Foreign Policy Blogs

On November 23rd in The Hague, more than 70 European and international experts gathered outside the International Criminal Court with a message Europe can no longer afford to ignore: the Muslim Brotherhood has become one of the most destabilizing forces operating within the continent’s borders. Their warning did not arise spontaneously. It reflects years of intelligence findings, parliamentary investigations, and a pattern of radicalization that has already reshaped the social and political landscape of major European cities.   The Muslim Brotherhood presents itself as a civil society organization committed to democracy and inclusion. But behind this veneer lies a political movement with a well-documented long-term strategy: transforming Europe from within through ideological infiltration, institutional penetration, and the gradual normalization of political Islam as an alternative to democratic governance.   European intelligence agencies in France, Belgium, Austria, and Germany have detailed the same pattern: Brotherhood networks use charities, cultural centers, mosques, community associations, youth clubs, and political organizations to shape local politics, influence policy debates, and recruit the next generation of activists. Their goal is not integration — it is transformation.   Former Dutch politician Henry Van Bommel summarized this strategy precisely at the Hague gathering: A “civilizational-jihadist process” aimed at eliminating Western civilization from within through ideological influence and political engagement.”   This is not a conspiracy theory. It is documented in classified intelligence reports, parliamentary inquiries, and court proceedings across Europe.   Speakers in The Hague emphasized an important distinction that must guide European policy: the Muslim Brotherhood is not Islam, and it does not represent Europe’s Muslim communities. It is a political project. As Ramon Rahangmetan warned, the issue is not religion but a movement that threatens democratic cohesion.   Across the continent, evidence of the Brotherhood’s presence is visible: parallel societies, foreign-financed NGOs, youth indoctrination, and extremist protests targeting Jews, women, LGBTQ communities, and democratic institutions. Interpol has documented over 100 jihadist attacks in Europe over the past decade — many ideologically linked to the Brotherhood’s worldview. Dr. Julio Levit Koldorf noted how “woke progressives” have unwittingly enabled a movement fundamentally opposed to European values.   EU investigations have revealed another alarming pattern: EU taxpayers indirectly financing Brotherhood-aligned organizations, while foreign governments — especially Qatar and Turkey — serve as major sponsors. Belgium-based activist Fahimeh Il Ghami stressed the need to designate both the Muslim Brotherhood and the IRGC as terrorist entities, given their transnational destabilizing roles.   Europe’s legal systems — built to protect freedom — have become vulnerable to exploitation. The Brotherhood uses religious rights, NGO protections, and democratic mechanisms to build legitimacy even as it advances an agenda contrary to those very principles. Tarana Faroqi rightly argued that when an organization engages in covert financing, intimidation, public-institution infiltration, or extremism promotion, the law must respond decisively.   Europe must no longer hesitate. The Muslim Brotherhood is designated a terrorist organization in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and parts of Austria. The United States categorizes its affiliated networks as extremist threats. Europe cannot remain the exception.   A coherent European strategy must include: full financial transparency on foreign funding, designation of extremist networks, oversight of political-Islamist organizations, support for liberal Muslim voices, and EU-wide intelligence coordination.   This is not a battle against a religion — it is a defense of Europe’s democratic identity.   Europe is at a crossroads. Ignoring the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence will not buy stability. It will deepen polarization, undermine social cohesion, and embolden extremist actors. The choice is stark but simple.

The Winter War that started in 2022 between Russia and Ukraine had some very surprising outcomes, one of which being that it is still going on in 2025. The defence Ukraine provided for itself with limited initial assistance from the West showed how effective the Soviet defences would have been during the Cold War. Ukraine’s armed forces and its defences was the barrier between East and West, with much of the Soviet weapons, plans, and systems for protecting the Greater Soviet Union being based in Ukraine. Attacking one of the greatest defensive structures in modern history with capabilities from the late 80s, proved to be as difficult to collapse as designed, even with modern 2022 weapons. Three years later, most of the modern 2022 weapons systems are burnt hulks on the Ukrainian plains, and the great Soviet weapons stockpiles have been stripped and torn apart in war, used by both sides of the conflict.

With Russia depleted and weakened, and its allies in the southern regions on the edge of failing, it remains a question to whether or not a failed Russia would be a better strategic outcome for the West. At the end of the Cold War, the menace that faced the world came about in the form of insurgency movements, supplied by smaller players at the will of larger adversaries. Sufficient attention to terror threats like those currently in Nigeria were effectively ignored, or given little attention that lead to any effective solutions. Today, the largest threats come from internal strife, likely designed to weaken and perplex any solutions, funded from abroad. Even with strategic victories in Europe and the Mid East, the main threat of large military action will come from Asia, and a feebled West will enable a large assault when weakness in leadership is demonstrated in North America and Europe. That claim can easily be made, linking the escape from Afghanistan towards enabling the war in 2022, a pure example of War Through Weakness.

China’s latest demonstration of its military prowess came with the introduction of several long range missile types, married to laser based defensive weapons systems. With the success of the China made J-10 against Indian Rafale jets, the move from Russia being the world’s largest weapons exporter towards China is likely to take shape rapidly. India itself uses licensed produced T-90 tanks and Sukhoi jets, technology that always surpassed China’s military technology in the past, but was unable to give significant advantage in the recent bout with Pakistan. Russia in its weakened state would secede a lot of regional power dynamics towards insurgencies in the South and China in the East, a security problem that could become more dynamic and difficult to address for the West in the future. With so little attention given to smaller regional conflicts, the likelihood of a small regional issue being felt in the West is almost a certainty, with Europe and the United States being target number one by all of these groups. Asymmetric warfare can never be ignored, even when a conventional war is the focus of defense policy.

Russia’s losses in Ukraine has lead to such a massive depletion of equipment, that the most substantial T-72 stockpiles are now likely in the old Soviet periphery of the Caucasus region and by allies like Venezuela. China, who has already taken to replacing much of its modern 2008 equipment with newer systems, has the largest and most modern standard military force in the world. While quantity has its own quality, massive quantities of common tanks like the ZTZ96 are at least equal to a T-72B, and the ZTZ99 variants can match the capabilities of a T-90, with more modern variants recently demonstrated in China amongst missiles and lasers. While the PLA ground forces would most likely be used against Indian forces on the border regions, China’s strategic missile forces are meant for the US Navy and for an assault on Taiwan. Western allies must decide what they wish for in their relations with Russia and end any adversarial support coming from other regions as soon as possible, as the main field of battle is now internal. Without addressing internal divisions, a motivation will come about for the massive army being built by China to advance an assault. A signal of weakness is being sought to continue the 2022 war beyond Europe to go worldwide. You can see it in every town and city in the West, and in every cannon forged for the PLA daily.

Ukrainian Made, Russian privately owned, Antonov AN-124 cargo plane grounded and ceased in Toronto, Canada since Feb 2022 after bringing in Covid supplies for the Canadian Government.

The united front in support of Ukraine solidified itself when the new US Administration’s efforts to bring a rapid end to the conflict was met with drone incursions outside of Ukraine’s territory, into the airspace of NATO countries. While efforts continue to negotiate an end to the conflict, support of Ukraine by all NATO allies continues, with advanced weapons from the US, France, Sweden and others in support of Ukraine’s Armed Forces. With a new funding arrangement since 2024, the importance of a united NATO is likely the only method to end the madness of the death machine that is the War in Ukraine.

One ally of the West, Canada, has taken its own approach in challenging the norm in US and NATO relations. Canada is unique in that is lies at the geographical centre of many world conflicts, and is a key ally that could help bring an end to conflict, or enable a long grind for its allies in this war. Canada is a microcosm of the West in its economy, location and values, but has chosen its trade relationship as the focus of its economy and security. The three pressures Canada face are China in the East, to Russia in the North, and Europe in the West. Canada’s response to the US and these three challenges will define Canada’s next generation of progress, whether they like it or not.

Canada seems to have taken an opposite track with their allies on China, doing little to challenge influences from their regime. Canada is considering increased trade with China to counter trade limits placed on it by the US, while similar limits are currently burdening Canada-China trade relations. Canada has been reticent to share intelligence information requested by the US on many occasions, done so despite the fact that the US-Canada border was at one point the most lucrative trading relationship in the world, and could easily regain that title in a year or two if needed. Canadian elections have been influenced from China on a few occasions, making running as a democratic candidate in Canada something that could hold risk from abroad. The reality is that many foreign actors infiltrate common allies like the UK for its financial industry and Australia for its role as a strong Western ally in the East, but Canada’s close proximity to the US with a largest undefended border is a strategic asset for any regime targeting the United States. While Canadian interests not being American interests may win elections, developing Canada into a hub for the interests of non-NATO allies hurts all Canadians.

It is never mentioned in the Canadian narrative that Canada has a Northern border with Russia. As an ally of Ukraine and NATO, Canada is responsible for defending itself from Northern incursions from Russian territory, especially those involving ballistic missiles. While Canada and the US always had a defensive posture via NORAD, the latest developments has Canada planning to move away from the US and purchase a defense radar complex from Australia. While the system from Australia is likely perfectly suited for Canada, the distance and parts to repair it if attacked or damaged leaves logistical issues that would not exist if using a system closer to Northern Canada coming from the US. Shipping parts from Australia to Canada post-attack would leave shipping vessels open to attack from China’s PLAN and Russia’s Navy, with little support ships from Canada existing to protect against an attack at the other end of the Pacific Ocean. Planes to ship such large parts were often contracted out to companies using Antonov aircraft, made in Ukraine, but used by companies incorporated in Russia. The US plan to produce a Golden Dome missile defense shield over North America may remedy many of these issues, but Canada would need to fully choose those tied in systems, likely not using their Australian radars in the infrastructure of the system. While THAAD type systems would make up the bulk of the first iterations of the Golden Dome, Canada would need to choose a path to keep itself safe as well, while supporting the safety of the US to the south. Radar detection means little when you have no missile interceptors to defend your cities, and most of your best equipment was sent to Ukraine’s border. It is unsure what military assets are capable in 2025 to defend Canada’s Northern Border region, and it is likely the case that Canada’s North is so poorly equipped that it is undefended at the moment from anything more than a slow 1950s era TU-95 Bear bomber. At this point, it is unsure what Canadian assets are defending the North from Russia’s mobile Topol missiles.

Canada’s narrative seems to be ignoring the issues above, in favour of the concept of becoming a member of the EU. While the Canadian government claims it has great ties to the EU, Canada’s own coat of arms shows ties to the United Kingdom historically and culturally, a region that has been divorced from the European Union for a few years. Canada’s main ties to the EU comes from their defense agreements via NATO, and NATO is focused on the defense of Western Europe. European powers would not be capable of adjusting to a defense of Canada due to distance and the vastness of Canada’s landmass, being limited themselves in defending from ballistic missile attacks using a lot less sophisticated weapons than a Topol missile system. Europe currently are tied up defending against drone incursions into Western Europe, and Canada would simply not ever be a priority for NATO.

Canada has its own issues making NATO a priority. Canada was asked directly to help ease the energy tensions in Europe from the Ukraine War, and declined the opportunity to help European citizens. After being openly requested to do so by European allies and Japan, Canada’s Government continues to refuse to take any meaningful steps to help send its oil and gas to Europe and Asia to help its Western allies. In the midst of this policy, Europe sought oil relief from using Russian oil bought from third party nations, only now to see it ceased due to the US targeting those nations purchasing Russian oil and gas. Despite all this, Canada has yet to take any serious steps to support its allies with its energy resources, but continues with its narrative for electoral gains.

The reality of Canada joining the EU comes after a generation of limited and failed trade agreements between Canada and the EU and Canada and the UK, the latter never being solidified due to limitations on access to Canada’s dairy sector. The same limit Canada placed on the US, ended up halting the Canada-UK trade agreement over Canadian agro sectors. While there is a Canada-European Union trade agreement, adding Canada to the EU would be counterproductive as Canada would burden the European Union’s agro sector by directly competing with it, something the EU never permits. Even when accepting new members into the EU, countries with large agro sectors like Poland were only admitted when they agreed to be discriminated against via their agro sector in favour of existing members keeping their benefits to those sectors. Canada’s massive agro sector has no value to the EU, and would be a disruption to local political interests. Europe’s need for Canadian oil and gas has already been scuttled by Canadian energy policy, or lack thereof, so Europe doesn’t need Canada, and when it does, Canada refused to give substantial help, even during the War in Ukraine.

The current policy limiting the sale of Russian energy is one of the best tools for winning the war. Canadian energy could be a near perfect remedy against European dependency on Russian oil and gas, helping all Europeans and other allies as a core strategic asset in the Ukraine War. Canadian policy could greatly contribute to ending the war sooner, keep Canadian safer, and produce a more prosperous relationship between Canada and the world. Canada does not seem to be going in that direction unfortunately, despite it being their duty as a NATO and Western ally. Europe will not seek added detriments from an additional member to the EU if that member has no ability to defend itself internally or externally, nor trade with its allies for needed assets. It is a choice for those in Canada to make if they wish to become part of the productive world, or become a victim of their own short term narratives. In Canada’s case, voting truly matters.

Source: UN

President Donald J. Trump on Sept. 23rd pledged that the United States would lead a global effort to strengthen safeguards against biological weapons, telling the United Nations General Assembly that his administration would spearhead the creation of an artificial intelligence–based verification system to enforce the Biological Weapons Convention.

“My administration will lead an international effort to enforce the biological weapons convention,” Mr. Trump said. “We will do so by pioneering an AI verification system that everyone can trust.” His remarks reflected Washington’s ambition to harness cutting-edge technologies to confront the rising risk of engineered pathogens.

An American Tradition of Leadership

The United States has long sought to place itself at the forefront of biological arms control. In 1969, it formally renounced any offensive biological weapons program; in 1975, it helped bring the Biological Weapons Convention into force. Today, nearly 190 nations are parties to the treaty, and the U.S. has consistently pressed to adapt it to new scientific and technological challenges.

In August, this year, during the Sixth Session of the Working Group on Strengthening the Convention in Geneva, the U.S. again assumed a prominent role. American negotiators pushed for stronger verification, greater transparency, and deeper cooperation to confront emerging biotechnological threats. They backed legally binding compliance provisions, capacity-building initiatives, and expanded confidence-building measures (CBMs), all aimed at updating the treaty for contemporary biological risks. That leadership not only generated momentum toward consensus but also produced tangible steps to reinforce global security and public health amid rapid advances in synthetic biology and AI. Looking ahead, Mr. Trump’s AI initiative is expected to be a centerpiece of debate at the 2026 BWC Review Conference, where states parties will weigh its potential role in shaping the future of biological arms control.

AI Verification as a Safeguard

The risk landscape at the intersection of AI and synthetic biology is changing rapidly. Tools originally developed for protein engineering or drug discovery are increasingly able to model novel toxins or design pathogens, lowering barriers to misuse. With the aid of large language models, even individuals with little biological training could, in theory, create harmful agents or evade conventional biosecurity measures. Such possibilities highlight the vulnerabilities that legitimate research faces in monitoring immune evasion, gene editing, and transmissibility.

Against this backdrop, the system outlined by Mr. Trump represents a shift from traditional state-centered inspections toward a networked, data-driven model. By leveraging artificial intelligence to analyze research data, genetic sequences, and biotechnology transactions, the platform is designed to detect suspicious activity that might indicate the development or stockpiling of biological weapons. In practice, it would operate as a cloud-based network, integrating existing biosurveillance databases and research registries, and using machine learning to flag anomalies in real time.

The U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Biosurveillance Ecosystem (BSVE) offers a preview of how such a system could function globally. For example, when an unusual spike in respiratory illness appears in a metropolitan area, BSVE enables analysts to quickly identify outbreak patterns, assess severity, and coordinate responses with local health authorities. It does so by ingesting diverse data streams—from social media posts and news reports to diagnostic results and historical outbreak records—and applying machine learning and natural language processing to detect anomalies. Those insights are then visualized on an analyst dashboard, providing an opportunity for early intervention before localized outbreaks spiral into full epidemics.

Lai Ching-te(R) greeting the crowd with a crossed finger gesture after delivering his speech on Taiwan’s National Day, October 10, 2025.

When President Lai Ching-te unveiled Taiwan’s T-Dome air and missile defense system on National Day, October 10, 2025, the message to Beijing was unmistakable: Taiwan is done waiting to see what comes next.

Taiwan’s T-Dome, the island’s most up-to-date effort to build credible deterrence against China, is a sophisticated, multi-layered air defense network designed to counter diverse aerial threats, from drones to ballistic missiles, by integrating advanced radar systems, interceptor missiles like the domestically developed Sky Bow III and U.S.-supplied Patriot batteries, as well as short-range Stinger missiles. Its AI-driven ‘sensor-to-shooter’ architecture is particularly noteworthy for its capacity to fuse data from radar arrays and sensors to coordinate rapid, precise interception while utilizing mobile launchers and hardened command centers to ensure resilience during sustained attacks. Prioritizing overlapping protection of critical infrastructure and command nodes in strategic areas such as Taipei, Taichung, and Kaohsiung, the Lai administration has positioned the T-Dome as the centerpiece of its defense modernization agenda, anchored in resilience and indigenous innovation. To maintain operational capacity amid growing Chinese military pressure, Taipei now aims to strategically invest in T-Dome. By 2026, Taiwan plans to push defense spending past 3 percent of GDP, targeting 5 percent by 2030.

The urgency in Taiwan demonstrated by the T-Dome is clear. Beijing now asserts sovereignty over Taiwan and continues to refuse to rule out the use of force to achieve unification. Throughout 2025, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) significantly expanded its operational reach around Taiwan. The Chinese air force deployed advanced fighter jets such as the J-10, J-16, and J-20, which can now reach Taiwan from bases deep within China without refueling. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported that PLA aircraft entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over 245 times per month in 2025, a steep increase from fewer than 10 times per month five years earlier. Alongside its increased intrusion into the ADIZ, it is estimated that PLA aircraft are crossing the Taiwan Strait median line roughly 120 times monthly, marking unprecedented levels of military pressure on Taiwan.

This heightened activity reached a new peak in early April 2025, when the PLA conducted its largest exercise to date, ‘Strait Thunder-2025A’ on April 1–2. This operation, the biggest since 2024’s ‘Joint Sword 2024B,’ further escalated tensions across the strait while politically propagandizing the Lai administration as ‘verminous insects’ conspiring for ‘Taiwan independence.’ The exercise simulated precision strikes against Taiwan’s energy infrastructure and ports, involving 76 aircraft sorties (37 crossing the Taiwan Strait median line), over 15 naval vessels including the Shandong carrier group, and coast guard ships extending outside the First Island Chain. The increasing instances of escalatory activities are part of the PLA’s broader “gray zone” campaign, designed to exhaust Taiwan’s defenses without triggering open warfare. Taiwan’s Defense Ministry analyzes that China is honing such capabilities for a possible military operation as early as 2027, aligned with major PLA modernization milestones.

The U.S. continuously seeks peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait

With respect to Lai’s announcement of the T-Dome, the U.S. Department of State expressed continuous American support for Taiwan’s efforts to strengthen its defensive and deterrence capabilities. Ensuring peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait remains the United States’ highest priority and serves as the fundamental purpose of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1979, following President Jimmy Carter’s formal recognition of the People’s Republic of China, the TRA provides the essential legal framework that guarantees Taiwan’s ability to maintain adequate self-defense capabilities in response to evolving threats. The Act also underpins the continuation of robust U.S. commercial, cultural, and defensive relations with Taiwan. Since its enactment, key developments under the TRA include the establishment of the American Institute in Taiwan, which manages unofficial relations, and congressional mandates ensuring that the United States stays prepared to effectively respond to any threats to Taiwan’s security.

No one in Asia wants a de Gaulle — collectively, at least

In October 2025, Sanae Takaichi made history as the first woman to lead Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, positioning herself to become the country’s first female prime minister. Her ascent breaks a longstanding political glass ceiling, yet her alignment with Shinzo Abe’s revisionist nationalism raises a critical question within Japan’s strategic circles: will Takaichi advance a revisionist, minilateral ‘coalition of the willing’ approach, or will she endorse a broader Asian adaptation of a NATO-style multilateral framework under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, thereby grounding cooperation in historical reflection and pacifist principles with neighboring countries—and in doing so, redefine the path set by her centrist predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba? The emergence of de Gaulle-like figures in the Indo-Pacific poses challenges not only to U.S. interests but also to those of most Asian countries, making this strategic choice consequential for the region’s future architecture.

In September 2024, outgoing Prime Minister Ishiba laid out a comprehensive vision in an op-ed for the Hudson Institute, proposing the creation of an ‘Asian NATO.’ Stressing the widespread post-Ukraine sentiment that “Ukraine today is Asia tomorrow,” Ishiba warned that the absence of a collective self-defense system comparable to NATO in Asia heightens the risk of conflict because no formal obligation for mutual defense exists among regional partners. He thus argued for institutionalizing a new regional security framework, explaining that “if these alliances are upgraded, a hub-and-spoke system, with the Japan-U.S. alliance at its core, will be established, and in the future, it will be possible to develop the alliance into an Asian version of NATO.”

While Ishiba’s proposal reflected his nationalist impulse to anchor any such structure around the U.S.-Japan alliance, his advocacy for moderate multilateralism implied a broader strategic evolution—from the U.S.-centric ‘hub-and-spoke’ model toward a value-chained, ‘spoke-to-spoke’ framework linking Indo-Pacific partners. Critics, however, noted that his essay lacked a clear articulation of how Japan could build the necessary like-mindedness with neighboring states to sustain such institution-building efforts. In his commemorative speech marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, Ishiba offered a clue, emphasizing that future cooperation must be grounded in historical reflection: “We must not repeat the mistakes of steering the nation astray by prioritizing emotional and sentimental judgments over rational ones.”

Growing U.S. Consensus Over Asian NATO

When Ishiba first presented the concept to U.S. security policy circles, the State Department responded cautiously. Daniel Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, commented, “It’s too early to talk about collective security in that context, and [the creation of] more formal institutions.” He did, however, acknowledge the importance of the U.S. continuing “to invest in the region’s existing formal architecture and continuing to build this network of formal and informal relationships,” which serves to prevent allies from retreating into isolated, ‘go-it-alone’ postures through enhanced collective deterrence, rapid military response, intelligence sharing, and joint logistics.

The restrained discourse surrounding a potential Asian NATO that prevailed under the Biden administration has shifted noticeably with the advent of the second Trump administration. Elbridge Colby—principal architect of the 2018 National Defense Strategy and now serving as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy—has rolled out a conservative multilateral framework of ‘collective defense,’ rooted in the Trumpian logic of ‘peace through strength’ and ‘burden-sharing.’ In a post on X commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, Colby sketched out how collective defense could take shape in the Indo-Pacific, asserting that “everyone must contribute and be prepared to bear the weight of collective defense,” and adding that “Pacifism is not the answer. To the contrary, peace through strength is. That is the policy we are carrying to our allies in the Asia-Pacific.” He further linked this message to the imperative of defense-industrial resilience, emphasizing that “the lessons of war are clear: our military must be prepared to fight and defend against aggression toward its core interests, especially in Asia,” and stressing the need for “an industrial base to support it.”

Complementing Colby’s assertive posture, Ely Ratner—who served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs under the Biden administration—advanced a related, though more institutionalist, argument during a recent Carnegie Endowment podcast. Ratner contended that the prevailing minilateral ‘hub-and-spoke’ architecture remains too informal to sustain the level of operational integration required among the United States, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. Echoing Colby’s concern for alliance durability, he urged U.S. allies to pursue Reciprocal Access Agreements(RAAs) that would institutionalize joint military exercises and foster deeper multilateral coordination across the Indo-Pacific.

Ishiba’s proposal has garnered cautious yet growing interest among U.S. officials, who view it as harmonizing with efforts to deepen Indo-Pacific multilateral cooperation by emphasizing alliance cohesion, burden-sharing, and institutionalized collaboration that complements existing commitments without overextending U.S. obligations. Although the concept often faces skepticism outside the U.S., especially from India and ASEAN states protective of their strategic autonomy, some interest groups even within these non-aligned countries may find it politico-economically advantageous.

Politico-Economic Benefits: from Critical Minerals to Unified Threat Perception

Despite its contentious nature, the current Indo-Pacific geopolitical climate is conducive to fostering a unified strategic voice through Asian NATO, especially among like-minded states; China’s rising hegemonic ambitions increasingly manifest in unilateral military incursions using ‘grey zone’ tactics that stop short of open conflict, while its strategic use of economic leverage compels neighbors to diversify trade and stabilize fragile supply chains.

If realized, an Asian NATO would offer multiple substantive benefits: an institutionally stable supply chain network, formalized mechanisms for building and sustaining trust among members independent of regime changes, and a unified, enduring threat perception against China.

Critical Minerals and Defense Supply Chains

Drawing from NATO’s cooperation on critical minerals, the 2024 Defence-Critical Supply Chain Security Roadmap identifies twelve essential Critical Raw Materials vital for defense industries, such as aluminum, graphite, cobalt, and rare earth elements. These materials underpin advanced military capabilities—from lightweight aircraft and missiles to stealth submarine components and jet engine superalloys. With China controlling 60–90% of global processing capacity for many of these materials, NATO’s strategy focuses on diversifying supply through partnerships with allies like Australia and Canada, boosting domestic production, maintaining strategic stockpiles, advancing recycling technologies, and researching substitutes. The roadmap, in sum, emphasizes coordinated procurement policies and market oversight to guard against supply manipulation. Emulating this model, an Asian NATO would institutionalize reciprocal commitments and protect critical infrastructure to ensure resilient, uninterrupted military and civilian supply chains, thereby countering geopolitical risks and enhancing regional readiness.

Institutionalizing Trust Across Regime Changes

Trust among Asian NATO members would be formalized through institutional mechanisms designed to remain resilient across political transitions. NATO’s 32 members maintain trust through nearly a few hundred standardized joint military exercises conducted annually, integrated command structures, and binding mutual defense commitments under Article 5. These mechanisms build predictability and habitual cooperation despite political shifts. According to Pew Research survey data, public opinion in NATO member states remains largely favorable, with a median of 66% viewing the alliance positively, reflecting broad underlying support for NATO’s continuity despite political changes. This institutionalized, recurrent engagement effectively counters fragmentation risks common in informal regional groupings, providing a robust framework that an Asian NATO would seek to emulate.

Sustaining Unified Threat Perception

Most significantly, an Asian NATO’s formal institutionalization would sustain an enduring collective threat perception regarding China by coordinating surveillance of China’s expanding military presence and coercive policies throughout the Indo-Pacific. NATO’s pre-summit polling results released in June 2024 identified China’s ambitions as a central challenge; recent polling shows that roughly 48% of respondents in NATO countries hold an unfavorable view of China, while only 14% view China favorably, highlighting broad concern about China’s role as a security threat among the alliance’s populations. Similarly, an Asian NATO could create an enduring unified voice, with member states collectively recognizing that China’s aggressive activities in the South and East China Seas and its increased military capabilities near Taiwan deepen distrust and warrant coordinated responses.

Future Challenges: Mission Specialization and Public Acceptance

As the strategic option of creating an Asian NATO becomes geopolitically favorable, security experts emphasize the necessity of bilateral Reciprocal Access Agreements(RAA) and Visiting Force Agreements(VFA) among like-minded Asian countries as foundational steps. Public acceptance of these frameworks constitutes a vital test for trust-building. The United States must therefore carefully guide mission specialization to achieve public approval and strengthen regional security cooperation.

Within NATO, mission specialization among Germany, Turkey, and the United Kingdom illustrates how divergent but complementary capabilities build alliance cohesion and trust. Germany specializes in armored and mechanized ground forces, providing essential heavy land defense capabilities anchored in European theater security. Turkey, strategically located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, offers versatile contributions including robust land forces, strong missile defense capabilities, maritime and air policing, and commands key missions such as KFOR in Kosovo, thereby enhancing NATO’s southern flank deterrence and operational reach. The United Kingdom, drawing on its expeditionary legacy, excels in naval power through aircraft carriers and submarines, and fields elite special operations forces enabling rapid crisis response.

The United States has historically facilitated a balance among these members by encouraging Germany’s continental ground force focus, leveraging Turkey’s geographic and operational versatility, and integrating the United Kingdom’s maritime and special forces expertise. This deliberate specialization avoided duplication, fostered operational complementarity, and built the mutual trust necessary for public and intergovernmental approval of Reciprocal Access Agreements and Visiting Force Agreements, which provide NATO with the operational framework for deployment and defense cooperation.

For the Indo-Pacific, the United States should encourage tailored specialization aligned with geography and strategic needs within flexible minilateral frameworks rather than formal alliances. By fostering transparency, interoperability, and joint capacity-building, Washington can help regional partners develop complementary defense roles. Such an approach would gradually build the public trust and political legitimacy required for broader reciprocal access arrangements—without triggering the sensitivities associated with an overt “Asian NATO.”

  From the battlefields of Idlib to the quiet ruins of Aleppo, Syria today stands as a paradox of survival—a nation ruled by the illusion of reform while imprisoned by the same machinery of coercion that tore it apart. Nearly fifteen years after the uprising began, the country is divided not only by geography but by truth itself: the truth of who governs, who suffers, and who still hopes that change is possible. The latest incarnation of power in Damascus and Idlib—the so-called “interim government” led by Ahmed al-Sharaa—promises reconstruction and moderation. Yet what it delivers is continuity: the same militant hierarchy dressed in civilian costume, the same war economy disguised as administration, and the same dependence on violence presented as stability.   Behind every speech about governance and recovery lies the legacy of jihad. Ahmed al-Sharaa, once known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, rose from the ranks of al-Qaeda in Iraq, pledged allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, and later led al-Nusra Front before rebranding his movement as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. His ideological transformation, celebrated by some as pragmatism, is in fact a tactical metamorphosis designed to survive—not to reform. When he split from al-Qaeda, it was not because he renounced jihadist doctrine but because global pressure demanded a new façade. The result is a system that maintains the language of extremism while courting legitimacy from the very world it once declared war upon.   Two successive leaders of the Islamic State—Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi—were both killed inside al-Sharaa’s territory. Such coincidence is impossible without complicity. Either the leader of Syria’s northwest knew they were there and sheltered them, or he lacked any control over his own domain. In both cases, the claim to legitimacy collapses. A government that emerges from this soil can only reproduce the logic of the underground: secrecy, loyalty, and fear.   Within this environment, governance becomes an instrument of survival rather than service. The administrative structures in Idlib mimic the forms of a state—ministries, courts, police—but their substance remains coercive. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and independent Syrian monitors describe the same pattern: arbitrary detentions, disappearances, censorship, forced morality codes, and restrictions on women. These are not the errors of an immature democracy but the deliberate instruments of control. Economic life follows the same logic. Markets are monopolized by HTS-linked businessmen; cross-border trade through Bab al-Hawa is taxed like a fiefdom; humanitarian aid is repackaged and resold. What was once jihad for ideology has become jihad for profit.   To the outside world, al-Sharaa’s rhetoric of moderation is seductive. Western diplomats, weary of endless conflict, see in him a potential partner—a Sunni leader who might counterbalance Iranian influence. But the illusion collapses under law. Al-Sharaa remains designated by the U.S. Treasury as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224. That label is not symbolic; it freezes his assets, bans his travel, and criminalizes any financial dealings with him. International reconstruction institutions—the IMF, World Bank, and UN development agencies—cannot legally transact with a government he leads. Under such conditions, Syria’s recovery becomes impossible. Every foreign investor faces the same barrier: to build in Idlib is to finance terrorism.   The paradox deepens when one considers al-Sharaa’s diplomacy. He now speaks of cooperation with Iran, the same power his movement once anathematized. He reaches out to Turkey and Qatar while suppressing pro-Turkish factions within his own ranks. His ideological compass spins toward whoever offers protection. In that shifting opportunism, Syria’s sovereignty dissolves. The country becomes an arena where foreign patrons trade influence over the ruins of a state. Tehran uses Syria as a corridor to Lebanon; Ankara sees it as a buffer against the Kurds; Moscow defends its Mediterranean base; Washington maintains its sanctions. None of them offer a roadmap to peace.   Yet amid this exhaustion, a new figure has re-entered the conversation—Brigadier General Manaf Tlass, a career officer once close to Bashar al-Assad, who defected in 2012 and refused to take part in the regime’s massacres. Tlass represents an idea long absent from Syrian discourse: that change can come from professionalism, not ideology. His proposal for a Transitional Military Council seeks to unite defected army officers, Kurdish representatives, and moderate opposition under one national command. The aim is not conquest but reconstruction—a neutral force that can secure cease-fire zones, disarm militias, and prepare the country for civilian governance under UN Resolution 2254.   Unlike those who weaponized faith, Tlass speaks the language of citizenship. He does not deny the crimes of the Assad era; he acknowledges them as the price of silence. He calls for transitional justice, truth commissions, and the reintegration of refugees. For the first time in years, a Syrian voice speaks not in the name of sect or faction, but of a state that belongs to all. It is not charisma that sets him apart but coherence: a man who understands both the army he served and the people it betrayed.   The contrast between the two men—al-Sharaa and Tlass—captures the essence of Syria’s choice. One promises salvation through continuity, the other through change. One is anchored in illegality, the other in legitimacy. The first offers a future of permanent militias and economic dependency; the second imagines the revival of national institutions and a secular order. The world, too, faces a choice. To engage with a terrorist administration is to endorse paralysis. To support a transitional structure is to risk involvement—but also to create the first conditions for peace.   The consequences of inaction are not abstract. Every month that Idlib remains under HTS control, new generations grow up in a culture of surveillance and indoctrination. Schools teach obedience instead of thought. Young men find identity only in arms. Women disappear behind walls of fear. Refugees lose hope of return because the Syria that awaits them no longer resembles a homeland. A conflict once defined by ideology has turned into one of demography: the replacement of citizens with subjects, of belonging with submission.   For the international community, moral clarity must precede political convenience. The question is no longer whether al-Sharaa can be “moderated,” but whether the world is willing to normalize a state that criminalizes dissent and profits from chaos. The price of appeasement is measured not only in dollars but in generations. Every compromise with illegitimacy deepens the conviction that violence pays.   Syria’s salvation will not come from slogans of reform or selective diplomacy. It will come from the re-creation of lawful authority, the re-establishment of institutions, and the recognition that no peace can stand on foundations of terror. The path outlined by Manaf Tlass is not perfect, but it is practicable. It builds on existing military structures, introduces accountability, and aligns with international law. It restores the idea that a Syrian state can exist without fear.   Fifteen years of war have turned Syria into a laboratory of despair. Its people have endured chemical attacks, siege, hunger, and betrayal. Yet within that devastation survives a stubborn will to live. The bazaar still opens, children still learn, and music still drifts from the cafés of Damascus and Hama. What they await is not another faction, but the return of a state.   Between illusion and renewal, Syria stands at its narrowest bridge. The mirage of reform cannot forever substitute for justice. The international community must decide whether it prefers the comfort of denial or the challenge of reconstruction. History will not remember who held Idlib; it will remember who dared to rebuild Syria.                                                                

Missile Types Used Against Civilian Population Centres

There would be little doubt from the audience who are watching The Sopranos that when one Tony’s crew is directed to do a hit on someone, that the order came directly from the Tony. This common and basic concept is of course the same in criminal law. When a crime is connected and directed by another coordinated source, the agent committing the crime is the extended arm of the one who directed the crime, as are all agents in law. This basic concept that is understood in many forms does not seem to enter the realm of international relations for some unfortunately, despite it always been a set law in their own legal codes.

When the concept of halting military actions takes place, the expectation is that both sides of a conflict would end their aggression. Reasonably, a failure to do so would illicit an equal and appropriate response following any violation of this agreement. It comes as a surprise that over the last while, the persistent ballistic missile fire and anti-shipping artillery arrives at the end of conflicts deemed complete, and the silence seems to be broken only for a moment despite aggression ever increasing.

There is no better examples of the post Fordow policy of the international community than the silence on direct attacks and abuses against sailors and ships operating in the Red Sea. While Iran backed Houthis continue to normalise ballistic missile attacks into population centres and the targeting of civilians, acts tantamount to the most aggressive of Russian crimes in Ukraine, Western powers massage narratives while their allies sink into bunkers and their ships sink into the Red Sea. The death of sailors by drones and anti-ship missiles shows that when you cease, they fire, and the European Union’s placating of terror to the point of ignoring their own killed and kidnapped sailors leaves little faith that they will protect their own interests. Peace through placating known threats does more to enable conflict than ensure a ceased conflict, and at this late point in the game, its time to start playing. While the US Administration’s efforts deserve every ounce of respect for their good faith actions to end many of these diverse global conflicts, allowing threats to metastasize will eventually destroy any productive efforts and achievements for the Administration.

Western allies are perhaps at their weakest point in modern history in 2025. While a massive push for a multilevel peace initiative took place in Egypt with many of the political actors in the region and from abroad, recent harms from placative policies were brushed aside and claims were made that failed policy lead to peace. It can be claimed that delusional policies can be excused if they fail, as to error is human, but this is not a valid measure. In legal examples the concept of negligence takes claims of lack of ability to the edge of intent, and it is hard to believe that with so much evidence to the contrary, that such a policy comes from a place of ignorance. To this question of intent, any actions agreed upon need to take place with an understanding of allies and adversaries, where adversaries to peace should play no role in the process as their intent will never bring calm to the region. Perhaps this was always the case.

When faith defies reason — and the battle for sacred land becomes a mirror of humanity’s broken order.

By autumn 2025, the Middle East is no longer governed by the old rules. On September 29, U.S. President Donald Trump unveiled his Gaza Peace Plan — a meticulously designed, technocratic roadmap promising ceasefire, withdrawal, hostage release, disarmament, and international oversight.

But the plan failed instantly. Not because of poor drafting, but because it tried to impose rational logic on a sacred conflict — one shaped by divine destiny and existential struggle rather than political pragmatism.

For one side, the fight is jihad and salvation; for the other, divine promise and survival. To speak of “committees” and “transitional governance” in such a space is to speak the wrong language.

Hamas formally accepted the plan, but added “conditions”: Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa are not negotiable; The movement’s identity as resistance is untouchable; Weapons could only be handed to a future Palestinian state; Disarmament would come only “after occupation ends” — meaning Israel’s very existence. Thus, the agreement was symbolic at best, and hollow in practice.

While liberal democracies tried to enforce their “universal values,” the rest of the world built an alternative architecture. BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization now speak for half of humanity, openly rejecting Western monopoly.

The Westphalian concept of equality among nations is fading. In its place stands a new order of competing blocs, where sovereignty is earned, not guaranteed — and where deals between powers matter more than principles. Israel, positioned between faith, identity, and geopolitics, has become the fault line of this fracture.

Trump’s peace plan was perfect on paper but dead on arrival. It was technically flawless but politically impossible. A ceasefire, troop withdrawal, 72-hour hostage release, amnesty for fighters, external oversight — are all logical steps that ignored the core truth: religious conviction trumps rational compromise.

For Hamas, disarmament is blasphemy. For Israel’s religious nationalists, surrendering land is betrayal. Two absolutes faced each other — and reason was crushed between them.

The October 7, 2023 massacre didn’t just ignite war; they split Israel’s soul in two. On the one side is Liberal Israel — urban, secular, anchored in democracy and human rights, which sees the conflict as a moral test. With rising casualties and growing isolation, 66% of Israelis now say the war should end.

On the other side is Religious-nationalist Israel — the settlers, the messianic right, who views compromise as heresy. For them, divine promise overrides diplomacy. “This is our land by God’s decree,” Israel’s Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich declared. Institutions meant to stand above politics — the IDF, Shin Bet, judiciary — have lost neutrality after years of political appointments. Pragmatism is gone; ideology rules.

Two Israel’s now coexist in one state — but only one will define its future. This is Israel’s ontological revolution, which is a struggle between secular, liberal, rational and Western Israel against religious Zionist Israel, which is theological, prophetic and absolute.

 A pragmatic middle — embodied by the army and Likud — tries to mediate, shifting tone between audiences: democracy for Washington, security for voters at home. October 7 shattered that fragile code-switching.

Polls reveal the transformation:

  72% support “whatever force necessary”;

  Support for the two-state solution has plunged from 43% to 24%;

  The line between combatants and civilians is fading fast.

The moral foundation of Israel’s Western legitimacy is crumbling — and Netanyahu, instead of restraining the drift, has accelerated it.

Religious Zionism and Hamas now reflect each other’s logic. Each sees itself as divinely chosen, each views the other as evil incarnate, and each rejects human law. Both sanctify martyrdom, both deny compromise. This is not civilization versus barbarism — it is two theologies of total victory staring at their own reflections.

Hamas’s attack was not a traditional war. It was a trap designed to make Israel confirm every accusation ever made against it. Unspeakable atrocities forced Israel into overwhelming retaliation; civilian casualties followed; global outrage exploded — and Israeli society turned further right. Hamas loses the battlefield but wins the narrative. The far right gains strength. Moderates disappear.

The liberal “script” — human rights, proportionality, international law — has burned away. Neither side recognizes neutral authority. The UN and Geneva Conventions are powerless. Moderates are silent; extremists speak in the name of God. There’s no longer a shared language of reason — only faith and fury.

The Dor Moriah Institute, led by analyst Igor Kaminnyk, surveyed Israelis in August 2025. The data reveal a stunning reality:

  41.1% heard of the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska — and didn’t care.

  28.9% didn’t even know it happened.

  Only 6% believed it achieved anything.

Experts saw existential stakes — Iran, global power balance — but citizens shrugged. The gap between elite anxiety and public indifference was vast.

Meanwhile, Israel’s right-wing media declared a new doctrine:

“America as partner — yes. At any price? No.”

“Dependence is dangerous.”

“Israel must act alone.”

Thus emerged a new strategic reflex — solitude by choice. In a world of uncertain alliances, Israelis are learning to trust only themselves. Smotrich called Trump’s plan “a tragic leadership failure” and “return to Oslo’s illusions.” Ben-Gvir was uncharacteristically silent — but his circle fumed over prisoner releases and recognition of the Palestinian Authority.

  Likud MK Amit Halevi insisted “nothing short of total control over Gaza” will do. Yossi Dagan, from Washington, warned against “creating a terror state in the heart of Israel.” Hamas sources described the plan as “a declaration of defeat,” demanding guarantees for their own immunity.  Netanyahu, ever the tactician, dodged a government vote to keep the coalition intact — approving only the hostage deal. The right protests. Hamas hesitates. Netanyahu smiles. Another day in the Middle East.

The Gaza war has become the world’s mirror. It exposes the paralysis of the UN, the decay of the “rules-based order,” and the shift of the Arab world toward BRICS and SCO. Israel now stands as a microcosm of global breakdown — where faith, identity, and raw power matter more than treaties and resolutions.

Trump’s plan will remain a diplomatic ghost — admired on paper, ignored in practice. Hamas will delay, Israel’s coalition will wobble, Netanyahu will maneuver. The war will end eventually — by exhaustion or by escalation. But the age of rational peace is over. The world has entered an era where belief, not logic, defines politics.

Israel is not just fighting a war — it is acting out humanity’s larger fracture. Liberal universalism has lost its grip; sacred identities have returned to the center of world politics. You cannot negotiate theology with spreadsheets. The next global order will need a new language — one that speaks to the sacred without surrendering to it. Until then, Israel remains the holy fault line of our broken world — where faith defies reason, and compromise itself has come to an end.

A press conference was organized in Brussels in front of the European Parliament by a coalition of International and European organizations as well as human rights and women’s rights advocates to shed the light on the humanitarian crisis in Sudan which is one of the biggest crises of our times and to call on the international community to act now to stop the war and implement a peace plan in the region.

The press conference stressed the fact that the use of chemical weapons by the Sudanese Armed forces against civilians must stop now and that foreign support of the Islamist army must end, particularly by Egypt.

Ramon Rahangmetan Co-Founder of circle of Sustainable Europe, mentioned that “The use of chemical weapons is not only a war crime, it is a moral red line that defines whether humanity still governs.”. He highlighted that the use of chemical weapons by the Sudanese government was determined by US department of State, independent journalists of France 24 and reports from humanitarian organizations and that we should demand accountability and strengthen sanctions against enablers.

Amina Nsenga ,author and women’s rights advocate, mentioned the threat that women and children go through in Sudan and the suffering of civilians under this conflict which is unfortunately not highlighted in the media. Sudanese women are victims of rape, physical and psychological traumas and they are completely excluded from decision-making. The EU leaders must act now to protect women and girls and protect their mental health and well-being.

Journalists and human rights defenders pointed out that after the Arab spring, Sudan fought for freedom and democracy and hoped for a better future for young people and women. However, the rise of Muslim Brotherhood to power destroyed the dream of the Sudanese people of a free and a democratic society. It is regrettable that Egypt which has been fighting against Muslim Brotherhood is now supporting Islamists in Sudan which is contradictory and hypocritical. Islamists should be eliminated everywhere and there is a need to protect the lives of Sudanese people as well as their fundamental freedoms and rights.

Jamil Maqsoud, head of the UKPNP reminded that the world should stand by women and girls fighting against oppression and dictatorship as well as extremism which is the case in Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as Sudan.

 Women rights activists highlighted the need to end violence against women and girls and stop using rape as a war weapon as well as starvation as a tool of pressure on civilians which the SAF uses constantly by blocking humanitarian aid and calls on international community to act to facilitate humanitarian aid which is blocked by countries which support the Sudanese army.

Representatives from Bangladesh, Iran, and Afghanistan in Europe mentioned the need to support secular voices and women’s rights in conflict zones and particularly in Sudan as well as stop Islamist extremism which threatens peace and security not only in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia but also worldwide.

 

In an era when global alliances are shifting faster than treaties can keep up, the relationship among Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan has become a rare example of strategic continuity. Born from cultural kinship and historical friendship, the “Three Brothers” partnership has gradually evolved from emotional solidarity into a working platform of political coordination. Yet its newest dimension — parliamentary cooperation — also invites a closer look at how ideals, institutions, and interests intersect across three very different political systems.   The parliamentary meeting in Islamabad in October 2025 marked a symbolic milestone but also a practical test. For years, cooperation among the three states had been driven by presidents, generals, and ministers. The adoption of the Islamabad Declaration extended that cooperation into the legislative sphere, aiming to translate diplomatic intent into law and oversight. It was less a revolutionary step than a cautious institutionalization of a friendship that already had strong foundations. Each parliament promised to promote joint initiatives in defense, trade, energy, and culture, but the real measure of success will lie in sustained implementation rather than declarations.   To make parliamentary oversight truly effective, the Islamabad framework now envisions several concrete mechanisms: joint parliamentary monitoring committees, annual progress reviews, and performance benchmarks aligned with national development goals. These tools are designed to ensure that resolutions on trade, education, and defense cooperation produce verifiable results—such as the growth of trilateral trade volumes, the establishment of educational exchange programs, and transparent reporting to a standing trilateral parliamentary secretariat. Such benchmarks convert symbolic alignment into measurable governance, making institutionalization not only aspirational but operational.   The roots of this trilateral bond run deep. During the 44-Day Patriotic War, Turkey and Pakistan supported Azerbaijan’s defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity, aligning their voices at international forums. Since then, cooperation has matured beyond wartime solidarity. Votes at the UN, consultations on security, and shared positions on international law now reflect an evolving alignment based on principle. As President Ilham Aliyev once noted, these nations “stand together for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and justice.” That sense of justice continues to frame their partnership, though it operates within the realities of modern geopolitics.   Those realities are complex. The three countries approach the world from distinct strategic positions: Turkey balances its NATO commitments with regional autonomy; Pakistan navigates a fragile relationship with India and periodic tensions with Western partners; Azerbaijan maintains a delicate equilibrium among Russia, Iran, and the West. Their “brotherhood” provides political comfort but not automatic policy alignment. Economic competition, defense-procurement limits, and external pressures all shape what is possible. The real strength of the alliance lies in coordination despite differences, not in the absence of them.   The economic and structural asymmetry among the three also matters. Turkey’s industrial base and diversified economy give it natural leadership capacity. Azerbaijan’s energy wealth provides leverage and connectivity, while Pakistan’s size and strategic location bring demographic weight but also fiscal fragility. Far from undermining the partnership, these imbalances define its realism: each country contributes a distinct asset—technology, energy, or human capital—that complements the others.   Parliamentary diplomacy, though modest in influence compared with executive authority, has a role to play. In states where foreign policy remains executive-driven, legislatures can still build continuity, exchange expertise, and support legal frameworks for long-term projects. Through oversight tools such as budget reviews, inter-parliamentary working groups, and thematic hearings, lawmakers can track the implementation of trilateral projects and recommend adjustments. The success of parliamentary engagement can thus be evaluated through concrete indicators — including the number of joint resolutions enacted, cooperative educational programs launched, or defense-industrial initiatives monitored through shared reporting.   External reactions to this trilateral format are mixed, and any honest analysis must acknowledge them. India views Pakistan’s participation with suspicion; Iran and Russia, both central actors in the region, watch cautiously as transport and energy corridors develop that may bypass their traditional routes. Western partners, including the EU and the US, see opportunities in expanded connectivity but remain alert to new geopolitical groupings that might complicate their own regional initiatives. The success of the “Three Brothers” therefore depends on diplomacy that is inclusive rather than exclusionary — cooperation that complements rather than competes with wider networks such as the OIC, ECO, or SCO.   Historically, the bond among the three has not always been linear. Periods of close solidarity have alternated with moments of limited coordination, shaped by domestic change and shifting power balances. The post-2020 environment—after Azerbaijan’s restoration of control over its territories—offered new momentum. The meetings in Lachin and Islamabad symbolize a transition from symbolic friendship to structured engagement, yet the continuity of that process will depend on how deeply societies, not just states, remain involved.   Looking forward, the sustainability of this brotherhood will hinge on institutional depth. Permanent parliamentary commissions, youth exchanges, and academic cooperation could anchor it beyond the political cycles of each country. Engaging women legislators and civil organizations would broaden its base and translate strategic narratives into social understanding. Success, ultimately, should be measured by outcomes — tangible increases in cross-border trade, defense cooperation, and legislative harmonization — tracked annually by the trilateral secretariat. In this sense, parliamentary diplomacy is not the engine of foreign policy but the conscience of it — a reminder that alliances endure only when citizens recognize their value.   Ultimately, the partnership among Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan is best understood not as an exclusive bloc but as a case study in adaptive regionalism. It shows how nations with distinct alignments can find convergence through shared history, pragmatic interests, and respect for sovereignty. Its success will not be measured by rhetoric but by its ability to navigate friction, expand trade, and contribute to stability from the Caucasus to South Asia. The “Three Brothers” story, now entering a new institutional chapter, reflects the enduring truth of modern diplomacy: real friendship is tested not by comfort, but by complexity.

 

On August 8, 2025, Washington hosted a landmark meeting where Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a U.S.-brokered peace agreement—an event that not only nudged the South Caucasus closer to a durable settlement, but also shifted calculations across the Caspian. Reuters reported the White House ceremony as a breakthrough likely to unsettle Moscow’s traditional sway in the region.   Beyond the headlines, this deal—and the transport link at its core—reframes routes, energy policy, and power balances from the Caucasus across Central Asia. The question is whether the promise of connectivity can outpace the frictions of geopolitics.   A central feature of the agreement is a new transit link across southern Armenia, officially branded the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), designed to connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan. U.S. development rights and operational involvement make the project more than a road: it is a political instrument and a supply-chain corridor rolled into one, according to Reuters reporting.   Ankara publicly welcomed the corridor, emphasizing that TRIPP would operate under Armenian law—a sovereignty reassurance meant to defuse domestic and regional anxieties even as the U.S. role grows.   Meanwhile, Jamestown Foundation analysis captured an important detail: Washington and Yerevan envisage an “exclusive partnership” framework for up to 99 years, with an Armenia–U.S. company managing the route’s business operations—language that Armenia’s leadership says preserves sovereignty over the road itself.   First, TRIPP sits atop a wider turn toward connectivity. The Caspian’s “Middle Corridor” (TITR) has surged as states seek routes that bypass checkpoints. Jamestown noted freight volumes on the Trans-Caspian route jumped dramatically in 2024, with Azerbaijan pivotal to that growth.   Second, energy leverage is at stake. Brussels and Baku have been working to expand the Southern Gas Corridor as Europe pivots away from Russian gas. Reuters and the European Commission highlighted the corridor’s strategic value and the financing bottlenecks that must be overcome.   Third, security dynamics on the inland sea are evolving. Jamestown documented how Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan have expanded security cooperation, reducing Moscow’s ability to dictate outcomes alone.   Fourth, climate and logistics matter. Reuters reported Azerbaijan’s warning that falling Caspian water levels are forcing costly dredging to keep tankers moving—showing how natural limits can undermine otherwise sound projects.   Moscow publicly welcomed the U.S.-brokered deal yet warned against “foreign meddling,” signaling acceptance of de-escalation coupled with red lines about who shapes the region’s rules.   Tehran’s reaction has been mixed: welcoming peace between Baku and Yerevan in principle while expressing unease about a U.S.-involved corridor along its border.   For Armenia, TRIPP offers an economic shot in the arm—but politics will decide the pace. Jamestown pointed to fierce domestic criticism and the shadow of June 2026 elections, with constitutional and legal debates likely to shape implementation.   For Azerbaijan, the corridor consolidates long-sought connectivity and enhances Baku’s role as a transit and energy hub. Reuters framed the Washington signing as both a prestige and logistics win.   The Washington Summit has pushed peace closer in the Caucasus and rewired calculations across the Caspian. If implemented transparently and inclusively, TRIPP and related corridors could redefine trade and security for decades. If mishandled, they risk becoming flashpoints on a new geopolitical chessboard.

 

On 14 September 2025, Shusha hosted the 1st Assembly of the Turkic World Insurance Union (TWIU)—a milestone bringing together supervisors, associations and market leaders from Turkic states under the umbrella of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). The meeting’s symbolism was clear; its economic intent even clearer: align rules, deepen re/insurance capacity and cut frictions in cross-border cover.     Delegates signed a joint Proclamation to re-form the Union on OTS principles, with five founding members and three observers (Hungary, Turkmenistan and the TRNC). The stated aims: structured exchange of expertise and data, systematic formation of reinsurance ties, and a roadmap for sustainable growth of member markets.   The event’s organization—by the Azerbaijan Insurers Association with strategic support from the Central Bank of Azerbaijan and OTS—underlined a public-private partnership model the bloc wants to scale.   Azerbaijan’s insurance metrics offered a first anchor. According to public statements around the Assembly, sector assets rose 12% year-on-year to AZN 2.1 bn by mid-2025; profitability exceeded AZN 80 m, with approximate ROA ~7% and ROE ~25%—indicators of strengthened balance sheets and pricing discipline.     Beyond one market, intra-OTS trade has risen from roughly 3% to ~5–7% of members’ total turnover in recent years—still modest, but moving in the right direction and giving insurers a larger cross-border client base (cargo, liability, project, credit covers).     For global context, reinsurance is about 7% of worldwide net insurance premiums (≈ $312 bn in 2020). A coordinated Turkic risk pool—even if initially small by global standards—could secure better terms from top reinsurers and, over time, place regional insurance-linked securities.     Why a Union Matters (and Where It Gets Hard)   1) Regulatory harmonization. Different solvency regimes, reserving rules and licensing playbooks fragment risk pools. A TWIU “minimum standard”—even if principle-based—would shrink compliance costs and enable passporting for niche lines (e.g., cargo hull, surety, agrisk). Shusha’s Proclamation points in that direction, but execution requires working groups, model laws and supervisory colleges.   2) Data & modelling. Regional pricing still suffers from thin loss histories and uneven catastrophe models. The Union could mandate shared data lakes (anonymized), improve flood/quake modeling and co-fund actuarial capacity. That would narrow the bid-ask spread with reinsurers. (Context: Azerbaijani market growth and reported premium/revenue dynamics signal improving datasets but more depth is needed across the bloc.)     3) Capital depth. Some markets show comfortable capital buffers, yet others remain constrained. A pooled regional reinsurance facility—even with conservative retentions—can smooth shocks, especially for quake-exposed zones. Early phase options: quota-share pools for transport and property, then layered CAT covers once data improves.     4) Cross-border product fit. Trade corridors need portable solutions: CMR/CMI cargo liability, political risk for exporters, project all-risk for infrastructure, credit insurance for SMEs, and health/travel covers for mobile labor. A TWIU-endorsed wording library (English + national languages) would accelerate uptake.   5) Governance & trust. Predictable rules—claims timelines, dispute resolution, and enforcement—lower risk loads. An OTS-linked arbitration panel for insurance disputes would be a quick win.     With trade integration rising, insurance becomes a force multiplier: it crowds in investment by de-risking projects, cushions climate shocks and professionalizes credit flows. A functioning TWIU would deepen the region’s financial market architecture alongside development banks and capital-market initiatives—enhancing the bloc’s geo-economic leverage.     If Shusha’s deliverables stall, the Union risks remaining ceremonial, while multinational incumbents continue to price regional risk on external terms. Divergent rules, patchy data, or politicized claims handling would keep risk premia high. Conversely, disciplined follow-through would let local carriers keep more premium on-shore and buy reinsurance on better terms.     Shusha was not just a photo-op. The convening power of OTS, public confirmation by the Central Bank of Azerbaijan, and a signed Proclamation together mark the institutional birth of a regional insurance project with real economic logic. The question is no longer “why”—it is “how fast.” If 2026 delivers harmonized reporting, a starter reinsurance pool and shared CAT modelling, the Turkic insurance market can move from aspiration to exportable standard.

Soviet made ZSU-23-4, seen here as relics from the Cold War, could be a low cost and effective drone killing system available en masse for future defense.

After incursions into NATO airspace by Russia’s Air and Drone forces over the last few weeks, the united NATO allies have had discussions on creating a mutli-layered air defence shield over Central Europe. This shield, made up of many different coordinated air defense systems, would be a permanent fixture in order to protect and repel Russian and other air threats into Europe. While Ukraine has been able to use most Western and Eastern air defense systems in its conflict with Russia, they are really a patchwork of different modern and old Western systems backing up older Soviet systems spaced out all over Ukraine. While effective to some degree, the mix of systems are not fully coordinated, or have been able to fully stop the various weapons shot into Ukraine’s infrastructure and cities. The coordinated plan is immediately necessary in order to defend NATO territory from new escalations by Russia.

The recent past has shown that extended conflicts are almost always to the detriment of Western and NATO strategy, with the exception of a few cases. The funding of Ukraine’s war effort came with purchases of Russian oil and gas by many of the same countries fighting on the side of NATO, funding both ends of the conflict while asking citizens to fund the war to the tune of billions of dollars. Seeking an end to the conflict when money was being dumped into the conflict would have never produced a scenario to end the fighting. New sanctions on oil purchasers of Russian energy may be sloppy in their application, but it does have the intention of cutting off Russia’s war production funding. Ignoring weapons suppliers to Russia came with the prohibition of technology for abroad for their equipment, but next to nothing was done about the drone threats that are designed as a pure terror weapon. To end a war, you have to first want to win the war.

The Western allies and NATO have a poor historical track record of ending conflicts at an appropriate time. Conflicts that have been dragged into the abyss makes it more difficult to rally an appropriate defense to future aggression. While Russian incursions have taken place, some key NATO allies have actually tried to actively tie the hands of their natural allies when fighting conflicts the West should always fight. The reality of this Quiet War is that it is being waged against common enemies targeting Americans, Europeans, Canadians and Australians at home and abroad. Alienating successful Western forces does nothing but extend their war by their own ally’s hands, and makes a combined effort impossible for their citizens to support. Focusing negatively on those who have the recipe for proper missile defense takes the ignorance and malice of these policies to another level, as its a detriment to allies and ourselves as NATO members in a current hot conflict. To win a war, you have to not work to lose the war.

The Central European Missile Shield requires support from the roots of NATO, its allies, and its core values in order to protect many of the cities we have all lived and worked in in both Central and Western Europe. Allowing incursions and future production of missile threats will ensure a future mass casualty event. Internal divisions in Western nations should be investigated as funding internal strife is as harmful as external incursions. At this point, the narrative is fuelling the conflict further, and this is a key strategic asset for those who want to tear apart the West with their own hand. We currently are allowing this war to be lost.

On May 21st, 2025, Tesla dropped its most impressive humanoid robot demo yet—a slick video of its Optimus robot cooking dinner, folding laundry, and taking out the trash. It wasn’t just choreography this time. The robot moved with coordination, handled tools with finesse, and followed natural language instructions—sparking online comparisons to “Rosie” from The Jetsons, the 1960s cartoon housekeeper who could do it all.

But while American audiences were still replaying the demo, across the Pacific, a different robotic future was quietly taking shape. Backed by strategic state funding and a relentless manufacturing machine, Chinese firms have been scaling up their own humanoid robots—less flashy, perhaps, but increasingly functional. And cheaper.

The question looms: Is Tesla about to deliver the first real Rosie? Or will China’s mass-market “Red Rosie” quietly win the race to your living room?

Optimus Evolves: From Viral Gimmick to Domestic Assistant

Tesla’s latest version of Optimus marks a stark evolution from its earlier dance-floor debut. In this newest release, the robot is shown preparing food, loading a dishwasher, and cleaning up—a transition from gimmick to genuine utility.

The leap forward lies in how it learns. Optimus can now observe third-person videos online, interpret them using computer vision and large language models, and reproduce tasks in physical space. Instead of needing line-by-line coding, it learns by watching—much like humans do.

Tesla says this model is being trained for a wide variety of applications, domestic and industrial alike. Elon Musk claims Optimus will enter mass production by 2030, with a target price of around $20,000 per unit, and ambitions for up to 1 million units per year.

It’s still early-stage—there are no retail units, no delivery timelines—but Optimus now looks less like science fiction, and more like a near-future consumer appliance.

Meanwhile, in Shenzhen: China’s Scaled-Down, Scaled-Up Approach

While Tesla’s Optimus captures headlines and likes, Chinese robotics firms are quietly building something more pragmatic: general-purpose service robots optimized for cost, volume, and immediate use.

China is already the world leader in industrial robot deployment, commanding over 50% of global installations. But in the last three years, its domestic firms have moved aggressively into humanoid and service robotics—deploying robots into hospitals, hotels, warehouses, and nursing homes.

Companies like Fourier Intelligence, UBTECH, and Unitree have each rolled out bipedal humanoids that can perform basic chores, support the elderly, or deliver goods in indoor settings. Some of these are already in commercial pilot use and priced below $10,000, made possible by China’s vast electronics supply chain and vertically integrated production ecosystems.

The difference isn’t just corporate—it’s strategic. China’s robot push is state-coordinated, part of national policy under the “Made in China 2025” initiative. Robotics R&D receives heavy subsidies, public-private partnerships accelerate prototyping, and domestic robot firms are given preferential access to procurement contracts.

It’s not about viral moments. It’s about building infrastructure.

Two Philosophies: Innovation vs. Execution

 

The contrast reveals fundamentally different approaches to robotics development:

  United States (Tesla, etc.) China (Various firms) How Robots Learn Robots watch videos and follow spoken instructions Robots follow set rules and also try to imitate behaviors What Robots Do Take on complex, advanced tasks Perform simple, practical tasks for everyday use Building Scale & Cost Small scale, prototype phase Large scale mass production, focuses on low cost Government Support Minimal direct backing, mostly private investment Strong government policies and funding support Typical Use Areas Factories and high-tech industries Hospitals, delivery, elderly care, and logistics Current Deployment Mainly in development, no public use yet Actively testing in real places like hospitals and hotels  

Tesla embodies Silicon Valley’s moonshot culture—bold technical leaps paired with viral marketing moments. Chinese firms follow a more methodical approach rooted in manufacturing pragmatism and coordinated state strategy.

Reality Check: Are We Living in The Jetsons Yet?

Rosie from The Jetsons vacuumed floors, managed schedules, offered life advice, and kept the family sane. Today’s robots—Optimus included—are still bound by brittle generalization and narrow use cases. They can follow a recipe, but can’t yet adapt to a toddler running underfoot or an unexpected spill.

Technically, we’re on the verge of semi-autonomous domestic robots that perform specific household tasks—but only under controlled conditions. And they can’t yet feel, intuit, or comfort, which limits their value in caregiving or companionship.

So yes, Rosie is coming—but she’ll start out as a kitchen intern with limited mobility and zero sarcasm. Full-blown domestic androids with emotional intelligence? That’s still science fiction.

The Bottom Line: Star Power vs. Industrial Engine

Tesla’s Optimus demonstrates what’s possible when cutting-edge AI, robotics engineering, and brand hype converge. But Chinese firms—state-backed, efficiency-optimized, and supply-chain fluent—may reach ordinary consumers faster.

Tesla might be the one to dream up Rosie. But China might just mass-produce her first.

The future of domestic robotics may not arrive with a viral video—but it may come stamped with “Made in China” and priced for mass adoption rather than headlines.

The September 2025 summit between the United States and the United Kingdom marks a watershed moment in the international nuclear energy landscape. The launch of the Atlantic Partnership for Advanced Nuclear Energy—an ambitious framework for regulatory alignment and joint commercial development—signals a peaceful, prosperous transition to what UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has hailed as a “golden age” of nuclear cooperation between two of the world’s most influential nuclear powers.

From Diplomatic Accord to Market Impact

At the heart of the summit’s breakthrough is an unprecedented commitment to streamline regulatory approval processes jointly conducted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the UK’s Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). This new arrangement seeks to compress the typically protracted nuclear licensing period—from as much as four years to roughly two—by pooling safety assessments and operational reviews. For the private sector, this promises accelerated deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs) and advanced modular reactors (AMRs), technologies critical to the strategic energy needs of both nations.

Alongside regulatory reform, the summit produced major commercial commitments. UK energy firm Centrica and US-based X-Energy agreed to develop up to 12 AMRs in Hartlepool, expected to power 1.5 million homes and generate approximately $15 billion(£12 billion) in economic output. Complementing this is a $14 billion( £11 billion) project to establish an advanced data center in Nottinghamshire powered by SMRs, through a partnership between US companies Holtec International and Tritax and France’s EDF—highlighting the deepening intersection of nuclear power and the digital economy across the Atlantic.

Beyond power generation, the partnership highlights nuclear fuel supply chain security, where US technological expertise and strategic capacity are vital to enhancing energy resilience. Collaborative fusion research—particularly the application of artificial intelligence for high-fidelity modeling, which involves creating extremely detailed computer simulations of nuclear systems—further underscores the alliance’s cutting-edge character. Together, these initiatives are projected to attract billions in private investment and create tens of thousands of high-skilled jobs—positioning the US-UK nuclear partnership as a strategic linchpin in the expanding global SMR market while advancing their shared goals of energy security, economic growth, and technological leadership.

Rise of Fourth-Generation SMRs and Maritime Nuclear Power

At the technological frontier of the US-UK nuclear partnership, fourth-generation SMRs epitomize the next leap in nuclear innovation. These reactors—often classified as AMRs—feature advanced cooling systems such as helium or sodium, elevated thermal efficiencies, and modular factory construction that reduces both costs and build times compared with legacy plants. Their design allows for flexible deployment across national grids, remote regions, or integration with high-tech industries. Just as importantly, 4G SMRs and AMRs converge with fast-growing fields like artificial intelligence and big data. Intelligent monitoring enables predictive maintenance and operational optimization, while their reliable electricity supports energy-intensive infrastructure such as hyperscale data centers—now central to both digital economies and broader national energy strategies.

The US-UK partnership’s focus on advanced nuclear technologies, including SMRs and AMRs, reflects these ambitions. With firms such as Rolls-Royce and X-Energy advancing commercial projects, the UK SMR Consortium estimates that by 2050 these efforts could deliver up to 24 gigawatts of new nuclear capacity and create around 40,000 skilled jobs.

Beyond SMRs on land, the US-UK partnership marks a pivotal step toward maritime nuclear power, poised to unlock a multi-trillion-dollar industry by transforming global shipping—a sector that still derives more than 99 percent of its energy from fossil fuels. Companies such as Core Power and Holtec International are developing floating nuclear plants and compact reactors to power ports and vessels. With the International Maritime Organization targeting net-zero emissions by 2050, and alternative fuels like hydrogen and ammonia facing economic and logistical barriers, nuclear emerges as a uniquely viable solution. 

Strategically, integrating nuclear into maritime infrastructure helps to substantially reduce exposure to fossil fuel price volatility—which has historically imposed significant financial risks on the shipping industry by causing unpredictable and often steep fuel cost fluctuations. Nuclear propulsion also offers extended vessel lifespans—with nuclear-powered ships typically operating for 40+ years compared to 20-25 years for conventional ships—reducing lifecycle costs and improving safety through reduced reliance on volatile oil markets. These advances contribute to geopolitical stability by securing vital energy corridors and strengthening supply chains critical to global trade.

By establishing innovative regulatory frameworks, fostering public-private partnerships, and enabling new commercial models, the United States and United Kingdom now stand at the forefront of transforming maritime energy for a secure, prosperous future—essential for sustaining global trade in the 21st century.

The escalation of the War in Ukraine came about in a significant manner recently when several Iranian designed attack drones entered Polish airspace from Belarus and Russia. While Ukraine has been the front lines in defending itself and access points into NATO territory, the border between NATO and the East is the Polish border. Poland has been equipping itself and readying its people to defend the nation from any possible threats to its integrity and sovereignty. Poland has been the strongest ally in NATO against threats from Russia, and has taken a generational approach to its own defense and that of NATO as a whole. Not only did Poland rapidly displace its old Warsaw Pact equipment with more modern NATO tanks and systems, but Poland has taken to establishing South Korean military equipment production in Poland, producing some of the best weapons systems in the world in local facilities. Poland is due to become one of the strongest militaries in the world, and it has now faced its first direct assault from Russia.

While the attack was significant as an act of war, it was not a serious threat to the integrity of Poland, its defenses, or its people. The reasoning behind the drone incursion into Poland is not known, but there are many suspected reasons behind it, none accepting the act as one taken in error. The debate currently going on in Poland and NATO is whether a strong response is required, and what proportional act of force is reasonable, if any at all. Suspected reasons for the incursion could be a show of force by Russia soon after China revealed its new missile force to the world. This might not be the case as Russia has its own significant missile force, and it has not been used against Poland and has been challenged in Ukraine. Drone usage often is accompanied by a swarm tactic using such systems mixed with higher end ballistic missiles, but that did not take place in the attack. Beyond a show of force against Poland, the drones could have been used to reveal the defensive capabilities of Poland against Russian weapons, as Polish defenses and NATO support all scrambled in response from the Netherlands, Italy, France, and local neighbours. What is clear however is that another possible escalation in the future is probable.

The lingering response of NATO and its allies to possible future threats has done nothing but made the conflict more robust and more likely to spiral out of control. The lack of solid coordination in displacing the purchase of Russian oil and gas until 2025, and those funds not only propping up the Rouble, but funding Russian war production does nothing more but extend the war and drain funds. The dedication to the war effort was ever diminishing when public funds in the billions from Ukraine’s allies contradict national energy policies in many of those same nations. It is suspect that since 2022, North American energy policy did not move to assist Europe in their fight, and in 2025 Canada has yet to adjust its energy policy towards assisting its allies currently in conflict in Europe. To add to these policies, the complete avoidance of targeting or eliminating the production of terror weapons, namely the drone production facilities in Iran, allowed those civilian murdering weapons to spring up in Kurdish lands, Poland and Venezuela. To end the war, it is best to start by actively preventing further conflict.

It is not known if the acts against Poland will trigger a wider conflict between NATO and Russia, but the manner the West and NATO treats its natural allies is as much of a challenge in this policy environment as Russian incursions. Rewarding Russian allies and Russian acts does more to turn the tide against NATO and its allies than to end the war with acceptable results. The narrative of a united front will never succeed as simple prose, as actions are needed in this wider war to end a Third World War. Responses in 2025 is the junction point between the end of war in Europe, or the spread of this war globally. It is that significant, and will start in the skies over Poland.

After the collapse of the USSR, Moldova emerged as a fragile state, burdened by weak institutions and deep socio-economic crises. The 1992 armed conflict in Transnistria further exposed these vulnerabilities. Although the conflict was frozen, for over three decades, it has remained an inseparable part of Moldova’s political landscape.

Moldova today is not merely a small post-Soviet republic. Situated between Romania and Ukraine, it lies at the intersection of EU and Russian spheres of influence. For this reason, every election and political decision attracts serious attention, both regionally and internationally.

European leaders — German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen — broke diplomatic protocol by traveling directly to Chișinău to openly endorse President Maia Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS).

Their message was clear: if Moldova embarks on the path of EU accession, it will enjoy economic growth and even find solutions to the Transnistrian conflict.

Yet this approach has sparked controversy. Opposition figures argue that open support from EU leaders disrupts electoral balance and undermines the legitimacy of the ruling party.

During the Biden administration, Moldova received millions of dollars in U.S. assistance, some of which had originally been earmarked for Ukraine. Former USAID Administrator Samantha Power stated bluntly: “We gave Moldova unprecedented support; we expanded USAID programs significantly.”

But the new administration — represented by Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio — has sharply criticized this policy. In their view, if a nation’s democracy depends on foreign money, then it was never strong to begin with.

The United States is now shifting toward a more distant stance, leaving Moldova’s future more in the hands of the European Union. As elections approach, Sandu’s government faces serious accusations:  pressure on opposition figures, closure of independent media outlets, and restrictions on access to polling stations.

Opposition leader Ion Ceban, mayor of Chișinău, stated bluntly: “They are holding the country hostage. They tell us: if you don’t support us, war in Transnistria may flare up again.”

The government denies these charges, insisting all measures comply with Moldovan law. Yet the pre-election climate is far from democratic standards. Former Israeli Communication Minister Ayoob Kara has assessed the Moldovan situation as follows: “Democracy cannot be sustained merely through pressure from Brussels or Washington; it must be strengthened by the free will of Moldova’s citizens. When foreign interventions distort electoral balance, public trust erodes. What we truly need are equal conditions, free media, and every citizen’s ability to express their vote freely.”

His statement underscores three critical points:

1. The risk of foreign intervention — it may undermine democratic legitimacy.
2. The necessity of strong domestic institutions — the only path to long-term stability.
3. Public trust — the true foundation of democracy.

 Kara’s remarks highlight that while international actors shape the playing field, genuine democracy depends on the people themselves. Moldova may be small, but it has become a symbolic battleground in the global struggle for influence.

 For the EU: Moldova is meant to be a success story of European integration. For the U.S, the new administration prefers distance, but for Donald Trump, resolving the Transnistrian issue could represent a major diplomatic achievement — perhaps even strengthening his case for the Nobel Peace Prize.

As Vice President JD Vance put it: “If your democracy can be destroyed by a few hundred thousand dollars in foreign advertising, then it wasn’t very strong to begin with.”

These words echo Kara’s perspective: one from the outside, the other from within the region, but both pointing to the same truth — real democracy can only be built on the will of the people and the strength of domestic institutions.

The Moldovan elections provide three key lessons:

1. For the West: The limits of exporting democracy are becoming clearer.
2. For Moldova: The real issue is preserving internal legitimacy.
3. For the international community: Democracy cannot be imported; it must grow from within.

Moldova’s elections are not just about one small country’s domestic politics — they are also a critical test of whether the West’s model of democracy promotion will succeed or fail.

Image Credits: Energy Industry Review

Strategic Partnership with the Cook Islands as a Small Step to The Blue Energy Revolution

 

On August 4, 2025—marking the 60th anniversary of the Cook Islands’ self-governing status—the United States secured a landmark bilateral agreement that fundamentally reshapes Pacific geopolitics. This strategic partnership grants U.S. companies prioritized access to seabed mineral exploration across the Cook Islands’ expansive 1.9 million square kilometer Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), while ensuring the islands maintain sovereign control over marine stewardship—a crucial balance that demonstrates American respect for partner autonomy.

The timing reveals masterful strategic calculation. Beijing’s 2024 agreement with the Cook Islands for seabed mineral exploration rights had triggered urgent reassessment in Washington. Rather than ceding this critical territory to Chinese influence, the new U.S. partnership represents a swift, decisive competitive response that transforms potential strategic loss into American advantage in the expanding Pacific theater.

The deep ocean floor within the Cook Islands’ EEZ harbors vast deposits of polymetallic nodules rich in nickel, cobalt, and manganese—critical minerals that power what experts recognize as the emerging ‘Blue Energy Revolution.’ This paradigm transcends traditional green technologies anchored to terrestrial renewable energy, instead harnessing the ocean’s vast untapped potential through breakthrough marine applications: offshore renewable energy systems, advanced maritime technologies, and sustainable undersea infrastructure that position America at the forefront of next-generation resource development.

Recent technological advances showcase American innovation leadership through sophisticated remotely operated subsea vehicles and cutting-edge offshore processing vessels. These systems create integrated vertical transport networks connecting seabed operations with surface facilities—an industrial value chain that promises to revolutionize critical mineral extraction while maintaining significantly lower environmental footprints than conventional terrestrial mining. The Cook Islands agreement strategically leverages this technological superiority, emphasizing rigorous scientific research, robust environmental safeguards, and technological cooperation to ensure transparent, responsible resource management that protects marine ecosystems while driving sustainable economic development.

From Green to Blue: A Unifying Western Narrative of Transregional Pacific Governance Framework

 

This bilateral partnership strategically builds upon America’s broader Pacific engagement initiatives, demonstrating sophisticated multilayered diplomacy. In September 2023, the United States joined the Pacific Islands Forum—representing island nations across 41 million square kilometers of ocean—to champion a unified commitment to a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” This framework embodies transregional governance excellence, where U.S. allies and partners coordinate seamlessly across vast maritime spaces to ensure lasting peace, enhanced security, climate resilience, and sustainable economic growth that benefits all partners.

The forum’s joint statement directly addressed countering “malign influences”—diplomatic language universally understood as strategic concern over China’s aggressive regional expansion. It called for strengthened maritime governance and ocean conservation cooperation, successfully uniting island nations around shared principles of sovereignty and sustainability. This approach demonstrates American leadership by transcending traditional multilateralism, integrating fisheries management, ocean surveillance, maritime law enforcement, and environmental standards into a comprehensive strategic framework that maximizes collective security and prosperity.

Pacific island communities, whose economies depend fundamentally on ocean health and productivity, had found traditional “green economy” rhetoric—focused primarily on terrestrial ecosystems and carbon reduction—inadequate for their maritime realities. The emerging “blue economy” concept directly addresses these needs by emphasizing sustainable ocean resource utilization: fisheries, marine renewable energy, seabed minerals, and marine biotechnology, while prioritizing ocean health, community resilience, and equitable economic opportunity that resonates with Pacific values and American interests.

This maritime-centered narrative has proven remarkably effective at fostering Western coalition strength and unity. The European Union has committed over €350 million to Pacific blue economy projects by 2030, supporting sustainable fisheries, ocean conservation, and clean marine energy development that complements American initiatives. Australia and Japan have similarly realigned their Pacific strategies around blue economy principles, creating unprecedented Western coordination that strengthens collective bargaining power against Chinese economic coercion.

World Bank projections confidently estimate the global blue economy will reach $3 trillion annually by 2030. The Pacific region, containing the world’s largest combined EEZs, stands positioned to dominate this economic transformation—provided governance and sustainability challenges are successfully addressed through American leadership and technological innovation.

Pacific Ocean Resources: Wealth and Vulnerability

 

The Pacific Ocean’s 63 million square miles contain extraordinary mineral and biological wealth that represents both immense opportunity and strategic vulnerability. The Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ), spanning 4.5 million square kilometers between Hawaii and Mexico, holds approximately 21.1 billion dry tonnes of polymetallic nodules containing cobalt, nickel, manganese, and rare earth elements essential for blue technologies powering battery storage and offshore renewables—resources critical to American technological supremacy and energy independence.

Despite the International Seabed Authority administering 17 exploration contracts covering 75,000 square kilometers within the CCZ, commercial mining remains suspended due to regulatory deliberations and environmental concerns that create opportunities for American leadership in establishing responsible extraction standards. Policymakers must skillfully balance immense economic potential against manageable risks including seabed disturbance and biodiversity loss, positioning the United States as the global leader in sustainable deep-sea resource development.

Beyond mineral wealth, the Pacific supports 60 percent of global tuna catch, generating over $10 billion annually in trade value while providing critical protein sources for 12 million Pacific island residents and hundreds of millions worldwide. Pacific coral reefs, covering 25 percent of global reef areas and harboring 30 percent of marine biodiversity, support essential fisheries, tourism, and natural climate resilience infrastructure. These ecosystems face mounting challenges from overfishing, illegal fishing fleets, climate-induced bleaching, and ocean acidification—threats that American technology and environmental leadership can effectively address while strengthening regional partnerships.

The U.S.-Cook Islands partnership thus represents far more than bilateral cooperation—it signals comprehensive Western strategy to secure sustainable ocean resource development while systematically countering Chinese expansion in this strategically vital region. Through technological superiority, environmental stewardship, and genuine partnership, America has positioned itself to lead the blue energy revolution while offering Pacific nations a compelling alternative to Chinese debt-trap diplomacy.

The EAC (East African Community) Global Connect Summit and Expo 2025 will be held August 19-21 in Nairobi, focusing on “Unlocking East Africa Community Markets to Global Business Avenues through Enhanced Trade Collaboration.”

Media narratives about the Global South often center on India and Brazil, portraying them as regional hegemonic powers and key patrons of neighboring economies. While this framing captures part of the story, it overlooks other emerging leaders. Africa—widely seen as a potential future hub of the Global South—is undergoing a dynamic transformation. According to the African Development Bank Group’s 2025 African Economic Outlook, Africa’s economy is projected to accelerate from 3.3 percent growth in 2024 to 3.9 percent in 2025, and to 4.0 percent in 2026, despite global economic uncertainties and geopolitical tensions. East Africa leads this momentum with an estimated 5.9 percent growth rate, driven by resilient economies such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Tanzania. In 2025, 21 African countries are expected to surpass 5 percent growth, with Ethiopia, Niger, Rwanda, and Senegal potentially reaching the critical 7 percent threshold for substantial poverty reduction and inclusive development. This robust performance places Africa ahead of the global average, making it the second-fastest growing region after emerging Asia.

Yet the BRICS-centric framing of the Global South often obscures the role of rising African actors, creating challenges for U.S. leadership. To align the broader Global South with U.S. strategic interests, Washington must intentionally support and nurture these emerging African nations—an approach that reflects shifting multipolar realities and positions the United States as a key partner in building a more inclusive and balanced global order.

Evolving U.S. Engagement in Africa, with East Africa at the Forefront

In recent years, U.S. engagement in Africa has shifted from a primarily aid-focused approach to one emphasizing trade, investment, and private-sector-led growth. The Trump administration’s Bureau of African Affairs Commercial Diplomacy Strategy, launched in 2025, exemplifies this transition by prioritizing commercial diplomacy over traditional aid. Within its first 100 days, the initiative facilitated 33 deals worth more than $6 billion, effectively integrating U.S. business interests with Africa’s expanding economic potential.

East Africa has emerged as a central focus of this strategy, owing to its strategic location along the Indian Ocean—a key maritime route—and its blend of political stability and economic integration. Countries like Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Tanzania are driving regional growth that surpasses the continental average, supported by substantial infrastructure investments, market reforms, and a growing middle class.

Even more, U.S. and East African relations have strengthened in the energy sector. The U.S.-Africa Energy Forum, held on August 7–8, 2025, in Houston, successfully connected U.S. investors with Africa’s rapidly growing energy market. Strategic partnerships with organizations such as the African Energy Chamber and African Energy Week granted American companies direct access to licensing rounds, LNG projects, deepwater exploration, and large-scale renewable energy initiatives. With Africa’s 2025 energy capital expenditures projected between $43 and $47 billion, this forum positioned U.S. firms to capitalize on substantial investment opportunities.

Building on this growing closeness between the U.S. and East Africa, momentum will continue with the EAC (East African Community) Global Connect Summit and Expo 2025, scheduled for August 19–21 in Nairobi. As East Africa’s economic powerhouse, Kenya is playing a leading role in advancing the EAC’s economic integration. This landmark event, themed “Unlocking EAC Markets to Global Business Avenues through Enhanced Trade Collaboration,” is expected to attract over 6,000 visitors, 2,000 delegates, and 400 companies from the region and beyond. The summit aims to expand intra-regional trade, attract foreign investment across agriculture, energy, technology, and tourism sectors, and foster public-private partnerships to further strengthen East Africa’s position as a vibrant economic hub.

Strengthening People-to-People Economic Ties

Beyond official initiatives, deepening people-to-people economic links between the U.S. and East Africa offers a powerful but underappreciated means of engagement. The growing African American middle class has nurtured a financially empowered diaspora increasingly investing in and relocating to East African nations such as Kenya.

Recent reports point to a surge in African American migration to Kenya, motivated not only by cultural and ancestral ties but also by opportunities in entrepreneurship, real estate, and technology. While media coverage often focuses on U.S. political and social controversies, these diaspora communities serve as important economic and cultural bridges—facilitating trade, investment, and exchange.

The U.S. government could integrate these connections into a broader investment-driven strategy. By expanding diaspora-focused funds and incentives, Washington could direct private capital toward sustainable growth projects in East Africa, reinforcing its diplomatic objectives. With remittances to sub-Saharan Africa exceeding $85 billion in recent years—outpacing foreign direct investment and official development assistance—policies that harness these flows could significantly strengthen economic integration and U.S. influence.

East Africa Aligned with U.S. Interests as a Future Linchpin of the Global South

Envision a Global South where East African economies—closely aligned with U.S. strategic interests—take on a central role, moving beyond a narrative historically dominated by India and Brazil. Emerging East African nations possess significant potential to assert their own agency, serving both as reliable partners and strategic counterbalances to other regional powers. By nurturing robust economic and diplomatic partnerships with East Africa, the United States can help shape a Global South where East African countries become pivotal players driving stability, shared prosperity, and a more balanced international order in the decades to come.