(B2) L’Union européenne dispose aujourd’hui de huit représentants spéciaux (Bosnie-Herzégovine*, Kosovo*, Processus de paix au Moyen Orient, Asie centrale, Sud Caucase et crise en Géorgie, Corne de l’Afrique, Sahel, Droits de l’Homme)
Le représentant spécial pour l’Asie centrale Peter Burian à New-York (crédit : SEAE)
Des super-diplomates à l’efficacité invisible
Ces ‘super diplomates’, compétents, se sont tellement ‘incrustés’ dans le paysage, dans une fonction quasi permanente, qu’on a cependant bien des difficultés à situer leur utilité dans le paysage européen (1). Leur activité réelle reste d’ailleurs un grand mystère. Aucun compte-rendu d’action n’est disponible : ni oral (conférence de presse, etc.) ni écrit (rapport annuel).
Une superposition plutôt qu’une simplification
Leur existence — prévue par le Traité européen — se superpose aujourd’hui tellement aux structures existantes — délégation de l’UE + division ou département ‘géographique du siège du SEAE + missions ou opérations PSDC — qu’elle complique réellement le paysage local plutôt qu’elle ne le simplifie. Leur rôle de coordination se révèle un leurre car toutes ces structures obéissent à des impératifs et des chaînes de commandement totalement différents. J’ai été apostrophé par plusieurs Africains par exemple me demandant qui était le représentant européen dans leur pays. Belle question.
Un coût non négligeable
Le coût de ces structures n’est cependant pas négligeable. En 2018, selon le dernier état des lieux dressé par la Commission européenne, le budget se montait à 20,745 millions d’euros ! Pourtant peu d’États membres sont disposés à supprimer cette modalité qui représentante un ‘fromage’ pas désagréable à se répartir.
Une rationalisation nécessaire ?
De façon concrète, la question de supprimer la plupart de ces postes au profit d’un ‘bon’ ambassadeur local, doté d’un rôle de coordination régionale, ou tout simplement du directeur ou chef de division au siège du service diplomatique européenne, dont c’est un peu le rôle (2). Cela aurait le mérite à la fois de rationaliser le système diplomatique européen, et de dégager des marges budgétaires pour faire autre chose. NB : Ramené au salaire moyen d’un diplomate (6-7000 euros), on pourrait engager une équipe d’au moins 200 diplomates… ce n’est pas négligeable
(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)
Written by Rosamund Shreeves,
© frikota / FotoliaThe European Union is committed to working collectively to eradicate female genital mutilation (FGM) as part of broader efforts to combat all forms of violence against women and girls, and to support the efforts of its Member States in this field. The European Commission has undertaken to assess EU efforts to combat FGM every year, on or around the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation on 6 February.
Facts and figuresFemale genital mutilation (FGM) includes all procedures that intentionally alter or cause injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons. FGM is carried out for cultural, religious and/or social reasons, mostly on young girls between infancy and the age of 15. It has no health benefits and can have serious immediate and long-term effects on health and wellbeing.
In 2016, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimated that, worldwide, at least 200 million women and girls are currently living with the consequences of FGM and around 3 million girls are at risk of undergoing FGM every year. The practice, which is most common in 28 African countries, is also prevalent in the Middle East (Yemen, northern Iraq), and Asia (Indonesia), and has been reported to a lesser extent elsewhere. An assessment, issued by the UN Secretary General in December 2018, finds that prevalence has been reduced in some regions, but progress could be cancelled out by population growth, girls undergoing FGM (increasingly performed by medical professionals) at a younger age, and the fact that, as a result of population movement, it is becoming a global issue.
Official EU statistics on the prevalence of FGM in Europe are lacking. However, three studies to map FGM, conducted by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) between 2012 and 2018, found that there are victims (or potential victims), in at least 16 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Around 20 000 women and girls from FGM-practising countries seek asylum in EU Member States every year, with an estimated 1 000 asylum claims directly related to FGM. This number has increased steadily since 2008.
Commitments and action to combat FGMFGM constitutes a form of child abuse and gender-based violence; recognised internationally as a violation of the human rights of girls and women. The practice also violates a person’s rights to health, security and physical integrity; the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; and the right to life in cases where the procedure results in death. A range of measures have been adopted at international, EU and national level to prevent FGM and to protect FGM victims.
International instrumentsAt international level, United Nations and Council of Europe standards are benchmarks in work to combat FGM. Key treaties, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women(CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Geneva Convention, all cover FGM indirectly, with specific guidance on protection and asylum for victims. The Council of Europe’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (‘Istanbul Convention’), is the first treaty to recognise that FGM exists in Europe (Article 38), and sets out a number of specific obligations on preventing and combating the practice, and providing support to victims and those at risk.
International actionThe UN’s longstanding efforts to end the practice culminated in its first specific resolution on female genital mutilation in December 2012, calling for the adoption of national action plans and comprehensive, multi-disciplinary strategies to eliminate FGM. The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development identifies FGM as a harmful practice which is to be eliminated by 2030 (Goal 5), a priority reaffirmed by the UN in 2018.
The UN named 6 February the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation and the European Commission takes stock annually, around that day, of EU efforts to combat FGM.
Legislative and policy framework at European levelAlthough the EU itself currently has no binding instrument designed to protect women from violence, relevant instruments exist in a number of areas. The principles of gender equality and non-discrimination are affirmed in the Treaty on European Union and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which also guarantees the right to dignity and includes specific provisions on the right to physical and mental integrity. The Directive on Victims’ Rights requires provision of support services to victims of violence, including FGM. In relation to asylum, the Asylum Reception Conditions Directive specifically mentions victims of FGM amongst vulnerable persons who should receive appropriate healthcare during their asylum procedure, while the recast Qualification Directive includes FGM as grounds to consider when granting asylum. The EU also signed the Istanbul Convention on 13 June 2017 and is currently in the accession process. Parliament has urged those Member States that have not yet done so to ratify and implement this Convention.
Combating gender-based violence is a priority in the European Commission’s strategic engagement for gender equality 2016-2019. On FGM, this includes pursuing the measures set out in the action plan adopted in the 2013 communication, ‘Towards the elimination of female genital mutilation’, aiming to ensure that action to combat FGM is mainstreamed across the fields of justice, police, health, social services, child protection, education, immigration and asylum and external action. Areas where the Commission has promised to act include:
The Commission has reported on action undertaken to 2018, including the launch of a knowledge platform for professionals who come into contact with (potential) victims, and funding made available under the Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme 2014‐2020 and the joint EU-United Nations Spotlight initiative.
Instruments against FGM at national levelMany of the actions needed to end FGM lie within the competences of the Member States. FGM is now a prosecutable offence under national laws in all Member States, either as a specific criminal act or as an act of bodily harm or injury. However, very few cases are brought to court. A number of Member States have also developed national action plans on FGM. Continuing issues of concern include barriers to reporting and successful prosecution, support for victims and ensuring long-term, sustainable cultural change.
European Parliament positionThe European Parliament has played a particularly important role in raising awareness and pushing for firm action on FGM, including through the work of its Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM). Parliament has adopted resolutions on FGM in 2001, 2009, 2012, 2014, and 2018, calling on the Commission and Member States to provide the legal and other means required to raise awareness, protect and support victims and ensure that offenders are prosecuted. In 2016, it urged Member States to recognise FGM as a form of persecution and the Commission to draw up interpretive guidelines on FGM, according appropriate protection to women and girls seeking asylum.
This publication is a further update of an ‘at a glance’ note published in January 2015.
Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Zero tolerance for female genital mutilation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Dacic elmondása szerint Beghjett Pacolli február elsején a nyugat-balkáni országok külügyminisztereinek bukaresti találkozóján fordult oda hozzá, és szerb nyelven annyit mondott: “Ha lesz valamilyen merénylet, csak tudd, hogy mi, albánok voltunk”.
Dacic a Kurirnak elmondta, már hozzászokott a fenyegetésekhez, de először történt meg vele, hogy egy albán politikus ilyen közvetlen módon fenyegesse meg. “Ez azt mutatja, hogy nagyon idegesek, mert kicsúszik a lábuk alól a talaj” – fogalmazott a szerb külügyminiszter. Kiemelte, a koszovói miniszter fenyegetésére azzal reagált, hogy tájékoztatta: Koszovó Szerbia része, ezért ott is ő a külügyminiszter, Pacolli pedig csak a segédje.
“A koszovói albánok megszokták, hogy mindent erőszakkal szereznek meg, de most kemény fába vágták a fejszéjüket, én a fenyegetések ellenére sem hátrálok meg” – magyarázta Dacic.
A koszovói külügyminiszter kijelentését élesen bírálták a szerb politikusok, és azt várják, hogy a nemzetközi közösség, elsősorban az Európai Unió is megszólal az ügyben.
Koszovó 2008-ban egyoldalúan kiáltotta ki függetlenségét Szerbiától, de Belgrád ezt azóta sem hajlandó elismerni, és továbbra is saját, déli tartományának tartja a többségében albánok lakta területet. A két fél között 2013-ban brüsszeli közvetítéssel megkezdődött a kapcsolat normalizálását célzó párbeszéd, egyelőre azonban nem történt jelentős előrelépés. A viszony rendezése mindkét ország európai integrációjának a kulcsa.
This report is for the media and the general public.
SUMMARY
KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons slightly increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.
OPERATIONAL REMARKS
The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of fund administration based in Vienna.
OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS
Persons crossing the border
The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:
The average number of entries/exits slightly increased from 7,766 to 7,787 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].
During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 187 per day for both BCPs.
The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.
Persons in military-style outfits
During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 13 this week (compared to 24 last week); seven of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and six into Ukraine (85 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.
Families with a significant amount of luggage
The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, six families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and four were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when four families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and three into Ukraine.
Bus connections
Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.
During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (316 compared to 308 observed during the previous week). There were 167 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 149 bound for Ukraine.
Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” route or destination was noted: Stakhanov- Kyiv; Alchevsk-Kyiv; and Kyiv.
On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.
Trucks
During the reporting period, the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 735 to 762 (201 at the Gukovo BCP and 561 at the Donetsk BCP); 430 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 332 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” (sometimes “DPR”) plates.
Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks slightly increased to 33 (compared to 32 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.
All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.
Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 162 to 189: of the total number of trucks scanned, 90 trucks (48 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 99 trucks (52 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.
Minivans
The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 107 to 160 vehicles; 83 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 77 into Ukraine.
Trains
The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on seven occasions, compared to four last week; the OTs assessed that six trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and another one to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the train bound for Ukraine.
Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.
Other observations
The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis.
On 3 February at Donetsk BCP, the OT observed two ambulances. The first ambulance (which bore Russian Federation licence plates) arrived at 06:15 and went behind the main building until it returned towards the Russian Federation at 08:32. One minute before it left, another ambulance (also with Russian Federation licence plates) arrived from the Russian Federation and parked in the same place.
At 08:50, the second ambulance also left towards the Russian Federation. From its position, the OT was not able to see whether the vehicles actually crossed the border to Ukraine, or whether they remained in the “blind spot” behind the main building of the BCP, where the OT does not have permission to move.
For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 1 January 2019 to 5 February 2019, please see the attachment here.
[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).
Pâte à crêpes : 2 œufs, 125 g de farine, 30 cl de lait entier, 2 c. à s. d’huile de tournesol, 1/2 sachet de levure chimique, sel, poivre
Garniture pour une crêpe : 1 poivron rouge, 1 poivron vert, 2 tomates, 20 cl d’huile de tournesol, sel
Mettez la farine, la levure, le sel et le poivre dans un grand saladier. Creusez un puits, cassez-y les œufs entiers. Mélangez énergiquement à l’aide d’un fouet et versez l’huile petit à petit. Délayez la préparation peu à peu avec le lait chaud. Laissez reposer la pâte au moins 30 min. Préparez vos crêpes dans une crêpière antiadhésive de 25 cm de diamètre et laissez-les refroidir à température ambiante.
Retirez le pédoncule des poivrons, placez ces derniers dans le four sous le gril et laissez-les, tout en les retournant, jusqu’à ce que la peau ait gonflé et noirci. Pelez-les, épépinez-les et coupez-les en lanières.
Mondez les tomates et épépinez-les, puis coupez-les en petits dés. Dans une sauteuse, mettez les poivrons, les tomates et le sel. Recouvrez d’huile. Laissez mijoter à feu doux durant 1 heure en remuant de temps en temps. Il ne doit plus y avoir d’huile à la surface. Laissez refroidir.
Coupez les crêpes en forme de rectangles. Garnissez le centre avec la chakchouka. Ramenez chacun des côtés vers le centre afin d’obtenir un petit paquet rectangulaire. Ces crêpes se dégustent froides, accompagnées d’une salade verte et du reste de chakchouka.
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Pour 6 personnes, 1 pot de yaourt nature, 1 pot 1/2 de sucre en poudre, 4 pots de farine, 3 œufs, 1 pot d’huile, 1 sachet de levure, 1 pincée de sel, 3 c. à s. de chocolat en poudre.
Préchauffez le four à 180°. Videz le pot de yaourt dans un saladier. Ajoutez le sucre, la farine et l’huile. Puis les œufs, le sel et la levure.
Mélangez le tout. Partagez la pâte en deux.Incorporez le chocolat à l’une des parties. Beurrez un moule et versez-y la préparation en alternance. Enfournez à mi-hauteur et faites cuire pendant 40 min. Démoulez et laissez refroidir.
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