European Union

MEPs on Tuesday adopted suggestions for reforms to the tax architecture to boost competitiveness while continuing to address tax avoidance and evasion.
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Subcommittee on Tax Matters

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

MEPs on Tuesday adopted suggestions for reforms to the tax architecture to boost competitiveness while continuing to address tax avoidance and evasion.
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Subcommittee on Tax Matters

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Length of video : 45'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Length of video : 75'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 209 - Draft report Addressing transnational repression of human rights defenders
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Chloé Ridel

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Czechia, as most countries of Central Europe, is not famous for welcoming immigrants with open arms. Czechs consider foreigners as people taking their jobs, their safety and their culture. However, since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, around 370 000 Ukrainians have come to Czechia to, at least temporarily, seek a new home here. This unprecedented influx of refugees led to the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) that has allowed for Ukrainians to live, work and access services in any EU country without going through tedious asylum processes. This was the first activation of the TPD in March 2022, so naturally it poses a question of whether this is a turning point in asylum policy. How did Czechia as a central European EU member state welcome Ukrainian immigrants? How has the integration of Ukrainians evolved? Can they be happy in Czechia, or will they be glad to go back once the war is over? 

Facts: How was immigration really handled? 

Originally, Ukrainians were only allowed to stay in Czechia for 90 days but, already in March 2022, the Czech government passed the first version of the so-called “Lex Ukrajina” which granted Ukrainians a temporary protection status. Initially, most of the Ukrainian immigrants were women and children, who therefore immediately needed financial support and housing. Half of the incoming family units had at least one child under 5 years of age, which led to many citizen-led initiatives, such as collecting clothing, buying diapers, etc. This was one of many volunteer initiatives that evolved right after the start of the war. 

After the first months, the numbers of incoming Ukrainians started to stabilize. This stabilization brought with it a necessity to revise the Lex Ukrajina, which has had 10 different versions since. These updates included housing support, healthcare access as well as the registration of Ukrainian cars. This shows that, from the initial crisis reaction, the focus has shifted towards a more detailed help of the immigrants’ specific needs.  The Czech government was not left to struggle alone, though. Czechia received over €40 million to support Ukrainian refugees and their integration. 

Although the effort to integrate Ukrainians was well funded and consistent, economic integration is not going as planned. While over 80 % of Ukrainian immigrants are economically active, most of them are well-educated women working in jobs that are not in their area of expertise or below their qualifications. Many Ukrainians are or have previously been employed without a contract, work long hours and are paid low wages, which does not make Czechia look very good at integrating them. Often, language barrier is an issue, but recognition of qualifications also plays a role. Moreover, many Ukrainians simply do not know if it is worth it to integrate or to hope to return to their homeland soon instead. 

An aspect that has been consistently funded for Ukrainian refugees in Czechia is housing. However, free state-granted accommodation ended in summer 2024 and now only financial contributions are available. A third of Ukrainian immigrants lives in non-apartment buildings, e. g. dormitories, and have issues with privacy and personal hygiene conditions. This also contributes to their lesser integration and Czech language skills; therefore, according to the PAQ research report, the focus of the Czech government should lie on getting them better accommodation as soon as possible. 

When discussion these facts, a clear comparison with the refugee crises in 2015 comes to mind. Back then, Czechia stood in strong opposition to the EU relocation quotas for asylum seekers from the Middle East together with the other members of the Visegrád Group – Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The Court of Justice of the EU even ruled in 2020 that the Visegrád Group failed to fulfil their obligations. This is a huge contrast to the swift actions of Lex Ukrajina and implementation of the TPD in 2022 – and this is where the feelings of Czechs come in. 

Feelings: Welcoming with open arms or hate?  

Prior to the influx of Ukrainian refugees, most Czechs viewed immigrants as people taking their jobs, profiting from their welfare system, and higher crime rates were perceived. One might assume that people with higher integration levels have more interactions with immigrants and hence might have a more positive view of them. However, this does not seem to be the reality. Still, the portrayal of immigrants as a security threat or people who could not be integrated into society transformed with the arrival of Ukrainians and the public opinion on Ukrainian immigrants shifted thanks to the cultural proximity. 

According to the Institute of Analytical Research, STEM, people still mostly think it was good from the Czech government to let Ukrainians stay, and the perception of Ukrainians has remained relatively similar since 2022. Data show that, while at the beginning of the war about 75% of Czechs supported accepting refugees from Ukraine, the majority of Czechs also considered this a temporary measure until the Ukrainians could return home – this has not changed. This shows that Czechia may not be the perfect safe haven for Ukrainians, as there are other EU member states that favour support of Ukraine more than Czechs do. While more data would be necessary for more conclusive findings, this is already an indicator. 

Even in the school environment, Ukrainian children who speak better Czech integrate faster and are perceived in a more positive manner than others, whose Czech is not as good. Czech may be a significant factor with adults too, as only 47% speak the language and many state they do not have the time or money to attend language classes. But there is one thing that changed significantly since the invasion of Ukraine, and that is the interest of Czechs in the Ukrainian situation – both in the war per se, as well as the Ukrainian refugees residing in Czechia. Indeed, it seems that people got tired of Ukraine. 

The question is, are Ukrainians tired of Czechia? Despite the financial aid and other substantial support, many Ukrainian refugees suffer from depression and other mental health issues – and, of course, it is extremely difficult to seek help in Ukrainian. Although Czechs do not perceive Ukrainians as overwhelmingly negative, the society’s view on their integration process is basically split in half: while 51% think Ukrainians are integrating well, 40% think they are failing to integrate. Moreover, more than 60% of Ukrainians have experienced some kind of aggression during their stay in Czechia. The positive behaviour of the state towards Ukrainians sparked complaints and protests from the Roma minority. They were offended by the fact that Czechia is willing to help Ukrainians, but not its own citizens. This is especially significant as the Roma people represent the largest ethnic minority in Czechia and have historically faced unequal treatment, leading to concerns about inconsistency in the state’s approach to different vulnerable groups. 

Future: Going home, rather than making a new one 

As always, facts and feelings are not the same thing. While Ukrainians contribute more to the state then they got on economic support, Czech perception of them has not changed substantially since the Russian invasion to Ukraine. In 2022, citizens’ initiatives were organized to buy diapers for Ukrainian mothers and, in 2025, Czechs are already tired of Ukraine. The mutual relationship is stable, but the language barrier and Czech scepticism towards immigrants does not enable it to be called a strictly positive one. 

What comes next? It is certainly possible for Ukrainians to stay in Czechia, especially if they manage to find a sustainable housing situation and a legal, qualifications appropriate job. However, more and more initiatives emerge to establish a long-term return mechanism for Ukrainian refugees back to their home country. It seems to be what many Ukrainians want (if of their own will or led by other factors of life in Czechia) and Ukraine needs them to come back to rebuild eventually. 

As for Czechia, it seems that the influx of Ukrainian refugees, whom they view more positively than other immigrants, has not had the desired impact. Surely, institutional reactions were adequate and NGOs continue working towards helping people coming from Ukraine. Alas, the Czech fear of migration is stronger than ever – maybe with the exception of the 2015 refugee crisis. It seems that this fear is deeply embedded in Czech society and just serves to create a deeper divide. 

With the recent political developments, this shows to be an EU-wide concern. While there was an extension of the TPD until March 2026, member states have already started questioning the costs and efforts going into continuous support of Ukraine, for instance when Hungary blocked the Ukraine Assistance Fund. This trend goes together with a rise of the far-right across Europe, which definitely worsens the attitudes towards Ukrainian refugees. The Czech Svoboda a přímá demokracie (SPD), a right-wing populist party whose members are in the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) political group in the European Parliament, is definitely not the only party rejecting the war, promoting isolationism, and painting a very negative picture of immigrants. The question remains: will the solidarity of the EU towards Ukraine hold firm despite the far-right wave, or will it falter? And will Czechia follow this European trend? Let us hope that we do not need another crisis or war to figure out the answer. 

This blog post is based on the outcomes of the course ‘EU Migration in Action’ that took place as part of EUCHALLENGES, a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence co-funded by the European Commission under grant agreement no. 101127539. 

 

The post Ukrainians in an (Un)Welcoming Czechia: Facts, Feelings and Future appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In a significant and politically charged development within the European banking sector, UniCredit, Italy’s second-largest financial institution, undertook a calculated and strategic acquisition of shares in Commerzbank, Germany’s second-largest publicly listed bank. The move, unfolding over the course of late 2024, marked a bold assertion of UniCredit’s long-standing vision for cross-border banking consolidation within the European Union—a vision consistently advocated by its Chief Executive Officer, Andrea Orcel. 

In early September 2024, UniCredit disclosed that it had acquired a 9% equity stake in Commerzbank, including a 4.5% tranche purchased directly from the German government. Berlin had retained a significant ownership interest in Commerzbank since its €18.2 billion capital injection during the 2008 global financial crisis, holding 16.49% prior to this divestment. The sale reduced the government’s stake to 12%, signalling a partial retreat from its post-crisis intervention. Just ten days later, UniCredit increased its effective ownership to 21% through complex derivative instruments and forward contracts, thereby establishing itself as Commerzbank’s largest shareholder. At the same time, the Italian lender was actively seeking regulatory clearance from the European Central Bank (ECB) to raise its stake to as much as 29.9%—a strategic ceiling designed to avoid triggering a mandatory full takeover under German securities law, which sets the threshold at 30%. 

This methodical stake-building operation was widely interpreted not as a passive financial investment, but as a deliberate precursor to a broader cross-border consolidation effort. The effort aligns with calls from European regulatory authorities for deeper financial integration to improve competitiveness, resilience, and systemic stability. Yet, the initiative quickly encountered strong political headwinds in Berlin. Former Chancellor Olaf Scholz publicly defined UniCredit’s advance as an “unfriendly attack”, framing it not merely as a business manoeuvre, but as a threat to national economic sovereignty. Bettina Orlopp, Commerzbank’s chief financial officer, claimed in an interview that a takeover would lead to Commerzbank losing customers and raised the prospect of German savers being exposed to the risk of an Italian debt crisis, given UniCredit’s large holdings of Italian bonds. German politicians from across the political spectrum have insisted that Commerzbank should remain independent and in German hands as a domestic competitor to Deutsche Bank, the country’s other large nationwide lender. Berlin has said that it no longer plans to sell any more of its shareholding, making a full takeover impossible. Besides, if Berlin were genuinely worried about the spillover risks to domestic savers from cross-border banks, it should back the creation of a pan-European bank deposit guarantee scheme. Instead, Berlin has consistently blocked this vital step to complete the banking union because it entails pooling financial risks. Although, Bundesbank President Joachim Nagel claimed for the urgent need for a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). He defended Germany’s concerns over UniCredit’s growing stake in Commerzbank, citing deeper structural issues in Europe’s fragmented banking system; he underscored how banks’ exposure to domestic sovereign debt and reliance on national deposit guarantee schemes create a dangerous link between banking stability and government solvency. This bank-sovereign nexus, he warned, poses particular risks in countries like Italy, where public debt exceeds 135% of GDP—over twice Germany’s 64%. With over a third of UniCredit’s €108 billion bond holdings in Italian sovereign debt, fears of financial contagion are not unfounded. Nagel emphasized how EDIS could break this cycle but acknowledged continued resistance—especially from German institutions wary of underwriting risks tied to less fiscally disciplined member states. His call aligns with ECB President Christine Lagarde’s recent appeal to the European Parliament to revive stalled EDIS talks, which she said are “desperately missing.” 

While the German government and finance ministry expressed deep reservations about foreign control over a key financial institution, European Union institutions struck a markedly different tone. Veerle Nuyts, spokesperson for the European Commission, highlighted that mergers and acquisitions, when properly regulated, can enhance financial resilience by allowing banks to diversify asset bases, streamline operations, and invest more aggressively in digital innovation. She noted that although the Commission refrains from commenting on specific transactions such as UniCredit’s bid for Commerzbank, it generally supports the creation of larger, more integrated banking groups, provided that restrictions are justified by legitimate concerns such as financial stability or consumer protection—and that such restrictions comply with EU treaties. ECB President Christine Lagarde reinforced this supranational perspective by publicly affirming the importance of banking sector consolidation. She asserted that cross-border mergers are vital for fostering stronger and more competitive financial institutions capable of operating at scale across the Eurozone. According to Lagarde, consolidation can serve as a bulwark against external economic shocks and enhance the global competitiveness of European banks relative to their American and Chinese counterparts. However, the mandate of the ECB, and in particular of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), must ensure that all prudential requirements and legal criteria are duly met. 

Despite these institutional endorsements, the proposed UniCredit-Commerzbank consolidation continued to expose the entrenched fragmentation of Europe’s banking system. Germany’s staunch opposition—driven by apprehensions about domestic job losses, capital flight, and the dilution of national control over strategic economic infrastructure—illustrated how national political agendas frequently override broader European integrationist goals. This resistance exemplifies the tension between the EU’s stated ambition of fostering a unified financial market and the enduring reality of national protectionism. 

Nonetheless, important regulatory milestones were achieved in early 2025. In March, the European Central Bank granted approval for UniCredit to raise its stake in Commerzbank to 29.9%.Indeed, under Capital Requirements Directive, any increase of a qualifying holding in a credit institution must be notified to and approved by the competent supervisory authority. Since both UniCredit and Commerzbank are supervised by the ECB under the SSM, the ECB is the authority that must assess and approve the transaction. The following month, Germany’s Federal Cartel Office likewise authorized the increase, enabling UniCredit to significantly expand its influence without breaching the 30% threshold that would trigger a mandatory takeover offer under German law. These developments represented a major procedural victory for UniCredit, offering it both strategic leverage and formal legitimacy in its efforts. Despite these regulatory wins, the path to full acquisition remains highly contentious and politically fraught.  

The UniCredit-Commerzbank episode thus stands as a salient case study in the interplay between capital markets, regulatory governance, and political sovereignty within the European Union. It reveals how domestic political imperatives can—and often do—supersede collective economic logic, hindering the development of a genuinely integrated financial infrastructure across the continent. As long as member states perceive systemically important banks as instruments of national policy rather than market actors embedded in a shared European economic project, the aspiration of a cohesive and competitive EU banking sector will remain unrealized. The UniCredit-Commerzbank case powerfully illustrates how political considerations continue to dominate economic rationale in the context of cross-border mergers—suggesting that deeper integration in the European banking sector, though necessary, remains politically fraught and institutionally constrained. 

This article is based on discussions that took place during the workshops as part of EUCHALLENGES, a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence co-funded by the European Commission under grant agreement no. 101127539. 

The post UniCredit’s Commerzbank Ambitions: Regulatory Green Lights, Political Red Flags appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Length of video : 90'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Length of video : 120'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

MEPs encourage the Ukrainian government to maintain its pace on implementing EU-related reforms while reaffirming the EU’s commitment to a just and lasting peace.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

MEPs encourage the Ukrainian government to maintain its pace on implementing EU-related reforms while reaffirming the EU’s commitment to a just and lasting peace.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

MEPs encourage the Ukrainian government to maintain its pace on implementing EU-related reforms while reaffirming the EU’s commitment to a just and lasting peace.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Length of video : 60'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

DRAFT REPORT on the recommendation for the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU’s diplomatic strategy and geopolitical cooperation in the Arctic
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Urmas Paet

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

DRAFT REPORT on military mobility
Committee on Security and Defence
Committee on Transport and Tourism
Roberts Zīle, Petras Auštrevičius

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Parliament’s co-rapporteurs for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) will brief journalists on the expectations for the next EU budget ahead of the Commission’s proposal.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Parliament’s co-rapporteurs for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) will brief journalists on the expectations for the next EU budget ahead of the Commission’s proposal.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Committees

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP