State fragility has remained a pressing challenge for international security and development policymakers for more than two decades. However, international engagement in fragile states has often failed, in part due to a lack of understanding about what constitutes state fragility. Established quantitative models usually rank fragile states on one-dimensional scales ranging from stable to highly fragile. This puts states characterised by very different problems and dimensions of fragility into the same “box”. Moreover, categorisations such as “fragile”, “weak”, “failed” or “collapsed” are increasingly rejected in the Global South, thereby hampering international development and security cooperation. The “Constellations of State Fragility” model, developed at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), provides a more differentiated model to measure state fragility. It assesses state fragility along three continuous dimensions, assuming that state fragility is a continuous trait that affects all states to some degree: authority, capacity and legitimacy. These dimensions are not aggregated into a one-dimensional index. Instead, the model detects typical constellations across these dimensions. In so doing, it also accounts for the fact that states can perform very differently in different dimensions. Our analysis yields three main insights about what constitutes state fragility and how it can be addressed: first, state fragility, illiberalism, repression and human rights violations are interrelated; second, state fragility is not unique to the Global South, with negative trends also occurring in the Global North; and, third, differentiated, multi-dimensional models offer better starting points for addressing state fragility than one-dimensional ones. We conclude with four policy recommendations:
• Improve analytical capacity by adopting a differentiated view of state fragility: International security and development policymakers would benefit from more fine-grained, differentiated assessments of state fragility. In addition, country-specific assessments of the specific local power constellations in which fragile state institutions are embedded are needed for devising adequate, context-sensitive measures.
• Connect measures to address fragility with democracy protection and the protection of human rights: Illiberalism, human rights violations and repression correlate with state fragility. This also suggests that there is a close relationship between autocracy, autocratisation and fragility. Accordingly, measures to address fragility, democracy support and efforts to protect human rights must be better connected. This also implies doing “no harm to democracy” (Leininger, 2023, p. 2).
• Identify conditions under which state-building can (or cannot) be pursued: It would be fruitful if international security and development policymakers engaged in thorough discussions about the conditions under which state-building can be pursued. Where existing state institutions are legitimate, they should be supported. However, donor coherence and the capacity (and political will) of donors to commit resources to fragile states and to engage long-term are also important preconditions. State-building is both a costly and a long-term endeavour.
• Learning across world regions: Patterns of state fragility can be highly similar, despite geographical distance. In particular, rising illiberalism and increasing attacks on civil liberties are global phenomena. Hence, policy decision-makers and civil society organisations (CSOs) seeking to counter fragility should engage in mutual learning across the North/South divide.
State fragility has remained a pressing challenge for international security and development policymakers for more than two decades. However, international engagement in fragile states has often failed, in part due to a lack of understanding about what constitutes state fragility. Established quantitative models usually rank fragile states on one-dimensional scales ranging from stable to highly fragile. This puts states characterised by very different problems and dimensions of fragility into the same “box”. Moreover, categorisations such as “fragile”, “weak”, “failed” or “collapsed” are increasingly rejected in the Global South, thereby hampering international development and security cooperation. The “Constellations of State Fragility” model, developed at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), provides a more differentiated model to measure state fragility. It assesses state fragility along three continuous dimensions, assuming that state fragility is a continuous trait that affects all states to some degree: authority, capacity and legitimacy. These dimensions are not aggregated into a one-dimensional index. Instead, the model detects typical constellations across these dimensions. In so doing, it also accounts for the fact that states can perform very differently in different dimensions. Our analysis yields three main insights about what constitutes state fragility and how it can be addressed: first, state fragility, illiberalism, repression and human rights violations are interrelated; second, state fragility is not unique to the Global South, with negative trends also occurring in the Global North; and, third, differentiated, multi-dimensional models offer better starting points for addressing state fragility than one-dimensional ones. We conclude with four policy recommendations:
• Improve analytical capacity by adopting a differentiated view of state fragility: International security and development policymakers would benefit from more fine-grained, differentiated assessments of state fragility. In addition, country-specific assessments of the specific local power constellations in which fragile state institutions are embedded are needed for devising adequate, context-sensitive measures.
• Connect measures to address fragility with democracy protection and the protection of human rights: Illiberalism, human rights violations and repression correlate with state fragility. This also suggests that there is a close relationship between autocracy, autocratisation and fragility. Accordingly, measures to address fragility, democracy support and efforts to protect human rights must be better connected. This also implies doing “no harm to democracy” (Leininger, 2023, p. 2).
• Identify conditions under which state-building can (or cannot) be pursued: It would be fruitful if international security and development policymakers engaged in thorough discussions about the conditions under which state-building can be pursued. Where existing state institutions are legitimate, they should be supported. However, donor coherence and the capacity (and political will) of donors to commit resources to fragile states and to engage long-term are also important preconditions. State-building is both a costly and a long-term endeavour.
• Learning across world regions: Patterns of state fragility can be highly similar, despite geographical distance. In particular, rising illiberalism and increasing attacks on civil liberties are global phenomena. Hence, policy decision-makers and civil society organisations (CSOs) seeking to counter fragility should engage in mutual learning across the North/South divide.
State fragility has remained a pressing challenge for international security and development policymakers for more than two decades. However, international engagement in fragile states has often failed, in part due to a lack of understanding about what constitutes state fragility. Established quantitative models usually rank fragile states on one-dimensional scales ranging from stable to highly fragile. This puts states characterised by very different problems and dimensions of fragility into the same “box”. Moreover, categorisations such as “fragile”, “weak”, “failed” or “collapsed” are increasingly rejected in the Global South, thereby hampering international development and security cooperation. The “Constellations of State Fragility” model, developed at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), provides a more differentiated model to measure state fragility. It assesses state fragility along three continuous dimensions, assuming that state fragility is a continuous trait that affects all states to some degree: authority, capacity and legitimacy. These dimensions are not aggregated into a one-dimensional index. Instead, the model detects typical constellations across these dimensions. In so doing, it also accounts for the fact that states can perform very differently in different dimensions. Our analysis yields three main insights about what constitutes state fragility and how it can be addressed: first, state fragility, illiberalism, repression and human rights violations are interrelated; second, state fragility is not unique to the Global South, with negative trends also occurring in the Global North; and, third, differentiated, multi-dimensional models offer better starting points for addressing state fragility than one-dimensional ones. We conclude with four policy recommendations:
• Improve analytical capacity by adopting a differentiated view of state fragility: International security and development policymakers would benefit from more fine-grained, differentiated assessments of state fragility. In addition, country-specific assessments of the specific local power constellations in which fragile state institutions are embedded are needed for devising adequate, context-sensitive measures.
• Connect measures to address fragility with democracy protection and the protection of human rights: Illiberalism, human rights violations and repression correlate with state fragility. This also suggests that there is a close relationship between autocracy, autocratisation and fragility. Accordingly, measures to address fragility, democracy support and efforts to protect human rights must be better connected. This also implies doing “no harm to democracy” (Leininger, 2023, p. 2).
• Identify conditions under which state-building can (or cannot) be pursued: It would be fruitful if international security and development policymakers engaged in thorough discussions about the conditions under which state-building can be pursued. Where existing state institutions are legitimate, they should be supported. However, donor coherence and the capacity (and political will) of donors to commit resources to fragile states and to engage long-term are also important preconditions. State-building is both a costly and a long-term endeavour.
• Learning across world regions: Patterns of state fragility can be highly similar, despite geographical distance. In particular, rising illiberalism and increasing attacks on civil liberties are global phenomena. Hence, policy decision-makers and civil society organisations (CSOs) seeking to counter fragility should engage in mutual learning across the North/South divide.
Seaweed farming using the off-bottom seaweed farming approach—tying algal fonds or seaweed seeds to ropes attached between wooden pegs driven into the ocean sediment. Credit: Joyce Chimbi/IPS
By Joyce Chimbi
MWAZARO BEACH, Kenya, Mar 8 2024 (IPS)
Nearly two kilometers into the Indian Ocean from the Mwazaro beach coastline in Lunga Lunga Sub-County, Kwale County, women can be spotted seated in the shallow ocean waters or tying strings to erected poles parallel to the waves. It is a captivating sight to see rows of seaweed farms in the Indian Ocean.
Seaweeds are a group of algae found in seawater and come in green, red, and brown species. The seaweed farms are a predominantly female-dominated form of aquaculture and their owners can only be spotted during low tide, especially in the morning. Once the tide comes in, the women will begin their journey back to the shores as the waters slowly rise.
Saumu Hamadi tells IPS that in 2016, residents of Mwambao village along the Mwazaro beach coastline started a community-led, community-driven initiative to conserve mangroves, protect the environment, and restore their fisheries, which had been destroyed by significant mangrove forest degradation.
“We realized that the more our mangroves disappeared, the fish ran away and so did the fishermen. We rely on fish for food and money. Men sell the big fish, such as the kingfish, shark, and rayfish, to the beach hotels, and women sell crabs and prawns by the roadside or in small village markets. The situation was threatening our daily bread and we decided to volunteer as a community to restore and protect our mangroves,” Hamadi explains.
Rehema Abdalla walking to her seaweed farm, located nearly 1.7 km away from the Mwazaro Beach coastline. Seaward farming is conducted in the ocean during low tides. Credit: Joyce Chimbi/IPS
Rehema Abdalla and Saumu Hamadi walking to their seaweed farms, where other women are already hard at work, sorting and packing their harvests. Credit: Joyce Chimbi/IPS
Rehema Abdalla and Saumu Hamadi weigh seaweed using a home scale. Credit: Joyce Chimbi/IPS
Women at work at the seaweed farm. Credit: Joyce Chimbi/IPS
“There were too many people cutting down mangrove trees, destroying the places that the fish we depend on call home. There was also a lot of soil erosion and the water flowing along the River Hamisi that pours into the Indian Ocean within this village’s coastline carried the soil into the ocean, polluting it. We formed two community groups: Mwambao Mkuyuni Youth and Bati Beach Mwambao. Women make up 80 percent of the members in both groups.”
Abdalla Bidii Lewa, a community coordinator on mangrove restoration in Pongwe Kikoneni ward where Mwambao village is located and chair of Bati Seaweed Farmers, tells IPS, “Mangroves have protected our villages and surrounding areas from extreme weather and disasters such as those that affected large parts of the coastal region during the heavy floods in November and early December 2023. Where houses were swept away and farmlands destroyed, we were safe from the disaster.”
Seaweed farming. Credit: Joyce Chimbi and Cecilia Russell/IPS
Research shows mangroves significantly prevent the progression of climate change while also playing a major role in limiting its impact. This is critical as temperatures rise dangerously, sea level shoots to alarming levels, and coastal climate-induced disasters become frequent, intense, and severe, with catastrophic results.
To avert coastal climate hazards and secure mangrove-related benefits for present and future generations, the community undertook mangrove conservation and restoration activities in earnest.
Then, in 2017, a scientist conducting research into seaweed farming using the off-bottom seaweed farming method—tying algal fonds or seaweed seeds to ropes attached between wooden pegs driven into the ocean sediment—approached women in the community.
“Of the two seaweed strains that grow on Kenya’s south coast, cottonii and spinosum, the scientist recommended that we plant spinosum and gave us the seeds. Seaweeds do not need something to grow on. We erect sticks into the ground inside the ocean water during low tides and plant seaweed seeds by tying them to strings fastened on these sticks. We harvest every 45 days. We have to tie the strings and place the sticks properly so that they are not swept away during high tides,” says Rehema Abdalla, a seaweed farmer in Mwambao village.
On concerns that aquaculture could form the entry point for mangrove degradation, Hamadi says, “It is not the case with seaweed. The mangroves are important to the survival of our seaweeds by ensuring that we have normal, safe tides and waves. When seaweeds are swept away, they stay trapped within the roots of the mangroves and we collect them from there. It is rare, but once in a while, the tides can be very strong.”
Lewa says seaweed farming is emerging as a new and sustainable climate change mitigation strategy while offering communities adjacent to mangroves and coastlines an alternative livelihood, reducing dependency on fishing and natural resources inside mangrove forests and the oceans. Seaweeds are superfoods, highly nutritious, can be used in sushi, soups, salads, and smoothies, and are an asset in the feed industry, cosmetics, and pharmaceuticals.
“The amount of seaweed harvested depends on the amount planted and every 45 days, you will get a harvest. At the moment, one kilogram of seaweed goes for USD 0.22 (Ksh 35). I am currently targeting making USD 467 (Ksh 75,000) every 45 days from seaweed. We also sell seaweed seeds to other women doing mangrove conservation, such as Imani Gazi and the Gazi Women Mangrove Restoration Group, from within Kwale County,” Hamadi says.
Seaweeds compliment mangroves by absorbing nutrients such as nitrogen, phosphorous, and carbon dioxide. They do not require soil, fertilizer, freshwater, or pesticides, and they significantly improve the environment in which they grow. Seaweeds efficiently absorb carbon dioxide, using it to grow and even when harvested, the carbon remains in the ocean.
Research shows that seaweed can pull more greenhouse gases from the water compared to seagrass, salt marshes, and mangroves based on biomass. Mwazaro’s beach community is on track to add seaweed as part of their blue carbon sink, setting the pace for other coastal communities.
All the same, the women are facing challenges such as a lack of mortar boats to help transport their harvest to the shore. Currently, they use a tedious process whereby they tie sacks of seaweed on their waste and wait for the onset of high tide in the early afternoon to push them from the seaweed farms to the shore. They are also struggling to access a larger market, currently relying on one major large-scale buyer and small buyers within the village and other mangrove conservation groups from neighboring villages.
IPS UN Bureau Report
This feature is published with the support of Open Society Foundations.
Follow @IPSNewsUNBureauExcerpt:
Written by Andrés García Higuera.
The European automotive industry is striving to adapt to market changes driven by the dual green and digital transition. Electrification has become the main strategy for reducing CO2 emissions, especially in urban traffic. At the same time, the average size and weight of cars have greatly increased. Big electric cars are the trend, but are they really the solution? Could better planning and optimisation of resources help?
According to Eurostat, average passenger car occupancy for urban mobility is usually less than 1.3 persons. Therefore, it is very common in cities for heavy cars to carry a single person. To transport the weight of that one person (80 kilogrammes for instance) means moving a full 1 800 kg. This could even reach 2 500 kg for big electric or hybrid cars with heavy long-range batteries. No matter the source of power used, this can never lead to efficient and sustainable mobility. Weight rates are usually over 10 times more favourable for the average motorbike or scooter and, of course, even better for lighter vehicles such as electric bicycles or kick-scooters.
Reducing CO2 emissions in transport is a key goal of the European Green Deal. However, specifications for choosing a city car are often based on the rare long trips that would best be made with a rented vehicle. Meanwhile, traditional emissions tests using gas analysers focus on the percentage concentration of pollutants and overlook references to the total quantity. The low speed limits generally established in Europe today also help to reduce emissions. However, efforts to reduce emissions may be counteracted by a trend towards bigger sports utility vehicles (SUVs), which are less agile and efficient but more comfortable and useful for longer drives.
Some people find themselves spending long periods every day in traffic, so they see their cars as a prolongation of their living rooms, with comfortable seats, plenty of space and ‘infotainment’, including big screens. Large vehicles also account for longer traffic jams. When anti-lock braking systems (ABS) were first introduced in premium cars, accidents increased initially for that sector owing to driver over-confidence. The same effect is again being seen with modern driving assist systems. Since large vehicles are especially safe for their occupants at low speeds, this has a pernicious effect on driver attention, consequently increasing casualty figures for other road users. Every year there are fewer victims of car accidents – but not among pedestrians, cyclists and other light vehicle users. This translates into further restrictions on the use of light vehicles, then considered unsafe, to the point of banning e-scooters and restricting the use of motorbikes – while cars are allowed in crowded areas. An alternative way to interpret these casualty figures would be to consider large heavy cars a menace to other users of public thoroughfares.
The EU automotive sector has traditionally excelled at producing vehicles with internal combustion engines (ICEs). The sector accounts for around 8 % of the EU’s gross domestic product (GDP) and for 12.9 million direct and indirect jobs. However, the green transition, digitalisation and global competition have fundamentally altered its business model. Electrification has become the main strategy for decarbonising the sector, mostly through the extensive use of critical raw materials such as lithium-ion batteries, which have to be quite large to propel big cars with extended ranges.
Potential impacts and developmentsJapan has been restricting car size in crowded areas since 1949, with the popular ‘Kei’ cars representing 40 % of the Japanese car market today. This Japanese regulation began with strict limits that have since evolved to set engine capacity at a maximum of 660 cc, vehicle length at 3.4 metres and total weight at 700 kg. Car ownership in Tokyo is restricted to corresponding parking spaces, following the idea that public thoroughfares are for public use, not for people to use for their exclusive benefit.
The high level of European industry specialisation in producing high quality ICEs accounts for its leading position in the market. However, electric vehicles do not require the same level of know-how, opening the door to other players. China became the top global car exporter in 2023, exporting mostly to Europe and Asia. China also dominates production of almost every raw material, technology and component used to make electric vehicles. Batteries require very polluting production and recycling methods, and they need to be charged.
Given the current electricity mix and the optimistic figures available, the equivalent emissions of a large electric car in Europe are of about 4 litres/100 km – not significantly lower than the emissions from a small ICE car (or Kei car). This figure is an average that results from considering: a total equivalent rising from 84 grammes CO2/km for some (partisan) sources to 125 g CO2/km considering the charging process alone for others; and that petrol produces 2.3 kg of CO2 per litre burned (i.e. divided by 23 to convert gCO2/km to l/100 km). In terms of the efficiency in transporting one person, a simple moped could do far better, not to mention public transport. Battery production process emissions are usually underestimated, considering that China produced the highest CO₂ emissions in 2022, accounting for nearly 31 % of the global total.
Anticipatory policymakingOn 4 October 2023, the European Commission initiated anti-subsidy investigations into EU imports of battery electric vehicles from China and is already considering provisional countervailing tariffs for five years. Although replacing one means of propulsion with another is clearly not enough, modest size electric cars are undoubtedly part of the solution. Even so, most European companies still lag behind in electric vehicle innovation. A smooth transition to alternative propulsion methods should be based on securing access to affordable batteries and semiconductors, improving innovation capacities in new technologies, reducing costs, and adopting a more circular approach – particularly on critical raw materials.
No European compact car qualifies as a ‘Kei’ car. As a result, 40 % of the Japanese car market is closed to competition from European manufacturers, and this share is increasing. The European Union regulation classifying vehicle categories already accounts for light four-wheelers or microcars (L7) and could be extended to include considerations regarding preferential access to urban areas. The various EU emission limits, such as the new Euro 7 regulation, propose values in g/km (not just concentrations) and revise measuring standards. The EU adopted an amendment to the EU light-duty vehicles (LDV) CO2 standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles in April 2023, in line with the EU’s increased climate ambition. In July 2023, the European Commission tabled a package of three proposals for the greening of freight transport. These include CountEmissionsEU, a proposal for a single methodology to calculate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, this only refers to transport services. The European Commission also added a proposal for a regulation addressing the whole life cycle of vehicles, from design to end-of-life. With a view to ending the trend towards ever bigger and heavier vehicles, the European Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism is considering a proposal to overhaul the EU’s 2006 agreement standardising driving licence rules between Member States.
Promoting electric cars may lead to market distortions that run counter to European industrial interests. While complementary measures such as those contemplated in the critical raw materials act take effect, and besides the obvious move towards public transport, one way to allow the EU car industry to adapt while still reducing CO2 emissions could be to limit the size, weight and engine capacity of urban vehicles. An improved vehicle-to-passenger weight rate could hugely increase energy efficiency in urban transport.
Since light vehicles are especially suited to electrification – as increased use of bicycles and scooters can attest – and other alternative propulsion methods, it may become appropriate to let the market and European industry adapt at its own pace, with some institutional encouragement and support, to such new conditions of improved mobility efficiency.
Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if the problem with cars was not their method of propulsion?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Listen to podcast ‘What if the problem with cars was not their method of propulsion?‘ on YouTube.
Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.
If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.
Accept YouTube ContentOSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Kairat Abdrakhmanov visited Bosnia and Herzegovina from 4 to 6 March 2024 to attend the Regional Conference on Co-operation on matters related to National Minorities in Sarajevo.
The Conference gathered representatives of national minorities and government authorities responsible for national minority issues from south-eastern Europe. It was an opportunity to discuss good governance and exchange experiences, ideas, challenges and good practices related to the integration of diverse societies.
The event was organized by Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Human Rights and Refugees Ministry, with the co-operation of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina and with the support of other OSCE field operations in the region.
The High Commissioner called on authorities and representatives to seize the opportunities presented by this event. “Let us embrace future opportunities to forge a new era of regional co-operation and understanding on national minority issues in south-eastern Europe. This is possible because co-operation is our language,” Abdrakhmanov said. The High Commissioner is hopeful that such meetings will become a regular occurrence.
While in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the High Commissioner took the opportunity to meet with government authorities, including Human Rights and Refugees Minister Sevlid Hurtić, as well as national minority representatives and civil society organizations in Mostar.