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Bonn, 27. Oktober 2025. Zum Ende des European Cybersecurity Awareness Month (ECSM) im Oktober 2025 stellt sich eine entscheidende Frage: Wie wirken sich Cybersicherheitsmaßnahmen – wie Anti-Fake-News-Gesetze oder Initiativen zur Datenlokalisierung – in unterschiedlichen politischen Kontexten aus? Der ECSM wird unter anderem von der Europäischen Union, verschiedenen nationalen Regierungen – auch autokratischen – und globalen wirtschaftlichen Akteuren weltweit begangen, um Cybersicherheitsrisiken entgegenzuwirken. Doch ein Blick nach Asien zeigt, dass Cybersicherheitsmaßnahmen auch als Mittel der Repression eingesetzt werden können, wenn sie nicht in demokratische Institutionen und politische Praktiken eingebettet sind.

Cybersicherheitsgesetze als Mittel der Zensur

Unter Berufung auf Onlinesicherheit wenden mehrere asiatische Regierungen Gesetze zur digitalen Regulierung so an, dass sie staatliche Kontrolle über öffentliche Meinungsäußerung verstärken. Im zunehmend autokratisch regierten Indien schreiben das Gesetz zum Schutz digitaler personenbezogener Daten (2023) und damit verbundene Rechtsvorschriften zwar bestimmte Nutzer*innenrechte fest, erlauben es dem Staat aber zugleich, Unternehmen zur Herausgabe von Informationen aufzufordern und die Löschung von Onlineinhalten anzuordnen. Forschungsarbeiten zeigen, dass Autokraten Gesetze gegen Fake News und Verleumdung, die häufig in Rechtrahmen zur Onlineregulierung enthalten sind, zunehmend dazu nutzen, Kritiker*innen zum Schweigen zu bringen.

Dabei sind die Straftatbestände oft vage formuliert und lassen Regierungen viel Ermessensspielraum. So bezieht sich Kasachstans Gesetz von 2023 zu Internetplattformen und Internetwerbung sowohl auf Online-Ressourcen als auch auf Messaging-Apps wie WhatsApp und sieht Haftungspflichten für die vorsätzliche wie auch die unbeabsichtigte Verbreitung von „Falschinformationen“ vor. In Kirgistan kann die Regierung unter Berufung auf das Gesetz zum Schutz vor Falschinformationen von 2021 Inhalte verbieten, die sie als falsch erachtet. Das Online-Sicherheitsgesetz von 2024 in Sri Lanka kriminalisiert „falsche Aussagen“, „beleidigende Nachrichten“ und Inhalte, die „die öffentliche Ordnung stören“ – und ermöglicht so die politische Verfolgung von Regierungskritiker*innen. In Myanmar verleiht das Cybersicherheitsgesetz von 2025 der Militärjunta weitreichende Zensurbefugnisse. Zudem stellt es die Erbringung digitaler Sicherheitsdienstleistungen ohne staatliche Lizenz unter Strafe – vermutlich ein gezielter Angriff auf zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen und Unternehmen, die digitale Sicherheitsschulungen anbieten.

Digitale Überwachung und Schikanen

Mehrere autokratische Regierungen kombinieren solch repressive Gesetze mit Cyber-Überwachung. Recherchen der thailändischen NROs iLaw und DigitalReach, des Citizen Lab und des Security Lab von Amnesty International deckten 2021 den Einsatz der Spionagesoftware Pegasus gegen thailändische Pro-Demokratie-Aktivist*innen auf. Später stellte sich heraus, dass auch Oppositionelle, Journalist*innen und Regierungsvertreter*innen in Europa mit Pegasus überwacht wurden. Da Pegasus teuer ist, greifen Autokraten in Asien oft auch auf andere Überwachungssoftware zurück. Zudem setzen sie Sicherheitskräfte und Informant*innen ein, die soziale Medien gezielt nach regierungskritischen Äußerungen durchsuchen. In Kambodscha betonen Aktivist*innen, dass kritische Beiträge in den sozialen Medien rasch gelöscht werden und Online-Aktivist*innen oft ins Visier regierungstreuer Influencer*innen geraten. Einige berichten von physischen Repressionen durch die sogenannte „Cyberpolizei“ – womit digitale in physische Repression übergeht. „Sie werden dich finden. […] Sie werden dich auf die Polizeistation vorladen“ oder „dich verhaften“ (Autorinneninterview 2025). Auch der Einparteienstaat Vietnam kontrolliert soziale Medien und nutzt regierungsnahe Influencer*innen zur Verbreitung seiner eigenen Narrative.

Ambivalente Auswirkungen von Datenlokalisierung

Mehrere Regierungen in Asien fordern von Online-Plattformen, Datenverwaltern und Unternehmen, Daten auf lokalen Servern zu speichern. Datenlokalisierung kann legitimen Regierungszielen wie Datensouveränität und der Abwehr von Cyberangriffen dienen, in repressiven Kontexten aber auch zur Beschneidung digitaler Freiräume beitragen. Das vietnamesische Cybersicherheitsgesetz von 2019 verpflichtet Online-Dienstleister, die Daten von vietnamesischen Nutzer*innen auf Servern in Vietnam zu speichern. Dadurch können Behörden darauf zugreifen und Inhalte löschen lassen. Auch Usbekistan verlangt mit dem ergänzten Gesetz „über personenbezogene Daten“ von 2021, dass Internetanbieter und Social-Media-Plattformen Daten auf lokalen Servern speichern.

Dies macht deutlich, dass demokratische Rahmenbedingungen maßgeblich darüber entscheiden, ob Cybersicherheitsmaßnahmen tatsächlich Sicherheit schaffen. Ohne demokratische Schutzmechanismen können sie leicht als Instrument für Repression missbraucht werden. Diese Erkenntnis ist auch für Europa relevant, wo demokratische Staaten versuchen, Desinformation entgegenzuwirken und europäische Datensouveränität zu stärken, etwa durch den Auf- und Ausbau einer europäischen digitalen Infrastruktur. Aktuell scheinen solche Maßnahmen zweifellos notwendig, um demokratische Institutionen zu schützen, doch könnten sie von rechtsextremen Parteien missbraucht werden, wenn es diesen gelingt, an die Macht zu kommen. Umso wichtiger ist es, breite gesellschaftliche Unterstützung für demokratische Werte und Institutionen aufrechtzuerhalten und zu stärken.

Dr. Jasmin Lorch ist Senior Researcher in der Abteilung “Transformation of Political (Dis-) Order” des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) in Bonn.

Ani Tovmasyan ist unabhängige Forscherin und Beraterin im Bereich Friedensförderung, Konflikttransformation und Demokratisierung mit Fokus auf die Umwelt- und Entwicklungsaspekte von Frieden und Sicherheit.

Willkommen bei Rapporteur! Jeden Tag liefern wir Ihnen die wichtigsten Nachrichten und Hintergründe aus der EU- und Europapolitik. In der heutigen Ausgabe: Haushalt: Europaabgeordneter kündigt an: Kommission will ihren Zwei-Billionen-Euro-Vorschlag überarbeiten. Niederlande: Geert Wilders gilt als Favorit für den Wahlsieg – wird aber wohl nicht Premierminister. Erde: EU berät mit China über Auswege im Handel […]

Die Trump-­Regierung verfolgt eine explizit antimulti­lateralistische Politik, die auf nationaler Souveränität (mit Einschränkungen für andere Länder), geopolitischen Interessen und kruder transaktionaler Ökonomie beruht. Verschwörungstheorien dienten maßgeblich zur Rechtfertigung von Maßnahmen wie der Abwicklung von USAID. Globale Normen, einschließlich der nachhaltigen Entwicklungsziele, werden als Bedrohung für amerikanische Interessen dargestellt – gerade weil sie kooperative Regierungsformen fördern.

Die Trump-­Regierung verfolgt eine explizit antimulti­lateralistische Politik, die auf nationaler Souveränität (mit Einschränkungen für andere Länder), geopolitischen Interessen und kruder transaktionaler Ökonomie beruht. Verschwörungstheorien dienten maßgeblich zur Rechtfertigung von Maßnahmen wie der Abwicklung von USAID. Globale Normen, einschließlich der nachhaltigen Entwicklungsziele, werden als Bedrohung für amerikanische Interessen dargestellt – gerade weil sie kooperative Regierungsformen fördern.

Die Trump-­Regierung verfolgt eine explizit antimulti­lateralistische Politik, die auf nationaler Souveränität (mit Einschränkungen für andere Länder), geopolitischen Interessen und kruder transaktionaler Ökonomie beruht. Verschwörungstheorien dienten maßgeblich zur Rechtfertigung von Maßnahmen wie der Abwicklung von USAID. Globale Normen, einschließlich der nachhaltigen Entwicklungsziele, werden als Bedrohung für amerikanische Interessen dargestellt – gerade weil sie kooperative Regierungsformen fördern.

Unsere Gesellschaft ist schizophren: An den Schulen will man die Noten abschaffen, zugleich wird im Internet heute alles bewertet, vom Restaurantbesuch über die Gondelfahrt bis zur Zahnbehandlung. Eine Entwicklung mit Schattenseiten.

St. Gallen empfängt am frühen Samstagabend GC (18 Uhr). Die Espen treten nach ihrem historischen Sieg in Bern mit viel Selbstvertrauen an – und positiven Updates neben dem Platz. Das FCSG-Inside.

Wie der Chefsprecher des Pentagons am Freitag bekannt gab, wird mit dem USS Gerald R. Ford der grösste Flugzeugträger der Welt in die Karibik verlegt. So will Trump gegen den Drogenschmuggel von Venezuela vorgehen.

Fast jede fünfte Person in der Schweiz erhält wegen Beitragslücken eine gekürzte AHV-Rente. Wir erklären, was Versicherte dagegen tun können.

Die Anwohner des Telli-Wohngebiets in Aarau kommt weiterhin nicht zur Ruhe. Die seit März geltenden Verbotsregeln für die private Verwendung von Einkaufswägeli werden noch immer tagtäglich missachtet.

Resolution 2719—adopted in December 2023—established a framework for using UN assessed contributions to fund up to 75 percent of AU-led peace operations authorized by the Security Council. Yet nearly two years later, the Security Council has yet to authorize an AU-led peace support operation that could mobilize funding under Resolution 2719 after efforts to apply the framework in Somalia failed to achieve consensus.

In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report convened a workshop on September 10, 2025, to assess progress in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2719. Participants discussed the AU–UN joint roadmap for implementing the resolution, the political and financial challenges that have emerged, and lessons from the failed attempt to apply the resolution to the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).

The workshop underscored the need to maintain political momentum behind the resolution, secure predictable and sustainable funding, and strengthen coordination between the AU and UN. Participants highlighted that its success will depend on flexible, context-specific implementation and on demonstrating tangible results for peace and security on the ground.

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The post Partnership in Peace Operations: Implementing Resolution 2719 appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Following the third wave of democratization, democracy and its proponents have recently experienced a shift towards autocratization. To date, however, little is known about the impact of this trend on democracy promotion. This article introduces a special issue that examines the complex relationship between autocratization and external democracy promotion. It provides a conceptual framework for understanding how the global trend of autocratization affects democracy promotion efforts. We identify two ways in which this is the case: first, autocratization requires democracy promoters to adapt to increasingly resistant environments in target countries where they seek to promote democracy or prevent autocratization; second, autocratization reduces the global leverage of democracy promoters due to the rise of autocratic competitors. We highlight the evolving strategies and responses of democracy promoters in the face of rising autocratic influence. We then provide an overview of the articles in this special issue, which examine the motives and strategies of traditional democracy promoters and their autocratic competitors and analyse how democracy promoters navigate the challenges of autocratization in target countries of democracy promotion and the strategic competition with autocratic regimes, using case studies from Southeastern Europe, the post-Soviet space, Africa and Latin America.

Following the third wave of democratization, democracy and its proponents have recently experienced a shift towards autocratization. To date, however, little is known about the impact of this trend on democracy promotion. This article introduces a special issue that examines the complex relationship between autocratization and external democracy promotion. It provides a conceptual framework for understanding how the global trend of autocratization affects democracy promotion efforts. We identify two ways in which this is the case: first, autocratization requires democracy promoters to adapt to increasingly resistant environments in target countries where they seek to promote democracy or prevent autocratization; second, autocratization reduces the global leverage of democracy promoters due to the rise of autocratic competitors. We highlight the evolving strategies and responses of democracy promoters in the face of rising autocratic influence. We then provide an overview of the articles in this special issue, which examine the motives and strategies of traditional democracy promoters and their autocratic competitors and analyse how democracy promoters navigate the challenges of autocratization in target countries of democracy promotion and the strategic competition with autocratic regimes, using case studies from Southeastern Europe, the post-Soviet space, Africa and Latin America.

Following the third wave of democratization, democracy and its proponents have recently experienced a shift towards autocratization. To date, however, little is known about the impact of this trend on democracy promotion. This article introduces a special issue that examines the complex relationship between autocratization and external democracy promotion. It provides a conceptual framework for understanding how the global trend of autocratization affects democracy promotion efforts. We identify two ways in which this is the case: first, autocratization requires democracy promoters to adapt to increasingly resistant environments in target countries where they seek to promote democracy or prevent autocratization; second, autocratization reduces the global leverage of democracy promoters due to the rise of autocratic competitors. We highlight the evolving strategies and responses of democracy promoters in the face of rising autocratic influence. We then provide an overview of the articles in this special issue, which examine the motives and strategies of traditional democracy promoters and their autocratic competitors and analyse how democracy promoters navigate the challenges of autocratization in target countries of democracy promotion and the strategic competition with autocratic regimes, using case studies from Southeastern Europe, the post-Soviet space, Africa and Latin America.

This study explores the dynamics of Israeli–Turkish relations amidst two pivotal conflicts: the war in Gaza, where Turkey has vocally supported the Palestinian side, and the Syrian crisis, where both countries maintain significant territorial and strategic stakes. While Turkey and Israel operate from distinct ideological and strategic positions, their interactions are neither those of allies nor outright adversaries, but rather of two regional powers navigating overlapping challenges. The analysis highlights how these conflicts reveal a duality in their relationship characterized by ideological divergence in Gaza and pragmatic considerations in Syria, offering insights into their complex coexistence within the rapidly shifting Middle Eastern landscape.

• Turkey was among the first Muslim-majority countries to recognize Israel in 1949, establishing early diplomatic ties grounded in Turkey’s pro-Western orientation and NATO ambitions.
• The rise of the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the 2000s gradually transformed Turkish foreign policy, emphasizing solidarity with the Muslim world and a more vocal defence of the Palestinian cause.
• Divergences over Gaza, Syria, and energy politics in the Eastern Mediterranean further strained relations, while shared economic interests and US mediation prevented a complete breakdown.
• The 2023–2025 Gaza war became a defining moment, with Turkey’s strong condemnation of Israel paired with pragmatic economic continuity and, later, participation in the peace process.
• For the first time, many Israelis and Turks saw Turkey and Israel respectively as one of their country’s key security threats.
• The likelihood of direct conflict between Israel and Turkey has substantially decreased, as both states prioritize stability, reconstruction, and regional influence over open rivalry.
• While ideological and rhetorical tensions persist, Israeli–Turkish relations are entering a new phase characterized by pragmatic coexistence, mutual recognition, and shared regional responsibilities.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Senior Research Fellow, Head, ELIAMEP Turkey Programme and Electra Nisidou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP Turkey Programme.

Introduction

Turkey was one of the first Muslim-majority states to formally recognize Israel, in 1949, establishing diplomatic ties just a year after Israel’s foundation. This recognition stemmed from Turkey’s desire to align more closely with Western powers as it sought NATO membership and a place in the broader Western alliance, ultimately joining NATO in 1952. Turkey’s relationship with Israel remained steady during the early Cold War decades, supported by shared strategic interests in the Middle East. However, Turkey made sure that its relationship with Israel would not ruin its ties with the Arab world.

During the various Arab-Israeli conflicts, Turkey maintained a policy of neutrality to avoid alienating either side. In the 1956 Suez Crisis, Turkey refrained from openly supporting Israel, the United Kingdom, or France in their military operation against Egypt. This approach reflected Turkey’s alignment with NATO, yet it also aimed to avoid direct involvement that could jeopardize crucial relations with Arab states. During the 1967 Six-Day War, Turkey again adopted a non-interventionist stance, preserving diplomatic ties with Israel without openly endorsing its actions. The 1973 Yom Kippur War heightened pressure on Turkey to align with its Arab neighbours, especially as anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric was on the rise in Turkey, and targeted Israel’s supporters. In response, Turkey reduced its diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv, a gesture meant to appease Arab states without severing ties with Israel. Throughout these conflicts, Turkey’s stance was shaped by a need to balance its Western and NATO alignment with regional considerations.[1] The 1970s and 1980s were marked by further fluctuations as Turkey recalibrated its regional stance, especially amidst growing Muslim solidarity on Palestinian self-determination and the rising influence of Turkish political Islam. Economic and commercial relations, however, continued to develop: Turkey exported textiles, food products, and raw materials to Israel, while Israel provided technological and agricultural innovations. This economic collaboration laid the foundation for a more robust partnership that would flourish in the 1990s.[2]

The end of the Cold War opened new avenues for Israeli–Turkish collaboration; both states recognized the benefits of strengthening their alliance. The 1990s represented the high-water mark of Israeli–Turkish cooperation, which developed into a strategic partnership with military cooperation at its core. Joint air and naval exercises, intelligence sharing, and arms modernization programmes reflected a deep level of strategic alignment. Importantly, this deepening cooperation benefited from the regional environment of the Oslo peace process: while Israel was engaged in negotiations with the Palestinians, its security cooperation with Turkey could develop without qualms or concerns.

Israeli–Turkish relations in the 1990s even survived the premiership of Necmettin Erbakan, Turkey’s first Islamist politician to rise to that post. As leader of the Islamist Welfare Party, Erbakan promised to promote closer ties with Muslim states and criticized close relations with Israel as incompatible with Turkey’s Islamic identity.[3] As prime minister, however, he avoided anything that could harm bilateral relations. In February 1996, a military cooperation agreement was signed, marking a milestone that allowed for joint training exercises, intelligence sharing, and defence collaboration. The agreement bolstered the position of both Israel and Turkey as regional powers and cemented a strategic partnership that aligned them with US interests in the region. Economic ties also flourished, with Israeli and Turkish businesses forming partnerships across sectors including technology, tourism, agriculture, and trade. The signing of a bilateral free trade agreement[4] meant that by the late 1990s, Turkey had become one of Israel’s most important trade partners.[5]

A Relationship in Flux

The rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in the 2000s gradually shifted the course of Turkish foreign policy towards closer alignment with the broader Muslim world. Erdoğan’s growing emphasis on the Palestinian issue and criticism of Israeli policies, particularly regarding Gaza, diverged sharply from the cooperative approach of his own first term in government. The deterioration in relations after the 2008–2009 Gaza War reached a symbolic climax at the 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos, where Erdoğan confronted Israeli President Shimon Peres in the “One Minute incident”. This marked a turning point in the public perception of bilateral relations, framing Turkey as a defender of the Palestinian cause. This trajectory culminated in the 2010 Mavi Marmara crisis, which brought relations to their lowest point in decades. Both episodes demonstrated Erdoğan’s propensity to instrumentalize high-profile confrontations with Israel to galvanize domestic and regional audiences, while also pushing the relationship toward long-term estrangement.

As Turkey pursued a more assertive regional role in the 2010s, often challenging Western positions on issues like Palestine, Syria, and Libya, Israel moved closer to other regional players, including Greece and Cyprus.

As Turkey pursued a more assertive regional role in the 2010s, often challenging Western positions on issues like Palestine, Syria, and Libya, Israel moved closer to other regional players, including Greece and Cyprus. The discovery of natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean added further fuel to this realignment. Israel’s prospective collaboration with Greece and Cyprus in energy exploration and transport provoked Turkey, which felt isolated and treated as a regional outsider, despite its geographical proximity and significant energy demands. But while energy dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean have highlighted the strategic divergence between Israel and Turkey, they have also underscored the potential for future realignment. Natural gas reserves and energy transport corridors in the region could serve as both a source of tension and an opportunity for cooperation. However, the political rift between the two states, exacerbated by disputes over maritime boundaries and Turkey’s exclusion from the EastMed Gas Forum, has stalled any meaningful collaboration.

Within this dynamic, the Kurdish question has emerged as a persistent source of mistrust. Israel’s growing ties with Kurdish groups across the Middle East, and especially in Iraq, were perceived in Ankara as a potential tool to challenge Turkey’s security interests. This perception reinforced Turkish suspicions that Israel could use Kurdish aspirations as leverage in times of political tension. The United States has added yet another layer to this equation, acting as both a stabilizer and a complicating factor. Washington has historically encouraged Israeli–Turkish cooperation, particularly in the 1990s. However, divergences between Ankara and Washington—ranging from the Iraq War to US support for Kurdish forces in Syria—have strained the triangle, with Israel’s close alignment with the United States amplifying Turkey’s sense of marginalization. At the same time, both Israel and Turkey remain indispensable—if difficult—allies for Washington. The US role therefore remains pivotal in determining whether Israeli–Turkish relations evolve toward renewed cooperation or slip irreversibly into strategic competition.

The Palestinian Issue and the War in Gaza

The Palestinian issue has historically played a catalytic role in shaping the regional dynamics of the Middle East, influencing both bilateral and multilateral relations. Before the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power, Turkey’s stance on the Palestinian issue was marked by cautious pragmatism. 

The Palestinian issue has historically played a catalytic role in shaping the regional dynamics of the Middle East, influencing both bilateral and multilateral relations. Before the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power, Turkey’s stance on the Palestinian issue was marked by cautious pragmatism. During much of the Cold War, Turkey sought to balance its relations with Israel and the broader Arab world, reflecting its desire to maintain strategic neutrality in a polarized region. While Turkey recognized Israel in 1949 and maintained diplomatic ties, it also supported Palestinian self-determination as a fundamental principle. Turkish leaders often criticized Israeli actions in the Occupied Territories, particularly after the 1967 Six-Day War, but avoided overt confrontation to preserve bilateral relations. This delicate balancing act was further shaped by Turkey’s alignment with Western powers through NATO, its growing trade relations with Israel, and its need to maintain good standing with the Arab states, which were significant trade and energy partners. While Turkey recognized the Palestinian state in 1988, by the 1990s, during what has been described as the “golden era” in Israeli–Turkish relations, Turkey’s approach to the Palestinian issue remained measured, focusing on multilateral dialogue and development initiatives rather than direct ideological opposition to Israeli policies. Since Erdoğan’s rise to power, the Palestinian cause has increasingly attracted Turkish attention; this has often been framed as part of its broader ambition to assert moral leadership in the Muslim world.

Erdoğan’s rhetoric during the Gaza war reflected the complexity of Turkey-Israel relations. While publicly denouncing Israel, Turkey continued to foster its bilateral economic ties, reflecting a pragmatic approach.

The recent war in Gaza, triggered by Hamas’ 7 October 2023 attack on Israel and followed by Israel’s counter-attack, intensified the scrutiny of Israeli–Turkish relations. While taking an initially circumspect position, Erdoğan gradually shifted to powerfully condemning Israel’s military actions, which he framed as disproportionate and accusing Israel of committing war crimes. This rhetoric was consistent with Turkey’s historical position, but was amplified by Erdoğan’s aspirations to position Turkey as a defender of Palestinian rights on the international stage. Erdoğan’s rhetoric during the Gaza war reflected the complexity of Turkey-Israel relations. While publicly denouncing Israel, Turkey continued to foster its bilateral economic ties, reflecting a pragmatic approach. Reports of Turkish goods being shipped to Israel via Greece or Azerbaijan,[6] despite an official trade ban, underscored that fully severing mutually beneficial economic relations was easier said than done.[7]

The war in Gaza unfolded against the backdrop of significant geopolitical shifts in the Middle East. The normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab reshaped the region’s diplomatic landscape and further marginalized the Palestinian issue. These developments presented both challenges and opportunities for Turkey. On the one hand, they isolated Turkey as it sought to position itself as a champion of the Palestinian cause. On the other, they created an opportunity for Turkey to reassert its influence by portraying itself as a mediator and advocate for Palestinian rights—a role that resonated with domestic and regional audiences.

The war in Gaza provided Erdoğan with an opportunity to recalibrate Turkey’s stance, leveraging its criticism of Israel to galvanize domestic and regional support, while seeking to counterbalance the emerging strategic alignments in the Eastern Mediterranean. The conflict further strained Israeli–Turkish relations, which had already been marked by periodic diplomatic freezes in the years preceding the war. Turkey’s decision to coincided with the—albeit discreet—maintenance of economic engagement, reflecting the multifaceted nature of their relationship and the mutual interests that continue to bind them in areas such as trade, tourism, and technology.[8]

The Palestinian issue remains a persistent point of divergence, yet it also has potential as a platform for soft-power diplomacy.

The Palestinian issue remains a persistent point of divergence, yet it also has potential as a platform for soft-power diplomacy. In the broader context of a rapidly shifting Middle East, the trajectory of the Palestinian issue and the fallout from the war in Gaza will be pivotal in shaping the future of Israeli–Turkish relations. Whether these tensions can be mitigated through pragmatic diplomacy, or whether the ideological divide will deepen, remains an open and pressing question.

Israel and Turkey in the Aftermath of the War

As the guns fall silent in Gaza and a ceasefire takes hold after two years of devastation, Israel and Turkey find themselves facing a familiar yet profoundly altered landscape; both countries must navigate a new regional reality shaped by exhaustion, mistrust, and necessity.

The ceasefire agreement, brokered through intense negotiations involving the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, marks a significant though fragile turning point. Israel has begun a partial withdrawal of its forces, while the release of hostages and prisoners is underway. For thousands of displaced Palestinians, this moment signals the beginning of an uncertain return to their devastated homes. Humanitarian access is being cautiously restored, and international actors—with Turkey among them— are seeking to ensure that aid can flow into the Gaza Strip and reconstruction begin without a renewed escalation being triggered.

President Erdoğan has confirmed that Turkey will take part in the international task force to be formed as part of the ceasefire deal, alongside contingents from Egypt, Qatar, and the United States. 

Turkey’s involvement in the mediation process has been significant. Ankara’s participation in the US-backed agreement now extends beyond diplomacy: President Erdoğan has confirmed that Turkey will take part in the international task force to be formed as part of the ceasefire deal, alongside contingents from Egypt, Qatar, and the United States. The Turkish Defence Ministry announced on 10 October 2025 that, “with their extensive experience in peacekeeping operations,” its armed forces were ready to take on any assigned mission.[9]

During the two-year war, Turkey escalated its measures against Israel, recalling its ambassador, suspending bilateral trade, restricting airspace access, and leading international criticism of Israeli operations. These moves resonated deeply with Turkish public opinion, strained economic ties, and tested Ankara’s ability to balance moral rhetoric with strategic pragmatism. Now, as the ceasefire takes effect, Turkey’s new role in the task force reflects an attempt to translate political capital into concrete influencethat Ankara can be both principled and indispensable.

For Israel, the post-war challenge lies in transforming battlefield outcomes into lasting security. The war, initially triggered by Hamas’s attacks, has left Israeli society weary and politically divided. More than a thousand Israelis were killed in the initial assault, while the subsequent military campaign in Gaza resulted in tens of thousands of Palestinian deaths and the near-total devastation of the Strip. Entire neighbourhoods have been erased, infrastructure shattered, and hundreds of thousands displaced—many with nowhere to return to. The “day after” brings neither triumph nor stability, but rather a complex mix of humanitarian responsibilities, diplomatic recalibration, and domestic reckoning.

If Ankara’s participation in the task force proceeds smoothly, it could set a precedent for Turkish involvement in humanitarian and reconstruction missions without marking the full normalization of its diplomatic relations with Israel.

Working indirectly with Turkey through a US-brokered mechanism may prove uncomfortable for Israeli policymakers–yet it could also open limited channels of technical cooperation, even amid political estrangement. In parallel, Gaza’s reconstruction looms as the most immediate and contentious test. Turkey, which previously funded key infrastructure in the enclave, including the Turkish–Palestinian Friendship Hospital, is likely to seek a prominent role in rebuilding efforts. Israel, wary of foreign political influence, may prefer such contributions to occur under international coordination. If Ankara’s participation in the task force proceeds smoothly, it could set a precedent for Turkish involvement in humanitarian and reconstruction missions without marking the full normalization of its diplomatic relations with Israel.

Still, old sources of friction persist. In Syria, Israeli and Turkish interests continue to diverge sharply, with Israel targeting Iranian networks and Turkey confronting Kurdish forces and trying to balance Russian and Iranian influence. Both countries remain active in overlapping, volatile theatres where a miscalculation could reignite confrontation. This has led many experts and a sizeable part of the public opinion in both countries to view each other as one of their country’s key security threats. Still, a further remains the least likely scenario.

Internationally, Turkey is likely to continue advocating for Israel to be held account for its wartime conduct, while Israel defends its actions as legitimate self-defence. These competing narratives—humanitarian moralism versus security necessity—will shape both nations’ diplomacy in the months to come.

The role of US policy in the Middle East must also be taken into account in any projections on the future of Israeli–Turkish relations. The fundamental reconfiguration of regional and global politics that the Gaza war has brought about will be strongly nuanced by the degree of US commitment to the Middle East.

Domestic politics is also going to weigh heavily on the future. While the Palestinian problem was used to serve domestic political goals in Turkey and , the two-year Gaza war also gave the Israeli government and Prime Minister Netanyahu the opportunity to paper over domestic failures and silence dissent by declaring a security crisis, forcing all Israeli citizens to rally around their government and deeply polarizing and fragmenting Israeli society in the process.

Ultimately, the “day after” for Gaza is not yet peace; it is a transitional moment, fragile and contested, where political manoeuvring replaces open warfare[10]. For Israel, it is a test of restraint and restoring diplomatic ties; for Turkey, it provides an opportunity to convert words into a tangible regional presence. Whether participation in the international task force becomes a platform for cautious engagement, or another point of friction, will depend on how both sides manage this uneasy coexistence.

Conclusion

Israel and Turkey stand at a crossroads: no longer outright enemies, they are still far from partners. What unfolds now will determine whether this ceasefire becomes a bridge to stability, or merely the pause between two storms.

The fact that the peace agreement in Gaza became possible thanks to the decisive intervention of US President Donald Trump adds a crucial dimension to the debates over the future of Israeli–Turkish relations.

President Trump has claimed a special relationship with both President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Netanyahu, and will probably use both to promote his vision on the Middle East. It would be difficult for either of the two leaders to go against US policy in Gaza and the Middle East as a whole. While Israel’s ability to influence US foreign policy in the Middle East remains substantially larger than Turkey’s, the degree and depth of President Trump’s involvement in the Palestinian problem will likely be influenced by the course of his relations with Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. In that respect, Turkey’s role in the reconstruction process will be influenced by the degree of involvement of these states and Egypt.

In the aftermath of the war, Turkey’s active participation in the peace process creates the prospect of greater closeness after a period of intense hostility–at the level of rhetoric and public political discourse, at least. This new phase holds the potential to replace confrontation with cooperation, laying the groundwork for a more stable and pragmatic relationship between the two states.

Ultimately, the trajectory of Israeli–Turkish relations after the Gaza war will depend on the ability of both states to transform pragmatic cooperation into sustained diplomatic engagement. Both countries now face a rare opportunity to move beyond decades of mistrust and redefine their regional roles not through rivalry, but through dialogue and mutual recognition. If managed wisely, Turkey’s involvement in the peace process can serve as a foundation for long-term stability, while Israel’s openness to collaboration may help consolidate a broader environment of peace in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The rhetoric of enmity may be maintained for domestic purposes, but beneath it lies an emerging understanding that coexistence, rather than confrontation, is the only viable path forward. In this sense, the end of the Gaza war could mark not merely the cessation of hostilities, but the beginning of a gradual, enduring reconciliation between two pivotal powers in the Middle East.

 

References

Soylu Ragip, Turkish goods shipped to Israel via Greece despite official ban, Middle East Eye, June 2024: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkish-goods-shipped-israel-greece-despite-official-ban

Soylu Ragip, Turkey severs all relations with Israel, says Erdoğan, Middle East Eye, November 2024: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-severs-all-relations-israel-says-Erdoğan

Turkey-Israeli Free Trade Agreement: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2455/download

Ghariani Jonathan, Turkish-Israeli relations: ‘the golden years’, 1991–2000, Israel Affairs, 30(1), 5–24’: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/13537121.2023.2295602?needAccess=true

Altunisik Meliha, “The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr, 2000)

Yusuf Can & Seda Güneş, Turkey-Israel Relations After October 7: Layers of Complexity and Posturing, Wilson Center, October 2024: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/turkey-israel-relations-after-october-7-layers-complexity-and-posturing

Hale William, Turkey, the US, Russia, and the Syrian Civil War, Insight Turkey, Vol. 21, No. 4

Hale William, “Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis”, International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Oct 1992)

Akçalı Emel, Görmüş Evrim and Özel Soli, Energy Transitions and Environmental Geopolitics in the Southern Mediterranean (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2022)

Muhammed Kafadar, What is Turkey’s role in the Gaza peace plan?, https://www.dw.com/en/from-bystander-to-player-what-is-turkeys-role-in-the-gaza-peace-plan/a-74310735

Omar Shaban, Gaza’s day after: Reconstruction and governance challenges, Brookings, April 2025: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/gazas-day-after-reconstruction-and-governance-challenges/?utm

 

 

[1] William Hale, Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 68, No. 4 (Oct., 1992), pp. 679-692

[2] Jonathan Ghariani, Turkish-Israeli Relations: ‘The Golden Years’, 1991–2000, Israel Affairs, 2024, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 5-24

[3] His rhetoric drew on the earlier Islamist-nationalist ideas of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, stressing “resistance to Western dominance” and “solidarity with Palestinians”—foreshadowing the tensions that would later deepen under Erdoğan and the AKP. Bülent Ecevit added another layer by adopting a critical stance toward US policy, fueling anti-Americanism and skepticism of the West. While diplomatic relations with Israel were maintained, they were increasingly shaped by Turkey’s broader tensions with Washington and its shifting stance toward the West.

[4] Sectors such as textiles, machinery, chemicals, and agriculture benefitted significantly from this agreement. Additionally, it encouraged the development of joint ventures and investments, with Israel bringing advanced technologies and Turkey providing a cost-effective production base. The FTA’s success exemplified how mutual economic interests could drive cooperation, serving as a model for pragmatic collaboration in an often-fractured region.

[5] Meliha Altunisik, The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr 2000), pp. 176-178

[6] Ragip Soylu, “Turkish Goods Shipped to Israel via Greece Despite Official Ban,” Middle East Eye, June 2024: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkish-goods-shipped-israel-greece-despite-official-ban

[7] Ragip Soylu, “Turkey severs all relations with Israel, says Erdoğan,” Middle East Eye, November 2024: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-severs-all-relations-israel-says-Erdoğan

[8] Yusuf Can & Seda Güneş, Turkey-Israel Relations After October 7: Layers of Complexity and Posturing, Wilson Center, October 2024: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/turkey-israel-relations-after-october-7-layers-complexity-and-posturing

[9] Muhammed Kafadar, “What is Turkey’s Role in the Gaza peace plan?”, Deutsche Welle (DW) https://www.dw.com/en/from-bystander-to-player-what-is-turkeys-role-in-the-gaza-peace-plan/a-74310735

[10] Omar Shaban, “Gaza’s Day After: Reconstruction and Governance Challenges”, Brookings Commentary, April 2025: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/gazas-day-after-reconstruction-and-governance-challenges/?utm

 

 

 

 

 

 

Am 10. Oktober 2025 hat das Forschungsprojekt MINDSET_Clean_H2 einen Workshop zur Wasserstoff-Wirtschaft in Deutschland und Frankreich gemeinsam mit Stakeholdern aus der Industrie und Wissenschaft an der TU München veranstaltet. Franziska Holz und Lukas Barner haben das Projektteam vom DIW Berlin ...

Der Begriff „Globaler Süden“ erfreut sich seit Jahren wachsender Beliebtheit. Oft wird er als knappe Referenz für Teile der Welt verwendet, die lange als „Entwicklungsländer“ oder „Dritte Welt“ bezeichnet wurden. Für viele bringt er die gemeinsame historische Erfahrung von Kolonialisierung und Marginalisierung in Afrika, Asien und Lateinamerika auf den Punkt und verweist auf den Anspruch, globale Prozesse proaktiv mitzugestalten.

Der Begriff „Globaler Süden“ erfreut sich seit Jahren wachsender Beliebtheit. Oft wird er als knappe Referenz für Teile der Welt verwendet, die lange als „Entwicklungsländer“ oder „Dritte Welt“ bezeichnet wurden. Für viele bringt er die gemeinsame historische Erfahrung von Kolonialisierung und Marginalisierung in Afrika, Asien und Lateinamerika auf den Punkt und verweist auf den Anspruch, globale Prozesse proaktiv mitzugestalten.

Der Begriff „Globaler Süden“ erfreut sich seit Jahren wachsender Beliebtheit. Oft wird er als knappe Referenz für Teile der Welt verwendet, die lange als „Entwicklungsländer“ oder „Dritte Welt“ bezeichnet wurden. Für viele bringt er die gemeinsame historische Erfahrung von Kolonialisierung und Marginalisierung in Afrika, Asien und Lateinamerika auf den Punkt und verweist auf den Anspruch, globale Prozesse proaktiv mitzugestalten.

The United Nations is a multilateral organization with near-universal reach. With few exceptions, United Nations rules and regulations apply to all 193 Member States. The operational activities for development of the United Nations system, however, are organized along a binary logic by which “developed” countries provide funding to United Nations entities and “developing” countries receive United Nations support. Against the backdrop of ongoing discussions under the United Nations Secretary-General’s UN80 initiative, we suggest that the United Nations reform its development work to ensure that it engages all Member States. Universalizing United Nations development functions – i.e., mandating the Organization’s development pillar to engage with countries of all income categories – is a key step towards a more effective multilateral development system.