Written by Clare Ferguson and Sebastian Clapp.
Security has become a top concern for Europeans. With Ukrainians battling to protect their country against Russia’s aggression and reports of drone and aerial incursions almost a daily occurrence in several EU countries, the European Parliament is determined to ensure that the conditions are optimum for EU governments to step up their defence readiness. The European Commission is expected to publish a non-legislative defence readiness roadmap this month. In the meantime, the Parliament has repeatedly made its position clear that defence spending should increase.
Finding funding for defence was a low priority for many EU countries in recent years. This changed definitively with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and total Member State defence expenditure has since risen to €343 billion in 2024. Nevertheless, this is far below what other world powers spend on defending their countries, relative to the size of their respective economies. Whilst decisions on defence spending remain in the hands of national governments, Members of the European Parliament are backing moves to complement EU government defence projects through additional EU funding for defence-related investment.
Presciently, the EU already launched its first approach to boosting defence with the European Defence Fund in 2021. To increase cooperation between EU countries, this €8 billion fund promotes joint defence research and capability development, defence innovation and cross-border industrial cooperation through over 160 collaborative projects. However, the interim evaluation of the European Defence Fund (EDF) highlighted the need for funding to be faster, more flexible, and for better definition of projects for real strategic impact.
The EDF is just one way in which the EU aims to tackle the European defence industry’s high fragmentation, where Member States take national positions that nevertheless undermine overall efficiency, interoperability and competitiveness at the EU level. Today’s goal to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of EU defence spending is to develop a true common market for Europe’s security and defence industry. Less red-tape and greater defence alignment between EU countries could lead to governments enjoying the advantages of economies of scale in both industrial processes and procurement. Companies operating in the European defence technological and industrial base (known as EDTIB) could expand, and less funding would be lost to procurement from non-EU firms. Parliament is a strong supporter of a competitive EU defence market, which would lead to improved deterrence and resilience, and help EU countries better protect their sovereignty in today’s unpredictable geopolitical environment.
The principal mission of EU countries’ armed forces is to protect their borders and citizens. Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union, the mutual defence clause, also commits EU countries to aid and assist other Member States who are under attack. Most EU countries are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and therefore subject to Article 5, the collective defence clause. The armed forces of one or several EU Member States may therefore be called on to defend a border or a NATO Ally, and so need to be able to move swiftly across EU territory. However, military mobility today faces considerable barriers – outdated, inadequate or missing infrastructure (such as bridges) and inconsistent legislation. While some improvements have already been seen on customs and transport procedures, tackling the under-investment and regulatory barriers in this area as a collective could lead to benefits almost three times higher than when EU countries do not coordinate their investment.
Returning to the situation in Ukraine, military drones are the main cause of casualties among both civilians and troops. The EU is already using EDF funding to develop drone technology and countermeasures, with EU governments already investing heavily in drone production. Parliament is monitoring the situation carefully to ensure robust ethical guardrails and strong accountability – and is particularly concerned that military drone innovation should not lead to development of lethal autonomous weapons.
Finally, to help Ukraine defend its borders and its people, a recurring question is how to use Russian central bank assets, frozen by Western countries because of Russia’s attack, to sustain Ukraine against its aggressor(s). While legal opinions on the lawfulness of confiscating Russia’s money diverge, G7 countries have already agreed to use the extraordinary revenues generated by the assets to service and repay a US$50 billion G7 loan to Ukraine. The EU channels its support for Ukraine through the European Peace Facility, and has already allocated €6.1 billion to address military and defence needs (2022-2024). This funding adds to military support directly provided by EU Member States, leading to an estimated €63.2 billion in total support for the Ukrainian armed forces. Fully behind the principle that Russia should pay for the damage it has inflicted, Parliament is unwavering in its support for Ukraine.
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