Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The Media Observatory Report (MORE) is the fruit of systematic monitoring of key Greek and Albania media. 

Each MORE offers a well-balanced mix of political insight and fact-driven analysis on the impact of Albanian media reporting of Greece and Greek media reporting of Albania on issues of common interest. It principally aims to filter out the noise that typically accompanies the media stories on the unresolved bilateral issues. 

3rd issue of MORE  (English).  The third issue is the outcome of a monitoring period between May 2023 – November 2023 and features: – The case of Fredis Beleris – The background, the various aspects of the case and the critical issues at hand – The media coverage and narratives in Greece and Albania

Mit dem Sieg Donald Trumps bei den jüngsten US-Präsidentschaftswahlen ist end­gültig klar geworden, dass sein Einzug ins Weiße Haus 2017 kein Ausrutscher war. Vielmehr ist es einem populistischen, in vielerlei Hinsicht extremen und undemo­kratischen Kandidaten grundsätzlich möglich, in den Vereinigten Staaten eine Mehr­heit der Wählerinnen und Wähler für sich zu gewinnen. Trump interpretiert den Wahlsieg als umfassendes Mandat für seine radikale Agenda. Ungeachtet dessen, ob diese Deutung korrekt ist, dürfte sie sein Handeln anleiten. Wie weit er hierbei gehen kann, wird vor allem davon abhängen, ob die Republikaner im Senat seine Pläne ge­schlossen und vorbehaltlos unterstützen.

Greece’s integration efforts have been classified as “equality on paper”, highlighting significant gaps in the process of integration of refugees and migrants. Although the actions of the last five years have been crucial regarding labour market inclusion and access to education, persistent gaps, and fragmented implementation hinder the effectiveness of these initiatives. Focusing on the aforementioned vital pillars of integration- i.e., education and access to labour market- this paper will examine the state of the art, highlighting existing gaps and deficiencies, as well as good practices. Concretely, the objective of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, it assesses the current developments and practices, as well as the remaining obstacles; while on the other hand, it draws policy recommendations that will enable Greece to transform its integration policies from “equality on paper” to a more cohesive and effective approach.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Maria Eleni Pantazi Psatha, PhD candidate, KU Leuven, Programme Officer at METAdrasi-Action for Migration and Development.

Introduction

For many years, the reception and management of large migration flows, along with the control of irregular movements and the reinforcement of legal pathways, have been at the forefront of the Greek policy and legislative agenda.[1] However, there has been a shift in focus, with the integration of refugees and migrants into host communities becoming a fundamental pillar of migration policy. Undeniably, there is a strong link between migration and integration policies, while managing the effective integration of refugees and migrants is perceived both as a priority in the state’s migration policy agenda, and within the broader public discourse and opinion.[2]

Over the previous years, the Greek State has introduced and carried out numerous policy initiatives aimed at promoting integration across different aspects of social, political, labour, and economic life.

Over the previous years, the Greek State has introduced and carried out numerous policy initiatives aimed at promoting integration across different aspects of social, political, labour, and economic life. Aligning with the EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion for 2021-2027, which advocates for timely support of applicants and beneficiaries of international protection in the integration process, the adopted Greek National Integration Strategy seeks to facilitate and enhance the integration procedure.

Despite the actions undertaken in the past five years and the efforts to replace the absence of an inclusive integration plan, significant gaps and ambiguities persist, posing challenges to the comprehensive integration of refugees and migrants. Specifically, the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)[3], characterises the country’s approach as “equality on paper”, highlighting that while migrants in Greece enjoy basic rights, they lack equal opportunities.[4] The most significant obstacles emerge in the areas of education, and political participation, whereas access to the labour market was characterised as “slightly favourable”.

Therefore, the first section of this policy paper will examine one of the aspects of migrant and refugee integration, and specifically, labour integration. It will provide an overview of recent actions, highlighting both the progress made, and the persisting gaps. Moreover, the following section will explore the situation of educational opportunities and the access to Non-Formal and Formal Education in Greece. Lastly, this paper will present a set of policy recommendations aimed at improving the integration of refugees and migrants, with a focus on labour and educational integration, taking also into consideration climate change, as a factor that can affect the integration process.

Overall, the objective of this brief is twofold: on the one hand, it assesses the current state of integration policies and practices in Greece, while on the other hand, it draws policy recommendations to address gaps and barriers that hinder refugees’ and migrants’ access to education and employment opportunities. 

Labour Integration

…the focus of the Greek migration policy was to manage migration flows,

A significant parameter of refugee and migrant inclusion in the host society is labour integration. Undeniably, at a first stage, reception, housing, and provision of food emerge as priority needs, where most attention was paid by the Greek authorities. However, the economic integration and the employment of refugee and migrant populations becomes a means to regain their autonomy, and rebuild their lives, while also enhancing their social inclusion.[5] In the previous years, the focus of the Greek migration policy was to manage migration flows with an emphasis on border security, whereas the organised reception and integration of refugees and migrants was left aside.

Following the general elections in June 2023, a new set of priorities was introduced: promotion of social cohesion and integration of refugees and migrants, addressing the labour shortages in key sectors through organised legal migration, and enhancement of sustainable reintegration. Although the integration efforts made by the Greek state have been seen as “an equality on paper”, major steps have been made at a legislative and policy level, making the integration process “slightly favourable”.[6] Therefore, this section aims at unfolding the steps that have been made from the Greek state regarding labour integration, while also underlining persisting gaps and impasses.

Based on UNHCR figures on labour integration during the last two years,[7] the majority of respondents (80 per cent) were either not working or were only able to find occasional work. Of those working, 56 per cent were doing so without any type of legal contract, indicating significant levels of labour exploitation. The main three challenges that refugees and migrants face with respect to finding work in Greece are the lack of knowledge of the language, the lack of documentation, and the inability to find legal employment. Moreover, the majority of respondents highlighted that the reason for stopping their job was due to its seasonal character. The figures provided by another study,[8] further corroborate the aforementioned, highlighting also a significant gender-based gap in access to employment, with women being disproportionately affected compared to men. Additionally, the study revealed that while economic integration scored highest in Greece, linguistic and social integration were rated lowest, underscoring the multidimensional nature of the issue. Nationality is also an aspect determining access to the labour market, as per Figure 1.[9] Individuals from Egypt, Turkey, and Iran achieved the highest integration scores, followed by Palestinians, Iraqis, Cameroonians, Syrians, and Afghans.

Complementary, a survey conducted by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 2021-2022, highlighted language barriers, and the lack of proper documentation as the primary challenges to employment.[10] Notably, the majority of participants (35 per cent) who had a job were asylum seekers, and a 33 per cent were beneficiaries of international protection, indicating that employment opportunities often depend on an individual’s legal status.[11] Overall, persistent obstacles, such as the temporary nature of available jobs and the difficulty in securing legal employment, significantly limit opportunities for stability and full integration.

 

Figure 1, Index attachment integration score for the ten largest nationality groups[12].

 

                                                                                                                            Source: IPL 2023.

 

An important legislative development was L. 5078/2023 and particularly Article 192 which amended Article 57 of the Asylum Code, providing that applicants have a right to access the labour market withing sixty days of the lodging of their application and the receipt of the relevant legal documents. It is considered as a crucial development as prior to 2020, asylum seekers had to wait six months to gain access to employment, leading to prolonged delays and uncertainty. The amendment also streamlines processes and enhances efficiency through digitalisation. In addition, Article 193 of the same Law, introduces a new procedure for granting residence permit, which provides access to paid employment and facilitates the regularisation of a substantial number of long-term migrants in Greece. The law further extends the duration of work permits, increases the quota for seasonal workers, reduces the types of residence permits, and simplifies documentary requirements for permit renewals.[13] Another noteworthy addition benefits second-generation migrants, who are eligible for ten-year residence permits, compared to the previous five-year permits, granting full access to the labour market. However, this favourable provision does not extend to beneficiaries of international protection, who without a valid residence permit, remain unable to access the labour market; [14] a disparity that highlights a gap in the inclusiveness of the legislative framework.

Another important legislative development is the new Migration Code which came into effect in January 2020 and amended various legal provisions of the previous Migration and Social Integration Code (L. 4251/2014).[15] The most important innovative provision is for the “long term residence permit” which allows a person to live and work in any country of the European Union.

As a general remark, it is vital to highlight the general labour market conditions in Greece. Despite noticeable improvements in recent years, unemployment rates in Greece remain high, compared to other EU Member States, ranking the country in the second place with 9,3 per cent of unemployment rate.[16] According to the International Migration Outlook,[17] the employment rate for migrants in Greece stands at 62,5 per cent, while the unemployment rate reaches a 14,9 per cent. These figures indicate a relative improvement in labour market conditions, with a greater reduction in unemployment among foreign-born individuals compared to native-born Greeks. Additionally, data from Eurostat’s migrant integration and inclusion visualisation corroborates this trend, showing that Greek nationals maintain higher employment rates than third-country nationals. [18] A particularly noteworthy finding is the temporality of employment contracts, which is significantly more common among non-EU nationals (23,3 per cent) compared to Greek nationals (10,1 per cent). This data, as illustrated in Figure 2 for labour market outcomes in 2023, underscores persistent disparities in employment opportunities and contract stability between migrants and nationals.                                    

 

 Figure 2, Labour Market Outcomes (2023)[19]

                                                                                                                   Source: Eurostat, 2024.

 

From the above it appears that high unemployment rates, combined with additional barriers, such as competition with Greek-speaking candidates, significantly hinder the holistic integration of refugees and migrants into the labour market.[20]  This challenge is particularly pronounced for third-country nationals, whose unemployment rate is even higher. According to the Public Employment Service, as of December 2023, the total number of registered unemployed third-country nationals stood at 126,610, a figure that rose further in January 2024. Interestingly, while public opinion on migration remains mixed, there is a notably positive perception of the economic benefits of labour migration.[21] Concretely, the majority of Greek nationals (71,8 per cent) believes that the departure of many migrants has had negative repercussions on production, particularly in the sectors of tourism and agriculture. Moreover, the acceptance of migrants based on the needs of the national economy is perceived highly positively (62,7 per cent).

In response to these challenges, the recently amended National Integration Strategy[22] focuses on social integration with an emphasis on early action and on the process of pre-integration for those with a refugee background. A key positive aspect of the Strategy is the inclusion of a pre-integration phase, which aims to facilitate smoother integration by teaching the Greek language, familiarising them with the European way of life, and instilling principles

of democracy and human rights. Several promising initiatives have emerged, such as the “Multaka: Intercultural Tours in Athens”, a pilot project which provided the opportunity to refugees and migrants to learn about Greek civilisation and history. While the Strategy focuses heavily on promoting social inclusion, it has faced criticism for its lack of a concrete implementation plan, and specific procedures to translate its objectives into effective actions.[23]

…he adopted legal provisions, while addressing some past barriers to labour integration, remain largely superficial.

As underlined “the objectives and actions proposed per chapter are fragmentary in nature, while there is no deepening and analysis of tools and practices that will be used to achieve them”.[24] The main issue, thus, lies in the fact that the adopted legal provisions, while addressing some past barriers to labour integration, remain largely superficial. As Lodovici points out, “measures to support access to the labour market are not sufficiently developed and are fragmented into projects implemented by NGOs and supported through EU funds”.[25] In other words, access to labour market is feasible solely through the submission of an ERGANI registration certificate by their employer to the National Social Security Entity (EFKA). However, this process can deter employers who may lack the necessary knowledge or support to navigate it, while also posing administrative hurdles for refugees and migrants.[26]

Another criticism apropos the population mentioned in the strategy underlines that focus has been placed on the integration of asylum seekers and refugees, rather than the migrant population. This by itself does not align with the preface that states “that the New National Integration Strategy is based on the new action plan of the European Union and adopts the recommendations for social inclusion”. In contrast it is mentioned that “the New Integration Strategy is addressed to asylum seekers as well as recognised beneficiaries of international protection and is aligned to the legal framework in force”,[27] which excludes to the fullest other categories of people. Thus, the idea of integration for all is not clearly envisaged in the Greek Strategy. Additionally, the progress made by state factors is also missing together with the best practices that have derived from the work of civil society organisations. At this point it is also important to underline the contribution of NGOs and international organizations in advancing the integration of refugees and migrants in Greece through the provision of employability services and vocational trainings.

A survey conducted by NGOs[28] revealed that individuals who participated in the research were beneficiaries of the project partner organisations, meaning they had received support from professionals prior to securing employment. Thus, this demonstrates that NGO support plays a critical role in providing refugees and migrants with access to labour market information and guidance on the necessary steps to gain employment. In any case, “successful integration of refugees needs a whole-of-society approach”.[29] There is also a notable absence of concrete measures addressing the needs of people with disabilities, as well as LGBTQ+ individuals.[30] Incontestably, significant progress has been achieved in improving employment opportunities for refugee and migrant populations; nevertheless, Greece still ranks among the lowest in Europe in terms of establishing an effective policy framework to enhance employability. [31]

…there have been several good practices that have been implemented in the area of integration and particularly labour integration.

Nonetheless, there have been several good practices that have been implemented in the area of integration and particularly labour integration, and often emerge from the collaboration between state actors, international organisations, and civil society organizations. The Hellenic Integration Support for Beneficiaries of International Protection programme (HELIOS), which was launched in 2019 by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) offered a variety of support actions aimed at promoting the independent living of beneficiaries of international protection, including information sessions, work counselling, language courses, and housing. A notable example is the organization of Job Fairs, which facilitate connections between employers from various sectors and refugees or migrants seeking employment. For instance, in July 2024, a Job Fair held on the island of Lesvos saw the participation of 452 individuals, resulting in 219 job offers.[32] Additionally, UNHCR has launched the ADAMA online platform, which plays a crucial role in bridging the gap between refugees looking for jobs in Greece and prospective employers across the country. This initiative not only provides refugees with essential information about the labour market and connects them with employers but also encourages businesses and agencies in the private sector to actively include refugees in their workforce, thereby fostering greater inclusion and diversity in the Greek labour market.

Another important initiative is the introduction of a pilot tool by the Hellenic Manpower Employment Organisation (OAED)- the so-called “Skills Recognition Tool”.[33] Specifically, as the report underlined, one key insight from this initiative is the critical role of collaboration between public institutions and civil society organisations in ensuring the effectiveness of the process.[34] This programme is therefore, aiming at placing approximately 1,000 recognised refugees in Attica and Central Macedonia. Such partnerships are essential for accurately evaluating refugees’ competencies and aligning them with appropriate employment opportunities. However, as of now, there is a lack of publicly available data detailing the progress and outcomes of this pilot program, making it challenging to assess its overall impact.

Furthermore, another factor that has contributed to shaping labour integration, is labour shortages. Concretely, during and after the Covid-19 pandemic, the agricultural, tourism, and construction sectors faced increased shortages, which were addressed by granting exceptional right to work.[35] Yet, labour shortages remain a constant issue up to date, while efforts have been made since the beginning of the year through bilateral agreements with Bangladesh and Egypt. Before examining the aforementioned agreements, it is crucial to mention the system of metaklisi, which focuses on hiring third-country nationals for the purpose of employment- mainly to areas where there was no interest from Greek employees.[36] According to the latest available data (2022-2023) from the Ministry of Migration and Asylum regarding the system of metaklisi,[37] a total of 32,794 of requests were submitted in 2022, out of which 29,130 were accepted. In 2023, the number of requests decreased to 25,945 of which, 20,042 were approved. Nonetheless, this process has been criticised for often allowing informal hirings, without a contract, leading to exploitation.

According to the Hellenic Ministry of Labour, the total number of residence visa quotas for 2023-2024 was 167,925.[38] Of the available posts, 20,000 would be covered through the agreements with Egypt and Bangladesh, and the rest through the system of metaklisi. It is interesting to highlight two points at this stage. Firstly, the number of permitted work permits was set significantly lower than the requests submitted through the Regional Authorities- that were approximately 380,000. While there was an increase in the number of workers allowed in sectors such as hospitality and accommodation- 9,261 compared to 2,811 during 2021-2022- this figure remains far below the 80, 316 employees proposed. Specifically, of the 379,165 requests received for 2023-2024, only 147,925 permits were issued, covering just 39 per cent of the demand. [39] Secondly, limited quotas were allocated for highly skilled workers, reflecting also the relatively low demand within the Greek labour market.[40]

In February 2022, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on migration and mobility was signed with Bangladesh, covering seasonal labour needs. Specifically, the agreement outlines the conditions for entry and temporary residence of Bangladeshi nationals for temporary employment. It provides the issuance of 4,000 temporary residence permits annually, each valid for a duration of five years, under the system of metaklisi.[41] In addition, and for the purpose of covering existing labour shortages, the Memorandum allows for up to 15,000 Bangladeshis already residing undocumented in Greece to be granted temporary long term seasonal visas, enabling them to enter the labour market.

According to the information provided by the Greek authorities, a total of 10,337 Bangladeshis applied for regularisation in 2023, out of whom 3,405 were granted residence permits or legal status. However, 1,009 applications were cancelled for various reasons. As of February 2024, an additional 113 applications were submitted, with approximately 5,910 still pending review. According to the Embassy of Bangladesh, rejected applicants will have the opportunity to re-apply, provided they meet the necessary conditions.[42]

On the other hand, the agreement with Egypt was signed on November 2022 and concerned the entry and residence of 5,000 Egyptian citizens for the purpose of employment in the agricultural sector. The screening and the choice of Egyptian nationals will be made by the state of Egypt, and then forwarded to the Greek consular authorities. The permit cap is set at a level which can be regarded as insufficient to meet the actual needs of the Greek agricultural sector. However, according to the former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, the low cap is intended to allow Greece to assess the agreement’s practical implementation, while ensuring that the country does not become overly dependent on a single source for its labour needs.[43]

The former Minister for Migration and Asylum, announced in June 2024 that an initial list of eligible 2,400 Egyptian seasonal workers had already been compiled.[44] However, specific statistics on the number of Egyptian workers who have arrived in Greece under this MoU is limited and not publicly available.[45] Based on data from ECRE,[46] the recognition rates for international protection among Egyptian applicants in Greece were notably low in recent years. In 2023, the recognition rate stood at 0,9 per cent, which further declined to 0,6 per cent in 2024.

…on the framework of adopting a more inclusive National Integration Strategy, factors such as climate change should also be taken into consideration.

In addition, and on the framework of adopting a more inclusive National Integration Strategy, factors such as climate change should also be taken into consideration since they can critically affect the integration of refugees and migrants into the labour market, and should thus, be included in the Integration Strategy. Specifically, climate change can influence labour integration, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and tourism. [47] Adverse effects like rainfall variability, soil erosion, and extreme weather events may disrupt agricultural production and reduce job opportunities. [48] Contrariwise, a more positive outcome would be the extension of the growing season which will benefit the cultivation of certain crops, leading to the emergence of new opportunities in some areas. Therefore, the link between climate change and labour integration is an aspect that could be incorporated into the Integration Strategy, as it could foster the development of regional responses that proactively address potential impacts of climate change on the integration process. This raises the question of whether existing bilateral agreements could be adapted to anticipate the challenges posed by climate change. An example could be the temporal circular labour migration scheme for communities vulnerable to climate change;[49] Bangladesh for instance, is a country that is severely affected by climate change. Thus, in the already signed MoU the aspect of climate change could also be added, reinforcing economic growth, social welfare, and innovation. Such an initiative would provide opportunities for both countries, reduce pressures on vulnerable communities, and expand avenues for sustainable labor integration.

…despite the strengthening of the institutional and legal framework for migrant integration, the implementation phase remains incomplete and “under construction”. 

Overall, from the above it becomes evident that despite the strengthening of the institutional and legal framework for migrant integration, the implementation phase remains incomplete and “under construction”. The primary issue thus, is not the absence of law, but rather the “inability of the administration to enforce it”.[50] The aforementioned analysis highlights that the question of integration of refugees and migrants into today’s Greek labour market remains largely unchanged over the past decade.[51] Undeniably, there have been notable advancements in employment through the adoption of the Law 5078/2023, the new Migration Code, the signature of the bilateral agreements with Egypt and Bangladesh, the National Integration Strategy, and the collaboration of civil society and international organisations; yet these efforts lack the coherence needed to achieve meaningful outcomes. A cohesive and comprehensive approach is still required, aligning with the needs of the national labour market, as well as emerging factors, such as climate change that could influence labour market needs, ensuring equal opportunities, and focusing on fostering long-term employment.

Non-formal and formal education

Access to education is transformative for refugees and migrants, serving as one of the most critical components of successful integration. Educational attainment and language proficiency are widely recognised as the cornerstones of the integration process, enabling individuals to build independence, enhance employment prospects, and foster social inclusion. [52] Therefore, this section explores the current state of educational opportunities for refugees and migrants in Greece, emphasising persistent challenges and barriers that hinder access and participation. It also highlights existing best practices that have proven effective and should be expanded to ensure a more inclusive and equitable educational framework for these populations.

In contrast with the access to labour market, education for refugees and migrants in Greece is rated as “slightly unfavourable”.

In contrast with the access to labour market, education for refugees and migrants in Greece is rated as “slightly unfavourable”, according to MIPEX. Based on a report from the Greek Council of Refugees, educational access is described as “another hurdle-filled area”.[53] Beyond legal stipulations, it is often the case that administrative challenges, and the absence of inclusive school practices frequently lead to exclusion. Even from a legal standpoint, the education of refugee and migrant children is often framed as an obligation, rather than a right.[54] Under Article 55 of the Asylum Code, asylum-seeking children are required to attend primary and secondary school, on the same basis as Greek nationals.[55] Preparation for entering formal education is also of outmost importance; nevertheless, reception classes, which are essential for easing this transitions, are often delayed due to understaffing and logistical challenges, leaving many children excluded from the educational system.

Based on data provided by Eurostat, “educational attainment is becoming an increasingly important factor, both in the labour market and for individuals, as well as society in general”.[56] Regarding educational attainment distributions in 2023, 41,8 per cent of third-country nationals had less than primary and lower secondary education, 41,8 per cent had upper secondary, and 10,1 per cent tertiary education.[57] Regarding children’s education, there is a lack of official data on enrollment in formal education provided by the Ministry of Education. Available information often pertains to non-formal activities, typically provided by NGOs. However, the Ministry of Education reported an increase in school registrations (16,417 students) and attendance (12,285 students) for 2021-2022.[58] Additionally, regarding the applications for recognition of titles and qualifications awarded by non-Greek Higher Education Institutions, 9,224 and 8,517 applications were submitted to DOATAP in 2022 and 2023 respectively. From those, a total of 11,472 and 8,481 diploma recognition documents were issued for 2022 and 2023.[59]

The programme[60] “All Children in Education” (ACE)[61] implemented by UNICEF from September 2021 to February 2024, assisted a total of 24,057 children not only through the provision of preparatory classes, but also through helping with the enrolment in formal education. By August 2022, approximately 22,000 refugee and migrant children were in Greece, with an estimated 17,000 being of school age, while at the end of 2022, 16,109 of these children had accessed education: 14,844 in formal education and 1,265 in non-formal education. Thus, about 68 per cent of refugee and migrant children attended formal or non-formal education.[62] By the end of 2023, approximately 15,134 refugee and migrant children were enrolled in Greek schools,[63] and by January 2024, 14,222 were actively attending classes.[64] Therefore, this demonstrates a clear increase in enrollment rates, with more refugee and migrant children actively participating in education. This progress underscores the impact of targeted programmes like ACE in promoting access to education.

It is important to note that the aforementioned data are provided by UNICEF and other organisations, since the availability and regency of official, and publicly available data is limited. Notably, Greece ranks second to last among European countries in child related Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) data availability, reaching only a 52 per cent.[65] This significant data impasse poses challenges in accurately assessing and addressing the educational needs of refugee and migrant children, underscoring the necessity for enhanced data collection and transparency to inform effective policymaking.

Adult refugees and asylum seekers are entitled to access several educational programmes offered by state and private agencies, international organisations or NGOS. For example, individuals who have not completed mandatory education can enroll in schools of Second Chance. Also, asylum seekers with a secondary education diploma are eligible to participate in examinations to enter Universities or Higher Technological Institutions or to register in Institutes of Vocational Training (IEK). On the other hand, beneficiaries of international protection are treated in the same way as Greek citizens regarding recognition of foreign certificates and qualifications. In case where documentation is unavailable, Greek authorities are required to facilitate the process. However, there is no official data available on the number of adult refugees and migrants attending formal education.

…understanding and learning the Greek language remains the most significant challenge for refugees and migrants. 

As highlighted earlier, understanding and learning the Greek language remains the most significant challenge for refugees and migrants. The limited availability of state-provided, language courses is often covered by local NGOs in collaboration with international organisations. Notable examples include the HELIOS project which integrates language learning as a component of its broader integration efforts. The Stepping Stone project implemented by a Greek NGO with the support of UNHCR, offering Greek language courses to facilitate communication and integration.

Good practices:

Several good practices are worth mentioning in the context of reinforcing educational integration of refugees and migrants. For instance, Action Two of the National Integration Strategy provides non-formal educational activities, conducted by professionals specialised in teaching Greek as a foreign language. This aspect is either taking place in preparatory classes or as an additional support within the formal educational system, including instruction in basic concepts of the English language. Nonetheless, what remains unclear is which entities will provide the language courses, how people can access them, and other general information. Additionally, the Department of Socio-economic Integration of the Ministry of Migration and Asylum, in collaboration with UNHCR, established a helpdesk for social integration.[66] This helpdesk, among other services, will also respond to requests on the access to Greek language courses and help people- through a new guide accessible in various languages- to take their first steps in the host country.

The Lifelong Learning Centers (LLC)[67] provided by the Ministry of Education and Religion are also another good practice that provides informal education to adults. In the context of a general education curriculum, the Centers offer Greek language courses to adults. This practice is of extreme importance for the promotion of education for adults with a refugee or migrant background and sets a great basis for the promotion of integration and social inclusion. It is also vital to mention that the Social Service through its collaboration with schools and educational authorities facilitates the enrollment of children in schools, even without any official documentation.[68]

Challenges:

From the above, it becomes obvious that a number of initiatives have been undertaken in the last years in order to facilitate the integration of refugees and migrants- both minors and adults- in the educational system of Greece; however, emphasis has been given to preparatory classes and non-formal educational activities rather than to the enrollment and active participation in formal education. These efforts, while promising, highlight gaps in coordination and communication that need to be addressed. Clarifying responsibilities, expanding the availability of language courses, and improving data collection on educational participation are some impasses that require amelioration.

One problem identified during the Greek Ombudsman’s on-site inspections, [69]  is that despite the existence of legal provisions that make education mandatory, there is a number of factors that prevent children from attending school regularly. One key challenge is transportation, as many children leave in remote areas or camps which are far from schools, making regular attendance difficult. Another issue is the inadequacy of resources- such as trained personnel- which usually complicates the inclusion of refugee and migrant children to a formal classroom.[70]

Shortcomings were also identified in some facilities regarding available logistical infrastructure, while the lack of funding from the Ministry of Education was also an important obstacle. These obstacles often lead to higher dropout rates and limited participation in education for refugee and migrant children. Notably, many of these issues were already identified and documented by the Greek Ombudsman as early as 2021, yet they remain largely unresolved. Addressing these systemic challenges is essential to ensuring meaningful access to education for all children.

…more attention has been paid in the preparatory process and the non-formal education activities rather than the inclusion to formal classrooms. 

From the above examination, it becomes obvious that despite the existence of a legal framework that reassures the access to educational activities for refugees and migrants, either minors or adults, in practice, a harmonised approach with common standards and indicators for education quality and content is missing. Specifically, more attention has been paid in the preparatory process and the non-formal education activities rather than the inclusion to formal classrooms. In no case does this undermine the importance of introductory classes that will enable the smoother integration to the Greek educational system. However, more attention needs to be paid from state actors to adopting a unified approach regarding formal education. Additionally, the lack of publicly available data is also hindering the monitoring of the achieved results.

…stronger collaboration between state actors, NGOs, facilities, and international organisations is required.

If we take the example of data offered by a Greek NGO for 2024, from the 1,920 new students that attended non-formal educational activities, only 754 attended formal education. This proves that the gap between non-formal and formal activities is wide, leading to an insufficient educational integration. The persistent impasses and difficulties in accessing formal education led to the conclusion that stronger collaboration between state actors, NGOs, facilities, and international organisations is required in order to provide an organised programme of educational activities for children and adults. 

Policy recommendations 

The aforementioned analysis highlights that Greece has made notable progress in advancing the integration of refugees and migrants, with significant steps, such as the adoption of new legislation to reinforce labour integration, the release of the New Integration Strategy, and the implementation of various educational activities by organisations, public actors, and NGOs. Nevertheless, the ad hoc nature of these policies, and the inconsistencies in strategic planning continue to pose challenges. “The contradictions [of the implemented policies] cause serious impasses, and inefficiencies, which public services and agencies, the local authorities, and NGOs involved are called upon to address”.[71] To achieve effective and sustainable integration, it is imperative to develop a stable and coherent integration policy that addresses the evolving realities of refugee and migrant populations in Greece, including emerging challenges such as climate change. [72]

…the integration process of refugees and migrants is still facing substantial gaps that hinder the creation of an equitable and inclusive society. 

Overall, the integration process of refugees and migrants is still facing substantial gaps that hinder the creation of an equitable and inclusive society. Addressing these challenges requires a commitment to the principles of inclusivity, equity, and adaptability. By embracing a more comprehensive approach and fostering collaboration across all sectors of society, Greece can transform integration from a mere policy goal into concrete outcomes.

1. Adopt a holistic and coherent policy framework that will address the needs and challenges that the refugee and migrant population is facing based on the principle of equal opportunities. While the Greek state has made strides in implementing a more structured legal and policy framework, many actions remain isolated efforts rather than part of a comprehensive strategy. Greece needs to prioritise systematic planning and coordinated efforts across all sectors.
2. Simplify administrative processes and make them more accessible. For example, the Greek Asylum Service’s upgraded information system (Alkyoni II), developed by the Ministry of Migration and Asylum, offers a promising solution by enabling services such as document submission and application registration in multilingual and digital formats, streamlining previously cumbersome processes.
3. Implement a more comprehensive National Integration Strategy that applies to all legally residing third-country nationals and individuals with a migrant background. Though the new National Integration Strategy provides a pre-integration process, it fails to fully incorporate labour integration into its framework. A more cohesive and inclusive approach will not only reduce inequalities but also foster social cohesion and economic development.
4. Shift focus from temporary employment to long-term labour opportunities that align with the evolving needs of the market. Additionally, a needs assessment would also be essential for the evaluation of labour demands, identification of the required skills, and a determination of the duration of work and stay.[73]
5. Incorporate climate change and adaptation in the integration strategy. Labour migration could be perceived as an adaptation strategy to the effects of climate change.in general, migration can be seen as an adaptation strategy regarding mobility due to climate change. Therefore, this could also be implemented in the case of labour integration through bilateral skills partnerships, or circular/seasonal migration schemes. Such initiatives would provide opportunities for both countries, reduce pressures on vulnerable communities, and expand avenues for sustainable labor integration.
6. Enhance collaboration among state agencies, local authorities, the private sector, NGOs, international organizations, and professional associations. Such partnerships can provide targeted support and facilitate the effective integration of refugees and migrants.
7. Reinforce access to formal education., programmes like ACE must be further reinforced, as it has successfully provided both formal and non-formal educational opportunities to children, while also preparing teachers to handle diverse classrooms, resulting in a more harmonised approach to education. Scaling up such programmes and addressing systemic barriers like transportation and teacher training will be crucial for improving access to education for refugee and migrant populations in Greece.
8. Develop individualised and needs-based approach policies focusing on the needs of refugees and migrants. Training in intercultural education and cultural diversity, academic guidance, and financial support are some targeted needs that could be further explored at a national level, taking into consideration the needs and capacities of the country.

 

References

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Georgakopoulos T., ‘The Consequences of Climate Change in Greece’ (DiaNEOsis, 2021) < https://www.dianeosis.org/en/2021/12/the-consequences-of-climate-change-in-greece/ > accessed 15 November 2024.

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Greek Council for Refugees, ‘Access to the Labour Market’ (ECRE, 2024) < Reception Conditions: Access to the Labour Market> accessed 06 November 2024.

Greek Council for Refugees, ‘Do the Human Right Thing: Raising our voice for refugee rights’ (Active Citizens Fund, 2022) < https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/Seeking%20a%20new%20life%20-%20seeking%20employment.pdf > accessed 03 November 2024.

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Hellenic Ministry of Migration and Asylum, ‘Press Release’ (Ministry of Migration and Asylum, 2024)< https://migration.gov.gr/megali-proseleysi-ton-epi-makron-diamenonton-metanaston-sti-nomimi-apascholisi-symfona-me-to-arthro-193-tis-tropologias-toy-ypoyrgeioy-metanasteysis-kai-asyloy/ > accessed 14 November 2024.

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InfoMigrants, ‘About 3,400 Bangladeshi migrants regularized in Greece in 2023’ (InfoMigrants, 2024) < https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/55362/about-3400-bangladeshi-migrants-regularized-in-greece-in-2023> accessed 10 November 2024.

IOM, ‘Integrating Migration into Environment and Climate Change Interventions: A Toolkit’ (IOM,  2021) <https://eca.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl666/files/mmicd/environment-climate-change-toolkit.pdf > accessed 15 November 2024.

IPA (L. 4636/2019).

Kalogiannidis S., Kalfas D., et al., ‘Integration of Climate Change Strategies into Policy and Planning for Regional Development: A Case Study of Greece (Land, 2024) < https://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/13/3/268> accessed 14 November 2024.

Kapsalis A., ‘Mobility and Employment of Refugee Populations in the Greek Region’ (IOM, 2022) <https://greece.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1086/files/documents/MOBILITY%20AND%20EMPLOYMENT_EN_online.pdf> accessed 07 November 2024.

Lodovici M.S., ‘Integration of Refugees in Greece, Hungary and Italy: Comparative analysis’ (European Parliament, 2017).

Migrant Integration Policy Index, ‘Greece-2019’ (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2019) <https://www.mipex.eu/greece> accessed 01 November 2024.

Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, ‘Refugees and Education’ (Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, 2024) < https://www.minedu.gov.gr/tothema-prosfigiko-m> accessed 12 November 2024.

OECD, ‘International Migration Outlook 2024’ (OECD, 2024) https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2024/11/international-migration-outlook-2024_c6f3e803.html  accessed 05 November 2024.

Papadopoulos V., ‘Issues of Integration of Immigrants in Greek Society’ (Institute for Alternative Policies [ENA], 2023),<  https://enainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/ENA_Issues-of-Integration-of-Immigrants_EN-1.pdf > accessed 02 November 2024.

The Greek Ombudsman, ‘The Challenges of Migratory Flows and Refugee Protection: Refugee Conditions and Procedures’ (The Greek Ombudsman, 2024) <https://migrant-integration.ec.europa.eu/news/greece-help-desk-integration-refugees_en> accessed 13 November 2024.

UNHCR, ‘The talent behind the numbers: Introducing Refugees in Greece’ (UNHCR, 2022) <https://reliefweb.int/report/greece/unhcr-greece-introducing-people-behind-numbers-updated-june-2022-enel > accessed 11 November 2024.

UNICEF, ‘All Children in Education: Ensuring a Pathway to Education for Refugee and Migrant Children in Greece’ (UNICEF, 2024) < https://www.unicef.org/greece/en/media/4306/file/%CE%91CE%20Brief%20ENGL.pdf.pdf> accessed 12 November 2024.

UNICEF, ‘Country Office Annual Report 2022: Greece’ (UNICEF, 2022) < https://www.unicef.org/media/135936/file/Greece-2022-COAR.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com > accessed 13 November 2024.

UNICEF, ‘Country Office Annual Report 2023: Greece’ (UNICEF, 2023) < https://www.unicef.org/media/152026/file/Greece-2023-COAR.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com> accessed 13 November 2024.

Wolffhardt A., Carmine Conte and Sinem Yilmaz, ‘The European Benchmark for Refugee Integration: A comparative analysis of the National Internation Evaluation Mechanism in 14 EU Countries’ (Fundacja Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2022) < https://www.migpolgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/The-European-benchmark-for-refugee-integration.-Evaluation-2-Comprehensive-report.pdf > accessed 11 November 2024.

World Bank Group’s Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice, ‘Support to the Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Greece: Assessing Skills and Work Readiness-Best Practices and Recommendations’ (World Bank Group, 2020), <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099816003082261107/pdf/P17097904da52c05308137080d97c1ffb23.pdf> accessed 08 November 2024. 

 

 

[1] Vassilis Papadopoulos, ‘Issues of Integration of Immigrants in Greek Society’ (Institute for Alternative Policies [ENA], 2023),<  https://enainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/ENA_Issues-of-Integration-of-Immigrants_EN-1.pdf > accessed 02 November 2024.

[2] Amalia Frangiskou, Georgios Kandylis et al., ‘From reception to integration: migrant populations in Greece during and in the aftermath of the crisis’ (National Centre for Social Research-EKKE, 2020) 17, < https://www.ekke.gr/publication_files/from-reception-to-integration-migrant-populations-in-greece-during-and-in-the-aftermath-of-the-crisis > accessed 02 November 2024.

[3] The measurements included in the Migrant Integration Policy Index are the most recent, referring to the period 2019-2020.

[4] Migrant Integration Policy Index, ‘Greece-2019’ (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2019) <https://www.mipex.eu/greece> accessed 01 November 2024.

[5] Greek Council for Refugees, ‘Do the Human Right Thing: Raising our voice for refugee rights’ (Active Citizens Fund, 2022) < https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/Seeking%20a%20new%20life%20-%20seeking%20employment.pdf > accessed 03 November 2024.

[6] Migrant Integration Policy Index (n 4).

[7] An ongoing study commissioned by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) from February 2022 until November 2024- with the latest available data, provides insights and figures on the integration of refugees and migrants. See: https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiNzNhNmJjMzktOGJkMi00MTFkLTliYmUtZmUzMjVlMzhmZmJjIiwidCI6ImU1YzM3OTgxLTY2NjQtNDEzNC04YTBjLTY1NDNkMmFmODBiZSIsImMiOjh9

[8] Marine Casalis, Dominik Hangartner, Alexandra Hartman, Rodrigo Sanchez, ‘Home for Good? Obstacles and Opportunities for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Greece’ (IPL, 2023) 37, < https://reliefweb.int/report/greece/home-good-obstacles-and-opportunities-refugees-and-asylum-seekers-greece > accessed 03 November 2024.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Greek Council for Refugees, (n 5).

[11] Additionally, it is important to mention that based on Article 26 of the Asylum Code, recognised refugees and subsidiary protection beneficiaries have full and automatic access to the labour market, under the same conditions as nationals, without any obligation to obtain a work permit.

[12] Marine Casalis (n 8) 35.

[13] Eda Gemi and Bledar Feta, ‘Migration Developments in Greece in 2023’ (ELIAMEP, 2024) 21, < https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Working-paper-128-SOPEMI-2.pdf > accessed 03 November 2024.

[14] Specifically, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection do not have the right to receive a three-year permit like recognised refugees. Instead, they obtain a one-year residence permit.

[15] Angeliki Dimitriadi, ‘Looking for seasonal workers: Greece’s search for migrant labor’ (ELIAMEP, 2024), < https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Policy-Paper-164-Dimitriadi-EN-final.pdf > accessed 05 November 2024.

[16] Eurostat, ‘Unemployment by sex and age’ (Eurostat, 2024), <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/UNE_RT_M__custom_4655204/bookmark/table?lang=en&bookmarkId=6870950a-b6ad-4f89-b327-2e1829d16c11 > accessed 05 November 2024.

[17] OECD, ‘International Migration Outlook 2024’ (OECD, 2024) 55, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2024/11/international-migration-outlook-2024_c6f3e803.html  accessed 05 November 2024.

[18]Eurostat, ‘Migrant integration and inclusion dashboard’ (Eurostat, 2024) < https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/dashboard/migrant-integration-inclusion/> accessed 06 November 2024.

[19] Ibid, 213.

[20] Greek Council for Refugees, ‘Access to the Labour Market’ (ECRE, 2024) < Reception Conditions: Access to the Labour Market> accessed 06 November 2024.

[21] DiaNEOsis, ‘What Greeks Believe-Part B’ (DiaNEOsis, 2024) < https://www.dianeosis.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/TPE2024_Part_B.pdf> accessed 06 November 2024.

[22] Hellenic Ministry of Migration and Asylum, ‘National Integration Strategy’ (Ministry of Migration and ASYLUM, 2022) < https://migration.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/NATIONAL-STRATEGY-FINAL.pdf  >accessed 07 November 2024.

[23] Greek Forum of Refugees, ‘Position on the National Integration Strategy’ (Greek Forum of Refugees,2022) < https://refugees.gr/greek-forum-of-refugees-position-on-the-national-integration-strategy/> accessed 07 November 2024.

[24] Apostolis Kapsalis, ‘Mobility and Employment of Refugee Populations in the Greek Region’ (IOM, 2022) <https://greece.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1086/files/documents/MOBILITY%20AND%20EMPLOYMENT_EN_online.pdf> accessed 07 November 2024.

[25] Manuela Samek Lodovici, ‘Integration of Refugees in Greece, Hungary and Italy: Comparative analysis’ (European Parliament, 2017).

[26]Apostolis Kapsalis (n 24).

[27] Hellenic Ministry of Migration and Asylum (n 22) 6.

[28] Greek Council for Refugees, (n 5).

[29] UNHCR, ‘Advancing Refugee Integration in Greece’ (UNHCR, 2023).

[30]Generation 2.0, ‘Comments on the National Integration Strategy’ (Generation 2.0, 2022), <https://g2red.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/sxolia-g2red-gia-ethiniki-stratigiki.pdf> accessed 07 November 2024.

[31] The assessed indicators are the following: a) Access to employment for groups of special concern, b) Administrative barriers to accessing employment, c) Awareness raising about the specific labor market situation of beneficiaries of international protection, d) Assessment of skills, e) Job-seeking counselling and positive action, f) Targeted support for entrepreneurs. (Ibid n 24).

[32]EUAA, ‘Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union’ (EUAA, 2024) 143, < https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2024-06/2024_Asylum_Report_EN.pdf> accessed 08 November 2024.

[33]World Bank Group’s Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice, ‘Support to the Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Greece: Assessing Skills and Work Readiness-Best Practices and Recommendations’ (World Bank Group, 2020), <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099816003082261107/pdf/P17097904da52c05308137080d97c1ffb23.pdf> accessed 08 November 2024.

[34] Ibid, 30.

[35] Article 16 of Law No. 4783/2021 (previously Article 42 of the Legislative Act 1-5-2020) sought to address seasonal needs.

[36] Angeliki Dimitriadi (n 15).

[37] Hellenic Ministry of Migration and Asylum, ‘Metaklisi 2022-2023’ (Ministry of Migration and Asylum, 2023)< https://migration.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/%CE%A3%CF%84%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B9%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AC-%CE%9C%CE%B5%CF%84%CE%B1%CE%BA%CE%BB%CE%AE%CF%83%CE%B5%CF%89%CE%BD-2022_2023.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com  > accessed 10 November 2024.

[38] Hellenic Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, ‘Government Gazette Issue’ (Ministry of Labour, 2023), < https://migration.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/FEK-2023-Tefxos-B-06844-downloaded-20_12_2023.pdf> accessed 10 November 2024.

[39] Hellenic Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, ‘Press Release on metaklisi for 2023-2024’ (Ministry of Labour, 2023), <https://ypergasias.gov.gr/sto-epipedo-tis-proigoumenis-dietias-oi-metakliseis-ergazomenon-apo-trites-chores-gia-tin-periodo-2023-2024/ > accessed 10 November 2024.

[40] Based on the latest data from the Ministry of Migration and Asylum (September 2024), only 15 residence permits for highly skilled workers (EU Blue Card) were recorded. See more in: https://shorturl.at/GsDAZ  (table 5, page 6).

[41] Angeliki Dimitriadi (n 15).

[42] InfoMigrants, ‘About 3,400 Bangladeshi migrants regularized in Greece in 2023’ (InfoMigrants, 2024) < https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/55362/about-3400-bangladeshi-migrants-regularized-in-greece-in-2023> accessed 10 November 2024.

[43] Hellenic Parliament, ‘Minutes session IV, Standing Committee on National Defense and Foreign Affairs Proceedings, article 40 para. 1’ (Hellenic Parliament).

[44] Angeliki Dimitriadi (n 15) 17.

[45] Hellenic Ministry of Migration and Asylum, ‘Press Release on the agreement between Greece and Egypt’ (Ministry of Migration and Asylum, 2024)< https://migration.gov.gr/stis-10-ioynioy-xekina-ti-leitoyrgia-tis-i-ilektroniki-platforma-gia-tin-efarmogi-tis-symfonias-elladas-aigyptoy/> accessed 10 November 2024.

[46] Greek Council for Refugees, ‘Statistics’ (ECRE, 2024) < https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/statistics/?utm_source=chatgpt.com> accessed 11 November 2024.

[47] Stavros Kalogiannidis, Dimitrios Kalfas et al., ‘Integration of Climate Change Strategies into Policy and Planning for Regional Development: A Case Study of Greece (Land, 2024) < https://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/13/3/268> accessed 14 November 2024.

[48] Thodoris Georgakopoulos, ‘The Consequences of Climate Change in Greece’ (DiaNEOsis, 2021) < https://www.dianeosis.org/en/2021/12/the-consequences-of-climate-change-in-greece/ > accessed 15 November 2024.

[49] IOM, ‘Integrating Migration into Environment and Climate Change Interventions: A Toolkit’ (IOM,  2021) 4, <https://eca.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl666/files/mmicd/environment-climate-change-toolkit.pdf > accessed 15 November 2024.

[50]  Amalia Frangiskou, Georgios Kandylis et al. (n 2) 118.

[51] Alexander Wolffhardt, Carmine Conte and Sinem Yilmaz, ‘The European Benchmark for Refugee Integration: A comparative analysis of the National Internation Evaluation Mechanism in 14 EU Countries’ (Fundacja Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2022) 17, < https://www.migpolgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/The-European-benchmark-for-refugee-integration.-Evaluation-2-Comprehensive-report.pdf > accessed 11 November 2024.

[52] UNHCR, ‘The talent behind the numbers: Introducing Refugees in Greece’ (UNHCR, 2022) <https://reliefweb.int/report/greece/unhcr-greece-introducing-people-behind-numbers-updated-june-2022-enel > accessed 11 November 2024.

[53] Agapi Chouzouraki, ‘Without papers, there is no life: Legal barriers in access to protection for unaccompanied children in Greece’ (Greek Council for Refugees and Save the Children, 2023) < https://gcr.gr/wp-content/uploads/No_paper_no_life.pdf > accessed 11 November 2024.

[54] IPA (L. 4636/2019).

[55]Greek Council for Refugees, ‘Access to Education; (ECRE, 2024) < https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/reception-conditions/employment-and-education/access-education/> accessed 11 November 2024.

[56] Eurostat, ‘Migrant integration statistics-education’ (Eurostat, 2024) <  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_-_education> accessed 12 November 2024.

[57] Eurostat, ‘Population by educational attainment level, sex, age and citizenship’ (Eurostat, 2024) <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/edat_lfs_9911/default/table?lang=en> accessed 12 November 2024.

[58] Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, ‘Refugees and Education’ (Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, 2024) < https://www.minedu.gov.gr/tothema-prosfigiko-m> accessed 12 November 2024.

[59] DOATAP, ‘Statistical Data’ (DOATAP, 2023) < https://www.doatap.gr/enhmerosh/statistika/> accessed 13 November 2024.

[60] It is important to mention that the ACE programme provided both formal and non-formal education opportunities for refugee and migrant children in Greece and was implemented in collaboration with the Ministry of Migration and Asylum and implemented in collaboration with various partners, and mainly Greek NGOs.

[61] UNICEF, ‘All Children in Education: Ensuring a Pathway to Education for Refugee and Migrant Children in Greece’ (UNICEF, 2024) < https://www.unicef.org/greece/en/media/4306/file/%CE%91CE%20Brief%20ENGL.pdf.pdf> accessed 12 November 2024.

[62] UNICEF, ‘Country Office Annual Report 2022: Greece’ (UNICEF, 2022) < https://www.unicef.org/media/135936/file/Greece-2022-COAR.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com > accessed 13 November 2024.

[63] UNICEF, ‘Country Office Annual Report 2023: Greece’ (UNICEF, 2023) < https://www.unicef.org/media/152026/file/Greece-2023-COAR.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com> accessed 13 November 2024.

[64]Greek Council for Refugees (n 55).

[65] UNICEF (n 61).

[66] The Greek Ombudsman, ‘The Challenges of Migratory Flows and Refugee Protection: Refugee Conditions and Procedures’ (The Greek Ombudsman, 2024) <https://migrant-integration.ec.europa.eu/news/greece-help-desk-integration-refugees_en> accessed 13 November 2024.

[67] See more at: The Lifelong Learning Centers (LLC- ΚΔΒΜ)

[68] Greek Forum for Refugees, ‘Activity Report 2023’ (Greek Forum for Refugees, 2023) 19, < https://gcr.gr/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/PROSFYGES_pepragmena_2023_GR.pdf > accessed 14 November 2024.

[69] The Greek Ombudsman, (n 66) 92.

[70] Here it is important to add that the ACE programme, among other components, also prepared educators for diverse classrooms and helped them integrate refugee and migrant children.

[71] Amalia Frangiskou, Georgios Kandylis et al. (n 2).

[72] By new realities it is meant the consequences of climate change and how it will affect the labour integration of refugees and migrants into the Greek society.

[73] Hellenic Ministry of Migration and Asylum, ‘Press Release’ (Ministry of Migration and Asylum, 2024)< https://migration.gov.gr/megali-proseleysi-ton-epi-makron-diamenonton-metanaston-sti-nomimi-apascholisi-symfona-me-to-arthro-193-tis-tropologias-toy-ypoyrgeioy-metanasteysis-kai-asyloy/ > accessed 14 November 2024.

Die heutige Zinssenkung des Rates der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) kommentiert Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) setzt ihren vorsichtigen Zinssenkungskurs fort. Die Zinssenkung um 25 Basispunkte ist zu wenig, um die Wirtschaft ausreichend zu stützen. Das Zinsniveau ist zu hoch und zu restriktiv. Die Geldpolitik wird die ohnehin schon schwache Wirtschaft auch im Jahr 2025 weiter schwächen. Offensichtlich fehlt dem Gremium des Zentralbankrats der Mut, dem Beispiel der US-Notenbank zu folgen und die Zinsen stärker zu senken, obwohl sich die Wirtschaft des Euroraums in einer deutlich schlechteren Lage befindet als die US-Wirtschaft.

Die übervorsichtige Entscheidung der EZB ist auch der ungewöhnlich hohen Unsicherheit geschuldet. Längst erfüllt die EZB wieder ihr Mandat der Preisstabilität: Die Inflation hat sich um das gesetzte Ziel von zwei Prozent stabilisiert. Auch die Inflationserwartungen sind gut verankert und geben keinen Anlass zur Sorge. Allerdings ist es sehr wahrscheinlich, dass die EZB in den kommenden beiden Jahren mit großen Veränderungen und Inflationsschocks zu kämpfen haben wird. Einerseits könnte die zu restriktive Geldpolitik dazu beitragen, die Wirtschaft weiter zu schwächen und die Preisentwicklung deutlich zu dämpfen. Andererseits könnten der Protektionismus von Donald Trump, ein zunehmender Konflikt mit China und die geopolitischen Konflikte die Inflation wieder stark steigen lassen.  

Daher ist die Vorsicht der EZB verständlich, auch wenn eine stärkere Zinssenkung der bessere Weg gewesen wäre. Zumal die EZB an externen Schocks von außerhalb des Euroraums nichts grundlegend ändern kann. Die politische Lähmung in großen Euro-Ländern, allen voran Deutschland und Frankreich, wird die Aufgabe der EZB auch im kommenden Jahr nicht einfacher machen. Die EZB muss ihre Glaubwürdigkeit schützen, um größere Turbulenzen an den Kapitalmärkten abzufedern, die Wirtschaft zu stabilisieren und dadurch ihr Mandat besser erfüllen zu können.

The new EU Commission is promising to improve the bloc’s geoeconomic resilience, make progress on decarbonisation and increase competitiveness. Achieving these aims will mean working with emerging economies like Brazil – where the EU’s influ­ence is waning as China’s expands. The EU lacks a long-term strategy and is poorly positioned to engage with a newly assertive Brazil in an increasingly multipolar world. This is increasingly problematic for the EU’s strategic agenda.

Auf der 29. Weltklimakonferenz (COP29) vom 11. bis 24. November 2024 wurde deutlich, dass sich die Kräfteverhältnisse in der internationalen Klimapolitik nach den Wahlen in den USA verschieben. China spielte bei den Verhandlungen zu internationaler Klimafinanzierung eine konstruktive Rolle. Vulnerable Länder waren dennoch zu schmerzhaften Kompromissen bei der Klimafinanzierung gezwungen. Saudi-Arabien und andere Schwellenländer blockierten den Themenkomplex Emissionsminderung stärker denn zuvor. Die Kritik mittlerer Mächte an Klimaschutzmaßnahmen der EU wuchs. Um eine fortschreitende Isolation der EU und negative Implikationen für ihre klima- und wettbewerbspolitische Agenda zu verhindern, muss die neue Europäische Kommission ihre klima­diplomatischen Anstrengungen anders ausrichten.

• EU cohesion policy is horizontal in nature and works in a complementary and supportive way to other public policies.
• Therefore, actions included in the National and Regional Programmes funded by the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) in Greece must support (national) sectoral and regional policies.
• The aim of this policy paper is to trace the relationship between the Partnership Agreement for the Development Framework (PADF) 2014-2020 and Greece’s climate change adaptation strategy – a top policy priority at national and regional level.
• To this end, it examines the policy initiatives that took shape during the period 2013-2020 and looks for synergies between these processes and the programming of cohesion policy actions for the period 2014-2020 – and, subsequently, the period 2021-2027.
• The conclusion of this exercise is disappointing. On the one hand, years of delays in the formulation of the required plans have resulted in their complete disconnection from the investment programming of the PADF 2014-2020 and 2021-2027. On the other hand, the resulting plans do not produce meaningful policy commitments and lack implementation mechanisms.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by George Andreou, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; Assistant Professor at the School of Political Sciences, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (in Greek).

 

Das SCP ist eine Längsschnittstudie, die vielfältige Aspekte des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalts in Deutschland erfasst. Es basiert auf einer repräsentativen Bevölkerungsstichprobe aus deutschen Einwohnermelderegistern und wurde 2021 zum ersten Mal durchgeführt. Die jährliche Befragung richtet sich nicht nur an die ausgewählten Personen, sondern auch an alle anderen erwachsenen Haushaltsmitglieder. Das SCP wird vom Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) gefördert. Es wird in Kooperation vom Forschungsinstitut Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt (FGZ) und dem Sozio-oekonomischen Panel (SOEP) geleitet und vom Umfrageinstitut infas durchgeführt.

Das SCP 2021/22 W1:

Der Datensatz „German Social Cohesion Panel 2021/22 – Wave 1“ (DOI: 10.60532/scp.2021_22.w1.v1) enthält Befragungsdaten und generierte Indikatoren des ersten und zweiten Teils der ersten Panelwelle. Er enthält Antworten von 13.053 Ankerpersonen aus dem Melderegister und von 3.974 erwachsenen Haushaltsmitgliedern, die von den Ankerpersonen benannt und anschließend befragt wurden.

Zugang zu den Daten:

Der SUF kann von allen Postdocs, die einer wissenschaftlichen Einrichtung angehören, am Forschungsdatenzentrum des FGZ (FDZ-FGZ) bestellt werden. Bitte richten Sie zu diesem Zweck einen Nutzer*innen-Account unter https://fgz-risc-data.de/registrierung/ ein, falls noch nicht geschehen. Mit diesem Konto können Sie in Zukunft alle Scientific Use Files bestellen, die im FDZ-FGZ verfügbar sind.

Account-Inhaber*innen (Primärnutzende) können die Daten an Forschende unter ihrer Aufsicht (Sekundärnutzende) weitergeben. Die Sekundärnutzenden müssen im Nutzer*innen-Account der Primärnutzenden aufgeführt sein und eine Datenschutzerklärung unterzeichnen, die von den Primärnutzenden archiviert werden muss.

Wir möchten darauf hinweisen, dass wir die Daten ausschließlich für wissenschaftliche Zwecke zur Verfügung stellen. 

Germany was heavily involved in international crisis management in Mali for ten years, from 2013 to 2023. Important lessons can be drawn for effective and adaptive foreign and security policy, in particular concern­ing Germany’s internal structures and processes. Germany’s engagement in Mali was shaped by its commitments to allies and the United Nations. This was a legitimate interest, but left Berlin without strategic goals of its own in Mali. The lack of strategic and political orientation has resulted in less than optimal use of the very substantial resources invested. Interministerial cooperation failed to meet expectations, despite a number of new instru­ments (including in security force assistance) and institutional innova­tions (the Sahel Task Force, CIVAD). Although Germany’s participation in MINUSMA was operationally successful, it was inadequately anchored politically and strategically. MINUSMA as a whole failed to achieve its political goals. In the field of crisis management, Germany’s organisational learning pro­cesses occur mainly from one deployment to the next, less so during a given operation. Despite the duration of the Mali engagement, learning and adjustment processes occurred only at the operational-tactical level. Fundamental course corrections were not made, despite the obvious need to do so. Interministerial cooperation was insufficient to facilitate effec­tive strategy-building. The learning culture within and between govern­ment departments proved inadequate.

In numerous countries, more restrictive regulations on abortions have recently led to a weakening of sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR). These legislative developments at the national level are reflected in the discussions at international forums, as they hinge upon human rights standards and access to health services. Although Germany has always advocated for the broad protection of SRHR, it is strik­ing that the German government is not very active in international forums when it comes to addressing the content of this set of rights. This approach of diplomatic restraint carries the risk of providing those who oppose a broad interpretation of SRHR – be they governments, organisations or individuals – with a means to undermine the concept. If the German government wants to pursue its international com­mit­ment to human rights and individual freedoms in global health as well, more active advocacy is required.