Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

In many arid and semi-arid regions, rural women are at the heart of water-related dynamics – and therefore greatly affected by its scarcity. This scarcity affects their daily lives, farming activities, economic initiatives and solidarity networks, which are directly dependent on the availability of this resource. These women are often more vulnerable to climate change because of the difficulties they sometimes experience in accessing public services, land, water and institutions. At the same time, they play a central role in the rural development of the oases, in particular through their know-how, initiatives and ability to adapt. This policy brief analyses the experiences of women in the oases of south-eastern Morocco. It shows that water stress acts as a multidimensional factor which redefines women’s domestic tasks, agricultural practices, economic opportunities and forms of sociability, as well as their contribution to development. It highlights three major challenges facing women in vulnerable rural areas: (a) limited access to resources (land, credit, infrastructure and education); (b) training that is often ill-suited to rural realities and their needs; and (c) social norms that restrict their participation in decision-making bodies and spaces. The heterogeneity of the women encountered and of their needs underlines the necessity for targeted and diverse approaches. The example of Moroccan oases also shows the importance of considering water in all its dimensions: domestic, agricultural, economic and institutional. This would provide a better understanding of both women’s vulnerabilities and their contributions to sustainable development. The lessons learnt from the Moroccan oases provide a benchmark for other arid countries, highlighting four action areas for Moroccan institutions and development policies:
1. Produce and disseminate gendered data
• Collect information disaggregated by gender, age, socio-economic status and other factors.
• Map women’s vulnerabilities, resources and skills.
• Ensure better circulation of these data between the field and decision-makers to provide appropriate support.
2. Support women’s access to public services, land and credit
• Promote access to health and education services according to specific needs, as well as access to credit and land.
3. Support women’s initiatives
• Support collective and individual initiatives through appropriate training, access to finance, and product development and marketing.
4. Support changes in social norms and institutional representation
• Integrate the cultural and social dimensions into development policies and programmes.
• Promote changes in the social representations of women’s roles and abilities.
• Promote the diversity of women’s initiatives and facilitate the participation of women in governance institutions, including water governance, through training and awareness-raising.

Hind Ftouhi is a senior researcher at the Institut National d’Aménagement et d'Urbanisme (INAU-Rabat).
Lisa Bossenbroek is a senior researcher at the Centre de Recherche sur les Sociétés Contemporaines (CRESC-Rabat).
Amal Belghazi is a doctoral student at l’Université Hassan II, Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines et sociales Ain Chock in Casablanca.

In many arid and semi-arid regions, rural women are at the heart of water-related dynamics – and therefore greatly affected by its scarcity. This scarcity affects their daily lives, farming activities, economic initiatives and solidarity networks, which are directly dependent on the availability of this resource. These women are often more vulnerable to climate change because of the difficulties they sometimes experience in accessing public services, land, water and institutions. At the same time, they play a central role in the rural development of the oases, in particular through their know-how, initiatives and ability to adapt. This policy brief analyses the experiences of women in the oases of south-eastern Morocco. It shows that water stress acts as a multidimensional factor which redefines women’s domestic tasks, agricultural practices, economic opportunities and forms of sociability, as well as their contribution to development. It highlights three major challenges facing women in vulnerable rural areas: (a) limited access to resources (land, credit, infrastructure and education); (b) training that is often ill-suited to rural realities and their needs; and (c) social norms that restrict their participation in decision-making bodies and spaces. The heterogeneity of the women encountered and of their needs underlines the necessity for targeted and diverse approaches. The example of Moroccan oases also shows the importance of considering water in all its dimensions: domestic, agricultural, economic and institutional. This would provide a better understanding of both women’s vulnerabilities and their contributions to sustainable development. The lessons learnt from the Moroccan oases provide a benchmark for other arid countries, highlighting four action areas for Moroccan institutions and development policies:
1. Produce and disseminate gendered data
• Collect information disaggregated by gender, age, socio-economic status and other factors.
• Map women’s vulnerabilities, resources and skills.
• Ensure better circulation of these data between the field and decision-makers to provide appropriate support.
2. Support women’s access to public services, land and credit
• Promote access to health and education services according to specific needs, as well as access to credit and land.
3. Support women’s initiatives
• Support collective and individual initiatives through appropriate training, access to finance, and product development and marketing.
4. Support changes in social norms and institutional representation
• Integrate the cultural and social dimensions into development policies and programmes.
• Promote changes in the social representations of women’s roles and abilities.
• Promote the diversity of women’s initiatives and facilitate the participation of women in governance institutions, including water governance, through training and awareness-raising.

Hind Ftouhi is a senior researcher at the Institut National d’Aménagement et d'Urbanisme (INAU-Rabat).
Lisa Bossenbroek is a senior researcher at the Centre de Recherche sur les Sociétés Contemporaines (CRESC-Rabat).
Amal Belghazi is a doctoral student at l’Université Hassan II, Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines et sociales Ain Chock in Casablanca.

In many arid and semi-arid regions, rural women are at the heart of water-related dynamics – and therefore greatly affected by its scarcity. This scarcity affects their daily lives, farming activities, economic initiatives and solidarity networks, which are directly dependent on the availability of this resource. These women are often more vulnerable to climate change because of the difficulties they sometimes experience in accessing public services, land, water and institutions. At the same time, they play a central role in the rural development of the oases, in particular through their know-how, initiatives and ability to adapt. This policy brief analyses the experiences of women in the oases of south-eastern Morocco. It shows that water stress acts as a multidimensional factor which redefines women’s domestic tasks, agricultural practices, economic opportunities and forms of sociability, as well as their contribution to development. It highlights three major challenges facing women in vulnerable rural areas: (a) limited access to resources (land, credit, infrastructure and education); (b) training that is often ill-suited to rural realities and their needs; and (c) social norms that restrict their participation in decision-making bodies and spaces. The heterogeneity of the women encountered and of their needs underlines the necessity for targeted and diverse approaches. The example of Moroccan oases also shows the importance of considering water in all its dimensions: domestic, agricultural, economic and institutional. This would provide a better understanding of both women’s vulnerabilities and their contributions to sustainable development. The lessons learnt from the Moroccan oases provide a benchmark for other arid countries, highlighting four action areas for Moroccan institutions and development policies:
1. Produce and disseminate gendered data
• Collect information disaggregated by gender, age, socio-economic status and other factors.
• Map women’s vulnerabilities, resources and skills.
• Ensure better circulation of these data between the field and decision-makers to provide appropriate support.
2. Support women’s access to public services, land and credit
• Promote access to health and education services according to specific needs, as well as access to credit and land.
3. Support women’s initiatives
• Support collective and individual initiatives through appropriate training, access to finance, and product development and marketing.
4. Support changes in social norms and institutional representation
• Integrate the cultural and social dimensions into development policies and programmes.
• Promote changes in the social representations of women’s roles and abilities.
• Promote the diversity of women’s initiatives and facilitate the participation of women in governance institutions, including water governance, through training and awareness-raising.

Hind Ftouhi is a senior researcher at the Institut National d’Aménagement et d'Urbanisme (INAU-Rabat).
Lisa Bossenbroek is a senior researcher at the Centre de Recherche sur les Sociétés Contemporaines (CRESC-Rabat).
Amal Belghazi is a doctoral student at l’Université Hassan II, Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines et sociales Ain Chock in Casablanca.

Die am DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomische Panel (SOEP) ist eine der größten und am längsten laufenden multidisziplinären Panelstudien weltweit, für die derzeit jährlich etwa 30.000 Menschen in knapp 15.000 Haushalten befragt werden. Das SOEP hat den Anspruch den gesellschaftlichen Wandel zu erfassen und steht somit immer neuen und vielfältigen Themen- und Aufgabenfelder gegenüber. Seine Datenerhebung und -generierung folgt dem Konzept des Survey bzw. Data Life Cycle.

Die ausgeschriebene Stelle ist Teil des Projekts „RDCnet“. Ziel des RDCnet ist es, den Zugang zu sensiblen Forschungsdaten für Wissenschaftler*innen zu erleichtern und so datengetriebene Forschung nachhaltig zu fördern. Das Projekt ist in das tragende Konsortium KonsortSWD eingebettet, das als Teil der NFDI die Infrastruktur für Sozial-, Verhaltens-, Bildungs- und Wirtschaftsdaten in Deutschland weiterentwickelt. Im Sinne der FAIR-Prinzipien arbeitet KonsortSWD unter anderem daran, die Forschungsdatenlandschaft zu verbessern und den Austausch von Daten über Disziplinen und Institutionen hinweg zu stärken.

Zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt suchen wir eine*n

Softwareentwickler*in (Full-Stack) (w/m/div) (Vollzeit/Teilzeit)

Das Konjunkturbarometer des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) hat sich im November leicht erholt und steht bei 92,9 Punkten. Im Oktober war der vorherige Aufwärtstrend noch durch ein Absacken auf 91,1 Punkte unterbrochen worden. Der Wert rückt somit wieder etwas näher an die ...

DIW-Studie wertet auf Basis des Mikrozensus 2022 die Erwerbstätigkeit älterer Menschen in Deutschland aus – Jeder 15. im Alter von 66 oder älter ist noch erwerbstätig – Gesundheit und Ausbildung beeinflussen Erwerbsbeteiligung älterer Menschen entscheidend Nach Erreichen der Regelaltersgrenze sind ...

Over the past decade, cooperative climate action has become a central feature of global climate governance. Thousands of businesses, subnational governments, civil society organizations, and international partnerships have mobilized to complement and support multilateral and state-led efforts. Using insights from the CoAct Database (formerly N-CID), and data from a sample of 387 initiatives, this chapter takes stock of developments since 2013 and looks ahead to how cooperative action can contribute to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, particularly addressing priorities arising from the Global Stocktake (GST). Our analysis yields five headline findings. 1. Rapid expansion, but uneven focus. CCIs have multiplied since 2015 and increasingly address adaptation, yet mitigation continues to dominate. While themes such as energy, land use, and industry remain strong, adaptation-related themes, e.g., particularly water, oceans, and resilience, remain underrepresented. 2. Effectiveness is improving, but equity gaps persist. Many CCIs now deliver more tangible outputs and report more systematically, yet overall output effectiveness has plateaued since 2018. Smaller and less-resourced initiatives often lag behind due to capacity constraints, while limited accountability mechanisms—such as monitoring, transparent governance, and membership control—continue to hinder performance. 3. Participation has broadened, but inclusivity remains limited. Participation of actors in CCIs has expanded, but leadership and decision-making remain concentrated among Northern and institutional actors. Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs) are largely absent from governance structures, while engagement of businesses, investors, and local civil society has stagnated in recent years. 4. Stronger alignment with global priorities is needed. Future orchestration should strengthen coherence between CCIs and priorities in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, for instance those emerging from the Global Stocktake (GST). Integrating adaptation, nature, and resilience more effectively—and fostering synergies across thematic axes such as energy–nature, food–energy, and cities–ecosystems—can enhance the systemic impact of cooperative climate action. 5. The next five years are critical. To sustain momentum and credibility, CCIs and orchestrators, such as the High-Level Climate Champions, COP presidencies and the UNFCCC secretariat, must focus on inclusion, capacity, and accountability—especially in underrepresented regions. Expanding implementation and participation in low- and middle-income countries will improve both effectiveness and procedural justice. Deliberate orchestration by COP Presidencies, policymakers, and leading CCIs can ensure that cooperative climate action evolves toward greater balance, legitimacy, and transformative impact. While cooperative climate action has expanded and matured over the past decade, its transformative potential remains only partly realized, calling for deeper structural and systemic change. As the world moves on to implement the Paris Agreement, cooperative initiatives should help accelerate ambition, bridge gaps in implementation, and foster more equitable and effective global climate action.

Over the past decade, cooperative climate action has become a central feature of global climate governance. Thousands of businesses, subnational governments, civil society organizations, and international partnerships have mobilized to complement and support multilateral and state-led efforts. Using insights from the CoAct Database (formerly N-CID), and data from a sample of 387 initiatives, this chapter takes stock of developments since 2013 and looks ahead to how cooperative action can contribute to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, particularly addressing priorities arising from the Global Stocktake (GST). Our analysis yields five headline findings. 1. Rapid expansion, but uneven focus. CCIs have multiplied since 2015 and increasingly address adaptation, yet mitigation continues to dominate. While themes such as energy, land use, and industry remain strong, adaptation-related themes, e.g., particularly water, oceans, and resilience, remain underrepresented. 2. Effectiveness is improving, but equity gaps persist. Many CCIs now deliver more tangible outputs and report more systematically, yet overall output effectiveness has plateaued since 2018. Smaller and less-resourced initiatives often lag behind due to capacity constraints, while limited accountability mechanisms—such as monitoring, transparent governance, and membership control—continue to hinder performance. 3. Participation has broadened, but inclusivity remains limited. Participation of actors in CCIs has expanded, but leadership and decision-making remain concentrated among Northern and institutional actors. Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs) are largely absent from governance structures, while engagement of businesses, investors, and local civil society has stagnated in recent years. 4. Stronger alignment with global priorities is needed. Future orchestration should strengthen coherence between CCIs and priorities in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, for instance those emerging from the Global Stocktake (GST). Integrating adaptation, nature, and resilience more effectively—and fostering synergies across thematic axes such as energy–nature, food–energy, and cities–ecosystems—can enhance the systemic impact of cooperative climate action. 5. The next five years are critical. To sustain momentum and credibility, CCIs and orchestrators, such as the High-Level Climate Champions, COP presidencies and the UNFCCC secretariat, must focus on inclusion, capacity, and accountability—especially in underrepresented regions. Expanding implementation and participation in low- and middle-income countries will improve both effectiveness and procedural justice. Deliberate orchestration by COP Presidencies, policymakers, and leading CCIs can ensure that cooperative climate action evolves toward greater balance, legitimacy, and transformative impact. While cooperative climate action has expanded and matured over the past decade, its transformative potential remains only partly realized, calling for deeper structural and systemic change. As the world moves on to implement the Paris Agreement, cooperative initiatives should help accelerate ambition, bridge gaps in implementation, and foster more equitable and effective global climate action.

Over the past decade, cooperative climate action has become a central feature of global climate governance. Thousands of businesses, subnational governments, civil society organizations, and international partnerships have mobilized to complement and support multilateral and state-led efforts. Using insights from the CoAct Database (formerly N-CID), and data from a sample of 387 initiatives, this chapter takes stock of developments since 2013 and looks ahead to how cooperative action can contribute to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, particularly addressing priorities arising from the Global Stocktake (GST). Our analysis yields five headline findings. 1. Rapid expansion, but uneven focus. CCIs have multiplied since 2015 and increasingly address adaptation, yet mitigation continues to dominate. While themes such as energy, land use, and industry remain strong, adaptation-related themes, e.g., particularly water, oceans, and resilience, remain underrepresented. 2. Effectiveness is improving, but equity gaps persist. Many CCIs now deliver more tangible outputs and report more systematically, yet overall output effectiveness has plateaued since 2018. Smaller and less-resourced initiatives often lag behind due to capacity constraints, while limited accountability mechanisms—such as monitoring, transparent governance, and membership control—continue to hinder performance. 3. Participation has broadened, but inclusivity remains limited. Participation of actors in CCIs has expanded, but leadership and decision-making remain concentrated among Northern and institutional actors. Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs) are largely absent from governance structures, while engagement of businesses, investors, and local civil society has stagnated in recent years. 4. Stronger alignment with global priorities is needed. Future orchestration should strengthen coherence between CCIs and priorities in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, for instance those emerging from the Global Stocktake (GST). Integrating adaptation, nature, and resilience more effectively—and fostering synergies across thematic axes such as energy–nature, food–energy, and cities–ecosystems—can enhance the systemic impact of cooperative climate action. 5. The next five years are critical. To sustain momentum and credibility, CCIs and orchestrators, such as the High-Level Climate Champions, COP presidencies and the UNFCCC secretariat, must focus on inclusion, capacity, and accountability—especially in underrepresented regions. Expanding implementation and participation in low- and middle-income countries will improve both effectiveness and procedural justice. Deliberate orchestration by COP Presidencies, policymakers, and leading CCIs can ensure that cooperative climate action evolves toward greater balance, legitimacy, and transformative impact. While cooperative climate action has expanded and matured over the past decade, its transformative potential remains only partly realized, calling for deeper structural and systemic change. As the world moves on to implement the Paris Agreement, cooperative initiatives should help accelerate ambition, bridge gaps in implementation, and foster more equitable and effective global climate action.

Climate and biodiversity are inseparable, yet global action to address them remains divided. As countries and non-state actors ramp up pledges, analysis and monitoring often lack one essential ingredient: knowing where implementation actually happens. Without spatial data, we cannot see progress, verify impact, or ensure fair outcomes. This commentary, addressing policymakers at UNFCCC COP30 and beyond, urges that climate and biodiversity tracking be rooted in place.

Climate and biodiversity are inseparable, yet global action to address them remains divided. As countries and non-state actors ramp up pledges, analysis and monitoring often lack one essential ingredient: knowing where implementation actually happens. Without spatial data, we cannot see progress, verify impact, or ensure fair outcomes. This commentary, addressing policymakers at UNFCCC COP30 and beyond, urges that climate and biodiversity tracking be rooted in place.

Climate and biodiversity are inseparable, yet global action to address them remains divided. As countries and non-state actors ramp up pledges, analysis and monitoring often lack one essential ingredient: knowing where implementation actually happens. Without spatial data, we cannot see progress, verify impact, or ensure fair outcomes. This commentary, addressing policymakers at UNFCCC COP30 and beyond, urges that climate and biodiversity tracking be rooted in place.

A Parlament elfogadta második időközi jelentését Magyarország jogállamiságának tartós aláásásáról és az uniós értékek folyamatos megsértéséről.
Állampolgári Jogi, Bel- és Igazságügyi Bizottság

Forrás : © Európai Unió, 2025 - EP

George Dikaios, Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

The Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has concluded without impressive results. What seems to be confirmed is that the international community understands the need to combat climate change, as an agreement was reached at the last minute. However, neither the required progress (on what was already agreed upon since 2015) was observed, nor the political will to breathe new life into the implementation of existing policies (which would lead to achieving the goal of maintaining the Earth’s average temperature at 1.5 degrees Celsius). The current political situation is challenging, and the results of COP30 were easy to agree on: a promise to increase funding for adaptation to climate change, the creation of a just transition mechanism, and the recognition of indigenous rights. Once again, there was no agreement on the process of transitioning to climate neutrality (and thus reducing the use of fossil fuels), nor on other critical issues, such as deforestation (which was expected as COP30 took place in Brazil). Even worse, there seems to have been an informal agreement to leave the burden of active climate action to “coalitions of the willing” operating outside the United Nations framework, as the latter seems to be a victim of the current trend of drifting away from multilateral cooperation.

Emmanuella Doussis, Professor, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens; Head of the Climate and Sustainability Programme and Senior Policy Advisor, ELIAMEP

Every year, as the annual COP meeting on Climate Change is drawing to a close, a major debate starts up on how effectively the system of international cooperation is tackling climate change. This is because greenhouse gas emissions are still rising, despite the promises and ambitious plans to switch to clean energy and reduce these harmful emissions. At the same time, the current geopolitical stand-offs continue to pose unprecedented challenges for multilateral cooperation.  This year’s conference in Belém, on the Amazon, concluded without major decisions being made on the implementation of the Paris Agreement and, in particular, on a phase-out roadmap for fossil fuels. Instead, the main outcomes of COP30 were a voluntary fossil fuel reduction plan, a new target to triple climate change adaptation financing, and a mechanism for a just transition.  It is clear that the annual global climate conference cannot provide both meaningful and all the solutions to climate change, especially given the absence of a willingness to self-limit on the part of the major polluters. Substantial agreements are not possible (or even realistic) when there are 200 countries around the negotiating table, each at their own level of development and with their own priorities, interests and levels of harmful emissions. But COP can serve as a guide to what the international community is collectively willing to do to prevent further global warming, and indicate what needs to be done to achieve this goal.

Othon Kaminiaris, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

COP30 concluded after two weeks of difficult negotiations, resulting in the adoption of 29 decisions, the “Belém Package.” This package includes several substantive steps toward implementation: the establishment of a just transition mechanism, the commitment to triple adaptation finance by 2035, and the completion of 59 voluntary indicators to track progress under the Global Goal on Adaptation. In addition, and though outside the formal decisions, the conference advanced, under Brazil’s initiative, the FINI (Fostering Investible National Implementation) mechanism for financing mature adaptation projects, as well as the Tropical Forests Forever Facility, which mobilized USD 6.7 billion for the protection of tropical forests.

However, the central political deadlock remained: no reference to phasing out fossil fuels was included in the official decisions, despite pressure from at least 80 countries. Thus, while adaptation, finance, and just transition were strengthened, no path was agreed on for decreasing global emissions in the coming years. As a counterweight, Colombia and the Netherlands announced that they will co-host, outside the UNFCCC framework, the First International Conference on the Just Transition Away from Fossil Fuels in April 2026, an initiative that may give an impetus to the COP process itself.

Looking ahead to COP31 in Turkey at the end of 2026, two issues, thus, remain unresolved:
a new collective climate finance goal (NCQG) that also covers mitigation, and the need for a shared approach to emission reductions in a decade requiring rapid and decisive acceleration.

Cheryl Novak, Research Associate, ELIAMEP

COP30 fell short of its central mandate, which is to accelerate collective action to keep global warming to 1.5°C and to establish a credible pathway for the phase-out of fossil fuels. The summit made progress on areas such as adaptation finance, Indigenous-led protection, and nature-based solutions, including the announcement of prominent initiatives like the Tropical Forests Forever Facility. Yet COP30 ultimately underscored the challenges of consensus-based multilateralism in a global environment characterized by divergent interests. UN Climate Chief Simon Stiell underscored COP30’s issues in his closing remarks, stating, “denial, division and geopolitics has dealt international cooperation some heavy blows this year.”

In response to the lack of progress on COP30’s core mission, its President, André Corrêa do Lago, announced plans to develop two “roadmaps” outside the formal negotiating process: one to halt and reverse deforestation, and another to support a just and orderly transition away from fossil fuels. Whether these parallel tracks can help unlock progress at COP31, or signal the beginning of a deeper schism between fossil-fuel-dependent states and more ambitious parties remains uncertain. Frustration over COPs opaque decision-making process and state accountability remains, as consensus rules mean countries’ positions on key provisions are undisclosed. Moreover, as in previous conferences, observers highlighted the significant presence of fossil-fuel-aligned interest groups seeking to shape outcomes. Participation by Indigenous, youth, and feminist organizations reached record levels, yet Indigenous representatives argued that their involvement remains largely symbolic and some staged blockades calling for stronger protections.

For countries in the Mediterranean, these shortcomings have direct implications. Under current policies, global warming projects now stand at 2.5–3.5°C, and Med region is warming 20% faster than the global average. This heightens existing pressures on water systems, agriculture, and food security. In this context, global agreements matter, but local action will be decisive for the future of the people of the region. Greece and its neighbors will need to accelerate renewable energy deployment, strengthen water and food systems resilience, and integrate climate risk across all planning processes. Regardless of multilateral setbacks, prioritizing climate security and system resilience should remain central to Greece’s national strategy.

 

European Seminars on the Economics of Crime take place on Fridays, 1pm - 2pm (2 - 3pm CET), unless otherwise stated. This series is part of the CEP's Crime Research Group. The seminars are co-organised with Anna Bindler (DIW Berlin and University of Potsdam), Gianmarco Daniele (CLEAN Unit, Bocconi ...

Violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has resulted in population displacement, psychological trauma, and the destruction of livelihoods, which has hindered economic growth. These events have increased in frequency and severity over time in the region. Violent conflict disrupts children’s human capital accumulation through widespread malnutrition and the disruption of social and emotional skills that should have been acquired in early childhood. This study aims to estimate the relationship between early-life exposure to violent conflict and children’s human capital formation (focusing on child health, nutrition, and schooling) in four selected SSA countries since 2003. Using nationally representative Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) merged with georeferenced conflict data, the study finds that children exposed to violent conflict, measured by the number of fatalities, experience reduced human capital formation, including stunted growth, underweight status, and lower educational outcomes. Specifically, children in households exposed to violent conflict have higher dropout rates (given their enrollment) and experience delays in completing primary school. Furthermore, the impact of conflict on long-term malnutrition is particularly pronounced among young children and those living in rural areas. Limited access to health facilities during or after conflict, disruptions in livelihoods and/or markets that result in deprivations in the dietary intake of children and mothers, and the place of residence appear to be the underlying mechanisms.

Violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has resulted in population displacement, psychological trauma, and the destruction of livelihoods, which has hindered economic growth. These events have increased in frequency and severity over time in the region. Violent conflict disrupts children’s human capital accumulation through widespread malnutrition and the disruption of social and emotional skills that should have been acquired in early childhood. This study aims to estimate the relationship between early-life exposure to violent conflict and children’s human capital formation (focusing on child health, nutrition, and schooling) in four selected SSA countries since 2003. Using nationally representative Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) merged with georeferenced conflict data, the study finds that children exposed to violent conflict, measured by the number of fatalities, experience reduced human capital formation, including stunted growth, underweight status, and lower educational outcomes. Specifically, children in households exposed to violent conflict have higher dropout rates (given their enrollment) and experience delays in completing primary school. Furthermore, the impact of conflict on long-term malnutrition is particularly pronounced among young children and those living in rural areas. Limited access to health facilities during or after conflict, disruptions in livelihoods and/or markets that result in deprivations in the dietary intake of children and mothers, and the place of residence appear to be the underlying mechanisms.

Violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has resulted in population displacement, psychological trauma, and the destruction of livelihoods, which has hindered economic growth. These events have increased in frequency and severity over time in the region. Violent conflict disrupts children’s human capital accumulation through widespread malnutrition and the disruption of social and emotional skills that should have been acquired in early childhood. This study aims to estimate the relationship between early-life exposure to violent conflict and children’s human capital formation (focusing on child health, nutrition, and schooling) in four selected SSA countries since 2003. Using nationally representative Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) merged with georeferenced conflict data, the study finds that children exposed to violent conflict, measured by the number of fatalities, experience reduced human capital formation, including stunted growth, underweight status, and lower educational outcomes. Specifically, children in households exposed to violent conflict have higher dropout rates (given their enrollment) and experience delays in completing primary school. Furthermore, the impact of conflict on long-term malnutrition is particularly pronounced among young children and those living in rural areas. Limited access to health facilities during or after conflict, disruptions in livelihoods and/or markets that result in deprivations in the dietary intake of children and mothers, and the place of residence appear to be the underlying mechanisms.

Bonn, 24. November 2025. Zivilgesellschaft ist kein Allheilmittel gegen Autokratisierung. Sie kann jedoch Rechtsverletzungen offenlegen und zu Pluralismus beitragen – daher verdient sie gezielte Förderung.

Zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen stehen weltweit unter Druck – und das von mehreren Seiten. Der weltweite Trend der Autokratisierung schränkt den Raum für die Zivilgesellschaft ein. Gleichzeitig brechen vielen Organisationen die Finanzierungsquellen weg. Zu den Verlusten durch die Abwicklung der United States Agency for International Development (USAID) kommen Kürzungen bei anderen Gebern wie Großbritannien und den skandinavischen Ländern. Zudem steht die organisierte Zivilgesellschaft in Form von Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGOs) seit langem in der Kritik, nicht demokratisch legitimiert zu sein und im Globalen Süden oft die Agenden westlicher Geber zu implementieren.

Auf deutscher Seite werfen die Kürzungen im Haushalt des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) die Frage nach einer Ausgabenpriorisierung auf. Trotz vieler Herausforderungen sollte die Zivilgesellschaftsförderung nicht heruntergefahren, sondern vielmehr gezielt zum Schutz der Demokratie eingesetzt werden. Denn eine starke Zivilgesellschaft kann durchaus wichtige Beiträge im Kampf gegen Autokratisierung leisten.

Ein Plädoyer für Realismus

Seit den 1990er Jahren wurden zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen von westlichen Gebern oft idealisiert. Dabei kam es vielfach zu einer Gleichsetzung von Zivilgesellschaft und NGOs, welche nicht nur in der Demokratieförderung, sondern auch bei der Erbringung sozialer Dienstleistungen als eine Art Allheilmittel („magic bullet“) angesehen wurden. Sie galten als besonders bevölkerungsnah und kosteneffektiv.

Diese Zeiten sind vorbei. NGOs werden nicht nur von autoritären Regierungen immer weiter eingeschränkt, sondern auch kritische Stimmen aus den eigenen Reihen zweifeln an ihrer Effektivität. Wo sie als Demokratieförderer auftreten, regt sich Kritik an ihrer demokratischen Legitimation. Zudem werfen Kritiker*innen aus dem Globalen Süden NGOs vor, vorrangig Geberagenden zu implementieren. NGOs können auch neue Hierarchien schaffen, indem sie „für“ marginalisierte Gruppen sprechen – anstatt diese zu befähigen, für sich selbst zu sprechen.

Was Zivilgesellschaft für Demokratie leisten kann

Klar ist: Professionelle NGOs im Globalen Süden sind selten Mitgliederorganisationen und sind nicht demokratisch gewählt. Demokratische Parteien können sie nicht ersetzen. Ihre Stärke liegt aber darin, einzelne Themen („issues“) auf die politische Agenda zu setzen. Was sie wirklich können, ist, in den Sektoren, in denen sie Expertise haben, den Finger in die Wunde zu legen.

Durch Advocacy, Lobbyarbeit und Recherche bringen NGOs Menschenrechtsverletzungen und andere Probleme wie Umweltverschmutzung an die Öffentlichkeit. Damit leisten sie wichtige Beiträge zur politischen Meinungsbildung und erhöhen die Transparenz und Rechenschaftspflicht der Regierung. In einigen Ländern wie Malawi oder im Senegal trug die Mobilisierung durch NGOs dazu bei, die Aufhebung von Amtszeitbeschränkungen zu verhindern.

Wo Oppositionsparteien verboten oder eingeschränkt werden, leisten NGOs einen begrenzten aber wichtigen Beitrag zu politischem Pluralismus. So zählen im autoritären Einparteienregime Kambodschas die Workshops von NGOs mittlerweile zu den wenigen verbliebenen Räumen, in denen Bürger*innen kritische Ansichten diskutieren können.

Gleichzeitig gilt es, den Blick auf Zivilgesellschaft zu weiten. Jüngst waren es die Proteste der jungen Generation (GenZ), die in Ländern wie Madagaskar, Kenia und Bangladesch, autokratische oder korrupte Regime herausfordern. Soziale Bewegungen, Gewerkschaften und religiöse Vereinigungen entfalten oft hohen Reformdruck. Nicht immer sprechen diese Akteure – im wörtlichen wie im übertragenen Sinne – die Sprache der Geber. Doch setzen sie autoritären Regierungen oft mehr entgegen und sind stärker in der Bevölkerung verwurzelt als professionalisierte NGOs.

Gezielt fördern

Daher sollten die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und andere Geber die Förderung von Zivilgesellschaft fortsetzen und die nötigen Mittel bereitstellen. Gerade in Zeiten knapper Kassen sollte genau geprüft werden, welche Ziele mit der Förderung erreicht werden sollen. Vorrangig förderungswürdig sind Organisationen, die Regierungen zur Rechenschaft ziehen und sich für Menschenrechte, Transparenz und Pluralismus einsetzen. Realismus hinsichtlich der Leistungen von NGOs ist angebracht. Doch wo sie zum Schutz der Demokratie in den Partnerländern beitragen, sollte die deutsche Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik dies fördern. Zudem gilt es, auch anderen Akteuren der Zivilgesellschaft, die wichtige demokratische Beiträge leisten – wie sozialen Bewegungen, Gewerkschaften und informellen Gruppen – bessere Zugänge zu Förderung und politischer Unterstützung zu eröffnen.

Bonn, 24. November 2025. Zivilgesellschaft ist kein Allheilmittel gegen Autokratisierung. Sie kann jedoch Rechtsverletzungen offenlegen und zu Pluralismus beitragen – daher verdient sie gezielte Förderung.

Zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen stehen weltweit unter Druck – und das von mehreren Seiten. Der weltweite Trend der Autokratisierung schränkt den Raum für die Zivilgesellschaft ein. Gleichzeitig brechen vielen Organisationen die Finanzierungsquellen weg. Zu den Verlusten durch die Abwicklung der United States Agency for International Development (USAID) kommen Kürzungen bei anderen Gebern wie Großbritannien und den skandinavischen Ländern. Zudem steht die organisierte Zivilgesellschaft in Form von Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGOs) seit langem in der Kritik, nicht demokratisch legitimiert zu sein und im Globalen Süden oft die Agenden westlicher Geber zu implementieren.

Auf deutscher Seite werfen die Kürzungen im Haushalt des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) die Frage nach einer Ausgabenpriorisierung auf. Trotz vieler Herausforderungen sollte die Zivilgesellschaftsförderung nicht heruntergefahren, sondern vielmehr gezielt zum Schutz der Demokratie eingesetzt werden. Denn eine starke Zivilgesellschaft kann durchaus wichtige Beiträge im Kampf gegen Autokratisierung leisten.

Ein Plädoyer für Realismus

Seit den 1990er Jahren wurden zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen von westlichen Gebern oft idealisiert. Dabei kam es vielfach zu einer Gleichsetzung von Zivilgesellschaft und NGOs, welche nicht nur in der Demokratieförderung, sondern auch bei der Erbringung sozialer Dienstleistungen als eine Art Allheilmittel („magic bullet“) angesehen wurden. Sie galten als besonders bevölkerungsnah und kosteneffektiv.

Diese Zeiten sind vorbei. NGOs werden nicht nur von autoritären Regierungen immer weiter eingeschränkt, sondern auch kritische Stimmen aus den eigenen Reihen zweifeln an ihrer Effektivität. Wo sie als Demokratieförderer auftreten, regt sich Kritik an ihrer demokratischen Legitimation. Zudem werfen Kritiker*innen aus dem Globalen Süden NGOs vor, vorrangig Geberagenden zu implementieren. NGOs können auch neue Hierarchien schaffen, indem sie „für“ marginalisierte Gruppen sprechen – anstatt diese zu befähigen, für sich selbst zu sprechen.

Was Zivilgesellschaft für Demokratie leisten kann

Klar ist: Professionelle NGOs im Globalen Süden sind selten Mitgliederorganisationen und sind nicht demokratisch gewählt. Demokratische Parteien können sie nicht ersetzen. Ihre Stärke liegt aber darin, einzelne Themen („issues“) auf die politische Agenda zu setzen. Was sie wirklich können, ist, in den Sektoren, in denen sie Expertise haben, den Finger in die Wunde zu legen.

Durch Advocacy, Lobbyarbeit und Recherche bringen NGOs Menschenrechtsverletzungen und andere Probleme wie Umweltverschmutzung an die Öffentlichkeit. Damit leisten sie wichtige Beiträge zur politischen Meinungsbildung und erhöhen die Transparenz und Rechenschaftspflicht der Regierung. In einigen Ländern wie Malawi oder im Senegal trug die Mobilisierung durch NGOs dazu bei, die Aufhebung von Amtszeitbeschränkungen zu verhindern.

Wo Oppositionsparteien verboten oder eingeschränkt werden, leisten NGOs einen begrenzten aber wichtigen Beitrag zu politischem Pluralismus. So zählen im autoritären Einparteienregime Kambodschas die Workshops von NGOs mittlerweile zu den wenigen verbliebenen Räumen, in denen Bürger*innen kritische Ansichten diskutieren können.

Gleichzeitig gilt es, den Blick auf Zivilgesellschaft zu weiten. Jüngst waren es die Proteste der jungen Generation (GenZ), die in Ländern wie Madagaskar, Kenia und Bangladesch, autokratische oder korrupte Regime herausfordern. Soziale Bewegungen, Gewerkschaften und religiöse Vereinigungen entfalten oft hohen Reformdruck. Nicht immer sprechen diese Akteure – im wörtlichen wie im übertragenen Sinne – die Sprache der Geber. Doch setzen sie autoritären Regierungen oft mehr entgegen und sind stärker in der Bevölkerung verwurzelt als professionalisierte NGOs.

Gezielt fördern

Daher sollten die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und andere Geber die Förderung von Zivilgesellschaft fortsetzen und die nötigen Mittel bereitstellen. Gerade in Zeiten knapper Kassen sollte genau geprüft werden, welche Ziele mit der Förderung erreicht werden sollen. Vorrangig förderungswürdig sind Organisationen, die Regierungen zur Rechenschaft ziehen und sich für Menschenrechte, Transparenz und Pluralismus einsetzen. Realismus hinsichtlich der Leistungen von NGOs ist angebracht. Doch wo sie zum Schutz der Demokratie in den Partnerländern beitragen, sollte die deutsche Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik dies fördern. Zudem gilt es, auch anderen Akteuren der Zivilgesellschaft, die wichtige demokratische Beiträge leisten – wie sozialen Bewegungen, Gewerkschaften und informellen Gruppen – bessere Zugänge zu Förderung und politischer Unterstützung zu eröffnen.