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Die südkoreanische Staatsanwaltschaft fordert zehn Jahre Haft für Ex-Präsident Yoon Suk Yeol. Ein Urteil wird im Januar erwartet.

Das Jahr 2025 geht dem Ende zu. Viel ist passiert und denkwürdige Momente wurden auf Video festgehalten. Über die Festtage zeigt dir Blick nochmals die Bilder, die am meisten bewegten.

By CIVICUS
Dec 26 2025 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses Generation Z-led protests in Bulgaria with Zahari Iankov, senior legal expert at the Bulgarian Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, a civil society organisation that advocates for participation and human rights.

Zahari Iankov

Bulgaria recently experienced its largest protests since the 1990s, driven largely by young people frustrated with corruption and institutional decay. What began as opposition to budget measures quickly escalated into broader demands for systemic change. The prime minister’s resignation has triggered Bulgaria’s seventh election since 2021, but whether this cycle of repeated elections will finally address fundamental questions about institutional integrity, informal power structures and the enduring influence of the oligarchy remains to be seen.

What sparked recent protests?

Bulgaria has been in a prolonged political crisis since 2020, when mass protests first erupted against corruption and state capture. Although they didn’t immediately lead to a resignation, these protests marked the beginning of a cycle of repeated elections and unstable governments. Since 2021, Bulgaria has held several parliamentary elections, and no political settlement has lasted.

The latest protests, which erupted on 1 December, have probably been the largest since the early 1990s, during Bulgaria’s transition from communism to democracy. They were initially sparked by a controversial 2026 budget that raised taxes to fund public sector wages, but while economic concerns played a role, the protests were primarily centres on values. People reacted to the fact that democratic rules were being openly disregarded and governance was increasingly being shaped by informal powers and personal interests.

Several incidents reinforced the perception that institutions were being systematically undermined. One symbolic moment was the treatment of student representatives during parliamentary debates about education, including proposals for mandatory religious education. Members of parliament publicly shamed student council representatives, which many people saw as emblematic of a broader contempt for citizen participation and government accountability.

Other cases reinforced this perception: environmental laws were weakened without debate, key oversight bodies were left inactive for over a year and proposals that threatened freedom of expression were introduced, and only withdrawn following public backlash. Together, these incidents created a sense that institutions were being hollowed out.

The budget acted as a trigger, but public anger had been building for months. Throughout the government’s short mandate, there was a clear pattern of sidelining public participation and bypassing parliamentary procedures. Laws were rushed through committees in seconds, major reforms were proposed without consultation and controversial decisions were taken at moments designed to avoid opposition.

What made these protests different from previous ones?

One striking difference was the speed and scale of the mobilisation. What began as a protest linked to budget concerns quickly turned into huge demonstrations involving tens of thousands of people. Estimates suggest that between 100,000 and 150,000 people gathered in Sofia, the capital, during the largest protest. For such a small country, this was impressive. Also unlike previous mobilisations, these protests spread well beyond Sofia to many cities across the country, something unusual for Bulgaria’s highly centralised political system.

Another important difference was the strong presence of young people, which led to the protests being described as Gen Z protests. While young people also played a role in big protest movements in 2013 and 2020, this time the generational identity was much more visible and explicitly embraced. Young people were central as communicators as well as participants. Social media campaigns, humour and memes played a significant role in spreading information and mobilising support.

Additionally, these protests were not driven by a single political party. Although one party provided logistical support in Sofia, the extent of participation and the geographic spread made clear this was a broad social mobilisation, not a partisan campaign.

What role did organised civil society groups play in sustaining the protests?

There were a couple of civil society groups that were involved in the organisation of protests, but organised civil society’s main role was not in mobilising but in providing crucial long-term support. For years, civil society groups and investigative journalists have documented corruption, challenged harmful laws and mobilised public awareness around environmental and rule-of-law issues.

As traditional media came under increasing control, civil society helped fill the gap by exposing abuses and explaining complex issues in accessible ways. This helped counter the narrative that ‘nothing ever changes’ and empowered people to believe protest could make a difference.

At the same time, attempts by politicians to discredit or intimidate civil society organisations, including proposals resembling laws to stigmatise civil society as foreign agent, underscored how influential civil society has become.

Who are the figures at the centre of public anger, and what do they represent?

The two key figures are Boyko Borissov and Delyan Peevski, who represent two different but deeply entrenched forms of political power. A former mayor of Sofia and prime minister who has dominated Bulgarian politics for over a decade, Borissov retains a loyal voter base despite major scandals, and has repeatedly returned to power through elections. He built his image on strongman rhetoric and visible policing actions.

Peevski is a different figure. Sanctioned under the Magnitsky Act — a US law targeting people involved in corruption and human rights abuses — he has never enjoyed broad public support but wields enormous informal influence. Despite leading a political party, he operates largely behind the scenes. Over the years, he has been linked to deep penetration of the judiciary, influence over regulatory bodies and media control. His role in governance has become increasingly visible despite his party not formally being part of the ruling coalition.

Together, these two figures embody what protesters see as the fundamental problem: a ‘mafia-style’ system of governance, where access, decision-making and protection depend on proximity to powerful individuals rather than transparent institutional processes.

Does the government’s resignation address the underlying problems?

This was a political response, but it does not resolve the structural issues that triggered the protests. Bulgaria’s institutions remain weak, key oversight bodies continue operating with expired mandates and the judiciary continues to face serious credibility problems.

What happens next will depend largely on voter participation and political renewal. Turnout in recent elections has fallen below 40 per cent, undermining any legitimacy claims and making vote-buying and clientelism easier. Mass turnout would significantly reduce the influence of these practices and could be our only hope for real change.

However, lasting change will require action to restore institutional independence, reform the judiciary and ensure regulatory bodies function properly. Otherwise, any new government risks being undermined by the same informal power structures that brought people out onto the streets.

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SEE ALSO
Anti-euro protests continue; arrest of Varna mayor sparks protests CIVICUS Monitor 28.Jul.2025
Unprecedented protests in Bulgaria’s public media CIVICUS Monitor 27.May.2025
Bulgaria: stuck in a loop? CIVICUS Lens 24.Oct.2022

 

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Geheime Gesprächsprotokolle enthüllen: Russlands Präsident Wladimir Putin sprach bereits 2001 mit dem damaligen US-Präsidenten George W. Bush über die Ukraine. Schon damals drohte er mit Krieg.

Cinq nouveaux membres, sur un total de onze, ont été élus au sein du Conseil des hauts procureurs de Serbie, mais de nombreux recours ont été déposés, y compris par le président Vučić, signe de l'intense lutte de pouvoir au sein de cet organisme judiciaire.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Vucic, Défense, police et justice, Serbie, Une - Diaporama, Politique, Une - Diaporama - En premier

Cinq nouveaux membres, sur un total de onze, ont été élus au sein du Conseil des hauts procureurs de Serbie, mais de nombreux recours ont été déposés, y compris par le président Vučić, signe de l'intense lutte de pouvoir au sein de cet organisme judiciaire.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Vucic, Défense, police et justice, Serbie, Une - Diaporama, Politique, Une - Diaporama - En premier

Cinq nouveaux membres, sur un total de onze, ont été élus au sein du Conseil des hauts procureurs de Serbie, mais de nombreux recours ont été déposés, y compris de la part du président Vučić, signe de la lutte de pouvoir au sein de cet organisme judiciaire.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Défense, police et justice, Serbie, Une - Diaporama

Cinq nouveaux membres, sur un total de onze, ont été élus au sein du Conseil des hauts procureurs de Serbie, mais de nombreux recours ont été déposés, y compris de la part du président Vučić, signe de la lutte de pouvoir au sein de cet organisme judiciaire.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Défense, police et justice, Serbie, Une - Diaporama

Le président américain a déclaré que plusieurs cibles de l'État islamique, groupe qu'il accuse d'avoir assassiné des chrétiens, avaient été attaquées jeudi.

Le président américain a déclaré que plusieurs cibles de l'État islamique, groupe qu'il accuse d'avoir assassiné des chrétiens, avaient été attaquées jeudi.

The plan would freeze the front line and drop any demand that Kyiv renounce NATO membership

Written by Anna Flynn.

On 18 December 2025, International Migrants Day was marked, honouring the contribution and value of migrants.

This commemoration follows a year of notable reforms.

For example, in November 2025, the Commission adopted the EU’s first annual Asylum and Migration Report. The report outlined that there has been a 35 % reduction in illegal border crossings between July 2024 and June 2025 – but challenges remain.

In parallel, the Council agreed on the proposed Annual Solidarity Pool for migration. The pool ensures that Member States that are under migratory pressure may be assisted by other Member States, for example, through financial aid and facilitating relocation. This will be evaluated based on population size and GDP. Parliament has no formal role in its implementation, but has nevertheless supported the scheme.

In the same month, Parliament voted in favour of a law establishing the European Centre Against Migrant Smuggling within the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). This will protect victims by increasing information sharing and providing a range of support to Member States.

Underpinning all of this is the new pact for migration and asylum – this became law at the end of 2024, and will apply in full from June 2026. The pact has 10 separate but interconnected legislative acts.

Some of the Commission’s proposals that complement the pact have been criticised.

In April 2025, the first, formal EU list outlining safe countries of origin was announced. This means that asylum applicants from countries that are deemed safe (according to this list) will generally not be considered eligible for international protection. It is mandatory for Member States to abide by this list, but they are also permitted to keep or create their own national lists.

Various human rights organisations, civil society, and other stakeholders condemn this. There are questions about the transparency of how these lists are compiled, as well as the repercussions for individuals who are migrating from a safe country of origin but do need protection. However, Parliament’s Civil Liberties Committee endorsed this list on 3 December 2025 as a way to better manage migration.

In March 2025, to further build upon the migration and asylum pact, the Commission proposed a common approach to returns for citizens illegally residing in a Member State. Part of this is the creation of return hubs – centres in safe non-EU countries that people may be sent to if they cannot legally reside in the EU. A mutual recognition of returns is also proposed, allowing Member States to recognise and apply return decisions made by another Member State.

The Council’s position on the regulation was finalised on 8 December 2025, so this will now be negotiated with Parliament.

Looking ahead, 2025 marked the start of decisions on how the pact will be financed over the coming years. In July, the Commission’s unveiled its proposal for the EU’s long-term budget for 2028-2034. This included information on how migration policies are to be financed during this period.

A proposed €12 billion (in 2025 prices) is to be allocated for migration policy. This is similar to the current budget for 2021-2027, where around €12.6 billion in 2025 prices has been dedicated to this.

One aspect that differs, however, is that this money will be allocated through national plans crafted by each Member State. Members of the European Parliament have highlighted their concern about how this will impact their capacity for oversight and scrutiny in this area.

Overall, the current and future budgets reflect the increasing importance of migration as a political issue.

Links to EPRS publications

• International Migrants Day: 18 December 2025
• Union support for asylum, migration and integration
• Stronger role for Europol to fight migrant smuggling and human trafficking
• European Parliament Plenary Session November I 2025
• The first annual Asylum and Migration Report and the Annual Solidarity Pool
• ‘Safe country of origin’ concept in EU asylum law
• Planned revision of the EU Return Directive
• Implementation of the EU pact on migration and asylum

From cheap toys that double as choke-hazards or contain hormone-disrupting plastics to AI-powered teddies that veer into sex chat, child safety risks are outpacing EU rules

La crise en Europe, la guerre en Ukraine et la concurrence de la main-d'œuvre à bas coût de pays comme le Bangladesh ont mis l'industrie textile de Macédoine du Nord à genoux. Depuis le début de l'année, une dizaine d'usines ont déjà fermé leurs portes dans l'est du pays et d'autres vont suivre.

- Articles / Radio Slobodna Evropa, Une - Diaporama, Macédoine du Nord, Economie

La crise en Europe, la guerre en Ukraine et la concurrence de la main-d'œuvre à bas coût de pays comme le Bangladesh ont mis l'industrie textile de Macédoine du Nord à genoux. Depuis le début de l'année, une dizaine d'usines ont déjà fermé leurs portes dans l'est du pays et d'autres vont suivre.

- Articles / Radio Slobodna Evropa, Une - Diaporama, Une - Diaporama - En premier, Macédoine du Nord, Economie

The US president accuses the group of killing Christians, as Nigeria’s foreign minister tells the BBC the strikes were a "joint operation" and "nothing to do" with religion.

Paul Dandelberger, Fabian Kerschbaumer und Johannes Lindner haben sich für ihr «Festzelt 2026» originelle Promo-Aktionen überlegt. In diversen Clips bewerben die Jungbauern aus Stephanskirchen (D) ihre Party. Ein Video knackt sogar schon fast die 2-Mio-Grenze.

US-Satiriker Jimmy Kimmel nutzt die alternative Weihnachtsbotschaft von Channel 4 für eine scharfe Abrechnung mit den USA: Er spricht von «Tyrannei im Aufschwung», berichtet von politischem Druck – und warnt, wie schnell Kritik zum Risiko wird.

Das US-Militär hat an Weihnachten IS-Terroristen in Nigeria angegriffen, wie Donald Trump auf Truth Social mitteilte. Die Angriffe im Bundesstaat Sokoto erfolgten nach Morden an Christen. Die Zahl der Toten blieb ungenannt.

Die ehemalige Hamas-Geisel Romi Gonen schildert erstmals, wie sie in Hamas-Gefangenschaft wiederholt vergewaltigt wurde – systematisch, über Wochen, von mehreren Männern. Stillhalten oder Tod. Unter vorgehaltener Waffe wurde sie zum Schweigen gezwungen.