssektor am kommenden Montag sind das logische Resultat dieser Zeitenwende. Ich erwarte für die kommenden Jahre eine deutliche Zunahme der Arbeitskämpfe in Deutschland. Es liegt in der Natur der Sache, dass diese Arbeitskämpfe auch signifikante Kosten mit sich bringen. Der beste Weg, um diese Kosten und die Arbeitskämpfe zu begrenzen, ist eine Stärkung der Sozialpartnerschaften. Der Staat wird eine wichtige Rolle spielen, um vor allem die verletzlichsten Arbeitnehmer*innen besser zu schützen. Dazu werden unweigerlich weitere deutliche Anhebungen des Mindestlohns gehören, zudem müssen Tarifabschlüsse für einzelne Branchen häufiger für allgemeinverbindlich erklärt werden.

Wenn all das gelingt, können sich Lohnerhöhungen über die kommenden Jahre positiv auf Beschäftigung, Wachstum und Wohlstand in Deutschland auswirken. Denn deutliche Lohnsteigerungen, vor allem für Menschen mit geringen Einkommen, stabilisieren die Nachfrage und helfen damit auch den Unternehmen. Sie entlasten die Sozialsysteme und helfen, den sozialen Frieden zu sichern. Und deutliche Lohnsteigerungen sind essenziell, um die Produktivität zu verbessern und um die erhebliche stille Reserve im deutschen Arbeitsmarkt heben zu helfen. Eine Lohn-Preis-Spirale droht nicht – sie ist ein Mythos. Die Beschäftigten mussten 2022 im Durchschnitt Reallohnverluste von drei Prozent hinnehmen, 2023 werden es wohl nochmals zwei Prozent oder mehr sein. Für keine der Branchen in Deutschland kann behauptet werden, dass Forderungen der Beschäftigten überzogen sind, auch nicht im öffentlichen Dienst, wo die geforderten Lohnerhöhungen noch nicht einmal die Inflation in den Jahren 2022 und 2023 ausgleichen. Dagegen haben große Konzerne ihre Gewinne deutlich erhöht. Analysen der EZB zeigen, dass der Anstieg der Gewinne alleine 2022 einen doppelt so großen Beitrag zur Inflation geleistet hat wie die Lohnerhöhungen, gerade in der Industrie.

Die am DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt zwei studentische Hilfskräfte (m/w/div) für 10 Wochenstunden.

Seit Netto-Null-Ziele ein integraler Baustein der Klimapolitik sind, wird verstärkt dar­über nachgedacht, zusätzlich zu einer drastischen Reduzierung der Emissionen Kohlen­dioxid (CO2) aktiv aus der Atmosphäre zu entfernen. Die Herausforderungen, die mit land­basierten Methoden der Kohlendioxid-Entnahme (Carbon Dioxide Re­moval, CDR) verbunden sind, werden zunehmend offenbar. Angesichts dessen könnte der Ozean eine neue Hoffnung sein für Strategien zur CO2-Entnahme und ‑Spei­che­rung in der Europäischen Union (EU) und weltweit. Allerdings ist der Ozean ein Gebiet mit sich über­schneidenden und manchmal widersprüchlichen Rechten und Pflichten. Es besteht ein Spannungsverhältnis zwischen dem souveränen Recht der Staaten, die Meeres­ressour­cen inner­halb ihrer ausschließlichen Wirtschafts­zonen zu nutzen, und der internatio­nalen Verpflichtung, den Ozean als globa­les Gemeinschafts­gut zu schüt­zen. Die EU und ihre Mitglied­staaten müssen das Ver­hältnis zwi­schen diesen beiden Para­digmen in der Meerespolitik klären, wenn sie in Erwägung ziehen, den Ozean gezielt als Kohlen­stoffsenke oder ‑speicher zu verwenden. Derzeit wird die Meeres­strategie-Rahmen­richtlinie überarbeitet und ein Rahmen für die Zertifizierung von CO2-Ent­nahmemethoden auf EU-Ebene entwickelt. Die Schaffung von Quer­verbindungen zwischen beiden könnte den Weg bereiten für eine Debatte über Ziel­konflikte und Synergien zwischen Schutz und Nutzung von Meeresökosyste­men.

With the SDGs, countries agreed that Peace, Planet, Partnership, Prosperity and People are connected. To maximise synergies and minimize trade-offs, their interactions need to be better understood. While 'SDG interlinkages' are increasingly studied, SDG 16 is rarely covered. This new publication builds on the first, ground-breaking study ‘Connections that Matter: How the Quality of Governance Institutions may be the Booster Shot we need to reduce Poverty and Inequality’ on the interlinkages between SDG 16 and SDG 1 (No Poverty) and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequality). UNDP's Oslo Governance Centre and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) have now released this second study on interlinkages between SDG 16 and SDG 14 (Life Below Water). Based on a scoping literature review of 300+ academic papers, the study finds empirical evidence from across the globe that inclusion and participation, accountability and rule of law, as well as transparency and control of corruption and crime can improve the effectiveness of marine and coastal protection efforts and contribute towards the sustainability of fisheries. The study highlights a number of examples, including how governance can regulation, management and enforcement tends to improve marine park conservation whereas lack of enforcement can lead to ‘paper parks’. This publication offers initial policy insights on how to identify and activate governance levers to accelerate progress on SDG 14.

With the SDGs, countries agreed that Peace, Planet, Partnership, Prosperity and People are connected. To maximise synergies and minimize trade-offs, their interactions need to be better understood. While 'SDG interlinkages' are increasingly studied, SDG 16 is rarely covered. This new publication builds on the first, ground-breaking study ‘Connections that Matter: How the Quality of Governance Institutions may be the Booster Shot we need to reduce Poverty and Inequality’ on the interlinkages between SDG 16 and SDG 1 (No Poverty) and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequality). UNDP's Oslo Governance Centre and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) have now released this second study on interlinkages between SDG 16 and SDG 14 (Life Below Water). Based on a scoping literature review of 300+ academic papers, the study finds empirical evidence from across the globe that inclusion and participation, accountability and rule of law, as well as transparency and control of corruption and crime can improve the effectiveness of marine and coastal protection efforts and contribute towards the sustainability of fisheries. The study highlights a number of examples, including how governance can regulation, management and enforcement tends to improve marine park conservation whereas lack of enforcement can lead to ‘paper parks’. This publication offers initial policy insights on how to identify and activate governance levers to accelerate progress on SDG 14.

With the SDGs, countries agreed that Peace, Planet, Partnership, Prosperity and People are connected. To maximise synergies and minimize trade-offs, their interactions need to be better understood. While 'SDG interlinkages' are increasingly studied, SDG 16 is rarely covered. This new publication builds on the first, ground-breaking study ‘Connections that Matter: How the Quality of Governance Institutions may be the Booster Shot we need to reduce Poverty and Inequality’ on the interlinkages between SDG 16 and SDG 1 (No Poverty) and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequality). UNDP's Oslo Governance Centre and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) have now released this second study on interlinkages between SDG 16 and SDG 14 (Life Below Water). Based on a scoping literature review of 300+ academic papers, the study finds empirical evidence from across the globe that inclusion and participation, accountability and rule of law, as well as transparency and control of corruption and crime can improve the effectiveness of marine and coastal protection efforts and contribute towards the sustainability of fisheries. The study highlights a number of examples, including how governance can regulation, management and enforcement tends to improve marine park conservation whereas lack of enforcement can lead to ‘paper parks’. This publication offers initial policy insights on how to identify and activate governance levers to accelerate progress on SDG 14.

On 6 February 2023, Turkey was hit by one of the worst earthquakes in its history. Buildings were destroyed and damaged across the southern and eastern provinces. The official death toll is already over 50,000, and it is conceivable that the real num­bers will be much higher. The earthquake also exposed the scale of political and institutional deterioration in Turkey. During Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s two decades in power, Turkey has experienced an enormous construction boom, evolved into an impor­tant player in humanitarian aid, and become an increasingly important region­al military actor. However, the earthquake revealed that the highly centralised and personalised system of power had weakened state institutions and undermined their capacity to deliver. Turkey needs to reform its disaster management and gov­ern­ance. The European Union should assist the recovery and reconstruction efforts by target­ing aid and using the momentum to mitigate anti-Westernism.

Der schwerste Zugunfall in der Geschichte Griechenlands hat für große wütende Proteste und Streiks im Land gesorgt. Ein Bahnbeamter hatte die Weichen falsch gestellt, zwei Züge stießen frontal zusammen. 57 Menschen kamen ums Leben, darunter viele junge Leute. Die Regierung steht seitdem unter großem Druck: Ihr wird vorgeworfen, das Schienennetz nicht modernisiert zu haben. Ist dieser Unfall ein tragisches Ereignis oder symptomatisch für Griechenland? Welche Machtstrukturen spielen eine Rolle? Welche Bedeutung hat die Zeit der Eurokrise, als Griechenland kurz vor der Pleite stand und sich einem Sparprogramm unterziehen musste? Sind damals im übertragenen Sinn die Weichen falsch gestellt worden?

Als Saudi-Arabien und Iran am 10. März verkündeten, ihre 2016 abgebrochenen Beziehungen wieder aufzunehmen, kam das einem politischen Erdbeben gleich: Wenn zwei seit mehr als vier Jahrzehnten verfeindete Staaten eine Phase der Entspannung einläuten, könnte diese auf viele Regionalstaaten ausstrahlen. Dennoch besteht der Konflikt zwischen dem Iran und seinen Gegnern fort – und könnte schon bald in einen Angriff Israels auf die iranischen Atomanlagen münden. Eine solche Eskalation könnte dann auch die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Riad und Teheran erneut befeuern.

Das Abkommen beendet einen regelrechten regionalen kalten Krieg zwischen den Rivalen, der seit 2011 und verstärkt seit 2015 ausgefochten wurde. Anlass war die beispiellose Expansion des Iran, das in die Bürgerkriege in Syrien, im Irak und im Jemen intervenierte und seinen Einfluss im Nahen Osten massiv ausweitete. Saudi-Arabien stellte sich dem Iran und seinen Verbündeten vor allem im Jemen entgegen, wo es gemeinsam mit den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten im März 2015 gegen die Huthi-Rebellen intervenierte. Doch konnte Riad Teheran wenig entgegensetzen und zog am Ende den Kürzeren. Dies zeigte sich spätestens am 14. September 2019, als iranische Drohnen und Marschflugkörper die saudi-arabischen Ölanlagen von Khurais und Abqaiq trafen, die saudi-arabische Ölproduktion für zwei Wochen auf rund die Hälfte verringerten und dem Königreich so seine Verwundbarkeit demonstrierten. Seitdem zeigte sich Riad an einer Verständigung interessiert. Iran hingegen lenkte erst in den vergangenen Monaten ein, weil seine Führung zunehmend unter Druck steht: Die Verhandlungen über eine Neuauflage des Atomabkommens von 2015 dürften gescheitert sein und die internationalen Sanktionen schaden der iranischen Wirtschaft massiv. Hinzu kommen die seit September andauernden Proteste im Land, die die Isolierung Irans verschärften.

Riads neue Prioritäten

Dafür, dass das Abkommen eine längerfristige Entspannungsphase einläuten könnte, sprechen vor allem Veränderungen in der saudi-arabischen Außenpolitik der vergangenen Jahre. Der starke Mann in Riad, Kronprinz Mohammed Bin Salman, hat ehrgeizige wirtschafts- und sozialpolitische Reformen gestartet: Er will aus dem Königreich eine moderne globale Wirtschaftsmacht formen. Vor diesem Hintergrund sind nicht nur die hohen Kosten des Krieges im Jemen ein Problem; dieser und der Konflikt mit dem Iran haben außerdem den Ruf des Landes beschädigt und potentielle Investoren ferngehalten. Die Ambitionen Bin Salmans vertragen sich auch nicht so recht damit, dass immer mal wieder Raketen, Drohnen und Marschflugkörper in Saudi-Arabien einschlagen. Hinzu kommt, dass das Königreich aus den Ereignissen vom September 2019 die Lehre zog, dass es sich nicht mehr auf den Schutz durch die USA verlassen kann – denn der damalige Präsident Donald Trump machte keine Anstalten militärisch zu reagieren. Riads Distanz zu Washington zeigte sich schon 2022, als es dem amerikanischen Ersuchen nicht nachkam, die Ölfördermenge zu erhöhen, um die Ausfälle an Öl aus Russland auszugleichen und so die Preise stabil zu halten. Obwohl die militärische Abhängigkeit von den USA bestehen bleibt, bemüht sich Saudi-Arabien parallel um gute Beziehungen zu Russland und zu China. Offenbar will Bin Salman, dass sein Königreich zu einem sehr viel unabhängigeren und mächtigeren Akteur der Regional- und Weltpolitik wird.

Riads Machtanspruch im Nahen Osten

Die machtpolitischen Ambitionen des Kronprinzen und die Entwicklung des Konfliktes zwischen dem Iran und seinen Gegnern sprechen jedoch gegen einen Erfolg des Abkommens – und damit auch gegen eine längere Entspannungsphase. Mohammed Bin Salman sieht sich als Führer einer starken und idealerweise dominierenden Regionalmacht, die auf das iranische Vormachtstreben und vor allem auf die wahrscheinlich bevorstehende nukleare Bewaffnung des großen Rivalen reagieren muss. Bisher ist dies vor allem dadurch geschehen, dass Saudi-Arabien seine militärische und nachrichtendienstliche Zusammenarbeit mit Israel ausgebaut hat – das als einziger Staat im Nahen Osten die Fähigkeiten hat sich dem Iran entgegenzustellen. Zuletzt zeigte sich Riad sogar zu einem Friedensschluss mit dem jüdischen Staat bereit, wenn die USA ihr Sicherheitsversprechen für das Königreich erneuerten und ihm bei einem saudi-arabischen Nuklearprogramm assistierten.

Hier zeigte sich, wie sehr Saudi-Arabien den Iran weiterhin als Bedrohung betrachtet und sich bemüht, die eigene Position gegenüber dem Nachbarn mithilfe der USA und Israels zu stärken. Deshalb kann die neue, ausgleichende Politik des Königreichs schon binnen kurzem scheitern, wenn die israelische Regierung sich entscheiden sollte, tatsächlich mit Militärschlägen gegen die iranischen Atomanlagen vorzugehen, wie sie das immer wieder angekündigt hat. Angesichts der Zusammenarbeit mit Israel dürfte Saudi-Arabien in einem solchen Fall große Schwierigkeiten haben, Iran davon zu überzeugen, dass es neutral und an guten Beziehungen interessiert ist. Der Schutz durch die USA dürfte dann wieder wichtiger sein als die neue Freundschaft zu Iran.

Für die Stabsstelle Recht suchen wir zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine*n Juristische*n Referent*in (m/w/div) (in Vollzeit, Teilzeit ist möglich) für die vollumfängliche Rechtsberatung des Vorstands und Abteilungen des Instituts.

International observers link many hopes for global sustainable development to the use of green hydrogen. Hydrogen produced via electrolysis and using renewable energies is a carbon-free energy carrier and feedstock for several industrial processes, e.g. in steel production and petrochemistry. To date, the application of hydrogen for fertiliser production has received insufficient attention. Globally and for the developing world, it offers at least a "triple win option": greenhouse gas emissions from natural gas-based fertiliser production can be avoided, developing countries may save foreign currency, which is today used for importing gas from, e.g. Russia. Finally, farmers may become less exposed to fluctuations in natural gas prices. An assured supply of fertilisers produced with local renewable energies can be an important element of food security. The article discusses the options and uncertainties related to green hydrogen production and digs deeper into the options of fertiliser production.

International observers link many hopes for global sustainable development to the use of green hydrogen. Hydrogen produced via electrolysis and using renewable energies is a carbon-free energy carrier and feedstock for several industrial processes, e.g. in steel production and petrochemistry. To date, the application of hydrogen for fertiliser production has received insufficient attention. Globally and for the developing world, it offers at least a "triple win option": greenhouse gas emissions from natural gas-based fertiliser production can be avoided, developing countries may save foreign currency, which is today used for importing gas from, e.g. Russia. Finally, farmers may become less exposed to fluctuations in natural gas prices. An assured supply of fertilisers produced with local renewable energies can be an important element of food security. The article discusses the options and uncertainties related to green hydrogen production and digs deeper into the options of fertiliser production.

International observers link many hopes for global sustainable development to the use of green hydrogen. Hydrogen produced via electrolysis and using renewable energies is a carbon-free energy carrier and feedstock for several industrial processes, e.g. in steel production and petrochemistry. To date, the application of hydrogen for fertiliser production has received insufficient attention. Globally and for the developing world, it offers at least a "triple win option": greenhouse gas emissions from natural gas-based fertiliser production can be avoided, developing countries may save foreign currency, which is today used for importing gas from, e.g. Russia. Finally, farmers may become less exposed to fluctuations in natural gas prices. An assured supply of fertilisers produced with local renewable energies can be an important element of food security. The article discusses the options and uncertainties related to green hydrogen production and digs deeper into the options of fertiliser production.

Since 1948, more than 1,000 UN personnel have been killed in malicious acts while serving in UN peacekeeping operations. Since 2013, the vast majority of fatalities have taken place in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). To address this trend, the UN Secretariat and member states have increasingly focused on strengthening the policy framework on accountability to peacekeepers. They have also increasingly focused specifically on how to pursue justice for peacekeepers who have been victims of attacks.

This paper focuses on advancing justice for crimes against peacekeepers as one aspect of the overall effort to enhance accountability to peacekeepers. It provides an overview of the role of UN peacekeeping operations in investigating and prosecuting crimes against peacekeepers and the UN’s growing focus on advancing and prioritizing accountability for these crimes. It then examines case studies of criminal cases supported by the UN missions in CAR (MINUSCA), Mali (MINUSMA), and the DRC (MONUSCO) in their respective host states and provides an overview of cross-cutting challenges they have faced.

The paper concludes with recommendations to help the UN Secretariat, peacekeeping operations, the Security Council, and other member states accelerate the investigation and prosecution of crimes against peacekeepers in a consistent and balanced manner:

• The UN Secretariat should maintain a comprehensive approach to accountability, develop a common definition of crimes against peacekeepers, ensure that host states adhere to human rights standards when engaging with those accused of crimes against peacekeepers, and improve internal and external coordination in this area.
• UN missions should pursue a comprehensive approach to accountability, continue to support host-state investigations and prosecutions of those accused of crimes against peacekeepers, advocate for host-state authorities to pursue accountability, and ensure sustained documentation of and follow-up on cases.
• The Security Council should reinforce peacekeeping mandates to build the host state’s capacity to pursue accountability and encourage legal clarity on the nature of crimes against peacekeepers.
• UN member states should use the group of friends to offer new ideas on ways to promote accountability and use the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to discuss ways to improve coordination in this area.

Download