The 2020 parliamentary elections in Slovakia were held in a pluralistic environment with respect for fundamental freedoms and a level playing field for contestants to compete. Voters were provided with diverse information, enabling them to make an informed choice. The legal framework provides an overall sound basis for democratic elections but there was lack of clarity on regulation regarding electoral dispute resolution, disclosure of campaign finance, and campaign silence.
These are some of the main conclusions from the final report on Slovakia’s parliamentary elections of 29 February 2020, published today by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).
The report provides 21 recommendations to improve the conduct of elections and bring them fully in line with OSCE commitments and other international standards.
RecommendationsKey recommendations include:
ODIHR deployed an Election Assessment Mission (EAM) on 18 February 2020 to observe the parliamentary elections. All countries across the OSCE region have formally committed to follow up promptly on ODIHR’s election assessments and recommendations.
The future shape of European trade policy and the right stance to take in security and climate matters are currently the subject of fierce Franco-German debate. These issues are also relevant to development policy in the context of the overarching 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Despite the opportunities afforded to them as strong donor countries to pursue joint approaches, Germany and France often tend to cooperate on an ad hoc basis rather than as part of a strategy (Krüger & Vaillé, 2019). Signed on 22 January 2019, the Aachen Treaty serves to renew the cooperation on Franco-German development cooperation (DC) formalised in the Élysée Treaty and offers the two countries a way to overcome differences and contribute jointly to global sustainable development (Aachen Treaty, Chapter 2, Article 7). Against this backdrop, this paper discusses challenges and opportunities for Franco-German DC based on two case studies in Cameroon and Morocco, which illustrate how differing mandates and methods being applied by the implementing organisations are preventing closer cooperation on the ground. Diverging political priorities, including within the national donor administrations, are also making it harder to engage in dialogue with the partner countries, especially if these have only limited capacity for donor coordination. If Germany and France succeed in overcoming their current differences, they will be able to attract other donors, particularly EU actors, for joint initiatives. Four policy recommendations can be derived from this:
Improving coherence between DC systems:
Even if the donor countries continue to maintain different political structures, the functional cooperation between the relevant actors will need to be supported at upper political levels. Coherence within the German and French DC systems should also be increased.
2. Germany and France should make it easier to launch joint projects:
Programming cycles need to be better coordinated in the interests of the political dialogue on DC. At the same time, the mutual recognition of procedures that form part of both countries’ technical cooperation (TC) and financial cooperation (FC) should be afforded greater political support.
3. Selecting partner countries and sectors strategically:
Focusing on common priorities and sectors is advisable, especially in partner countries with limited capacity for coordination. Franco-German cooperation with middle-income countries should also be strengthened strategically in order to support projects requiring substantial financing in sectors such as renewable energy.
4. Structuring Franco-German cooperation so as to be open to other partners:
Germany and France should commit to a common Europe-wide implementation approach and promote its application in partner countries through pilot projects. Franco-German DC should also be structured so as to be open to other actors and should campaign for the preservation of global public goods in international organisations in which both donors play an active part (e.g. in the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria).
The future shape of European trade policy and the right stance to take in security and climate matters are currently the subject of fierce Franco-German debate. These issues are also relevant to development policy in the context of the overarching 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Despite the opportunities afforded to them as strong donor countries to pursue joint approaches, Germany and France often tend to cooperate on an ad hoc basis rather than as part of a strategy (Krüger & Vaillé, 2019). Signed on 22 January 2019, the Aachen Treaty serves to renew the cooperation on Franco-German development cooperation (DC) formalised in the Élysée Treaty and offers the two countries a way to overcome differences and contribute jointly to global sustainable development (Aachen Treaty, Chapter 2, Article 7). Against this backdrop, this paper discusses challenges and opportunities for Franco-German DC based on two case studies in Cameroon and Morocco, which illustrate how differing mandates and methods being applied by the implementing organisations are preventing closer cooperation on the ground. Diverging political priorities, including within the national donor administrations, are also making it harder to engage in dialogue with the partner countries, especially if these have only limited capacity for donor coordination. If Germany and France succeed in overcoming their current differences, they will be able to attract other donors, particularly EU actors, for joint initiatives. Four policy recommendations can be derived from this:
Improving coherence between DC systems:
Even if the donor countries continue to maintain different political structures, the functional cooperation between the relevant actors will need to be supported at upper political levels. Coherence within the German and French DC systems should also be increased.
2. Germany and France should make it easier to launch joint projects:
Programming cycles need to be better coordinated in the interests of the political dialogue on DC. At the same time, the mutual recognition of procedures that form part of both countries’ technical cooperation (TC) and financial cooperation (FC) should be afforded greater political support.
3. Selecting partner countries and sectors strategically:
Focusing on common priorities and sectors is advisable, especially in partner countries with limited capacity for coordination. Franco-German cooperation with middle-income countries should also be strengthened strategically in order to support projects requiring substantial financing in sectors such as renewable energy.
4. Structuring Franco-German cooperation so as to be open to other partners:
Germany and France should commit to a common Europe-wide implementation approach and promote its application in partner countries through pilot projects. Franco-German DC should also be structured so as to be open to other actors and should campaign for the preservation of global public goods in international organisations in which both donors play an active part (e.g. in the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria).
The future shape of European trade policy and the right stance to take in security and climate matters are currently the subject of fierce Franco-German debate. These issues are also relevant to development policy in the context of the overarching 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Despite the opportunities afforded to them as strong donor countries to pursue joint approaches, Germany and France often tend to cooperate on an ad hoc basis rather than as part of a strategy (Krüger & Vaillé, 2019). Signed on 22 January 2019, the Aachen Treaty serves to renew the cooperation on Franco-German development cooperation (DC) formalised in the Élysée Treaty and offers the two countries a way to overcome differences and contribute jointly to global sustainable development (Aachen Treaty, Chapter 2, Article 7). Against this backdrop, this paper discusses challenges and opportunities for Franco-German DC based on two case studies in Cameroon and Morocco, which illustrate how differing mandates and methods being applied by the implementing organisations are preventing closer cooperation on the ground. Diverging political priorities, including within the national donor administrations, are also making it harder to engage in dialogue with the partner countries, especially if these have only limited capacity for donor coordination. If Germany and France succeed in overcoming their current differences, they will be able to attract other donors, particularly EU actors, for joint initiatives. Four policy recommendations can be derived from this:
Improving coherence between DC systems:
Even if the donor countries continue to maintain different political structures, the functional cooperation between the relevant actors will need to be supported at upper political levels. Coherence within the German and French DC systems should also be increased.
2. Germany and France should make it easier to launch joint projects:
Programming cycles need to be better coordinated in the interests of the political dialogue on DC. At the same time, the mutual recognition of procedures that form part of both countries’ technical cooperation (TC) and financial cooperation (FC) should be afforded greater political support.
3. Selecting partner countries and sectors strategically:
Focusing on common priorities and sectors is advisable, especially in partner countries with limited capacity for coordination. Franco-German cooperation with middle-income countries should also be strengthened strategically in order to support projects requiring substantial financing in sectors such as renewable energy.
4. Structuring Franco-German cooperation so as to be open to other partners:
Germany and France should commit to a common Europe-wide implementation approach and promote its application in partner countries through pilot projects. Franco-German DC should also be structured so as to be open to other actors and should campaign for the preservation of global public goods in international organisations in which both donors play an active part (e.g. in the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria).
Roumanie : le défi des villages sans électricité
Roumanie : la vie rurale, belle à voir, dure à vivre
Roumanie : la démocratie rurale n'est pas encore pour demain
Revue de presse • Roumanie : une rentrée scolaire avec de moins en moins d'élèves
(B2) La frégate grecque Hydra (F-452) a quitté la base navale de Salamis mardi (12 mai) pour rejoindre l’opération EUNAVFOR MED Irini de l’UE en mer Méditerranée, indique la marine grecque
La frégate Hydra F-452 (crédit : Marine grecque)Mais elle ne sera concrètement opérationnelle que fin mai. Elle doit passer quelques jours sur la base navale de Crète, au centre d’entraînement (KENAP), notamment pour parfaire l’entraînement des équipes de marins à l’arraisonnement des navires.
À bord du Hydra, se trouvera une équipe d’abordage (type VPD), similaire à celle qu’aurait dû fournir Malte (lire : Nuage noir sur l’opération Irini. Malte brandit la menace d’un veto). Elle est destinée à aller contrôler les navires suspects de faire du trafic d’armes vers la Libye.
(NGV)
Lire aussi : L’opération EUNAVFOR Med Irini en quelques mots
Cet article La frégate grecque rejoindra l’opération Irini fin mai est apparu en premier sur B2 Le blog de l'Europe politique.