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At least 120,000 Georgians took to the streets Monday (20 June) in support of the country's EU membership bid, after the European Commission recommended deferring Tbilisi's candidacy.

Az ukrán parlament megszavazta hétfőn a nők elleni, illetve a családon belüli erőszak megelőzéséről és leküzdéséről szóló Isztambuli Egyezményt – jelentette a Jevropejszka Pravda hírportál.

Az előterjesztést 259 képviselő támogatta a 450 fős törvényhozásban, négy elutasította, 25 pedig tartózkodott. Az isztambuli egyezmény ratifikálását elemzők jó jelzésnek tartják a közelgő EU-csúcs előtt, mert ez arról tanúskodik, hogy Ukrajna kész az európai integrációhoz szükséges reformok végrehajtására – mutatott rá a hírportál.

A Jevropejszka Pravda ismertetése szerint az isztambuli egyezmény az Európa Tanács egyezménye a nők elleni erőszak és a családon belüli erőszak megelőzéséről és leküzdéséről, amely 2011-ben készült el, s amelyet Ukrajna még abban az évben alá is írt. Az egyezmény 2014-ben lépett hatályba.

Ez az első ilyen jellegű dokumentum, amely jogilag kötelezi a részes országokat a nők elleni erőszakkal szembeni küzdelem jogi keretének létrehozására. Az egyezményhez csatlakozó országoknak büntethetővé kell tenniük a pszichológiai bántalmazást, az üldözést, a fizikai és szexuális bántalmazást, a kényszerházasságot, a kényszerabortuszt és a sterilizálást.

A dokumentumot 46 ország és az Európai Unió írta alá eddig, közülük kilenc ország azonban még nem ratifikálta. Az ukrán ratifikáció elsősorban azért csúszott mostanáig, mert az egyházak és a konzervatív politikusok tiltakoztak a dokumentumban használt “gender” kifejezés ellen. Több olyan uniós tagállam is van, például Magyarország, amelyek aláírták, de egyelőre nem ratifikálták az egyezményt.

 

The post Az ukrán parlament ratifikálta az Isztambuli Egyezményt appeared first on .

A múlt héten azon agyaltam, hogy mi van, ha Emmanuel Macron azért kampányol ilyen pocsékul, mert nem is akar stabil ----> tovább olvasok!

The post Mégis elnöki arrogancia? appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

Written by Katrien Luyten with Alessia Rossi.

In 1987, the United Nations General Assembly decided that every year 26 June should mark International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking. The idea was to demonstrate its commitment to the fight against drug abuse, illicit production and trafficking, and their nefarious effects on individuals and on society as whole. The illicit drug market generates huge profits for organised crime, and is estimated to be the source of approximately one fifth of global crime proceeds.

Background

The illicit drug market has long been the largest criminal market in the EU, reaching an estimated minimum retail value of €30 billion a year. Illicit drugs are also the preferred market for organised crime groups, eager to accumulate wealth by whatever means necessary. Their use of violence has intensified in recent years as they seek to intimidate other drug suppliers identified as rivals.

Europe is globally considered an important market for drugs, both in terms of domestic production and as a transit point or trafficking destination from other countries around the world. South America, west Asia, and North Africa are major drug-trafficking corridors into Europe. Cannabis and synthetic pharmaceuticals are also produced increasingly within Europe. According to the 2022 European Drug Report issued by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), cannabis is the illicit drug most used in the EU (used by 78.6 million adults) – followed by cocaine (14.4 million), MDMA (10.6 million) and amphetamines (8.9 million). The same report estimates that around 83.4 million or 29 % of adults (aged 15 to 64) have used illicit drugs at least once. According to estimates provided in the report, at least 5 800 people died of an overdose involving illicit drugs in the EU in 2020, up 12 % from 2019. Although overdose deaths increased in nearly all age categories, the highest increase (82 %) was among the 50-plus age group. Opioids, mainly heroin or its metabolites, often in combination with other substances, were found in 74 % of all fatal overdoses; furthermore, of all those entering drug treatment in Europe in 2020, 28 % did so with opioids as their primary drug.

Criminal groups not only adapt their supply to society’s demand but are also flexible in adapting and capitalising on changes in the environment in which they operate, creating additional challenges for law enforcement. In this regard, innovation in drug production, trafficking methods, and the related use of anonymised services for secure communications are a fertile breeding ground for the establishment of new trafficking routes and the growth of online markets, on both the surface web and the darknet. Drug sales using social media and instant messaging apps are attractive to potential customers and may be on the increase, as these technologies are perceived as a safer, more convenient and more accessible source of supply. These new methods were refined during the Covid-19 crisis, against which this market has been extremely resilient.

According to the EMCDDA report, levels of drug availability and use increased across the EU in 2021 compared with 2020, with some variations depending on the substance and the Member State. This points to a return to the pre-pandemic drug situation. In addition, the drug market can be influenced by significant international developments. Geopolitical tensions, determining the attractiveness of a specific border region or sector for criminals, are considered an opportunity for organised crime groups. In this regard, the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and the war in Ukraine may also have an impact in the medium and long terms on the kinds of drug problems facing the European Union.

EU action against drug abuse and illicit trafficking

The drug market not only inflicts substantial harm on millions of people, it also infiltrates and undermines public institutions, health and safety, the environment and labour productivity. For all these reasons and many others, the EU has been active in pursuing strategic and operational measures since the 1985 Schengen Agreement and 1990 Schengen Convention. Member States have been increasingly reliant on cross-border and EU cooperation to support their law enforcement authorities on the ground and to counter transnational drug operations. The constant goal is to reduce drug supply and demand by working closely with all partners at national and international level, EU institutions, bodies and agencies, as well as civil society organisations. Justice and home affairs EU agencies, such as the EMCDDA, Europol and Eurojust, play a central role in the drugs field, in the EU and internationally.

It is worth mentioning that the Council of the EU recently adopted a general approach on the new mandate of the European Drugs Agency, which aims to transform the current EMCDDA into a fully fledged agency and to respond more effectively to the new health and safety challenges posed by illicit drugs. Once adopted by the co-legislators, the Commission proposal put forward in January 2022, will enable the Agency, amongst other things, to issue alerts for particularly dangerous substances put on the market; to set up a network of forensic and toxicological laboratories; to carry out awareness and prevention campaigns at EU level; develop research in a more systematic way on drug markets and drug supply, and also support the EU policy against drug trafficking and drug consumption at international level.

Through the EU drugs strategy, the EU coordinates evidence-based, balanced and integrated measures with EU countries, and speaks with one voice internationally. In 2020, the Council of the EU approved the EU’s 2021-2025 drugs strategy, which builds on input from the Commission communication on an EU agenda and action plan on drugs for 2021 to 2025 – adopted in July 2020 as part of the new 2020-2025 security union strategy. The strategy aims to ensure a high level of health protection, social stability and security, while also contributing to awareness-raising. Moreover, it places EU responses to organised crime and drugs problems at the centre of the EU policy agenda – also dovetailing with the applicable goals of the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.

Law enforcement action against drug trafficking is coordinated through EMPACT (the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats). This is a security initiative, driven by EU Member States, to identify, prioritise and address threats posed by organised and serious international crime and has become a permanent instrument, as set out in the Council conclusions on the permanent continuation of the EU policy cycle for organised and serious international crime: EMPACT 2022+.

Relatively few EU legislative acts have been adopted in this area. Along with the Council implementing decisions to ban new psychoactive substances, these include:

• Directive (EU) 2017/2103 on adding new psychoactive substances to the definition of ‘drug’, amending Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA and repealing Council Decision 2005/387/JHA;
• Regulation (EU) 2017/2101 amending Regulation (EC) No 1920/2006 on information exchange on, and an early warning system and risk assessment procedure for, new psychoactive substances; and
• Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1737 amending Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 and Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 as regards the inclusion of certain drug precursors in the list of scheduled substances.

European Parliament

Parliament has been very active in addressing the problem of illicit drug control across the entire EU for many years. Already back in 1986, Parliament adopted a resolution calling on the Council to address the drug problem at ‘all levels from production and supply to demand and consumption’. In its 2020 resolution on the EU security union strategy, Parliament called for increased focus on rehabilitation and prevention in the EU action plan, not least through awareness-raising campaigns dedicated especially to children and young people. Parliament once again stressed that attention should be paid to both drug production and consumption and called for the extension of the EMCDDA’s mandate to cover multiple addictions.

Read this at a glance note on ‘International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

“Katasztrofális eredményt ért el az Emmanuel Macron köztársasági elnök nevével fémjelzett Ensemble gyűjtőmozgalom a vasárnapi nemzetgyűlési választás második fordulójában. Ahhoz, ----> tovább olvasok!

The post Mi történt vasárnap? (Elemzésem a 24.hu-nak) appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

The summer when air travel was supposed to return to normal after a two-year pandemic vacuum is in danger of becoming the summer when the high-volume, low-cost air travel model broke down - at least in Europe's sprawling integrated market.

By Anis Chowdhury and Jomo Kwame Sundaram
SYDNEY and KUALA LUMPUR, Jun 21 2022 (IPS)

After decades of rejecting international tax cooperation under multilateral auspices, rich countries have finally agreed. But, by insisting on their own terms, progressive corporate income tax remains distant.

Tax avoidance and evasion by transnational corporations (TNCs) are facilitated by ‘tax havens’ – jurisdictions with very low ‘effective’ taxation rates. Intense competition among developing countries to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) makes things worse.

Anis Chowdhury

Developing countries need tax revenue most, but they will lose more, as a share of GDP, than wealthy countries. But a global minimum corporate (income) tax rate (GMCTR) can become a “game changer” undermining tax havens.

Minimal minimum rate
TNCs exploit legal loopholes to avoid or minimize tax liabilities. Such practices are referred to as ‘base erosion and profit shifting’ (BEPS).

Tax havens collectively cost governments US$500–600bn yearly in lost revenue. Low-income countries (LICs) will lose some US$200bn, more than the foreign aid, of around US$150bn, they receive annually.

Corporate income tax represents 15% of total tax revenue in Africa and Latin America, compared to 9% in OECD countries. Developing countries’ greater reliance on this tax means they suffer disproportionately more from BEPS.

A GMCTR requires TNCs to pay tax on their worldwide income. This discourages hiding profits in tax havens. The Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation (ICRICT) recommended a 25% GMCTR.

This 25% rate was around the current GDP-weighted average statutory corporate tax rate for 180 countries. Slightly below the OECD countries’ average, it is much less than the developing countries’ average. So, a GMCTR below 25% implies major revenue losses for most developing countries.

To reverse President Trump’s 2017 tax cut, the Biden administration proposed, in April 2021, to tax foreign corporate income at 21%. In June, the G7 agreed to a 15% GMCTR, endorsed by G20 finance ministers in July. This poor G7 rate is now sold as a “ground-breaking” tax deal.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Unsurprisingly, the World Bank President also rejected 21% as too high. The Bank has long promoted ‘race-to-the-bottom’ host country tax competition. Embarrassingly, its Doing Business Report was ‘suspended’ indefinitely in 2021 after its politically motivated data manipulation was exposed.

The OECD also wants to distribute taxing rights and revenue by sales, and not where their goods and services are produced. Critics, including The Economist, have pointed out that large rich economies would gain most. Small and poor developing economies, particularly those hosting TNC production, will lose out.

The OECD proposals could reduce small developing economies’ (SDEs) tax bases by 3%, while four-fifths of the revenue would likely go to high income countries (HICs). Hence, developing countries prefer revenue distribution by contribution to production, e.g., employees, rather than sales.

Undemocratic inclusion
Developing countries have never had a meaningful say in international tax matters. G20 members should have asked multilateral organizations, such as the UN and the IMF, which the G7 dominated OECD has long blocked.

Instead, the G20 BEPS initiative asked the OECD to work out its rules. After decades of keeping developing countries out of tax governance, its compromise Inclusive Framework on BEPS (IF) promotes lop-sided international tax cooperation.

Developing countries were only involved “after the agenda had been set, the action points were agreed on, the content of the initiatives had been decided and the final reports were delivered”.

Developing countries have been allowed to engage with OECD and G20 members, supposedly “on an equal footing”, to develop some BEPS standards. To become an IF member, a country or jurisdiction must first commit to the BEPS outcome.

Thus, the non-OECD, non-G20 countries must enforce a policy framework they had little role in designing. Unsurprisingly, with little real choice or voice, the 15% GMCTR was agreed to, in October 2021, by 136 of the 141 IF members.

FDI vs taxes
The proposed OECD tax reforms are supposed to be implemented from 2023 or 2024. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Investment Division recognizes it will have major implications for international investment and investment policies affecting developing countries.

UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2022, on International tax reforms and sustainable investment, offers guidance for developing country policymakers to navigate the complex new rules and to adjust their investment and fiscal strategies.

Committed to promoting investments in the real economy, especially by FDI, UNCTAD recognizes most developing countries lack the technical capacity to address the complex tax proposal. Implementing BEPS reports and related documents via legislation will be difficult, especially for LICs.

Existing investment treaty commitments also constrain fiscal policy reform. “The tax revenue implications for developing countries of constraints posed by international investment agreements (IIA) are a major cause for concern”, the Report notes.

Although tax regimes influence investment decisions, tax incentives are far from being the most important factor. Other factors – such as political stability, legal and regulatory environments, skills and infrastructure quality – are more significant.

Nonetheless, tax incentives have been important for FDI promotion. Such incentives inter alia include tax holidays, accelerated depreciation and ‘loss carry-forward’ provisions – reducing tax liability by allowing past losses to offset current profits.

With the GMCTR, many tax incentives will be less attractive to much FDI. Tax incentives will be affected to varying degrees, depending on their features. UNCTAD estimates productive cross-border investments could decline by 2%.

Hence, policymakers will need to review their incentives for both existing and new investors. The GMCTR may prevent developing countries from offering fiscal inducements to promote desired investments, including locational, sectoral, industry or even employment-creating incentives.

Investors rule
With generally lower rates, ‘top-up taxes’ could significantly augment SDEs’ revenue. Top-up taxes would apply to profits in any jurisdiction where the effective tax rate falls below the minimum 15% rate. This ensures large TNCs pay a minimum income tax in every jurisdiction where they operate.

However, host countries may be prevented by IIAs – especially Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions – from imposing ‘top-up taxes’. If so, they will be imposed by TNCs’ mainly rich ‘home countries’.

Thus, FDI-hosting countries would lose tax revenue without benefiting by attracting more FDI. Existing IIAs – of the type found in most developing countries – are likely to be problematic.

Hence, the GMCTR’s implications are very important for FDI promotion policies. Reduced competition from low-tax locations could benefit developing economies, but other implications may be more relevant.

As FDI competition relies less on tax incentives, developing countries will need to focus on other determinants, such as supplies of skilled labour, reliable energy and good infrastructure. However, many cannot afford the significant upfront financial commitments required to do so.

Many important details of reforms required still need to be clarified. Thus, developing countries must strengthen their cooperation and technical capabilities to more effectively negotiate GMCTR reform details. This is crucial to ‘cut losses’, to minimize the regressive consequences of this supposedly progressive tax reform.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Sønderborg, a small Danish town lying just beyond the border with Germany, is a living example of a possible future for decarbonised towns – and a blueprint for study by policymakers the world over.

Kopenhagen hat seine Meinung geändert und unterstützt nun die EU-Erweiterung, insbesondere für die Ukraine.

Ein Kooperationsvertrag zwischen der Universität Helsinki und dem Konfuzius-Institut wird gekündigt, nachdem dem Institut vorgeworfen wurde, chinesische Soft Power zu fördern, Spionage zu betreiben und Diskussionen über Tibet zu behindern.

Die Mitgliedsstaaten der Drei-Meeres-Initiative (3SI) haben der Ukraine den Status eines teilnehmenden Partners der Gruppe zuerkannt und unterstützen ihre Bemühungen um einen EU-Beitritt.

Ukrainians eagerly await the decision of the EU summit, fully supporting the reforms demanded by the European Commission for the country’s EU accession, writes Roman Rukomeda.

Die Niederlande wollen in den kommenden Monaten Kohlekraftwerke betreiben, um Gas für den kommenden Winter zu sichern, wie Dutch News berichtete.

Dans une déclaration commune, le Parti socialiste (PS), Europe Ecologie-Les Verts (EELV) et le Parti communiste français (PCF) ont opposé un refus à la proposition de Jean-Luc Mélenchon, formulée lundi (20 juin), de former un groupe parlementaire commun.

La présidence tchèque de l’Union européenne ne refusera pas un appel à la Convention de Vienne sur les traités si la volonté de modification de ces derniers est forte, a déclaré le ministre tchèque des Affaires européennes, Mikuláš Bek.

Copenhague déclare désormais soutenir l’élargissement de l’UE, en particulier celui à l’Ukraine, alors que les dirigeants européens doivent bientôt se réunir à Bruxelles pour décider de l’avenir du bloc. Cela marque un changement de position clair de la part du Danemark.

In today’s edition of the Capitals, find out more about Kosovo being cautiously hopeful for visa liberalisation, Italian regions considering a state of calamity over drought, and so much more.

Despite not being known for its ecological ambitions, Czechia wants to make climate and the environment the drivers of its upcoming EU Council presidency.

Die tschechische Ratspräsidentschaft werde die Einberufung eines Konvents zur Öffnung der Verträge nicht verhindern, wenn es einen "starken Willen" dafür gibt, sagte der Minister für EU-Angelegenheiten, Mikuláš Bek, am Montag auf einer Pressekonferenz.