Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Die europäische Entwicklungspolitik hat sich parallel zum europäischen Integrationsprozess stetig weiterentwickelt. Während der Politikbereich ursprünglich auf die überseeischen Länder und Gebiete (ULG) in Afrika beschränkt war, kamen mit jeder Erweiterungsrunde der Europäischen Union (EU) neue Zielregionen dazu. Heute arbeitet die EU in diesem Bereich mit nahezu allen Weltregionen zusammen. Damit hat die EU in ihrer Entwicklungszusammenarbeit eine deutlich breitere geografische Orientierung als die einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten. Ein dichtes Netzwerk von EU-Delegationen vor Ort ermöglicht die Kooperation in allen Weltregionen. Auch finanziell ist die EU ein Schwergewicht in der Entwicklungspolitik: 2023 brachten die EU und ihre 27 Mitgliedstaaten zusammen 42 % der gesamten öffentlichen Entwicklungshilfe weltweit auf, insgesamt 95,9 Mrd. €.

Civilian perceptions of peacekeepers are a critical yet underutilized factor in the effectiveness of protection of civilians (POC) mandates. While peacekeeping missions are often assessed through mandate design and force posture, far less attention is paid to how communities themselves perceive peacekeepers’ conduct, legitimacy, and use of force.

This issue brief by Linnéa Gelot and Prabin B. Khadka draws on original survey data from more than 3,000 respondents in South Sudan and Somalia to examine how trust in peacekeepers shapes civilian demand for peacekeeping presence. The authors explore how patrol frequency, expectations around the use of force, and adherence to norms of conduct influence civilian perceptions.

The findings highlight that civilian support for peace operations cannot be assumed. Trust depends not only on presence but also on behavior, restraint, and perceived legitimacy. Integrating civilian perception data into mission planning can strengthen operational decision-making, improve POC outcomes, and support more context-sensitive peace operations.

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The post Civilian Perceptions and Protection of Civilians by Peacekeepers: Integrating Local Views into Robust Peace Operations appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Local civilians are often the first actors to respond to threats against civilians in conflict-affected settings. Long before international peacekeepers or humanitarian actors arrive, communities develop their own unarmed, nonviolent strategies to prevent violence, mitigate harm, and protect vulnerable populations.

This issue brief by Rachel Julian and Berit Bliesemann de Guevara examines the role of local civilians in protection of civilians (POC) efforts, focusing on unarmed civilian protection practices that operate alongside—or independently from—UN peacekeeping missions and specialized NGOs. The brief explores how civilians engage in early warning, mediation, negotiation, and protective accompaniment.

As peace operations face transitions, drawdowns, and lighter footprints, the brief raises critical questions about how international actors understand, support, or overlook local civilian protection strategies—and what this means for the future of POC.

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The post Local Civilians’ Role in the Protection of Civilians: Expanding UN-Led Protection through Community-Led Approaches appeared first on International Peace Institute.

AGOA technically lives on after a one-year extension, but its main advantage has largely disappeared since the US added tariffs on top of it. Our simulations show the new tariff regime drives large declines in US-bound exports, with the steepest damage in a few AGOA-dependent countries and sectors such as apparel. The shock is forcing African policymakers to think beyond fragile preferences and build resilience through diversification and stronger regional and alternative market links.

AGOA technically lives on after a one-year extension, but its main advantage has largely disappeared since the US added tariffs on top of it. Our simulations show the new tariff regime drives large declines in US-bound exports, with the steepest damage in a few AGOA-dependent countries and sectors such as apparel. The shock is forcing African policymakers to think beyond fragile preferences and build resilience through diversification and stronger regional and alternative market links.

AGOA technically lives on after a one-year extension, but its main advantage has largely disappeared since the US added tariffs on top of it. Our simulations show the new tariff regime drives large declines in US-bound exports, with the steepest damage in a few AGOA-dependent countries and sectors such as apparel. The shock is forcing African policymakers to think beyond fragile preferences and build resilience through diversification and stronger regional and alternative market links.

La 4e édition du Festival international des arts du Bénin (FInAB), s'est achevée ce dimanche 1er mars 2026. Près de 50 activités intellectuelles ont meublé cette édition spéciale qui a favorisé une immersion dans l'univers des artistes et créateurs dans les différentes disciplines, ainsi qu'un partage d'expérience entre les locaux et les experts internationaux déployés à Cotonou pour la circonstance.

Le FInAB, grand rendez-vous culturel et artistique organisé chaque année à Cotonou, s'est achevé ce dimanche 1er mars 2026. Durant les 10 jours que l'évènement d'envergure mondiale a duré, d'intenses activités ont été organisées et permis aux artistes et créateurs d'exprimer une fois encore, leur talent et leur créativité.
Pour ce qui concerne le volet intellectuel de cette 4e édition, près de 50 activités ont été organisées. Celles-ci incluent les masters class, des keynotes, speed meeting et des formations dans divers secteurs tels que la mode, l'industrie culturelle et créative, l'économie et l'industrialisation des arts, la politique culturelle, la monétisation de l'art, etc. L'objectif de ces différentes activités selon le comité d'organisation, est de renforcer les capacités des acteurs locaux et de créer un lien entre ces derniers et les experts internationaux.

Placée sous le thème : « Les industries culturelles et créatives : levier de diversité culturelle, de coopération et de paix », cette 4e édition du FInAB qui a mis en lumière les productions relevant de la mode et de la musique, a connu la participation de ALPHADI, le géant de la mode africaine, et plusieurs artistes musiciens béninois et étrangers qui ont fait vibrer durant les 10 jours, la plage du Family Beach à Cotonou.

Le FInAB Fashion Week, creuset dédié à la mode
A travers le FInAB Fashion Week, creuset spécial dédié à la célébration de la mode à l'édition 2026 du FInAB, plusieurs activités ont été organisées. Du Fashion Chill au Défilé de mode, en passant par les masterclasses, et les échanges profonds autour de l'identité, cette édition selon le comité d'organisation, a célébré la mode au-delà des standards, engagée, créative et résolument africaine. « Les défilés ont mis en lumière des créations fortes, audacieuses et inspirantes, portées par des stylistes qui racontent l'Afrique à travers les matières, les coupes et les symboles », a souligné Ulrich ADJOVI, PDG du Groupe Empire, promoteur du FInAB.

Deux scènes distinctes
Deux scènes distinctes ont été ouvertes à cette 4e édition du FInAB. Une grande scène dédiée aux concerts et aux performances majeures, et une seconde scène consacrée aux animations, aux découvertes, aux rencontres et aux expressions émergentes. Selon Ulrich ADJOVI, cette édition a également permis de célébrer l'amour des peuples et la fraternité culturelle à travers des journées dédiées telles que le Nigeria Day, le Togo Day, le Maroc Day et le Liban Day, avec une soirée orientale visant à saluer les communautés marocaine et libanaise qui participent à la richesse culturelle et économique du Bénin.

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The People’s Republic of China has considerably expanded its engagement with the United Nations (UN) system, but its influence differs significantly across issue areas. Despite this unevenness, patterns in Beijing’s multilateral priorities suggest what a growing Chinese footprint may portend for the future of the UN. We examine this via three main dimensions. With regard to the underlying logic of multilateralism, China emphasises intergovernmental control at the expense of more autonomous UN bureaucracies. On the substance of multilateralism, China’s objective to ensure the primacy of the state challenges core liberal values long promoted by the UN. In terms of multilateral power dynamics, Beijing works towards increasing space for the UN’s developing country majority, with China as its de facto leader. The Trump administration’s attack on international organisations further strengthens Beijing’s bid to reshape UN multilateralism. The paper assesses the implications of these reordering pathways and concludes with policy recommendations.

The People’s Republic of China has considerably expanded its engagement with the United Nations (UN) system, but its influence differs significantly across issue areas. Despite this unevenness, patterns in Beijing’s multilateral priorities suggest what a growing Chinese footprint may portend for the future of the UN. We examine this via three main dimensions. With regard to the underlying logic of multilateralism, China emphasises intergovernmental control at the expense of more autonomous UN bureaucracies. On the substance of multilateralism, China’s objective to ensure the primacy of the state challenges core liberal values long promoted by the UN. In terms of multilateral power dynamics, Beijing works towards increasing space for the UN’s developing country majority, with China as its de facto leader. The Trump administration’s attack on international organisations further strengthens Beijing’s bid to reshape UN multilateralism. The paper assesses the implications of these reordering pathways and concludes with policy recommendations.

The People’s Republic of China has considerably expanded its engagement with the United Nations (UN) system, but its influence differs significantly across issue areas. Despite this unevenness, patterns in Beijing’s multilateral priorities suggest what a growing Chinese footprint may portend for the future of the UN. We examine this via three main dimensions. With regard to the underlying logic of multilateralism, China emphasises intergovernmental control at the expense of more autonomous UN bureaucracies. On the substance of multilateralism, China’s objective to ensure the primacy of the state challenges core liberal values long promoted by the UN. In terms of multilateral power dynamics, Beijing works towards increasing space for the UN’s developing country majority, with China as its de facto leader. The Trump administration’s attack on international organisations further strengthens Beijing’s bid to reshape UN multilateralism. The paper assesses the implications of these reordering pathways and concludes with policy recommendations.

Dans une démarche visant à renforcer ses effectifs à travers l’ensemble du territoire national, le Commandement de la Gendarmerie Nationale a annoncé l’ouverture des concours […]

L’article La Gendarmerie nationale recrute 2026 : Une chance inédite pour cette catégorie de candidats est apparu en premier sur .

This entry is available in Greek.

Cover photo: publicdomainpictures.net

Digitalisation is reshaping economies, politics and societies worldwide, creating both opportunities for inclusion and risks of deepening inequality. While digital literacy frameworks exist, they remain fragmented and insufficiently connected to broader goals of citizenship education. Without equipping teachers and learners with the competencies to think critically, act ethically and participate constructively in digital spaces, democratic institutions and individual well-being are at risk. Building on UNESCO’s Global Citizenship Education and Digital Literacy Global frameworks, this brief argues that integrating digital literacy into citizenship education, standardising teacher training across contexts and promoting international cooperation – particularly through the G20 – are key to ensuring that all citizens become empowered, responsible and globally connected digital actors.

Digitalisation is reshaping economies, politics and societies worldwide, creating both opportunities for inclusion and risks of deepening inequality. While digital literacy frameworks exist, they remain fragmented and insufficiently connected to broader goals of citizenship education. Without equipping teachers and learners with the competencies to think critically, act ethically and participate constructively in digital spaces, democratic institutions and individual well-being are at risk. Building on UNESCO’s Global Citizenship Education and Digital Literacy Global frameworks, this brief argues that integrating digital literacy into citizenship education, standardising teacher training across contexts and promoting international cooperation – particularly through the G20 – are key to ensuring that all citizens become empowered, responsible and globally connected digital actors.

Digitalisation is reshaping economies, politics and societies worldwide, creating both opportunities for inclusion and risks of deepening inequality. While digital literacy frameworks exist, they remain fragmented and insufficiently connected to broader goals of citizenship education. Without equipping teachers and learners with the competencies to think critically, act ethically and participate constructively in digital spaces, democratic institutions and individual well-being are at risk. Building on UNESCO’s Global Citizenship Education and Digital Literacy Global frameworks, this brief argues that integrating digital literacy into citizenship education, standardising teacher training across contexts and promoting international cooperation – particularly through the G20 – are key to ensuring that all citizens become empowered, responsible and globally connected digital actors.

The article examines how citizens’ expectations in social contracts lead them to take to the streets for contentious collective action. It draws on original, nationally representative telephone surveys in Tunisia and Lebanon that we commissioned in late 2020 and unpacks popular preferences about the social contract and states’ obligations to deliver social service provision, protection, and political participation. We measure empirically whether participation in protest can be explained predominantly by people’s grievances with their states’ social contract obligations or the position of people in society. Findings reveal intriguing differences between the two countries, but also among social groups within societies. We find that socially privileged people are more likely to take to the streets in pursuit of their demands, lending support to theories that identify society’s middle classes as drivers of protest action. We believe that the article’s findings will have significant implications for studies of contentious state society relations in the MENA region and beyond.

The article examines how citizens’ expectations in social contracts lead them to take to the streets for contentious collective action. It draws on original, nationally representative telephone surveys in Tunisia and Lebanon that we commissioned in late 2020 and unpacks popular preferences about the social contract and states’ obligations to deliver social service provision, protection, and political participation. We measure empirically whether participation in protest can be explained predominantly by people’s grievances with their states’ social contract obligations or the position of people in society. Findings reveal intriguing differences between the two countries, but also among social groups within societies. We find that socially privileged people are more likely to take to the streets in pursuit of their demands, lending support to theories that identify society’s middle classes as drivers of protest action. We believe that the article’s findings will have significant implications for studies of contentious state society relations in the MENA region and beyond.

The article examines how citizens’ expectations in social contracts lead them to take to the streets for contentious collective action. It draws on original, nationally representative telephone surveys in Tunisia and Lebanon that we commissioned in late 2020 and unpacks popular preferences about the social contract and states’ obligations to deliver social service provision, protection, and political participation. We measure empirically whether participation in protest can be explained predominantly by people’s grievances with their states’ social contract obligations or the position of people in society. Findings reveal intriguing differences between the two countries, but also among social groups within societies. We find that socially privileged people are more likely to take to the streets in pursuit of their demands, lending support to theories that identify society’s middle classes as drivers of protest action. We believe that the article’s findings will have significant implications for studies of contentious state society relations in the MENA region and beyond.

Das Konjunkturbarometer des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) macht im Februar einen Sprung auf 101,6 Punkte. Damit liegt das Barometer fast sieben Punkte über dem Januar-Wert und erstmals seit knapp drei Jahren wieder über der neutralen 100-Punkte-Marke, die ein ...

Emotionale Stabilität hängt positiv mit Bruttostundenlohn zusammen, Verträglichkeit negativ – Zusammenhang ist bei Frauen schwächer als bei Männern – Stereotype und Rollenbilder könnten eine Rolle spielen Bestimmte Persönlichkeitsmerkmale gehen mit Unterschieden im Bruttostundenlohn einher. Hat ...