Diplomacy & Crisis News

Souvent indispensable pour éviter l'incarcération préventive, la caution représente une manne pour plusieurs acteurs dont les « bail bondsmen », qui se portent garants du paiement auprès des tribunaux. Les assureurs spécialisés dans cette niche réalisent aussi de juteux bénéfices alors que les pressions (...) / Prison, États-Unis, Inégalités, Femmes, Justice pénale, Justice - 2023/07

Le 6 juin dernier, alors que Moscou et Kiev se renvoient la responsabilité de la destruction du barrage de Kakhovka, en Ukraine, Bernard-Henri Lévy contre-attaque : « Comme Hitler en 1945, #Putin a une fois de plus utilisé la tactique de la terre brûlée » (Twitter 6 juin). Le Monde se rabat alors sur (...) - 2023/07

Le 24 mars dernier, l'Algérie et la France tournaient officiellement la page de leur dernière querelle diplomatique en date. Lors d'un entretien téléphonique, les présidents algérien et français affirmaient avoir levé les « incompréhensions » provoquées par la fuite en Tunisie — le 3 février — puis par (...) / Russie, Diplomatie, Algérie, Conflit russo-ukrainien 2022- - 2023/07

Technologie de pointe, tubes de variété fredonnés sur tous les continents, séries à succès, cinéma mondialement reconnu : la Corée du Sud jouit d'une image particulièrement positive. Un peu comme si, dans bien des domaines, Séoul montrait la voie au reste du monde. Découvrir la réalité des conditions de (...) / Capitalisme, Travail, Syndicalisme, Corée du Sud, Société, Économie - 2023/07

Après avoir évacué un blessé vers l'arrière, le petit tailleur de la première section revient avec des nouvelles alarmantes : le poste de secours a été retiré, les routes sont encombrées de colonnes en retraite, officiers et ordonnances ont déserté le parc du château, autant de signes que le mince cordon (...) / Littérature, Histoire, Allemagne - 2023/07

« Réfléchir à deux fois avant de ne rien dire. » Cet adage, parmi tant d'autres, à propos des diplomates peut paraître moqueur. Il n'en traduit pas moins les mérites d'un métier indispensable aux relations internationales. En faisant le choix de normaliser cette profession, notamment en banalisant son (...) / Diplomatie, État, Relations internationales, France - 2023/07

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External observers keenly anticipated the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) third plenary session of the twentieth Central Committee. Third plenums—the third plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP elected at the last Party Congress (in this instance in November 2022)—have, in the post-Mao era, traditionally been where the Central Committee issues “authoritative” decisions on the direction of continued “reform and opening” policies.

The July 18 Third Plenum resolution, however, was notable for the fact that it introduced little that was substantively new in terms of policy. Instead, it served to reiterate the Party’s commitment to the hallmarks of Xi’s policy agenda: state-led efforts to gird the economy for self-sufficiency and resilience against external shocks, firm ideological control, and the linkage of national security and “development” as interdependent conditions necessary for China’s continued rise.

Herein may lie the plenum’s significance: to signal that Xi remains firmly in the driver’s seat. 

Some external observers have suggested that this signals the failure of the “China model” or that Xi has “missed” an opportunity for course correction of the Chinese economy. Yet that misreads the fact that for Xi, it is not an either-or-choice between the economy and politics. Rather, they are inextricably connected as Xi seeks to build a new “China model” that is capable of grappling simultaneously with both China’s economic headwinds and “strategic competition” with the United States. 

The plenum resolution thus “unanimously agreed that in the face of a grave and complex international environment,” advancing “reform and development and ensuring stability at home” would be achieved by “promoting high-quality development” and “strengthening full and rigorous [Party] self-governance.”

The emphasis on “high-quality development” spruiked at the plenum had been prefigured by a “study session” of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) in January, which identified the harnessing of “new qualitative productive forces” as central to the achievement of this goal. “New productive forces” are short-hand for the application of innovation to the cutting-edge “frontier” of technology (e.g., Artificial Intelligence, quantum computing) that will make China self-reliant in the “fourth industrial revolution,” as well as to traditional manufacturing industries. 

This dual emphasis, Evan Feigenbaum suggests, is not only designed to “better insulate China from American strategic pressure” such as the CHIPS Act but also geared to “lock in Chinese dominance of advanced manufacturing and outcompete global rivals in old-fashioned industries like shipbuilding.” Only in this way, the PBSC study session noted, can China succeed in “breaking away from traditional economic growth modes and paths of productive force development.”

That this is not simply tied to “breaking away” from China’s post-1978 growth model but to “strategic competition” was underscored by the communique’s treatment of “national security.” 

Although explicitly identified as “a pivotal foundation for ensuring steady and continued progress in Chinese modernization,” “national security” was framed as interdependent with “high-quality development.” “We must,” the resolution stated, “ensure that high-quality development and greater security reinforce each other, so as to safeguard the country’s long-term stability and security.” 

There are two salient observations to be made here. First, this is consistent with previous statements by Xi that frame the transition to a new economic model as crucial to both continued development and the attainment of “strategic initiative in international competition.” Second, such framing signals the continued securitization of major policy areas in the service of the political security of the CCP under Xi’s leadership. 

Indeed, Xi’s explanatory note on the plenum’s decision demonstrates both dynamics. The section on “national security” underscores the objective of “modernizing” the “national security system” through the establishment of “a unified national population management system” and improvement in “the overall prevention and control system for public security,” as well as noting that the “integration of development and security” will enable the Party-state to improve “Mechanisms for countering foreign sanctions, interference, and long-arm jurisdiction…” (i.e. enable it to overcome U.S.-led economic and diplomatic sanctions). 

The plenum’s commitment to ensure ideological “self-governance” and discipline within the Party is not surprising. However, the tone and substance of that statement, as well as some lengthier associated official explanations of how the plenum’s resolution was arrived at, provide some indication of the nature of contemporary elite politics and decisionmaking. 

The resolution noted that the Party had to “follow the leadership core,” “keep in alignment with the central Party leadership,” “stay confident in the path, theory, system, and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” and “uphold Comrade Xi Jinping’s core position on the Party Central Committee…and the Central Committee’s authority and its centralized, unified leadership.” This is consistent with major ideological directives since the 2022 Party Congress that have sought to consolidate Xi’s role as the fountainhead of political and ideological authority. 

Xi’s explanatory note, however, struck a tone that suggests some level of dissatisfaction with the progress of this project when it stipulated that the plenum’s decision was, in fact, an opportunity for the Party to make a “redeclaration of what banner to hold and what road to take in the new era.”

With respect to policy, Xi’s note implies that some of China’s current problems are the result of poor implementation rather than poor policy. It notes, for example, the need to improve “the institutional mechanisms for preventing and controlling formalism and bureaucracy,” “the mechanism for investigating and dealing with unhealthy trends and corruption at the same time,” and “methods for preventing and controlling new types of corruption and hidden corruption.” 

It appears that China’s former Minister of Defense Li Shangfu, head of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) General Li Yuchao, and chief-of-staff of the PLARF, lieutenant-general Sun Jinming—whose expulsions from the CCP were confirmed in the plenum resolution—likely fell afoul of this ongoing quest to ensure both loyalty and probity amongst top officials.

Finally, as Neil Thomas has highlighted, the official commentary on the “making of the decision of the third plenum” demonstrates that Xi “increasingly discourages internal policy discussions.” Thomas notes that in May, “the plenum drafting team circulated a draft decision to cadres, retired leaders, satellite parties, and policy experts,” from which they subsequently received “1,911 suggestions and made 221 revisions,” while “the drafting team for the 2013 decision received 2,564 suggestions and made 539 revisions, meaning this plenum saw a 25 [percent] fall in suggestions and a near-halving of their acceptance rate from 21 [percent] to 12 [percent].”

The third plenum has thus been significant in demonstrating Xi’s continued hold over the Party and its decisionmaking processes. While that outcome may speak to Xi’s political success in further consolidating his unchallenged position and affirming his preferences across core policy domains, it remains to be seen whether this will help or hinder China’s ability to both solve deep domestic problems and compete with the United States.

Dr. Michael Clarke is a Senior Lecturer in Strategic Studies at the Deakin Centre for Future Defence and National Security at the Australian War College (Canberra) and Adjunct Professor at the Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney. Follow him on LinkedIn and X @meclarke114.

Dr. Jade Guan is a Senior Lecturer in Strategic Studies at the Deakin Centre for Future Defence and National Security at the Australian War College (Canberra). Follow her on LinkedIn and X @JiaAu.

Image: Mirko Kuzmanovic / Shutterstock.com.

Whether Trump wins or loses, the continent needs a new strategy toward the United States.

M10 Booker Looks To Be Making Progress: The U.S. Army is expanding its fleet of M10 Booker Combat Vehicles, with General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) continuing low-rate initial production (LRIP) under a $322.7 million contract.

-The M10 Booker, designed for Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), features a 105 mm cannon, advanced sensors, and a modular design for future upgrades.

-Although it resembles a main battle tank, it was developed from the Mobile Protected Firepower Vehicle program and named after two heroic soldiers, Private Robert Booker and Staff Sergeant Stevon Booker.

U.S. Army Expands Fleet with Advanced M10 Booker Combat Vehicles

The vehicle is crucial for the Army's transformation to dominate large-scale combat operations.

The U.S. Army Could Increase Its Fleet of M10 Booker Combat Vehicles

In April, the United States Army took the delivery of its first M10 Booker Combat Vehicle in a ceremony at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. Developed by General Dynamics Land Systems, the M10 Booker is equipped with a 105 mm cannon and advanced sensors for night and urban combat. The U.S. Army will employ the modular vehicle to enhance Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs).

The platform entered low-rate initial production (LRIP) in July.

Testing of the vehicle has continued at Fort Liberty, North Carolina, while the 82nd Airborne Division has been slated to put the M10 through additional gunnery training and testing at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

LRIP to Continue

This week, GDLS announced that it had been awarded a $322.7 million contract from the U.S. Army for continued LRIP of the vehicle.

"As part of low-rate initial production, multiple Booker vehicles have been delivered to the Army to support government testing and logistics efforts," GDLS stated on Tuesday. "The Booker employs a four-person crew and features an enhanced thermal viewer, a large-caliber cannon, a lightweight hull and turret, and a modern diesel engine, transmission and suspension system. It has been designed from the start for capability upgrades, based on future operational needs."

According to the defense contractor, work will be provided at the company's facilities in Sterling Heights, Michigan, Anniston, Alabama, Lima, Ohio, Tallahassee, Florida, and Scranton, Pennsylvania. The estimated completion date of the LRIP is scheduled for Oct. 20, 2026.

"The M10 Booker is named after two American heroes who gave their lives in service to their country, and we are honored to design, build and deliver these vehicles to the Army," said Gordon Stein, General Dynamics Land Systems vice president and general manager for U.S. operations in a May 15, 2024 statement. "These latest Bookers incorporate improvements and lessons we learned from the Middle Tier Acquisition phase of the program, and we’re confident that Soldiers will find them highly useful in completing their missions."

Not a Tank

Though it could be mistaken for a main battle tank (MBT) with its tracked chassis and turret, the Booker was born out of the Mobile Protected Firepower Vehicle (MPFV), it was officially designated the M10 last year.

It is unique among American military platforms as it actually is named to honor two different soldiers named Booker.

The first was Medal of Honor recipient Private Robert Booker of the 133rd Infantry Regiment, 34th Infantry Division, who was killed on April 9, 1943, near Fondouk, Tunisia, during the Second World War; while the latter was tank commander and Distinguished Service Cross recipient Staff Sergeant Stevon Booker, Company A, 1st Battalion, 64th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, who was killed in April 5, 2003, during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

"The Army is undertaking its most significant transformation in several decades to dominate in large-scale combat operations in a multidomain environment, and the M10 Booker is a crucial part of that transformation," said Doug Bush, the assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology, in April.

The GDLS prototype beat out a design from BAE Systems in 2022.

It is the first major combat vehicle developed for the U.S. Army since the late stages of the Cold War in the 1980s. The finalized M10 Booker is operated by a crew of four, including a commander, a driver, a gunner, and a loader. Its armament consists of a 105 mm M35 primary weapon, a 7.62 mm coaxial weapon, and a .50-caliber M2 commander's weapon. It has a maximum speed of 40 miles per hour, and a C-17 can transport two of the vehicles.

"The M10 Booker provides IBCTs with a safe and effective platform to complete their mission – one that may include bunkers, machine guns or armored vehicle," said Gordon Stein, General Dynamics Land Systems vice president and general manager for U.S. operations. "We are honored to continue to manufacture the M10 Booker Combat Vehicle."

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary and What You Need to Know: Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel highlighted the growing use of drones in modern warfare, particularly against armored vehicles like main battle tanks (MBTs).

-However, Israel’s Merkava MBTs, equipped with advanced protection systems like the Trophy Active Protection System, proved resilient against these drone assaults.

-Designed for survivability with features such as thick armor and a unique front-positioned engine, the Merkava has been a critical asset for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) for over four decades, helping to protect Israel’s borders even in the face of sophisticated drone threats.

How Israel’s Merkava Tanks Can Survive Hamas’ Deadly Drone Assault

Hamas’ October 7 massacre against Israel showcased the true capacity of the Gaza-based terror group’s drone arsenal. Like other non-state actors, Hamas heavily relies on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in barrages. Since drones are cheaper to develop and far simpler to produce than other explosive devices, their presence in modern warfare—as seen in the Russian-Ukrainian and Israeli-Hamas Wars—has increased. Drones can carry out a range of functions, including surveillance, reconnaissance, and lethal attacks, which can threaten nearly all military systems and equipment. Tiny, explosive-laden UAVs can be particularly threatening to main battle tanks (MBTs) and other armored vehicles.

As part of Hamas’s offensive strategy this October, the terror group launched lethal drones against Israel’s tanks. However, the Israel Defense Force’s (IDF) fleet of Merkava MBTs is better equipped than most of its counterparts to survive these types of drone barrages.

Introducing the Merkava

The Merkava series of main battle tanks has remained in service with the IDF’s armored corps for more than four decades. Equipped with a range of advanced capabilities, the “Chariot” battle tank is often referred to as one of the best-armored vehicles of its kind across the globe. The Merkava tank can be linked back to the early days of the Israeli state. During the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel’s armored corps attained victory by deploying its fleet of American-made M48 Patton and British-made Centurion tanks across the Sinai Peninsula and into the Golan Heights. Israel’s pre-emptive attack was not well received by some of the new country’s European allies.

In fact, the United Kingdom decided to reverse the joint-tank initiative it was developing with the Jewish state that would have provided Israel with its Chieftain tanks. At the same time, France further embargoed deliveries of its Mirage fighter jets and missile boats to Israel. At this point, Israeli officials understood that it could not rely on foreign allies for security.

To rectify this situation, the then-commander of the IDF armored corps, Maj. Gen. Israel Tal, spearheaded the Jewish state’s MBT domestic production capability. The primary function of Israel’s new tank would be survivability. In order to keep personnel losses down in combat, the new tank was designed with thick-spaced armor and unique engine/transmission positioning to provide extra protection for crews.

By installing the engine and transmission in the front of the tank, more space was created in the MBT’s rear, increasing storage capacity and access to enemy fire for the crew. Other tanks being developed around this time sported a rear-positioned engine, emphasizing the Merkava’s unique internal structure.

Operational history

The Merkava first proved to be a critical asset for the IDF during the 1982 Lebanon War. Outperforming Syria’s fleet of Soviet-designed T-62 armored vehicles, the Merkava became the mainstay of the IDF’s armored corps.

Over the years, several new Merkava variants have been introduced, all sporting new enhancements for the platform to retain an edge over competitors. Perhaps the most significant improvement added to the Merkava was the Trophy Active Protection System. This countermeasure, designed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, is installed on the newer Merkava 4 and Merkava 5 variants.

The homegrown system protects the Merkava from an array of projectiles, including anti-tank rockets, anti-tank guided missiles, and high-explosive anti-tank rounds. Additionally, the Trophy system improves the tank’s capacity to locate enemy MBTs, therefore increasing the crew’s survivability. With the Trophy system in place, the Merkava can act more offensively on the battlefield.

As explained by the executive office of the IDF’s tank commander school, “The first and foremost difference in the tank commander’s behavior (pre and post Trophy), we used to be a lot more defensive, and we found ourselves sort of hiding on the battlefield and trying to get out of the range of the anti-tank systems. With Trophy, you feel you have the ability to be more offensive and put yourself out there a little more and allow yourself to accept a little more risk than what we did before.”

Israel’s prioritization of survivability when it comes to the Merkava has boded well for the IDF. Since the Merkava tanks are better protected from top-done drone attacks than its counterparts, Hamas terrorists were unable to destroy as many of these MBTs during its October 7 invasion. While the Merkava may not be invulnerable, it is certainly a critical asset that helps protect Israel’s borders.

About the Author: Maya Carlin

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary and What You Need to Know: The Russian Tu-160 "Blackjack" strategic bomber, a symbol of Russia's military might, recently made headlines when President Vladimir Putin took a short flight in the modernized aircraft.

-Despite Russia's challenges in Ukraine, the Tu-160 remains an impressive weapon system, boasting a new low-observable coating, improved engines, and enhanced electronic warfare capabilities.

-Capable of carrying almost 100,000 lbs of ordnance, including nuclear weapons, the Tu-160 has been used in Ukraine for strategic bombing missions. However, its limited stealth capabilities restrict its effectiveness in non-nuclear deep-penetration strikes.

Tu-160 Blackjack: Russia's Strategic Bomber with Massive Firepower

The Russian military might be taking a serious beating in Ukraine, but it still fields some impressive weapon systems. The Tu-160 Blackjack strategic bomber is one of them. And in February, the aircraft got a rare day in the news after a visit from the top.

In February, Russian President Vladimir Putin flew in a modernized Tu-160 Blackjack strategic bomber.

The short flight took place in central Russia, far away from hostilities in Ukraine.

The Russian leader took the event as an opportunity to tout the Russian defense and aerospace industries after 25 months of failure in Ukraine.

“It's a new machine, a lot about it is new. It's easier to control. It's reliable,” Putin said afterward.

Of course, the flight had an aroma of propaganda. The Tu-160 bomber took off and landed from a runway near the factory that produces the aircraft in Kazan.

The aircraft is manufactured by Tupolev and requires a crew of four men. Approximately 20 of these bombers are active with the Russian Aerospace Forces.

The Modernized Tu-160 Blackjack Strategic Bomber 

The modernized version of the Tu-160 features a new low-observable coating to reduce the strategic bomber’s radar signature and make it stealthier. It also uses new engines with increased performance and better operational range. It has an improved cockpit and new electronic warfare capabilities and countermeasures, as well as better communications and control systems. 

Overall, the Tu-160 Blackjack is an impressive aircraft. Operational since 1987, the nuclear-capable strategic bomber is the largest and heaviest supersonic military aircraft in history. An impressive feat of aerodynamics and engineering, the Tu-160 Blackjack has one main mission: strategic bombing. In the event of a conflict with the United States and NATO, the Russian Aerospace Forces would use the Tu-160 Blackjack against high-value targets or as a platform to launch nuclear weapons, depending on the level of escalation.

The Russian bomber can fire twelve Raduga Kh-55SM/101/102/555 cruise missiles in two internal rotary launchers, or twelve AS-16 Kickback short-range nuclear weapons. All told, the Tu-160M Blackjack can carry almost 100,000 lbs of ordnance. The Russian Aerospace Forces have been using the aircraft in Ukraine in strategic bombing missions against Ukrainian urban centers, critical infrastructure, and the country’s power grid.

With a range of approximately 12,000 kilometers (7,500 miles), the Tu-160 Blackjack can deliver its payload at great distances. Mid-air refueling can extend its operational range.

The aircraft uses four Samara NK-321 jet engines, each of which can produce almost 31,000 lbs of thrust at normal speeds, and 55,000 lbs each with afterburner. As a result, the aircraft can reach speeds over Mach 2, exceeding 1,500 miles per hour.

The Tu-160 Blackjack is a powerful, dangerous aircraft that could pose a serious threat in a near-peer conflict. However, the aircraft significantly lacks in stealth capabilities, thus limiting its ability to conduct deep-penetration strikes in a non-nuclear environment.

About the Author

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense and national security journalist specializing in special operations. A Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), he holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University, an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is pursuing a J.D. at Boston College Law School. His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Images Credit: Shutterstock and/or Creative Commons. 

Summary and What You Need to Know: The Mikoyan MiG-31 "Foxhound" is a supersonic interceptor that replaced the flawed MiG-25 "Foxbat." Developed in the 1970s, the MiG-31 was designed to address the shortcomings of its predecessor, particularly in radar capability and low-altitude performance.

-The aircraft, built with a strong airframe and advanced radar, can track multiple targets, including low-flying cruise missiles and bombers. Despite its impressive speed and altitude capabilities, the MiG-31 is not designed for close combat.

-Still in service, the MiG-31 has been used by Russia during the invasion of Ukraine, proving effective against Ukrainian aircraft.

How the MiG-31 Foxhound Replaced the Flawed MiG-25

Known to NATO as the “Foxhound,” the Mikoyan MiG-31 is a supersonic interceptor produced from 1975 to 1994 and is still flown today. 

Designed to replace the MiG-25 “Foxbat,” the MiG-31 was one of the fastest operational combat aircraft of its time. The MiG-31 is expected to remain in service with Russian and Kazakh forces until 2030 or later.

MiG-31: Replacing a Flawed Fighter

The MiG-25 was a single-seat fighter with impressive speed, altitude, and rate of climb. However, it was flawed in certain respects. It lacked maneuverability at the high speeds required for interception, and it proved especially difficult to fly at low altitudes. The MiG-25’s top speed was indeed impressive. The jet could reach Mach 3.2, although designers did not recommend exceeding Mach 2.83 for the risk of sustaining engine damage. 

The Soviets began working on a replacement for the flawed MiG-25 in the early 1970s. By 1975, a prototype known as the Ye-155MP made its first flight. 

The prototype that would become the MiG-31 looked much like the MiG-25, but it was an improved aircraft. One of the most important differences between the two jets was radar capability. The MiG-31, featuring a fuselage lengthened to accommodate a radar operator’s cockpit, was capable of both look-up and look-down/shoot-down engagement, and it could track multiple targets simultaneously. 

The result was an interceptor aircraft that could track low-flying cruise missiles and bombers at long range. Although built as a predecessor to the MiG-25, the MiG-31 would also serve as a replacement for the Tu-128 long-range interceptor.

The Specifications of the MiG-31

The MiG-31 is a large two-seater with two engines and side-mounted air intakes. The wings are shoulder-mounted. The design was crafted around a specific set of mission objectives, which included intercepting cruise missiles and the aircraft from which the missiles originated, finding and eliminating low-flying missiles, UAVs, and helicopters, escorting bombers, and providing air defense.

However, the MiG-31 was decidedly not designed for close combat or rapid turning. Accordingly, the jet is only rated for five Gs while traveling at supersonic speeds. The wing load is marginal, and its thrust-to-weight ratio is respectable.

The MiG-31 was built with stronger wings and a stronger airframe than the MiG-25, which allows for supersonic flight in the dense air of low altitude. The aircraft was built from a nickel-steel alloy that permits the MiG-31 to tolerate the kinetic heating created at Mach 3 airspeeds. In all, the MiG-31 airframe is composed of 49 percent arc-welded nickel steel, 33 percent light metal alloy, 16 percent titanium, and 2 percent composites.

The MiG-31 carries two D30-F6 jet engines, which are rated for 152 kilonewtons of thrust. The D30-F6 is capable of propelling the MiG-31 to Mach 3.2 – but speeds above Mach 3 pose substantial risks to the engine and airframe and are not recommended. The MiG-31 is, therefore, redlined at Mach 2.83.

The Russians have relied on the MiG-31 during the invasion of Ukraine. Reportedly, MiG-31s shot down several Ukrainian aircraft, mostly with the long-range R-37 air-to-air missile. The Ukrainians do not have an aircraft that can match the MiG-31’s speed or altitude, meaning the MiG-31s have been able to operate in Ukrainian airspace virtually unopposed.

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Images: Shutterstock and/or Creative Commons. 

Parliamentarians hoped to revise two Constitutional Court rulings to extend the Widodo administration’s influence.

Earlier this year, at the ninth International Conference of Tibet Support Groups (TSGs) held in Brussels, the Dalai Lama addressed 140 representatives from 40 countries. His speech highlighted Tibet’s environmental concerns as a global problem. This is not the first time the revered Tibetan leader has tackled the issues of climate change and the effects of ecological degradation due to wanton human activities.

Over the years, be it his speech at the “Endangered Tibet” conference in 1996 or his remarks at the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26), to name a few,  the Dalai Lama has not only cautioned about the global ramifications of “ecological neglect” in the “Third Pole” of the Himalayas and Tibetan Plateau but also emphasized the importance of the “spirit of solidarity and cooperation” to counter transnational challenges.

But if the world at large has thus far remained relatively unmindful of the Buddhist leader’s words, what is the relevance of the Dalai Lama’s climate advocacy today? First, there is a direct correlation between his teachings on the interdependence of species on each other and nature and the impact of human-driven environmental changes, including severe water shortages.

Second, the significance of the Dalai Lama’s advocacy for climate action is related to China’s repression of the Tibetan people and culture. This repression, in part, takes the form of accelerating Tibet’s climate crisis through myriad infrastructure developments (from mega-dams to over-mining). In this context, the Dalai Lama has not shied away from calling out China for not only neglecting the ecological devastation in the Tibetan Plateau but actively participating in the overexploitation of natural resources “without proper environmental safeguards.”

The third reason is the current highly divided political landscape where the democratic states, and not just in the West, are increasingly recognizing the imperative of countering China’s militaristic aims, including in Tibet. China’s financial and diplomatic support of several authoritarian regimes like Russia, North Korea, and Iran have also created greater concerns about the dangers to the liberal order. Thus, today, there is potential for greater receptivity of Tibetan concerns than ever.

What is the extent of Chinese activities on the Tibetan and Himalayan ecology? What specific measures must the West and partners like India take to address the ecological balance in the Himalayas?

The Climate Crisis in the Third Pole

The Tibetan Plateau and its surrounding mountainous areas are commonly considered the “Third Pole” because they are home to the largest reservoir of glaciers and ice sheets on earth after the Arctic and Antarctica polar regions. In effect, several major rivers such as the Mekong, Salween, Yellow, Yangtze, Yarlung Tsampo (Brahmaputra in India), Indus, Irrawaddy, Ganges, Sutlej, and Karnali fountain from the Plateau. Thus, it serves as the “Water Tower of Asia,” providing fresh water and vital sources of livelihood to billions of people not just in Tibet but across South and Southeast Asia.

Moreover, the Plateau is not only one of the most biodiverse regions in the world but also rich in minerals, including rare earth reserves. Additionally, it is surrounded by four biodiversity hotspots—biologically diverse but threatened areas—namely the Himalayas, Mountains of Southwest China, Mountains of Central Asia, and Indo Burma. These hotspots are not immune to the repercussions of climate change, including glacial melting and extreme weather events like flash floods. This is exacerbated by increased human activities—from unbridled infrastructure development to increased hostilities in the Himalayas.

In such a scenario, it is time that the world and its leaders champion an ethical approach to climate-change solutions, including proper and widespread dissemination of information among the general populace, something the Dalai Lama has always underscored. However, the challenges are far from over. The rise in decibel levels from the U.S.-China great power competition and Russia’s Ukraine invasion means that the Chinese will stake a claim over Tibetan resources more aggressively than ever.

China’s Infrastructure Spree: Unlikely to Slow Down?

China has been systematically undertaking infrastructure development in Tibet and Xinjiang over the last twenty years. This has had devastating results for the fragile Himalayan ecology, and lowland areas have witnessed increased flooding. The intensive infrastructure buildup has led to habitat fragmentation and increased air and noise pollution.

In 2006, after the Golmud-Lhasa railway line became operational, there was a massive boom in mining operations on the Tibetan plateau. Mining exploration revealed that there were deposits of over 110 types of minerals across 3,000 sites, with a value of more than $125 billion. This included large deposits of copper, chromium, gold, and lithium, as well as oil and gas reserves. The heightened mining activity led to protests by Tibetan nomads, citing poisoned drinking water and the deaths of herd animals. Moreover, there are reports of the forced resettlement of Tibetan nomads to make way for mining and hydropower projects.

Between 2021 and 2025, China has planned to spend approximately $30 billion on infrastructure projects in Tibet under the Fourteenth Five-Year Plan: “By 2025, the total mileage of highways in Tibet will exceed 120,000 km, and that of expressways will exceed 1,300 km.” This development plan includes roads, railways, airfields, border villages, telecommunication facilities, and hydroelectric projects.

Moreover, China’s construction of hydroelectric projects on the river Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), such as the sixty-gigawatt mega-dam, is concerning for downstream states like India and Bangladesh. It will impinge on the availability of water in downstream nations and create opportunities for coercion and conflict. It is important to note that in Chinese president Xi Jinping’s security-obsessed worldview, water is not a global common but a source of leverage to solidify regional domination.

As a result, the vision of a Sino-centric order as a “community with a shared future for mankind” is hogwash intended to mislead the international community from investigating China’s repressive policies in Tibet (and elsewhere) that have accelerated climate change via increased mining of valuable minerals, building “dual-use” infrastructure, and “whole-village” relocation of Tibetan nomads, who are essential to maintaining the ecosystem of the plateau.

The consequence of all this activity is the rapid degradation of delicate environs and habitats, such as wetlands, alpine meadows, and forests. Several endangered species, including the snow leopard and Tibetan antelope, which reside here, are thus further vulnerable. Not only is wildlife threatened, but a recent study indicated that if the prevailing temperature trends continued, the Himalayan glaciers might disappear entirely, “having a significant impact on regional water supplies, hydrological processes, ecosystem services, and transboundary water sharing.” Studies show the Tibetan Plateau is warming three times faster than other parts of the world, leading to retreating glaciers. Thus, the international community needs to act fast not only to counter China’s policies but also to spur climate action.

India & the West Must Join Forces

Clearly, Europe and the West must include the Himalayan region in their environmental strategies since the climate crisis in the Third Pole will soon escalate into a global emergency. Concurrently, China’s recent militarization efforts in the Tibetan Plateau that have transformed villages into resettlement zones, including dual-use infrastructure such as helipads, highways, oil pipelines, road and rail networks, and dams, must be countered together.

India faces even more onerous direct challenges due to its Himalayan territory coming under threat from climate change. In addition, India’s decades-long border dispute with China and the risks associated with China’s growing eco-hegemony, including unrestricted access to Tibet’s critical water resources, are also no less a threat.

Against this scenario, the fast-changing conditions at the Third Pole have not received much attention compared to the northern and southern polar ice caps. Often, the mainstream media, in particular, has focused excessively on the disputed borders rather than the region’s environment, which is relevant to global well-being. This needs to change, and a concerted approach to increase public awareness should be one of the main targets.

More importantly, reliable, informed, up-to-date scientific knowledge is essential to tackle this crisis. That being said, Europe and the West must collaborate with India and other “like-minded” nations to develop scientific programs for environmental and climate change monitoring, including both ground-based and satellite-based monitoring.

Moreover, as the partnerships within the still-emerging U.S.-led Indo-Pacific economic and security architecture continue to take shape, it is important to include the Himalayan climate and geopolitical concerns into the mix. Naturally, bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral cooperation that earnestly works at climate change solutions is all equally vital.

In this regard, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)’s Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP) is a welcome initiative. While it recognizes the need for “integrating resilience” into policies from investments to governance, the Quad must look into including the Third Pole specifically in this ambit. Similarly, the G7’s push to address the tripartite crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution is admirable.

As the group of 198 countries that have ratified the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change get ready to meet for the COP29 held in Baku later this year, new frameworks and partnerships will be needed to scale up climate cooperation, particularly for the three polar regions. This is all the more pertinent as the COP29 Presidency’s plan is based on two mutually reinforcing parallel pillars. The first is to get all parties to commit via national action plans, and the second is to ensure the availability of finance to enable action, thereby reducing emissions, adjusting societies to the effects of climate change, and addressing damages. COP29 must integrate the mountain region’s challenges into the negotiation tracks.

Hopefully, the debates this year will focus beyond energy transition and into the ways to control extensive damage caused by human actions and greed for more resources and power, particularly in politically and ecologically sensitive regions like the Tibetan Plateau. The international community, including decision-makers and the private and public sectors, needs to be involved in regional cooperation ventures in the Himalayas to ensure accountability, maintain transparency, and take responsibility.

Last but not least, the world’s leaders will do well to remember what the Dalai Lama cautioned nearly thirty years ago about developing a “greater sense of universal responsibility” for global well-being and solving environmental problems—words to live by.

Dr. Jagannath Panda is the Head of the Stockholm Centre for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs (SCSA-IPA) at the Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP), Sweden, and a Professor at the University of Warsaw.

Ana Carolina De Oliveira Assis is a Project Coordinator for the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs (SCSA-IPA) at the Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP), Sweden.

This piece is an outcome of ISDP’s Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs (SCSA-IPA) research project titled “China’s Himalayan Hustle.”

Image: Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: The F-22 Raptor, once hailed as the most advanced air superiority fighter, ended its production in 2011, leaving the U.S. with only 186 operational units.

-While the F-22 remains unmatched in air combat, the decision to cease production, driven by the post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism rather than high-end warfare, was likely irreversible.

-Restarting production now would be prohibitively expensive, estimated at $50 billion for just 194 fighters, and may not be justified given the current and future focus on next-generation aircraft like the NGAD. The era of the F-22 might be drawing to a close as warfare evolves.

The F-22 Raptor Is Rare 

The F-22, in many respects the most advanced fighter jet ever created, ended its production run in 2011. While the F-22 remains in service, with 186 operational airframes flying with the US Air Force, no new F-22s will be built, meaning what we have is what we’ve got.

Was ending production of the F-22 a mistake? Probably not. But it was likely irreversible. 

F-22 Raptor: Simply the Best But What About That War on Terror? 

When it comes to air superiority, the F-22 is the probably the best aircraft ever made; the F-22 was intended to replace the F-15 Eagle, which itself has an undefeated track record in air-to-air combat.

Initially, the Air Force had intended to buy 750 F-22s to create a legitimate fleet of stealth dog fighters, rendering the F-15 obsolete.

But the F-22, which was first blueprinted in the 1980s and flight tested in the 1990s, was of a different time. After 9/11 and the reactive invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the US became embroiled in counter-terror and counter-insurgency operations against nations that flew obsolete, ineffectual fighter jets. The US didn’t need a fifth-generation F-22 to take down fifty-year-old Iraqi MiGs.

By 2011, wars were ongoing in multiple theaters – neither of which relied upon the F-22 – the costly funding of F-22 production was axed. So today, while the F-22 is revered for its capabilities, only a few are operational. 

“Now the United States faces concerns about its dwindling fleet of F-22 Raptors that were once intended to replace the F-15 outright,” Alex Hollings wrote for Business Insider. “Only around 130 of those 186 delivered F-22s were ever operational, and today the number of combat-ready F-22s is likely in the double digits.” 

Clearly, the F-22 is not the future of the Air Force. The F-22s, which have a shelf-life, are still being flown regularly – meaning that the end of their service run is approaching gradually. 

“But America needs an air superiority fighter that can stand and swing with the best in the world,” Hollings wrote, “and as capable as the F-15EX II may be, it lacks the stealth it would need to survive an open war with a nation like China or Russia.” 

And while the US is developing the sixth-generation NGAD program – that product won’t be ready for a decade or more. “American’s air-superiority mission now runs the risk of not having the jets it needs for a high-end fight if one were to break out – as unlikely as that may be.”

You Can't Build Anymore F-22s

Yet, the US can’t simply restart F-22 Raptor production to fill the air superiority gap. The costs to do so would be exorbitant.

Much of the F-22 production infrastructure was converted into F-35 production infrastructure, so the plants that used to build F-22s don’t really exist anymore.

“In a report submitted to Congress in 2017, it was estimated that restarting F-22 production would cost the United States $50 billion just to procure 194 more fighters,” Hollings wrote. “That breaks down to between $206 and $216 million per fighter, as compared to the F-25’s current price of around $80 million per airframe and the F-15EX’s per-unit price of approximately $88 million.” As I said, the price of restarting the F-22 production would be exorbitant. But would it be worth the investment? Probably not.

Is the Time of Raptor Over? 

The role of dogfighting has decreased dramatically in modern warfare, accounting for improvements in both offensive and defensive technologies. A pure air superiority fighter was more foundational to Cold War doctrine than twenty-first-century doctrine.

Granted, the US needs an air superiority fleet. But restarting the F-22 program, on the off chance that America needs them for combat over contested air space in either Russia or China, is probably not worth the investment.

Open conflict with either Russia or China should be avoided at all costs, given that each nation is a nuclear power. Making such an investment as egregious as restarting Raptor production to facilitate conventional war with nuclear powers is a bad investment. 

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a prolific defense writer with over 1,000 articles published.  An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, he joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. He lives in Oregon and listens to Dokken. Follow him on Twitter @harrison_kass.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The Mikoyan MiG-27, developed from the MiG-23 fighter, was designed for low-level ground-attack missions with a powerful Gryazev-Shipunov GSh-6-30 23mm six-barrel gun.

-While this weapon made the MiG-27 formidable, it also caused significant problems, such as extreme recoil and vibrations that damaged the aircraft's structure and systems.

-Though intended for use in Europe, the MiG-27 was first deployed in the Soviet-Afghan War, where its sophistication proved unnecessary and problematic. The aircraft's design flaws, particularly those related to its main gun, highlighted the challenges of Soviet engineering in harsh combat conditions.

The MiG-27 Had a Big Gun That Causes Some Big Problems

Optimized for low-level strike operations that were anticipated in a war in Western Europe, the Mikoyan MiG-27 (NATO reporting named Flogger-D) was a variable-sweep ground-attack aircraft that proved unnecessarily sophisticated for the war in Afghanistan, where it was first employed in combat. Instead, robust, reliable, and simpler aircraft maintained an edge in that conflict.

Development of the MiG-27 began in the 1960s, based on the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-23 fighter (NATO reporting name Flogger), but modified for use as a ground-attack fighter.

Modified MiG-23

As the first swing-wing fighter to enter service with the Soviet Union, the MiG-23 wasn't without more than its share of notable issues. It was reported to be difficult to fly and expensive to maintain, while its engines had a short service life. Moreover, it was reported to have an operational range of less than 1,600 miles, while its top speed was just 1,553 mph.

Development on the MiG-27 was protracted, and it ran years behind the MiG-23, even as the aircraft shared major parts of the airframe while numerous subsystems were common to both. However, the MiG-27 was noted for having a simpler propulsion system, and a different nose.

Different Armament For a Different Role

As noted, whereas the MiG-23 was a true fighter, the MiG-27 was developed to serve as a ground attack aircraft. It first entered service in 1970.

For that role, it was armed with a single Gryazev-Shipunov GSh-6-30 23mm six-barrel gun on its centerline, and for that reason, the MiG-27 and its weapon have earned comparisons to the United States Air Force's Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II.

Though designed for use in Europe against NATO armor, the MiG-27 was first employed in combat in the Soviet-Afghan War where it proved far from effective. Much of the issue could be the design of the aircraft and notably that main gun.

According to "alternative aviation" website Hushkit.net, the GSh-6-30, which earned the nickname "Gasha," was far lighter than the A-10's GAU-8, with a greater rate of fire and a heavier projectile ­ it was very accurate and extremely loud. But it wasn't without problems.

It had a rate of fire of around 5,000 rounds per minute, and was able to expend the aircraft's 300 rounds in just a few seconds – and aviators were trained to fire short bursts of just a second or two to ensure the gun wouldn't overheat.

Firing the gun wasn't for the faint of heart, said Indian pilot Anshuman Mainkar in an interview with Hushkit.net.

"The aircraft seemingly came to a stand-still, engrossed with its target – tracers creating an illusion of morse communication. Smoke and the smell of cordite entered the cockpit, and in a flash it was all over…the airframe shuddered during the trigger pull, and surge was a possibility, hence the exit had to be smooth and deliberate."

Mainkar further explained that when fired, the nearly 12-foot-long gun produced around six tons of recoil that practically shook the aircraft apart. The vibrations were powerful enough that some of the MiG-27s in the Indian Air Force service were found to have cracked fuel tanks, broken avionics systems, and other structural problems.

In other words, the MiG-27 was very much a tried and true Soviet design. It may have gotten the job done when firing at a target on the ground, but it was almost as damaging to the aircraft doing the firing.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Sumantra Maitra. The Sources of Russian Aggression: Is Russia a Realist Power? (Lanham, Lexington Books) 234 pp., $110.00, Hardcover. $45.00, Ebook.   

Ten years ago, the borders of Eastern Europe shifted for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine saw its pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, ousted from power, shortly followed by the takeover of Crimea by the Russian Federation. These events also started the war in the Donbas, which, in February 2022, escalated into an all-out war on Ukraine. 

In the United States, this slow-burn regional escalation characterized Russian president Vladimir Putin as a latter-day Adolf Hitler who was attempting to reunite all of the exclave Russian populations under one banner. Dr. Sumantra Maitra’s The Sources of Russian Aggression: Is Russia a Realist Power? offers better causal explanations than allowing politicians to relive fantasies of  WWII.  

In the weeks following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, President Biden declared, “For God’s sake [Putin] cannot remain in power.” There is a certain comfort in believing that Russian foreign policy is predicated on the psychology of one individual. No doubt Putin has immense control over foreign policy, but to suggest that a different Russian leader would change Russian key strategic interests is contradicted by history. In 2008, diplomat William Burns, in an email to Condoleezza Rice, stated that “Ukraine in NATO remains the ‘brightest of all red lines.’” Despite the deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations throughout the 2010s, Ukraine’s entrance into NATO was still being promoted, even as pressure built. Ten years later, hundreds of thousands are dead, millions more have been displaced, and the threat of nuclear war grows with each new expansion of the war in Ukraine. 

Maitra’s book challenges analyses that explain Russian behavior by infantilizing the Russian people and ignoring the concerns of successive occupants of the Kremlin. His balanced and compelling look into recent Russian history investigates when aggression is used by Russia, under which circumstances, and to what ends.

Much analysis of the origins of the Ukraine War boils down to optimism about international law as a tool for peace. In this view, Russia has nothing to fear from the Western liberal world order and hence should not worry about NATO and the European Union expansion on its doorstep. Maitra takes a more pessimistic view of the international world order. Realists argue that the world is devoid of order, and military power establishes the only genuine guarantee of present and future security. The Sources of Russian Aggression demonstrates that Russia’s behavior is explained by Russia’s national interests. However, the fantasy of Vladimir Putin as a senseless madman leader seems to be an intoxicating trope that the mainstream media will not abandon. 

Even critics of the mainstream media, like Tucker Carlson, fall into this trap. His interview with the Russian potentate ended up dwelling on Putin’s thoughts about 8th-century Slavic history. Such statements reinforce the case that Putin cannot be reasoned with. Realists don’t conduct foreign policy by psychological profile. Realists understand that Russia cannot afford to take NATO’s “defensive mandate” at face value. Realists understand that Russia, like the United States and every other country, faces an anarchic world devoid of overarching authority.

The 2014 annexation of Crimea instilled a sense of dread and fear in a world that believed history had ended with the Cold War. Russia took Crimea with barely a shot fired and forced Ukraine into a perpetual counterinsurgency operation in the Donbas. Russia’s inability to force Ukraine to the negotiating table in February of 2022 was a blow to its image as a military superpower. Russia has had to recalibrate its strategy and is now geared up for the long haul. As Barack Obama famously said, Russia possesses “escalation dominance” in the region. Now that the wheels are in motion, we see just how far Russia is willing to go to secure its interests. Russia’s desire to double down in Ukraine rather than retreat despite high casualty rates shows that its interest in this region vastly exceeds America’s own.  

Maitra makes an important case about Russian intentions through a rigorous analysis of its aggression in Ukraine in 2014 and Georgia in 2008. Maitra rejects attempts to explain these events in terms of Putin’s domestic popularity as some scholars attempt to propagate. He points out that there is no reliable correlation between falling poll numbers and an increase in Russian aggression. Putin did not need Crimea to help win an election or “shore up” support at home.   

Realists argue that motivations are external to states, not internal. The Sources of Russian Aggression supports the superior explanation that the path to the current war is better explained through the timeline of America’s insistence that Ukraine will someday join NATO. At the 2008 NATO summit, leaders presented Georgia and Ukraine’s accession as inevitable. At the time, Russia relied on an increasingly reluctant Ukraine for cooperation on their lease of the naval base at Sevastopol. If Kyiv were admitted into NATO, the vital Black Sea Fleet would assuredly be sent packing. Taking this off the geopolitical chessboard would have disastrous consequences for Russian interests not only in the Black Sea but also in the Middle East and beyond. 

Georgia is where the dynamic of overt power-balancing is even more apparent. One of the pervasive myths around Georgia in 2008 is that had it not been for U.S. threats, Putin would have gobbled up the whole country. However, as Maitra argues, from the beginning, it appears that Russia had neither the will nor the local firepower necessary for a full annexation. Russia gained de facto independence for Russian exclave regions and created a situation in which Georgia would be unable to join NATO. Russia gained what it wanted in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, leaving Georgia to contend with adversaries in its backyard and stunting NATO ambitions in the Caucasus region.  

Through the examples of 2008 in Georgia and 2014 in Ukraine, Maitra argues that Russia was deadly serious about threats tied to neighboring countries—a realist demand, not an ideological crusade. Georgian or Ukrainian accession into NATO would strain Russia’s military posture across the entire Rostov Oblast, much in the same way that the Suwałski Gap puts NATO forces at a perceived disadvantage against the Russians.

However, one problem with the book that sticks out is how it deals with the counterarguments to Russian aggression. This is the common objection of whether a different leader in Russia would have reacted in the same way given U.S. actions in Ukraine and Eastern Europe, more broadly. This is a point of criticism that Maitra briefly touches on, but it would have been helpful to give it more space, as it is one of the primary objections to the realist framing of this conflict. Maitra doesn’t address this because it falls under a disagreement on first principles. Realists do not put much weight on the contingencies and personalities of leadership in foreign policy.  

Maitra’s book shows that Russia’s actions on the world stage, much like some of America’s own, have motives extending from rational calculations of interest. Analysts of Russia need not conjure up the specter of World War II but rather that of nineteenth-century Europe. Then, the central concern was balancing the strategic interests of the great powers in Europe. To any reader who wants to get a deeper understanding of Russian aggression, its causes, and its consequences, this is the place to start.

Matthew Bryant graduated with a B.A. in Global Affairs from George Mason University. He has also studied as a joint Graduate student at the University of Trento & the Higher School of Economics. He researches and writes about the post-Soviet area as well as United States-Russia relations. He has been published in Law and Liberty, The National Interest, and The Realist Review. Follow him on X @Realmofmatt. 

Image: Shutterstock.com

Summary and Key Points: The F-15 Silent Eagle (F-15SE) was developed by Boeing as a stealthier upgrade to the fourth-generation F-15, intended to compete with the more advanced and expensive fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II.

-First flown in 2010, the F-15SE featured conformal weapons bays, radar-absorbing materials, and reconfigured stabilizers to enhance stealth and extend range.

-Despite its innovative design and potential for cost savings, the Silent Eagle failed to attract buyers, with South Korea and Saudi Arabia opting for other aircraft. Consequently, the F-15SE was never produced, leaving its potential untapped.

F-15SE Silent Eagle: A Missed Opportunity for Cost-Effective Stealth

Stealth is the name of the modern air warfare game. The harder a bird is for enemy radar systems to detect, the better. 

The F-15SE, aka the Silent Eagle, was the Air Force’s quiet acknowledgement that its ubiquitous fourth-generation F-15 would need greater stealth capabilities to keep pace in the increasingly contested modern era. 

First flown in 2010, Boeing developed this upgraded fourth-generation warplane to better compete with Lockheed Martin’s pricier fifth-generation warplane, the F-35 Lightning II. 

The F-35 is not only a U.S. military warplane. It is one of Lockheed’s most important export systems as well. Boeing hoped to cut into that business by producing a stealthier variant of the F-15 that was highly effective, stealthy like the F-35, but far more affordable than the Lightning II. 

Interesting Features of the Silent Eagle

One of the most interesting upgrades for the Silent Eagle over its predecessors was its conformal weapons bays. These not only made the plane stealthier, but also meant that the bird could carry more missiles. 

All these increased capabilities helped to ensure the Silent Eagle’s excellence in the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses operations that have come to define much of the F-15’s post-Cold War existence. 

Engineers on the Silent Eagle project made some adjustments to the F-15’s body as well. One thing they did was move the twin vertical stabilizers around so they were canted outward by 15 degrees. This modest change added nearly 100 miles to the F-15SE’s range. The Silent Eagle was coated in Radar Absorbent Materials (RAM), and this is where the aircraft was most innovative – and most interesting. 

The reason for the RAM coating was to help reduce the radar cross section of areas of the plane that were simply not stealthy. Remember, despite all the upgrades and changes to assorted F-15 variants, at its core the basic airframe remains the same. There are certain unchangeable features of the bird. 

The F-15 was not originally designed to be stealthy. It was designed for speed. But the RAM, while not making the Silent Eagle completely stealthy, certainly helped cut down on its visibility to enemy radar systems.

The F-15 Silent Eagle Isn’t Wanted

Sadly for Boeing, this sweet new F-15 variant was never purchased. Initially, the bird was developed as part of a larger deal with South Korea’s air force, but Seoul later opted for the F-35. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia expressed an initial interest in the Silent Eagle, but Riyadh chose to purchase F-15C and D variants. 

So neither the U.S. Air Force nor any of America’s major partners wanted to purchase this stealthier variant of the F-15. It died in the womb. It would have been interesting to have seen a small grouping of these warbirds purchased, if not by a foreign military, then by the United States, to see if they were worth greater investment. 

Certainly, they are not as advanced as the F-35 or F-22. But the F-15 Silent Eagle might have helped keep costs down while maintaining key capabilities for the Air Force. Alas, we will never know. 

About the Author 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.