Europäische Union

Tehran will “pay the price” for stalling negotiations, the U.S. president warned.

Two new books offer fresh explanations for what went wrong—but little on how to make it go right.

La route des Balkans reste toujours l'une des principales voies d'accès l'Union européenne, pour les exilés du Proche et du Moyen Orient, d'Afrique ou d'Asie. Alors que les frontières Schengen se ferment, Frontex se déploie dans les Balkans, qui sont toujours un « sas d'accès » à la « forteresse Europe ». Notre fil d'infos en continu.

- Le fil de l'Info / Bosnie-Herzégovine, Albanie, Kosovo, Bulgarie, Questions européennes, Populations, minorités et migrations, Migrants Balkans, Courrier des Balkans, Croatie, Turquie, Grèce, Moldavie, Macédoine du Nord, Monténégro, Slovénie, Roumanie, Serbie, Gratuit, Grèce immigration

La route des Balkans reste toujours l'une des principales voies d'accès l'Union européenne, pour les exilés du Proche et du Moyen Orient, d'Afrique ou d'Asie. Alors que les frontières Schengen se ferment, Frontex se déploie dans les Balkans, qui sont toujours un « sas d'accès » à la « forteresse Europe ». Notre fil d'infos en continu.

- Le fil de l'Info / Bosnie-Herzégovine, Albanie, Kosovo, Bulgarie, Questions européennes, Populations, minorités et migrations, Migrants Balkans, Courrier des Balkans, Croatie, Turquie, Grèce, Moldavie, Macédoine du Nord, Monténégro, Slovénie, Roumanie, Serbie, Gratuit, Grèce immigration

Trump and the Iran war gave Russia a boost. Brussels is fed up.

Ireland also wants to boost Europe's competitiveness in AI

How immigration, trade, and conflict are overshadowing soccer.

Enlargement raises concerns of destabilising the balance of power within the Union. Unless an alternative arrangement can be agreed

Chief medical officer: Some companies may not bring products to Europe first

The row comes amid growing tensions between Brussels and Bratislava over LGBTI+ rights

Germany is considering additional F-35 purchases after FCAS collapse

REPORT on the 2025 Commission report on Kosovo
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Riho Terras

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

REPORT on the 2025 Commission report on Bosnia and Herzegovina
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Ondřej Kolář

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Climate-induced Loss and Damage (L&D) is becoming a defining challenge for global climate governance, especially in West Africa, where adaptation limits are increasingly surpassed. Yet, the literature has largely overlooked how national governments in Africa conceptualize, operationalize, and govern L&D. Existing studies tend to focus on international finance debates or localized impacts, leaving a gap in understanding the national policy frameworks shaping L&D responses. This paper addresses this gap through a comparative analysis of five West African countries, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, structured around four thematic dimensions: conceptual clarity, scope and depth of losses, policy integration, and institutional readiness.
Drawing on more than 60 official policy documents, including National Adaptation Plans, disaster frameworks, and climate legislation, the study applies an interpretive scoring framework and proposes a three-stage typology of L&D policy engagement (Nascent, Emerging, Integrated). The results show that Senegal and Ghana fall into the Emerging category, with partial recognition of L&D concepts but limited institutionalization in formal policy architecture. Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Sierra Leone remain Nascent, where L&D is either subsumed under adaptation and humanitarian action or only referenced anecdotally. No country has yet reached the Integrated stage. Across all five cases, economic losses in agriculture and infrastructure are frequently reported, while non-economic losses such as displacement, cultural erosion, and psychological harm remain weakly specified. Institutional arrangements for L&D are fragmented in national frameworks, suggesting uneven preparedness for engagement with emerging international L&D governance mechanisms, including the Santiago Network and the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage.
The findings suggest that the absence of formal L&D strategies in many national policy documents may limit the visibility of irreversible climate impacts and complicate future claims-making in international arenas. By advancing a systematic baseline of how L&D is framed in national policies and introducing a heuristic typology for cross-country comparison, this study contributes conceptually, empirically, and policy-relevantly to debates on climate justice and the evolving governance of L&D in the Global South.
Key policy insights:
- Non-economic losses remain under-recognized in national climate policies, limiting justice-oriented approaches to L&D governance.
- Stronger integration of L&D across adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and development planning is needed to improve policy coherence and institutional coordination.
- Establishing dedicated L&D focal points, clearer institutional mandates, and links to existing risk-financing instruments could strengthen national engagement with emerging global L&D mechanisms.
- Embedding L&D more explicitly within NDCs, NAPs, and related reporting frameworks could improve strategic positioning within the FRLD and Santiago Network processes.

Climate-induced Loss and Damage (L&D) is becoming a defining challenge for global climate governance, especially in West Africa, where adaptation limits are increasingly surpassed. Yet, the literature has largely overlooked how national governments in Africa conceptualize, operationalize, and govern L&D. Existing studies tend to focus on international finance debates or localized impacts, leaving a gap in understanding the national policy frameworks shaping L&D responses. This paper addresses this gap through a comparative analysis of five West African countries, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, structured around four thematic dimensions: conceptual clarity, scope and depth of losses, policy integration, and institutional readiness.
Drawing on more than 60 official policy documents, including National Adaptation Plans, disaster frameworks, and climate legislation, the study applies an interpretive scoring framework and proposes a three-stage typology of L&D policy engagement (Nascent, Emerging, Integrated). The results show that Senegal and Ghana fall into the Emerging category, with partial recognition of L&D concepts but limited institutionalization in formal policy architecture. Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Sierra Leone remain Nascent, where L&D is either subsumed under adaptation and humanitarian action or only referenced anecdotally. No country has yet reached the Integrated stage. Across all five cases, economic losses in agriculture and infrastructure are frequently reported, while non-economic losses such as displacement, cultural erosion, and psychological harm remain weakly specified. Institutional arrangements for L&D are fragmented in national frameworks, suggesting uneven preparedness for engagement with emerging international L&D governance mechanisms, including the Santiago Network and the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage.
The findings suggest that the absence of formal L&D strategies in many national policy documents may limit the visibility of irreversible climate impacts and complicate future claims-making in international arenas. By advancing a systematic baseline of how L&D is framed in national policies and introducing a heuristic typology for cross-country comparison, this study contributes conceptually, empirically, and policy-relevantly to debates on climate justice and the evolving governance of L&D in the Global South.
Key policy insights:
- Non-economic losses remain under-recognized in national climate policies, limiting justice-oriented approaches to L&D governance.
- Stronger integration of L&D across adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and development planning is needed to improve policy coherence and institutional coordination.
- Establishing dedicated L&D focal points, clearer institutional mandates, and links to existing risk-financing instruments could strengthen national engagement with emerging global L&D mechanisms.
- Embedding L&D more explicitly within NDCs, NAPs, and related reporting frameworks could improve strategic positioning within the FRLD and Santiago Network processes.

On Wednesday, Parliament and Council negotiators agreed on proposals to accelerate defence investment and improve the EU’s responsiveness to security challenges.
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
Committee on Security and Defence

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On Wednesday, Parliament and Council negotiators agreed on proposals to accelerate defence investment and improve the EU’s responsiveness to security challenges.
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
Committee on Security and Defence

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On Wednesday, Parliament and Council negotiators agreed on proposals to accelerate defence investment and improve the EU’s responsiveness to security challenges.
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
Committee on Security and Defence

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

REPORT on the 2025 Commission report on North Macedonia
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Thomas Waitz

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On Monday, 15 June 2026, from 19.00 to 20.00, the Committees on Foreign Affairs and on Development and the Subcommittee on Human Rights, and in association with the Delegation for relations with Belarus, will hold a joint exchange of views with Andrzej Poczobut, journalist, activist and 2025 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought co-laureate.
Andrzej Poczobut has become one of the most prominent symbols of the repression faced by independent journalists, civil society representatives and political activists in Belarus. Arrested in 2021 and sentenced to eight years in prison on politically motivated charges, he spent five years in detention before his release in April 2026. Members will discuss the human rights situation in the country, the plight of political prisoners, and the European Union's support for democratic forces and fundamental freedoms in Belarus.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP