Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Field experiments in Lima, Peru show that correcting social misperceptions and sending SMS reminders can significantly boost recycling participation.

Field experiments in Lima, Peru show that correcting social misperceptions and sending SMS reminders can significantly boost recycling participation.

Les militants dénoncent le manque de financement et l'absence de délais contraignants

The post Le plan AccelerateEU est jugé indispensable mais insuffisant pour faire face à la crise énergétique appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Ioannis Alexandris, Research Fellow and Alessandro Ieranò, Research Assistant at the Wider Europe Programme of ELIAMEP explore Hungary’s landmark electoral shift and its broader implications for the European Union. It highlights the key drivers behind Peter Magyar’s victory and assesses how a new political era in Budapest could reshape the country’s relationship with Brussels and the trajectory of EU integration.

Read the ELIAMEP Explainer here.

Event Video 
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IPI, in partnership with the Permanent Missions of Bahrain and Switzerland, and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), cohosted a fireside chat between IPI President Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein and Gilles Michaud, UN Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Safety and Security on April 22nd.

In the conversation, USG Michaud reflected on his seven-year tenure leading the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS), comprising over 50 organizations. The discussion shed light on how the UNSMS is addressing current challenges such as increasing threats from state and non-state actors, the UN funding crisis, and the evolving multilateral landscape. It also focused on how the UNSMS is embracing new opportunities, including emerging technologies, to meet its goal of enabling the UN to stay and deliver while mitigating security risks to its approximately 180,000 personnel.

This discussion took place against the backdrop of the recent Security Council briefing on Resolution 2730 (2024) and annual General Assembly deliberations culminating in the adoption of Resolution 80/112 (2025) on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of UN personnel. USG Michaud shared his lived experience, often behind the scenes, of directing security support to reach people in need or to assist personnel and families affected by traumatic incidents, and his efforts to ensure that the UNSMS remains fit for purpose for years to come.

Welcome and Opening Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute
Oliver Hoehne, Deputy Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations

Featured Speaker:
Gilles Michaud, UN Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Safety and Security

Closing Remarks:
Suma Sameer Abdulkarim Alalaiwat, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Bahrain to the United Nations

The post Fireside Chat between Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein and Gilles Michaud appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Dr. Semuhi Sinanoglu argues that existing explanations for the opposition’s success in Hungary are after the fact and secondary. Without Magyar’s legal immunity and financial mobilization, this victory would be impossible.

Dr. Semuhi Sinanoglu argues that existing explanations for the opposition’s success in Hungary are after the fact and secondary. Without Magyar’s legal immunity and financial mobilization, this victory would be impossible.

Dr. Semuhi Sinanoglu argues that existing explanations for the opposition’s success in Hungary are after the fact and secondary. Without Magyar’s legal immunity and financial mobilization, this victory would be impossible.

Climate action is shaped as much by politics as by technology and economics. The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), central to mitigation and adaptation assessments, do not yet include a quantitative representation of political development. We outline a research agenda to systematically integrate political dimensions into climate scenario modelling.

Climate action is shaped as much by politics as by technology and economics. The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), central to mitigation and adaptation assessments, do not yet include a quantitative representation of political development. We outline a research agenda to systematically integrate political dimensions into climate scenario modelling.

Climate action is shaped as much by politics as by technology and economics. The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), central to mitigation and adaptation assessments, do not yet include a quantitative representation of political development. We outline a research agenda to systematically integrate political dimensions into climate scenario modelling.

Ungarn hat es geschafft: Ein autokratisches Regime wurde an der Wahlurne gestürzt. Deutschland muss daraus lernen und die AfD-Propaganda endlich entlarven., Die überwältigende Abwahl Viktor Orbáns bei der ungarischen Parlamentswahl ist ein Zeichen der Hoffnung – für Ungarn, für Europa und für die liberale Demokratie weltweit. Péter Magyar und seine Tisza-Partei haben mit einer Zweidrittelmehrheit und einer Rekordwahlbeteiligung von fast 80 Prozent ...

Heute spricht 'fossilfrei' Host Wolf-Peter Schill mit Kai Wehnemann darüber, ob Deutschland seine Klimaziele erreicht und welche Rolle dabei die von ihm betreuten Treibhausgas-Projektionen des Umweltbundesamts spielen. Als Hintergrund erklärt Kai Wehnemann, wie aufwändig, aber auch wie transparent ...

Wegen des Iran-Kriegs wächst die Sorge, dass es zu Engpässen bei der Kerosin-Versorgung kommt. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Claudia Kemfert, Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im DIW Berlin:

Deutschland steht derzeit nicht vor einem akuten Kerosin-Blackout, aber vor einer ernsthaften Stressprobe. Die Versorgung ist noch stabil, doch anhaltende geopolitische Spannungen treiben Preise und erhöhen den Druck auf die Infrastruktur. Am Ende zahlen vor allem Verbraucher*innen die Rechnung dieser fossilen Krisenabhängigkeit. Das ist der Preis der verschleppten Energiewende.  

Aktuell ist Deutschland noch mit Kerosin versorgt, aber die Lage ist angespannt. Ein Großteil des Kerosins stammt aus heimischen und europäischen Raffinerien, insbesondere aus dem Nordwesteuropa-Raum rund um Rotterdam. Gleichzeitig ist Europa stark importabhängig und globale Lieferketten, etwa über die Straße von Hormus, spielen eine zentrale Rolle. Das macht das System krisenanfällig, auch wenn es aktuell noch stabil wirkt. 

Ein Kerosin-Mangel kann abgewendet werden, wenn schnell gegengesteuert wird. Entscheidend sind zusätzliche Importe, etwa aus den USA, eine höhere Auslastung der Raffinerien sowie der Zugriff auf strategische Reserven. Die Bundesregierung kann hier koordinierend eingreifen, Importwege flexibilisieren und die Verteilung priorisieren. Letztlich ist das aber eine europäische Aufgabe, die enge Abstimmung erfordert.

Reisende müssen sich derzeit eher auf höhere Preise als auf flächendeckende Ausfälle von Flügen einstellen. Airlines könnten bei anhaltender Knappheit einzelne Verbindungen reduzieren, vor allem weniger profitable Strecken. Ein genereller Zusammenbruch des Flugverkehrs ist aber nicht zu erwarten. Die Entwicklung wird sich zunächst über Preise und punktuelle Anpassungen im Flugplan zeigen.  

Bundesinnenminister Alexander Dobrindt hat heute die Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik (PKS) 2025 vorgestellt. Es folgt eine Einschätzung von Anna Bindler, Leiterin der Abteilung Kriminalität, Arbeit und Ungleichheit im DIW Berlin:

Die Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik zeigt insgesamt einen Rückgang in registrierten Straftaten um 5,6 Prozent im Vergleich zu 2024 (ohne ausländerrechtliche Verstöße um 4,4 Prozent), bei Gewaltkriminalität einen Rückgang um 2,3 Prozent. Diese Zahlen reihen sich in längerfristige Entwicklungen ein: Die Kriminalitätsraten sind – bereinigt um ausländerrechtliche Verstöße – seit den 1990er‑Jahren im Trend gesunken.

Effektive Kriminalitätsbekämpfung, insbesondere im Bereich der Prävention, bleibt aber zentral. Denn Kriminalität kostet: Sie belastet den Staat unter anderem durch Polizei- und Justizkosten und verursacht in der Gesellschaft erhebliche (auch finanzielle) Schäden. Neben der erfassten Kriminalität sind Wahrnehmungen von Kriminalität gesellschaftlich und ökonomisch relevant. Unsere Auswertungen der Daten des Sozio‑oekonomischen Panels (SOEP) zeigen zum Beispiel, dass sich in manchen Jahren trotz sinkender Kriminalitätsraten die Sorgen vor Kriminalität erhöht haben. Beides – Kriminalität und das subjektive Sicherheitsgefühl – hat ökonomische Folgen und beeinflusst auch Mobilität und Arbeitsmarktverhalten von Menschen. Das zeigen auch die heute vorgestellten Ergebnisse der Dunkelfeldstudie Sicherheit und Kriminalität in Deutschland (SKiD) für das Jahr 2024.

Internationale Studien schätzen die gesamtwirtschaftlichen Kosten von Kriminalität (materielle Schäden, Folgen für die Opfer, aber auch Vermeidungsverhalten aus Angst) auf bis zu zehn Prozent des Bruttoinlandprodukts. Das unterstreicht die Relevanz einer evidenzbasierten Kriminalitätsprävention und Opferunterstützung. Dazu gehören aus ökonomischer Sicht eine kluge Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik, um in der Wissenschaft aufgezeigte sozio-ökonomische Faktoren für Kriminalität präventiv anzugehen, sowie eine sachliche Berichterstattung und verantwortungsvolle politische Rhetorik, um keine unnötigen Ängste auszulösen.

Die Ergebnisse der PKS müssen dabei mit Vorsicht interpretiert werden. Sie erfasst Verdachtsfälle und bildet das Hellfeld ab. Damit haben neben der Kriminalitätsentwicklung selbst auch das Meldeverhalten in der Bevölkerung und die Prioritätensetzung in der polizeilichen Arbeit einen Einfluss auf die Statistik. Insgesamt bietet die PKS damit nur eine Annäherung an die reale Kriminalitätsentwicklung und sollte gemeinsam mit den Ergebnissen der Dunkelfeldstudien (SKiD, LeSuBiA) interpretiert werden.

Climate-related extreme weather events are increa-singly displacing communities across Southern Africa, with negative implications for social cohesion, livelihoods, and community resilience. Understanding how displacement erodes social cohesion is important for developing strategies for restoring it. Evidence shows that livelihood support interventions, for example, cash‑based assistance, in-kind transfers (agricultural inputs) up to skills development programmes, are a pathway for mending or strengthening social cohesion in displacement contexts. Yet, in some cases, they can further fragment it. This requires strategies under which such interventions can be deployed to positively shape social cohesion outcomes.
This Policy Brief synthesises insights from qualitative research conducted from 2023 to 2025 with displaced communities and host populations in Zimbabwe (Chimanimani and Tsholotsho districts) and Mozambique (Guara Guara, Grudja and Praia Nova). It examines how livelihood interventions can either rebuild or further fragment social cohesion, identifies critical factors driving cohesion outcomes, and provides evidence-based recommendations for national governments, humanitarian actors, and development co-operation actors working in climate-displacement contexts across Southern Africa.
In Zimbabwe, vertical social cohesion in displacement contexts is eroded by a lack of designated policies on displacement, leading to poor socioeconomic outcomes for displaced individuals; ad hoc recovery and reconstruction efforts that undermine durable solutions and long-term recovery; and a lack of accountability infrastructure that undermines trust in the government. In Mozambique, the slow implementation and unequal distribution of recovery interventions undermine cooperation between communities and the institutions involved in post-disaster recovery efforts. This has led to large-scale returns of people to high-risk areas.
Drawing insights from both case studies, we provide key recommendations and conditions for implementing livelihood support to achieve social cohesion in climate-related displacement contexts.
Key policy messages
• Livelihood interventions can lead to maladaptation if not supported by strong governance mechanisms including policy frameworks and institutional coordination in planning and implementation.
• People-centred, area-based approaches to livelihood programming that account for pre-displacement livelihoods and support post-displacement transitions, while benefiting both displaced populations and host communities, should be adopted. One-size-fits-all interventions risk undermining economic recovery and social cohesion.
• Horizontal and vertical social cohesion indicators should be embedded in livelihood programmes from the outset to assess the social impacts before and after implementation.
• Inclusive, participatory decision-making in the delivery of livelihood support programmes should be mandated to prevent exclusionary practices that erode trust in institutions.

Dr Tomy Ncube is a postdoctoral researcher affiliated with the Centre for International Development Innovation at the Ryan Institute, University of Galway, and the School of Geography, Archaeology and Irish Studies.

Climate-related extreme weather events are increa-singly displacing communities across Southern Africa, with negative implications for social cohesion, livelihoods, and community resilience. Understanding how displacement erodes social cohesion is important for developing strategies for restoring it. Evidence shows that livelihood support interventions, for example, cash‑based assistance, in-kind transfers (agricultural inputs) up to skills development programmes, are a pathway for mending or strengthening social cohesion in displacement contexts. Yet, in some cases, they can further fragment it. This requires strategies under which such interventions can be deployed to positively shape social cohesion outcomes.
This Policy Brief synthesises insights from qualitative research conducted from 2023 to 2025 with displaced communities and host populations in Zimbabwe (Chimanimani and Tsholotsho districts) and Mozambique (Guara Guara, Grudja and Praia Nova). It examines how livelihood interventions can either rebuild or further fragment social cohesion, identifies critical factors driving cohesion outcomes, and provides evidence-based recommendations for national governments, humanitarian actors, and development co-operation actors working in climate-displacement contexts across Southern Africa.
In Zimbabwe, vertical social cohesion in displacement contexts is eroded by a lack of designated policies on displacement, leading to poor socioeconomic outcomes for displaced individuals; ad hoc recovery and reconstruction efforts that undermine durable solutions and long-term recovery; and a lack of accountability infrastructure that undermines trust in the government. In Mozambique, the slow implementation and unequal distribution of recovery interventions undermine cooperation between communities and the institutions involved in post-disaster recovery efforts. This has led to large-scale returns of people to high-risk areas.
Drawing insights from both case studies, we provide key recommendations and conditions for implementing livelihood support to achieve social cohesion in climate-related displacement contexts.
Key policy messages
• Livelihood interventions can lead to maladaptation if not supported by strong governance mechanisms including policy frameworks and institutional coordination in planning and implementation.
• People-centred, area-based approaches to livelihood programming that account for pre-displacement livelihoods and support post-displacement transitions, while benefiting both displaced populations and host communities, should be adopted. One-size-fits-all interventions risk undermining economic recovery and social cohesion.
• Horizontal and vertical social cohesion indicators should be embedded in livelihood programmes from the outset to assess the social impacts before and after implementation.
• Inclusive, participatory decision-making in the delivery of livelihood support programmes should be mandated to prevent exclusionary practices that erode trust in institutions.

Dr Tomy Ncube is a postdoctoral researcher affiliated with the Centre for International Development Innovation at the Ryan Institute, University of Galway, and the School of Geography, Archaeology and Irish Studies.

Climate-related extreme weather events are increa-singly displacing communities across Southern Africa, with negative implications for social cohesion, livelihoods, and community resilience. Understanding how displacement erodes social cohesion is important for developing strategies for restoring it. Evidence shows that livelihood support interventions, for example, cash‑based assistance, in-kind transfers (agricultural inputs) up to skills development programmes, are a pathway for mending or strengthening social cohesion in displacement contexts. Yet, in some cases, they can further fragment it. This requires strategies under which such interventions can be deployed to positively shape social cohesion outcomes.
This Policy Brief synthesises insights from qualitative research conducted from 2023 to 2025 with displaced communities and host populations in Zimbabwe (Chimanimani and Tsholotsho districts) and Mozambique (Guara Guara, Grudja and Praia Nova). It examines how livelihood interventions can either rebuild or further fragment social cohesion, identifies critical factors driving cohesion outcomes, and provides evidence-based recommendations for national governments, humanitarian actors, and development co-operation actors working in climate-displacement contexts across Southern Africa.
In Zimbabwe, vertical social cohesion in displacement contexts is eroded by a lack of designated policies on displacement, leading to poor socioeconomic outcomes for displaced individuals; ad hoc recovery and reconstruction efforts that undermine durable solutions and long-term recovery; and a lack of accountability infrastructure that undermines trust in the government. In Mozambique, the slow implementation and unequal distribution of recovery interventions undermine cooperation between communities and the institutions involved in post-disaster recovery efforts. This has led to large-scale returns of people to high-risk areas.
Drawing insights from both case studies, we provide key recommendations and conditions for implementing livelihood support to achieve social cohesion in climate-related displacement contexts.
Key policy messages
• Livelihood interventions can lead to maladaptation if not supported by strong governance mechanisms including policy frameworks and institutional coordination in planning and implementation.
• People-centred, area-based approaches to livelihood programming that account for pre-displacement livelihoods and support post-displacement transitions, while benefiting both displaced populations and host communities, should be adopted. One-size-fits-all interventions risk undermining economic recovery and social cohesion.
• Horizontal and vertical social cohesion indicators should be embedded in livelihood programmes from the outset to assess the social impacts before and after implementation.
• Inclusive, participatory decision-making in the delivery of livelihood support programmes should be mandated to prevent exclusionary practices that erode trust in institutions.

Dr Tomy Ncube is a postdoctoral researcher affiliated with the Centre for International Development Innovation at the Ryan Institute, University of Galway, and the School of Geography, Archaeology and Irish Studies.

This policy brief offers advice for making digital remote work a viable solution to fill labour gaps without requiring workers to physically relocate. From a technology standpoint, there is no reason someone who does computer-based work must physically relocate, assuming they have the required job skills and internet connectivity. The increased use of bilateral labour agreements (BLAs) between countries is evidence that there are major skills gaps and global competition for labour. Indeed, a BLA can serve as a “policy sandbox” where governments negotiate the legal and statutory terms of digital remote work. Digital remote work can be an especially useful solution when the country providing labour has a large pool of people who are willing to work and fill labour pool gaps in countries of employment, but for different legal or personal reasons cannot relocate across borders. This latter point is no small thing: there is a significant body of migration research showing that the majority of people are not interested in moving across borders – or in the case of many refugees are unable to do so. The reasons for this are myriad. Digital labour could be a workaround to meet basic labour demand and facilitate economic inclusion. The word “could” is critical because banking, social and health insurance, and taxation, all of which are components of legal employment, remain bordered. This policy brief will focus on a specific case from research on urban refugee livelihoods where the worker was able to work digitally in the U.S. from Malaysia, while being subject to social security, taxation and insurance in the U.S. The idiosyncrasies in this case help point to spaces for reforming social security, tax and insurance rules to reduce their “bordered-ness” and make digital work more systematically viable.
Key policy messages:
• To make digital remote work viable at scale, development cooperation agencies should play a key facilitator role, linking relevant authorities in the tax, social insurance and banking regulation sectors. This is especially important for refugees, who often cannot move and who fall outside the protection of host country labour laws. These reforms could, for example, be built into BLAs.
• Achieving inclusive economic development goals via digital employment would require that remote workers earned competitive salaries. Thus, there would need to be buy-in from the private sector regarding wage competitiveness for workers in different countries, as well as a role for unions and civil society in negotiating digital remote work policy.
• While digital work can enable greater economic and labour participation for workers who cannot relocate for jobs, there are still sectors that require physical presence. Thus, digital remote work is not a replacement for immigration policy that facilitates safe and flexible migration for those people who do have to move.

This policy brief offers advice for making digital remote work a viable solution to fill labour gaps without requiring workers to physically relocate. From a technology standpoint, there is no reason someone who does computer-based work must physically relocate, assuming they have the required job skills and internet connectivity. The increased use of bilateral labour agreements (BLAs) between countries is evidence that there are major skills gaps and global competition for labour. Indeed, a BLA can serve as a “policy sandbox” where governments negotiate the legal and statutory terms of digital remote work. Digital remote work can be an especially useful solution when the country providing labour has a large pool of people who are willing to work and fill labour pool gaps in countries of employment, but for different legal or personal reasons cannot relocate across borders. This latter point is no small thing: there is a significant body of migration research showing that the majority of people are not interested in moving across borders – or in the case of many refugees are unable to do so. The reasons for this are myriad. Digital labour could be a workaround to meet basic labour demand and facilitate economic inclusion. The word “could” is critical because banking, social and health insurance, and taxation, all of which are components of legal employment, remain bordered. This policy brief will focus on a specific case from research on urban refugee livelihoods where the worker was able to work digitally in the U.S. from Malaysia, while being subject to social security, taxation and insurance in the U.S. The idiosyncrasies in this case help point to spaces for reforming social security, tax and insurance rules to reduce their “bordered-ness” and make digital work more systematically viable.
Key policy messages:
• To make digital remote work viable at scale, development cooperation agencies should play a key facilitator role, linking relevant authorities in the tax, social insurance and banking regulation sectors. This is especially important for refugees, who often cannot move and who fall outside the protection of host country labour laws. These reforms could, for example, be built into BLAs.
• Achieving inclusive economic development goals via digital employment would require that remote workers earned competitive salaries. Thus, there would need to be buy-in from the private sector regarding wage competitiveness for workers in different countries, as well as a role for unions and civil society in negotiating digital remote work policy.
• While digital work can enable greater economic and labour participation for workers who cannot relocate for jobs, there are still sectors that require physical presence. Thus, digital remote work is not a replacement for immigration policy that facilitates safe and flexible migration for those people who do have to move.