SWP

Die Verständigung auf ein Übergangsregime ist der wichtigste mittelfristige Baustein in der zweiten Phase der Brexit-Verhandlungen. Im März 2019 soll Großbritanniens Austritt aus der EU vollzogen sein, doch bis dahin wird es kein ausgehandeltes Abkommen über die künftigen Beziehungen geben. An einem abrupten Ende ist indes keine der beiden Seiten interessiert. Daher hat Großbritannien um eine Übergangsregelung gebeten und auch die EU-27 ziehen eine solche Lösung in Betracht. Einfach wäre diese aber nicht. Aus Sicht der EU wäre nur eine vollständige Nachbildung des Status quo akzeptabel. Dafür müsste Großbritannien allerdings sämtliche Versprechen der Brexit-Befürworter brechen und mindestens zwei Jahre lang Regeln der EU anerkennen und umsetzen, ohne ein Mitspracherecht zu haben.

By November 2017, as the civil war abated and the so-called Islamic State (IS) was all but defeated, Moscow increased its efforts to reach what it regards as conflict resolution in several fora beyond the UN-led Geneva process. Moreover, as the US administration made it clear that it would not be engaging in reconstruction efforts, Russia has sought European financial assistance to help cover the costs of rebuilding the country, together with Arab Gulf states. Although the European Union had, in April 2017, ruled out support for reconstruction without a political transition, calls have now been mounting in Europe to accommodate Bashar al-Assad, help in the reconstruction of Syria, and send back refugees. Yet, the fighting is far from over. More importantly, the mere reconstruction of physical infrastructure would do little to instill stability, but would rather raise the risk of fueling new conflicts. Europeans should therefore make clear to Russia that they will stick with their own approach. They should play the long game and develop leverage to make future contributions serve state- and peace-building purposes. Meanwhile, they should focus on increased levels of humanitarian aid, early recovery measures, such as de-mining and restoring basic water and health infrastructure, building human capital in Syria and among Syrian refugee communities, in addition to concentrating on civil society and local governance support where they have credible partners.

Im November 2018 geben die US-Wählerinnen und -Wähler bei den Midterm Elections das erste Mal ihr Votum darüber ab, wie zufrieden sie mit ihrem Präsidenten, Donald Trump, und der Republikanischen Regierung sind. Im Vorfeld dieser Wahlen zum US-Kongress, die nach der ersten Hälfte der Amtszeit des Präsidenten stattfinden, gerät Trump zusehends unter Druck: Er muss politische Erfolge vorweisen. Das gilt nicht nur, aber vor allem auch für jene Wirtschaftsthemen, mit denen er im Präsidentschaftswahlkampf punkten konnte: massive Steuersenkungen, eine aggressive Handelspolitik und die Deregulierung der Finanzmärkte. Trump könnte versuchen, mit einer harten Linie in der Außenpolitik und wirtschaftlichen Muskelspielen, auch gegenüber Partnerländern, sein Profil als durchsetzungsstarker Staatsmann zu schärfen. Im Wahlkampfjahr 2018 müssen sich die EU und Deutschland daher auf außen- und wirtschaftspolitische Konflikte mit den USA einstellen. Unmittelbar negativ würden sich US-Strafzölle auf europäische Stahlimporte und neue US-Sanktionen gegen Russland und Iran auswirken. Langfristig schaden könnten der EU die geplante Steuerreform, die politische Vereinnahmung der Geldpolitik und die Aussetzung strenger Finanzregeln.

Während sich die Sicherheitslage in Mali und seinen Grenzgebieten stetig verschlechtert, hat die neue »gemeinsame Truppe« (Force Conjointe, FC) der G5-Sahel-Staaten Mitte November ihre erste Militäroperation abgeschlossen. Sie soll einen regionalen Beitrag zum Kampf gegen Terrorismus und Kriminalität leisten. Am 13. Dezember wird in Paris eine Geberkonferenz stattfinden, um weitere finanzielle Unterstützung und Ausstattungshilfe für die FC zu mobilisieren. Bei diesem Vorhaben sind Deutschland und die EU an der Seite Frankreichs stark engagiert. Die Anstrengungen, regionale Streitkräfte zu befähigen, sind aber mit Problemen behaftet: Die internationalen Partner ziehen einen Capacity-Building-Ansatz, der auf kurzfristige Erfolge ausgerichtet ist, einer Reform des Sicherheitssektors vor und verfolgen keine abgestimmte Strategie. Mali wiederum hält am Status quo fest und ist nicht bereit, politische Eigenverantwortung zu übernehmen.

The Red Sea is a vital pathway for goods, people, arms, and livestock. European trade with Asia passes through here as well as oil from the Gulf to the Mediterranean, and a sizeable amount of global marine cargo is hauled through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea into the Indian Ocean. In addition to its significance as a trade route, the Red Sea is a lane for migration between the Gulf and the Horn of Africa and a bridge for roving terrorists. Its water connects the Horn of Africa with the Gulf countries, although it also separates African and Arab political and social cultures. Moreover, many issues are contested in the Red Sea region, ranging from military control to political Islam. In order to avoid further rifts between the Horn of Africa countries as a consequence of the disruptive politics of the Gulf, the Horn needs to perceive itself as a region and find common interests rather than becoming fragmented and weakened. The stability of the Horn of Africa as well as the security of its trade routes are of vital interest to European countries and economies.

At their summit on 6 July 2017, Japan and the EU reached an agreement in principle for bilateral free trade. The agreement should be ready for signing by the end of 2017. The intended liberalization of trade in goods, agriculture and services would create the world’s largest free trade area – assuming the agreement is successfully concluded and ratified by parliament. Japan and Europe are sending out a strong signal against protectionism and in favour of free trade and modernizing global trade rules. While free trade in the transatlantic and trans-Pacific context may remain an illusion for some time to come, the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (JEEPA) is a realistic opportunity for trade partners at the western and eastern margins of the Eurasian continent to achieve trade-induced growth and increased prosperity. Given its prominence, JEEPA raises the following questions: What trade liberalization can be expected? Does a free trade agreement between Japan and Europe actually make sense? Who would be the winners and losers? What are the risks and limitations? What are the political implications of the European-Japanese alliance?

Two years after the climate summit in Paris, the euphoria over the diplomatic break-through and adoption of new targets – holding the temperature increase to well below 2 degrees Celsius, preferably even to 1.5 degrees – has largely evaporated. There has been little sign of additional ambition in climate change mitigation since. One fundamental problem is the global nature of temperature targets, which are little suited for generating concrete national action plans and not at all suited for evaluating emissions reduction measures implemented by governments or businesses. Starting with the “facilitative dialogue” being prepared at the Bonn climate summit for 2018, it is the third Paris mitigation target that should be the benchmark: namely to attain greenhouse-gas neutrality in the second half of the century. The European Commission and member states of the European Union (EU) should make the zero emissions target their central reference point in reformulating the Climate Roadmap 2050 and in adopting a long-term decarbonisation strategy. This could provide the opportunity to redesign the EU’s climate policy so as to make it both more ambitious and more pragmatic.

In September 2017 the EU updated its 2013 Cyber Security Strategy. The new version is intended to improve the protection of Europe’s critical infrastructure and boost the EU’s digital self-assertiveness towards other regions of the world. But the reformed strategy leaves open a number of questions as to how its objective of an “open, safe and secure cyberspace” will be credibly defended, both internally and externally. The EU has neither properly defined resilience or deterrence nor made sufficiently clear how it intends to overcome institutional fragmentation and lack of legal authority in cybersecurity issues. Moreover, controversial topics – such as the harmonisation of criminal law or the use of encryption – have been entirely omitted. Member states should abandon their standalone efforts and speed up the legal regulation of cybersecurity at the EU level.

Making greater of use of the waters of the Congo could boost development across – and beyond – the region, but threatens to favour particular users’ interests at the expense of others. Within its enormous catchment area, the Congo is the dominant transport network and the lifeblood of the African rain forest, upon which millions depend for their livelihoods. Tapping the river’s resources could significantly improve the region’s water and food supplies, while its hydro-energy potential could theoretically satisfy the electricity needs of the entire continent. Plans to construct more major dams at the Inga Falls demonstrate that the ten Congo Basin states are pursuing common goals – but also having to deal with sharpening intersectoral conflicts. An inconsistent line on dam-building makes it harder for Germany to play a constructive role in these development processes.

Die deutsch-tschechischen Beziehungen geraten in eine komplizierte Phase. Nachdem in beiden Ländern die Parlamente neu gewählt worden sind, steht nun die Regierungsbildung an. Währenddessen ist neuer Schwung in die Diskussion über die Reform der EU gekommen, ohne dass Berlin oder Prag mit eigenen Vorschlägen an die Öffentlichkeit getreten wären. Bilateral wird das Thema zwar konstruktiv, aber nicht schlüssig behandelt. Vor allem die Konturen der tschechischen Europapolitik sind seit Jahren unklar. Um mehr als nur ein pragmatisches Nebeneinander zu sichern und einem Auseinanderdriften in der EU rechtzeitig entgegenzuwirken, müssen beide Seiten die europapolitische Dimension ihres Verhältnisses bewusst weiterentwickeln.

Zwei Jahre nach dem Pariser Klimagipfel ist die Euphorie über den diplomatischen Durchbruch und die Verabschiedung neuer Ziele – die Eindämmung des Temperaturanstiegs auf deutlich unter 2 Grad, möglichst sogar 1,5 Grad – weitgehend verflogen. Von zusätzlichem Ehrgeiz ist beim Klimaschutz seither wenig zu sehen. Ein Grundproblem liegt in der globalen Natur von Temperaturzielen, aus denen sich für nationale Politik und Wirtschaft nur wenig konkrete Handlungsanleitungen ergeben und die sich auch nicht dazu eignen, Klimaschutzmaßnahmen von Regierungen und Unternehmen zu bewerten. Schon im Rahmen des »facilitative dialogue«, der beim Bonner Klimagipfel vorbereitet wird und für 2018 geplant ist, sollte daher das dritte Klimaschutzziel von Paris als Maßstab ins Zentrum gestellt werden: das Erreichen von Treibhausgasneutralität in der zweiten Jahrhunderthälfte. EU-Kommission und Mitgliedstaaten sollten dieses Nullemissionsziel bei der Neuformulierung der Klima-Roadmap 2050 und der Verabschiedung einer langfristigen Dekarbonisierungsstrategie zum zentralen Orientierungspunkt machen. Dies würde die Chance eröffnen, die EU-Klimapolitik künftig sowohl ehrgeiziger als auch pragmatischer zu konzipieren.

Renewable and decentralized power generation are a centerpiece of Germany’s domestic energy transition (Energiewende) and a major element of its international efforts to promote this goal. Recently, the renewables sector has also been advancing in Russia, albeit from a lower level. Thus, it is time to explore the status quo and analyze the potential for sustainable energy cooperation. In the context of the current deterioration in EU-Russian (energy) relations, crafting a sustainable energy partnership that is based on innovation, with an emphasis on electricity cooperation, might present an added value.

The aim of China’s Silk Road Initiative is to bolster both its international legitimacy and its geopolitical power. One important element of the initiative is the plan to transport export goods by high-speed train to Western Europe. In order to ensure that rapid freight transit is profitable in the long term, Beijing believes that major changes are needed along the borders of Central Asia. The Chinese government has explicitly called for reforms from its partner countries, including Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, meaning greater economic openness, regional cooperation and modern border crossings.

The opportunities for change in Central Asia are now much better than in the past. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s growth models have reached their limits and both countries are now under considerable pressure to reform. Uzbekistan’s new president has also announced promising new reform policies. In addition, political rule in Central Asia is now more institutionalized and, therefore, increasing scope for partial reforms. Furthermore, since the beginning of the century, China has become a powerful actor in the region. Unlike Russia, it is interested in better intra-regional cooperation in Central Asia and, ultimately, the Silk Road Initiative provides incentives for reform and greater cooperation at the borders.

For Germany and the EU, it might be worth discussing common interests with China and how synergies could be used to positively influence the reforms. The EU can draw on the knowledge and experience gained from its long-term project on border reforms in Central Asia.

Ten years after Hamas violently seized power in Gaza, and following a string of failures to reconcile the Palestinian factions, there are now signs of a rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas. In September 2017 the Hamas leadership announced it would dissolve the administrative committee it had established in March, opening the way for the Palestinian Authority (PA) to take over the government in the Gaza Strip. In mid-October representatives of Hamas and Fatah signed an Egyptian-mediated reconciliation agreement. On 1 November PA forces were deployed to the Palestinian side of the Rafah border crossing with Egypt. Even if there are still major obstacles to merging the two security apparatuses, establishing a unity government, restoring the democratic process and achieving comprehensive reconciliation – the chances of the rapprochement preventing another round of armed conflict and improving the situation for the population in crisis-ridden Gaza are considerably better this time around. Germany and its European partners should help to accentuate the positive dynamics, support permanent improvements of the situation in Gaza through practical steps and work towards comprehensive reconciliation between the Palestinian factions.

Even though the country is a regional frontrunner, Georgian democracy is not yet consolidated. Parliamentary elections in 2016 saw the governing Georgian Dream returned with a constitutional majority. The October 2017 local elections brought the ruling party another sweeping victory. Despite Georgian Dream’s overwhelming electoral successes, the country faces voter apathy. Alongside lack of parliamentary controls and a fragmentation of the party-political spectrum this does not bode well for consolidating democracy in the near future.