Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

L’approche russe de l’information est ancrée dans l’héritage de la Russie soviétique, qui considère cet objet non comme un simple vecteur de communication, mais comme un véritable outil stratégique. Bien que la Russie ne soit pas le seul acteur de la guerre informationnelle, son approche se distingue notamment par l’importance des moyens financiers mobilisés ainsi que par certaines de ses méthodes : des « fermes à trolls » dans lesquelles des individus créent et relaient du contenu pour manipuler l’opinion ; des bots permettant également de diffuser massivement de faux contenus de manière automatisée.

La désinformation climatique russe en Europe désigne l’ensemble des contenus faux ou trompeurs relatifs aux changements climatiques, diffusés intentionnellement par la Russie et visant les États ou les institutions européennes à des fins stratégiques. Bien que l’attribution de son origine demeure complexe à établir, la désinformation climatique d’origine russe semble être diffusée par plusieurs canaux. Ainsi, cette désinformation est majoritairement dissimulée, véhiculée par des canaux contrôlés par l’État (46 %) ou des canaux liés à l’État (12 %). Cependant une part de la désinformation climatique russe est également assumée, diffusée notamment par des canaux officiels de l’État (2 %) ou des canaux alignés sur l’État (40 %).

Par ailleurs, la désinformation climatique russe cible principalement les politiques énergétiques et climatiques européennes (89 %), d’après les 120 cas de désinformation climatique russe recensés entre janvier 2021 et mars 2026.

L’article État des lieux de la désinformation climatique russe en Europe est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Was hat die aktuelle Bundesregierung cybersicherheitspolitsch im ersten Jahr geschafft? Und was lief schief? Wir ziehen Bilanz: Ein Jahr schwarz-rot unter Merz – wie sieht es mit der Cybersicherheitspolitik der Bundesregierung aus? Was hat sie im ersten Jahr geschafft? Was steht auf der To-Do-Liste für die verbleibende Legislaturperiode? Dafür schauen wir in den Koalitionsvertrag, gucken auf den sogenannten „Cyber Dome“ und fragen uns, wie es mit der Umsetzung von NIS-2 aussieht.

Au-delà des aspects militaires, le plus important après cette attaque de drones est d’interpréter les messages qui sont envoyés par l’Ukraine à la Russie.

En premier lieu, il faut bien voir que l’effet militaire est limité. L’attaque a été réalisée grâce à des drones légers de taille moyenne avec des charges militaires peu importantes. L’objectif n’était pas d’affaiblir militairement la Russie, mais d’envoyer un certain nombre de messages aux Russes et à Vladimir Poutine.

Le premier message est de nature politique. Durant toute la campagne d’hiver, la Russie a frappé toutes les installations énergétiques ukrainiennes pour affaiblir la capacité de résistance des Ukrainiens. L’objectif était d’atteindre leur moral. Le message de cette frappe est de montrer qu’au sortir de l’hiver, l’Ukraine est toujours debout, que le moral des Ukrainiens n’a pas été atteint par la campagne militaire hivernale de la Russie, qu’ils ne se contentent pas de se défendre : ils peuvent aussi attaquer.

Le deuxième message qui est envoyé est que la base industrielle et technologique de défense (BITD) ukrainienne est intacte malgré toutes les frappes de la Russie et qu’ils sont capables de produire en grande quantité des drones, certes rustiques, mais peu chers, et capables de frapper le territoire russe. La défense des Ukrainiens ne repose donc pas uniquement sur les armements livrés par les Européens ou que les Européens auront achetés aux Américains pour les fournir aux Ukrainiens. C’est une frappe « made in Kiev » et non « made in OTAN » et cela a donc aussi pour but d’affecter le moral des Russes : l’Ukraine est capable de leur résister y compris sans les armements livrés par les Européens.

Le troisième message est que Kiev peut désormais frapper Moscou. Celui-ci se divise en deux plans.

En premier lieu la guerre se déroule depuis le début sur le territoire ukrainien et les Occidentaux ont pris bien soin de demander aux Ukrainiens de ne pas frapper le territoire russe dans sa profondeur avec les armements qu’ils leur ont livrés. Or, ici on a bien une escalade dans le conflit, non pas tant par l’intensité des frappes, mais du fait de l’extension de son champ géographique au territoire russe, et ce jusqu’à Moscou. Mais les Ukrainiens ont toutefois pris bien soin d’utiliser leurs armements et non des armements occidentaux pour ne pas mettre dans l’embarras les Européens, voire entraîner une réaction négative de Donald Trump.

En second lieu, l’Ukraine a montré qu’elle était capable de lancer une frappe massive tout en moins en nombre, et ce, allant jusqu’à viser Moscou. Ces drones ont franchi plus de 500 km, ils n’ont pas été arrêtés par la défense aérienne russe et il est frappant de constater que les vidéos qui ont circulé ont été réalisés par des habitants de Moscou et de sa banlieue. L’impact psychologique est énorme et c’est bien l’effet recherché : montrer aux citoyens russes que « l’opération spéciale » de la Russie en Ukraine est un échec et que plus de quatre ans après le début de cette guerre la peur peut changer de camp.

L’article Quels sont les enseignements de l’attaque de drones de l’Ukraine contre Moscou ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

La piraterie au large des côtes somaliennes a repris de plus belle, alors que la guerre en Iran attise l'instabilité dans la région.

Deutschlands Industrie schwächelt seit 2015 bei hochwertigen Technologiegütern und Spitzentechnologie – Anteile an Wertschöpfung und Welthandel sinken, Produktivität schwächelt – Politischer Handlungsbedarf bei Regulierungsdichte, öffentlicher Verwaltung und europäischem Binnenmarkt Deutsche ...

Javed Aslam, président de la communauté pakistanaise en Grèce depuis 2005, est menacé d'être expulsé au Pakistan par les autorités grecques. Son asile a été révoqué en mars, il a fait appel de cette décision.

- Le fil de l'Info / Personnalités, Migrants Balkans, Courrier des Balkans, Grèce, Populations, minorités et migrations

Le président croate Zoran Milanović a refusé d'accréditer Nissan Amdur comme nouvel ambassadeur d'Israël à Zagreb, invoquant à la fois une entorse au protocole diplomatique et son opposition à la politique du gouvernement de Benjamin Netanyahou.

- Le fil de l'Info / Une - Diaporama, Courrier des Balkans, Israël-Palestine , Croatie, Relations internationales

Le Ghana affrontera ses compatriotes poids lourds d'Afrique de l'Ouest, la Côte d'Ivoire, lors des qualifications pour la Coupe d'Afrique des Nations 2027, qui sera co-organisée par le Kenya, la Tanzanie et l'Ouganda.

La spécificité de la guerre informationnelle réside dans son caractère évolutif : afin d’atteindre efficacement les opinions publiques, elle s’adapte aux environnements sociaux et politiques en se greffant aux thématiques qui suscitent une attention accrue dans les sociétés ciblées. Comme de nombreux autres enjeux, les changements climatiques peuvent donc être intégrés dans le cadre de la guerre informationnelle.

Bien que l’intégration des questions climatiques dans le cadre d’ingérences informationnelles étrangères soit récente, la manipulation de l’information climatique est en réalité une pratique ancienne. Toutefois, la désinformation climatique contemporaine se distingue par la diversité des acteurs impliqués : aux acteurs des énergies fossiles s’ajoutent désormais ceux de la Big Tech, ainsi que des acteurs étatiques. De 2024 à 2026, la désinformation climatique représentait en moyenne 7,7 % de l’ensemble des contenus de désinformation recensés dans l’Union européenne (UE).

La manipulation de l’information climatique recouvre une diversité de pratiques, dont les nuances reposent sur le degré d’intentionnalité. L’UE établit ainsi une distinction entre « mésinformation » – définie comme la « diffusion de contenus faux ou trompeurs transmis sans intention de nuire, même si leurs effets peuvent néanmoins être préjudiciables » – et la « désinformation », définie comme des « contenus faux ou trompeurs diffusés avec l’intention de tromper ou dans un but lucratif ou politique et susceptibles de causer un préjudice public ».

Dans la continuité des travaux menés par l’Observatoire Défense et climat sur l’intégration des changements climatiques dans les dynamiques de guerre hybride, cette note propose d’analyser l’instrumentalisation de l’information climatique par des puissances étrangères, grâce à une approche multifactorielle. Dans cette perspective, elle intègre les questions climatiques comme nouvel objet de la guerre informationnelle. Ainsi, après une présentation du cadre méthodologique du nexus désinformation climatique – guerre informationnelle (I), cette note propose un panorama des principaux acteurs étatiques de la désinformation climatique ciblant l’Europe, notamment la Russie et les États-Unis, ainsi que leurs interactions avec des acteurs non étatiques (II). L’analyse porte ensuite sur les conséquences sécuritaires de la désinformation climatique (III). Sur la base de ces conclusions, la note développe trois scénarii de prospective, accompagnés de recommandations à destination du ministère des Armées (IV).

Note Synthèse

L’article Désinformation climatique et guerre informationnelle : ingérences étatiques et enjeux sécuritaires est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Tax expenditures (TEs) in Zimbabwe represent a significant portion of government spending, amounting to 2.8 percent of GDP, 24.7 percent of total revenue, and 21.2 percent of public spending in 2023. Companies benefitting from TEs enjoy tax savings that trigger a reduction in government revenue, which may in turn result in higher budget deficits and sovereign debt. TEs are often regressive, e.g., when TEs related to personal income tax (PIT) benefit those in higher income tax brackets more, and TEs related to value-added tax (VAT) provide a larger benefit to higher income households, given their larger consumption in absolute terms. Although TEs are meant to boost investment, exports, innovation and employment, their real impact is often unknown, as Zimbabwe lacks a culture of ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of TEs.

Transparency: Section 3 of the Public Finance Management Act [Chapter 22:19] aims to secure transparency, accountability and sound management of revenues and expenditure, but does not provide specific provisions on TEs assessments nor reporting to the Parliament of Zimbabwe. Section 30 of the Zimbabwe Investment Development Agency (ZIDA) Act also highlights that ZIDA, in consultation with the Minister responsible for Finance, should publish guidelines for investment, which include general and special incentives applicable to specific categories of licensed investors. Against this backdrop, it is fair to say that there is no explicit policy on TE transparency in Zimbabwe.

Complex landscape: The rationale for the introduction of business-related TEs is to stimulate investment and production, which should then create employment opportunities and other benefits, potentially leading to higher government revenues in the medium or long term. If well-designed, tax incentives for investment can be a cost-effective policy tool. However, TEs may be vulnerable to lobbying and abuse, providing preferential tax treatment to specific groups with vested interests to keep the incentives in place even without much benefit to the economy at large. Empirical evidence on TEs is still limited in Zimbabwe, which undermines evidence-based tax policymaking.

Evaluation challenges: The government of Zimbabwe committed to develop a tax incentive monitoring and evaluation framework, managed by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), to facilitate the management of TEs and inform cost-benefit analyses by Treasury on an annual basis with effect from 1 January 2019. No ex-ante evaluation has been conducted so far, but some ex-post evaluations of TEs were undertaken in 2021 and 2023. In addition, ZIMRA has started to publish TE figures from 2019 onwards in its annual reports, although the statistics published are highly aggregated and do not cover all taxes upon which TEs are granted. The published TEs from the annual reports are revenue forgone from domestic and trade taxes. Although the Parliament of Zimbabwe has the competence to oversee the national budget cycle, it is currently not involved in the monitoring and control of TEs.

Fiscal sustainability: Fiscal sustainability enables governments to meet future public expenditure and financial obligations without resorting to excessive borrowing. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013 (Act No. 1 of 2013, Section 299) provides for Parliamentary oversight of state revenues and expenditure to ensure accountability, monitoring and fiscal sustainability (Government of Zimbabwe, 2023a). Section 298 (1) b i of the Constitution states that the burden of taxation must be shared equally which implies that TEs should not be allocated without evaluating if they are beneficial to Zimbabwe. TEs can be described as hidden government spending, which can negatively affect fiscal sustainability. Zimbabwe’s TEs amounted to US$1.34 billion in 2023, which is about 2.8 percent of GDP, compared to the global average of about 4 percent of GDP. However, VAT rate reductions and exemptions on domestic sales, which constituted 51 percent and 27.1 percent of total TEs reported by ZIMRA in 2020, were not reported through the new Tax and Revenue Management System (TaRMS) in 2023. Moreover, TEs for CIT, PIT and excise duty were not reported since they are not captured by ZIMRA. The bulk of the reported figures for 2023 were TEs related to custom duties. Thus, the extent of TE use in Zimbabwe is underreported and may in fact be considerably higher than the global average. Moreover, this is happening at a time when Zimbabwe is facing limited fiscal space, with public debt constituting 59.7 percent of GDP in 2024.

Policy recommendations: The Government of Zimbabwe should conduct or commission ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of TEs to enhance their effectiveness. Statistics on TE use and revenue forgone should be publicly available and easily accessible to enhance transparency and access of information to the users. All TEs should be time-bound (with sunset clauses) and, ideally, only be renewed after an assessment has been undertaken to justify their existence. All new TEs should be subject to an ex-ante evaluation to clarify expectations and ensure that only effective TEs are implemented in the country. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should be involved in the monitoring and control of TEs. The legislation should ensure that TE proposals are in line with national development plans and policies. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should also ensure that TE reports are published at pre-defined dates. TE reporting should be comprehensive, reported annually. This means there should be a designated authority responsible for preparing the TE report, preferably in the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion. The legal framework should also establish the structure and frequency of TE evaluations, including both ex-ante assessments and ex-post evaluations.

Tax expenditures (TEs) in Zimbabwe represent a significant portion of government spending, amounting to 2.8 percent of GDP, 24.7 percent of total revenue, and 21.2 percent of public spending in 2023. Companies benefitting from TEs enjoy tax savings that trigger a reduction in government revenue, which may in turn result in higher budget deficits and sovereign debt. TEs are often regressive, e.g., when TEs related to personal income tax (PIT) benefit those in higher income tax brackets more, and TEs related to value-added tax (VAT) provide a larger benefit to higher income households, given their larger consumption in absolute terms. Although TEs are meant to boost investment, exports, innovation and employment, their real impact is often unknown, as Zimbabwe lacks a culture of ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of TEs.

Transparency: Section 3 of the Public Finance Management Act [Chapter 22:19] aims to secure transparency, accountability and sound management of revenues and expenditure, but does not provide specific provisions on TEs assessments nor reporting to the Parliament of Zimbabwe. Section 30 of the Zimbabwe Investment Development Agency (ZIDA) Act also highlights that ZIDA, in consultation with the Minister responsible for Finance, should publish guidelines for investment, which include general and special incentives applicable to specific categories of licensed investors. Against this backdrop, it is fair to say that there is no explicit policy on TE transparency in Zimbabwe.

Complex landscape: The rationale for the introduction of business-related TEs is to stimulate investment and production, which should then create employment opportunities and other benefits, potentially leading to higher government revenues in the medium or long term. If well-designed, tax incentives for investment can be a cost-effective policy tool. However, TEs may be vulnerable to lobbying and abuse, providing preferential tax treatment to specific groups with vested interests to keep the incentives in place even without much benefit to the economy at large. Empirical evidence on TEs is still limited in Zimbabwe, which undermines evidence-based tax policymaking.

Evaluation challenges: The government of Zimbabwe committed to develop a tax incentive monitoring and evaluation framework, managed by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), to facilitate the management of TEs and inform cost-benefit analyses by Treasury on an annual basis with effect from 1 January 2019. No ex-ante evaluation has been conducted so far, but some ex-post evaluations of TEs were undertaken in 2021 and 2023. In addition, ZIMRA has started to publish TE figures from 2019 onwards in its annual reports, although the statistics published are highly aggregated and do not cover all taxes upon which TEs are granted. The published TEs from the annual reports are revenue forgone from domestic and trade taxes. Although the Parliament of Zimbabwe has the competence to oversee the national budget cycle, it is currently not involved in the monitoring and control of TEs.

Fiscal sustainability: Fiscal sustainability enables governments to meet future public expenditure and financial obligations without resorting to excessive borrowing. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013 (Act No. 1 of 2013, Section 299) provides for Parliamentary oversight of state revenues and expenditure to ensure accountability, monitoring and fiscal sustainability (Government of Zimbabwe, 2023a). Section 298 (1) b i of the Constitution states that the burden of taxation must be shared equally which implies that TEs should not be allocated without evaluating if they are beneficial to Zimbabwe. TEs can be described as hidden government spending, which can negatively affect fiscal sustainability. Zimbabwe’s TEs amounted to US$1.34 billion in 2023, which is about 2.8 percent of GDP, compared to the global average of about 4 percent of GDP. However, VAT rate reductions and exemptions on domestic sales, which constituted 51 percent and 27.1 percent of total TEs reported by ZIMRA in 2020, were not reported through the new Tax and Revenue Management System (TaRMS) in 2023. Moreover, TEs for CIT, PIT and excise duty were not reported since they are not captured by ZIMRA. The bulk of the reported figures for 2023 were TEs related to custom duties. Thus, the extent of TE use in Zimbabwe is underreported and may in fact be considerably higher than the global average. Moreover, this is happening at a time when Zimbabwe is facing limited fiscal space, with public debt constituting 59.7 percent of GDP in 2024.

Policy recommendations: The Government of Zimbabwe should conduct or commission ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of TEs to enhance their effectiveness. Statistics on TE use and revenue forgone should be publicly available and easily accessible to enhance transparency and access of information to the users. All TEs should be time-bound (with sunset clauses) and, ideally, only be renewed after an assessment has been undertaken to justify their existence. All new TEs should be subject to an ex-ante evaluation to clarify expectations and ensure that only effective TEs are implemented in the country. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should be involved in the monitoring and control of TEs. The legislation should ensure that TE proposals are in line with national development plans and policies. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should also ensure that TE reports are published at pre-defined dates. TE reporting should be comprehensive, reported annually. This means there should be a designated authority responsible for preparing the TE report, preferably in the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion. The legal framework should also establish the structure and frequency of TE evaluations, including both ex-ante assessments and ex-post evaluations.

Tax expenditures (TEs) in Zimbabwe represent a significant portion of government spending, amounting to 2.8 percent of GDP, 24.7 percent of total revenue, and 21.2 percent of public spending in 2023. Companies benefitting from TEs enjoy tax savings that trigger a reduction in government revenue, which may in turn result in higher budget deficits and sovereign debt. TEs are often regressive, e.g., when TEs related to personal income tax (PIT) benefit those in higher income tax brackets more, and TEs related to value-added tax (VAT) provide a larger benefit to higher income households, given their larger consumption in absolute terms. Although TEs are meant to boost investment, exports, innovation and employment, their real impact is often unknown, as Zimbabwe lacks a culture of ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of TEs.

Transparency: Section 3 of the Public Finance Management Act [Chapter 22:19] aims to secure transparency, accountability and sound management of revenues and expenditure, but does not provide specific provisions on TEs assessments nor reporting to the Parliament of Zimbabwe. Section 30 of the Zimbabwe Investment Development Agency (ZIDA) Act also highlights that ZIDA, in consultation with the Minister responsible for Finance, should publish guidelines for investment, which include general and special incentives applicable to specific categories of licensed investors. Against this backdrop, it is fair to say that there is no explicit policy on TE transparency in Zimbabwe.

Complex landscape: The rationale for the introduction of business-related TEs is to stimulate investment and production, which should then create employment opportunities and other benefits, potentially leading to higher government revenues in the medium or long term. If well-designed, tax incentives for investment can be a cost-effective policy tool. However, TEs may be vulnerable to lobbying and abuse, providing preferential tax treatment to specific groups with vested interests to keep the incentives in place even without much benefit to the economy at large. Empirical evidence on TEs is still limited in Zimbabwe, which undermines evidence-based tax policymaking.

Evaluation challenges: The government of Zimbabwe committed to develop a tax incentive monitoring and evaluation framework, managed by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), to facilitate the management of TEs and inform cost-benefit analyses by Treasury on an annual basis with effect from 1 January 2019. No ex-ante evaluation has been conducted so far, but some ex-post evaluations of TEs were undertaken in 2021 and 2023. In addition, ZIMRA has started to publish TE figures from 2019 onwards in its annual reports, although the statistics published are highly aggregated and do not cover all taxes upon which TEs are granted. The published TEs from the annual reports are revenue forgone from domestic and trade taxes. Although the Parliament of Zimbabwe has the competence to oversee the national budget cycle, it is currently not involved in the monitoring and control of TEs.

Fiscal sustainability: Fiscal sustainability enables governments to meet future public expenditure and financial obligations without resorting to excessive borrowing. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013 (Act No. 1 of 2013, Section 299) provides for Parliamentary oversight of state revenues and expenditure to ensure accountability, monitoring and fiscal sustainability (Government of Zimbabwe, 2023a). Section 298 (1) b i of the Constitution states that the burden of taxation must be shared equally which implies that TEs should not be allocated without evaluating if they are beneficial to Zimbabwe. TEs can be described as hidden government spending, which can negatively affect fiscal sustainability. Zimbabwe’s TEs amounted to US$1.34 billion in 2023, which is about 2.8 percent of GDP, compared to the global average of about 4 percent of GDP. However, VAT rate reductions and exemptions on domestic sales, which constituted 51 percent and 27.1 percent of total TEs reported by ZIMRA in 2020, were not reported through the new Tax and Revenue Management System (TaRMS) in 2023. Moreover, TEs for CIT, PIT and excise duty were not reported since they are not captured by ZIMRA. The bulk of the reported figures for 2023 were TEs related to custom duties. Thus, the extent of TE use in Zimbabwe is underreported and may in fact be considerably higher than the global average. Moreover, this is happening at a time when Zimbabwe is facing limited fiscal space, with public debt constituting 59.7 percent of GDP in 2024.

Policy recommendations: The Government of Zimbabwe should conduct or commission ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of TEs to enhance their effectiveness. Statistics on TE use and revenue forgone should be publicly available and easily accessible to enhance transparency and access of information to the users. All TEs should be time-bound (with sunset clauses) and, ideally, only be renewed after an assessment has been undertaken to justify their existence. All new TEs should be subject to an ex-ante evaluation to clarify expectations and ensure that only effective TEs are implemented in the country. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should be involved in the monitoring and control of TEs. The legislation should ensure that TE proposals are in line with national development plans and policies. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should also ensure that TE reports are published at pre-defined dates. TE reporting should be comprehensive, reported annually. This means there should be a designated authority responsible for preparing the TE report, preferably in the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion. The legal framework should also establish the structure and frequency of TE evaluations, including both ex-ante assessments and ex-post evaluations.

The OECD Conference on the Future of International Development Co-operation convened in Paris on 11-12 May 2026. Andy Sumner and Stephan Klingebiel consider one core idea arising.

The OECD Conference on the Future of International Development Co-operation convened in Paris on 11-12 May 2026. Andy Sumner and Stephan Klingebiel consider one core idea arising.

The OECD Conference on the Future of International Development Co-operation convened in Paris on 11-12 May 2026. Andy Sumner and Stephan Klingebiel consider one core idea arising.

This study examines the synergistic effects of digital and green economies on sustainable development in 35 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over the period 2010–2021. Using a two-step System GMM estimator, we analyze the interaction among digital technology index (DT), green total factor productivity (GP), and adjusted net savings (ANS) as a percentage of GNI. The baseline results reveal a negative association between DT and ANS at low levels of green productivity. However, this penalty is mitigated as green productivity rises indicating a synergistic effect. Robustness checks across income levels, regions, and infrastructure types uncover heterogeneities. Specifically, the marginal penalty associated with fixed broadband subscription improves by 0.41% point as economies move from the 25th to the 50th percentile of green productivity, and by a larger 0.828% points when moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile. While basic mobile connectivity remains sustainability-neutral, high-capacity fixed broadband requires environmental efficiency to avoid eroding national savings. Furthermore, digitalization attenuates the negative relationship between natural resource rents and ANS. These findings underscore that achieving sustainable development in SSA requires synchronized policy strategies rather than isolated investments in technology or green initiatives.

This study examines the synergistic effects of digital and green economies on sustainable development in 35 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over the period 2010–2021. Using a two-step System GMM estimator, we analyze the interaction among digital technology index (DT), green total factor productivity (GP), and adjusted net savings (ANS) as a percentage of GNI. The baseline results reveal a negative association between DT and ANS at low levels of green productivity. However, this penalty is mitigated as green productivity rises indicating a synergistic effect. Robustness checks across income levels, regions, and infrastructure types uncover heterogeneities. Specifically, the marginal penalty associated with fixed broadband subscription improves by 0.41% point as economies move from the 25th to the 50th percentile of green productivity, and by a larger 0.828% points when moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile. While basic mobile connectivity remains sustainability-neutral, high-capacity fixed broadband requires environmental efficiency to avoid eroding national savings. Furthermore, digitalization attenuates the negative relationship between natural resource rents and ANS. These findings underscore that achieving sustainable development in SSA requires synchronized policy strategies rather than isolated investments in technology or green initiatives.

This study examines the synergistic effects of digital and green economies on sustainable development in 35 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over the period 2010–2021. Using a two-step System GMM estimator, we analyze the interaction among digital technology index (DT), green total factor productivity (GP), and adjusted net savings (ANS) as a percentage of GNI. The baseline results reveal a negative association between DT and ANS at low levels of green productivity. However, this penalty is mitigated as green productivity rises indicating a synergistic effect. Robustness checks across income levels, regions, and infrastructure types uncover heterogeneities. Specifically, the marginal penalty associated with fixed broadband subscription improves by 0.41% point as economies move from the 25th to the 50th percentile of green productivity, and by a larger 0.828% points when moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile. While basic mobile connectivity remains sustainability-neutral, high-capacity fixed broadband requires environmental efficiency to avoid eroding national savings. Furthermore, digitalization attenuates the negative relationship between natural resource rents and ANS. These findings underscore that achieving sustainable development in SSA requires synchronized policy strategies rather than isolated investments in technology or green initiatives.

The so-called Russian shadow fleet primarily serves to evade sanctions on oil exports and thereby finance its war of aggression against Ukraine. At the same time, it is increasingly emerging as a security risk with defence implications for Europe. Vessels associated with the shadow fleet are being linked with growing frequency to acts of espionage and sabotage, thereby posing a threat to German and European security as well as to the maritime environ­ment. In close coordination with its partners, the German government should pursue a sys­tematic approach to countering the shadow fleet effectively. The overarching objectives are to preserve the integrity of sanctions regimes, safeguard maritime security, and contain defence-related threats.

Heute sprechen Alexander Roth und Wolf-Peter Schill mit Dr. Anna Billerbeck und Alexander Burkhardt vom Fraunhofer ISI über Fernwärme und Wärmespeicher. Wie wichtig ist der Wärmesektor für die Energiewende und warum geht es dort langsamer vor als beim Strom? Was ist eigentlich Fernwärme, wie hat sie ...