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VIENNA, 6 February – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today raised his concerns over the amendments to the Press Act establishing a right of reply for physical and legal persons, which passed the first reading in the parliament of Slovakia last week.

The amendments to paragraphs 8 and 10 of the Press Act would grant a right of reply which will particularly apply to political actors or public officials who claim that their honour or reputation has been damaged in media reports. The Representative underlined that the Press Act already permits a right of correction for all individuals, including politicians. With the proposed version of the right of reply, regardless of the veracity of the statements, editors would be compelled to publish a correction, under the threat of paying damages between 1,660 to 4,980 euros. This would signify a return to a similar legal provision introduced in 2008 and repealed in 2011 following strong domestic and international opposition.

“I am seriously concerned that this will represent a regression of the legal environment in Slovakia, which enables the media to report freely and without political pressure on matters of public interest,” said Désir. “I call upon the parliament of Slovakia to repeal these amendments, to protect media freedom and investigative journalism, and to take into account the objections raised by the media and civil society in the country.” The Representative expressed regret that the concerned amendments were not reviewed by the Culture Ministry’s working group responsible for reviewing media freedom legislation.

The right of reply as foreseen in these amendments goes far beyond the existing right to correction. “This represents a high risk of undue and disproportionate interference in the editorial independence of the media, and must not lead to permanent pressure or self-censorship of the media,” stated Désir.  “Political actors must accept a high level of scrutiny and criticism, and the press must remain free to exercise its function without facing financial threats.”

The Representative concluded that the suggestion by the President of the CIS and the National Council to extend the right of reply to comments would exacerbate the situation further.

The RFOM previously issued a statement asking Slovakia to abandon the article in April 2008 (See: https://www.osce.org/fom/49620)

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Viele wollten bei Mere in Leipzig (D) zu Tiefstpreisen einkaufen. Zu viele – so dass die Regale bald leer waren und die Filiale schliessen musste. Jetzt gehts weiter. Doch noch immer fehlen Produkte.

Muhammadu Buhari, the "new broom" president, hoping to win a second term in office.

Die NATO hat ungeachtet russischer Kritik die Aufnahme der künftigen Republik Nordmazedonien beschlossen.

Atiku Abubakar, the man hoping to unseat Nigeria's president, is a veteran politician and business tycoon.

Mauriweb - Khaled Bouyahmed Abass, né en 1962, vient d’annoncer sa candidature à la présidentielle 2019. Dans un entretien qu’il nous a...

Les membres du gouvernement réunis en Conseil des ministres ce mercredi 06 février 2019, ont adopté le Plan d'actions national sur la gestion durable des terres 2018-2027.
Selon le relevé du Conseil des ministres, le défaut de planification de la gestion des terres et des ressources agroforestières a induit au fil des ans, leur dégradation avancée.
En l'espace de 35 ans, précise le Conseil des ministres, le pays a perdu environ 48% de sa forêt dense qui ne couvre désormais que 0,29% du territoire.
Une telle situation selon le gouvernement, est de nature à provoquer de plus graves dégradations physiques et une vulnérabilité accrue des écosystèmes face au changement climatique si rien n'est fait.
Ainsi, prenant la mesure de l'enjeu sur l'environnement et en vue d'y remédier durablement, il a initié en février 2018, un atelier qui a regroupé des acteurs spécialisés d'origines socioprofessionnelles diverses. Les travaux de cet atelier ont permis de mettre en place un Plan d'actions national sur la gestion durable des terres, sur une période de 30 ans. Sa mise en œuvre permettra entre autres, une appropriation et une intégration effectives de cette problématique dans les investissements couvrant plusieurs années.

F. A. A.

Milan Lučanský országos rendőrfőkapitány szerint jól halad a Ján Kuciak újságíró és jegyese, Martina Kušnírová meggyilkolása ügyében folytatott nyomozás.

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission again observed military and military-type presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. It recorded ceasefire violations inside the area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission continued to observe long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas as well as in Staromykhailivka and near Verkhnoshyrokivske. The Mission was prevented from continuing an unmanned aerial vehicle flight near the Zolote disengagement area*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 200 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (95 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), south-east and south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and east, south-south-east and south-south-west of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 320 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 4 February, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) approximately 650m south of the area’s northern edge and 1km east of its western edge, and again spotted an IFV (BMP-2) near the road bridge (all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces).

Also inside the disengagement area, the same long-range UAV again spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) about 100m north of its southern edge and 800m west of its eastern edge (assessed as belonging to the armed formations), as well as three recent craters assessed as impacts of mortar (120mm) rounds about 50m north-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the area (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 31 January 2019).

On the evening and night of 4-5 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded ten projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east and south (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and ten projectiles at an assessed range of 2-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 5 February, positioned near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 4-5km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned near Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard over 30 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at an assessed range of 4-5km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned in Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and over 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The same day, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

4 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Ozarianivka (52km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 February

An SMM mini-UAV again spotted:

• four tanks (T-72) in revetted positions on the north-eastern edge of Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk) and adjacent fresh tracks on the ground (indicating that the tanks had moved recently).

5 February

The SMM observed:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

5 February

The SMM observed:

• three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) near Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk);
• a tank (T-64) near Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk);
• a tank (T-72) near Druzhkivka (72km north of Donetsk);
• a tank (T-72) near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk);
• a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) near Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (66km north of Donetsk); and
• eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 February

An SMM long-range UAV again spotted:

• four tanks (T-72) in a field near Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM was unable to verify as withdrawn[4]

Heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

5 February

The SMM observed that:

• three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) were present and
• 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), six towed howitzers (D-30), 28 mortars (15 2B11, 12 M-120 Molot, 120mm and a BM-37, 82mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

4 February      

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (undetermined types) next to residential houses in Staryi Aidar (20km north-west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-1) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk);
• six IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk);
• an  armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk);
• three IFVs (BMP-1), six probable IFVs (BMP-1) and an ACV (undetermined type) near Zolote;
• an IFV (BMP-1) on the south-eastern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk); and
• two IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two APCs (possible BTR-80) near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol).

5 February

The SMM observed:

• an APC (BTR-60) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• an APC (undetermined variant) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BMP-1) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Znamianka (36km north-west of Luhansk);
• two APCs (one undetermined variant and one MT-LB MA) near Kalynove-Borshchuvate;
• an ACV (undetermined type) near Nyzhnie Lozove (59km north-east of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) on the southern edge of Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk);
• 31 APCs (MT-LB) and two APCs (MT-LB M), one with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23), in a compound in Pervomaisk;
• an ACV (undetermined type) in Berezivske (53km north-west of Luhansk);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Holubivka (51km west of Luhansk);
• five APCs (an BTR-80, three MT-LB and an MT-LB MA) and two IFVs (BMP-2) in a compound in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk);
• three ACVs close to a residential area in Bohdanivka (44km west of Luhansk)
• two ACVs (undetermined types) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk);
• an APC (BTR-80), a probable IFV (BMP-1), two trench diggers (an MDK-2 and a PZM-2) and an automatic jamming system (R-330ZH ZHITEL) in a training area near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk);
• three IFVs (BMP-1) and two probable IFVs (BMP-1) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk); and
• three IFVs (two BMP-1 and a BMP-2) near Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk).

5 February

The SMM observed:

• an IFV (BMP-1) near Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk).

Long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska

At around 09:30 on 5 February, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw about 1,000 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 50 people queueing in the opposite direction. About two and a half hours later, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed about 1,000 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 100 people queuing to travel in the opposite direction. Three women (aged 45-60) told the SMM that it had taken them four to five hours to cross the checkpoint of the armed formations and the entry-exit checkpoint.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), as well as to enable an assessment related to snow removal near the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 4 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• While the SMM was following up on reports of recent damage in a residential area of Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations (two armed) at a checkpoint in the town denied the Mission access to the area, citing the need for prior permission from their “superiors”. (The SMM’s passage at the same checkpoint was denied for “security reasons” the day before.)
• At a checkpoint south of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “security concerns”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 4 February, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to signal interference, while flying over government-controlled areas close to the contact line in a western part of Luhansk region.[6]
• On 5 February, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north the Zolote disengagement area, a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier approached the SMM and told it to discontinue the flight, saying that he was not informed about it. The SMM recalled its UAV and left the area.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some SMM cameras. The SMM camera in Chermalyk was not operational for most of the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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STELLUNGNAHME zu der Entlastung für die Ausführung des Gesamthaushaltsplans der Europäischen Union für das Haushaltsjahr 2017, Einzelplan III – Kommission und Exekutivagenturen
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Neena Gill

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2019 - EP

Les membres du gouvernement ont décidé en Conseil des ministres, ce mercredi 06 février 2019, de la construction d'un site pour accueillir les pèlerins du Hadj. Selon le relevé du Conseil des ministres, l'absence d'un espace adéquat d'accueil des pèlerins venant de l'intérieur du pays, en partance pour le Hadj, fait que les conditions de séjour et d'hébergement à Cotonou en attendant leur départ, sont difficiles.
Pour mettre fin à cette situation, le gouvernement en accord avec la communauté musulmane a identifié un espace au quartier Akpakpa pour y réaliser des aménagements et ériger quelques bâtiments.
Les travaux consisteront notamment à l'assainissement et au pavage de la cours, en la construction de bâtiments à usage d'hébergement des pèlerins, de local administratif, ainsi que de blocs de toilettes et de douches, en la réalisation d'une allée de circulation des véhicules, puis de zone d'accueil et de repos.
Le début du Hadj 2019 étant prévu pour le mois d'août, le gouvernement entend rendre le site disponible pour le mois de juin.
F. A. A.

Nem egyeztethető össze Timmermans európai bizottsági alelnöksége azzal, hogy az európai szocialista pártot képviseli az EP-választáson.

Schlimme Szenen in Davos-Clavadel: Ein Hund jagt ein Reh durch die Strassen, ehe er es tötet. Anwohner sind aber auch geschockt über die Reaktion des Herrchens, Tarzisius Caviezel. Er soll seinen Hund übel geschlagen haben. Caviezel bestreitet das vehement.

Eine Autofahrerin kommt mit ihrem Fahrzeug von der Strasse ab und knallt gegen mehrere Bäume. Sie überlebt – doch für fünf Kinder in ihrem Auto kommt jede Hilfe zu spät. Keines war zum Zeitpunkt des Unfalls angeschnallt.

Eine Goldmedaille hat Freeskier Fabian Bösch bereits im Trockenen. Doppelt er heute dank seiner Achtziger-Jahre-Filmfrisur gleich nochmals nach?

Le corps sans vie d'un enseignant en service à l'école primaire publique de Porga, a été découvert pendu, ce mercredi 06 février 2019, à l'entrée de la ville de Tanguiéta. Le corps de Bio N'gobi GUIDADO est déposé à la morgue de l'hôpital Saint Jean de Dieu de Tanguiéta.
Pour l'instant, aucune précision sur les mobiles de ce décès.

F. A. A.

Zum Start der 14. Staffel von Germany’s Next Topmodel hat Modelmami Heidi Klum die ganze Show umgekrempelt.

There has been major backlash against the plan to attract visitors using images of plus-size women.

A 22 éves Patrik még 2017-ben videóra vette, hogy egy kassai temetőben fogdosta és mozgatta az elhunyt maradványait. A bűncselekményért akár három év szabadságvesztést is kaphat az elkövető.

Due to their unique and complex nature, UN peacekeeping missions depend on effective leadership. Because few, if any, mission leaders have the requisite skills, knowledge, political judgment, and physical and mental stamina upon being selected, they require continuous, institutionalized, and sustained training and learning support. While the Secretariat has undertaken a number of training and learning initiatives, critical gaps remain.

This paper identifies these gaps and analyzes obstacles that impede progress in addressing them. It looks at gaps in three broad areas: knowledge of peacekeeping doctrine, policy, and practice specific to UN peacekeeping; knowledge of UN policies and procedures on financial and human resources management; and leadership and team-building skills. To address these gaps, it recommends that the Secretariat prioritize action in several areas:

• Centralize responsibility for mission leadership training in a single unit;
• Integrate training into planning and recruitment processes;
• Provide more sustained support to training; and
• Employ new tools such as scenario-based exercises for in-mission training.

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