It is clear 2026 will not be a routine year for global development cooperation. The US is now a deliberate norm-breaker under Trump 2.0, China is edging into high-income status while insisting it is still “developing”, close to 80 per cent of the population in low- and middle-income countries live under some form of autocracy, and Russia is selling long-term nuclear dependence as a development offer. At the same time middle powers from Brazil to the Gulf states are quietly turning that turmoil into leverage. In a new IDOS Policy Brief we argue that these dynamics are not background noise but the core story that will shape cooperation in the next few years.
It is clear 2026 will not be a routine year for global development cooperation. The US is now a deliberate norm-breaker under Trump 2.0, China is edging into high-income status while insisting it is still “developing”, close to 80 per cent of the population in low- and middle-income countries live under some form of autocracy, and Russia is selling long-term nuclear dependence as a development offer. At the same time middle powers from Brazil to the Gulf states are quietly turning that turmoil into leverage. In a new IDOS Policy Brief we argue that these dynamics are not background noise but the core story that will shape cooperation in the next few years.
It is clear 2026 will not be a routine year for global development cooperation. The US is now a deliberate norm-breaker under Trump 2.0, China is edging into high-income status while insisting it is still “developing”, close to 80 per cent of the population in low- and middle-income countries live under some form of autocracy, and Russia is selling long-term nuclear dependence as a development offer. At the same time middle powers from Brazil to the Gulf states are quietly turning that turmoil into leverage. In a new IDOS Policy Brief we argue that these dynamics are not background noise but the core story that will shape cooperation in the next few years.
Despite strategic rivalry, bureaucratic behavior in China and the United States follows strikingly similar logics. Drawing on comparative research across foreign aid, environmental governance, and pandemic response, we show that Chinese and U.S. bureaucrats are often driven by strikingly similar incentives. Career pressures, blame avoidance, political signaling, and risk aversion shape day-to-day decision-making on both sides — frequently producing comparable outcomes, despite very different political systems. Understanding these shared bureaucratic dynamics helps explain why the two superpowers can appear deeply polarized politically, yet are surprisingly predictable in practice. Beneath geopolitical rivalry, common administrative logics continue to anchor state action.
Despite strategic rivalry, bureaucratic behavior in China and the United States follows strikingly similar logics. Drawing on comparative research across foreign aid, environmental governance, and pandemic response, we show that Chinese and U.S. bureaucrats are often driven by strikingly similar incentives. Career pressures, blame avoidance, political signaling, and risk aversion shape day-to-day decision-making on both sides — frequently producing comparable outcomes, despite very different political systems. Understanding these shared bureaucratic dynamics helps explain why the two superpowers can appear deeply polarized politically, yet are surprisingly predictable in practice. Beneath geopolitical rivalry, common administrative logics continue to anchor state action.
Despite strategic rivalry, bureaucratic behavior in China and the United States follows strikingly similar logics. Drawing on comparative research across foreign aid, environmental governance, and pandemic response, we show that Chinese and U.S. bureaucrats are often driven by strikingly similar incentives. Career pressures, blame avoidance, political signaling, and risk aversion shape day-to-day decision-making on both sides — frequently producing comparable outcomes, despite very different political systems. Understanding these shared bureaucratic dynamics helps explain why the two superpowers can appear deeply polarized politically, yet are surprisingly predictable in practice. Beneath geopolitical rivalry, common administrative logics continue to anchor state action.
Das Postgraduierten-Programm (PGP) des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS, vormals Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, DIE) ist ein renommiertes, neunmonatiges Ausbildungsprogramm für Hochschulabsolvent:innen, das seit 1965 jährlich durchgeführt wird. Ziel ist die gezielte Vorbereitung auf Fach- und Führungsaufgaben in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Die Verbleibstudie wurde anlässlich des 60-jährigen Programmjubiläums 2025 durchgeführt, um erstmals systematisch die Berufswege und den Nutzen des Programms für die bislang fast 1.000 Absolvent:innen zu analysieren. Die Studie basiert auf einer Online-Befragung aller Absolvent:innen der Jahrgänge 1965–2023. Es wurden rund 800 ehemalige Teilnehmer:innen erreicht, von denen sich 366 an der Befragung beteiligten (Rücklaufquote: 46 %). Die Auswertung erfolgte Kohorten vergleichend (10-Jahres-Gruppen), um Hinweise auf über die Zeit erfolgte Veränderungen zu gewinnen. Das PGP des IDOS/DIE hat sich in den Augen der Alumni und Alumnae des Programms als wirkungsvolles Sprungbrett in den Arbeitsbereich der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit erwiesen. Es bietet nach ihren Einschätzungen gute Möglichkeiten für Kompetenzaufbau, Netzwerkbildung und persönliche Entwicklung. Die ehemaligen Absolvent:innen empfehlen das Programm überwiegend weiter, sehen aber auch Potenzial für mehr Praxisnähe, Diversität und gezielte Vernetzung. Ihre Aussagen decken sich mit Aussagen, die bereits in den letzten Jahren in Rückmeldungen von den jeweiligen Kursteilnehmenden geäußert wurden. Sie bestätigen damit die Stoßrichtung grundlegender Reformen des Programms im Jahr 2024. Die Ergebnisse dieser Verbleibstudie liefern weitere Hinweise für die Entwicklung des Programms, um es an die sich wandelnden Anforderungen des Arbeitsmarktes und an die Bedürfnisse künftiger Teilnehmender anzupassen.
Das Postgraduierten-Programm (PGP) des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS, vormals Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, DIE) ist ein renommiertes, neunmonatiges Ausbildungsprogramm für Hochschulabsolvent:innen, das seit 1965 jährlich durchgeführt wird. Ziel ist die gezielte Vorbereitung auf Fach- und Führungsaufgaben in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Die Verbleibstudie wurde anlässlich des 60-jährigen Programmjubiläums 2025 durchgeführt, um erstmals systematisch die Berufswege und den Nutzen des Programms für die bislang fast 1.000 Absolvent:innen zu analysieren. Die Studie basiert auf einer Online-Befragung aller Absolvent:innen der Jahrgänge 1965–2023. Es wurden rund 800 ehemalige Teilnehmer:innen erreicht, von denen sich 366 an der Befragung beteiligten (Rücklaufquote: 46 %). Die Auswertung erfolgte Kohorten vergleichend (10-Jahres-Gruppen), um Hinweise auf über die Zeit erfolgte Veränderungen zu gewinnen. Das PGP des IDOS/DIE hat sich in den Augen der Alumni und Alumnae des Programms als wirkungsvolles Sprungbrett in den Arbeitsbereich der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit erwiesen. Es bietet nach ihren Einschätzungen gute Möglichkeiten für Kompetenzaufbau, Netzwerkbildung und persönliche Entwicklung. Die ehemaligen Absolvent:innen empfehlen das Programm überwiegend weiter, sehen aber auch Potenzial für mehr Praxisnähe, Diversität und gezielte Vernetzung. Ihre Aussagen decken sich mit Aussagen, die bereits in den letzten Jahren in Rückmeldungen von den jeweiligen Kursteilnehmenden geäußert wurden. Sie bestätigen damit die Stoßrichtung grundlegender Reformen des Programms im Jahr 2024. Die Ergebnisse dieser Verbleibstudie liefern weitere Hinweise für die Entwicklung des Programms, um es an die sich wandelnden Anforderungen des Arbeitsmarktes und an die Bedürfnisse künftiger Teilnehmender anzupassen.
Das Postgraduierten-Programm (PGP) des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS, vormals Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, DIE) ist ein renommiertes, neunmonatiges Ausbildungsprogramm für Hochschulabsolvent:innen, das seit 1965 jährlich durchgeführt wird. Ziel ist die gezielte Vorbereitung auf Fach- und Führungsaufgaben in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Die Verbleibstudie wurde anlässlich des 60-jährigen Programmjubiläums 2025 durchgeführt, um erstmals systematisch die Berufswege und den Nutzen des Programms für die bislang fast 1.000 Absolvent:innen zu analysieren. Die Studie basiert auf einer Online-Befragung aller Absolvent:innen der Jahrgänge 1965–2023. Es wurden rund 800 ehemalige Teilnehmer:innen erreicht, von denen sich 366 an der Befragung beteiligten (Rücklaufquote: 46 %). Die Auswertung erfolgte Kohorten vergleichend (10-Jahres-Gruppen), um Hinweise auf über die Zeit erfolgte Veränderungen zu gewinnen. Das PGP des IDOS/DIE hat sich in den Augen der Alumni und Alumnae des Programms als wirkungsvolles Sprungbrett in den Arbeitsbereich der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit erwiesen. Es bietet nach ihren Einschätzungen gute Möglichkeiten für Kompetenzaufbau, Netzwerkbildung und persönliche Entwicklung. Die ehemaligen Absolvent:innen empfehlen das Programm überwiegend weiter, sehen aber auch Potenzial für mehr Praxisnähe, Diversität und gezielte Vernetzung. Ihre Aussagen decken sich mit Aussagen, die bereits in den letzten Jahren in Rückmeldungen von den jeweiligen Kursteilnehmenden geäußert wurden. Sie bestätigen damit die Stoßrichtung grundlegender Reformen des Programms im Jahr 2024. Die Ergebnisse dieser Verbleibstudie liefern weitere Hinweise für die Entwicklung des Programms, um es an die sich wandelnden Anforderungen des Arbeitsmarktes und an die Bedürfnisse künftiger Teilnehmender anzupassen.
This paper examines how citizens in a large middle-income country evaluate the design of cash transfer programmes, and whether these preferences shift when vulnerability is framed as climate-induced. Using a pre-registered online survey in Brazil, we combined a multi-attribute conjoint experiment with a climate information treatment. Respondents evaluated programmes varying in benefit level, eligibility, conditionalities, implementing actor, payment schedule and financing.
Support depends strongly on perceived fairness and financing choices. Expanding eligibility from extreme poverty to poverty substantially increases approval, while further expansion yields no additional gains. Conditionalities (in particular, empowering ones, such as financial training or health check-ups) raise support, whereas work requirements have heterogeneous effects across different social groups. Financing through personal income tax or cuts to existing programmes enjoys lower levels of approval, while corporate taxation and subsidy reductions are more acceptable. Climate information modestly increases solidaristic attitudes but does not eliminate underlying ideological divides. This study highlights how citizens update not only the extent but also the preferred form of redistribution under climate stress.
This paper examines how citizens in a large middle-income country evaluate the design of cash transfer programmes, and whether these preferences shift when vulnerability is framed as climate-induced. Using a pre-registered online survey in Brazil, we combined a multi-attribute conjoint experiment with a climate information treatment. Respondents evaluated programmes varying in benefit level, eligibility, conditionalities, implementing actor, payment schedule and financing.
Support depends strongly on perceived fairness and financing choices. Expanding eligibility from extreme poverty to poverty substantially increases approval, while further expansion yields no additional gains. Conditionalities (in particular, empowering ones, such as financial training or health check-ups) raise support, whereas work requirements have heterogeneous effects across different social groups. Financing through personal income tax or cuts to existing programmes enjoys lower levels of approval, while corporate taxation and subsidy reductions are more acceptable. Climate information modestly increases solidaristic attitudes but does not eliminate underlying ideological divides. This study highlights how citizens update not only the extent but also the preferred form of redistribution under climate stress.
This paper examines how citizens in a large middle-income country evaluate the design of cash transfer programmes, and whether these preferences shift when vulnerability is framed as climate-induced. Using a pre-registered online survey in Brazil, we combined a multi-attribute conjoint experiment with a climate information treatment. Respondents evaluated programmes varying in benefit level, eligibility, conditionalities, implementing actor, payment schedule and financing.
Support depends strongly on perceived fairness and financing choices. Expanding eligibility from extreme poverty to poverty substantially increases approval, while further expansion yields no additional gains. Conditionalities (in particular, empowering ones, such as financial training or health check-ups) raise support, whereas work requirements have heterogeneous effects across different social groups. Financing through personal income tax or cuts to existing programmes enjoys lower levels of approval, while corporate taxation and subsidy reductions are more acceptable. Climate information modestly increases solidaristic attitudes but does not eliminate underlying ideological divides. This study highlights how citizens update not only the extent but also the preferred form of redistribution under climate stress.
Since the 1990s, the G7 has increasingly addressed gender equality in its political declarations. Treating gender equality initially as a challenge to be tackled mainly abroad, the group later acknowledged the need for change in its member countries too. In addition, over the years the G7 shifted from focusing on economic inclusion of women as a means to increase economic growth to considering gender equality as a goal in itself, to be addressed in other policy fields also. To what extent this changing approach to gender equality in the G7's declarations has influenced policy changes within G7 countries and abroad is hard to assess. In principle, the G7 has the potential to exercise two functions with respect to gender equality. First, the G7 might coordinate group members’ national policies and the activities of international organisations in this area. However, given the democratic deficits of the G7, it is questionable whether it is desirable for the group to exercise this function, especially since it does not seem necessary for the effectiveness of gender equality policies that these policies are internationally coordinated. Second, the G7 could serve as a forum for the transnational exchange of experiences and ideas.
Since the 1990s, the G7 has increasingly addressed gender equality in its political declarations. Treating gender equality initially as a challenge to be tackled mainly abroad, the group later acknowledged the need for change in its member countries too. In addition, over the years the G7 shifted from focusing on economic inclusion of women as a means to increase economic growth to considering gender equality as a goal in itself, to be addressed in other policy fields also. To what extent this changing approach to gender equality in the G7's declarations has influenced policy changes within G7 countries and abroad is hard to assess. In principle, the G7 has the potential to exercise two functions with respect to gender equality. First, the G7 might coordinate group members’ national policies and the activities of international organisations in this area. However, given the democratic deficits of the G7, it is questionable whether it is desirable for the group to exercise this function, especially since it does not seem necessary for the effectiveness of gender equality policies that these policies are internationally coordinated. Second, the G7 could serve as a forum for the transnational exchange of experiences and ideas.
Since the 1990s, the G7 has increasingly addressed gender equality in its political declarations. Treating gender equality initially as a challenge to be tackled mainly abroad, the group later acknowledged the need for change in its member countries too. In addition, over the years the G7 shifted from focusing on economic inclusion of women as a means to increase economic growth to considering gender equality as a goal in itself, to be addressed in other policy fields also. To what extent this changing approach to gender equality in the G7's declarations has influenced policy changes within G7 countries and abroad is hard to assess. In principle, the G7 has the potential to exercise two functions with respect to gender equality. First, the G7 might coordinate group members’ national policies and the activities of international organisations in this area. However, given the democratic deficits of the G7, it is questionable whether it is desirable for the group to exercise this function, especially since it does not seem necessary for the effectiveness of gender equality policies that these policies are internationally coordinated. Second, the G7 could serve as a forum for the transnational exchange of experiences and ideas.