European Union

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Introduction

In her State of the Union address in 2021, EU Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, stated that ‘we have started to develop a European defence ecosystem’ (von der Leyen 2021). Beyond a mere mention within her speech, the concept was never elaborated on from a policymaking point of view. In essence, while this is a policy signifier, it remains empty of tangible strategies or instruments at the European level. Yet, the concept provides a signal that the EU is moving toward a holistic perspective of European defence and security in the form of an organic collective development, already before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the role of the different parts of what we conceptualise as the Ecosystem has become more prominent. The invasion upended European countries’ defence assumptions, constituting a ‘Zeitenwende’ or ‘turning point’ in European security (Scholz 2024). The uncertainty over the transatlantic commitment since Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 further highlighted Europe’s need to strengthen its own security and defence capabilities. It is now critical that the various institutions and actors who constitute the Ecosystem work together to provide for European security given the current challenges.

 

The European Defence Ecosystem in a new light 

As an empty term, we aim to fill in the gap by proposing a European Defence Ecosystem, envisaged as the policy environment in which European and international security and defence actors operate. Conceptualised as the system of actors, institutions and processes engaged within European Defence, it includes (a) the UK, the EU and NATO (and their member states), as well as the defence industry as actors, and any formal and informal bilateral and mini-lateral cooperation between them; (b) relevant institutions and agencies at the EU, NATO and their member state level and; (c) policy instruments, procedures, initiatives and strategies put forward by those actors.

Previous research looked at different elements of the Ecosystem but it never took a systemic approach to connect these moving parts together under a wider framework for defence and security policy making (Håkansson 2024; 2021; Fiott 2023; Bergmann and Müller 2021). It also predominantly emphasised structural factors over the roles of individual agents as norm- and policy entrepreneurs or facilitators within critical junctures or as discursive agents within the organisations involved. We adopt an agent-centred approach emphasising the role institutions play in shaping actors’ preferences and channeling individual agency, incorporating insights from the public policy toolbox, in terms of agenda-setting, policy styles and the role of policy entrepreneurs in moving ideas and concepts forward.

Our approach also seeks to understand how agents navigate institutional complexity and how it shapes the relations between different organisations, engaging with research on institutional complexity (Çelik 2024; Hofmann 2019; Martill 2024), differentiated integration (Rieker 2021; Blockmans and Crosson 2021, Martill and Sus 2023), Europeanisation (Exadaktylos 2012) and orchestration (Abbott et al. 2015) to show this.

Whilst the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine provided an opportunity for a renewed coordinated response to the war among actors within the Ecosystem, including between the EU and UK, we argue that this specific relationship is the weak link. This is due to a lack of formal defence engagement between the UK and the EU (Sus and Martill 2024). It is clear that since the formation of the current Labour government, there is a window of opportunity to advance this relationship and by extension strengthen the European defence ecosystem.

 

UK-EU relations in the era of Russian aggression

The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine did not immediately lead to a closer security and defence partnership between the EU and the United Kingdom. But it did lead to a clear realisation on both sides that broader, collective issues were at stake and that the poor state of post-Brexit political relations might impede cooperation.

The rapidly emerging division of labour between the EU and NATO coupled with the rapid coordination efforts on the EU side made the UK’s self-imposed outsider status more costly than it had been during the Brexit process (Martill 2025). Meanwhile, the UK’s robust (and quick) response to Russia’s invasion drew plaudits from many EU member states, demonstrating the indispensability of the UK to the European security efforts.

UK-EU re-engagement developed cautiously and informally during this period and was limited by the desire of successive Conservative governments to avoid formal, structured ties. Instead, London focused on bilateral security agreements with countries neighbouring Russia, including Finland, Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltic states.

While the UK did not initially prioritise deeper institutional cooperation with the EU, there was close coordination between London and Brussels on sanctions policy and on support for Ukraine’s defence efforts. High-level calls took place between UK and EU leaders and the UK helped coordinate weapons transfers to Ukraine and shaped the curriculum for the EU’s own training mission (EUMAM Ukraine).

Signs of a new approach emerged in 2023 as the then opposition Labour Party signalled it would seek to negotiate a Security and Defence Partnership (SDP) with the EU if elected. The subsequent coming to power of a Labour government under Keir Starmer in July 2024 provided the opportunity to make this a reality and the Starmer government prioritised this aspect of the reset above other areas.

With the new political opening in London, the climate in EU–UK relations shifted. In May 2025, the two sides concluded a new Security and Defence Partnership, marking a reset in post-Brexit security relations and reflecting a shared response to an increasingly volatile global security environment (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, 2025). The framework establishes regular high-level strategic consultations, joint initiatives in areas such as maritime, space, and cyber security, hybrid threats, and defence-industrial cooperation, as well as the possibility of UK participation in selected EU defence programmes. While the partnership paves the way for deeper cooperation, it remains more of an opening than a concrete framework of cooperation.

The UK, treated as a regular third country, cannot immediately access new EU defence-industrial instruments, such as the €150 billion SAFE fund. For countries that have signed a Security and Defence Partnership, such as the United Kingdom, the regulation permits participation in common procurement actions; however, loans from SAFE remain reserved for EU member states. As of late 2025, negotiations are ongoing to enable fuller participation of UK companies via the UK”s financial contribution to the fund. However, the talks remain deadlocked because London has yet to agree on the fee structure and full industrial equivalence required for participation.

It is likely that a solution will be found, as the UK’s defence industry constitutes a key element of the European Defence Ecosystem, a fact well recognised by EU member states. Indeed, the lesson from earlier negotiations (e.g., over UK access to PESCO projects as a third country) suggest that – while EU member states are not undivided on these issues – there are strong incentives to find ways to enable the UK to participate from the outside, given the overall boost to EU credibility and strategic action this can produce.

 

Conclusion: What does the European Defence Ecosystem mean for the future of European defence and security?

The conceptual meaning of the European defence ecosystem involves a holistic investigation of the different parts and incorporates their interactions in creating a wider sum for European defence and security. In other words, how do the synergies across the different components of the Ecosystem help build what all the involved partners have in mind in terms of Europe’s role in world politics as a wider sum.

As a new conceptual undertaking with a substantive number of different actors, institutions and processes, this research agenda incorporates different avenues of investigation. We focus here on the ‘weak link’ of EU-UK relations due to the configuration of the Russian invasion of Ukraine constituting a window of opportunity, and the change of government in the UK, bringing in new policy entrepreneurs who are more willing to work closely with the EU on defence in a newly conceptualised integrated fashion. However, it is evident that other linkages are also legitimate fields of enquiry, including Europe’s cooperation with Ukraine, EU-NATO relations, the way minilateralism and informal cooperation frameworks feed into this Ecosystem, and how different actors work with the defence industry, which is also a part of UK-EU relations in this field.

The European Defence Ecosystem does not only constitute an innovative addition to the contemporary conceptualisation of European security, but as a term, it offers the opportunity to synergise with the policy making community. This will facilitate an understanding of the wider implications for defence and security policy, not only domestically but most importantly collectively among the different actors within the Ecosystem. In times of geopolitical turmoil, bridging the worlds of policy-making and academia is not only necessary but imperative – we simply cannot afford to do otherwise.

 

Author bios

Laura Chappell is Senior Lecturer in European Politics at the University of Surrey.

Theofanis Exadaktylos is Professor in European Politics at the University of Surrey.

Benjamin Martill is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Edinburgh.

Monika Sus is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Polish Academy of Sciences and Part-time Professor at the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute.

The post The birth of a European Defence Ecosystem? European defence in the era of geopolitical upheaval. appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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