The demand for digital financial services has risen significantly over recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated this trend and since the focus has shifted towards economic recovery, digital lending has become central. Digital credit products exploit traditional and alternative financial and non-financial data to provide access to finance for households and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). While it makes lending more inclusive for underserved or unserved households and firms, its increasing influence also brings forth challenges that need to be addressed by policy-makers and regulators in order to guarantee well-functioning credit markets and broader financial systems that foster sustainable economic development.
A central concern is the adverse effect of digital lending on the stability and integrity of credit markets (and potentially the wider financial systems). The rise in non-performing loans, even before the COVID-19 crisis, has been associated with an increase in digital credits. New players with little experience enter the market and exploit regulatory arbitrage, but often these players have no (or only a partial) obligation to report to respective systems for sharing credit information or to supervisory bodies, which introduces severe vulnerabilities.
In addition, the low entry threshold of digital financial products, due to their convenience and simplicity for customers, provides fertile ground for exploitative financialisation. Underserved households and MSMEs with limited financial literacy may be lured into taking up unsuitable and unaffordable digital credits, leading to over-indebtedness and bankruptcy.
The last challenge arises from significantly shorter loan maturities in MSME lending if current forms of digital lending are scaled up. This is problematic, as firms need loans with longer maturities to realise productivity-enhancing medium- and long-term investments, many of which include complementary investments in labour, thereby contributing to an improvement in job quality.
Governments and regulators need to strike a balance between leveraging the potential of digital lending for inclusive finance and economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis, and mitigating associated risks. In particular, they should, together with providers of technical and financial development cooperation, consider the following:
- Fostering the integrity of (digital) credit markets. Regulators should establish specific licenses and regulations for all digital financial service providers, and intro¬duce obligatory reporting requirements to supervisory bodies and national systems for sharing credit information.
- Preventing exploitative financialisation. Regulators need to require digital lenders to present the costs and risks of their loan products in a manner comprehensible to consumers with little financial literacy, and extend consumer protection policies to digital financial services.
- Ensuring availability of loans with longer maturities. Development finance institutions and other national and international promoters of (M)SMEs should assist local banks in the provision of longer-term loans, e.g. by offering respective funds or partial credit guarantees.
- Establishing regulatory sandboxes. Regulators should launch regulatory sandboxes to test legislation in a closed setting and to learn about risks without hindering innovation.
The demand for digital financial services has risen significantly over recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated this trend and since the focus has shifted towards economic recovery, digital lending has become central. Digital credit products exploit traditional and alternative financial and non-financial data to provide access to finance for households and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). While it makes lending more inclusive for underserved or unserved households and firms, its increasing influence also brings forth challenges that need to be addressed by policy-makers and regulators in order to guarantee well-functioning credit markets and broader financial systems that foster sustainable economic development.
A central concern is the adverse effect of digital lending on the stability and integrity of credit markets (and potentially the wider financial systems). The rise in non-performing loans, even before the COVID-19 crisis, has been associated with an increase in digital credits. New players with little experience enter the market and exploit regulatory arbitrage, but often these players have no (or only a partial) obligation to report to respective systems for sharing credit information or to supervisory bodies, which introduces severe vulnerabilities.
In addition, the low entry threshold of digital financial products, due to their convenience and simplicity for customers, provides fertile ground for exploitative financialisation. Underserved households and MSMEs with limited financial literacy may be lured into taking up unsuitable and unaffordable digital credits, leading to over-indebtedness and bankruptcy.
The last challenge arises from significantly shorter loan maturities in MSME lending if current forms of digital lending are scaled up. This is problematic, as firms need loans with longer maturities to realise productivity-enhancing medium- and long-term investments, many of which include complementary investments in labour, thereby contributing to an improvement in job quality.
Governments and regulators need to strike a balance between leveraging the potential of digital lending for inclusive finance and economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis, and mitigating associated risks. In particular, they should, together with providers of technical and financial development cooperation, consider the following:
- Fostering the integrity of (digital) credit markets. Regulators should establish specific licenses and regulations for all digital financial service providers, and intro¬duce obligatory reporting requirements to supervisory bodies and national systems for sharing credit information.
- Preventing exploitative financialisation. Regulators need to require digital lenders to present the costs and risks of their loan products in a manner comprehensible to consumers with little financial literacy, and extend consumer protection policies to digital financial services.
- Ensuring availability of loans with longer maturities. Development finance institutions and other national and international promoters of (M)SMEs should assist local banks in the provision of longer-term loans, e.g. by offering respective funds or partial credit guarantees.
- Establishing regulatory sandboxes. Regulators should launch regulatory sandboxes to test legislation in a closed setting and to learn about risks without hindering innovation.
The demand for digital financial services has risen significantly over recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated this trend and since the focus has shifted towards economic recovery, digital lending has become central. Digital credit products exploit traditional and alternative financial and non-financial data to provide access to finance for households and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). While it makes lending more inclusive for underserved or unserved households and firms, its increasing influence also brings forth challenges that need to be addressed by policy-makers and regulators in order to guarantee well-functioning credit markets and broader financial systems that foster sustainable economic development.
A central concern is the adverse effect of digital lending on the stability and integrity of credit markets (and potentially the wider financial systems). The rise in non-performing loans, even before the COVID-19 crisis, has been associated with an increase in digital credits. New players with little experience enter the market and exploit regulatory arbitrage, but often these players have no (or only a partial) obligation to report to respective systems for sharing credit information or to supervisory bodies, which introduces severe vulnerabilities.
In addition, the low entry threshold of digital financial products, due to their convenience and simplicity for customers, provides fertile ground for exploitative financialisation. Underserved households and MSMEs with limited financial literacy may be lured into taking up unsuitable and unaffordable digital credits, leading to over-indebtedness and bankruptcy.
The last challenge arises from significantly shorter loan maturities in MSME lending if current forms of digital lending are scaled up. This is problematic, as firms need loans with longer maturities to realise productivity-enhancing medium- and long-term investments, many of which include complementary investments in labour, thereby contributing to an improvement in job quality.
Governments and regulators need to strike a balance between leveraging the potential of digital lending for inclusive finance and economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis, and mitigating associated risks. In particular, they should, together with providers of technical and financial development cooperation, consider the following:
- Fostering the integrity of (digital) credit markets. Regulators should establish specific licenses and regulations for all digital financial service providers, and intro¬duce obligatory reporting requirements to supervisory bodies and national systems for sharing credit information.
- Preventing exploitative financialisation. Regulators need to require digital lenders to present the costs and risks of their loan products in a manner comprehensible to consumers with little financial literacy, and extend consumer protection policies to digital financial services.
- Ensuring availability of loans with longer maturities. Development finance institutions and other national and international promoters of (M)SMEs should assist local banks in the provision of longer-term loans, e.g. by offering respective funds or partial credit guarantees.
- Establishing regulatory sandboxes. Regulators should launch regulatory sandboxes to test legislation in a closed setting and to learn about risks without hindering innovation.
By Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury
SINGAPORE, Nov 22 2021 (IPS)
It has been said that when Greek meets Greek, then comes the tug of war. The summit of the leaders of world’s two strongest powers, the United States and China, came face to face at long last. Albeit virtually. Still, this was undoubtedly the “mother of summits” this year. There were two telephone conversations earlier, but according to US officials this nearly four hours of summitry was far more “candid intense, and deeper interaction”. If there was one single take-away from this meeting, it was the establishment beyond all reasonable doubt of the incontrovertible fact that the US and China were indeed the two most influential global state actors. The decisions between the two, represented by their leaders, would profoundly impact the rest of humanity far into the future.
Dr. Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury
Given that in terms of deliverables, the consensus among all analysts was that nothing significant was expected, the event was important in that it put to rest the bickering between the subordinates that was pushing the world towards a precipice. It was about time the supreme political masters, Joe Biden of the US and Xi Jinping assumed the reins of control of the most important relationship of our times. Both sides were intellectually convinced that the stiffest possible competition between the two was on the cards. The challenge was to manage this in a way to prevent a conflict that would be catastrophic. This was one point on which, luckily, there was understanding on both sides.There was not much on anything else. Prior to the meeting that Biden was focussed on writing the rules of the engagement of China “in a way that is favourable to our interests and our values and those of our allies and partners”. Unsurprisingly, Xi and the Chinese did not play ball. Both sides basically emphatically stated their positions on issues and showed nary an inclination to concede an inch to the other. In the end, as was expected, there were no breakthroughs. The irreconcilable positions remained in- tact, with a vague call by both sides for more cooperation.
A virtual meeting is bereft of the positive influences of informal chats, banquets, and the opportunity of developing personal camaraderie. Still, both leaders exuded friendly demeanours, and Xi called Biden “an old friend”. On Taiwan, the dialogue was tough. Xi reminded Biden of the US position on the Peoples ‘Republic being the sole legitimate government of China , reinforced by here communiques issued in 1972, 1979 and 1982. Following the talks the White House clarified that the “One China’ was also guided by the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances committing the US to opposing” unilateral efforts to change the status quo”. Xi made it clear that Taiwan for China was a “core issue”; it was a province of China, and any support to its independence was akin to playing with fire. “Whoever plays with fire will get hurt” was a message he strongly underscored.
There seemed a glimmer of hope on one front, though. In the past China has refused to be drawn into any nuclear arms control agreements given that its arsenal was far smaller than those of the US and Russia. But recent significant qualitative improvements of its capabilities have been worrying the US. At the meeting China showed willingness to talk on the subject. However, there is no possibility of agreements beyond the rim of the saucer because the Chinese will naturally demand steep cuts in US numbers which will be unacceptable to Washington. However, there could be forward movement through diplomatic engagements on matters such as Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), will the positivity that would entail.
There is a fundamental difference in the approach of China and the US to negotiations. The US believes in a kind of “a la carte” method of choosing areas where it believes there is scope for collaboration while competition, and even confrontation, continues others. The Chinese on the other hand reject this as “cherry picking” and see the agenda as a comprehensive package. What is the use of understanding on one subject, while differences on another cam lead to war? Unless this basic divergence is resolved, negotiations are unlikely to be able to yield any worthwhile results. Discussions will continue to be both sweet and sour, as the summit deliberations were, but nothing seriously palatable will get cooked!
Xi has in the meanwhile has consolidated his own power in China to a point that he may be set obtain a third term of office. More importantly, he is viewed as the navigator in the journey towards national rejuvenation leading to China becoming a modern fully developed nation by 2049 which will bring him yet closer to the status of the Great helmsman, Chairman Mao Zedong, himself. All these were the outcome of the Sixth plenum of the Chinese Communist Party which met last week and adopted a “historical resolution” that buttressed Xi’s power and position.
Incidentally, in the history of the party this was the third historical resolution. The first was adopted in 1945 under Mao four years prior to the revolutionary victory, and the second by the ‘reformist” Deng Xiaoping. While Mao was the one who restored a sense of pride among the Chinese people enabling them “to stand up” and Deng made them rich through his reforms, Xi, by the dint of this “thought” (which supersedes “theory” in Chinese political lexicon) gave them strength and shared prosperity. In an abstruse political milieu where the count of numbers means a great deal, a Xinhua communique on the meeting mentioned Xi’s name at least fourteen times, compared to seven of Mao and Five of Deng. That tells a lot.
Consequently, it is now all but certain that Xi will be elected to an unprecedented third term in office as party General Secretary at the 20th Party Congress next year. There is also some talk that he may assume the title of “Chairman” as well which will bring him at par with Mao. The plenum also elevated Xi Jinping Thought to 21st Century Marxism, completing the process of “Sinicization” of Marxist philosophy. Xi has been pragmatic in welding the conservatism of Mao, but shunning his repressive methods, with the reforms of Deng, correcting the “capitalist excesses”, and bringing China on a socialist path that would lead to a “modern society” with “shared prosperity “. Small wonder that many Chinese observers are beginning to see him as a “Philosopher King” in the mould of Plato in the West and Confucius in the East, a perfect mix for the cauldron of power and authority. An interesting footnote is that the Chinese Communist Party formally announced its third “historical resolution”, cementing Xi’s powers hours after the Summit, though it was leaked earlier, which pointed to a thought-through calibrated set of actions.
Nowhere the same degree, Joe Biden also seems to have achieved a modicum of success of his own despite powerful head winds. He has managed to create a sense of cohesion among America’s allies, though his path has had numerous pitfalls and bumps. Importantly he has managed to secure the passage into law of the massive legislation in terms of the US $1.2 trillion bill on a revamp of infrastructures, to “build back better”, a campaign pledge. This for him is no mean achievement, proving that persistence pays. But for him and his Democratic Party the future is not as rosy as that what appears to be for his Chinese counterpart. A Republican win in the Presidential race is a distinct possibility. That could lead to turmoil and backlash in US domestic politics, requiring the identification of a common foe to rally the nation. China is the obvious candidate. If, consequently, the “ultimate red line” for China, such as on the issue of Taiwan is crossed, a catastrophe could follow.
Surely the Chinese have made those calculations. From now to then, China and Xi will, while seeking to avoid an immediate conflict, be preparing to, in the words of the Global Times seen as a State media outlet, “to deal with the biggest storms in the world, the most powerful and comprehensive siege from the US and its allies”. Halfway down this decade it will be high- risk for one to wager too much in favour of peace!
Dr Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury is the Honorary Fellow at the Institute of South Asia Studies, NUS. He is a former Foreign Advisor (Foreign Minister) of Bangladesh and President & Distinguished Fellow of Cosmos Foundation. The views addressed in the article are his own. He can be reached at: isasiac @nus.edu.sg
This story was originally published by Dhaka Courier.
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Az online közvetített rendezvényen Pintér Sándor felidézte: húsz évvel ezelőtt, 2001. november 23-án harminc ország minisztere látogatott el Budapestre, hogy az Európa Tanács (ET) számítástechnikai bűnözésről szóló egyezményének aláírásával elkötelezze magát a kiberbűnözés elleni harc iránt. Az úgynevezett Budapest Egyezményt azóta már 66 állam ratifikálta, ami bizonyítja a dokumentum hatékonyságát, egyben időtállóságát is – értékelt a miniszter.
Elmondta, hogy hamarosan ratifikálhatják az egyezmény új, második kiegészítő jegyzőkönyét is, amely hatékony eszközt nyújt majd a hatóságoknak a kiberbűnözés elleni fellépéshez. Felhívta a figyelmet arra, hogy a technológia fejlődésével folyamatosan nő a kiberbűnözés intenzitása és összetettsége. Ez a bűnüldöző szervek részéről is határozott fellépést, gyors reagálást és folyamatos tanulást igényel.
Pintér kiemelte, hogy a kiberbűnözés már nemcsak egy önmagában létező bűnözési forma, hanem megjelenik a hagyományos bűncselekmények kísérőjelenségeként is. Úgy vélekedett: a globális összefogás, a hatékony nemzetközi keretek kialakítása alapozza meg a kiberbűnözők elleni sikeres fellépést, a kiberbiztonságot. A miniszter szerint Magyarország megfelelő módon reagált ezekre a kihívásokra, így jött létre a virtuális környezetben elkövetett bűncselekményekre szakosodott rendőri részleg is.
A belügyminiszter rámutatott arra, hogy az elektronikus bizonyítékok hatékony gyűjtése, megőrzése és átadása kiemelten fontossá vált. A Budapest Egyezmény nyomán kialakult kapcsolati hálózatban pedig a részt vevő országok folyamatosan, napi szinten megosztják egymással az információkat.
“A gyors és állandó adatcsere meghatározó pontja a nemzetközi szervezett bűnözési csoportok felderítésének és elfogásának – közölte Pintér.
Marija Pejcinovic Buric, az Európa Tanács főtitkára mindenekelőtt figyelemreméltónak nevezte, hogy Pintér – ahogy húsz évvel ezelőtt – most is belügyminiszteri pozícióban lehet vendéglátójuk, egyúttal mind a miniszternek, mind a magyar hatóságoknak köszönetet mondott a kiberbűnözés elleni fellépésben való közreműködésért.
Felhívta a figyelmet arra, hogy az internet terjedésével “jelentősen felgyorsultak az események”, a kiberbűnözés egyre elterjedtebb és egyre több módon károsíthatja meg a társadalmakat. A főtitkár azt is kiemelte, hogy nőtt a magán-, az állami, illetve a nemzetközi szervezeteket érintő adatlopások száma, továbbá közintézményeket, választási rendszereket is érnek támadások.
Mindemellett napjainkban a koronavírus-járványt is kihasználták a bűnözők, hamis tesztek, gyógyszerek értékesítésével – figyelmeztetett, kiemelve, hogy emberéleteket is veszélyeztethet a kiberbűnözés.
Az ET főtitkára hangsúlyozta, hogy a technológia gyorsan fejlődik, ezért a bizonyítékok megszerzését szolgáló rendszereket is fejleszteni kell. Véleménye szerint a második kiegészítő jegyzőkönyv mérföldkövet jelent. Ez egyebek mellett lehetővé teszi a hatóságok számára a domain információk megszerzését, továbbá adatszolgáltatási kötelezettséget is előír az internetszolgáltatók számára – sorolta példaként, kiemelve: mindez meggyorsítja a nyomozó munkát.
Az Európa Tanács kiberbűnözéssel foglalkozó szakmai rendezvényét, az “Octopus Konferenciát” a magyar elnökség programsorozata részeként szervezték meg. A nyitórendezvény lehetőséget ad a Budapest Egyezmény elfogadása 20. évfordulójának és az új, második kiegészítő jegyzőkönyv elfogadásának megünneplésére, valamint a kiberbűnözés elleni globális összefogás áttekintésére – írták a szervezők.
The post Pintér: Magyarország biztos partner a kiberbűnözés elleni harcban appeared first on .
Il n’est secret pour personne que les athlètes, notamment les joueurs de football, reçoivent un salaire qualifié « d’énorme », de la part de leur club professionnel, mais aussi de leur équipe nationale.
Le grand montant en échangeant de leur service sur le terrain, concerne pratiquement tous les joueurs de football, particulièrement ceux qui évoluent dans de grands clubs, à l’image du Paris Saint-Germain, le Real Madrid ou encore Manchester United.
Pour les footballeurs du club français Olympique de Lyon, dont lequel évolue l’Algérien Islam Slimani, ils ne sont pas exclus de cette catégorie. En effet, la direction dudit club a récemment publié un tableau contenant les salaires de ses joueurs, pour cette saison (2021-2022).
3M d’euros pour Slimani cette saisonDans ledit tableau, le nom Islam Slimani apparait clairement avec un montant de 3 millions d’euros pour la saison 2021-2022, sachant que ce dernier est lié d’un contrat avec les Lyonnais qui s’étale jusqu’à l’année prochaine.
Pour les deux coéquipiers du Fennec, qui sont liés, tout comme lui, d’un contrat qui se termine en 2022, sont rémunérés comme suit : Jason Denayer avec 3,24 millions d’euros et Emerson avec 2,7 millions d’euros.
Par ailleurs, il est utile de rappeler que l’Algérois est désormais le meilleur butteur de l’histoire de l’équipe nationale, et ce, en inscrivant un doublé contre le Niger (6-1), dans le cadre des qualifications à la Coupe du Monde 2022 au Qatar. L’attaquant de 33 ans avait égalé le record le 2 septembre dernier face à Djibouti (8-0).
L’article France : quand l’Olympique Lyonnais révèle le salaire de Slimani est apparu en premier sur .