Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

ELIAMEP’s analysts assess the latest developments and examine possible scenarios for the future of Iran–US relations, as well as their implications for the Middle East and international security.

Read it here (in Greek).

Das Bundeskabinett will heute Änderungen am Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG) auf den Weg bringen. Dazu folgt eine Einordnung von Claudia Kemfert, Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im DIW Berlin:

Die stärkere Ausrichtung auf Systemintegration, Speicher und Flexibilität ist grundsätzlich richtig. Positiv ist auch, dass beim Netzanschlusspaket gegenüber den ersten Plänen nachgebessert wurde. Dennoch bleibt problematisch, dass die Folgen unzureichender Netze zunehmend auf die Betreiber erneuerbarer Anlagen verlagert werden. Eine entschädigungsfreie Abregelung von bis zu 20 Prozent ist ein erheblicher Eingriff und kann Investitionen verteuern. Regionale Steuerung darf den dezentralen Netzausbau nicht ersetzen. Netzbetreiber müssen verbindlich zu schneller Optimierung, Digitalisierung und Ausbau verpflichtet werden.

Die Einigung auf die EEG-Novelle und das Netzanschlusspaket enthält wichtige Fortschritte: zusätzliche zwölf Gigawatt Windenergie an Land, stärkere Anreize für Speicher, eine höhere Beteiligung der Kommunen und gegenüber den ursprünglichen Plänen begrenztere Regeln zur entschädigungsfreien Abregelung. Positiv sind auch die Übergangsregelungen für kleine Photovoltaikanlagen. Damit wird ein wichtiger Schritt getan, um den Ausbau der Erneuerbaren ab 2027 rechtssicher fortzuführen. 

Allerdings stimmt bei der EEG-Novelle die Reihenfolge noch nicht. Mehr Marktintegration kann sinnvoll sein, aber dafür müssen Smart Meter, digitale Infrastruktur, Speicher und bezahlbare Direktvermarktungsangebote vorhanden sein. Werden Einspeisevergütungen zurückgefahren, bevor diese Voraussetzungen flächendeckend geschaffen sind, droht vor allem bei kleiner Dach-Photovoltaik und Bürgerenergie ein Investitionsdämpfer. Entscheidend ist jetzt, Planungssicherheit über 2026 hinaus zu schaffen und Erneuerbaren-Ausbau, Netze, Speicher, Digitalisierung und Flexibilität konsequent gemeinsam voranzubringen.

Systemintegration ja, Investitionsbremse nein. Wer Erneuerbare stärker in den Markt schicken will, muss zuerst Netze, Smart Meter, Speicher und Flexibilität bereitstellen. Sonst werden Versäumnisse im Stromsystem auf diejenigen abgewälzt, die die Energiewende tragen. Kritisch bleibt, dass die Bundesregierung die Ursachen der Netzengpässe nicht konsequent beseitigt, sondern einen Teil der Risiken auf Investoren erneuerbarer Energien verlagert. Wer Investitionen in Wind- und Solarenergie durch neue Unsicherheiten erschwert, gefährdet den Ausbau ausgerechnet der Technologien, die für ein klimaneutrales, bezahlbares und sicheres Energiesystem gebraucht werden. Es ist ein Fehler, die Defizite bei Netzen, Digitalisierung und Flexibilität den Erneuerbaren anzulasten. Die Energiewende scheitert nicht an zu viel Wind- und Solarenergie, sondern an einem Stromsystem, das zu langsam modernisiert wird.

Das Konjunkturbarometer des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) ist im Juli deutlich gefallen. Mit 91,3 Punkten liegt der Wert nun so niedrig wie seit Herbst 2025 nicht mehr und entfernt sich damit merklich von der neutralen 100-Punkte-Marke, die ein durchschnittliches Wachstum ...

Die deutsche Industrie verliert an Boden – viele Ursachen sind hausgemacht. Wie kann die stille Auszehrung gestoppt werden? Fünf Vorschläge., Dieser Gastbeitrag von Alexander Schiersch und Alexander S. Kritikos ist am 27. Juli 2026 in der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung erschienen., Deutschlands forschungsintensive Industrien bilden seit Jahrzehnten das Fundament der deutschen Wirtschaft. Doch ob Automobilindustrie, Maschinenbau, Chemie- oder Elektronikindustrie, es knirscht seit einiger Zeit. Das zentrale Problem ist eine politisch hausgemachte und inzwischen strukturell ...

A Tanács kinevezte Birgitte Nygaard Markussent az EU Száhel-övezetért felelős új különleges képviselőjévé.

A Tanács elfogadta a gazdasági és egyéni korlátozó intézkedések 21. csomagját. Az új intézkedések az Oroszország gazdaságára legnagyobb hatást gyakorló ágazatokat célozzák meg, valamint az ország azon képessége ellen irányulnak, hogy folytatni tudja az Ukrajna elleni agressziós háborúját. A mostani csomag az elmúlt négy év legnagyobb egyéni jegyzékbevételi csomagját jelenti.

Az intézkedés lehetővé teszi az online szolgáltatók számára a gyermekek szexuális bántalmazását ábrázoló online anyagok önkéntes felderítését, bejelentését és eltávolítását.

Eine AfD-Politik träfe die Regionen am härtesten, in denen die Partei besonders stark ist. Eine Studie zeigt, dass Sachsen-Anhalt etliche Jobs verlieren könnte., Im September wählt Sachsen-Anhalt einen neuen Landtag. Die AfD hat gute Chancen, stärkste Kraft zu werden – womöglich könnte sie sogar eine absolute Mehrheit erreichen. Die Debatte dreht sich dabei fast immer um die Gründe für ihren Erfolg: wirtschaftliche Sorgen, Migration oder das Gefühl, ...

Marten Ritterrath, Assoziierter Doktorand in der Abteilung Kriminalität, Arbeit und Ungleichheit, hat am 20. Juli 2026 seine Dissertation an der Universität zu Köln erfolgreich verteidigt. Die Dissertation mit dem Titel "How Personal Experiences and Social Concerns Shape Green Innovation and Climate ...

Exacerbated by the cuts in development cooperation (DC), many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are currently facing severe financial constraints. Against this backdrop, higher domestic revenue is a desirable goal for most countries. Greater attention is being devoted to enhancing domestic revenue in the international development policy discourse too – across the entire political spectrum. For some, the goal is to extend the decision-making scope of government and enhance the development focus of public action, while others hope to relieve the burden of transfers on industrialised nations of the Global North and end the recipient countries’ “addiction” to DC payments. Yet what options are actually available to LMICs to generate more domestic revenue? The present policy brief shows that taxing personal income and landed property in particular could offer opportunities for additional revenue. Another important area is the rationalisation of tax expenditures, which often lead to substantially less revenue without providing any evident benefit. At the same time, however, it is also important to recognise the systemic – and eminently political – nature of tax reforms. Above and beyond the issue of technical and administrative feasibility, the political achievability of reforms must also be taken into
account. Short-term tax increases – for example through higher consumer taxes or tariffs – are often not very sustainable in their own right.
Instead, the aim must be to place the “fiscal contract” between taxpayers and the state on a broader and more stable base where better public services also play a role. One type of revenue (in this case DC) therefore cannot simply be replaced by another (taxes) – a fact that advocates of DC cuts often fail to mention. During the transition, DC must continue to provide contributions, despite declining overall funds.
International players, including the German Government and the EU, can support partner governments in a variety of ways. They are already doing so, for example by promoting the Addis Tax Initiative (ATI). In addition, Germany and the EU should make a determined effort to help strengthen multilateral approaches to cooperation. This particularly applies to the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on International Tax Coopera-tion currently being negotiated.

Exacerbated by the cuts in development cooperation (DC), many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are currently facing severe financial constraints. Against this backdrop, higher domestic revenue is a desirable goal for most countries. Greater attention is being devoted to enhancing domestic revenue in the international development policy discourse too – across the entire political spectrum. For some, the goal is to extend the decision-making scope of government and enhance the development focus of public action, while others hope to relieve the burden of transfers on industrialised nations of the Global North and end the recipient countries’ “addiction” to DC payments. Yet what options are actually available to LMICs to generate more domestic revenue? The present policy brief shows that taxing personal income and landed property in particular could offer opportunities for additional revenue. Another important area is the rationalisation of tax expenditures, which often lead to substantially less revenue without providing any evident benefit. At the same time, however, it is also important to recognise the systemic – and eminently political – nature of tax reforms. Above and beyond the issue of technical and administrative feasibility, the political achievability of reforms must also be taken into
account. Short-term tax increases – for example through higher consumer taxes or tariffs – are often not very sustainable in their own right.
Instead, the aim must be to place the “fiscal contract” between taxpayers and the state on a broader and more stable base where better public services also play a role. One type of revenue (in this case DC) therefore cannot simply be replaced by another (taxes) – a fact that advocates of DC cuts often fail to mention. During the transition, DC must continue to provide contributions, despite declining overall funds.
International players, including the German Government and the EU, can support partner governments in a variety of ways. They are already doing so, for example by promoting the Addis Tax Initiative (ATI). In addition, Germany and the EU should make a determined effort to help strengthen multilateral approaches to cooperation. This particularly applies to the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on International Tax Coopera-tion currently being negotiated.

Exacerbated by the cuts in development cooperation (DC), many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are currently facing severe financial constraints. Against this backdrop, higher domestic revenue is a desirable goal for most countries. Greater attention is being devoted to enhancing domestic revenue in the international development policy discourse too – across the entire political spectrum. For some, the goal is to extend the decision-making scope of government and enhance the development focus of public action, while others hope to relieve the burden of transfers on industrialised nations of the Global North and end the recipient countries’ “addiction” to DC payments. Yet what options are actually available to LMICs to generate more domestic revenue? The present policy brief shows that taxing personal income and landed property in particular could offer opportunities for additional revenue. Another important area is the rationalisation of tax expenditures, which often lead to substantially less revenue without providing any evident benefit. At the same time, however, it is also important to recognise the systemic – and eminently political – nature of tax reforms. Above and beyond the issue of technical and administrative feasibility, the political achievability of reforms must also be taken into
account. Short-term tax increases – for example through higher consumer taxes or tariffs – are often not very sustainable in their own right.
Instead, the aim must be to place the “fiscal contract” between taxpayers and the state on a broader and more stable base where better public services also play a role. One type of revenue (in this case DC) therefore cannot simply be replaced by another (taxes) – a fact that advocates of DC cuts often fail to mention. During the transition, DC must continue to provide contributions, despite declining overall funds.
International players, including the German Government and the EU, can support partner governments in a variety of ways. They are already doing so, for example by promoting the Addis Tax Initiative (ATI). In addition, Germany and the EU should make a determined effort to help strengthen multilateral approaches to cooperation. This particularly applies to the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on International Tax Coopera-tion currently being negotiated.

Vor genau einem Jahr stellte der Internationale Gerichtshof in Den Haag in einem Rechtsgutachten fest: Staaten sind völkerrechtlich verpflichtet, das Klima zu schützen und erhebliche Schäden zu verhindern. Der Klimaspruch kann ein Instrument der internationalen Klimadiplomatie sein, diese aber nicht ersetzen.

Vor genau einem Jahr stellte der Internationale Gerichtshof in Den Haag in einem Rechtsgutachten fest: Staaten sind völkerrechtlich verpflichtet, das Klima zu schützen und erhebliche Schäden zu verhindern. Der Klimaspruch kann ein Instrument der internationalen Klimadiplomatie sein, diese aber nicht ersetzen.

Vor genau einem Jahr stellte der Internationale Gerichtshof in Den Haag in einem Rechtsgutachten fest: Staaten sind völkerrechtlich verpflichtet, das Klima zu schützen und erhebliche Schäden zu verhindern. Der Klimaspruch kann ein Instrument der internationalen Klimadiplomatie sein, diese aber nicht ersetzen.

Zusammenfassung:

24. Juli 2026 – Im September 2026 wählt Sachsen-Anhalt einen neuen Landtag. Die AfD hat gute Chancen, stärkste Kraft zu werden. Doch was würden weniger Europa, weniger Zuwanderung und geringere öffentliche Investitionen für die Menschen bedeuten? Diese Kurzstudie belegt ein AfD-Paradox: Regionen, die überproportional stark für die AfD stimmen, leiden deutlich stärker unter einer AfD-Politik als andere. Obwohl vieles an der Unzufriedenheit der Menschen in starken AfD-Regionen verständlich ist, würden sie sich mit der Wahl der AfD selbst am meisten schaden. Das gilt nirgendwo mehr als in Sachsen-Anhalt. Durch die von der AfD geforderte Politik – den Austritt aus Euro und EU, Abschottung und einen Stopp der Zuwanderung sowie massive staatliche Kürzungen – würden Menschen dort im Durchschnitt jährlich rund 1.600 Euro pro Kopf an Einkommen verlieren; zudem könnten rund 10.000 Arbeitsplätze verloren gehen. Die Einkommensverluste durch eine AfD-Politik könnten in Sachsen-Anhalt bis zu doppelt so hoch ausfallen wie im Bundesdurchschnitt. Die Gefahr einer Abwärtsspirale ist groß. Unzufriedenheit treibt die Unterstützung für die AfD, was wiederum die Lebenssituation weiter verschlechtert. Eine hoffnungsvolle Perspektive: Gelingt es, neue Zukunftschancen zu schaffen, kann aus der Abwärts- eine Aufwärtsspirale werden. Denn diese Kurzstudie zeigt auch, dass AfD-Wähler*innen, gerade im Osten, auf Veränderungen reagieren. Die deutsche Geschichte belegt es: Die 1990er und 2000er Jahre waren gerade in den ostdeutschen Ländern Jahrzehnte der Stärkung der Demokratie, des wachsenden Wohlstands und sozialer Teilhabe.

The majority of the people displaced by the armed conflict in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province live in host communities. Our research shows that many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) live with family/friends. Less than half live in displacement camps. As in many other internal displacement contexts, the government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian organisations use the terms IDPs and host communities to distinguish between the people who fled the conflict and those who welcomed them, respectively. This is a necessary distinction because IDPs are in a particularly precarious situation, having lost homes, family members and means of livelihoods, which renders material and psychosocial support to them indispensable. However, this policy brief identifies two issues that are pertinent to this distinction and the provision of material support to IDPs. First, while the categories of IDPs and host communities may provide clarity for interventions, they do not always reflect the broader history of local communities and how people identify and relate to each other. Second, in contexts where economically vulnerable host communities share their meagre resources with IDPs prior to the arrival of external humanitarian support, humanitarian organisations need to be sensitive to the material circumstances of host communities so that these do not see such support as discriminatory, leading to conflict. When the material support that humanitarian organisations provide to IDPs is beyond the means of their hosts, the latter can become resentful and withdraw their own support from the IDPs. This is a common problem, and the policy brief shows some ways to address it. Governments, development partners, and humanitarian organisations that adopt simplistic distinctions between IDPs and host communities without locating them in the specific socio-economic context risk missing local acts of solidarity and mutual identification as channels of inclusion that are central to maintaining social cohesion. 

Key policy messages:

• Contextualise displacement. In contexts where displacement occurs within a broader history of regional migration, IDPs are not always seen as outsiders in their host communities because many have prior personal connections to host com­munities. The government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian actors need to embed and understand the current displacement within the long history of migration, ethnolinguistic identification and displacement which shapes relations and contributes to social cohesion. 
• Integrate local ethos of solidarity. In the absence of external humanitarian support or prior to the arrival of emergency aid, host communities mobilise themselves through an ethos of solidarity, care and hospitality to help displaced people. External interventions coming into such situations need to be sensitive to this ethos and build on existing inclusive social support mechanisms and locally led initiatives so that they do not disrupt positive relations.
• Build on locally led integration. Locally led efforts are integral to local ownership of the integration of IDPs and its sustainability. When external support builds on local initiatives, this reduces unintended consequences such as resentment and conflicts between IDPs and host communities.

The majority of the people displaced by the armed conflict in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province live in host communities. Our research shows that many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) live with family/friends. Less than half live in displacement camps. As in many other internal displacement contexts, the government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian organisations use the terms IDPs and host communities to distinguish between the people who fled the conflict and those who welcomed them, respectively. This is a necessary distinction because IDPs are in a particularly precarious situation, having lost homes, family members and means of livelihoods, which renders material and psychosocial support to them indispensable. However, this policy brief identifies two issues that are pertinent to this distinction and the provision of material support to IDPs. First, while the categories of IDPs and host communities may provide clarity for interventions, they do not always reflect the broader history of local communities and how people identify and relate to each other. Second, in contexts where economically vulnerable host communities share their meagre resources with IDPs prior to the arrival of external humanitarian support, humanitarian organisations need to be sensitive to the material circumstances of host communities so that these do not see such support as discriminatory, leading to conflict. When the material support that humanitarian organisations provide to IDPs is beyond the means of their hosts, the latter can become resentful and withdraw their own support from the IDPs. This is a common problem, and the policy brief shows some ways to address it. Governments, development partners, and humanitarian organisations that adopt simplistic distinctions between IDPs and host communities without locating them in the specific socio-economic context risk missing local acts of solidarity and mutual identification as channels of inclusion that are central to maintaining social cohesion. 

Key policy messages:

• Contextualise displacement. In contexts where displacement occurs within a broader history of regional migration, IDPs are not always seen as outsiders in their host communities because many have prior personal connections to host com­munities. The government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian actors need to embed and understand the current displacement within the long history of migration, ethnolinguistic identification and displacement which shapes relations and contributes to social cohesion. 
• Integrate local ethos of solidarity. In the absence of external humanitarian support or prior to the arrival of emergency aid, host communities mobilise themselves through an ethos of solidarity, care and hospitality to help displaced people. External interventions coming into such situations need to be sensitive to this ethos and build on existing inclusive social support mechanisms and locally led initiatives so that they do not disrupt positive relations.
• Build on locally led integration. Locally led efforts are integral to local ownership of the integration of IDPs and its sustainability. When external support builds on local initiatives, this reduces unintended consequences such as resentment and conflicts between IDPs and host communities.

The majority of the people displaced by the armed conflict in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province live in host communities. Our research shows that many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) live with family/friends. Less than half live in displacement camps. As in many other internal displacement contexts, the government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian organisations use the terms IDPs and host communities to distinguish between the people who fled the conflict and those who welcomed them, respectively. This is a necessary distinction because IDPs are in a particularly precarious situation, having lost homes, family members and means of livelihoods, which renders material and psychosocial support to them indispensable. However, this policy brief identifies two issues that are pertinent to this distinction and the provision of material support to IDPs. First, while the categories of IDPs and host communities may provide clarity for interventions, they do not always reflect the broader history of local communities and how people identify and relate to each other. Second, in contexts where economically vulnerable host communities share their meagre resources with IDPs prior to the arrival of external humanitarian support, humanitarian organisations need to be sensitive to the material circumstances of host communities so that these do not see such support as discriminatory, leading to conflict. When the material support that humanitarian organisations provide to IDPs is beyond the means of their hosts, the latter can become resentful and withdraw their own support from the IDPs. This is a common problem, and the policy brief shows some ways to address it. Governments, development partners, and humanitarian organisations that adopt simplistic distinctions between IDPs and host communities without locating them in the specific socio-economic context risk missing local acts of solidarity and mutual identification as channels of inclusion that are central to maintaining social cohesion. 

Key policy messages:

• Contextualise displacement. In contexts where displacement occurs within a broader history of regional migration, IDPs are not always seen as outsiders in their host communities because many have prior personal connections to host com­munities. The government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian actors need to embed and understand the current displacement within the long history of migration, ethnolinguistic identification and displacement which shapes relations and contributes to social cohesion. 
• Integrate local ethos of solidarity. In the absence of external humanitarian support or prior to the arrival of emergency aid, host communities mobilise themselves through an ethos of solidarity, care and hospitality to help displaced people. External interventions coming into such situations need to be sensitive to this ethos and build on existing inclusive social support mechanisms and locally led initiatives so that they do not disrupt positive relations.
• Build on locally led integration. Locally led efforts are integral to local ownership of the integration of IDPs and its sustainability. When external support builds on local initiatives, this reduces unintended consequences such as resentment and conflicts between IDPs and host communities.

The following paper was awarded first prize in the policy paper competition organized by ELIAMEP’s Turkey Programme, focusing on Turkey’s domestic developments, foreign relations, and socio-political dynamics.

The policy paper examines the systematic erosion of press freedom and digital rights in Turkey, focusing particularly on events following the arrest of Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu on March 19, 2025. The Saraçhane protests that erupted in response revealed the full dimensions of the Turkish government’s digital censorship apparatus: bandwidth throttling, mass social media account suspensions, and the systematic suppression of citizen journalism. Through an analysis of recent policy developments, legal frameworks, and the relationship between the Erdoğan regime and Big Tech companies, this report documents how authoritarian governments leverage digital platforms to silence dissent.

The analysis shows that with 90% of traditional media under state control, journalists have migrated to YouTube and social media platforms only to face expensive licensing requirements, threats of arrest, and platform-level censorship. The report argues that İmamoğlu’s case represents a dangerous precedent: his social media accounts remain suspended, despite his legal case maintaining the presumption of innocence, which effectively prevents him from campaigning as a presidential candidate. This systematic destruction of information infrastructure has implications not only for Turkey, but for democratic movements worldwide.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Ezgi Daryurek, Master’s Program in Media and Migration Flows, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.