You can read here the article on the recent decision by the Council of State concerning media landscape in Greece, which was written by Professor George Pagoulatos. The commentary was published on 29 October 2016 in the Sunday edition of Kathimerini and is available in Greek.
You can read here the article on the US presidential election, which was written by Professor Emeritus and Member of the Board of Trustees of ELIAMEP Theodore Couloumbis. This commentary was published on 29 October 2016 in the Sunday edition of Kathimerini. It is available in Greek.
On the occasion of a publication of a relevant research report by ELIAMEP, Dr Ioannis Armakolas, Head of South-East Europe Programme, spoke on Athina 9.84 radio station on relations between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The interview is available here (in Greek).
Greece’s non-performing exposure ratio is the second highest in Europe, largely linked to the unprecedented contraction of domestic economic activity in recent years. Causality is known to go both ways, with persistently high non-performing loans (NPLs) constituting a drag on credit and GDP growth. Theoretically, Greek governments keen to reduce the debt overhang and restore the productive pillars of the economy should have created the conditions for a rapid and effective workout of NPLs. The country’s third bailout programme has provided a road map for reform, with the Institutions bent on facilitating or enforcing ownership. Conditionality, anchored on a ‘reforms for cash’ logic, has reduced perceived or real margins for noncompliance.
In fact, NPLs resolution has remained a work in progress. Weak cyclical conditions tell part of the story. Democratic politics have collided with reform ownership. Electoral and non-electoral pressures, multiple veto points, and private sector resistance have undermined majority-backed rules and regulations. The current fully-liberalised framework has come about under conditions of severe stress – a heavy debt repayment schedule and the country’s dependence on bailout programme funds.
The Institutions have upped their game: outcomes-based conditionality has been central to boost and reinforce political ‘will’. In some cases, ownership has altogether been removed from government hands. Greek recalcitrance and the paradoxes of inaction, procrastination or limited response in the face of a glaringly unsustainable equilibrium cannot be discounted. The strongly directive elements of an externally-dictated process, however, raise questions about the political tradeoffs between prompt implementation, accountability, and the legitimacy of the Institutions’ design.
To enhance the framework’s credibility, scope, and effectiveness, the main stakeholders, regulators, elected politicians, bankers, and investors, will have to flesh it out and create the right incentives for engagement. After six years of seeking to build ‘ownership’, the Institutions have yet to link capacity with the broader institutional context, including the integrity of the legal and judicial process, the independence of regulatory agencies, and the transparency of business-government relations. They have also yet to own up to their role in the self-reinforcing negative loop of recession, deterioration of credit quality, NPLs creation.
Author: Dr Eleni Panagiotarea
Source: Hellenic Observatory blog, LSE
From national coordination to supranational supervision: Greece towards the EU programs of economic adjustment – This article assesses the impact of European economic governance on the political and administrative system of Greece in the context of the sovereign debt crisis. It describes the changes in the coordination and administrative system that Greece has put in place according to the requirements of the economic adjustment programmes in order to adapt to the new environment at national and European level. The article assesses how the strict conditions of the Greek membership in the Eurozone have weakened the centrality of the State, the administrative and political sovereignty of Greek governments and their bargaining power in the intergovernmental decision-making bodies governing the Eurozone.
Author: Dr Filippa Chatzistavrou