Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

EXCLUSIF - Le nouveau maire PS de la capitale dévoile ses « cinq priorités » pour « l’entretien, l’amélioration et la transformation de l’espace public ».

Over time, the EU has established multiple instruments and processes to increase the synchronisation of member states’ defence planning practices and to push for more cooperation in executing their capability development plans. However, the results have so far been limited. To help understand why this is the case, this ARES Group Comment studies how Finland navigates the EU’s complex defence landscape. The paper examines to what extent the different EU capability development tools are – or are not – relevant for Finland and why this is the case. It argues that the EU instruments – especially those with funding attached – have become increasingly important for Finland in recent years, and that this trajectory is likely to continue. At the same time, the EU tools’ role should not be overemphasised, as several factors continue to limit Finland’s engagement and ambition.

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• ARES Group #129 – Comment (PDF)

L’article Integration of the European Capability Process in Member States’ Administration : The Finnish Case est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has become one of the most aggressive external actors in African conflicts, from Ethiopia, Libya and Somalia to Sudan. The leadership in Abu Dhabi obstinately denies its support for belligerents, yet it has maintained it even during the US-Israeli war against Iran – despite the serious repercussions for the UAE. Its role impedes efforts at conflict resolution and exacerbates humanitarian crises and regional instability. It undermines Europe’s interest in reliable trade routes, the prevention of forced displacement and regional integration. Germany and its Euro­pean partners should accord much greater weight to the UAE’s destabilising actions in their bilateral relations, criticise them more explicitly and consider sanctions. The context of the war with Iran, as well as tensions between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, offers an opening for a change in policy in Abu Dhabi.

Das Verhältnis zwischen USA und China sei kompliziert und zusätzlich vom "erratischen Politikstil" Trumps geprägt.

Depuis le 1er mai 2026, la Chine a choisi de supprimer les droits de douane sur les produits en provenance de 53 pays africains. Cette mesure intervient dans un contexte de tensions commerciales mondiales et pourrait constituer une opportunité économique majeure pour les États du continent. Toutefois, pour en tirer pleinement profit, ils devront mettre en place des stratégies pour protéger leurs marchés et renforcer leurs capacités exportatrices. Dans quelle mesure les États africains peuvent-ils réellement bénéficier de cette levée des barrières douanières ? Quels sont les objectifs de la Chine derrière cette mesure ? Et comment éviter de tomber dans une relation commerciale déséquilibrée ? Le point avec Christian Pout, président du Centre africain d’études internationales diplomatiques économiques et stratégiques (CEIDES, Cameroun).

À compter du 1er mai 2026, les exportations en provenance de 53 pays africains, excepté l’Eswatini, à destination de la Chine seront exemptées des droits de douane. Que gagne l’Afrique dans cette réforme ?

L’annonce faite par le président chinois le 14 février dernier, en marge du 39e sommet de l’Union africaine, s’inscrit dans un contexte de guerre tarifaire, de crise du multilatéralisme commercial, de course mondiale aux ressources critiques pour la transition énergétique et numérique et d’accélération de la dédollarisation des paiements transfrontaliers via le système chinois CIPS[1]. Lue isolément, la mesure ressemblerait à un cadeau ; replacée dans cette matrice, elle est un instrument stratégique.

En effet, depuis le 1er décembre 2024, les 33 pays les moins avancés (PMA) africains bénéficiaient déjà du tarif zéro chinois sur 100 % de leurs lignes ; au 1er mai 2026, ce sont les pays à revenu intermédiaire qui accèdent en franchise totale à un marché de 1,4 milliard de consommateurs, sur près de 97 % des lignes douanières. À cela s’ajoutent la facilitation procédurale via le « canal vert » et la perspective d’un accord économique structurant annoncée à Addis-Abeba.

Sur le papier, le périmètre est plus large que celui de la loi sur la croissance et les possibilités économiques en Afrique (AGOA) et plus stable que celui de la « tout sauf les armes » européenne. Mais en pratique, le bénéfice reste conditionnel à la capacité d’offre. Les chiffres rappellent la contrainte structurelle : 89 % des exportations africaines vers la Chine relèvent encore de l’extractif. Pour mon pays, le Cameroun, dont 85 % des exportations sont peu ou pas transformées, avec un déficit commercial global de plus de 2 000 milliards FCFA en 2025 et un taux de couverture tombé à 59 %, la franchise tarifaire ne libère un potentiel réel que sur les segments capables de montée en gamme (cacao transformé, bois ouvré, agro-industrie, textile-confection, fruits tropicaux à haute valeur ajoutée). Sur les matières premières, déjà faiblement taxées à l’entrée chinoise, l’effet sera marginal. Le tarif zéro ouvre une porte mais il ne crée pas l’offre exportable.

La Chine a annoncé cette décision de manière unilatérale sans négociation préalable avec les États africains. Que vise finalement Pékin derrière cette mesure ? S’agit-il d’un simple geste de générosité vis-à-vis de l’Afrique ?  

L’unilatéralité en est elle-même le message. Dans le contexte de la guerre tarifaire, la décision positionne Pékin en champion du libre-échange dans le Sud global face au protectionnisme occidental. Le calcul est stratégique, multidimensionnel aussi, et il faudrait le déplier sans naïveté.

Premièrement, sécuriser l’amont des chaînes de valeur de l’économie chinoise. Avec environ 62 % des ventes mondiales de véhicules électriques en 2025, 85 % des capacités planétaires de fabrication de cellules de batteries, 41 % du cobalt minier mondial, plus de 80 % du graphite mondial extrait et raffiné, et un investissement cumulé de 143 milliards US$ à l’étranger entre 2014 et 2025 dans la filière véhicules électriques et batteries, Pékin doit verrouiller son accès au cobalt, au lithium, au manganèse, au cuivre et aux terres rares, indispensables à la transition énergétique et à l’absorption de ses propres surcapacités industrielles.

Deuxièmement, discipliner les choix diplomatiques africains. L’exclusion explicite de l’Eswatini, dernier allié africain de Taipei, constitue une signature politique de la mesure et illustre la pression exercée pour aligner les usages diplomatiques sur la doctrine de la « Chine unique ». Le tarif zéro serait ici un levier de cette diplomatie de la conformité.

Troisièmement, stimuler en miroir les exportations chinoises elles-mêmes, car un marché africain plus solvable importera davantage de véhicules électriques abordables, de panneaux solaires, d’électronique grand public ou encore de machines-outils.

Quatrièmement, faire avancer la dédollarisation. Le tarif zéro doit être lu en complément du déploiement africain du système de paiement chinois CIPS, qui a traité 175 000 milliards de yuans (environ 24 400 milliards USD) en 2024, en hausse de 43 %. Pour Pékin, plus l’Afrique exporte, plus elle est incitée à régler en yuan, et plus le yuan s’internationalise, un cercle vertueux pour la souveraineté monétaire chinoise, au grand dam de l’Oncle Sam… Aussi, n’oublions pas que l’unilatéralité a un revers structurel ; ce qui est concédé sans négociation peut, par construction, être retiré sans concertation.

Jusqu’ici, les flux commerciaux restent structurellement déséquilibrés en faveur de la Chine au détriment de l’Afrique. Que faut-il faire pour que cette dernière ne soit pas phagocytée par le géant chinois et qu’elle tire réellement profit de cette nouvelle relation commerciale ?

Il faudrait tout d’abord garder en mémoire la séquence de certains accords de libre-échange, où le démantèlement tarifaire prématuré, sans préparation industrielle, a creusé le déficit plutôt qu’il n’a stimulé les exportations. Cela étant dit, quatre conditions nous semblent nécessaires.

Il faudrait tout d’abord faire de la Zone de libre-échange continentale africaine (ZLECAf) une condition préalable. Aucun État pris isolément ne pèse face à la deuxième économie mondiale ; seule l’intégration continentale construira les volumes, les chaînes de valeur régionales et le rapport de force permettant d’exporter autre chose que de la matière brute. L’accord-cadre paraphé le 10 décembre 2025 entre le ministère du Commerce (MINCOMMERCE) et l’Ambassade de Chine au Cameroun ne tiendra ses promesses qu’inscrit dans cette dynamique.

Il faudrait également rompre avec la dialectique de la dépendance aux produits de base par une politique industrielle exigeante. Le précédent indonésien fait référence : depuis l’interdiction d’exporter le nickel non transformé en 2014, l’Indonésie est devenue le premier producteur mondial et a attiré 22 milliards US$ d’investissements chinois. Le tarif zéro chinois devrait être adossé à des restrictions ciblées d’exportation des minerais bruts, à du contenu local imposé aux investissements, à des transferts technologiques contractualisés, et à la montée en gamme des filières cacao, café, coton, bois.

En outre, il est important de négocier intelligemment les règles d’origine et les barrières non tarifaires, sinon, le tarif zéro deviendrait un aspirateur à réexportations. Les barrières non tarifaires (normes SPS, certifications HACCP/GACC, exigences linguistiques, contraintes logistiques, agréments d’établissement…) constituent par ailleurs le plafond de verre des exportations africaines à forte valeur ajoutée.

Enfin, la construction d’une défense commerciale est vitale. La Chine est, simultanément, le pays le plus visé au monde par les enquêtes antidumping, et l’un de ceux qui en usent le plus activement comme levier à l’export. L’Afrique, à l’inverse, demeure démunie. La franchise tarifaire offerte par Pékin doit s’accompagner, du renforcement des autorités nationales et continentales d’enquête commerciale, de mécanismes antidumping opérationnels et d’instruments de sauvegarde activables, faute de quoi la mise en concurrence frontale de l’industrie locale avec les surcapacités chinoises ne fera qu’achever ce que le déficit structurel a commencé… L’opportunité monétaire (règlements directs en yuan via CIPS, réduction du coût de la double conversion, diminution de l’exposition au dollar) doit être saisie de manière sélective et négociée, sans substituer une dépendance à une autre.

Le tarif zéro est une opportunité certes mais il ne deviendra un avantage qu’adossé à un cadre négocié, à des règles intelligentes, à une défense commerciale crédible et à une véritable politique de l’offre.

[1] CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System) : réseau de paiement international créé par la Banque populaire de Chine qui permet d’envoyer de l’argent entre pays directement en monnaie chinoise (yuan), sans passer par les circuits dominés par le dollar et le réseau SWIFT.

L’article Levée des barrières douanières par la Chine au profit des pays africains : un instrument stratégique pour Pékin ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

This episode investigates the relationship between China and Iran, Russia’s role in this multilateral triangle, and how Teheran’s view of the global order aligns with and differs from Beijing’s.

United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres launched the UN80 Initiative in March 2025. Faced with the US government’s increasingly hostile approach to the UN, UN80 was presented as a reform geared towards making the UN system “fit for purpose”. However, this policy brief argues that both the UN bureaucracy and member states have missed key opportunities to turn UN80 into a tool for reconfiguring UN multilateralism and providing space for multilateral cooperation that – despite rising geopolitical tensions – effectively addresses transnational challenges. The UN Secretariat, on the one hand, has pushed for a rushed reform agenda through an avalanche of bureaucratic reshuffling and technocratic ideas that are driven primarily by the logic of efficiency gains. Despite investing considerable efforts, it has failed to develop a coherent organisational and governance vision for the future of the UN that would help the organisation adapt to shifts in global power and policy preferences. Although welcoming reform efforts in principle, member states – on the other hand – have neither provided proactive guidance on desired reform outcomes, nor offered strategic input on the reform proposals put forward by the UN bureaucracy. They have failed to take up their role as political reform governors of a UN system in need of adapting to new geopolitical realities. Although the trajectory of UN80 to date has been far from ideal, the Initiative could still serve as a first step towards more fundamental reform efforts that address member states’ diverging preferences and attempt to tackle multilateral governance deficits. Inorder to highlight what is at stake, the policy brief outlines three scenarios of how post-UN80 dynamics might unfold, helping stakeholders identify what kind of UN system they would like to see and which steps might be necessary to get there.

Scenario 1. Faltering momentum: the phase-out of UN80 contributes to UN fragmentation and decline. Member states and the UN bureaucracy continue working through the UN80 Initiative’s to-do list until everything is either proclaimed done, watered down or silently abandoned. This leaves major challenges unaddressed, contributing to increasing levels of fragmentation and dysfunction across the UN system.

Scenario 2. Bold moves: strategic UN reform ambitions supersede technocratic logics. Member states leave decisions about efficiency gains to UN chief executives while prioritising and spearheading more ambitious reforms. They task the new Secretary-General with designing a high-level debate on the purpose(s) and the future governance of the UN system that reaffirms the UN as the multilateral centre of world politics.

Scenario 3. Muddling through: a combination of technocratic and governance reforms keeps the UN afloat. Cost-cutting reforms continue while a coalition of reform-oriented small and medium-sized member states pushes for a selective reform of multilateral governance. The result is a somewhat smaller UN system that, while not fundamentally transformed, is better equipped to navigate geopolitical tensions.

United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres launched the UN80 Initiative in March 2025. Faced with the US government’s increasingly hostile approach to the UN, UN80 was presented as a reform geared towards making the UN system “fit for purpose”. However, this policy brief argues that both the UN bureaucracy and member states have missed key opportunities to turn UN80 into a tool for reconfiguring UN multilateralism and providing space for multilateral cooperation that – despite rising geopolitical tensions – effectively addresses transnational challenges. The UN Secretariat, on the one hand, has pushed for a rushed reform agenda through an avalanche of bureaucratic reshuffling and technocratic ideas that are driven primarily by the logic of efficiency gains. Despite investing considerable efforts, it has failed to develop a coherent organisational and governance vision for the future of the UN that would help the organisation adapt to shifts in global power and policy preferences. Although welcoming reform efforts in principle, member states – on the other hand – have neither provided proactive guidance on desired reform outcomes, nor offered strategic input on the reform proposals put forward by the UN bureaucracy. They have failed to take up their role as political reform governors of a UN system in need of adapting to new geopolitical realities. Although the trajectory of UN80 to date has been far from ideal, the Initiative could still serve as a first step towards more fundamental reform efforts that address member states’ diverging preferences and attempt to tackle multilateral governance deficits. Inorder to highlight what is at stake, the policy brief outlines three scenarios of how post-UN80 dynamics might unfold, helping stakeholders identify what kind of UN system they would like to see and which steps might be necessary to get there.

Scenario 1. Faltering momentum: the phase-out of UN80 contributes to UN fragmentation and decline. Member states and the UN bureaucracy continue working through the UN80 Initiative’s to-do list until everything is either proclaimed done, watered down or silently abandoned. This leaves major challenges unaddressed, contributing to increasing levels of fragmentation and dysfunction across the UN system.

Scenario 2. Bold moves: strategic UN reform ambitions supersede technocratic logics. Member states leave decisions about efficiency gains to UN chief executives while prioritising and spearheading more ambitious reforms. They task the new Secretary-General with designing a high-level debate on the purpose(s) and the future governance of the UN system that reaffirms the UN as the multilateral centre of world politics.

Scenario 3. Muddling through: a combination of technocratic and governance reforms keeps the UN afloat. Cost-cutting reforms continue while a coalition of reform-oriented small and medium-sized member states pushes for a selective reform of multilateral governance. The result is a somewhat smaller UN system that, while not fundamentally transformed, is better equipped to navigate geopolitical tensions.

United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres launched the UN80 Initiative in March 2025. Faced with the US government’s increasingly hostile approach to the UN, UN80 was presented as a reform geared towards making the UN system “fit for purpose”. However, this policy brief argues that both the UN bureaucracy and member states have missed key opportunities to turn UN80 into a tool for reconfiguring UN multilateralism and providing space for multilateral cooperation that – despite rising geopolitical tensions – effectively addresses transnational challenges. The UN Secretariat, on the one hand, has pushed for a rushed reform agenda through an avalanche of bureaucratic reshuffling and technocratic ideas that are driven primarily by the logic of efficiency gains. Despite investing considerable efforts, it has failed to develop a coherent organisational and governance vision for the future of the UN that would help the organisation adapt to shifts in global power and policy preferences. Although welcoming reform efforts in principle, member states – on the other hand – have neither provided proactive guidance on desired reform outcomes, nor offered strategic input on the reform proposals put forward by the UN bureaucracy. They have failed to take up their role as political reform governors of a UN system in need of adapting to new geopolitical realities. Although the trajectory of UN80 to date has been far from ideal, the Initiative could still serve as a first step towards more fundamental reform efforts that address member states’ diverging preferences and attempt to tackle multilateral governance deficits. Inorder to highlight what is at stake, the policy brief outlines three scenarios of how post-UN80 dynamics might unfold, helping stakeholders identify what kind of UN system they would like to see and which steps might be necessary to get there.

Scenario 1. Faltering momentum: the phase-out of UN80 contributes to UN fragmentation and decline. Member states and the UN bureaucracy continue working through the UN80 Initiative’s to-do list until everything is either proclaimed done, watered down or silently abandoned. This leaves major challenges unaddressed, contributing to increasing levels of fragmentation and dysfunction across the UN system.

Scenario 2. Bold moves: strategic UN reform ambitions supersede technocratic logics. Member states leave decisions about efficiency gains to UN chief executives while prioritising and spearheading more ambitious reforms. They task the new Secretary-General with designing a high-level debate on the purpose(s) and the future governance of the UN system that reaffirms the UN as the multilateral centre of world politics.

Scenario 3. Muddling through: a combination of technocratic and governance reforms keeps the UN afloat. Cost-cutting reforms continue while a coalition of reform-oriented small and medium-sized member states pushes for a selective reform of multilateral governance. The result is a somewhat smaller UN system that, while not fundamentally transformed, is better equipped to navigate geopolitical tensions.

Will the current oil supply shock hold back the region’s green transition, or accelerate it?

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, the “post–Cold War” international order as we know it is coming to an end. Amid increasing volatility and conflict, the shape and character of the order that will replace it are dangerously unclear. There are ambitions by so-called middle powers – including some member states of the EU – to provide an effective response, but questions remain as to their potential impact. Three scenarios can be envisaged: (1) an Orwellian dystopia dominated by three global powers – the United States, China and Russia – each with its own sphere of influence; (2) a “new Cold War” between two rival capitalist models: “Western” liberal democracy versus “Eastern” oligarchy and (3) the survival of the rules-based international order, possibly as a counterweight to oligarchic spheres of influence. For this scenario to materialise, middle powers must address the liberal order’s inherent weaknesses so that it delivers for all of its members. This discussion paper brings together 14 contributions drawing on the German Institute of Development and Sustainability’s (IDOS) broad regional and thematic expertise to examine these questions. The contributions analyse key actors, cooperation themes and regions. Each contribution analyses the implications of the changing global order for its specific area of focus and explores how international cooperation in general – and development cooperation in particular – can contribute to a more just and sustainable international system. The paper aims to provide readers with a range of perspectives on the state of international development cooperation and its possible evolution. Taken together, the contributions provide insights into the roles that international development cooperation may play in an emerging global order and identify priorities for reforms.

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, the “post–Cold War” international order as we know it is coming to an end. Amid increasing volatility and conflict, the shape and character of the order that will replace it are dangerously unclear. There are ambitions by so-called middle powers – including some member states of the EU – to provide an effective response, but questions remain as to their potential impact. Three scenarios can be envisaged: (1) an Orwellian dystopia dominated by three global powers – the United States, China and Russia – each with its own sphere of influence; (2) a “new Cold War” between two rival capitalist models: “Western” liberal democracy versus “Eastern” oligarchy and (3) the survival of the rules-based international order, possibly as a counterweight to oligarchic spheres of influence. For this scenario to materialise, middle powers must address the liberal order’s inherent weaknesses so that it delivers for all of its members. This discussion paper brings together 14 contributions drawing on the German Institute of Development and Sustainability’s (IDOS) broad regional and thematic expertise to examine these questions. The contributions analyse key actors, cooperation themes and regions. Each contribution analyses the implications of the changing global order for its specific area of focus and explores how international cooperation in general – and development cooperation in particular – can contribute to a more just and sustainable international system. The paper aims to provide readers with a range of perspectives on the state of international development cooperation and its possible evolution. Taken together, the contributions provide insights into the roles that international development cooperation may play in an emerging global order and identify priorities for reforms.

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, the “post–Cold War” international order as we know it is coming to an end. Amid increasing volatility and conflict, the shape and character of the order that will replace it are dangerously unclear. There are ambitions by so-called middle powers – including some member states of the EU – to provide an effective response, but questions remain as to their potential impact. Three scenarios can be envisaged: (1) an Orwellian dystopia dominated by three global powers – the United States, China and Russia – each with its own sphere of influence; (2) a “new Cold War” between two rival capitalist models: “Western” liberal democracy versus “Eastern” oligarchy and (3) the survival of the rules-based international order, possibly as a counterweight to oligarchic spheres of influence. For this scenario to materialise, middle powers must address the liberal order’s inherent weaknesses so that it delivers for all of its members. This discussion paper brings together 14 contributions drawing on the German Institute of Development and Sustainability’s (IDOS) broad regional and thematic expertise to examine these questions. The contributions analyse key actors, cooperation themes and regions. Each contribution analyses the implications of the changing global order for its specific area of focus and explores how international cooperation in general – and development cooperation in particular – can contribute to a more just and sustainable international system. The paper aims to provide readers with a range of perspectives on the state of international development cooperation and its possible evolution. Taken together, the contributions provide insights into the roles that international development cooperation may play in an emerging global order and identify priorities for reforms.

Krankheitsbedingte Fehltage von Beschäftigten in Deutschland sind 2022 stark gestiegen – Grund ist aber nicht primär die elektronische Krankschreibung – Atemwegserkrankungen und verändertes Verhalten nach der Pandemie sorgen für mehr Fehlzeiten am Arbeitsplatz – Teilkrankschreibung und mehr ...

Es ist das Treffen der Supermächte: Donald Trump besucht Xi Jinping in Peking. Während der US-Präsident nach vorweisbaren Erfolgen für seinen Wahlkampf sucht, hofft China auf ein Einknicken der USA in der Taiwan-Frage.

Amid the expected pomp and circumstance, what can we expect from the Trump-Xi summit?

The new legislation agreed on Tuesday seeks to foster the right to autonomy for adults across the EU.
Committee on Legal Affairs

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