European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Clare Ferguson and Sebastian Clapp.

Security has become a top concern for Europeans. With Ukrainians battling to protect their country against Russia’s aggression and reports of drone and aerial incursions almost a daily occurrence in several EU countries, the European Parliament is determined to ensure that the conditions are optimum for EU governments to step up their defence readiness. The European Commission is expected to publish a non-legislative defence readiness roadmap this month. In the meantime, the Parliament has repeatedly made its position clear that defence spending should increase.

Finding funding for defence was a low priority for many EU countries in recent years. This changed definitively with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and total Member State defence expenditure has since risen to €343 billion in 2024. Nevertheless, this is far below what other world powers spend on defending their countries, relative to the size of their respective economies. Whilst decisions on defence spending remain in the hands of national governments, Members of the European Parliament are backing moves to complement EU government defence projects through additional EU funding for defence-related investment.

Presciently, the EU already launched its first approach to boosting defence with the European Defence Fund in 2021. To increase cooperation between EU countries, this €8 billion fund promotes joint defence research and capability development, defence innovation and cross-border industrial cooperation through over 160 collaborative projects. However, the interim evaluation of the European Defence Fund (EDF) highlighted the need for funding to be faster, more flexible, and for better definition of projects for real strategic impact.

The EDF is just one way in which the EU aims to tackle the European defence industry’s high fragmentation, where Member States take national positions that nevertheless undermine overall efficiency, interoperability and competitiveness at the EU level. Today’s goal to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of EU defence spending is to develop a true common market for Europe’s security and defence industry. Less red-tape and greater defence alignment between EU countries could lead to governments enjoying the advantages of economies of scale in both industrial processes and procurement. Companies operating in the European defence technological and industrial base (known as EDTIB) could expand, and less funding would be lost to procurement from non-EU firms. Parliament is a strong supporter of a competitive EU defence market, which would lead to improved deterrence and resilience, and help EU countries better protect their sovereignty in today’s unpredictable geopolitical environment.

The principal mission of EU countries’ armed forces is to protect their borders and citizens. Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union, the mutual defence clause, also commits EU countries to aid and assist other Member States who are under attack. Most EU countries are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and therefore subject to Article 5, the collective defence clause. The armed forces of one or several EU Member States may therefore be called on to defend a border or a NATO Ally, and so need to be able to move swiftly across EU territory. However, military mobility today faces considerable barriers – outdated, inadequate or missing infrastructure (such as bridges) and inconsistent legislation. While some improvements have already been seen on customs and transport procedures, tackling the under-investment and regulatory barriers in this area as a collective could lead to benefits almost three times higher than when EU countries do not coordinate their investment.

Returning to the situation in Ukraine, military drones are the main cause of casualties among both civilians and troops. The EU is already using EDF funding to develop drone technology and countermeasures, with EU governments already investing heavily in drone production. Parliament is monitoring the situation carefully to ensure robust ethical guardrails and strong accountability – and is particularly concerned that military drone innovation should not lead to development of lethal autonomous weapons.

Finally, to help Ukraine defend its borders and its people, a recurring question is how to use Russian central bank assets, frozen by Western countries because of Russia’s attack, to sustain Ukraine against its aggressor(s). While legal opinions on the lawfulness of confiscating Russia’s money diverge, G7 countries have already agreed to use the extraordinary revenues generated by the assets to service and repay a US$50 billion G7 loan to Ukraine. The EU channels its support for Ukraine through the European Peace Facility, and has already allocated €6.1 billion to address military and defence needs (2022-2024). This funding adds to military support directly provided by EU Member States, leading to an estimated €63.2 billion in total support for the Ukrainian armed forces. Fully behind the principle that Russia should pay for the damage it has inflicted, Parliament is unwavering in its support for Ukraine.

Further reading:

• EU defence funding
• The interim evaluation of the European Defence Fund
• Building a common market for European defence
• Military mobility
• Towards a comprehensive and beneficial approach to military mobility
• Military drone systems in the EU and global context: Types, capabilities and regulatory frameworks
• Confiscation of immobilised Russian sovereign assets: State of play, arguments and scenarios
• European Peace Facility – For Ukraine, but not only

Written by Marie Lecerf.

Updated on 14.10.2025.

At more than one in five, the number of children at risk of poverty in the European Union (EU) remains high. This year’s International Day for the Eradication of Poverty presents an opportunity to take stock of what the EU is doing to fight child poverty. Even though legal competence for child policy remains primarily with the Member States, the fight against child poverty is a major EU priority. The European strategy on the rights of the child now reflects the EU’s increasing willingness to tackle child poverty, while the use of European funds is key to success.

Background

It is now 33 years since the United Nations (UN) established the International Day for the Eradication of Poverty. The objective of the international day’s 2025 edition, to be marked on 17 October, is to ‘end social and institutional maltreatment by ensuring respect and effective support for families’. In recent decades, there has been marked progress in reducing poverty worldwide. Nevertheless, the number of people living in poverty remains very high, even in the EU, in particular among children. In 2024, 93.3 million people in the EU‑27 were living in households at risk of poverty or social exclusion (i.e. 21.0 % of the EU‑27 population, according to Eurostat). With an at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate of 24.2 % for the EU‑27, children were at greater risk in 2024 than adults (see Figure 1).

Children at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU, 2024 EU contribution to the fight against child poverty Legal basis

The EU is guided by the principles set out in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by all EU Member States. The objective of promoting protection of the rights of the child is established in Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union. Moreover, the EU and its Member States are bound to comply with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 24 of which is dedicated entirely to the rights of the child.

EU policy responses

Fighting child poverty in the EU is primarily a Member State responsibility. Nevertheless, at EU level there is broad consensus that action is needed to lift children out of poverty and to promote children’s wellbeing.

The proclamation of the European pillar of social rights in November 2017 demonstrated increasing willingness to tackle child poverty in the EU. Principle 11 is clear that the fight against child poverty is a priority of today’s social Europe, while referring to children’s right to protection from poverty.

In June 2021, the European Commission adopted, and the Council endorsed, a recommendation on the European Child Guarantee, demanding that social exclusion be tackled by guaranteeing that children in need have access to services, such as early childhood education and care, education, healthcare, nutrition, housing, cultural and leisure activities. Many of these services are provided at regional and local levels, as highlighted by the Commission in its April 2024 recommendation on developing and strengthening child protection systems in the best interests of the child. Three years after the publication of their national action plans, Member States have submitted progress reports, which generally emphasise the need for better monitoring and clearer targets, tackling regional inequalities, expanding proven pilot projects, improving data sharing, reaching more vulnerable children, building the workforce and ensuring stable long-term funding.

In her 2025 State of the Union address, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to eradicating poverty by 2050 and announced a European anti-poverty strategy.

The EU has also committed to the UN Sustainable Development Goals, not least Goal 1, which aims to halve the number of people, including children, in poverty, by 2030.

EU funds

Numerous financial instruments offer Member States EU support for measures to address child poverty.

• For the 2021-2027 programming period, the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) provides a broad range of funding opportunities to fight child poverty. The Fund for European Aid to the most Deprived (FEAD) is built into ESF+, allowing greater synergies between the two funds to address child poverty; the ESF+ also links to the national recovery and resilience plans. ESF+ supports measures to eradicate child poverty in the EU through the implementation of the European Child Guarantee.
• Under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), €200 billion (2018 prices) is dedicated to measures to promote social inclusion and combat poverty, notably by supporting investment in social infrastructure, equipment and access to quality services, such as new classrooms or modernised capacity for childcare, and education facilities.
• Member States can also make use of the InvestEU and REACT-EU programmes or the Recovery and Resilience Facility to fund measures combating child poverty and social exclusion.

European Parliament

Demonstrating its commitment to child wellbeing, Parliament has had a Coordinator on Children’s Rights since 2018, a position held by Parliament Vice-President Ewa Kopacz (EPP, Poland) since 2019.

Parliament has also adopted several resolutions and reports addressing child poverty over the years. Most recently, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) has been working on a draft report on developing a new EU anti-poverty strategy (rapporteur: João Oliveira, GUE/NGL, Portugal), scheduled for a committee vote by the end of the year. The rapporteur’s draft report calls for a comprehensive EU strategy to eradicate poverty by 2035, highlights that child poverty constitutes a violation of human rights, and urges the adoption of integrated measures across social, educational and health policies.

In a March 2024 resolution, Parliament called for a European Capitals for Children initiative to help fight child poverty, make a comprehensive examination of children’s living conditions and ensure effective implementation of the European Child Guarantee.

On 21 November 2023, with resolutions on reducing inequalities and promoting social inclusion in times of crisis for children and their families and on strengthening the Child Guarantee, Members urged the Commission and the Member States to do more to tackle the challenge of child poverty.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘EU contribution to the fight against child poverty‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai and Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Raffaele Ventura, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides insight into the economic performance of Georgia compared with the European Union (EU) and examines the trade dynamics between them. In 2024, Georgia achieved a sustained growth rate of its economy of 9.4%, while the EU-27 managed only a growth rate of 1.1%. Georgia’s public debt as a percentage of GDP continues to decline, recovering from the significant increase in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The EU-27 is Georgia’s primary trading partner, accounting for 22.1% of its trade share, with Germany being the leading country. The main exported goods to Georgia are vehicles, aircraft, mechanical appliances, and electrical equipment, while the EU mainly imports ores, slag, ash, and agri-food from Georgia.

Read this ‘infographic’ on ‘Georgia: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

GDP growth
(annual change, %) Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
(at PPP 1 in thousands of international dollars) Female labour force participation rate
(% of female population aged 15+) Total unemployment rate
(% of total labour force) FDI and remittances
Foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflows (% of GDP) Public finances, monetary and financial data EU trade with Georgia Main trade partners (2024)
Trade in goods, exports plus imports Top EU partners (2024)
Trade in goods EU exports of goods to Georgia (2024) EU imports of goods from Georgia (2024)

Written by Gregor Erbach.

The forthcoming United Nations Climate Change Conference – COP30 – to be held in Belém, Brazil, in November 2025, is a decisive moment in international climate action. By September 2025, countries have to submit the third round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC 3.0) that will determine whether the targets of the Paris Agreement remain within reach. NDCs are countries’ climate plans, setting national greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets and means of implementation. Parties to the Paris Agreement must update them every five years to ensure progress towards the agreement’s temperature target. The updated NDCs cover a timeframe up to 2035 and must align with the outcomes of the first global stocktake and with Parties’ long-term GHG emissions reduction objectives.

Analysis by the United Nations Environment Programme shows that current efforts would lead to global warming of between 2.6 and 3.1 °C by 2100. Therefore, NDCs should demonstrate increased ambition, backed by concrete measures to deliver on the targets. Those major economies that have already submitted NDCs 3.0 (Brazil, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) have set higher targets for 2035 compared with 2030. However, these pledges would already take up about 36 % of the remaining post-2030 carbon budget for 1.5 °C, while these Parties represent only 19.2 % of global emissions.

The EU needs to submit its collective NDC 3.0 in September 2025, informed by the legislative proposal for amending the European Climate Law with a climate target for 2040.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The third generation of national climate plans: Analysis of major economies’ nationally determined contributions ahead of COP30‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Timelines of major economies’ successive waves of NDC submissions NDC 3.0 share of the remaining global post-2030 carbon budget

Written by Tim Peters and Jakub Przetacznik with Ana Luisa Melo Almeida.

Updated on 07.10.2025

In response to Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, which started in February 2022, the European Union (EU) and its Member States have provided unprecedented financial, military and humanitarian support to Ukraine. According to European Commission figures, Team Europe, consisting of the EU and its Member States, has made available around €173.5 billion in support to Ukraine. This support encompasses macro-financial assistance, financial support through the Ukraine Facility, humanitarian aid and military assistance from Member States and the European Peace Facility, as well as support to Ukrainian refugees in the EU.

The overall support for Ukraine provided by Team Europe is now larger than the support provided by the United States, except in terms of military support allocation, even though Team Europe has provided 83 % of the tanks and 61 % of the air defence systems given to Ukraine since the start of the full-scale war.

The disbursement of EU payments is conditional on Ukraine implementing the Ukraine Plan – an ambitious reform and investment plan drafted by Ukraine’s government and endorsed by the EU. The G7 have agreed upon a further €45 billion loan, with €18.1 billion of the whole amount to be financed by the EU. For that purpose, a Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism has been established, which uses extraordinary revenues originating from Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the G7 member states to repay loans and associated interest costs. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for a full confiscation of immobilised Russian sovereign assets with the objective of making Russia pay for the destruction it has brought on Ukraine. The European Commission has proposed to use those assets for a ‘reparation loan’ to Ukraine.

Read the complete briefing on ‘State of Play: EU support to Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Team Europe financial, humanitarian and military support for Ukraine, February 2022 to September 2025, in € billion Bilateral and EU budget contributions to Ukraine by EU and non-EU Member States, 2022-2025, in € billion and as a % of GNI

Written by Vasilis Margaras.

Towns and cities are home to nearly three quarters of the EU’s population. Many EU cities and urban areas constitute vibrant spaces of economic growth and innovation. However, they also face multiple challenges, such as building inclusive societies, tackling inequalities, addressing climate change and environmental degradation, and dealing with housing issues and demographic challenges. Cities are at the forefront of implementing EU legislation in several policy areas, including cohesion, and have been demanding a stronger role in shaping these policies and greater access to EU financial resources.

Cohesion policy has a strong urban dimension. Its support for sustainable urban development was reinforced in the current 2021-2027 programming period to help cities take an active role in designing and implementing policy responses to their own challenges. Cohesion funds invest more than €100 billion in towns and cities. For their part, cities are directly responsible for designing and implementing investments worth over €24 billion under the cohesion policy programmes.

The emergence of the Urban Agenda for the EU in 2016 and the beginning of participatory partnerships raised new expectations about the role of urban authorities in the EU decision-making process. The Pact of Amsterdam provided for urban partnerships focusing on key urban themes such as air quality, urban poverty and housing. However, progress in empowering cities within cohesion policy has been limited. Stakeholders evaluating the progress of the Urban Agenda for the EU highlight issues such as limited EU resources channelled to tackling urban issues, obstacles in achieving direct EU funding, a lack of effective long-term urban governance mechanisms in EU policymaking, and limited input of urban areas into EU policies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘A new urban policy agenda for the EU: Addressing cities’ current challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Enrico D’Ambrogio.

Japan’s culture of national resilience is one of the most advanced in the world. The UN-backed definition of preparedness was adopted in 2017 in Japan, a country highly exposed to natural hazards, under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). Through national resilience, the country aims to prevent human loss by any means, avoid fatal damage to important functions for maintaining administration as well as social and economic systems, mitigate damage to private property and public facilities, and achieve swift recovery and reconstruction.

The COVID-19 pandemic made Japan an early mover in the implementation of economic security policies, including reducing the dependence of its supply chains on China. Japan appointed the world’s first minister for economic security and adopted legislation to protect the country from coercion by others through economic dependency. Japan’s initiatives also made it a leader in global green supply chains. The adoption of three main documents in December 2022 helped Japan reshape its approach to national security and defence and become better equipped to face the current complex geopolitical environment.

In March 2025, the European Commission launched the preparedness union strategy. The EU and Japan are increasing cooperation in several aspects related to preparedness and resilience, including in economic security, cybersecurity and foreign information manipulation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Japan’s preparedness strategies: Lessons for the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Parliament’s first October plenary session featured a formal address by Jens-Frederik Nielsen, Prime Minister of Greenland. Members discussed the European Union’s relations with countries outside the Union in various debates, including on the EU’s role in supporting peace efforts for Gaza and a two-state solution; a united EU response to Russian violation of EU Member States’ airspace; an EU strategy to face Iran’s nuclear threat and on EU sanctions; the situation in Afghanistan; and the Second World Summit for Social Development. Members also considered and rejected two motions of censure of the Commission. A debate addressed rising antisemitism in Europe. Members also debated intergenerational fairness; completing the single market; and promoting EU digital rules. Finally, a debate marked World Mental Health Day (10 October), and Members debated the public health risks exacerbated by global warming.

This is Europe debate

The October I 2025 session featured the first ‘This is Europe‘ debate of the current term, with the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Luc Frieden.

Visa suspension mechanism

Many non-EU nationals can visit the Schengen area for 90 days without having to apply for a visa. To protect the system from abuse, the visa suspension mechanism allows the EU to temporarily end the visa exemption for citizens of certain countries for security reasons. A proposal to strengthen the mechanism has been on the table since 2023. Members held a debate and adopted the text agreed between Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Council, which emphasises the links between the EU’s external relations and the need to revise the visa suspension mechanism to cover, for instance, cases of state-sponsored instrumentalisation of migrants, investor-citizenship schemes and human rights violations.

Common agricultural policy simplification

Following a debate on the common agricultural policy (CAP), Members approved a report on the European Commission proposal to amend the current rules on payments to farmers, aimed at cutting red tape, one of the farming community’s key demands. Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development proposes the CAP simplification include more flexibility on environmental rules, easier access to crisis payments and increased support for small and medium-sized farms. The vote sets Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

European works councils

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement reached by Parliament’s negotiators on a revision of the European Works Councils Directive. European works councils represent workers employed by multinationals operating in at least two EU countries. The revision of the legislation aims at strengthening the enforcement of transnational information and consultation rights, excluding trivial issues and including stronger provisions on gender balance. Parliament has succeeded in including rules to ensure penalties will be dissuasive, effective and proportionate.

Amending budget No 2/2025

Members adopted amending budget No 2/2025, updating the revenue side of the current year’s EU budget. The report from Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) endorsed the Council position on the Commission proposal to take revised revenue forecasts into account and notes the need for increased gross national income contributions from the Member States. The committee also reiterates that the EU must endeavour to find fresh funding streams for new EU policy priorities.

Inland waterway transport: River Information Services

Members adopted an agreed revision to the legislation ensuring safety and environmental protection on the EU’s inland waterways. Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) reached an agreement with the Council that the revision should establish a single digital information platform, ensure harmonised reporting, introduce a feedback mechanism and update privacy and security requirements. The committee would, however, prefer that the scope of the revision of harmonised river information services apply only to waterways and ports that are part of a cross-border network.

Extension of the derogation for heavy-duty vehicles with zero emissions

The EU aims at reducing CO2 emissions from heavy-duty vehicles by 43 % by 2030, with higher targets to follow. However, as zero-emission heavy-duty vehicles remain expensive, EU law allows governments to encourage their use by granting reductions or exemptions to road charges for such vehicles. Members approved, under the urgent procedure, an extension of the derogation for heavy-duty vehicles with zero emissions to June 2031.

New strategic EU-India agenda

Members held a debate on Council and Commission statements on a joint communication, which lays out the path for negotiations on a new strategic EU-India agenda, set for adoption at a bilateral summit in 2026. The debate covered progress on a free trade agreement, financial supervision arrangements and security and defence ties.

EU-Côte d’Ivoire Fisheries Partnership Agreement

Following a recommendation from Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries (PECH), Members granted Parliament’s consent for the conclusion of a new protocol covering the EU’s fisheries agreement with Côte d’Ivoire. The protocol sets opportunities for EU vessels from Spain, France and Portugal to fish for tuna in Côte d’Ivoire’s waters, in exchange for a financial contribution to the country’s sustainable fisheries sector.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Four decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, from: the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) and Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) Committees on the public interface connected to the Internal Market Information System for the declaration of posting of workers; from the EMPL committee on improving and enforcing working conditions of trainees and combating regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships (‘Traineeships Directive’); from the IMCO committee on market availability of measuring instruments: electric vehicle supply equipment, compressed gas dispensers, and electricity, gas and thermal energy meters; and from the Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) Committee on incentivising defence-related investments in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan were approved without a vote.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – October I 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

When asked how many microcontrollers they have on their desk, most people would only consider the one in their laptop, whereas in fact, a laptop alone contains several. Besides the microprocessor hosting the Control Processing Unit (CPU), which is not a microcontroller properly speaking, microcontrollers govern laptop functions such as communications, drivers, the power supply, touchpad and screen. There may also be another microcontroller (or several) in their smartphone, plus those in their landline phone, watch, earphones, mouse, calendar, thermometer, printer, chargers, external screen – and even in the coffee machine and the desk lamp. Microelectronics technology is everywhere: it includes semiconductors and components, but is far broader than that. It ranges from the control units for cars, planes and drones to small appliances, medical equipment or mobile phones, reaching over US$600 billion in revenue, up by 19.7 % year-on-year, excluding software development for artificial intelligence (AI).

The microelectronics industry is a strategic asset for Europe, which the European Commission ranks as one of the most research and development (R&D) intensive sectors. The sector supports around 200 000 jobs directly and more than 1 000 000 indirect jobs in Europe. However, the EU share in global chip capacity has decreased from 13 % in 2010 to 7‑8 % in 2025. This can be attributed to factors such as growing manufacturing costs – including energy – and low public investment in the required R&D to deploy the complex supply chain and to support initial investment in manufacturing equipment.

The major manufacturers of semiconductor chips are based in the USA (Intel, Micron), Taiwan (TSMC) and South Korea (Samsung, SK Hynix), and most designers (or Fabless semiconductor companies) are also based in the USA (NVIDIA, AMD). Nevertheless, the EU has traditionally been at the forefront of the global semiconductor value chain, holding specific know-how, such as in the production of equipment for manufacturing semiconductors (e.g. ASML in the Netherlands). Furthermore, and although they are decreasing and insufficiently widespread, Europe retains the basic skills for non-advanced everyday (but highly strategic) versions of microelectronics technology.

Potential impacts and developments

Microelectronic components are complete miniaturised circuits composed of standard electronic parts, such as transistors, capacitors, diodes, and resistors, which operate at microscopic scale. These circuits are designed to perform specific functions and, therefore, are closely linked to optimisation in the assembly of new products and devices. Modern versions of technological products rely on microelectronics technology to the extent that no product can compete in the market today without it, which risks excluding the small and medium-sized enterprises that are – and will remain – vital to the EU and usually lack the required skills and resources. This is not always about the newest technologies and the highest levels of integration for big production series, it is also about everyday components in a broad variety of industrial sectors. The competitive advantage of already strong microelectronic players has become overwhelming.

According to the European Semiconductor Industry Association (ESIA), in the EU this sector has a multiplier effect of around 2.5 (meaning that every euro invested in the industry generates an additional €2.5 in economic activity), whereas this same factor is 4.3 in the USA and 3.5 in China. Microelectronics accounts for around 1.4 % to 1.6 % of the EU’s GDP (€230 billion to €250 billion), 2.2 % to 2.5 % of the USA’s GDP (€380 billion to €440 billion) and 2.5 % to 3.0 % of China’s GDP (€390 billion to €480 billion).

Strategic sectors such as the automotive industry, AI, telecommunications and defence are fast evolving to models that are ever more dependent on microelectronics to provide new functionalities, which are becoming key market assets. The European Chips Act entered into force on 21 September 2023, together with the Critical Raw Materials Act; they have become key pillars for EU open strategic autonomy, setting a reliable foundation for a competitive EU.

Anticipatory policymaking

While addressing competitiveness in her 2025 State of the Union speech, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stressed the need to ‘keep up the speed’. The Commission will therefore ‘propose an industrial accelerator act for key strategic sectors and technologies’. Von der Leyen concluded that, ‘when it comes to digital and clean tech’, the EU aims to be ‘faster, smarter and more European’. However, and although she particularly referred to critical raw materials and this was implicit in her speech, she did not specifically mention microelectronics or semiconductors. However, they are fundamental to achieving the proposed goals of a competitive knowledge economy and enhanced defence capacity.

Pillar I of the European Chips Act establishes the chips for Europe initiative, which will support technological capacity building and innovation in the Union by bridging the gap between the Union’s advanced research and innovation capabilities and their industrial (and dual-use) exploitation. Horizon Europe allocates significant funding for R&D in the microelectronics sector, while the Chips Joint Undertaking (Chips JU) aims to support its development. Related technologies such as the internet of things, edge computing and AI benefit from complementary initiatives such as smart anything everywhere (SAE) and the European processor initiative (EPI). The EU is addressing the skills shortage through programmes such as the digital education action plan and the more specific large-scale partnership (LSP) in microelectronics, which promotes specialised training. Additionally, the Important Project of Common European Interest (IPCEI) in microelectronics allows EU Member States to support related projects with State aid, and initiatives such as Eurostack aim to improve the EU’s strategic autonomy.

While the Chips Act is a definite step forward, the strong strategic aspect of this sector requires continued monitoring and sustained action. Policymakers and industry leaders can work together to promote public and private investment and the development of a sustainable business environment suitable for the microelectronics industry, including to support the development of skills, talent, innovation and risk-taking that will bolster European prosperity and security.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if the EU ran on microelectronics?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai and Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Raffaele Ventura, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides insight into the economic performance of Ukraine compared with the European Union (EU) and examines the trade dynamics between them. In 2024, Ukraine experienced an economic growth rate of 3.5%, while the EU-27 recorded a growth rate of only 1.1%. Both regions continue to see declining inflation rates. However, increasing exchange rate of the Ukrainian hryvnia reveals a weakening currency, alongside a rise in the country’s public net debt, which has climbed to 89.8%. The EU-27 is Ukraine’s primary trading partner, accounting for 53.6% of its trade share, with Poland being the leading country with trade value €17.8 billion. In 2024, while overall EU exports are on the rise, imports from Ukraine to the EU are experiencing a declining trend.

Read this ‘infographic’ on ‘Ukraine: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

GDP growth
(annual change, %) Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
(at PPP 1 in thousands of international dollars) Female labour force participation rate
(% of female population aged 15+) Total unemployment rate
(% of total labour force) FDI and remittances Public finances, monetary and financial data EU trade with Ukraine Main trade partners (2024) Top EU partners (2024) EU exports of goods to Ukraine (2024) EU imports of goods from Ukraine (2024)

Written by Sebastian Clapp and Martin Höflmayr with Falk Vambrie.

The European defence industry is highly fragmented, with limited collaborative investment and procurement, divergent national regulations, and protectionist tendencies that undermine efficiency, interoperability and competitiveness. The Letta report makes the case for a concerted effort to advance towards the development of a ‘Common Market for the Security and Defence Industry’, which focuses on regulatory simplification, pooled procurement, and cross-border industrial integration. While the Draghi report puts its finger on the EU defence sector’s fragmentation, under-investment, and external dependencies, it urges coordinated action to strengthen the industrial base, boost joint innovation, and align national efforts through common policies and incentives. According to the White Paper for European Defence, a truly integrated EU defence market would be among the largest globally, strengthening competitiveness, readiness and industrial scale. It would enable firms from the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) to expand across the Union and stimulate cross-border cooperation, mergers and new ventures, increasing the availability of EU-made defence products.

The new Defence Readiness Omnibus aims to remove procedural bottlenecks and facilitate up to €800 billion in defence investment under the Rearm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan, combining streamlined procurement rules, simplified intra-EU transfers, and revised financial instruments. Achieving readiness and autonomy requires predictable joint planning, harmonised standards, and public-private coordination. Without genuine market reform, Europe’s rising defence spending risks being absorbed by inefficiencies rather than delivering real capability gains. A functioning common defence market is therefore essential not only for competitiveness, but also for deterrence, resilience and strategic sovereignty in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment.

The European Parliament advocates a fully integrated internal market for defence to overcome fragmentation, urging regulatory reform, joint procurement, and cross-border industrial cooperation as essential steps towards greater efficiency, competitiveness, and strategic autonomy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Building a common market for European defence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU members of NATO: Composition of defence spending

Written by Maria Niestadt.

As the global race to harness the power of artificial intelligence (AI) accelerates, the European Union has set the objective of becoming a leading AI continent. The adoption of the Artificial Intelligence Act in 2024 was a milestone in establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework for AI in the EU, but regulation alone cannot make the EU a technological leader. In April 2025, the European Commission published an AI continent action plan, a communication that attempts to look beyond rules and combine regulatory oversight with investment, infrastructure and skills development. It also aims to increase the use of AI in both the private and public sector. The plan illustrates the Commission’s growing attention to competitiveness, moving away from its previous focus on setting usage rules

Despite progress in some areas, the EU is still far from being a global leader in AI, in terms of scale, investment, and uptake of AI. Structural weaknesses such as a fragmented single market, limited private investment, and reliance on foreign cloud and semiconductor technology continue to hinder progress. Stakeholders are divided on the road to follow. While industry representatives call for simplifying regulation to boost innovation, civil society warns against sacrificing democratic safeguards.

The EU’s prospects of becoming an AI continent depend not only on its ability to implement the AI continent action plan but also on its decisiveness in acting on other fronts such as making progress on the Savings and Investments Union, and its progress in reducing reliance on foreign technologies. The European Parliament will play a central role in scrutinising the Commission’s activities and shaping legislation such as the forthcoming Cloud and AI Development Act.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Making Europe an AI continent‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clément Evroux.

CONTEXT

On 25 June 2025, the Commission published a proposal for a regulation on the safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities in the European Union (EU) (‘the EU space act’). A majority of Member States have already adopted or are considering adopting legislation on space activities. The regulation’s relevance was highlighted by Mario Draghi’s report on the future of European competitiveness, which explained the role of space systems and services in supporting the EU’s sovereignty and economy.

Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – TFEU (internal market) is the legal basis of the proposed regulation. It aims to create a single market for space activities, grounded on common safety, sustainability and resilience rules, which should apply in principle to any space operator providing space services in the EU. The proposal is expected to lay down rules on: the authorisation, registration and supervision of space activities and services carried out by space service providers; orbit traffic management; and the establishment of an EU space label. On resilience, the proposed regulation is expected to complement Directive (EU)2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the EU, and Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities. In the Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), which has appointed Elena Donazzan (ECR, Italy) as rapporteur. In the Council, the working party on space has started examining the proposal.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0335(COD) – Proposal for a regulation on the safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities in the Union – COM(2025) 335, 25 June 2025

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0335(COD) EU space law

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU space act‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Steven Blaakman.

Although euthanasia and assisted dying remain highly controversial in large parts of the globe, an increasing number of countries have legislation on it in place or are considering doing so. This is due to changing attitudes, advancements in medical technology and an ageing population.

Several EU countries are at the forefront of these legal changes; at the same time, each of them has come up with its own solutions for addressing challenges such as how to avoid abuse.

Neither EU law nor the European Convention on Human Rights contain provisions precluding EU countries from legislating on euthanasia. In response to questions from Members of the European Parliament, the European Commission has made it clear the EU is not competent to deal with the issue in any way.

Four EU countries – Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – have legislation in force that allows euthanasia to be administered by a physician. Germany, Italy and Austria allow assisted suicide only.

The Netherlands and Belgium, the two EU countries that were the first to allow euthanasia, have seen an increasing number of people apply for euthanasia over the years, with studies showing no sign of the legislation leading to any abuse.

In addition, several EU countries are working on legislation on euthanasia or assisted dying. These include: Ireland, France, Cyprus, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia. The Portuguese parliament adopted relevant legislation back in 2023; however, owing to vetoes by the Portuguese president and rulings by the country’s constitutional court, it has still not entered into force.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Euthanasia legislation in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Pieter Baert.

G7 statement

On 28 June 2025, the G7 issued a statement expressing a ‘shared understanding’ that the domestic and foreign profits of US-parented multinational groups would be excluded from the scope of Pillar Two, the OECD-G20 global minimum corporate tax framework. Instead, the G7 signalled readiness to work on a ‘side-by-side’ approach in which the US GILTI regime, its current minimum tax on foreign earnings of US parented groups – would co-exist with Pillar Two. The statement allowed for the withdrawal of proposed US retaliatory measures (‘section 899’) that had been included in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA).

Reminder: Pillar Two applies a 15 % global minimum effective tax rate using a hierarchical rule order to ensure large multinational enterprises are taxed appropriately in each jurisdiction:

• 1. The Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-Up Tax (QDMTT) – Gives the local jurisdiction first claim to top up low-taxed domestic profits.
• 2. The Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) – The ultimate parent’s jurisdiction imposes a top-up tax on the local parent entity to make up for any remaining low-taxed profits of foreign entities.
• 3. The Undertaxed Profits Rule (UTPR) – If the IIR is not applied by the ultimate parent’s jurisdiction, the UTPR steps in as a backstop, with lower-tier jurisdictions imposing top-up taxes on local entities to make up for any remaining low-taxed profits in the parent jurisdiction or any other third jurisdiction.

Council Directive (EU) 2022/2523 introduced Pillar Two’s minimum tax rules in the EU.

Given the broad nature of the G7 statement, which speaks of ‘accepted principles’, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions at this stage. Based on its wording, a side-by-side approach – if endorsed by the OECD Inclusive Framework – could imply that non-US jurisdictions would not apply the UTPR to local entities of US-parented groups in respect of low-taxed profits arising in the US or in another jurisdiction that does not apply the QDMTT or the IIR. However, the statement does not explicitly clarify the specific terms of the exemption. For instance, it does not address how US intermediary parent entities within non-US multinational groups would be treated for minimum tax purposes, the potential creditability of the GILTI tax in relation to a jurisdiction’s QDMTT, or how the side-by-side approach would be defined in legislation.

NCTI and Pillar Two

As Pillar Two and the US’ GILTI (now called ‘NCTI’ under the OBBBA) operate on different principles and design features, it is difficult to assess to what extent the side-by-side approach could raise concerns about a level playing field or lead to base erosion and profit shifting among the multinational companies subject to each regime. Potential competitive disadvantages arise not only from differences in direct tax liabilities but also from the variations in the administrative and legal complexity of the respective regimes.

The OBBBA, signed into law in July 2025, introduced several adjustments allowing NCTI to more accurately reflect the real outcomes of Pillar Two. It increased the effective tax rate to 14 % (up from 13.125 %) and removed the carve-out for the Qualified Business Asset Investment (QBAI), thereby broadening the taxable base.

However, a key difference between the two systems remains: the ‘blending’ of income. Pillar Two requires corporate groups to meet a minimum level of tax in each jurisdiction where they operate (‘jurisdictional blending’), while the US’ NCTI allows income and foreign taxes to be blended across all foreign countries (‘global blending’). This way, low-taxed income can be offset with high-taxed income elsewhere and profits in some jurisdictions can be reduced by losses in others.

Table 1 – Key comparisons between OECD G20 Pillar Two and US NCTI

 OECD-G20 – Pillar TwoUS – NCTITax rate15 %14 %Tax baseBased on accounting incomeBased on US taxable incomeBlendingJurisdictional blendingGlobal blendingCarve-outsBased on payroll and tangible assets (SBIE)Payroll or tangible assets do not qualify for a carve-out

Note: The effective 14 % floor of NCTI results from the interaction of the 21 % US statutory corporate tax rate, the 60% inclusion of NCTI taxable income and the 90 % foreign tax credit limitation ((21 % * 60 %)/90 % = 14 %).

Additionally, the OBBA introduced broader corporate tax changes, such as permanent expensing for domestic R&D investments and a higher interest deductibility cap, to enhance US competitiveness.

Pillar One

The G7’s statement noted that the delivery of the side-by-side system ‘will facilitate further progress to stabilize the international tax system, including a constructive dialogue on the taxation of the digital economy’, referencing the negotiations on Pillar One. During the September 2025 plenary session, in response to questions from Members of the European Parliament on Pillar One and the prospects for a European digital services tax (DST), the European Commission acknowledged that Pillar One discussions were ‘on hold’ but could resume once a Pillar Two solution is reached. To give the OECD-led process space and time to deliver, the Commission stated that it does not intend to table a new proposal for a DST at this stage.

Several countries have already implemented or announced digital services taxes (DSTs), with revenues steadily increasing over time, showcasing the continuous growth of the digital economy. In 2023, Spain, Italy and France collectively generated €1.4 billion from their DSTs. However, estimating the revenue potential of an EU-wide DST would heavily depend on key design parameters, such as the definition of in-scope activities (the types of digital services or business activities that would fall under the tax), the applicable tax rate, and the revenue thresholds.

Table 2 – Revenue of DSTs, € million, 2019-2023

Revenue (€ million)20192020202120222023Spain  €166€295€323France€277€375€474€621€668Italy €233€303€394€434

Data source: Data on Taxation Trends – European Commission. All three countries apply a 3 % DST on turnover from online advertising, user data sales and digital platforms, with a €750 million global revenue threshold and varying domestic thresholds: €3 million (Spain), €25 million (France), and €5.5 million (Italy; lowered to €0 in 2025).

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Side by side? The future of Pillar Two minimum corporate tax rules‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gisela Grieger.

The importance of the EU’s trade defence arsenal is underscored, among other factors, by persistent global overcapacity in a range of sectors, which has significant distorting effects on international markets, and by the weaponisation of trade, including through economic coercion amid growing geopolitical tensions.

The arsenal can be divided into two categories. First, the EU’s traditional trade defensive instruments (TDIs), which are based on multilateral trade agreements going back to Codes developed under the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; and second, the EU’s more recent autonomous trade instruments, most of which were enacted between 2019 and 2024.

TDIs enable the EU to deter and combat unfair trade practices from companies and public authorities of third countries, shield EU industries and jobs from these practices, and restore a level playing field for EU companies in the internal market. TDIs are mainly applied in the form of additional duties on imports of dumped and/or subsidised goods, or on goods whose imports have surged suddenly and unexpectedly and have caused serious injury to EU industry – or threaten to do so.

The EU’s autonomous trade instruments seek to fill regulatory gaps in international trade law in areas such as public procurement and foreign subsidies, with a view to levelling the playing field between EU companies and non-EU companies and to safeguarding the EU’s economic interests, including its economic security.

Against the backdrop of the United States’ recent unilateral tariff policies, which are likely to lead to a diversion of trade flows to other markets, including the EU, and to a further increase in the global use of trade defence measures, the relevance of the EU’s trade defence toolbox is set to grow in the future.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding the EU trade defence toolbox‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf.

A persisting gender pay gap

The ‘gender pay gap’ is a measurable indicator of inequality between women and men. It generally refers to the average difference between the remuneration of employed female and male workers.

Although the gender pay gap is measured by different methods and indicators, data clearly show that women around the world still earn less than men. Across OECD countries, on average, the unadjusted gender pay gap stands at 11.9 % – meaning that the median full-time working woman earns about 88 cents to every dollar or euro earned by the median full-time working man. This rate has barely moved in recent decades. Despite the increase in women’s educational attainment and participation in the labour market over the years, the gender pay gap remains a persistent and multi-dimensional issue in all countries and across all economic sectors. For women with children, women of colour, migrant women, and women with disabilities, the discrepancy is even larger. In 2023, women’s gross hourly earnings were, on average, 12.0 % below those of men in the European Union (Eurostat, EU-27). Across Member States, the gender pay gap varied widely, ranging from -0.7 % in Luxembourg to 19.0 % in Latvia.

International Equal Pay Day The United Nations’ commitment

Mainstreaming the gender perspective is key to the implementation of the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Since 2015, the ‘equal pay for work of equal value’ principle has been recognised as one of the priority areas of the United Nations sustainable development goals (UNSDGs), as mentioned in target 8.5: ‘By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value’. In 2017, under the leadership of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the UN entity for gender equality and the empowerment of women (UN Women) and the Gender Initiative of the OECD, and together with governments, labour organisations (e.g. ITUC), employers’ organisations (e.g. IOE) and other dedicated agencies, the Equal Pay International Coalition (EPIC) was launched for the effective and swift achievement of the principle. On 15 November 2019, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution proclaiming 18 September as International Equal Pay Day. The resolution was introduced by the Equal Pay International Coalition with the support of Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Panama, South Africa and Switzerland. The day is intended to promote further action towards the achievement of equal pay for work of equal value.

The first International Equal Pay Day – 18 September 2020

On 18 September 2020, the first International Equal Pay Day, international leaders committed to taking affirmative action to narrow the gender pay gap. EPIC called on participants to put pay equity  at the heart of  COVID-19 recovery efforts by introducing integrated policy responses aimed at mitigating job and income losses resulting from the pandemic and ensuring that women do not end up disproportionately shouldering these job losses and reductions in incomes.

The 2025 Equal Pay Day

For EPIC, the focus this year will be (1) ‘Achieving Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value in the Beijing+30 Era’ for the members-only annual Technical Meeting and (2) an Equal Pay Day event featuring a friendly debate between senior representatives of workers’ and employers’ organisations, underscoring the complementarity of a multi-stakeholder approach and measures being taken.

European Union initiatives

Equal pay for equal work is one of the EU’s founding principles, enshrined in Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Since then, there have been initiatives to address the gender pay gap at both EU and Member State levels. While some progress has been achieved, the gender pay gap remains a persistent feature of European labour markets. In response, as embedded in the EU gender equality strategy 2020-2025, the EU has complemented its soft measures by introducing binding legislation.

The Pay Transparency Directive (Directive (EU) 2023/970), adopted in May 2023 and in force since 6 June 2023, marks a recent step in the EU’s efforts to address pay transparency. It mandates salary transparency in job postings, bans the use of pay history, and grants employees the right to access information on pay levels by gender. Employers with at least 150 employees are required to report regularly on pay gaps. Where unexplained gaps of 5 % or more are identified, joint pay assessments must be conducted in cooperation with workers’ representatives. The directive also strengthens enforcement through a shift in the burden of proof, the right to compensation for victims of pay discrimination, and financial penalties for non-compliance. Member States must transpose the directive by 7 June 2026.

Other relevant legislation includes the Women on Boards Directive (2022), which requires listed companies to meet gender balance targets on corporate boards by mid‑2026, and the Work-Life Balance Directive (in force since 2022), which promotes equal sharing of care responsibilities by introducing new rights to paternity leave, parental leave, and flexible working.

In March 2025, the European Commission unveiled the roadmap for women’s rights to advance gender equality across all sectors of society, including a renewed push to reduce the gender pay gap.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has long called for binding legislation to advance pay equity. In a series of resolutions since 2015, Parliament has urged the Commission to address persistent gender-based inequalities through stronger enforcement and transparency tools.

Parliament’s resolution of 30 January 2020 on the Gender pay gap urged the Commission to ensure that the forthcoming pay transparency legislation applies to both the public and private sectors, promotes the role of the social partners and collective bargaining, and includes strong enforcement policies for those failing to comply. Parliament’s resolution of 21 January 2021 on the new EU gender equality strategy stressed that binding measures are necessary to close the gender pay gap. In its 15 December 2021 resolution on Equality between women and men, Parliament called on Member States to develop an action plan with clear objectives to tackle the gender pay and pension gaps.

Members’ efforts have been key to shaping the final content of the Pay Transparency Directive and ensuring a strong implementation framework across the Union.

Read the complete briefing on ‘International Equal Pay Day‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Steven Blaakman.

Migrants contribute about 10 % to the world’s gross domestic product and are likely to gain in importance due to skills shortages and an ageing population in host countries. Labour migration also has a significant impact on the countries of origin, both positive and negative. The overall impact of migrant workers on their countries of origin varies depending on the circumstances. In 2022, there were 167.7 million migrant workers globally, 93 % of whom were employed. Some 90 % of migrants move voluntarily, mostly for economic reasons.

Remittances sent by migrants have become an important source of income for their countries of origin, reaching about US$656 billion in 2023. Additionally, diasporas can serve as a means for countries of origin to exercise more influence beyond their borders. These countries can also reap the benefits of the skills and knowledge acquired by returning migrants. Some countries, such as India and the Philippines, have policies in place to maximise the possible benefits.

On the other hand, the exodus of migrant workers can exacerbate skills shortages in their home countries, particularly in smaller ones. In addition, migrant workers may encounter substandard working conditions and lower wages compared to local workers.

Read the complete briefing on ‘How labour migration affects countries of origin‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Top 20 countries of origin for international migrants in 2024 (in millions) International remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries (2000-2024) Top 10 countries receiving international remittances in 2022 (US$ billion)

Written by Györgyi Mácsai and Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Raffaele Ventura, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides insight into the economic performance of the United States (US) compared with the European Union (EU) and examines the trade dynamics between them. In 2024, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate for the US was recorded at 2.8%, while the EU experienced a growth rate of 1.1%. Both inflation rates remain stable and show a declining trend compared to the years following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the start of the war in Ukraine. The inflation rate in the US was slightly higher than that in the EU. Trade between the US and the EU continues to grow, except for EU imports of goods from the US, which have been in a declining phase since 2022.

Read this ‘infographic’ on ‘US: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Within the Schengen area, European Union (EU) citizens and non-EU nationals legally residing in the EU can move freely without being subject to border controls.

The Schengen area has 29 member countries: 25 EU countries (all except Ireland and Cyprus) and 4 non-EU countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). Ireland chose not to join the Schengen area, although its police and judiciary cooperate fully with other Schengen countries in criminal matters.

As of 31 March 2024, Bulgaria and Romania are part of the Schengen area. On that date, border checks were lifted at internal air and sea borders. In January 2025, checks were also removed at internal land borders.

Common rules for the Schengen area

To ensure safe and controlled entry into the Schengen area, the Schengen Borders Code sets out common rules for checks at external borders. These include rules on identity verification and the duration of stay, as well as the common visa requirements. The Code also sets out the conditions for a temporary reintroduction of controls at internal borders within the Schengen area.

Following a 2024 update:

• EU countries can set up internal border checks for a maximum of two years in the case of a serious threat to internal security or public policy (a terrorist threat, for example).
• EU countries can reduce the number of border crossing points or shorten their opening hours in cases where a non-EU country encourages the movement of migrants towards the EU’s external borders.
• The Council can decide to introduce temporary travel restrictions at the EU’s external borders in the case of a large-scale public health emergency (a pandemic, for example).

Common visa policy

The EU has established a common visa policy for persons travelling through or staying for a short period in the Schengen area.

The Visa Code sets out the rules for obtaining short-stay visas, which are the most common type for people from outside the EU. These visas let you stay in the EU for 90 days within a 180-day period. If a person wants to stay longer than 90 days, they have to follow the national rules of the EU country they wish to stay in.

The EU has a list of countries whose citizens need a visa to enter the EU, and a list of countries whose citizens do not.

Digitalisation of the visa procedure

Under new rules from 2023, applications for Schengen visas will be made through an online EU platform. The system will automatically decide which EU country will handle an application. Digital visas will be issued once the online platform has been put in place, which is expected to take a few years.

Further information

• Free movement of persons, EU Fact Sheets, European Parliament, June 2025
• State of the Schengen area, Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, May 2025
• Schengen, European Commission, February 2025
• Revision of the Schengen Borders Code, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, July 2024

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