Amal Kabashi addressing the UN Security Council last week. Credit: United Nations
By Amal Kabashi
BAGHDAD, Iraq, Dec 9 2021 (IPS)
As a feminist activist and defender of women’s rights in Iraq, I would like to share with you my growing concerns about the assassinations, kidnappings, assaults, threats of assassination against and defamation of feminist activists and human rights defenders, which they have faced especially during the popular protests in October 2019–2020, all of which have occurred with impunity.
Over the last two years Iraqi women have faced daily challenges in realizing their full, equal and meaningful participation in establishing peace and securing protection from violence in Iraq.
As part of my work with the Iraqi Women Network, I have played a prominent role in drafting the first National Action Plan (NAP) for Resolution 1325 and in preparing the second NAP (2021–2024), which focuses on the role of Iraqi women in achieving stability, security, and peace, as well as combating terrorism and extremism.
Last week, I was invited to provide a civil society perspective and recommendations when the Security Council met to discuss the situation in Iraq. I focused on three key issues that must be addressed to end this cycle of discrimination and exclusion against Iraqi women.
First, the elections and the present negotiations for forming a new government are both critical for ensuring women’s meaningful participation and promoting democracy in Iraq.
The early elections in Iraq last month were organized in response to the demands of the peaceful protests that shook the country from October 2019–2020. Women played a key role in these protests and defied social norms. Protestors were confronted with excessive use of force that left over 600 dead and thousands wounded.
Despite the boycott of the elections that followed, they proceeded under wide monitoring by the United Nations (UN) and the European Union. 3,240 candidates, including 950 women, participated in the elections to compete for 329 seats in the House of Representatives.
The elections resulted in the emergence of new political movements and independent winners. Moreover, many women candidates received thousands of votes, indicating the general electorate’s support for women’s political participation. The results of the election have raised the percentage of women’s representation to more than 28%.
I can’t emphasize enough the critical role of and need for women as active participants in parliament and in negotiations to form the new government. Their meaningful representation must also be reflected through an increase in the number of women in ministerial positions and to ensure gender equality and equal opportunity, which the constitution affirms.
Second, while women’s engagement and increased participation in the electoral process is encouraging, an enabling environment for their participation is essential, as they still face serious barriers of discrimination, inequality and stereotyping of gender roles in the family, society, and law.
During the 2014–2021 parliamentary sessions we advocated for Parliament to pass a law against domestic violence. However, we failed. Despite the existence of such a law in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. This is due to the tyrannical mentality of many Iraqi legislators, who reject such efforts because they claim for the privacy of family life.
Yet the Iraqi constitution guarantees protection from all forms of violence and abuse in the family, school and society. These fundamental principles, as well as Iraq’s international legal obligations, require the establishment of national laws and regulations that protect women and girls from gender-based violence in all spheres of society.
This year has witnessed some encouraging legislation, such as the Yazidi Survivors’ Law. This law is part of the framework of transitional justice adopted by the Iraqi government to address the consequences of terrorism and violent extremism.
However, the law focuses on providing material compensation to women survivors and does not take the necessary measures to institutionalize psychological, health and social services for the survivors and their children.
The law also fails to address access to justice for survivors of gender-based violence and their children born to fathers affiliated with ISIS, particularly in terms of registering their births and obtaining civil documentation.
There are also gaps in the government program to implement rehabilitation and support the integration of ISIS families into their local communities. This has a profound impact on the ongoing stigmatization of women and girls forced to join ISIS or marry their fighters. The delay in resolving the situation of these families makes them ticking time bombs that threaten peace and societal security.
Stability in my country also needs strengthened law and justice enforcement institutions that are gender sensitive. This is essential for fighting impunity, corruption, and militarism, all of which negatively affect women’s rights and women’s participation in promoting social cohesion, reconciliation, and peacebuilding.
Third, a national mechanism to support inclusion of women is critical to ensure oversight of and adequate resources for implementing Iraq’s NAP on 1325. The absence of such a mechanism has contributed to the weakening of women’s participation in decision-making bodies, and in development programs.
We, as a national feminist movement, have called for the Iraqi government to form a National Council for Women’s Empowerment with representation of the government, Parliament, and the Supreme Judicial Council, as well as civil society organizations concerned with women and media.
This Council is needed to effectively lead work at the level of state institutions and local communities, realize the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda, and invest in Iraqi women’s potential to reform the political process and build a state of equal citizenship and social justice.
In closing, I urged the UN Security Council to:
We need sweeping and urgent action from the UN Security Council, the government of Iraq and the international community on all these fronts if we are to see truly sustainable and inclusive peace in Iraq. The futures of all Iraqis depend on it.
Amal Kabashi is the Executive Director of the Iraqi Women Network, which was established in 2004 as a civil society feminist alliance and includes more than 100 local organizations from all over Iraq.
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KYIV, 8 December 2021 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Mikko Kinnunen, made the following statement to the press after the regular meetings of the TCG and its Working Groups held through video conferencing:
“The focus of today’s meeting was on the security situation. Lengthy discussions were held on the need to ensure adherence to the 22 July 2020 ceasefire agreement. There is a common understanding that the long lasting ceasefire is a priority. I invite the participants for further constructive work.
Although the number of ceasefire violations reported by SMM the last two weeks is lower if compared with previous two weeks, the security situation along the contact line is still of concern with a high level of kinetic activity. The Mission continues to report observations of non-SMM UAVs along the contact line and the Mission’s freedom of movement has further worsened, especially in certain areas of Luhansk region of Ukraine (CALO).
The participants in the Security Working Group discussed in detail how to strengthen the ceasefire, though without reaching a common understanding.
The Political Working Group had a constructive discussion on issues related to the development of a single Plan of Action on Implementation of the Minsk Agreements.
The participants in the Humanitarian Working Group concentrated on conflict-related detainees and the possible opening of two new crossing points across the contact line in Zolote and Shchastia of Luhansk region.
The Economic Working Group discussed issues related to water supply, including tariffs for water payments, as well as pensions, telecommunication issues and ecological situation in the Donbas region.”
A közlemény szerint az ITM akkreditált élelmiszer- és vegyipari laboratóriumának vizsgálata a szaloncukrok bevonatarányának és nettó tömegének megfelelő feltüntetésére terjedt ki. A húszféle csemege között a klasszikusnak számító zselés és marcipános mellett előfordult tiramisu ízű és tökmagkrémes is. A szabályozásban megkülönböztetett három fajtából mártott és töltött édességeket ellenőriztek fele-fele arányban, kandírozottat ezúttal nem.
A túl vékony burokkal rendelkező szaloncukor tölteléke könnyen kifolyhat, a mártott termék a kevés bevonat miatt hamarabb kiszáradhat. A megfelelő arányt ezért előírások rögzítik, a töltöttek mindegyike megugrotta a 25, a mártottaké pedig a 20 százalékos limitet. Az elégtelen bevonat miatt tehát egyetlen szaloncukrot sem kellett bevonni.
Rendelkezés adja meg azt is, hogy a tételellenőrzés során legfeljebb mennyivel térhet el az előre csomagolt termék tömege a tájékoztatásban jelzettől. 100-200 gramm között kilenc százaléknál nagyobb különbség már nem fogadható el. Egy termék dobozába az egyedileg megengedhetőnél is kevesebb szaloncukrot csomagoltak, az ügyben hatósági eljárás indult. A vizsgált termékek tételes felsorolása a Fogyasztóvédelmi portálon érhető el.
Keszthelyi Nikoletta fogyasztóvédelemért felelős helyettes államtitkár kiemelte: az év vége a legerősebb időszak a kereskedelmi forgalomban, így többletfeladatokkal jár a hatósági munkában. A fogyasztóvédelem otthonaink nyugalma érdekében nemcsak a megspórolható kiadásoktól, hanem a felesleges bosszúságoktól is igyekszik megkímélni a magyar családokat. Az ünnepi ellenőrzéssorozat következő eleme a rázós fényfüzérek kiszűrésével a használók biztonságát védi.
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Written by Andrés García Higuera.
The European Union has an ambitious climate strategy and is looking for ways to boost technologies that will make it possible. Could hydrogen and the deployment of related technology and infrastructure become a decisive factor in decarbonising specific industry sectors?
The European strategies for energy system integration and for hydrogen have been in the limelight in recent months, and a related resolution was adopted during the European Parliament’s plenary session in May 2021. Furthermore, in mid-July 2021, the European Commission adopted its ‘Fit for 55‘ package of legislative proposals to make the EU’s climate, energy, land use, transport and taxation policies fit for reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030, compared to 1990 levels.
Achieving these emission reductions in the next decade is crucial for Europe to become the world’s first climate-neutral continent by 2050, and for the European Green Deal to become a reality. The European Commission has set out a vision for a digitalised, integrated and circular energy system, driven by electrification, powered by renewables and relying on energy efficiency. Following a political agreement reached between the co-legislators and the Parliament’s adoption of its position at first reading on 24 June 2021, the European Parliament and the Council adopted the Regulation on a European Climate Law earlier this year.
Potential impacts and developmentsThe European hydrogen strategy envisages a path towards a European hydrogen ecosystem, with upscaling in the next five years followed by further interconnections across Europe and finally large-scale diffusion after 2030. This implies an increase in renewable hydrogen production, driving down the costs and boosting demand in hard-to-abate sectors, to make Europe the global hydrogen powerhouse, with a set of ambitious targets: 6 gigawatt (GW) of electrolysers installed by 2024, and 40 GW by 2030. Key policy initiatives in this field also include the EU Climate Law, the EU climate target plan, the EU Clean Hydrogen Alliance and the forthcoming hydrogen and decarbonised gas market package. Transforming the EU’s energy system to take full advantage of the potential of hydrogen is perceived to provide benefits in terms of job creation, economic growth, innovation and reduced air pollution.
Hydrogen technologies cover the entire chain from hydrogen generation to its distribution and storage, and to its final utilisation in sectors including mobility, energy storage scale and industrial use. Here, the EU acts in a context of international partners and competitors that strive for similar goals and hold traditionally strong positions in the field of hydrogen technologies.
The opinion presented in June 2021 by the European Commission’s Group of Chief Scientific Advisors and Science Advice for Policy by European Academies (SAPEA), as well as a recent study by STOA, provide an update on the state of play of hydrogen use in the EU economy. They also determine current policies and gaps, and propose policy options to fill these gaps to enable replacement of fossil fuels, particularly in energy-intensive industries and long-distance transport. In the past decade, almost a third of all transnational patents covering electrolytical hydrogen generation were generated by actors based within the EU. This strength not only creates an opportunity, but also a responsibility towards promoting cost-effective supply on a global scale. The EU has the potential to become the global leader in the field, followed by the USA and Japan.
Anticipatory policy-makingSustainable use and production of hydrogen should be focused on hard-to-decarbonise sectors, and begin by contemplating its use predominantly in applications where there are no cheaper alternatives. However, clear guidelines and a hierarchy of such priority uses are lacking, while there is a need for support schemes to foster diffusion in sectors that need hydrogen. There is currently no significant hydrogen infrastructure or regulation, which may lead to uncertainty for market participants and potential grid operators. It is therefore important to clarify the rules for future markets. Furthermore, trading in hydrogen requires exact specification of the products, particularly renewable (green H2), but also low-carbon hydrogen, as a way to scale up production (mainly blue H2, produced from natural gas using carbon capture and storage, CCS). Despite ongoing work on certification schemes, specific criteria have not yet been agreed upon.
With regard to actors, regions and the international perspective, there is a lot of mobilisation in certain sectors for both hydrogen production and use, but civil society has not yet been addressed to a sufficient extent. Moreover, the role of hydrogen in the Just Transition Mechanism is yet to be defined. Future policies will need to foster a sustainable approach to international hydrogen partnerships, as, while there will be production of green hydrogen in the EU, imports will still be needed. International cooperation must be fostered while ensuring compatibility with partner countries’ development strategies, such as acceptance of selected production and infrastructure sites, environmental impact of expanding renewable energy use and associated material flows (e.g. water), and socio-economic impacts and end-user costs.
Public funding and schemes such as carbon contracts for difference (CCfDs) are key to achieving a far larger scale of hydrogen technology deployment and for its production to become decarbonised, while private investment must also be fostered by providing certainty about the future pathway and political framework. Such a supportive framework is required in the case of infrastructure regulation, to lay down overarching rules and define elements that will allow future EU-wide local trade interconnectivity, while still providing leeway for regional experimentation, for example with respect to the refinancing of infrastructure. There is also a need to promote research and innovation in hydrogen technologies, e.g. through dedicated European Innovation Council (EIC) Fund calls and important projects of common European interest (IPCEIs).
The security of supply is crucial, with production and storage capacities having to match demand across Europe. It will be necessary to interconnect different users and producers, so that production scales up in line with consumption, and hydrogen infrastructure is initially deployed in regional clusters, before a broader roll-out after 2030. Hydrogen can be blended with natural gas for transport at limited percentages of 5 %‑20 %, while higher shares of up to 30 % are being investigated. This, together with the possibility of repurposing infrastructure already in place, constitutes a good starting point to further develop the concept of hydrogen valleys and foster hydrogen networks.
While perspectives for using alternatives such as hydrogen are growing, gas of fossil origin presently constitutes 95 % of gaseous fuels consumed in the EU, and accounts for about 22 % of total EU energy consumption, 20 % of EU electricity production and 39 % of heat production. Hydrogen can be produced from almost all energy resources, although today’s use of hydrogen in oil refining and chemical production is mostly covered by hydrogen from fossil fuels, with significant associated CO2 emissions. However, as we look for solutions to decarbonise European industry, the share of hydrogen in the energy mix could rise significantly, as it can increasingly be produced from renewable energy. Through the uptake of new technologies still under development, especially those related to hydrogen, gaseous fuels are in any case expected to continue to account for a very significant part of total EU energy consumption in 2050, while also ensuring resilience.
Fighting climate change is a key global trend and the first of the six policy priorities set out by the von der Leyen Commission. The EU has the potential to become a leader in pilot technologies, with a high decarbonisation potential including in hydrogen production, storage, transport and use.
Read the complete briefing on ‘What if hydrogen could help decarbonise European industry?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Listen to policy podcast ‘What if hydrogen could help decarbonise European industry?’ on YouTube.