Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, the “post–Cold War” international order as we know it is coming to an end. Amid increasing volatility and conflict, the shape and character of the order that will replace it are dangerously unclear. There are ambitions by so-called middle powers – including some member states of the EU – to provide an effective response, but questions remain as to their potential impact. Three scenarios can be envisaged: (1) an Orwellian dystopia dominated by three global powers – the United States, China and Russia – each with its own sphere of influence; (2) a “new Cold War” between two rival capitalist models: “Western” liberal democracy versus “Eastern” oligarchy and (3) the survival of the rules-based international order, possibly as a counterweight to oligarchic spheres of influence. For this scenario to materialise, middle powers must address the liberal order’s inherent weaknesses so that it delivers for all of its members. This discussion paper brings together 14 contributions drawing on the German Institute of Development and Sustainability’s (IDOS) broad regional and thematic expertise to examine these questions. The contributions analyse key actors, cooperation themes and regions. Each contribution analyses the implications of the changing global order for its specific area of focus and explores how international cooperation in general – and development cooperation in particular – can contribute to a more just and sustainable international system. The paper aims to provide readers with a range of perspectives on the state of international development cooperation and its possible evolution. Taken together, the contributions provide insights into the roles that international development cooperation may play in an emerging global order and identify priorities for reforms.

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, the “post–Cold War” international order as we know it is coming to an end. Amid increasing volatility and conflict, the shape and character of the order that will replace it are dangerously unclear. There are ambitions by so-called middle powers – including some member states of the EU – to provide an effective response, but questions remain as to their potential impact. Three scenarios can be envisaged: (1) an Orwellian dystopia dominated by three global powers – the United States, China and Russia – each with its own sphere of influence; (2) a “new Cold War” between two rival capitalist models: “Western” liberal democracy versus “Eastern” oligarchy and (3) the survival of the rules-based international order, possibly as a counterweight to oligarchic spheres of influence. For this scenario to materialise, middle powers must address the liberal order’s inherent weaknesses so that it delivers for all of its members. This discussion paper brings together 14 contributions drawing on the German Institute of Development and Sustainability’s (IDOS) broad regional and thematic expertise to examine these questions. The contributions analyse key actors, cooperation themes and regions. Each contribution analyses the implications of the changing global order for its specific area of focus and explores how international cooperation in general – and development cooperation in particular – can contribute to a more just and sustainable international system. The paper aims to provide readers with a range of perspectives on the state of international development cooperation and its possible evolution. Taken together, the contributions provide insights into the roles that international development cooperation may play in an emerging global order and identify priorities for reforms.

Krankheitsbedingte Fehltage von Beschäftigten in Deutschland sind 2022 stark gestiegen – Grund ist aber nicht primär die elektronische Krankschreibung – Atemwegserkrankungen und verändertes Verhalten nach der Pandemie sorgen für mehr Fehlzeiten am Arbeitsplatz – Teilkrankschreibung und mehr ...

Standfirst para:

Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge of weak job creation and persistent informality. Drawing on survey evidence on business behaviour and labour market dynamics, this column explains why job creation is limited and informal work remains such an integral part of how firms organise production. The generation of more formal jobs requires a comprehensive policy approach, one that goes beyond enforcement of labour regulations to reshape the economic environment in which firms and workers make decisions.

In a nutshell

Informality in the labour market reflects incentives on both sides: firms benefit from lower costs and flexibility, while workers may prefer higher take-home pay or they may perceive limited benefits from formal employment.

Policies to create formal jobs that are focused solely on enforcement may backfire by raising hiring costs; effective reform requires reducing the cost of formality -including through simpler tax procedures and more proportionate labour costs - while increasing its benefits.

Addressing informality requires targeting informal employment within formal firms, aligning labour market and industrial policies, and adapting social protection and contribution systems to non-standard work arrangements.

Standfirst para:

Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge of weak job creation and persistent informality. Drawing on survey evidence on business behaviour and labour market dynamics, this column explains why job creation is limited and informal work remains such an integral part of how firms organise production. The generation of more formal jobs requires a comprehensive policy approach, one that goes beyond enforcement of labour regulations to reshape the economic environment in which firms and workers make decisions.

In a nutshell

Informality in the labour market reflects incentives on both sides: firms benefit from lower costs and flexibility, while workers may prefer higher take-home pay or they may perceive limited benefits from formal employment.

Policies to create formal jobs that are focused solely on enforcement may backfire by raising hiring costs; effective reform requires reducing the cost of formality -including through simpler tax procedures and more proportionate labour costs - while increasing its benefits.

Addressing informality requires targeting informal employment within formal firms, aligning labour market and industrial policies, and adapting social protection and contribution systems to non-standard work arrangements.

Standfirst para:

Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge of weak job creation and persistent informality. Drawing on survey evidence on business behaviour and labour market dynamics, this column explains why job creation is limited and informal work remains such an integral part of how firms organise production. The generation of more formal jobs requires a comprehensive policy approach, one that goes beyond enforcement of labour regulations to reshape the economic environment in which firms and workers make decisions.

In a nutshell

Informality in the labour market reflects incentives on both sides: firms benefit from lower costs and flexibility, while workers may prefer higher take-home pay or they may perceive limited benefits from formal employment.

Policies to create formal jobs that are focused solely on enforcement may backfire by raising hiring costs; effective reform requires reducing the cost of formality -including through simpler tax procedures and more proportionate labour costs - while increasing its benefits.

Addressing informality requires targeting informal employment within formal firms, aligning labour market and industrial policies, and adapting social protection and contribution systems to non-standard work arrangements.

Escalatory attacks on multilateral rules and institutions in this era of raw power politics have plunged international politics into uncharted territory. Traditional alliances have been fractured and new partnerships between unlikely bedfellows are emerging. No longer in transition, the post-World War II world order is in rupture. This paper examines international cooperation under these conditions and argues that a new ‘flexi-lateralism’ is taking shape as a pragmatic response to changing times. We define the new flexi-lateralism as international cooperation expressed through adaptable modular tools and selective coalitions, anchored in UN norms, that proceeds even when universal commitments are openly contested and attacked. Our paper considers a set of initiatives launched around the Financing for Development (FfD) conference in Sevilla (July 2025) on the issue of debt servicing. We illustrate how cooperation often depends on selective participation, informal venues and issue-specific coalitions, rather than comprehensive universal bargains. The paper uses ‘flexi-lateralism’ as a term for these flexible multilateral forms that sit between classic UN-style universality and narrow great-power deals. We conclude that international cooperation in this era is neither automatically collapsing nor simply fragmenting. It is adapting and reconfigured through overlapping clubs and coalitions with uneven implications for the Global South and the North.

Escalatory attacks on multilateral rules and institutions in this era of raw power politics have plunged international politics into uncharted territory. Traditional alliances have been fractured and new partnerships between unlikely bedfellows are emerging. No longer in transition, the post-World War II world order is in rupture. This paper examines international cooperation under these conditions and argues that a new ‘flexi-lateralism’ is taking shape as a pragmatic response to changing times. We define the new flexi-lateralism as international cooperation expressed through adaptable modular tools and selective coalitions, anchored in UN norms, that proceeds even when universal commitments are openly contested and attacked. Our paper considers a set of initiatives launched around the Financing for Development (FfD) conference in Sevilla (July 2025) on the issue of debt servicing. We illustrate how cooperation often depends on selective participation, informal venues and issue-specific coalitions, rather than comprehensive universal bargains. The paper uses ‘flexi-lateralism’ as a term for these flexible multilateral forms that sit between classic UN-style universality and narrow great-power deals. We conclude that international cooperation in this era is neither automatically collapsing nor simply fragmenting. It is adapting and reconfigured through overlapping clubs and coalitions with uneven implications for the Global South and the North.

Escalatory attacks on multilateral rules and institutions in this era of raw power politics have plunged international politics into uncharted territory. Traditional alliances have been fractured and new partnerships between unlikely bedfellows are emerging. No longer in transition, the post-World War II world order is in rupture. This paper examines international cooperation under these conditions and argues that a new ‘flexi-lateralism’ is taking shape as a pragmatic response to changing times. We define the new flexi-lateralism as international cooperation expressed through adaptable modular tools and selective coalitions, anchored in UN norms, that proceeds even when universal commitments are openly contested and attacked. Our paper considers a set of initiatives launched around the Financing for Development (FfD) conference in Sevilla (July 2025) on the issue of debt servicing. We illustrate how cooperation often depends on selective participation, informal venues and issue-specific coalitions, rather than comprehensive universal bargains. The paper uses ‘flexi-lateralism’ as a term for these flexible multilateral forms that sit between classic UN-style universality and narrow great-power deals. We conclude that international cooperation in this era is neither automatically collapsing nor simply fragmenting. It is adapting and reconfigured through overlapping clubs and coalitions with uneven implications for the Global South and the North.

The OECD conference “will focus on action, connecting geopolitical realities with development priorities and translating vision into practical strategic directions.” So how does the flexi-lateralism framework help? We argue that cooperation is reconfiguring into selective coalitions using discrete modular instruments, orchestrated through intermediaries, connected to universal norms but no longer dependent on universal participation. Whether this configuration can maintain legitimacy while delivering speed and adaptation is an open question. Delegates in Paris could look at the design principles we set out that distinguish workable flexi-lateral arrangements from fragmentation, namely, transparency, open accession pathways, and normative alignment with agreed development goals. These are the features that differentiate new forms of cooperation.

The OECD conference “will focus on action, connecting geopolitical realities with development priorities and translating vision into practical strategic directions.” So how does the flexi-lateralism framework help? We argue that cooperation is reconfiguring into selective coalitions using discrete modular instruments, orchestrated through intermediaries, connected to universal norms but no longer dependent on universal participation. Whether this configuration can maintain legitimacy while delivering speed and adaptation is an open question. Delegates in Paris could look at the design principles we set out that distinguish workable flexi-lateral arrangements from fragmentation, namely, transparency, open accession pathways, and normative alignment with agreed development goals. These are the features that differentiate new forms of cooperation.

The OECD conference “will focus on action, connecting geopolitical realities with development priorities and translating vision into practical strategic directions.” So how does the flexi-lateralism framework help? We argue that cooperation is reconfiguring into selective coalitions using discrete modular instruments, orchestrated through intermediaries, connected to universal norms but no longer dependent on universal participation. Whether this configuration can maintain legitimacy while delivering speed and adaptation is an open question. Delegates in Paris could look at the design principles we set out that distinguish workable flexi-lateral arrangements from fragmentation, namely, transparency, open accession pathways, and normative alignment with agreed development goals. These are the features that differentiate new forms of cooperation.

Looking back, the return of Donald Trump to the White House, and, in the early phase, the role played by Elon Musk in reshaping the U.S. foreign aid approach has, to a large extent, foreshadowed what the second Trump administration would become. This profile consists of: (i) crude transactionalism, (ii) a strong ideological foundation (with significant elements of authoritarian libertarianism), (iii) a high degree of chaos with decisions not necessarily based on strategic or even tactical considerations, and (iv) an obsession with disruption. The wide range of current initiatives, coalitions, commissions, and conferences that are discussing development cooperation, as well as efforts to reflect on narratives, international aid governance, and resource mobilisation, are thus operating in a highly hostile environment shaped by the U.S. administration assault on long standing policy norms. European leaders could speak out more clearly about what can be seen as an open challenge those norms. They could also advance a more proactive narrative and, importantly, refuse to de facto repurpose development institutions and decide not to follow the fundamental ODA reductions by the United States.

Looking back, the return of Donald Trump to the White House, and, in the early phase, the role played by Elon Musk in reshaping the U.S. foreign aid approach has, to a large extent, foreshadowed what the second Trump administration would become. This profile consists of: (i) crude transactionalism, (ii) a strong ideological foundation (with significant elements of authoritarian libertarianism), (iii) a high degree of chaos with decisions not necessarily based on strategic or even tactical considerations, and (iv) an obsession with disruption. The wide range of current initiatives, coalitions, commissions, and conferences that are discussing development cooperation, as well as efforts to reflect on narratives, international aid governance, and resource mobilisation, are thus operating in a highly hostile environment shaped by the U.S. administration assault on long standing policy norms. European leaders could speak out more clearly about what can be seen as an open challenge those norms. They could also advance a more proactive narrative and, importantly, refuse to de facto repurpose development institutions and decide not to follow the fundamental ODA reductions by the United States.

Looking back, the return of Donald Trump to the White House, and, in the early phase, the role played by Elon Musk in reshaping the U.S. foreign aid approach has, to a large extent, foreshadowed what the second Trump administration would become. This profile consists of: (i) crude transactionalism, (ii) a strong ideological foundation (with significant elements of authoritarian libertarianism), (iii) a high degree of chaos with decisions not necessarily based on strategic or even tactical considerations, and (iv) an obsession with disruption. The wide range of current initiatives, coalitions, commissions, and conferences that are discussing development cooperation, as well as efforts to reflect on narratives, international aid governance, and resource mobilisation, are thus operating in a highly hostile environment shaped by the U.S. administration assault on long standing policy norms. European leaders could speak out more clearly about what can be seen as an open challenge those norms. They could also advance a more proactive narrative and, importantly, refuse to de facto repurpose development institutions and decide not to follow the fundamental ODA reductions by the United States.

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, it has become apparent that the “post–Cold War” international order is in its death throes. For three decades, global affairs have been shaped by a system dominated by the United States as the world’s only genuinely global power. American power was embedded in a “rules-based” international order founded on respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, alongside liberal-democratic norms such as “free” global economic exchange and institutionalised governance. Led by the United States and its Western allies, this order was considered by some in the early 1990s to be the “end of history”, a supposedly final stage in human ideological, political and economic evolution (Fukuyama, 1989). While the order was never without its practical and moral failings, and although many countries did not benefit from its protection, it was widely considered an improvement over past systems for organising international interdependence. Today, however, the liberal inter­nationalist project faces a profound crisis and is being challenged by geopolitical competition and a hollowing out from within (Ikenberry, 2024).

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, it has become apparent that the “post–Cold War” international order is in its death throes. For three decades, global affairs have been shaped by a system dominated by the United States as the world’s only genuinely global power. American power was embedded in a “rules-based” international order founded on respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, alongside liberal-democratic norms such as “free” global economic exchange and institutionalised governance. Led by the United States and its Western allies, this order was considered by some in the early 1990s to be the “end of history”, a supposedly final stage in human ideological, political and economic evolution (Fukuyama, 1989). While the order was never without its practical and moral failings, and although many countries did not benefit from its protection, it was widely considered an improvement over past systems for organising international interdependence. Today, however, the liberal inter­nationalist project faces a profound crisis and is being challenged by geopolitical competition and a hollowing out from within (Ikenberry, 2024).

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, it has become apparent that the “post–Cold War” international order is in its death throes. For three decades, global affairs have been shaped by a system dominated by the United States as the world’s only genuinely global power. American power was embedded in a “rules-based” international order founded on respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, alongside liberal-democratic norms such as “free” global economic exchange and institutionalised governance. Led by the United States and its Western allies, this order was considered by some in the early 1990s to be the “end of history”, a supposedly final stage in human ideological, political and economic evolution (Fukuyama, 1989). While the order was never without its practical and moral failings, and although many countries did not benefit from its protection, it was widely considered an improvement over past systems for organising international interdependence. Today, however, the liberal inter­nationalist project faces a profound crisis and is being challenged by geopolitical competition and a hollowing out from within (Ikenberry, 2024).

Caught between weak employment opportunities and widespread informal employment, Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge. Existing incentives in the labour market encourage both firms and workers to engage in informal employment arrangements. Firms benefit from lower labour costs and greater flexibility, while workers often seek higher take-home pay, driven by limited confidence in the benefits associated with formal employment. Many workers perceive tax and social insurance deductions as offering few tangible benefits or effective safety nets that would compensate for the reduction in current income. At the same time, policies aimed at promoting formal job creation that rely exclusively on stricter enforcement may backfire by increasing hiring costs, thereby creating an additional obstacle for job creation as well as for policymakers. 

Caught between weak employment opportunities and widespread informal employment, Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge. Existing incentives in the labour market encourage both firms and workers to engage in informal employment arrangements. Firms benefit from lower labour costs and greater flexibility, while workers often seek higher take-home pay, driven by limited confidence in the benefits associated with formal employment. Many workers perceive tax and social insurance deductions as offering few tangible benefits or effective safety nets that would compensate for the reduction in current income. At the same time, policies aimed at promoting formal job creation that rely exclusively on stricter enforcement may backfire by increasing hiring costs, thereby creating an additional obstacle for job creation as well as for policymakers.