Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

L'Istrie fut une terre de résistance, où la mémoire des partisans de la Seconde Guerre mondiale reste plus présente qu'ailleurs en Croatie. Pas seulement avec d'imposants monuments brutaliste, mais aussi par des témoignages plus diffus et plus intimes, dans tous les petits villages de la péninsule. Diaporama.

- Articles / Mémoires Italie, Courrier des Balkans, Croatie, Histoire, Yougonostalgie, Une - Diaporama

Decembertől Peter Janků vezeti a Szlovák Rádiót – közölte Zuzana Vicelová, az STVR kommunikációs osztályának vezetője. Martina Flašíková, az STVR vezérigazgatója szerint Janků kinevezése világos jelzés, hogy a közszolgálati rádió a kulturált párbeszéd, a pluralizmus és a professzionális zsurnalisztika megjelenítője.

A nyilvánosság segítségét kéri a losonci rendőrség a 14 éves gömörsídi (Šíd/Losonci járás) Ivan megtalálásához, akit szerdán (11. 26.) láttak legutóbb Füleken, azóta nincs hír róla.

Die Spitzen von CDU, CSU und SPD wollen das Rentenpaket unverändert im Bundestag beschließen. Dies kommentiert Rentenexperte Peter Haan, Leiter der Abteilung Staat im DIW Berlin:

Die Einigung zum Rentenpaket im Koalitionsausschuss sendet ein wichtiges Signal: Der Reformbedarf ist erkannt, der politische Druck zum Handeln nimmt zu. Positiv ist, dass die Rentenkommission zügig Empfehlungen erarbeiten soll, um noch in dieser Legislatur eine Reform zu ermöglichen. Gleichzeitig bleiben zentrale Schwachstellen bestehen: Finanzierungsfragen sind nicht geklärt und werden in die Zukunft verschoben. Der Auftrag an die Kommission ist ambitioniert, und die Erwartungen an ihre Durchsetzungskraft ist kaum realistisch. Eine Besetzung mit Wissenschaftler*innen und Politiker*innen kann die Konsensbildung fördern. Doch die Kommission kann nur erfolgreich sein, wenn sie nicht von parteipolitischen Konflikten geprägt wird. Zudem bleibt die Herausforderung, alle gesellschaftlichen Gruppen einzubeziehen, enorm groß – ohne breiten Konsens dürfte die Halbwertszeit der Beschlüsse begrenzt sein.

Accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic and technological developments such as artificial intelligence, digital transformations affect almost all areas of social, economic, and environmental life. Emerging as a tool for addressing challenges – but also as a source of new problems or as an amplifier of existing challenges – digital transformation has increasingly become the focus of initiatives at the European Union (EU) level. Since 2015, the EU has developed a comprehensive digital agenda spanning various policy domains, ranging from bolstering the single market to addressing foreign and security policy concerns. This paper examines the evolving landscape of digitalisation-related EU policies through the lens of strategy documents and policy guidelines, with particular emphasis on developments between 2020 and 2025. It explores the EU’s overarching approach towards digitalisation – its conceptualisation, objectives, and self-defined role in shaping the digital revolution. The analysis reveals that the EU addresses digitalisation through a multitude of policy-specific strategies and guidelines, characterised by four predominant strategic narratives: A geopolitical (“digital sovereignty”), an environmental (“twin transitions”), a socio-political (“fundamental rights”), and an economic (“growth and competitiveness”) narrative.

Accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic and technological developments such as artificial intelligence, digital transformations affect almost all areas of social, economic, and environmental life. Emerging as a tool for addressing challenges – but also as a source of new problems or as an amplifier of existing challenges – digital transformation has increasingly become the focus of initiatives at the European Union (EU) level. Since 2015, the EU has developed a comprehensive digital agenda spanning various policy domains, ranging from bolstering the single market to addressing foreign and security policy concerns. This paper examines the evolving landscape of digitalisation-related EU policies through the lens of strategy documents and policy guidelines, with particular emphasis on developments between 2020 and 2025. It explores the EU’s overarching approach towards digitalisation – its conceptualisation, objectives, and self-defined role in shaping the digital revolution. The analysis reveals that the EU addresses digitalisation through a multitude of policy-specific strategies and guidelines, characterised by four predominant strategic narratives: A geopolitical (“digital sovereignty”), an environmental (“twin transitions”), a socio-political (“fundamental rights”), and an economic (“growth and competitiveness”) narrative.

Accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic and technological developments such as artificial intelligence, digital transformations affect almost all areas of social, economic, and environmental life. Emerging as a tool for addressing challenges – but also as a source of new problems or as an amplifier of existing challenges – digital transformation has increasingly become the focus of initiatives at the European Union (EU) level. Since 2015, the EU has developed a comprehensive digital agenda spanning various policy domains, ranging from bolstering the single market to addressing foreign and security policy concerns. This paper examines the evolving landscape of digitalisation-related EU policies through the lens of strategy documents and policy guidelines, with particular emphasis on developments between 2020 and 2025. It explores the EU’s overarching approach towards digitalisation – its conceptualisation, objectives, and self-defined role in shaping the digital revolution. The analysis reveals that the EU addresses digitalisation through a multitude of policy-specific strategies and guidelines, characterised by four predominant strategic narratives: A geopolitical (“digital sovereignty”), an environmental (“twin transitions”), a socio-political (“fundamental rights”), and an economic (“growth and competitiveness”) narrative.

ÄNDERUNGSANTRÄGE 1 - 278 - Entwurf eines Berichts Strategische Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitspartnerschaften der EU
Ausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung
Michał Szczerba

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

Die Sozialwissenschaftlerin Sabine Zinn leitet ab sofort das Sozio-oekonomische Panel (SOEP) im Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) und tritt dem DIW-Vorstand bei. Das DIW-Kuratorium hat sie bereits im Mai in diese Positionen berufen. Mit der Vertragsunterzeichnung wird ihre ...

Panagiota Manoli and George Tzogopoulos, Senior Research Fellows at ELIAMEP, provide a first assessment of the ongoing peace talks concerning the war in Ukraine. (in Greek)

In this chapter we draw on our research with displaced people, conflict, violence, gender, and humanitarian aid between 2006 and 2024 in different African countries, which we conducted separately but were brought together by these shared research interests. We address the nexus between conflict, peace, and forced migration using examples from Africa. We situate the discussion within the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial eras, which we take not as mere footnotes but as salient periods in the continent’s history that have influenced current conflicts and forced displacement in Africa. We therefore emphasize the role of history in understanding contemporary conflicts and forced migration on the continent. In doing so, we critique Western research perspectives on forms of violence and their ahistorical explanations of contemporary violent conflicts in Africa. We explain the role of colonial borders not only in engendering conflict but also in creating structural obstacles for refugees to contribute to transformation in countries of origin. We also critique the separation of peacebuilding in the countries of origin from refugee protection in host countries and highlight this as a limitation of global (i.e., Western) perspectives on peacebuilding.

In this chapter we draw on our research with displaced people, conflict, violence, gender, and humanitarian aid between 2006 and 2024 in different African countries, which we conducted separately but were brought together by these shared research interests. We address the nexus between conflict, peace, and forced migration using examples from Africa. We situate the discussion within the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial eras, which we take not as mere footnotes but as salient periods in the continent’s history that have influenced current conflicts and forced displacement in Africa. We therefore emphasize the role of history in understanding contemporary conflicts and forced migration on the continent. In doing so, we critique Western research perspectives on forms of violence and their ahistorical explanations of contemporary violent conflicts in Africa. We explain the role of colonial borders not only in engendering conflict but also in creating structural obstacles for refugees to contribute to transformation in countries of origin. We also critique the separation of peacebuilding in the countries of origin from refugee protection in host countries and highlight this as a limitation of global (i.e., Western) perspectives on peacebuilding.

In this chapter we draw on our research with displaced people, conflict, violence, gender, and humanitarian aid between 2006 and 2024 in different African countries, which we conducted separately but were brought together by these shared research interests. We address the nexus between conflict, peace, and forced migration using examples from Africa. We situate the discussion within the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial eras, which we take not as mere footnotes but as salient periods in the continent’s history that have influenced current conflicts and forced displacement in Africa. We therefore emphasize the role of history in understanding contemporary conflicts and forced migration on the continent. In doing so, we critique Western research perspectives on forms of violence and their ahistorical explanations of contemporary violent conflicts in Africa. We explain the role of colonial borders not only in engendering conflict but also in creating structural obstacles for refugees to contribute to transformation in countries of origin. We also critique the separation of peacebuilding in the countries of origin from refugee protection in host countries and highlight this as a limitation of global (i.e., Western) perspectives on peacebuilding.

Critical minerals (CMs) have become a strategic priority for the European Union (EU) amid the green and digital transitions. These resources – including lithium, cobalt, rare earths and nickel – are essential for clean energy technologies, defence systems and electronics. Yet, their processing and refining are highly concentrated in a few countries, leaving the EU especially vulnerable to supply disruptions and fuelling geopolitical tensions.

Recent shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, have further exposed the fragility of supply chains. At the same time, extracting and trading CMs pose severe environmental and social challenges, from high carbon footprints to local community impacts. EU trade policy is therefore confronted with a trilemma: how to safeguard economic competitiveness, ensure en­vironmental sustainability and enhance security of supply.

This policy brief summarises research tracing how the Euro­pean Commission’s trade discourse on CMs has evolved to address the trilemma (Laurens, 2025). Initially, com­muni­cations focused narrowly on free trade and market access for raw materials. Gradually, sustainability and security considerations entered the narrative. Most recently, the EU has embraced a hybrid framing, simultaneously highlighting economic, environ­mental and security objectives in its trade discourse on CMs.

Although this hybrid discursive approach can help build broader support for CM policies and agreements by appealing to diverse stakeholders, it also demands careful policy design to minimise trade-offs and deliver on its promises. Without credible implementation and genuine integration of economic, environmental and security objectives, hybrid framing risks remaining largely rhetorical and failing to steer policy in practice.

Key policy messages:

• The EU should adopt an integrated approach that effectively addresses economic, sustainability and security goals together while anticipating trade-offs to support more robust CM policies. This requires strong coordination across trade, industry, environ­ment and security-related directorates-general to align CM strategies, avoid policy conflicts and maximise synergies. It may also require short-term economic sacrifices for long-term resilience.
• Early and meaningful engagement with research institutions, civil society, local communities and industry should move beyond formal consultation and enable genuine co-creation of solutions. Dialogue should begin before key decisions on CMs are finalised, incorporate stakeholder input trans­parently, and respond to concerns about sustain­ability and security of supply.
• CM policies and agreements should provide for binding obligations and concrete implementation plans to ensure environmental and labour pro­tection, local value addition, skills development and technology transfer in resource-rich but eco­nomically vulnerable regions. Listening to partner governments and local communities as well as investing in the knowledge of local political, social and environ­mental contexts are essential for building trust and long-term partnerships.
• International cooperation on CMs should be strengthened through inclusive arrangements that involve both major consumers and producing countries. Clubs composed primarily of resource-poor but wealthy economies risk being perceived as exclusionary.

Critical minerals (CMs) have become a strategic priority for the European Union (EU) amid the green and digital transitions. These resources – including lithium, cobalt, rare earths and nickel – are essential for clean energy technologies, defence systems and electronics. Yet, their processing and refining are highly concentrated in a few countries, leaving the EU especially vulnerable to supply disruptions and fuelling geopolitical tensions.

Recent shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, have further exposed the fragility of supply chains. At the same time, extracting and trading CMs pose severe environmental and social challenges, from high carbon footprints to local community impacts. EU trade policy is therefore confronted with a trilemma: how to safeguard economic competitiveness, ensure en­vironmental sustainability and enhance security of supply.

This policy brief summarises research tracing how the Euro­pean Commission’s trade discourse on CMs has evolved to address the trilemma (Laurens, 2025). Initially, com­muni­cations focused narrowly on free trade and market access for raw materials. Gradually, sustainability and security considerations entered the narrative. Most recently, the EU has embraced a hybrid framing, simultaneously highlighting economic, environ­mental and security objectives in its trade discourse on CMs.

Although this hybrid discursive approach can help build broader support for CM policies and agreements by appealing to diverse stakeholders, it also demands careful policy design to minimise trade-offs and deliver on its promises. Without credible implementation and genuine integration of economic, environmental and security objectives, hybrid framing risks remaining largely rhetorical and failing to steer policy in practice.

Key policy messages:

• The EU should adopt an integrated approach that effectively addresses economic, sustainability and security goals together while anticipating trade-offs to support more robust CM policies. This requires strong coordination across trade, industry, environ­ment and security-related directorates-general to align CM strategies, avoid policy conflicts and maximise synergies. It may also require short-term economic sacrifices for long-term resilience.
• Early and meaningful engagement with research institutions, civil society, local communities and industry should move beyond formal consultation and enable genuine co-creation of solutions. Dialogue should begin before key decisions on CMs are finalised, incorporate stakeholder input trans­parently, and respond to concerns about sustain­ability and security of supply.
• CM policies and agreements should provide for binding obligations and concrete implementation plans to ensure environmental and labour pro­tection, local value addition, skills development and technology transfer in resource-rich but eco­nomically vulnerable regions. Listening to partner governments and local communities as well as investing in the knowledge of local political, social and environ­mental contexts are essential for building trust and long-term partnerships.
• International cooperation on CMs should be strengthened through inclusive arrangements that involve both major consumers and producing countries. Clubs composed primarily of resource-poor but wealthy economies risk being perceived as exclusionary.

Critical minerals (CMs) have become a strategic priority for the European Union (EU) amid the green and digital transitions. These resources – including lithium, cobalt, rare earths and nickel – are essential for clean energy technologies, defence systems and electronics. Yet, their processing and refining are highly concentrated in a few countries, leaving the EU especially vulnerable to supply disruptions and fuelling geopolitical tensions.

Recent shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, have further exposed the fragility of supply chains. At the same time, extracting and trading CMs pose severe environmental and social challenges, from high carbon footprints to local community impacts. EU trade policy is therefore confronted with a trilemma: how to safeguard economic competitiveness, ensure en­vironmental sustainability and enhance security of supply.

This policy brief summarises research tracing how the Euro­pean Commission’s trade discourse on CMs has evolved to address the trilemma (Laurens, 2025). Initially, com­muni­cations focused narrowly on free trade and market access for raw materials. Gradually, sustainability and security considerations entered the narrative. Most recently, the EU has embraced a hybrid framing, simultaneously highlighting economic, environ­mental and security objectives in its trade discourse on CMs.

Although this hybrid discursive approach can help build broader support for CM policies and agreements by appealing to diverse stakeholders, it also demands careful policy design to minimise trade-offs and deliver on its promises. Without credible implementation and genuine integration of economic, environmental and security objectives, hybrid framing risks remaining largely rhetorical and failing to steer policy in practice.

Key policy messages:

• The EU should adopt an integrated approach that effectively addresses economic, sustainability and security goals together while anticipating trade-offs to support more robust CM policies. This requires strong coordination across trade, industry, environ­ment and security-related directorates-general to align CM strategies, avoid policy conflicts and maximise synergies. It may also require short-term economic sacrifices for long-term resilience.
• Early and meaningful engagement with research institutions, civil society, local communities and industry should move beyond formal consultation and enable genuine co-creation of solutions. Dialogue should begin before key decisions on CMs are finalised, incorporate stakeholder input trans­parently, and respond to concerns about sustain­ability and security of supply.
• CM policies and agreements should provide for binding obligations and concrete implementation plans to ensure environmental and labour pro­tection, local value addition, skills development and technology transfer in resource-rich but eco­nomically vulnerable regions. Listening to partner governments and local communities as well as investing in the knowledge of local political, social and environ­mental contexts are essential for building trust and long-term partnerships.
• International cooperation on CMs should be strengthened through inclusive arrangements that involve both major consumers and producing countries. Clubs composed primarily of resource-poor but wealthy economies risk being perceived as exclusionary.

The world is moving away from a single, post-2000 consensus around multilateralism and poverty reduction. What replaces it depends on which coalition wins the argument, and then bakes that argument into institutions and finance. So what are the visions for the global development architecture in 2030 that we see? One is ‘Aid Retrenchment with Nationalist Conditionality’. Assistance is folded into foreign, trade, and interior policy. Grants shrink, multilateral agencies are sidelined, and cooperation becomes bilateral deals tied to migration control, geopolitical alignment, or access to minerals. Rights, gender, and climate justice recede. A second world is ‘Strategic Multilateralism’. The multilateral development banks stay central, but their remit narrows to macro-stability, crisis response, and “risk containment”. Concessional finance is rationed to countries seen as fragile or geostrategic. Aid rhetoric turns technocratic and securitised and health framed as biosecurity. A third vision is ‘Pluralist Development Cooperation’. There is no single system, but many partially overlapping regimes: Chinese, Indian, Gulf, regional, and club initiatives. Low and middle income countries gain bargaining space by choosing across offers. The trade-off is fragmentation. Rules on debt workouts, safeguards, and transparency diverge, and global public goods struggle for predictable funding. Finally, a fourth vision is ‘Global Solidarity 2.0’. Development cooperation is rebuilt around shared risks such as climate stability, pandemics, antimicrobial resistance, and debt contagion. North and South co-lead a pooled Global Public Goods Facility. Contributions reflect income and carbon profile, and access reflects exposure to cross-border risk. The donor-recipient binary fades, even if frictions persist.

The world is moving away from a single, post-2000 consensus around multilateralism and poverty reduction. What replaces it depends on which coalition wins the argument, and then bakes that argument into institutions and finance. So what are the visions for the global development architecture in 2030 that we see? One is ‘Aid Retrenchment with Nationalist Conditionality’. Assistance is folded into foreign, trade, and interior policy. Grants shrink, multilateral agencies are sidelined, and cooperation becomes bilateral deals tied to migration control, geopolitical alignment, or access to minerals. Rights, gender, and climate justice recede. A second world is ‘Strategic Multilateralism’. The multilateral development banks stay central, but their remit narrows to macro-stability, crisis response, and “risk containment”. Concessional finance is rationed to countries seen as fragile or geostrategic. Aid rhetoric turns technocratic and securitised and health framed as biosecurity. A third vision is ‘Pluralist Development Cooperation’. There is no single system, but many partially overlapping regimes: Chinese, Indian, Gulf, regional, and club initiatives. Low and middle income countries gain bargaining space by choosing across offers. The trade-off is fragmentation. Rules on debt workouts, safeguards, and transparency diverge, and global public goods struggle for predictable funding. Finally, a fourth vision is ‘Global Solidarity 2.0’. Development cooperation is rebuilt around shared risks such as climate stability, pandemics, antimicrobial resistance, and debt contagion. North and South co-lead a pooled Global Public Goods Facility. Contributions reflect income and carbon profile, and access reflects exposure to cross-border risk. The donor-recipient binary fades, even if frictions persist.

The world is moving away from a single, post-2000 consensus around multilateralism and poverty reduction. What replaces it depends on which coalition wins the argument, and then bakes that argument into institutions and finance. So what are the visions for the global development architecture in 2030 that we see? One is ‘Aid Retrenchment with Nationalist Conditionality’. Assistance is folded into foreign, trade, and interior policy. Grants shrink, multilateral agencies are sidelined, and cooperation becomes bilateral deals tied to migration control, geopolitical alignment, or access to minerals. Rights, gender, and climate justice recede. A second world is ‘Strategic Multilateralism’. The multilateral development banks stay central, but their remit narrows to macro-stability, crisis response, and “risk containment”. Concessional finance is rationed to countries seen as fragile or geostrategic. Aid rhetoric turns technocratic and securitised and health framed as biosecurity. A third vision is ‘Pluralist Development Cooperation’. There is no single system, but many partially overlapping regimes: Chinese, Indian, Gulf, regional, and club initiatives. Low and middle income countries gain bargaining space by choosing across offers. The trade-off is fragmentation. Rules on debt workouts, safeguards, and transparency diverge, and global public goods struggle for predictable funding. Finally, a fourth vision is ‘Global Solidarity 2.0’. Development cooperation is rebuilt around shared risks such as climate stability, pandemics, antimicrobial resistance, and debt contagion. North and South co-lead a pooled Global Public Goods Facility. Contributions reflect income and carbon profile, and access reflects exposure to cross-border risk. The donor-recipient binary fades, even if frictions persist.

A message from the President of IPI: We are all heartbroken by the news we have lost a cherished member of our small IPI/IPA family in the form of Ambassador David Malone DPhil, who served as our President with great distinction from 1998 to 2004. We extend our condolences to David’s family, as well as to his diplomatic family in Canada.

Loved and respected by the UN Think-Tank community, David was ubiquitous throughout Turtle Bay when leading IPA, always in the thick of things, tugging at old approaches and suggesting new ways of analyzing multilateralism. He did so brilliantly and—true to his personality, often playfully. He was a most remarkable man and a friend to so many of us. We will miss him sorely.

The post In Memoriam: David M. Malone appeared first on International Peace Institute.