Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Renewable energy has seen rapid uptake, particularly in the Global South. Solar energy projects have boomed in recent years, but uptake by countries is uneven. Beyond geophysical conditions, technological innovation, market dynamics and donor-driven “lighthouse projects”, political institutionalisation has played a critical role in decarbonisation. In this policy brief, which is based on extensive research from Global South case studies, we argue that political institutionalisation is key to determining whether and how innovative solar initiatives become stabilised, scaled up, and mainstreamed.
Drawing on the research project Institutionalizing Low Carbon Development in the Global South (INLOCADE) and expert contributions from a follow-up IDOS workshop, this policy brief synthesises comparative policy-relevant findings on how institutionalisation unfolds in various emerging economies of the Global South, including Brazil, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia and South Africa.
Key messages:
• Political institutionalisation – understood here as an enduring change of formal and informal rules and practices towards low-carbon development – is essential for making renewable energy projects sustainable by embedding them in conducive, stable governance frameworks. Isolated, donor-driven initiatives are at risk of provoking resistance and backlash, and of fading away once external support ends.
• Multiple pathways for institutionalisation exist. State leadership, subnational action, alliances between development partners and communities,
and crisis-driven coalitions can enable institutionalisation under different conditions. Policies should be tailored to the institutional realities of each context rather than using one-size-fits-all models. Similarly, development partners should assess local realities and adapt their strategies accordingly.
• Distributive justice and participation must be actively supported. Political institutionalisation can lead to inequitable outcomes and reinforce exclusionary practices. Development partners should take a proactive role by aligning their interventions with inclusive and equitable approaches to ensure support for marginalised groups leads to socially just transitions, not just box-ticking.
• Crises can be opportunities. Energy shortages and climate shocks can disrupt fossil-fuel lock-ins and open the door to innovation. Development partners need flexible instruments and strategies to help translate crisis-driven experiments into durable institutional change.
• Development partners are catalytic, not deci-sive. They can accelerate change by providing finance, technical expertise, and legitimacy, especially when working with domestic actors beyond national governments. German and EU development cooperation should place greater emphasis on strengthening domestic institutional enviro-ments, including regulatory stability, administrative capacity, and actor coalitions that embed projects in lasting policy and organisational change. This helps ensure donor interventions contribute to sustained low-carbon transitions beyond initial project cycles.

Dr Joshua Philipp Elsässer is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for Environment, Economy and Energy (C3E) of the Brussels School of Governance.
Prof em. Dr Harald Fuhr is a Professor Emeritus of International Politics at the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Potsdam.
Anna Fünfgeld is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Hamburg; Mercator Professorship for Sociology.
Prof Dr Markus Lederer is a Professor of International Relations at the Technical University of Darmstadt.
Dr Jens Marquardt is a Research Associate in the Research Group “International Relations” at the Technical University of Darmstadt.
Dr HyunAh Yi is a Senior Researcher at the Institute of Comparative Governance, Korea University, and an Associate Researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

 

The annual report prepared by Eda Gemi, Research Associate, ELIAMEP and Bledar Feta, Research Fellow, Wider Europe Programme, ELIAMEP for the OECD Network of International Migration Experts offers a comprehensive and analytically rich assessment of Greece’s migration landscape during 2024–2025, a period marked by moderated inflows, administrative modernisation, and a more securitised approach to border and asylum governance.

Drawing on the latest statistical data, legislative developments, and administrative practices, the report examines how Greece’s migration system is evolving amid demographic pressures, labour market needs, and heightened scrutiny over fundamental rights compliance. The analysis captures both quantitative trends and qualitative policy shifts, providing an authoritative overview of migration flows, legal residence, asylum procedures, integration policies, labour market participation, and citizenship acquisition.

You can read the full national report about Greece here.

You can read the 2025 edition of International Migration Outlook produced by OECD here.

Key themes explored in the report

• Migration flows and asylum trends: Arrivals surged in 2024 before moderating in 2025, while asylum applications declined and recognition rates fell. Persistent backlogs and a widening gap between arrivals and returns underscore structural imbalances. The period was further shaped by allegations of pushbacks and the temporary suspension of access to asylum procedures for specific categories of new arrivals.
• Legal residence and long-term settlement: The legally residing migrant population continued to expand, reaching 916,697 persons in October 2025. Naturalisation increased, particularly among second‑generation applicants, signalling deeper settlement patterns. Yet administrative delays and reliance on temporary certificates heightened precariousness for long-term residents.
• Labour market and integration: Migrant labour participation remained strong, with unemployment among foreign nationals dropping to 9.7% in Q3 2025. Integration governance consolidated further, especially for unaccompanied minors, while increasingly linking residence and protection to labour market participation, reflecting a shift toward conditional inclusion.
• Reception, enforcement, and border management: Island reception centre populations fell sharply, indicating decongestion. At the same time, enforcement intensified, particularly in return policy, while irregular stay apprehensions declined. These developments unfolded against a backdrop of growing domestic and international scrutiny.

A governance model at a crossroads

The period 2024–2025 emerges as a transitional yet tension‑filled phase in Greece’s migration governance, marked by a structural rebalancing between administrative consolidation and intensified enforcement. While arrivals moderated in 2025 after the sharp increase of 2024, pressures on the asylum system remain substantial, reflected in expanding backlogs, declining first‑instance recognition rates, and persistent disparities between arrivals and effective returns. Administrative digitalisation, procedural streamlining, and the expansion of selected legal and investment‑based migration pathways signal efforts toward institutional modernisation and closer alignment with EU standards. At the same time, a more restrictive and securitised orientation has taken hold, exemplified by the temporary suspension of access to asylum procedures for specific categories of new arrivals and the reinforcement of return enforcement mechanisms, developments that have heightened domestic and international scrutiny, particularly in light of allegations of pushbacks and broader concerns regarding compliance with fundamental rights obligations.

The legal residence framework continues to expand quantitatively, with growth in valid permits and consolidation of long‑term settlement patterns. Yet persistent delays in residence permit renewals and reliance on short‑term certificates have increased precariousness for long‑term residents, undermining legal certainty and stable socio‑economic integration. Integration governance has strengthened institutionally, especially for unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable groups, but the growing linkage between protection status and labour market participation reflects a shift toward conditional, economically driven inclusion.

Taken together, developments during 2024–2025 point to a migration governance model at a crossroads, where selective openness and administrative modernisation coexist with deterrence‑oriented measures and heightened enforcement. The long‑term sustainability of this evolving approach will depend on Greece’s ability to reconcile control objectives with procedural safeguards, social cohesion, and the protection of fundamental rights.

Pro-environmental behavior, such as recycling, often needs to be regular to be effective, and interventions to encourage behavioral change may therefore need to be repeated; yet, little evidence exists on the optimal time pattern and frequency of such repeated interventions. To fill this gap, we investigate the impact of mobile text reminders on households’ recycling behavior in urban Peru by randomly varying the exposure length and continuity of reminders. We find that reminders increase both the likelihood that households start to recycle and the frequency of recycling among households that already did so before the intervention. The effects are stronger when reminders are repeated over a longer period. Our findings suggest that both limited attention and habit formation matter for recycling behavior, and that low-cost mobile text reminders can effectively support regular pro-environmental behavior.

Pro-environmental behavior, such as recycling, often needs to be regular to be effective, and interventions to encourage behavioral change may therefore need to be repeated; yet, little evidence exists on the optimal time pattern and frequency of such repeated interventions. To fill this gap, we investigate the impact of mobile text reminders on households’ recycling behavior in urban Peru by randomly varying the exposure length and continuity of reminders. We find that reminders increase both the likelihood that households start to recycle and the frequency of recycling among households that already did so before the intervention. The effects are stronger when reminders are repeated over a longer period. Our findings suggest that both limited attention and habit formation matter for recycling behavior, and that low-cost mobile text reminders can effectively support regular pro-environmental behavior.

Pro-environmental behavior, such as recycling, often needs to be regular to be effective, and interventions to encourage behavioral change may therefore need to be repeated; yet, little evidence exists on the optimal time pattern and frequency of such repeated interventions. To fill this gap, we investigate the impact of mobile text reminders on households’ recycling behavior in urban Peru by randomly varying the exposure length and continuity of reminders. We find that reminders increase both the likelihood that households start to recycle and the frequency of recycling among households that already did so before the intervention. The effects are stronger when reminders are repeated over a longer period. Our findings suggest that both limited attention and habit formation matter for recycling behavior, and that low-cost mobile text reminders can effectively support regular pro-environmental behavior.

In recent years, the European Union (EU) has introduced several policy measures to better align financial markets with sustainability goals. So far, these policies have mainly aimed to improve how information on the sustainability impacts of investments is collected and transmitted. Policymakers hope that adjustments to the epistemic infrastructure of financial markets will lead to a shift in investments that translates into transformational change in the real economy. The EU’s sustainable finance policies often follow a reflexive law approach and confine themselves to setting procedural and organisational norms. This article analyses the potential and limitations of this approach and argues that sustainable finance policies must be sufficiently detailed and binding to avoid the risk, associated with reflexive law policies, of granting too much discretion to agents with vested interests detrimental to the governance aims. However, detailed and binding policies do not fully realise the advantages in dealing with highly complex and dynamic situations that are often ascribed to reflexive law policies. While sustainable finance policies that address the epistemic infrastructure of financial markets are for various reasons still important, their potential and advantages compared to other governance approaches should not be exaggerated.

In recent years, the European Union (EU) has introduced several policy measures to better align financial markets with sustainability goals. So far, these policies have mainly aimed to improve how information on the sustainability impacts of investments is collected and transmitted. Policymakers hope that adjustments to the epistemic infrastructure of financial markets will lead to a shift in investments that translates into transformational change in the real economy. The EU’s sustainable finance policies often follow a reflexive law approach and confine themselves to setting procedural and organisational norms. This article analyses the potential and limitations of this approach and argues that sustainable finance policies must be sufficiently detailed and binding to avoid the risk, associated with reflexive law policies, of granting too much discretion to agents with vested interests detrimental to the governance aims. However, detailed and binding policies do not fully realise the advantages in dealing with highly complex and dynamic situations that are often ascribed to reflexive law policies. While sustainable finance policies that address the epistemic infrastructure of financial markets are for various reasons still important, their potential and advantages compared to other governance approaches should not be exaggerated.

In recent years, the European Union (EU) has introduced several policy measures to better align financial markets with sustainability goals. So far, these policies have mainly aimed to improve how information on the sustainability impacts of investments is collected and transmitted. Policymakers hope that adjustments to the epistemic infrastructure of financial markets will lead to a shift in investments that translates into transformational change in the real economy. The EU’s sustainable finance policies often follow a reflexive law approach and confine themselves to setting procedural and organisational norms. This article analyses the potential and limitations of this approach and argues that sustainable finance policies must be sufficiently detailed and binding to avoid the risk, associated with reflexive law policies, of granting too much discretion to agents with vested interests detrimental to the governance aims. However, detailed and binding policies do not fully realise the advantages in dealing with highly complex and dynamic situations that are often ascribed to reflexive law policies. While sustainable finance policies that address the epistemic infrastructure of financial markets are for various reasons still important, their potential and advantages compared to other governance approaches should not be exaggerated.

Bonn, 09. März 2026. Aktuelle weltpolitische Verwerfungen erweitern den Gestaltungsspielraum der Volksrepublik – und verlangen eine intensivere Auseinandersetzung mit China.

Für die Volksrepublik China ist bei Weitem nicht alles rosig. Die Krise des chinesischen Immobilienmarkts klingt nicht ab, die Binnennachfrage schwächelt und eine rapide alternde Bevölkerung bereitet der Regierung in Peking Kopfzerbrechen. International fordern die volatile Zollpolitik der US-Regierung und Spannungen zwischen den Großmächten die chinesische Wirtschaft heraus. Trotz einiger Trümpfe – Stichwort seltene Erden – hätten exportabhängige Sektoren bei einem eskalierenden Handelskrieg viel zu verlieren. Gerade erst wurde im Nationalen Volkskongress das niedrigste Wachstumsziel der letzten 30 Jahre ausgegeben.

Weltpolitisch jedoch könnte es für die Volksrepublik momentan kaum besser laufen. Während sich die Weltöffentlichkeit mit Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine oder den US-Militärschlägen gegen Iran beschäftigt, betont China die zentrale Rolle der Vereinten Nationen für eine stabile internationale Zusammenarbeit. Verglichen mit Donald Trumps oder Wladimir Putins Feldzug gegen zentrale Prinzipien der Nachkriegsordnung erscheint Xi Jinpings China als multilateraler Musterschüler. Chinas Nähe zu Moskau ist dabei für viele kein Grund, der Volksrepublik Vorwürfe zu machen. Während in westlichen Staaten erst seit Kurzem der Wegfall der USA als Sicherheitsgarant debattiert wird, kritisiert China schon lange die hegemoniale Rolle der US-Regierung. Für die Volksrepublik soll eine reformierte Weltordnung vor allem eines sein: weniger abhängig von Washington und damit stärker ausgerichtet auf Pekings Interessen.

Internationale Zusammenarbeit chinesischer Prägung

China unterstreicht dabei, dass es selbst keine hegemoniale Kontrolle anstrebt – auch, weil die Durchsetzung von Hegemonie zu viele Ressourcen beanspruchen würde. Für die chinesische Regierung ist das Überleben des eigenen Regimes im Einparteienstaat von übergeordneter Bedeutung. Statt die Rolle des angeblichen Weltpolizisten von den USA zu übernehmen, strebt Peking eine stärkere – durchaus von China dominierte – weltweite Vernetzung an. Ein zentraler Hebel dabei ist Chinas Position als primus inter pares in der heterogenen Gruppe der „Entwicklungsländer“, die den Großteil der Weltbevölkerung stellen. Wirtschaftliche Verflechtung, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sowie rhetorische Unterstützung für Belange des Globalen Südens sind dabei zentrale Instrumente in Chinas Werkzeugkasten.

Auf multilateraler Ebene zielen chinesische Reformvorstellungen nicht nur auf Machtverschiebung, sondern auch auf Veränderungen in prozeduralen und normativen Logiken. Die UN, wie China sie sich vorstellt, soll weniger von einer multilateralen Bürokratie und mehr von zwischenstaatlichen Entscheidungen geprägt werden. Teilweise überlappt sich das mit Präferenzen in Moskau und Washington. Normativ positioniert sich China dabei in Opposition zu einem guten Teil liberaler Agenden. Statt zivile und politische Rechte von Individuen zu stärken, versucht China, das kollektiv gedachte Recht auf Entwicklung ins Zentrum globaler Menschenrechtsdiskurse zu stellen. Anstelle einer Schutzverantwortung der internationalen Gemeinschaft sieht Peking die Nichteinmischung in interne Angelegenheiten als Grundlogik multilateraler Zusammenarbeit. Vom Umgang mit Protestierenden in Hongkong bis zur „Wiedervereinigung“ mit Taiwan gibt es eine Reihe von Anliegen, bei denen die Volksrepublik freie Hand haben möchte.

China als komplexes Gegenüber

Insgesamt erweitert die Disruption der lange von den USA dominierten Weltordnung den Raum, in dem China seine Präferenzen und Reformvorschläge positionieren kann. Ungeachtet aller Diskrepanzen hat dadurch auch für Europa die längerfristige Relevanz der Volksrepublik zugenommen. Erst Ende Februar meldete das Statistische Bundesamt, dass das Handelsvolumen der Bundesrepublik mit den USA im Jahr 2025 um fünf Prozent zurückgegangen und China wieder Deutschlands wichtigster Handelspartner ist.

Trotz der in vielerlei Hinsicht nachvollziehbaren Tendenz europäischer Regierungen, Peking als systemischen Rivalen zu sehen, werden so – wie schon jüngst bei Friedrich Merz‘ Chinareise – auch die Konturen Chinas als potentiellem Partner wieder stärker in den Blick genommen werden. Das verlangt nach einer differenzierten Herangehensweise, die Detailwissen mit strategischer Klugheit verbindet. Bei der viel beschworenen Chinakompetenz, die in Deutschland oft zu wünschen übriglässt, geht es nicht nur um das Erlernen der chinesischen Sprache. Es geht auch um eine breitere gesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit China als Land und der chinesischen Regierung als globalem Akteur.

Vor diesem Hintergrund muss der traditionelle Fokus auf die politische, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Auseinandersetzung mit den USA dringend erweitert werden. Sowohl in Deutschland als auch in anderen Ländern, die sich nach wie vor als Teil des Westens sehen, scheint aktuell breiter Konsens zu herrschen, dass eine Neujustierung der internationalen Beziehungen vonnöten ist. China als komplexes Gegenüber sollte dabei einen zentralen Platz einnehmen. Das bedeutet, auch atypische Dialogformate auszubauen, Expertise in Forschung und Verwaltung zu bündeln und schon im Schulkontext der Beschäftigung mit China genug Platz einzuräumen. Und es bedeutet, durch konkrete Begegnungen mit Chines*innen eine Idee von der Vielfalt chinesischer Realitäten zu bekommen, die auch jenseits des Einparteienstaats und ungleicher Handelsbeziehungen Anknüpfungspunkte für ein kritisches globales Miteinander bieten können.

Bonn, 09. März 2026. Aktuelle weltpolitische Verwerfungen erweitern den Gestaltungsspielraum der Volksrepublik – und verlangen eine intensivere Auseinandersetzung mit China.

Für die Volksrepublik China ist bei Weitem nicht alles rosig. Die Krise des chinesischen Immobilienmarkts klingt nicht ab, die Binnennachfrage schwächelt und eine rapide alternde Bevölkerung bereitet der Regierung in Peking Kopfzerbrechen. International fordern die volatile Zollpolitik der US-Regierung und Spannungen zwischen den Großmächten die chinesische Wirtschaft heraus. Trotz einiger Trümpfe – Stichwort seltene Erden – hätten exportabhängige Sektoren bei einem eskalierenden Handelskrieg viel zu verlieren. Gerade erst wurde im Nationalen Volkskongress das niedrigste Wachstumsziel der letzten 30 Jahre ausgegeben.

Weltpolitisch jedoch könnte es für die Volksrepublik momentan kaum besser laufen. Während sich die Weltöffentlichkeit mit Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine oder den US-Militärschlägen gegen Iran beschäftigt, betont China die zentrale Rolle der Vereinten Nationen für eine stabile internationale Zusammenarbeit. Verglichen mit Donald Trumps oder Wladimir Putins Feldzug gegen zentrale Prinzipien der Nachkriegsordnung erscheint Xi Jinpings China als multilateraler Musterschüler. Chinas Nähe zu Moskau ist dabei für viele kein Grund, der Volksrepublik Vorwürfe zu machen. Während in westlichen Staaten erst seit Kurzem der Wegfall der USA als Sicherheitsgarant debattiert wird, kritisiert China schon lange die hegemoniale Rolle der US-Regierung. Für die Volksrepublik soll eine reformierte Weltordnung vor allem eines sein: weniger abhängig von Washington und damit stärker ausgerichtet auf Pekings Interessen.

Internationale Zusammenarbeit chinesischer Prägung

China unterstreicht dabei, dass es selbst keine hegemoniale Kontrolle anstrebt – auch, weil die Durchsetzung von Hegemonie zu viele Ressourcen beanspruchen würde. Für die chinesische Regierung ist das Überleben des eigenen Regimes im Einparteienstaat von übergeordneter Bedeutung. Statt die Rolle des angeblichen Weltpolizisten von den USA zu übernehmen, strebt Peking eine stärkere – durchaus von China dominierte – weltweite Vernetzung an. Ein zentraler Hebel dabei ist Chinas Position als primus inter pares in der heterogenen Gruppe der „Entwicklungsländer“, die den Großteil der Weltbevölkerung stellen. Wirtschaftliche Verflechtung, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sowie rhetorische Unterstützung für Belange des Globalen Südens sind dabei zentrale Instrumente in Chinas Werkzeugkasten.

Auf multilateraler Ebene zielen chinesische Reformvorstellungen nicht nur auf Machtverschiebung, sondern auch auf Veränderungen in prozeduralen und normativen Logiken. Die UN, wie China sie sich vorstellt, soll weniger von einer multilateralen Bürokratie und mehr von zwischenstaatlichen Entscheidungen geprägt werden. Teilweise überlappt sich das mit Präferenzen in Moskau und Washington. Normativ positioniert sich China dabei in Opposition zu einem guten Teil liberaler Agenden. Statt zivile und politische Rechte von Individuen zu stärken, versucht China, das kollektiv gedachte Recht auf Entwicklung ins Zentrum globaler Menschenrechtsdiskurse zu stellen. Anstelle einer Schutzverantwortung der internationalen Gemeinschaft sieht Peking die Nichteinmischung in interne Angelegenheiten als Grundlogik multilateraler Zusammenarbeit. Vom Umgang mit Protestierenden in Hongkong bis zur „Wiedervereinigung“ mit Taiwan gibt es eine Reihe von Anliegen, bei denen die Volksrepublik freie Hand haben möchte.

China als komplexes Gegenüber

Insgesamt erweitert die Disruption der lange von den USA dominierten Weltordnung den Raum, in dem China seine Präferenzen und Reformvorschläge positionieren kann. Ungeachtet aller Diskrepanzen hat dadurch auch für Europa die längerfristige Relevanz der Volksrepublik zugenommen. Erst Ende Februar meldete das Statistische Bundesamt, dass das Handelsvolumen der Bundesrepublik mit den USA im Jahr 2025 um fünf Prozent zurückgegangen und China wieder Deutschlands wichtigster Handelspartner ist.

Trotz der in vielerlei Hinsicht nachvollziehbaren Tendenz europäischer Regierungen, Peking als systemischen Rivalen zu sehen, werden so – wie schon jüngst bei Friedrich Merz‘ Chinareise – auch die Konturen Chinas als potentiellem Partner wieder stärker in den Blick genommen werden. Das verlangt nach einer differenzierten Herangehensweise, die Detailwissen mit strategischer Klugheit verbindet. Bei der viel beschworenen Chinakompetenz, die in Deutschland oft zu wünschen übriglässt, geht es nicht nur um das Erlernen der chinesischen Sprache. Es geht auch um eine breitere gesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit China als Land und der chinesischen Regierung als globalem Akteur.

Vor diesem Hintergrund muss der traditionelle Fokus auf die politische, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Auseinandersetzung mit den USA dringend erweitert werden. Sowohl in Deutschland als auch in anderen Ländern, die sich nach wie vor als Teil des Westens sehen, scheint aktuell breiter Konsens zu herrschen, dass eine Neujustierung der internationalen Beziehungen vonnöten ist. China als komplexes Gegenüber sollte dabei einen zentralen Platz einnehmen. Das bedeutet, auch atypische Dialogformate auszubauen, Expertise in Forschung und Verwaltung zu bündeln und schon im Schulkontext der Beschäftigung mit China genug Platz einzuräumen. Und es bedeutet, durch konkrete Begegnungen mit Chines*innen eine Idee von der Vielfalt chinesischer Realitäten zu bekommen, die auch jenseits des Einparteienstaats und ungleicher Handelsbeziehungen Anknüpfungspunkte für ein kritisches globales Miteinander bieten können.

Bonn, 09. März 2026. Aktuelle weltpolitische Verwerfungen erweitern den Gestaltungsspielraum der Volksrepublik – und verlangen eine intensivere Auseinandersetzung mit China.

Für die Volksrepublik China ist bei Weitem nicht alles rosig. Die Krise des chinesischen Immobilienmarkts klingt nicht ab, die Binnennachfrage schwächelt und eine rapide alternde Bevölkerung bereitet der Regierung in Peking Kopfzerbrechen. International fordern die volatile Zollpolitik der US-Regierung und Spannungen zwischen den Großmächten die chinesische Wirtschaft heraus. Trotz einiger Trümpfe – Stichwort seltene Erden – hätten exportabhängige Sektoren bei einem eskalierenden Handelskrieg viel zu verlieren. Gerade erst wurde im Nationalen Volkskongress das niedrigste Wachstumsziel der letzten 30 Jahre ausgegeben.

Weltpolitisch jedoch könnte es für die Volksrepublik momentan kaum besser laufen. Während sich die Weltöffentlichkeit mit Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine oder den US-Militärschlägen gegen Iran beschäftigt, betont China die zentrale Rolle der Vereinten Nationen für eine stabile internationale Zusammenarbeit. Verglichen mit Donald Trumps oder Wladimir Putins Feldzug gegen zentrale Prinzipien der Nachkriegsordnung erscheint Xi Jinpings China als multilateraler Musterschüler. Chinas Nähe zu Moskau ist dabei für viele kein Grund, der Volksrepublik Vorwürfe zu machen. Während in westlichen Staaten erst seit Kurzem der Wegfall der USA als Sicherheitsgarant debattiert wird, kritisiert China schon lange die hegemoniale Rolle der US-Regierung. Für die Volksrepublik soll eine reformierte Weltordnung vor allem eines sein: weniger abhängig von Washington und damit stärker ausgerichtet auf Pekings Interessen.

Internationale Zusammenarbeit chinesischer Prägung

China unterstreicht dabei, dass es selbst keine hegemoniale Kontrolle anstrebt – auch, weil die Durchsetzung von Hegemonie zu viele Ressourcen beanspruchen würde. Für die chinesische Regierung ist das Überleben des eigenen Regimes im Einparteienstaat von übergeordneter Bedeutung. Statt die Rolle des angeblichen Weltpolizisten von den USA zu übernehmen, strebt Peking eine stärkere – durchaus von China dominierte – weltweite Vernetzung an. Ein zentraler Hebel dabei ist Chinas Position als primus inter pares in der heterogenen Gruppe der „Entwicklungsländer“, die den Großteil der Weltbevölkerung stellen. Wirtschaftliche Verflechtung, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sowie rhetorische Unterstützung für Belange des Globalen Südens sind dabei zentrale Instrumente in Chinas Werkzeugkasten.

Auf multilateraler Ebene zielen chinesische Reformvorstellungen nicht nur auf Machtverschiebung, sondern auch auf Veränderungen in prozeduralen und normativen Logiken. Die UN, wie China sie sich vorstellt, soll weniger von einer multilateralen Bürokratie und mehr von zwischenstaatlichen Entscheidungen geprägt werden. Teilweise überlappt sich das mit Präferenzen in Moskau und Washington. Normativ positioniert sich China dabei in Opposition zu einem guten Teil liberaler Agenden. Statt zivile und politische Rechte von Individuen zu stärken, versucht China, das kollektiv gedachte Recht auf Entwicklung ins Zentrum globaler Menschenrechtsdiskurse zu stellen. Anstelle einer Schutzverantwortung der internationalen Gemeinschaft sieht Peking die Nichteinmischung in interne Angelegenheiten als Grundlogik multilateraler Zusammenarbeit. Vom Umgang mit Protestierenden in Hongkong bis zur „Wiedervereinigung“ mit Taiwan gibt es eine Reihe von Anliegen, bei denen die Volksrepublik freie Hand haben möchte.

China als komplexes Gegenüber

Insgesamt erweitert die Disruption der lange von den USA dominierten Weltordnung den Raum, in dem China seine Präferenzen und Reformvorschläge positionieren kann. Ungeachtet aller Diskrepanzen hat dadurch auch für Europa die längerfristige Relevanz der Volksrepublik zugenommen. Erst Ende Februar meldete das Statistische Bundesamt, dass das Handelsvolumen der Bundesrepublik mit den USA im Jahr 2025 um fünf Prozent zurückgegangen und China wieder Deutschlands wichtigster Handelspartner ist.

Trotz der in vielerlei Hinsicht nachvollziehbaren Tendenz europäischer Regierungen, Peking als systemischen Rivalen zu sehen, werden so – wie schon jüngst bei Friedrich Merz‘ Chinareise – auch die Konturen Chinas als potentiellem Partner wieder stärker in den Blick genommen werden. Das verlangt nach einer differenzierten Herangehensweise, die Detailwissen mit strategischer Klugheit verbindet. Bei der viel beschworenen Chinakompetenz, die in Deutschland oft zu wünschen übriglässt, geht es nicht nur um das Erlernen der chinesischen Sprache. Es geht auch um eine breitere gesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit China als Land und der chinesischen Regierung als globalem Akteur.

Vor diesem Hintergrund muss der traditionelle Fokus auf die politische, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Auseinandersetzung mit den USA dringend erweitert werden. Sowohl in Deutschland als auch in anderen Ländern, die sich nach wie vor als Teil des Westens sehen, scheint aktuell breiter Konsens zu herrschen, dass eine Neujustierung der internationalen Beziehungen vonnöten ist. China als komplexes Gegenüber sollte dabei einen zentralen Platz einnehmen. Das bedeutet, auch atypische Dialogformate auszubauen, Expertise in Forschung und Verwaltung zu bündeln und schon im Schulkontext der Beschäftigung mit China genug Platz einzuräumen. Und es bedeutet, durch konkrete Begegnungen mit Chines*innen eine Idee von der Vielfalt chinesischer Realitäten zu bekommen, die auch jenseits des Einparteienstaats und ungleicher Handelsbeziehungen Anknüpfungspunkte für ein kritisches globales Miteinander bieten können.

Catherine Boura, Ambassador (ad hon.)

Why women in diplomacy

Women –as professionals– in diplomacy is, in fact, a rather recent development/phenomenon. Historically, diplomacy has been the preserve of men, and women were either absent or excluded from any official diplomatic business.  There were of course Exceptional women, such as Gertrude Bell, Freya Stark, the Armenian Diana Abgar, Hungarian Rosika Schwimmer, the Bulgarian Nadezhda Stanchova, who were offered posts or recruited temporarily for their special knowledge of geographical areas; they remained, however, for a long time an exception. It was in 1924, that a Russian revolutionary, Alexandra Kollontai, earned the distinction of being the first female to be appointed Ambassador, to Oslo. Born into a wealthy landed family, Kollontai, lived many years in Europe as an exile, was steeped in European culture and was fluent in many languages. She was ideally qualified for the Bolshevik regime’s bid to win over western public opinion in the post-revolutionary years. Her appointment created a precedent that did not go unnoticed in the European capitals, but it was attributed to the fact that she was an ‘uncommon’ and ‘exceptionally capable woman’.  It was a few years later, in 1933, that the appointment of an American, Ruth Bryan Owen as US head of mission to Denmark created a stir and offered ammunition to supporters of women’s admission to the diplomatic service – at least in Britain. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of women’s participation in the professional diplomatic arena remained contested for the most part of the twentieth century. Foreign Services did not gain a critical mass of women officers until the late 1980s. Once the bar was lifted, women did not pursue a ‘women agenda’ and worked hard to pursue their careers without any gender distinction. International bodies, such as the UN, played an important role building women’s power to intervene in debates and reframe global norms. In the 21st century, women reached unprecedented levels of representation in diplomatic posts and international organisations.  Today, they have finally made their impact on diplomacy. But we are still talking about women in diplomacy. On 20 June 2022, the UN General Assembly declared   24 June International Day of Women in Diplomacy to remind the world that, while women’s numbers in diplomacy are growing, significant barriers and challenges still remain.

One may ask, why is it so important to underline the role of women in diplomacy. I will limit my arguments to three aspects: i) gender equality, ii) because of what they bring in diplomacy, (with special focus on peace and security) and iii) role models for more balanced societies.

I will start with the obvious: gender-equal leadership is implemented with a strong presence of women in leadership roles, including women ambassadors. How can diplomacy flourish if it does not reflect the gender diversity of the nation or the global populations it seeks to serve?

Having said that, one might immediately ask:

Is women’s participation in diplomacy meaningful and worthwhile?

My immediate answer would be: Yes, it is.

Why? Because of their contribution to promoting issues pertaining to civil society, and because of their impact on diplomatic practices and policies that promote peace and security on a global scale.

Issues related to women are inextricably connected with the lives and the security of communities and societies. Evidence collected in relation to several conflict cases has shown that conflict was preceded by a history of violence against women and girls in their societies. Gender violence, domestic violence, and the social marginalization of women, affect the overall behavior of a society and generate risks for its immediate environment and consequently for regional security. Where women are marginalized and disempowered, violence is higher and usually accompanied by other forms of hate that affect the overall behavior of a society.

It was women Ambassadors at the UN who brought the issue of women in conflict situations into the conversation: Sexual slavery, trafficking, the prostitution of children etc, are recurrent during conflicts. For years, the atrocities and appalling abuses committed against women and children in conflict situations were systematically neglected and not an item on the peace and security UN Agenda, in the period before women participated in UNSC working sessions.  It was during the 1990s, initially due to the insistence and championing of a woman diplomat -the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright – with the support of other women diplomats at the UN, that these issues were discussed in the context of peace and security.  Some argued that this was cultural and that there was nothing to be done about it. Women diplomats insisted that it was criminal and that the international community bore the responsibility for stopping it.

This precipitated change: After long and persistent efforts, UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, voted on in 2000, incorporated the three dimensions: the protection, promotion and participation of women at all levels of decision-making, as a key component in peace. What was agreed then has still to be fully implemented but building on this Resolution, issues such as enslavement and rape as weapons against opponents, gender violence, the trafficking of women and children, and many more, are now seriously addressed.

Women’s inclusion is inextricably linked to sustainable peace. As the path to peace is through exchanges and dialogue, compromise and negotiation, it is important to achieve a “male-female consensus” as male and female experiences are both part of a situation.

Therefore, ways   to bring women into the process need to be devised. This is not, however, just about formal participation. Women cannot be brought in overnight to simply address the gender balance at a negotiation table. In order to create sustainable peace, ways to bring women into peace processes at different levels need to be introduced. For instance, an example could be set by including women in the team of mediators.  In certain parts of the world where gender segregation is prevalent, female diplomats/negotiators can serve as a vital bridge for bringing women into peace processes at different levels. Female diplomats/negotiators can be effective because they have access to areas and sectors of society that are otherwise restricted to male diplomats. They can have access to women who have been victims and encourage societies to listen to the voices of their vulnerable members, and facilitate it.

Last argument: role models. Societies are different throughout the world, and women’s rights are not understood in the same way everywhere. Women in diplomacy promote role models in the general process of female advancement in any field, and constitute a benchmark on the trajectory toward gender-equality and toward more balanced, inclusive, peaceful societies.

Looking into the future, one may ask how different the world would be if women played a more central role in diplomacy.  I would argue that it would not change the world by itself; women are not better, or inherently more peaceful.  But nor should they be viewed as passive and helpless. It is important that their voices are heard.  Women’s diplomatic skills can certainly contribute no less than men’s to resolving conflicts, fostering peace, and promoting reconciliation and good neighbourly relations.

The world today is facing new challenges and undergoing a tremendous transformation in an environment of continuous uncertainty and change. Contemporary challenges, from war and humanitarian crises to sectarian and violent extremism, from poverty and inequalities to climate change and environmental degradation – to mention just a few of the challenges we face in our complicated and unpredictable world – all come with an increasing need to re-imagine the future and prepare for it.

Therefore, the questions we need to ask now are: How do countries want to shape their future? How do they want to contribute to it?  How do they see their interests being advanced in it? And is there a role for women in this future?

The answer is this: yes, there is a role for women as much as there is one for men.  Empowering women and promoting their active participation in decision-making positions in a spirit of partnership, mutuality and equality within the wider societal arena can only enhance trust and equip societies to better serve national interests for security and prosperity.  Skillful, well-equipped and well-educated diplomats, both male and female, can play an important role in the future we want. Diplomacy has historically been both a function and a determinant of regional and global orders. To be effective, it requires political entities with the willingness to communicate. Illuminating women’s role in diplomacy shows us how diplomacy can work more broadly.

Ekaterini Nassika, Ambassador

Women and diplomacy

It goes without saying that this is another quintessential equality issue. If a woman possesses the desire, the capability and the merit, she must have unhindered, legally-enshrined access to every profession. Within the Greek Foreign Ministry, this has been the reality for at least half a century. Ideally, we should have standardized global metrics—perhaps provided by the UN—for all its member states. Are there women serving in every diplomatic service? At what percentages? Where are women still barred, by law or social convention, from pursuing a career in diplomacy?

Such prejudices have deep roots; I had to deal with them myself in the early days of my career, but not anymore. At the Hellenic Foreign Ministry, we have achieved more than just numerical parity in the diplomatic branch, we have secured equal opportunities for a successful career.

Do women offer something distinct? In diplomacy, in negotiations of all kinds, in mitigating problems confronting our societies, I believe they do. That something different is a less aggressive, less confrontational approach.

To clarify, I believe that women are, for various reasons, naturally closer to the true essence of diplomacy. It is a return to its roots. Women tend towards a more consensual approach to problem-solving, even when dealing with the most intractable issues. We believe in common sense and don’t feel the need to display our strength or show how tough we can be. Unless, of course, the situation demands it!

I don’t want to sugarcoat the reality. Our profession, especially when looked at from the outside, appears far less demanding than it actually is.

My thoughts lately are often with my colleagues in Kyiv, and especially my female colleagues in Tel Aviv, Beirut, Amman, and Riyadh. They provide vital intelligence, represent our country with distinction, negotiate, and protect our fellow citizens abroad—all while being forced frequently into underground shelters. They remain foremost in our minds and held in the highest regard. Well deserved.

Vasiliki Gounari, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Greece to NATO

The growing presence of women in senior positions within Greek diplomacy is a welcome development. As the first woman to serve as Greece’s Permanent Representative to NATO, I am keenly aware that my own path reflects a broader shift: the steady and meaningful expansion of women’s role in shaping our country’s foreign policy.

The different stages of my career—from work on disarmament and non‑proliferation to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, and including the honour of being Greece’s first woman Ambassador to the Political and Security Committee—have shown me how essential it is for our diplomatic service to draw on the full range of its talent. These experiences have reinforced my belief that diverse perspectives strengthen our ability to engage, negotiate, and contribute effectively in multilateral settings.

The increasing number of women in positions of high responsibility is a sign of institutional maturity. Their contribution is not simply a marker of progress; it enhances the quality, credibility, and effectiveness of Greek diplomacy, supporting dialogue, cooperation, and the confident representation of our country on the international stage.

My hope is that diplomacy will continue to become more inclusive, making room for all those who wish to serve. I want the next generation—women and men alike—to find the space to contribute, to innovate, and to represent Greece with dedication and vision.

Natalia Panourgia, First Counsellor, Unit for Equality, Office of the Secretary General, Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In 2022, during its 76th session, the United Nations General Assembly declared June 24th as the “International Day of Women in Diplomacy” to be observed annually, in recognition of the women’s contribution to international cooperation and peace. In a historically male-dominated field, women diplomats serve with remarkable effectiveness. They often bring new perspectives, creativity and collaborative approaches which substantially enhance the quality and impact of a country’s diplomacy.

The Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively champions the meaningful participation of women in diplomacy, both as a key element of our country’s foreign policy and within its own institutional framework. As part of its commitment to gender mainstreaming, the Ministry established a Unit for Equality in 2024 and adopted an Equality Action Plan 2024-2027. This Plan sets forth tangible objectives, including staff training and awareness, the promotion of gender-inclusive language in administrative documents, the development of gender-disaggregated statistics, and the advancement of equal representation in leadership roles. Positive trends are already evident regarding this final objective: the percentage of women serving as heads of Greek Diplomatic Missions abroad increased from 35% in 2023 to almost 38% in 2026.

In a world defined by multiple challenges— armed conflicts, climate crisis, emerging technologies—the equal participation of women in diplomacy ensures more representative, inclusive and resilient policies, ultimately bolstering the quality of our country’s international presence.

 

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The Third Wave of Democratization's international dimension connects domestic democratization processes with the global spread of democracy after 1989. How has democracy promotion, a specific international source, contributed to the Wave of Democratization? And is scholarship well equipped to study the fundamental shifts in democracy promotion caused by the Third Wave of Autocratization? This article answers these questions from two perspectives. First, it assesses the relevance, patterns and effects of international democracy promotion between 1995 and 2024. Second, it takes a meta-perspective and identifies the main characteristics and blind spots of the study of international democracy promotion. Based on these insights, the article makes a conceptual contribution by distinguishing between democracy support and democracy protection. Furthermore, it defines the international scope conditions necessary for effectively promoting democracy during periods of autocratization. Finally, it proposes a new agenda for the study of international democracy promotion after the Third Wave of Democratization.

The Third Wave of Democratization's international dimension connects domestic democratization processes with the global spread of democracy after 1989. How has democracy promotion, a specific international source, contributed to the Wave of Democratization? And is scholarship well equipped to study the fundamental shifts in democracy promotion caused by the Third Wave of Autocratization? This article answers these questions from two perspectives. First, it assesses the relevance, patterns and effects of international democracy promotion between 1995 and 2024. Second, it takes a meta-perspective and identifies the main characteristics and blind spots of the study of international democracy promotion. Based on these insights, the article makes a conceptual contribution by distinguishing between democracy support and democracy protection. Furthermore, it defines the international scope conditions necessary for effectively promoting democracy during periods of autocratization. Finally, it proposes a new agenda for the study of international democracy promotion after the Third Wave of Democratization.

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Accelerating net-zero transitions requires deliberate governance. We examine the deliberate acceleration of net-zero transitions through a case study of California’s governance of private vehicle electrification. Our analysis integrates the literatures on policy mixes and political institutions to offer a novel explanation for how California has effectively expedited its net-zero transition to electric cars. We base our inductive analysis on evidence from 47 expert interviews conducted in 2022–23. We argue that California’s systemic acceleration capacity has two core components: first, an effective policy mix that harnesses the accelerating forces of creative destruction, and second, specific path-dependent political institutions that have enabled this respective policy mix. Together, these two components have contributed to California’s state capacity to accelerate its technology substitution pathway away from internal combustion engines. California’s climate technocracy offers critical lessons for other jurisdictions seeking to speed up similar net-zero transitions.

Accelerating net-zero transitions requires deliberate governance. We examine the deliberate acceleration of net-zero transitions through a case study of California’s governance of private vehicle electrification. Our analysis integrates the literatures on policy mixes and political institutions to offer a novel explanation for how California has effectively expedited its net-zero transition to electric cars. We base our inductive analysis on evidence from 47 expert interviews conducted in 2022–23. We argue that California’s systemic acceleration capacity has two core components: first, an effective policy mix that harnesses the accelerating forces of creative destruction, and second, specific path-dependent political institutions that have enabled this respective policy mix. Together, these two components have contributed to California’s state capacity to accelerate its technology substitution pathway away from internal combustion engines. California’s climate technocracy offers critical lessons for other jurisdictions seeking to speed up similar net-zero transitions.

Accelerating net-zero transitions requires deliberate governance. We examine the deliberate acceleration of net-zero transitions through a case study of California’s governance of private vehicle electrification. Our analysis integrates the literatures on policy mixes and political institutions to offer a novel explanation for how California has effectively expedited its net-zero transition to electric cars. We base our inductive analysis on evidence from 47 expert interviews conducted in 2022–23. We argue that California’s systemic acceleration capacity has two core components: first, an effective policy mix that harnesses the accelerating forces of creative destruction, and second, specific path-dependent political institutions that have enabled this respective policy mix. Together, these two components have contributed to California’s state capacity to accelerate its technology substitution pathway away from internal combustion engines. California’s climate technocracy offers critical lessons for other jurisdictions seeking to speed up similar net-zero transitions.