Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

La 4e édition du Festival international des arts du Bénin (FInAB), s'est achevée ce dimanche 1er mars 2026. Près de 50 activités intellectuelles ont meublé cette édition spéciale qui a favorisé une immersion dans l'univers des artistes et créateurs dans les différentes disciplines, ainsi qu'un partage d'expérience entre les locaux et les experts internationaux déployés à Cotonou pour la circonstance.

Le FInAB, grand rendez-vous culturel et artistique organisé chaque année à Cotonou, s'est achevé ce dimanche 1er mars 2026. Durant les 10 jours que l'évènement d'envergure mondiale a duré, d'intenses activités ont été organisées et permis aux artistes et créateurs d'exprimer une fois encore, leur talent et leur créativité.
Pour ce qui concerne le volet intellectuel de cette 4e édition, près de 50 activités ont été organisées. Celles-ci incluent les masters class, des keynotes, speed meeting et des formations dans divers secteurs tels que la mode, l'industrie culturelle et créative, l'économie et l'industrialisation des arts, la politique culturelle, la monétisation de l'art, etc. L'objectif de ces différentes activités selon le comité d'organisation, est de renforcer les capacités des acteurs locaux et de créer un lien entre ces derniers et les experts internationaux.

Placée sous le thème : « Les industries culturelles et créatives : levier de diversité culturelle, de coopération et de paix », cette 4e édition du FInAB qui a mis en lumière les productions relevant de la mode et de la musique, a connu la participation de ALPHADI, le géant de la mode africaine, et plusieurs artistes musiciens béninois et étrangers qui ont fait vibrer durant les 10 jours, la plage du Family Beach à Cotonou.

Le FInAB Fashion Week, creuset dédié à la mode
A travers le FInAB Fashion Week, creuset spécial dédié à la célébration de la mode à l'édition 2026 du FInAB, plusieurs activités ont été organisées. Du Fashion Chill au Défilé de mode, en passant par les masterclasses, et les échanges profonds autour de l'identité, cette édition selon le comité d'organisation, a célébré la mode au-delà des standards, engagée, créative et résolument africaine. « Les défilés ont mis en lumière des créations fortes, audacieuses et inspirantes, portées par des stylistes qui racontent l'Afrique à travers les matières, les coupes et les symboles », a souligné Ulrich ADJOVI, PDG du Groupe Empire, promoteur du FInAB.

Deux scènes distinctes
Deux scènes distinctes ont été ouvertes à cette 4e édition du FInAB. Une grande scène dédiée aux concerts et aux performances majeures, et une seconde scène consacrée aux animations, aux découvertes, aux rencontres et aux expressions émergentes. Selon Ulrich ADJOVI, cette édition a également permis de célébrer l'amour des peuples et la fraternité culturelle à travers des journées dédiées telles que le Nigeria Day, le Togo Day, le Maroc Day et le Liban Day, avec une soirée orientale visant à saluer les communautés marocaine et libanaise qui participent à la richesse culturelle et économique du Bénin.

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The People’s Republic of China has considerably expanded its engagement with the United Nations (UN) system, but its influence differs significantly across issue areas. Despite this unevenness, patterns in Beijing’s multilateral priorities suggest what a growing Chinese footprint may portend for the future of the UN. We examine this via three main dimensions. With regard to the underlying logic of multilateralism, China emphasises intergovernmental control at the expense of more autonomous UN bureaucracies. On the substance of multilateralism, China’s objective to ensure the primacy of the state challenges core liberal values long promoted by the UN. In terms of multilateral power dynamics, Beijing works towards increasing space for the UN’s developing country majority, with China as its de facto leader. The Trump administration’s attack on international organisations further strengthens Beijing’s bid to reshape UN multilateralism. The paper assesses the implications of these reordering pathways and concludes with policy recommendations.

The People’s Republic of China has considerably expanded its engagement with the United Nations (UN) system, but its influence differs significantly across issue areas. Despite this unevenness, patterns in Beijing’s multilateral priorities suggest what a growing Chinese footprint may portend for the future of the UN. We examine this via three main dimensions. With regard to the underlying logic of multilateralism, China emphasises intergovernmental control at the expense of more autonomous UN bureaucracies. On the substance of multilateralism, China’s objective to ensure the primacy of the state challenges core liberal values long promoted by the UN. In terms of multilateral power dynamics, Beijing works towards increasing space for the UN’s developing country majority, with China as its de facto leader. The Trump administration’s attack on international organisations further strengthens Beijing’s bid to reshape UN multilateralism. The paper assesses the implications of these reordering pathways and concludes with policy recommendations.

The People’s Republic of China has considerably expanded its engagement with the United Nations (UN) system, but its influence differs significantly across issue areas. Despite this unevenness, patterns in Beijing’s multilateral priorities suggest what a growing Chinese footprint may portend for the future of the UN. We examine this via three main dimensions. With regard to the underlying logic of multilateralism, China emphasises intergovernmental control at the expense of more autonomous UN bureaucracies. On the substance of multilateralism, China’s objective to ensure the primacy of the state challenges core liberal values long promoted by the UN. In terms of multilateral power dynamics, Beijing works towards increasing space for the UN’s developing country majority, with China as its de facto leader. The Trump administration’s attack on international organisations further strengthens Beijing’s bid to reshape UN multilateralism. The paper assesses the implications of these reordering pathways and concludes with policy recommendations.

Dans une démarche visant à renforcer ses effectifs à travers l’ensemble du territoire national, le Commandement de la Gendarmerie Nationale a annoncé l’ouverture des concours […]

L’article La Gendarmerie nationale recrute 2026 : Une chance inédite pour cette catégorie de candidats est apparu en premier sur .

This entry is available in Greek.

Cover photo: publicdomainpictures.net

Digitalisation is reshaping economies, politics and societies worldwide, creating both opportunities for inclusion and risks of deepening inequality. While digital literacy frameworks exist, they remain fragmented and insufficiently connected to broader goals of citizenship education. Without equipping teachers and learners with the competencies to think critically, act ethically and participate constructively in digital spaces, democratic institutions and individual well-being are at risk. Building on UNESCO’s Global Citizenship Education and Digital Literacy Global frameworks, this brief argues that integrating digital literacy into citizenship education, standardising teacher training across contexts and promoting international cooperation – particularly through the G20 – are key to ensuring that all citizens become empowered, responsible and globally connected digital actors.

Digitalisation is reshaping economies, politics and societies worldwide, creating both opportunities for inclusion and risks of deepening inequality. While digital literacy frameworks exist, they remain fragmented and insufficiently connected to broader goals of citizenship education. Without equipping teachers and learners with the competencies to think critically, act ethically and participate constructively in digital spaces, democratic institutions and individual well-being are at risk. Building on UNESCO’s Global Citizenship Education and Digital Literacy Global frameworks, this brief argues that integrating digital literacy into citizenship education, standardising teacher training across contexts and promoting international cooperation – particularly through the G20 – are key to ensuring that all citizens become empowered, responsible and globally connected digital actors.

Digitalisation is reshaping economies, politics and societies worldwide, creating both opportunities for inclusion and risks of deepening inequality. While digital literacy frameworks exist, they remain fragmented and insufficiently connected to broader goals of citizenship education. Without equipping teachers and learners with the competencies to think critically, act ethically and participate constructively in digital spaces, democratic institutions and individual well-being are at risk. Building on UNESCO’s Global Citizenship Education and Digital Literacy Global frameworks, this brief argues that integrating digital literacy into citizenship education, standardising teacher training across contexts and promoting international cooperation – particularly through the G20 – are key to ensuring that all citizens become empowered, responsible and globally connected digital actors.

The article examines how citizens’ expectations in social contracts lead them to take to the streets for contentious collective action. It draws on original, nationally representative telephone surveys in Tunisia and Lebanon that we commissioned in late 2020 and unpacks popular preferences about the social contract and states’ obligations to deliver social service provision, protection, and political participation. We measure empirically whether participation in protest can be explained predominantly by people’s grievances with their states’ social contract obligations or the position of people in society. Findings reveal intriguing differences between the two countries, but also among social groups within societies. We find that socially privileged people are more likely to take to the streets in pursuit of their demands, lending support to theories that identify society’s middle classes as drivers of protest action. We believe that the article’s findings will have significant implications for studies of contentious state society relations in the MENA region and beyond.

The article examines how citizens’ expectations in social contracts lead them to take to the streets for contentious collective action. It draws on original, nationally representative telephone surveys in Tunisia and Lebanon that we commissioned in late 2020 and unpacks popular preferences about the social contract and states’ obligations to deliver social service provision, protection, and political participation. We measure empirically whether participation in protest can be explained predominantly by people’s grievances with their states’ social contract obligations or the position of people in society. Findings reveal intriguing differences between the two countries, but also among social groups within societies. We find that socially privileged people are more likely to take to the streets in pursuit of their demands, lending support to theories that identify society’s middle classes as drivers of protest action. We believe that the article’s findings will have significant implications for studies of contentious state society relations in the MENA region and beyond.

The article examines how citizens’ expectations in social contracts lead them to take to the streets for contentious collective action. It draws on original, nationally representative telephone surveys in Tunisia and Lebanon that we commissioned in late 2020 and unpacks popular preferences about the social contract and states’ obligations to deliver social service provision, protection, and political participation. We measure empirically whether participation in protest can be explained predominantly by people’s grievances with their states’ social contract obligations or the position of people in society. Findings reveal intriguing differences between the two countries, but also among social groups within societies. We find that socially privileged people are more likely to take to the streets in pursuit of their demands, lending support to theories that identify society’s middle classes as drivers of protest action. We believe that the article’s findings will have significant implications for studies of contentious state society relations in the MENA region and beyond.

Das Konjunkturbarometer des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) macht im Februar einen Sprung auf 101,6 Punkte. Damit liegt das Barometer fast sieben Punkte über dem Januar-Wert und erstmals seit knapp drei Jahren wieder über der neutralen 100-Punkte-Marke, die ein ...

Emotionale Stabilität hängt positiv mit Bruttostundenlohn zusammen, Verträglichkeit negativ – Zusammenhang ist bei Frauen schwächer als bei Männern – Stereotype und Rollenbilder könnten eine Rolle spielen Bestimmte Persönlichkeitsmerkmale gehen mit Unterschieden im Bruttostundenlohn einher. Hat ...

Panagiota Manoli, Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; Associate Professor at the University of the Peloponnese 

Despite the recent revival of EU’s enlargement policy as a result of the EU’s geopolitical awakening of 2022, elites in candidate countries still perceive accession as a perpetual goal. The continually evolving accession conditions and extended candidacy periods have weakened the policy’s predictability and credibility. A survey conducted within the framework of the Geo-Power-EU project (2025)* showed the gap between the declared objectives of the EU’s enlargement policy and the perceptions held by the elites of the candidate countries.

On the EU side, enlargement is viewed as progressively advancing through partial integration mechanisms. EU policymakers, emphasize gradual integration through the single market, Growth Plans, Association Agreements, and DCFTAs as evidence of steady progress, viewing progress as dependent on the candidates’ commitment to reform. On the contrary many candidate-country elites, especially among long-standing candidates, see limited progress toward full membership. Elites in the Western Balkans, report that accession conditions have continually shifted (e.g. ICTY cooperation, regional relations) or taken hostage of bilateral disputes (e.g. most recently between Bulgaria and North Macedonia) creating a perception of deferral rather than progression, undermining confidence in the process. Accession process is commonly described as stagnation and technical engagement without political certainty. One of the most significant negative developments is that prolonged candidacy has contributed to public fatigue, rising Euroscepticism, and disincentives for reform. Among the new EU candidates in eastern European neigbourhood, Moldova and Ukraine (except for Georgia) exhibit cautious optimism following their fast track candidate status (2023) and technical progress, though it is acknowledged that security challenges necessitate flexible accession models.

Most EU elites are more concerned about the Union’s own capacity to absorb new members, arguing that enlargement must be matched by internal reforms to safeguard effective governance and institutional resilience. While geopolitical pressures—particularly related to security and stability—are widely acknowledged, they are also seen as pushing the EU toward enlargement decisions that may exceed its institutional limits. Fast-tracked or expedited accession processes are mostly dismissed, as they risk overstretching EU institutions, financial resources, and policy frameworks, ultimately undermining the effectiveness of the Union.

As the European Union weighs expansion to include the Western Balkans and eastern neighbours like Ukraine and Moldova, it must navigate a strategic tension: how to reconcile the principle of merit-based accession with geopolitical urgency, without undermining the deepening and cohesion of integration itself.

*Note: The results of an elite survey conducted in all 9 candidate countries in Spring 2025 within the framework of the Geo-Power-EU project (funded Horizon Europe and coordinated by the University of the Peloponnese) are presented in Deliverable D2.1. “Discerning the perceptual gap between the EU policies and the countries’ expectations and needs”.

• High-quality early childhood education and care helps children’s early development and positively affects educational, social and economic outcomes in later life for the children involved and for society at large. Conversely, the lack of affordable high-quality childcare creates deficits in abilities and skills, including soft ones, which raise social costs and drive down productivity.

• Compulsory pre-school education in Greece has recently been extended, now starting at age 4. Nevertheless, participation in early childhood education and care at a younger age remains below the European average. Limited availability of affordable subsidised places is a key obstacle to raising enrolment in childcare centres.

• The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) offered Member States generous funding for investing in childcare. This is especially important in countries like Greece, where female employment– though rising – remains low, which reflects the difficulties Greek women face in reconciling career and family responsibilities.

• Greece 2.0, The National Recovery and Resilience Plan, included measures to improve childcare quality and expand access. While some initiatives began, most were later abandoned, highlighting the fragility of reforms amid institutional bottlenecks.

• Despite setbacks, ECEC has gained some visibility in national debates. Yet without a long-term fiscal commitment and a coherent national strategy, it will be difficult to expand access for children under the age of 2, improve quality, and ensure equity in a sector that has historically been underfunded and neglected.

Read here in pdf the policy paper by Chryssa Papalexatou, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.