Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Ein Jahr lang habe das Team von «Plötzlich Prinzessin 3» um sie geworben, erzählt Julie Andrews. Abgesagt hat die 90-Jährige trotzdem. Denn die Schauspielerin will generell nicht mehr vor eine Kamera treten.

Ein antikes Theater in Arcugnano (I) entpuppt sich als dreiste Fälschung. Betreiber Franco Malosso kassierte 40 Franken Eintritt, sitzt nun wegen Fälschung im Gefängnis. Nun ringt die Gemeinde um Hunderttausende Franken für den Rückbau.

In Tansania liefern sich zwei Giraffenbullen einen eindrucksvollen Kampf. Mit ihren langen Hälsen rammen sie sich gegenseitig die Hörner in den Bauch. Beim sogenannten «Necking» wird entschieden, wer der stärkere Bulle ist.

Die Landespolizei Liechtenstein warnt vor einer Betrugsmasche, die in der Schweiz längst bekannt ist. Das sogenannte Quishing breitet sich nun offenbar auch bei unseren Nachbarn aus.

Zusammenfassung:

13. August 2026 – Die Blockade der Straße von Hormus ab Ende Februar hat den Ölmarkt in einer Konstellation weltweit schwacher Nachfrage und steigendem Ölangebot getroffen. Aufgrund des Angebotsschocks stieg der Ölpreis kurzzeitig auf über 110 US-Dollar pro Barrel. Die Konstellation von schwacher Nachfrage und Angebotsausweitung würde eigentlich zu einem sinkenden Ölpreis führen – zum Jahresende 2025 kostete ein Barrel Rohöl tatsächlich unter 60 US-Dollar, ein für manche Förderländer nicht mehr tragfähiger Preis. Bisher haben vor allem Nicht-OPEC-Länder ihr Angebot ausgeweitet. Auch innerhalb der OPEC ist die Geschlossenheit brüchig geworden: Die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate sind im Mai 2026 ausgetreten und planen mehr Öl zu fördern. Wenn Öltanker die Straße von Hormus wieder wie früher passieren können, dürfte erneut die Konstellation von steigendem Angebot bei schwacher Nachfrage zum Tragen kommen. Noch zeichnet sich indes keine vollständige und dauerhafte Öffnung der Straße von Hormus ab, zumal zunächst Minen geräumt und Sicherheitsgarantien geklärt werden müssen. Darüber hinaus bleiben Seewege anfällig, was künftig zu höheren Versicherungsprämien und volatileren Ölpreisen führen dürfte.

Gemeinsame Geldpolitik im Euroraum erhöht Wirksamkeit nationaler Staatsausgaben – Öffentliche Investitionen und Staatskonsum kurbeln Wirtschaft deutlich stärker an als Steuersenkungen – Kurzfristige Stabilisierungsvorteile müssen gegen Risiken für Staatsfinanzen und langfristiges Wachstum abgewogen ...

Wasserstoff gilt als Schlüsseltechnologie für die Dekarbonisierung mancher Sektoren und die langfristige Speicherung erneuerbarer Energien – aber ist gasförmiger Wasserstoff wirklich die beste Option? In dieser Folge von ‚fossilfrei‘ stellt uns Tom Brown, Professor an der TU Berlin, seine ...

Künstliche Intelligenz wird zunehmend zu einer wichtigen, mitunter zur einzigen Informationsquelle vieler Menschen – nicht nur im Alltag, sondern auch in politischen Fragen. Wer wissen möchte, was eine politische Partei wirtschaftlich plant, muss sich nicht mehr über Medien und Parteiprogramme ...

Rund zwei Drittel der von 1975 bis 2019 abgebauten Industriearbeitsplätze wurden durch produktionsnahe Tätigkeiten im Dienstleistungssektor kompensiert – Einkommensverluste bleiben gering, wenn Beschäftigte ihren Beruf beim neuen Arbeitgeber beibehalten – Arbeitsmarktpolitik sollte stärker auf ...

Adapting to climate impacts is more critical than ever. Average global temperatures surpassed the 1.5°C threshold in 2024, and the ten worst climate-related disasters of 2025 caused over $120 billion in insured losses alone. Yet just as adaptation becomes more urgent, climate has slipped down the global agenda, leaving the developing countries most exposed to climate impacts—and least responsible for them—to adapt with shrinking international support. 

This issue brief gives an overview of the history and current state of adaptation finance and examines how it overlaps with development finance and with loss and damage. It sets the goals agreed at COP29 and COP30 against estimated adaptation needs of $310 to $365 billion per year by 2035 and explains why, for many small island developing states and least developed countries, the form finance takes—grant-based and directly accessible—matters as much as the amount. 

The brief argues that adaptation, sustainable development, and loss and damage should complement one another rather than compete for scarce, siloed funding. It makes the case for strict criteria on what counts as climate finance rather than the automatic separation of climate and development projects, and for multilateral climate finance to grow, grant-based funding to expand, and climate resilience to be mainstreamed across all development efforts. This will ensure the international system is ready to deliver when political will to tackle climate change returns. 

Download

The post Synergies and Challenges in Financing Adaptation, Sustainable Development, and Loss and Damage appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Von hohen Aktienkursen profitieren Reiche besonders stark. Ärmere hingegen werden durch steigende Preise und Mieten zunehmend abgehängt. Das ist politisch gefährlich., Als Elon Musk Anfang Juni 2026 mit dem geplanten Börsengang von SpaceX offiziell zum ersten Billionär der Menschheitsgeschichte aufstieg, war das Medienecho gewaltig. Kaum Aufmerksamkeit hingegen erhielt die Tatsache, dass dies kein Ausreißer, sondern Symptom einer strukturellen Verschiebung ist, ...

À Zogota, en Guinée, où vivent toujours de nombreuses familles des victimes, cette décision est accueillie avec prudence mais aussi avec espoir.