Afrique

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

- Agenda / Roumanie, Région parisienne

- Agenda / Albanie, France - Régions

Lors de cet atelier, nous étudierons des airs et des chants de la région élargie d'Asie Mineure et la manière dont le répertoire correspondant a été intégré et domestiqué, principalement dans les îles du nord-est de la mer Égée et des Cyclades.
À travers le répertoire et la pratique, nous étudierons les points communs et les différences stylistiques de ces régions spécifiques. Parallèlement, l'analyse des chants et des airs nous permettra d'identifier les caractéristiques (développement (…)

- Agenda / France - Régions, Turquie

- Agenda / Dans les Balkans, Grèce

L'Institut culturel bulgare à le plaisir d'accueillir pour la première fois l'exposition personnelle de l'artiste contemporain Rossen Markovski, intitulée Le Récit des Poissons, du 26 mars au 22 mai 2026.
L'exposition réunit 25 toiles ainsi que quelques sculptures — « empreintes de rencontres et d'amour » et inspirées par sa vie « à la lisière de la mer », selon les mots de l'artiste. Celui-ci peint de manière spontanée et expressive ; ses tableaux sont à la fois puissants et délicats, (…)

- Agenda / Bulgarie, Région parisienne

- Agenda / Région parisienne

Billetterie : Le Pass 3 Jours est disponible au tarif de 74€ pour ne manquer aucun concert de cette prochaine édition. Le Pass Camping est également disponible en ligne - au tarif de 8€ pour accéder au camping pendant toute la durée du festival.
► Site officiel : welcome-in-tziganie.com
GORAN BREGOVIC De Kalashnikov à Bella Ciao en passant par l'iconique « Edelerzi » (BO du film Le Temps des Gitans), Goran Bregović, rock star des Balkans est devenu en 3 décennies une star (…)

- Agenda / France - Régions, Gratuit

Du 16 au 22 avril 2026

- Agenda / Macédoine du Nord, Dans les Balkans, France - Régions

Vendredi 17 avril 2026 à 18 heures au campus Malesherbes (amphithéâtre 128) au 108, boulevard Malesherbes 75017 Paris

- Agenda / Monténégro, Région parisienne

Jeudi 16 avril 2026 à 16 heures à la bibliothèque Malesherbes (108, boulevard Malesherbes 75017 Paris).

- Agenda / Monténégro, Région parisienne

For nearly thirty years, beginning with the Razali Initiative in 1997, I’ve been in and out of discussions related to UN Security Council reform. Aside from the work undertaken by the Small Five Group (S-5) and later by the ACT Group on working methods (with which I was fortunate to be involved), much of the discussion at the UN has focused on permanent representation and whether the privilege of exercising the veto should be extended to new permanent members. So much so that it is now almost taken for granted that Security Council reform will only be meaningful if it brings about permanent representation for both the Group of Latin America and the Caribbean and the African Group, with the question of the veto remaining in the balance.

While permanent membership is a matter of utmost significance, just changing the composition of the membership (permanent, elected to two-year terms, or elected to longer terms) would not be enough to deliver a fully functional Security Council. This led me to indulge in some thinking on what else would be needed.

The first thought came to me months ago as I was sharing with my law students some of the techniques a multilateral diplomat chairing a complex legal negotiation would use to arrive at a strong outcome. I pointed out that if a delegation was being obstructive, I would suspend the meeting for a period of time and ask that delegation to come up with a solution that would secure widespread support. No multilateral diplomat worth their salt, or with any sense of professional pride, would refuse me, simply because it would be too embarrassing for them to admit before all their peers that they were lacking the skills to do so. If it was the first time a delegation had ever experienced something like this, they would shuffle out of the conference room looking dumbstruck. They would, however, return at some point, beaming with pride at having found a solution. They would be exhausted, too, and the very next day they would be less enthusiastic about raising an objection.

This reflection coincided with an argument I recalled hearing in private repeatedly from Larry Johnson and Mona Khalil of the UN Office of Legal Affairs when I was a permanent representative (PR). They would tell me time and again that the permanent members of the Council were always quick to seize on their veto privileges expressed in Article 27(3) of the UN Charter but not to honor this article’s twin—the “responsibility” conferred on them in Article 24(1). In other words, they were happy to exercise the privilege of blocking actions without bearing the responsibility of ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

Fifteen years ago, I remember casually making remarks in this direction in discussions within the ACT Group. Now, I believe this issue needs to be studied more closely.

The problem with the Council is its chronic state of constipation, with obvious and disastrous effects felt around the world. Changing the composition in any direction won’t affect that underlying state. Instead, we can learn from the techniques used to unlock complex negotiations. Would it not be more sensible to make the exercise of the veto contingent on having a permanent member first provide the Council (in informal consultations) with a credible alternative that could secure nine affirmative votes and no vetoes? This would mean that the PR of a permanent member could only block a draft resolution if they were also willing to do the work of imagining another possible solution—and one that would win widespread support. No work, no veto. The work of the Council might then tip from blocking action to ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

The same principle applies to other multilateral bodies. It is high time we dispense with references to a “consensus rule” in multilateral negotiations and call it what it is: a “veto rule.” I have been saying this for many months now. It is hypocritical for member states to weigh in against the use of the veto in the Security Council when they are only too happy to themselves block agreement in the climate negotiations or the negotiations on a pathogen access and benefit sharing system for the Pandemic Treaty. If we are serious about wanting to do something about the veto in the Council, we must address it in all multilateral bodies and stick to the intent behind Article 18 and its provisions on majoritarian voting in the General Assembly.

If Article 27(3) were to be amended, what might it look like? It might require the concurrence of permanent members “provided those members can first assure the Security Council of there being an accepted alternative.”

There would also have to be an additional subparagraph (4): “The Secretary-General will provide the first draft of every resolution (carrying a decision) to the Security Council but will not subsequently negotiate over it; that will be the prerogative of the Council.” More on this point in my next post.

“From pillar to post” is an English expression denoting frenetic activity—an accurate representation of a functioning multilateral system.

The post From Pillar to Post: No Work, No Veto appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Written by Laurence.Amand-Eeckhout.

CONTEXT

Health biotechnologies are increasingly important for public health, innovation, and the European Union’s competitiveness in global research and healthcare markets. They encompass, for example, gene therapies for rare diseases, cell therapies to treat cancer, immunotherapies, bio-artificial skin for burn treatment, and mRNA vaccines. Biotechnology is among the fastest-growing economic sectors in the EU, yet the EU continues to lag behind the United States and China in translating biotech innovation into commercially viable products and large-scale manufacturing. Structural challenges remain, particularly in clinical development, regulatory processes, and manufacturing capacity.
On 16 December 2025, the European Commission proposed a package of measures intended to improve the health of EU citizens, and ensure the long-term resilience and competitiveness of the EU health sector. The package includes a proposal for a ‘European biotech act’ setting out an EU-level framework to strengthen the competitiveness of the health biotechnology and biomanufacturing sector in the EU, by simplifying regulatory processes, promoting innovation, boosting EU-based biomanufacturing with new incentives and support tools, and facilitating access to finance, while maintaining high safety, ethics and sustainability standards.
Following this health-focused initiative, the Commission is expected to propose a second European Biotech Act later in 2026, centred on industrial biotechnologies and biomanufacturing, to ensure a competitive internal market for all biotechnology areas.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0406(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Union’s biotechnology and biomanufacturing sectors particularly in the area of health and amending Regulations (EC) No 178/2002, (EC) No 1394/2007, (EU) No 536/2014, (EU) 2019/6, (EU) 2024/795 and (EU) 2024/1938 (European Biotech Act) – COM(2025) 1022, 16 December 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule:2025/0406(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘European biotech act‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

At an international conference in Berlin on Wednesday, aid commitments to the tune of 1.5 billion euros were agreed for Sudan, which for the past three years has been ravaged by a brutal civil war. According to UN estimates, 34 million people, or two-thirds of the population in the northeast African country, are dependent on humanitarian aid. The media debate the causes, consequences and possible solutions to the famine.