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On Sunday, September 17, 2023, IPI held its eighteenth annual Ministerial Working Dinner on the Middle East in its Trygve Lie Center for Peace, Security, and Development. The dinner drew the participation of foreign ministers and other high-level representatives.

The event was chaired by IPI President Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein and co-hosted by Qatar and the European Union, represented respectively by Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Qatar, and Josep Borrell, Vice President and High Representative of European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Participants had a frank discussion on regional issues held under the Chatham House Rule.

Attendees included Hadja Lahbib, Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs, and of Defence of the Kingdom of Belgium; Lars Lokke Rasmussen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark; Fuad Mohammad Hussein, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq; Ayman Safadi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; Murat Nurtleu, Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan; Abdallah Bouhabib, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of Lebanon; Dominique Hasler, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Education, and Sport of the Principality of Liechtenstein; Catherine Colonna, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France; Micheál Martin, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Ireland; Sheikh Jarrah Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Jean Asselborn, Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of Luxembourg; Khalifa Shaheen Almarar, State Secretary of the United Arab Emirates; Sayyid Badr bin Hamad bin Hamood Albusaidi, Foreign Minister of the Sultanate of Oman; Riyad Al-Maliki, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Palestine; Ahmet Yildiz, Deputy Minister of Foreign of Republic of Türkiye; Anniken Huitfeldt, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway; Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi, Minister of State to the State of Qatar; Lolwah Rasshid Al-Khater, Minister of State for International Cooperation to the State of Qatar; Sameh Hassan Shoukry Selim, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt; and Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain.

Also present were Luise Amtsberg, Federal Government Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Assistance; Jasem Mohamed AlBudaiwi, Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council; Mirjana Spoljaric Egger, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); Prince Turki AlFaisal, Chairman of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies and member of IPI’s International Advisory Council; Hissein Brahim Taha, Secretary-General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation; Amr Moussa, Former Secretary General of the League of Arab States and member of IPI’s International Advisory Council; Rosemary A. DiCarlo, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; Mary Robinson, Chair of the Elders, First female President of Ireland, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; Miguel Moratinos, High Representative for the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations; Philippe Lazzarini, Commissioner-General of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; Ferid Belhaj, Vice President of the World Bank; Jeffrey Feltman, Former USG –DPPA and John C. Whitehead Visiting Fellow in International Diplomacy in the Foreign Policy program, Brookings Institute; Daniel Levy, President of US / Middle East Project (USMEP); Tor Wennesland, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority; Sven Koopmans, EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process; and Alya Ahmed Saif Al-Thani, Permanent Representative of Qatar to the UN.

There is an increased recognition of human mobility responses to climate change among policy-makers and stakeholders. At the global level, the Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration (GCM) highlights this intersection of climate change and migration. In addition, follow-up processes to the Paris Agreement highlight human mobility outcomes from climate impacts. This policy brief argues that while there is a recognition of climate migration at the international and national levels, implementation at the sub-national level where pertinent migration is happening, is far from adequate. At the national level, Ghana and Senegal have signed on and engaged in follow-up processes of the GCM and the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, they have in different ways highlighted climate migration as a key policy area. For Senegal, there is a mandate to include climate change and migration along with three other priority areas for all development plans in the country. On the other hand, Ghana’s national migration policy identifies climate change as a key area for policy attention. These reflect recognition of climate change and human mobility as a policy issue at the national level. However, there appear to be gaps in the implementation of these mandates and policy frameworks locally. Hence, there is a need to further investigate the patterns, weaknesses and strengths of climate (im)mobility strategy implementation at the sub-national level. This policy brief presents insights based on case studies of two West African cities, Accra and Dakar, which are relevant to urban climate (im)mobility governance because human mobility patterns are well established internally and from countries in the West African region, as are the influences of climate change on these mobility patterns. Because cities attract migrants, they offer insights into sub-national climate (im)mobility governance. It is, however, important to note the difficulty of isolating climate change as a driver of human mobility since it interacts with several other drivers (Black, Bennett, Thomas, & Beddington, 2011; Ekoh, Teron, & Ajibade, 2023). Regardless of the drivers of human mobility, city authorities have a responsibility to support their resident populations, and with increasing climate threats, they have a duty to support climate adapta-tion and resilience building within the city. This policy brief outlines three major challenges associated with addressing the human mobility dimension of climate change locally, under existing frameworks and agreements:
(1) City authorities have limited competencies in governing migration, including climate-induced migration.
(2) Cities have limited resources and capacity to adapt to climate change and the associated (im)mobility dimensions.
(3) At the local level, human mobility and climate change are mostly treated as separate issues in the absence of an integrated policy framework on climate (im)mobility.
The recommendations in this policy brief are addressed to national governments, local authorities and donors; they highlight how to move from global and national recognition to action so that cities/local authorities are better prepared to support migrants:
• A whole-of-government approach is necessary at all levels to address the crosscutting issue of climate change and human mobility. This should be part of a new or updated national migration policy that gives local authorities/cities a clear role to play in human mobility and climate change.
• National governments and donors need to support local authorities and non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations and civil society organi-sations, with funding and investment in capacity building towards the design and implementation of climate (im)mobility strategies.
• Urban action plans should clearly reflect climate (im)mobility strategies given current trends and projections of increased mobility towards cities like Accra and Dakar.

There is an increased recognition of human mobility responses to climate change among policy-makers and stakeholders. At the global level, the Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration (GCM) highlights this intersection of climate change and migration. In addition, follow-up processes to the Paris Agreement highlight human mobility outcomes from climate impacts. This policy brief argues that while there is a recognition of climate migration at the international and national levels, implementation at the sub-national level where pertinent migration is happening, is far from adequate. At the national level, Ghana and Senegal have signed on and engaged in follow-up processes of the GCM and the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, they have in different ways highlighted climate migration as a key policy area. For Senegal, there is a mandate to include climate change and migration along with three other priority areas for all development plans in the country. On the other hand, Ghana’s national migration policy identifies climate change as a key area for policy attention. These reflect recognition of climate change and human mobility as a policy issue at the national level. However, there appear to be gaps in the implementation of these mandates and policy frameworks locally. Hence, there is a need to further investigate the patterns, weaknesses and strengths of climate (im)mobility strategy implementation at the sub-national level. This policy brief presents insights based on case studies of two West African cities, Accra and Dakar, which are relevant to urban climate (im)mobility governance because human mobility patterns are well established internally and from countries in the West African region, as are the influences of climate change on these mobility patterns. Because cities attract migrants, they offer insights into sub-national climate (im)mobility governance. It is, however, important to note the difficulty of isolating climate change as a driver of human mobility since it interacts with several other drivers (Black, Bennett, Thomas, & Beddington, 2011; Ekoh, Teron, & Ajibade, 2023). Regardless of the drivers of human mobility, city authorities have a responsibility to support their resident populations, and with increasing climate threats, they have a duty to support climate adapta-tion and resilience building within the city. This policy brief outlines three major challenges associated with addressing the human mobility dimension of climate change locally, under existing frameworks and agreements:
(1) City authorities have limited competencies in governing migration, including climate-induced migration.
(2) Cities have limited resources and capacity to adapt to climate change and the associated (im)mobility dimensions.
(3) At the local level, human mobility and climate change are mostly treated as separate issues in the absence of an integrated policy framework on climate (im)mobility.
The recommendations in this policy brief are addressed to national governments, local authorities and donors; they highlight how to move from global and national recognition to action so that cities/local authorities are better prepared to support migrants:
• A whole-of-government approach is necessary at all levels to address the crosscutting issue of climate change and human mobility. This should be part of a new or updated national migration policy that gives local authorities/cities a clear role to play in human mobility and climate change.
• National governments and donors need to support local authorities and non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations and civil society organi-sations, with funding and investment in capacity building towards the design and implementation of climate (im)mobility strategies.
• Urban action plans should clearly reflect climate (im)mobility strategies given current trends and projections of increased mobility towards cities like Accra and Dakar.

There is an increased recognition of human mobility responses to climate change among policy-makers and stakeholders. At the global level, the Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration (GCM) highlights this intersection of climate change and migration. In addition, follow-up processes to the Paris Agreement highlight human mobility outcomes from climate impacts. This policy brief argues that while there is a recognition of climate migration at the international and national levels, implementation at the sub-national level where pertinent migration is happening, is far from adequate. At the national level, Ghana and Senegal have signed on and engaged in follow-up processes of the GCM and the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, they have in different ways highlighted climate migration as a key policy area. For Senegal, there is a mandate to include climate change and migration along with three other priority areas for all development plans in the country. On the other hand, Ghana’s national migration policy identifies climate change as a key area for policy attention. These reflect recognition of climate change and human mobility as a policy issue at the national level. However, there appear to be gaps in the implementation of these mandates and policy frameworks locally. Hence, there is a need to further investigate the patterns, weaknesses and strengths of climate (im)mobility strategy implementation at the sub-national level. This policy brief presents insights based on case studies of two West African cities, Accra and Dakar, which are relevant to urban climate (im)mobility governance because human mobility patterns are well established internally and from countries in the West African region, as are the influences of climate change on these mobility patterns. Because cities attract migrants, they offer insights into sub-national climate (im)mobility governance. It is, however, important to note the difficulty of isolating climate change as a driver of human mobility since it interacts with several other drivers (Black, Bennett, Thomas, & Beddington, 2011; Ekoh, Teron, & Ajibade, 2023). Regardless of the drivers of human mobility, city authorities have a responsibility to support their resident populations, and with increasing climate threats, they have a duty to support climate adapta-tion and resilience building within the city. This policy brief outlines three major challenges associated with addressing the human mobility dimension of climate change locally, under existing frameworks and agreements:
(1) City authorities have limited competencies in governing migration, including climate-induced migration.
(2) Cities have limited resources and capacity to adapt to climate change and the associated (im)mobility dimensions.
(3) At the local level, human mobility and climate change are mostly treated as separate issues in the absence of an integrated policy framework on climate (im)mobility.
The recommendations in this policy brief are addressed to national governments, local authorities and donors; they highlight how to move from global and national recognition to action so that cities/local authorities are better prepared to support migrants:
• A whole-of-government approach is necessary at all levels to address the crosscutting issue of climate change and human mobility. This should be part of a new or updated national migration policy that gives local authorities/cities a clear role to play in human mobility and climate change.
• National governments and donors need to support local authorities and non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations and civil society organi-sations, with funding and investment in capacity building towards the design and implementation of climate (im)mobility strategies.
• Urban action plans should clearly reflect climate (im)mobility strategies given current trends and projections of increased mobility towards cities like Accra and Dakar.

With a view to better analysing concrete challenges to address SDG financing in developing economies, this Study coordinated by IDDRI and prepared in cooperation with the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) focuses on the global picture and examines the state of play, recent initiatives, and prospects for financing the SDGs in Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, and Senegal. It seeks to answer the following question: how and under what conditions can partner countries further align their development plans and policies with the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs to better finance their objectives? Key Messages: Alignment and effective SDG financing are possible when four main conditions are met:
- Avoiding SDG-incompatible finance. For many countries–notably OECD and BRICS countries– achieving the 2030 Agenda is just as much about financing more as it is about financing less and in a more sustainable way. Examples include less financing for approaches that compromise specific SDGs (e.g., fossil fuel subsidies) and making difficult policy decisions that require short-term costs to achieve long-term sustainability gains.
- Combining long-term financing with longterm planning. Development financing strategies provide public and private investors with clarity and predictability, and make it possible for those key actors to better grasp the sequence of investments across relief, recovery, and long-term structural transformation. Planning efforts should also seek to avoid lock-in situations and path dependencies where short-term recovery expenditure could hamper long-term goals of reducing inequalities or advancing environmental protection, and even increase vulnerabilities.
- Better understanding the cost and benefits of SDG financing at country level. A clear understanding of allocation and spending on public services and public investments that contribute to the SDGs can help identify funding shortfalls. Double-counting investment needs in particular should be avoided while synergies between different types of investment should be prioritized.
- Aligning SDG financing instruments with countries’ needs and priorities. SDG budgeting tools can be the cornerstone of strengthening financing for the SDGs in countries and establish more coherent links between the SDGs and development strategies, as well as their implementation. However, as case studies in Africa, Asia and Central America, these tools only prove relevant if they do not add complexity to the administration but are well integrated into and supportive of existing national or local processes and strategies. And international partners should fully align with such national strategies.

With a view to better analysing concrete challenges to address SDG financing in developing economies, this Study coordinated by IDDRI and prepared in cooperation with the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) focuses on the global picture and examines the state of play, recent initiatives, and prospects for financing the SDGs in Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, and Senegal. It seeks to answer the following question: how and under what conditions can partner countries further align their development plans and policies with the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs to better finance their objectives? Key Messages: Alignment and effective SDG financing are possible when four main conditions are met:
- Avoiding SDG-incompatible finance. For many countries–notably OECD and BRICS countries– achieving the 2030 Agenda is just as much about financing more as it is about financing less and in a more sustainable way. Examples include less financing for approaches that compromise specific SDGs (e.g., fossil fuel subsidies) and making difficult policy decisions that require short-term costs to achieve long-term sustainability gains.
- Combining long-term financing with longterm planning. Development financing strategies provide public and private investors with clarity and predictability, and make it possible for those key actors to better grasp the sequence of investments across relief, recovery, and long-term structural transformation. Planning efforts should also seek to avoid lock-in situations and path dependencies where short-term recovery expenditure could hamper long-term goals of reducing inequalities or advancing environmental protection, and even increase vulnerabilities.
- Better understanding the cost and benefits of SDG financing at country level. A clear understanding of allocation and spending on public services and public investments that contribute to the SDGs can help identify funding shortfalls. Double-counting investment needs in particular should be avoided while synergies between different types of investment should be prioritized.
- Aligning SDG financing instruments with countries’ needs and priorities. SDG budgeting tools can be the cornerstone of strengthening financing for the SDGs in countries and establish more coherent links between the SDGs and development strategies, as well as their implementation. However, as case studies in Africa, Asia and Central America, these tools only prove relevant if they do not add complexity to the administration but are well integrated into and supportive of existing national or local processes and strategies. And international partners should fully align with such national strategies.

With a view to better analysing concrete challenges to address SDG financing in developing economies, this Study coordinated by IDDRI and prepared in cooperation with the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) focuses on the global picture and examines the state of play, recent initiatives, and prospects for financing the SDGs in Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, and Senegal. It seeks to answer the following question: how and under what conditions can partner countries further align their development plans and policies with the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs to better finance their objectives? Key Messages: Alignment and effective SDG financing are possible when four main conditions are met:
- Avoiding SDG-incompatible finance. For many countries–notably OECD and BRICS countries– achieving the 2030 Agenda is just as much about financing more as it is about financing less and in a more sustainable way. Examples include less financing for approaches that compromise specific SDGs (e.g., fossil fuel subsidies) and making difficult policy decisions that require short-term costs to achieve long-term sustainability gains.
- Combining long-term financing with longterm planning. Development financing strategies provide public and private investors with clarity and predictability, and make it possible for those key actors to better grasp the sequence of investments across relief, recovery, and long-term structural transformation. Planning efforts should also seek to avoid lock-in situations and path dependencies where short-term recovery expenditure could hamper long-term goals of reducing inequalities or advancing environmental protection, and even increase vulnerabilities.
- Better understanding the cost and benefits of SDG financing at country level. A clear understanding of allocation and spending on public services and public investments that contribute to the SDGs can help identify funding shortfalls. Double-counting investment needs in particular should be avoided while synergies between different types of investment should be prioritized.
- Aligning SDG financing instruments with countries’ needs and priorities. SDG budgeting tools can be the cornerstone of strengthening financing for the SDGs in countries and establish more coherent links between the SDGs and development strategies, as well as their implementation. However, as case studies in Africa, Asia and Central America, these tools only prove relevant if they do not add complexity to the administration but are well integrated into and supportive of existing national or local processes and strategies. And international partners should fully align with such national strategies.

A demanding policy vision can accelerate global sustainable development efforts

In 2015, the world embarked on an ambitious climate and development agenda with the adoption of the Paris Agreement (PA) and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Now, eight years later, both processes are at important milestones assessing the progress achieved so far. In December 2023, the UN climate conference in Dubai will conclude the first Global Stocktake (GST), a process for assessing collective progress towards the PA objectives. In September, the midterm review of the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will take place at the SDG Summit in New York. Still, no pleasant surprises are to be expected. It is already clear that progress to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement is way off track, as countries’ NDCs are far too weak to achieve the objectives of the Agreement. Similarly, at the mid-point to achieve the Agenda for Sustainable Development by 2030, no country is on track. Progress on the 17 SDGs has stalled over the past three years. On some Goals, the world has been backsliding, raising questions both about political will and about suitable options for changing course. Despite this disturbing state of affairs, calls for urgency have not resonated with policy makers. In the climate realm, the messages from the IPCC have become ever more alarming, UN Secretary-General Guterres has been exhorting countries to act, and the previous climate conferences in Glasgow and Sharm el-Sheik called on countries to enhance their NDCs – but very few actually did so. But how can we still make progress if all calls for urgency are in vain? It has long been argued that integration of the climate and sustainable development agendas is necessary to achieve both objectives. We argue that it is, in fact, indispensable and our only hope to close the ambition and implementation gaps.

In 2015, the world embarked on an ambitious climate and development agenda with the adoption of the Paris Agreement (PA) and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Now, eight years later, both processes are at important milestones assessing the progress achieved so far. In December 2023, the UN climate conference in Dubai will conclude the first Global Stocktake (GST), a process for assessing collective progress towards the PA objectives. In September, the midterm review of the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will take place at the SDG Summit in New York. Still, no pleasant surprises are to be expected. It is already clear that progress to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement is way off track, as countries’ NDCs are far too weak to achieve the objectives of the Agreement. Similarly, at the mid-point to achieve the Agenda for Sustainable Development by 2030, no country is on track. Progress on the 17 SDGs has stalled over the past three years. On some Goals, the world has been backsliding, raising questions both about political will and about suitable options for changing course. Despite this disturbing state of affairs, calls for urgency have not resonated with policy makers. In the climate realm, the messages from the IPCC have become ever more alarming, UN Secretary-General Guterres has been exhorting countries to act, and the previous climate conferences in Glasgow and Sharm el-Sheik called on countries to enhance their NDCs – but very few actually did so. But how can we still make progress if all calls for urgency are in vain? It has long been argued that integration of the climate and sustainable development agendas is necessary to achieve both objectives. We argue that it is, in fact, indispensable and our only hope to close the ambition and implementation gaps.

In 2015, the world embarked on an ambitious climate and development agenda with the adoption of the Paris Agreement (PA) and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Now, eight years later, both processes are at important milestones assessing the progress achieved so far. In December 2023, the UN climate conference in Dubai will conclude the first Global Stocktake (GST), a process for assessing collective progress towards the PA objectives. In September, the midterm review of the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will take place at the SDG Summit in New York. Still, no pleasant surprises are to be expected. It is already clear that progress to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement is way off track, as countries’ NDCs are far too weak to achieve the objectives of the Agreement. Similarly, at the mid-point to achieve the Agenda for Sustainable Development by 2030, no country is on track. Progress on the 17 SDGs has stalled over the past three years. On some Goals, the world has been backsliding, raising questions both about political will and about suitable options for changing course. Despite this disturbing state of affairs, calls for urgency have not resonated with policy makers. In the climate realm, the messages from the IPCC have become ever more alarming, UN Secretary-General Guterres has been exhorting countries to act, and the previous climate conferences in Glasgow and Sharm el-Sheik called on countries to enhance their NDCs – but very few actually did so. But how can we still make progress if all calls for urgency are in vain? It has long been argued that integration of the climate and sustainable development agendas is necessary to achieve both objectives. We argue that it is, in fact, indispensable and our only hope to close the ambition and implementation gaps.

Der Rat der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) hat heute beschlossen, den Leitzins um weitere 0,25 Prozentpunkte zu erhöhen. Dazu ein Statement von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die EZB geht mit ihrer erneuten Zinserhöhung ein erhebliches Risiko ein. Damit könnte sie dazu beitragen, dass die Wirtschaft der Eurozone in die Rezession rutscht, ohne dass sie die Inflation noch schneller senkt. Die Wirtschaft der Eurozone hat sich in den vergangenen Monaten weiter abgeschwächt. Die Risiken einer Rezession sind gestiegen. Die Inflation dagegen ist zwar nach wie vor zu hoch, aber auf einem stabilen Pfad, so dass die EZB ihr Mandat der Preisstabilität in der mittleren Frist wieder erreichen sollte – auch ohne weitere Zinserhöhungen. Der Rat der EZB will mit dieser Entscheidung Härte zeigen und die eigene Glaubwürdigkeit stärken. Dies ist verständlich, aber auch riskant.  

Die erneute Abschwächung der Wirtschaft der Eurozone ist Grund zur Sorge. Wichtigste Gründe für den wirtschaftlichen Rückschlag sind nicht die schwächelnde Weltwirtschaft oder die hohen Rohstoffkosten, sondern die deutlichen Zinserhöhungen der EZB. Die Finanzierungsbedingungen haben sich stark für Unternehmen und Menschen verschlechtert. Dies ist gerade in der Baubranche schmerzlich zu spüren. Die EZB-Geldpolitik sollte nicht zu einer noch stärkeren Bremse der Wirtschaft der Eurozone werden und damit möglicherweise permanenten Schaden anrichten.   

Die Inflation, vor allem die Kerninflation, ist zwar noch immer deutlich zu hoch, bewegt sich jedoch kontinuierlich auf das Ziel der Preisstabilität zu. Da die Inflation nur mit einer erheblichen Zeitverzögerung auf Zinsänderungen reagiert, wäre es klüger für die EZB gewesen, eine Pause einzulegen und die bisherige geldpolitische Straffung ihre Wirkung entfalten zu lassen. Ich erwarte, dass die EZB den Höhepunkt ihres Zyklus erreicht hat und die Zinsen nicht weiter erhöhen wird. Ich rechne mit einer ersten Zinssenkung schon recht bald – und früher als von der EZB signalisiert – im Laufe des Jahres 2024, zumal das Zinsniveau heute auf einem restriktiven Niveau ist, die Wirtschaft sich aber auch 2024 nur schleppend erholen dürfte.

Die gemeinsame Abschlusserklärung ist angesichts der geopolitischen Spannungen ein bleibender Erfolg der indischen G20-Präsidentschaft. Damit hatten im Vorfeld nur wenige Beobachter gerechnet. Alle vorangegangenen G20-Ministertreffen in diesem Jahr waren trotz inhaltlicher Gemeinsamkeiten ohne Abschlusserklärung geblieben, da sich die Teilnehmer nie auf eine Formulierung zum Ukrainekrieg verständigen konnte. In anderer Hinsicht war die selbsterklärte »Brückenmacht« Indien sogar noch erfolgreicher: Die Aufnahme der Afrikanischen Union (AU) in die dann G21 ist ein wichtiger Schritt der Annäherung der mächtigen G20-Nationen an den Globalen Süden.

Nationale und internationale Interessen Indiens

Indiens G20-Präsidentschaft verfolgte ein doppeltes Ziel. Auf der internationalen Bühne wollte Premierminister Narendra Modi die Anliegen des Globalen Südens in der G20 stärker thematisieren. Damit wollte er zugleich Indiens Anspruch als Führungsmacht in dieser Staatengruppe unterstreichen – auch und gerade in der Konkurrenz zu China. Im nationalen Rahmen sollte die Präsidentschaft Modi als führenden Staatsmann präsentieren, der auf Augenhöhe mit den mächtigen Staats- und Regierungschefs dieser Welt agiert.

Der erste Aspekt prägte die wichtigsten Sachthemen der diesjährigen G20-Agenda. Indien forcierte Anliegen des Globalen Südens wie Schuldenerlass, eine Stärkung multilateraler Entwicklungsbanken und eine wirksamere Regulierung von Kryptowährungen. Weitere Schwerpunkte waren inklusives Wachstum, die beschleunigte Umsetzung der Ziele nachhaltiger Entwicklung (SDGs) im Vorfeld des anstehenden SDG-Gipfels der Vereinten Nationen, technologische Transformation und digitale öffentliche Infrastruktur sowie ein stärkerer Fokus auf Frauen im Entwicklungsprozess.

Angesichts der gewachsenen globalen Bedeutung Indiens und der damit verbundenen Anerkennung Modis als führender Staatsmann war die Präsidentschaft innenpolitisch eine willkommene Unterstützung für die Parlamentswahlen im nächsten Jahr. So fanden mehr als 200 Veranstaltungen zu G20 in 60 indischen Städten statt, die das neue Renommee im Land verbreiteten. Die G20-Präsidentschaft hat sicherlich auch dazu beigetragen, dass 70 Prozent der Befragten einer Pew-Umfrage in Indien der Meinung sind, ihr Land sei in letzter Zeit international einflussreicher geworden. Diese Einschätzung teilen außerhalb Indiens allerdings nur 28 Prozent der Befragten. Bei den G20-Sitzungen in Neu-Delhi bezeichnete sich Indien selbst als »Bharat« und verwies damit auf die hindu-nationalistische Vision des Landes, wie sie von der regierenden Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) propagiert wird. Demgegenüber repräsentiert »Indien« die säkulare Vision, den sich zugleich die größten Oppositionsparteien als Namen ihres Bündnisses I.N.D.I.A. (India National Development Inclusive Alliance) gegeben haben. Diese gegensätzlichen Vorstellungen über die künftige Ausrichtung des Landes werden im Wahlkampf des kommenden Jahres eine zentrale Rolle spielen.

Treffen im Schatten globaler Konflikte

Alles bestens also mit der indischen Präsidentschaft? Diese Wertung wäre verfrüht. Denn es zeigten sich auch Gegensätze zwischen Nord und Süd. Die Forderung einiger Industriestaaten nach einer vorzeitigen Reduktion der CO2-Emissionen um 60 Prozent von 2019 bis 2035 fand wenig Gegenliebe bei Indien und anderen Staaten des Globalen Südens. Die Frage der finanziellen Unterstützung der Klimatransformation im Globalen Süden scheiterte am Widerstand der Industriestaaten. Differenzen gab es auch bei der Frage der finanziellen Unterstützung durch die Industriestaaten und bei der Frage des Ausstiegs aus der Nutzung fossiler Energie. Dennoch gelang Indien mit der Gründung einer neuen Allianz für Biokraftstoffe im Energiebereich ein Erfolg.

Noch gravierender: Die Gräben zwischen dem Aggressor Russland und China einerseits und dem »politischen Westen« in der G20 (G7-Staaten, Australien, Südkorea und EU) andererseits haben sich seit dem vergangenen G20-Gipfel in Indonesien deutlich vertieft.

Deutlich wurde in Neu-Delhi indes auch, wie sehr inzwischen die Dynamiken innerhalb eines Konfliktdreiecks die internationale Politik prägen. Eine Spitze dieses Dreiecks bildet die systemische Konkurrenz zwischen den USA und China. Die Rivalität zwischen der etablierten Führungsmacht einerseits und dem aufstrebenden Konkurrenten andererseits wird von vielen Beobachterinnen und Beobachtern als die prägende Konfliktlinie des 21. Jahrhunderts gedeutet.

Als zweite Spitze des Dreiecks hat sich die Konfrontation über den russischen Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine herauskristallisiert. Hier steht der politische Westen Russland und China gegenüber, beide Lager werben um die Unterstützung der sogenannten Middle Ground Powers.

Hinzu kommt als dritte Konfliktdimension die Rivalität zwischen China und Indien um die Führungsrolle im Globalen Süden. Ob Indien sich mit den Erfolgen als Führungsmacht des Globalen Südens etablieren kann, bleibt angesichts der Konkurrenz durch China offen. Dass der chinesische Präsident Xi Jinping erstmals seit seinem Amtsantritt nicht an einem G20-Gipfel teilnahm, war ein diplomatischer Affront gegenüber Indien. Nach dem erfolglosen Treffen zwischen Modi und Xi am Rande des BRICS-Gipfels in Johannesburg ist dies ein weiterer Rückschlag in den bilateralen Beziehungen. Die massive militärische Aufrüstung entlang der ungeklärten Grenze im Himalaya seit 2020 bleibt damit einer der zentralen Hotspots im Indo-Pazifik.

Wie sehr Indien mittlerweile als Partner vom Westen als Gegengewicht zu China umworben wird, verdeutlicht zudem die im Rahmen des Gipfels vorgestellte neue Konnektivitätsinitiative IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor). Sie wird von den Initiatoren USA, Indien, EU, Saudi-Arabien, Vereinigte Arabische Emirate, Italien, Deutschland und Frankreich als Alternative zur chinesischen Seidenstraßeninitiative verstanden. Sofern dieses neue Projekt die engere Vernetzung Indiens mit dem Mittleren Osten und Europa vorantreibt, könnte sich daraus langfristig ein größerer geopolitischer Einfluss für Neu-Delhi ergeben. Für Indien wäre dies ein nachhaltiger Erfolg der G20-Präsidentschaft.

One of the main features of today’s global trade system is the proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs). The proliferation of RTAs in recent years has been coupled with broader and deeper coverage under these agreements. Broader coverage increasingly includes more policy areas that may be trade-related (tariffs and nontariff measures) or non trade-related (behind-the-border policies, intellectual property rights, movement of capital and people, competition policy, and others). In this regard, the scope of RTAs has been expanded by WTO members and signatories of RTAs from just 8 policy areas in the 1950s to 17 policy areas today. Deeper agreements include an increasing number of commitments within each policy area. They are also increasingly accompanied by legal requirements, such as stronger transparency and enforcement mechanisms. This chapter assesses the role of RTAs in boosting agricultural trade in Africa. Our analysis extends beyond estimating the overall impact of agreements on African trade to assess the relative importance of the detailed  agreements’ provisions, including both broader and deeper coverage, in boosting agricultural trade.

One of the main features of today’s global trade system is the proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs). The proliferation of RTAs in recent years has been coupled with broader and deeper coverage under these agreements. Broader coverage increasingly includes more policy areas that may be trade-related (tariffs and nontariff measures) or non trade-related (behind-the-border policies, intellectual property rights, movement of capital and people, competition policy, and others). In this regard, the scope of RTAs has been expanded by WTO members and signatories of RTAs from just 8 policy areas in the 1950s to 17 policy areas today. Deeper agreements include an increasing number of commitments within each policy area. They are also increasingly accompanied by legal requirements, such as stronger transparency and enforcement mechanisms. This chapter assesses the role of RTAs in boosting agricultural trade in Africa. Our analysis extends beyond estimating the overall impact of agreements on African trade to assess the relative importance of the detailed  agreements’ provisions, including both broader and deeper coverage, in boosting agricultural trade.