Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is increasingly hampered by insufficient funding. This Policy Brief, drawing on insights from a roundtable held in the context of the Hamburg Sustainability Conference (HSC) with experts from the Americas, Africa, Europe, and Asia, examines how sustainable development financing can be safeguarded in an era of economic disruptions, global conflicts, and political shifts. It situates these recommendations within the context of the outcomes of the fourth Financing for Development (FfD4) Conference, with a view to informing the follow-up process.
An estimated USD 4.2 trillion are needed for the implementation of SDG policies. Notwithstanding this, economic insecurity, slow growth, and waning political commitment reduce private and public investments in sustainability. Rising conflicts lead to a redistribution of budgets towards military expenditures and away from environmental and social objectives. This includes reductions in Official Development Aid, further limiting funding for sustainability transformations in low- and middle-income countries.
In order to sustain and increase financing for SDG implementation, taking the challenging framework conditions into account, a series of actions is needed: 
–    Alignment of public spending with the SDGs and planetary boundaries by phasing out harmful subsidies and integrating sustainability into credit ratings and investment strategies.
–    Strengthening domestic revenue mobilisation through improved and efficient tax systems, tax transparency, and reduction of harmful tax expenditures.
–    Building institutional capacity in transitioning sectors, including sustainable finance, digitalised tax systems, and data provision for and engagement with credit-rating agencies.
–    Translating FfD4 outcomes into concrete actions in platforms like the G20, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank meetings, and the HSC, aligning them with social and environmental priorities. But also filling the gaps on issues neglected in FfD4 by supporting future multilateral agreements and voluntary initiatives on tax, SDRs, cost of capital, and debt restructuring.

 

Progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is increasingly hampered by insufficient funding. This Policy Brief, drawing on insights from a roundtable held in the context of the Hamburg Sustainability Conference (HSC) with experts from the Americas, Africa, Europe, and Asia, examines how sustainable development financing can be safeguarded in an era of economic disruptions, global conflicts, and political shifts. It situates these recommendations within the context of the outcomes of the fourth Financing for Development (FfD4) Conference, with a view to informing the follow-up process.
An estimated USD 4.2 trillion are needed for the implementation of SDG policies. Notwithstanding this, economic insecurity, slow growth, and waning political commitment reduce private and public investments in sustainability. Rising conflicts lead to a redistribution of budgets towards military expenditures and away from environmental and social objectives. This includes reductions in Official Development Aid, further limiting funding for sustainability transformations in low- and middle-income countries.
In order to sustain and increase financing for SDG implementation, taking the challenging framework conditions into account, a series of actions is needed: 
–    Alignment of public spending with the SDGs and planetary boundaries by phasing out harmful subsidies and integrating sustainability into credit ratings and investment strategies.
–    Strengthening domestic revenue mobilisation through improved and efficient tax systems, tax transparency, and reduction of harmful tax expenditures.
–    Building institutional capacity in transitioning sectors, including sustainable finance, digitalised tax systems, and data provision for and engagement with credit-rating agencies.
–    Translating FfD4 outcomes into concrete actions in platforms like the G20, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank meetings, and the HSC, aligning them with social and environmental priorities. But also filling the gaps on issues neglected in FfD4 by supporting future multilateral agreements and voluntary initiatives on tax, SDRs, cost of capital, and debt restructuring.

 

Progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is increasingly hampered by insufficient funding. This Policy Brief, drawing on insights from a roundtable held in the context of the Hamburg Sustainability Conference (HSC) with experts from the Americas, Africa, Europe, and Asia, examines how sustainable development financing can be safeguarded in an era of economic disruptions, global conflicts, and political shifts. It situates these recommendations within the context of the outcomes of the fourth Financing for Development (FfD4) Conference, with a view to informing the follow-up process.
An estimated USD 4.2 trillion are needed for the implementation of SDG policies. Notwithstanding this, economic insecurity, slow growth, and waning political commitment reduce private and public investments in sustainability. Rising conflicts lead to a redistribution of budgets towards military expenditures and away from environmental and social objectives. This includes reductions in Official Development Aid, further limiting funding for sustainability transformations in low- and middle-income countries.
In order to sustain and increase financing for SDG implementation, taking the challenging framework conditions into account, a series of actions is needed: 
–    Alignment of public spending with the SDGs and planetary boundaries by phasing out harmful subsidies and integrating sustainability into credit ratings and investment strategies.
–    Strengthening domestic revenue mobilisation through improved and efficient tax systems, tax transparency, and reduction of harmful tax expenditures.
–    Building institutional capacity in transitioning sectors, including sustainable finance, digitalised tax systems, and data provision for and engagement with credit-rating agencies.
–    Translating FfD4 outcomes into concrete actions in platforms like the G20, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank meetings, and the HSC, aligning them with social and environmental priorities. But also filling the gaps on issues neglected in FfD4 by supporting future multilateral agreements and voluntary initiatives on tax, SDRs, cost of capital, and debt restructuring.

 

Tax expenditures (TEs) – i.e. deviations from a benchmark tax system that lower the tax burden of specific groups, economic sectors or activities – can be powerful tools to promote public policies. However, their effectiveness is often in doubt. The present report discusses the determinants and explores the empirical evidence of TE effectiveness.

Tax expenditures (TEs) – i.e. deviations from a benchmark tax system that lower the tax burden of specific groups, economic sectors or activities – can be powerful tools to promote public policies. However, their effectiveness is often in doubt. The present report discusses the determinants and explores the empirical evidence of TE effectiveness.

Tax expenditures (TEs) – i.e. deviations from a benchmark tax system that lower the tax burden of specific groups, economic sectors or activities – can be powerful tools to promote public policies. However, their effectiveness is often in doubt. The present report discusses the determinants and explores the empirical evidence of TE effectiveness.

Statistisches Bundesamt: WIESBADEN (ots) - Der Anteil der Einnahmen aus Kassenabrechnung der Arztpraxen in Deutschland ist im Jahr 2023 auf 67,0 % gesunken. Wie das Statistische Bundesamt (Destatis) weiter mitteilt, ist dies der niedrigste Wert seit der erstmaligen ...

AccessGO / DGfB Deutsche Gesellschaft für Barrierefreiheit mbH: Berlin (ots) - Barrierefreie Webseiten sind für 15 Prozent der Bevölkerung wichtig und seit Mitte 2025 Gesetz. Viele gemeinnützige Organisationen und Vereine sind vom Barrierefreiheitsstärkungsgesetz (BFSG) zwar nicht direkt verpflichtet, ...

Wort & Bild Verlagsgruppe - Gesundheitsmeldungen: Baierbrunn (ots) - Das Smartphone ist unser ständiger Begleiter - doch in der Beziehung zu unseren Kindern kann es zum echten Bindungskiller werden. Das Problem: "Eltern, die mit dem Handy beschäftigt sind, reagieren verzögert und weniger ...

Autocratisation has become a defining global trend, replacing decades of democratisation and forcing demo­cracy promoters to rethink their approaches. Democracy promoters must adapt to several challenges, including autocratisation in target countries, the rise of powerful autocratic competitors in the global arena, and challenges to democracy in some of the very countries promoting it. Moreover, the crisis in development aid fuelled by the withdrawal of funding by the United States (US) and other countries, and their prioritisation of security, pose further structural challenges. This Policy Brief examines the effects of the global trend of autocratisation on international democracy promotion, summarising findings from a collaborative research project (Grimm et al., 2025).

The findings show that democracy promoters respond to these shifts in four ways: 1) choosing to “carry on and observe” by continuing existing programmes and main­taining cooperation rather than risking confronta­tion; 2) reinforcing rhetorical and diplomatic efforts for demo­cracy, to signal continued commitment; 3) selec­tively adapting policies and strategies, with renewed focus on civil society, education and targeted funding, yet rarely making substantive policy changes; 4) disen­gaging by shifting cooperation toward less politicised fields or withdrawing entirely. So far, however, we lack evidence on the effectiveness of these responses to counter autocratisation.

Given the new challenges to democracy promotion arising from the changed international context, demo­cracy promoters should consider taking the following actions:

Ramping up efforts to counter the rise of autocratic powers: Democracy promoters should proactively deepen their pro-democracy cooperation, reaffirm democratic alliances and maintain a clear normative profile. They should invest in long-term partnerships with governments and civil societies committed to democratic reform.

Revitalising the norm of democracy: Democracy pro­moters must make a case for why democracy matters, highlighting that it delivers rights and freedoms, as well as stability, prosperity, and peace – at least as effectively as autocratic regimes. Em­pha­sising its tangible benefits can help restore faith in its long-term value, and counter the appeal of autocratic alternatives.

Coordinating strategies and combining strengths: Joint frameworks for action among democracy pro­moters are needed that allow for the simultaneous use of different instruments, e.g. political dialogue, develop­ment cooperation, human rights advocacy and eco­nomic incentives. Combining direct and indirect demo­cracy promotion increases adaptability.

Adapting democracy promotion to the context: In contexts where democracy is being eroded, prioritise the defence of current democratic institutions, actors and practices rather than pushing for rapid reforms. Strengthen local actors who uphold democratic values, protect them against repression and maintain spaces for civic participation.

Restoring credibility: Democracy-promoting states and organisations should openly discuss challenges to democracy at home in order to rebuild trust, strengthen legitimacy and facilitate collaboration in defence of democracy. Reinforcing own democratic institutions and upholding the rule of law contributes to restoring the credibility of democracy promoters.

Autocratisation has become a defining global trend, replacing decades of democratisation and forcing demo­cracy promoters to rethink their approaches. Democracy promoters must adapt to several challenges, including autocratisation in target countries, the rise of powerful autocratic competitors in the global arena, and challenges to democracy in some of the very countries promoting it. Moreover, the crisis in development aid fuelled by the withdrawal of funding by the United States (US) and other countries, and their prioritisation of security, pose further structural challenges. This Policy Brief examines the effects of the global trend of autocratisation on international democracy promotion, summarising findings from a collaborative research project (Grimm et al., 2025).

The findings show that democracy promoters respond to these shifts in four ways: 1) choosing to “carry on and observe” by continuing existing programmes and main­taining cooperation rather than risking confronta­tion; 2) reinforcing rhetorical and diplomatic efforts for demo­cracy, to signal continued commitment; 3) selec­tively adapting policies and strategies, with renewed focus on civil society, education and targeted funding, yet rarely making substantive policy changes; 4) disen­gaging by shifting cooperation toward less politicised fields or withdrawing entirely. So far, however, we lack evidence on the effectiveness of these responses to counter autocratisation.

Given the new challenges to democracy promotion arising from the changed international context, demo­cracy promoters should consider taking the following actions:

Ramping up efforts to counter the rise of autocratic powers: Democracy promoters should proactively deepen their pro-democracy cooperation, reaffirm democratic alliances and maintain a clear normative profile. They should invest in long-term partnerships with governments and civil societies committed to democratic reform.

Revitalising the norm of democracy: Democracy pro­moters must make a case for why democracy matters, highlighting that it delivers rights and freedoms, as well as stability, prosperity, and peace – at least as effectively as autocratic regimes. Em­pha­sising its tangible benefits can help restore faith in its long-term value, and counter the appeal of autocratic alternatives.

Coordinating strategies and combining strengths: Joint frameworks for action among democracy pro­moters are needed that allow for the simultaneous use of different instruments, e.g. political dialogue, develop­ment cooperation, human rights advocacy and eco­nomic incentives. Combining direct and indirect demo­cracy promotion increases adaptability.

Adapting democracy promotion to the context: In contexts where democracy is being eroded, prioritise the defence of current democratic institutions, actors and practices rather than pushing for rapid reforms. Strengthen local actors who uphold democratic values, protect them against repression and maintain spaces for civic participation.

Restoring credibility: Democracy-promoting states and organisations should openly discuss challenges to democracy at home in order to rebuild trust, strengthen legitimacy and facilitate collaboration in defence of democracy. Reinforcing own democratic institutions and upholding the rule of law contributes to restoring the credibility of democracy promoters.

Autocratisation has become a defining global trend, replacing decades of democratisation and forcing demo­cracy promoters to rethink their approaches. Democracy promoters must adapt to several challenges, including autocratisation in target countries, the rise of powerful autocratic competitors in the global arena, and challenges to democracy in some of the very countries promoting it. Moreover, the crisis in development aid fuelled by the withdrawal of funding by the United States (US) and other countries, and their prioritisation of security, pose further structural challenges. This Policy Brief examines the effects of the global trend of autocratisation on international democracy promotion, summarising findings from a collaborative research project (Grimm et al., 2025).

The findings show that democracy promoters respond to these shifts in four ways: 1) choosing to “carry on and observe” by continuing existing programmes and main­taining cooperation rather than risking confronta­tion; 2) reinforcing rhetorical and diplomatic efforts for demo­cracy, to signal continued commitment; 3) selec­tively adapting policies and strategies, with renewed focus on civil society, education and targeted funding, yet rarely making substantive policy changes; 4) disen­gaging by shifting cooperation toward less politicised fields or withdrawing entirely. So far, however, we lack evidence on the effectiveness of these responses to counter autocratisation.

Given the new challenges to democracy promotion arising from the changed international context, demo­cracy promoters should consider taking the following actions:

Ramping up efforts to counter the rise of autocratic powers: Democracy promoters should proactively deepen their pro-democracy cooperation, reaffirm democratic alliances and maintain a clear normative profile. They should invest in long-term partnerships with governments and civil societies committed to democratic reform.

Revitalising the norm of democracy: Democracy pro­moters must make a case for why democracy matters, highlighting that it delivers rights and freedoms, as well as stability, prosperity, and peace – at least as effectively as autocratic regimes. Em­pha­sising its tangible benefits can help restore faith in its long-term value, and counter the appeal of autocratic alternatives.

Coordinating strategies and combining strengths: Joint frameworks for action among democracy pro­moters are needed that allow for the simultaneous use of different instruments, e.g. political dialogue, develop­ment cooperation, human rights advocacy and eco­nomic incentives. Combining direct and indirect demo­cracy promotion increases adaptability.

Adapting democracy promotion to the context: In contexts where democracy is being eroded, prioritise the defence of current democratic institutions, actors and practices rather than pushing for rapid reforms. Strengthen local actors who uphold democratic values, protect them against repression and maintain spaces for civic participation.

Restoring credibility: Democracy-promoting states and organisations should openly discuss challenges to democracy at home in order to rebuild trust, strengthen legitimacy and facilitate collaboration in defence of democracy. Reinforcing own democratic institutions and upholding the rule of law contributes to restoring the credibility of democracy promoters.

US-Schiffe vor Venezuela, „geschlossener“ Luftraum, Milizionäre mobilisiert: Alltag in Caracas vs. Machtpolitik – Analyse und Einordnung

Deutschlands Haushalte heizten 2024 laut Daten des Immobiliendienstleisters ista SE ähnlich viel wie im Vorjahr – Preise für Heizenergie stiegen langsamer – Fernwärmepreise legten im Gegensatz zum Vorjahr überdurchschnittlich stark zu – Preistransparenz und verlässliche Regulierung der Fernwärme ist ...

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) poses a critical threat to global health, with environmental transmission pathways – pharmaceutical waste, wastewater effluents, agricultural runoff – increasingly recognised as significant yet inadequately governed. Despite international calls for One Health approaches integrating human, animal and environmental sectors, coordination across these domains remains weak, particularly for environmental dimensions. This paper examines why environmental integration lags in Kenya’s AMR governance, despite sophisticated formal architecture that includes national and county coordination platforms (NASIC, CASICs), tech-
nical working groups and the One Health AMR Surveillance System (OHAMRS). We investigate two research questions: (i) What are the enablers and barriers to effective governance of interlinkages among human health, animal health and environmental sectors in mitigating AMR? (ii) What are the options for effectively integrating the environmental dimension into AMR governance?
Drawing on polycentric governance theory, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and the concept of Networks of Adjacent Action Situations (NAAS), we analyse how authority, information and resources shape interactions among overlapping decision centres across constitutional, collective-choice and operational levels. Through 12 semi-structured interviews with government officials, fisheries officers and environmental regulators, supplemented by policy document analysis, we map six action situations spanning planning, resource allocation, surveillance, stewardship, wastewater treatment and regulation. Findings reveal that constitutional-choice rules create formal overlaps intended to foster coordination, yet systematic asymmetries in authority, information and resources perpetuate the marginalisation of environmental issues. Boundary and position rules concentrate agenda setting in health sectors; information rules exclude AMR parameters from environmental permits and inspections; payoff rules reward clinical outputs while environmental investments compete with higher priorities; and scope rules omit environmental accountability targets. These rule configurations attenuate feedback loops between environmental action situations and upstream planning, maintaining system stability but at sub-optimal performance for One Health objectives. We identify rule-focused interventions – mandating environmental representation with voting authority, embedding AMR parameters in regulatory instruments, institutionalising joint inspection protocols, ring-fencing environmental budgets, and establishing explicit environmental targets – that would realign coordination toward genuine environmental integration. 

Morris Buliva is an independent researcher based in Nairobi, and Governance and Partnerships Consultant for the Fleming Fund Country Grant in Kenya.

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) poses a critical threat to global health, with environmental transmission pathways – pharmaceutical waste, wastewater effluents, agricultural runoff – increasingly recognised as significant yet inadequately governed. Despite international calls for One Health approaches integrating human, animal and environmental sectors, coordination across these domains remains weak, particularly for environmental dimensions. This paper examines why environmental integration lags in Kenya’s AMR governance, despite sophisticated formal architecture that includes national and county coordination platforms (NASIC, CASICs), tech-
nical working groups and the One Health AMR Surveillance System (OHAMRS). We investigate two research questions: (i) What are the enablers and barriers to effective governance of interlinkages among human health, animal health and environmental sectors in mitigating AMR? (ii) What are the options for effectively integrating the environmental dimension into AMR governance?
Drawing on polycentric governance theory, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and the concept of Networks of Adjacent Action Situations (NAAS), we analyse how authority, information and resources shape interactions among overlapping decision centres across constitutional, collective-choice and operational levels. Through 12 semi-structured interviews with government officials, fisheries officers and environmental regulators, supplemented by policy document analysis, we map six action situations spanning planning, resource allocation, surveillance, stewardship, wastewater treatment and regulation. Findings reveal that constitutional-choice rules create formal overlaps intended to foster coordination, yet systematic asymmetries in authority, information and resources perpetuate the marginalisation of environmental issues. Boundary and position rules concentrate agenda setting in health sectors; information rules exclude AMR parameters from environmental permits and inspections; payoff rules reward clinical outputs while environmental investments compete with higher priorities; and scope rules omit environmental accountability targets. These rule configurations attenuate feedback loops between environmental action situations and upstream planning, maintaining system stability but at sub-optimal performance for One Health objectives. We identify rule-focused interventions – mandating environmental representation with voting authority, embedding AMR parameters in regulatory instruments, institutionalising joint inspection protocols, ring-fencing environmental budgets, and establishing explicit environmental targets – that would realign coordination toward genuine environmental integration. 

Morris Buliva is an independent researcher based in Nairobi, and Governance and Partnerships Consultant for the Fleming Fund Country Grant in Kenya.

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) poses a critical threat to global health, with environmental transmission pathways – pharmaceutical waste, wastewater effluents, agricultural runoff – increasingly recognised as significant yet inadequately governed. Despite international calls for One Health approaches integrating human, animal and environmental sectors, coordination across these domains remains weak, particularly for environmental dimensions. This paper examines why environmental integration lags in Kenya’s AMR governance, despite sophisticated formal architecture that includes national and county coordination platforms (NASIC, CASICs), tech-
nical working groups and the One Health AMR Surveillance System (OHAMRS). We investigate two research questions: (i) What are the enablers and barriers to effective governance of interlinkages among human health, animal health and environmental sectors in mitigating AMR? (ii) What are the options for effectively integrating the environmental dimension into AMR governance?
Drawing on polycentric governance theory, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and the concept of Networks of Adjacent Action Situations (NAAS), we analyse how authority, information and resources shape interactions among overlapping decision centres across constitutional, collective-choice and operational levels. Through 12 semi-structured interviews with government officials, fisheries officers and environmental regulators, supplemented by policy document analysis, we map six action situations spanning planning, resource allocation, surveillance, stewardship, wastewater treatment and regulation. Findings reveal that constitutional-choice rules create formal overlaps intended to foster coordination, yet systematic asymmetries in authority, information and resources perpetuate the marginalisation of environmental issues. Boundary and position rules concentrate agenda setting in health sectors; information rules exclude AMR parameters from environmental permits and inspections; payoff rules reward clinical outputs while environmental investments compete with higher priorities; and scope rules omit environmental accountability targets. These rule configurations attenuate feedback loops between environmental action situations and upstream planning, maintaining system stability but at sub-optimal performance for One Health objectives. We identify rule-focused interventions – mandating environmental representation with voting authority, embedding AMR parameters in regulatory instruments, institutionalising joint inspection protocols, ring-fencing environmental budgets, and establishing explicit environmental targets – that would realign coordination toward genuine environmental integration. 

Morris Buliva is an independent researcher based in Nairobi, and Governance and Partnerships Consultant for the Fleming Fund Country Grant in Kenya.