Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The Council and the European Parliament reached a provisional deal on the regulation on EU-Mercosur safeguard clauses, ensuring swift and strong action to protect EU farmers.

We need people to understand the holistic value of that natural blue capital and infrastructure. Whilst our countries (in the Pacific) are on the front line of climate change, they are also holding the front line by protecting large swaths of intact marine ecosystems that play a huge role in planetary stability—from biodiversity to climate change. —Coral Pasisi, SPC’s Director of Climate Change and Sustainability

Club governance formats were meant to work around blockages and challenges in the multilateral system. In a system under pressure, these have become more important. Simultaneously, they become embattled themselves in a political climate that has become more ruthless. Just after its presidence, South Africa has declared it would ”pause” its engagement in the G20 for 2026 after intense bullying by the US President. Yet, the existence of the G20 is based on the recognition that (financial) crisis of global scale require close cooperation among countries across the globe, going beyond the G7. That fact remains valid. The G20 is a collection of key countries that have to engage with each other – and that Europe has to engage with – to push for solutions for global challenges. Yet, polarisations are making G20 presidencies increasingly challenging. How did the last four “Southern” presidencies – Indonesia, India, Brazil and South Africa – navigate the increasingly choppy waters? And which elements can we distil from deliberations as communalities?

Club governance formats were meant to work around blockages and challenges in the multilateral system. In a system under pressure, these have become more important. Simultaneously, they become embattled themselves in a political climate that has become more ruthless. Just after its presidence, South Africa has declared it would ”pause” its engagement in the G20 for 2026 after intense bullying by the US President. Yet, the existence of the G20 is based on the recognition that (financial) crisis of global scale require close cooperation among countries across the globe, going beyond the G7. That fact remains valid. The G20 is a collection of key countries that have to engage with each other – and that Europe has to engage with – to push for solutions for global challenges. Yet, polarisations are making G20 presidencies increasingly challenging. How did the last four “Southern” presidencies – Indonesia, India, Brazil and South Africa – navigate the increasingly choppy waters? And which elements can we distil from deliberations as communalities?

Club governance formats were meant to work around blockages and challenges in the multilateral system. In a system under pressure, these have become more important. Simultaneously, they become embattled themselves in a political climate that has become more ruthless. Just after its presidence, South Africa has declared it would ”pause” its engagement in the G20 for 2026 after intense bullying by the US President. Yet, the existence of the G20 is based on the recognition that (financial) crisis of global scale require close cooperation among countries across the globe, going beyond the G7. That fact remains valid. The G20 is a collection of key countries that have to engage with each other – and that Europe has to engage with – to push for solutions for global challenges. Yet, polarisations are making G20 presidencies increasingly challenging. How did the last four “Southern” presidencies – Indonesia, India, Brazil and South Africa – navigate the increasingly choppy waters? And which elements can we distil from deliberations as communalities?

Foreign aid is an important component of international economic exchange and has historically been a central topic in International Relations (IR) scholarship. This phenomenon prompts fundamental questions regarding the motivations behind states’ allocation of resources beyond their national borders and the processes by which donor preferences are shaped at the nexus of power, interests, and ideas. Conventional IR theories concur on the premise that aid is inherently political. Subsequent scholarship has expanded upon this foundation, examining a broad range of systemic and domestic determinants of aid, emphasising how state interests, institutions, and the political economy of donors influence aid allocation. This article provides an overview of the extant literature, including pertinent debates, and presents significant advances in the field of the international political economy of aid. It also highlights how recent geopolitical shifts challenge conventional understandings of aid and concludes by proposing a reversal of the classic question for future research—from why states give aid to why they are increasingly reluctant to do so.

Foreign aid is an important component of international economic exchange and has historically been a central topic in International Relations (IR) scholarship. This phenomenon prompts fundamental questions regarding the motivations behind states’ allocation of resources beyond their national borders and the processes by which donor preferences are shaped at the nexus of power, interests, and ideas. Conventional IR theories concur on the premise that aid is inherently political. Subsequent scholarship has expanded upon this foundation, examining a broad range of systemic and domestic determinants of aid, emphasising how state interests, institutions, and the political economy of donors influence aid allocation. This article provides an overview of the extant literature, including pertinent debates, and presents significant advances in the field of the international political economy of aid. It also highlights how recent geopolitical shifts challenge conventional understandings of aid and concludes by proposing a reversal of the classic question for future research—from why states give aid to why they are increasingly reluctant to do so.

Foreign aid is an important component of international economic exchange and has historically been a central topic in International Relations (IR) scholarship. This phenomenon prompts fundamental questions regarding the motivations behind states’ allocation of resources beyond their national borders and the processes by which donor preferences are shaped at the nexus of power, interests, and ideas. Conventional IR theories concur on the premise that aid is inherently political. Subsequent scholarship has expanded upon this foundation, examining a broad range of systemic and domestic determinants of aid, emphasising how state interests, institutions, and the political economy of donors influence aid allocation. This article provides an overview of the extant literature, including pertinent debates, and presents significant advances in the field of the international political economy of aid. It also highlights how recent geopolitical shifts challenge conventional understandings of aid and concludes by proposing a reversal of the classic question for future research—from why states give aid to why they are increasingly reluctant to do so.

Les entreprises européennes ne sont plus de simples acteurs économiques : elles sont devenues des cibles stratégiques. Cyberattaques, espionnage industriel, pressions réglementaires, désinformation, sabotages logistiques ou prises de contrôle hostiles composent désormais un continuum de menaces dites « hybrides », où les frontières entre guerre, économie et influence s’effacent. Dans un nouveau Briefing, l’Institut Choiseul […]

Immobilienpreise weitgehend stabil, aber erste Anstiege bei Wohnungen – Mieten bundesweit um vier Prozent gestiegen – Zahl der Neubauten geht zurück – Politik sollte Wohnungsbau mit gezielten Investitionen stärken Auf dem deutschen Immobilienmarkt deutet sich eine leichte Trendwende an: Nach zwei ...

It is clear 2026 will not be a routine year for global development cooperation. The US is now a deliberate norm-breaker under Trump 2.0, China is edging into high-income status while insisting it is still “developing”, close to 80 per cent of the population in low- and middle-income countries live under some form of autocracy, and Russia is selling long-term nuclear dependence as a development offer. At the same time middle powers from Brazil to the Gulf states are quietly turning that turmoil into leverage. In a new IDOS Policy Brief we argue that these dynamics are not background noise but the core story that will shape cooperation in the next few years.

It is clear 2026 will not be a routine year for global development cooperation. The US is now a deliberate norm-breaker under Trump 2.0, China is edging into high-income status while insisting it is still “developing”, close to 80 per cent of the population in low- and middle-income countries live under some form of autocracy, and Russia is selling long-term nuclear dependence as a development offer. At the same time middle powers from Brazil to the Gulf states are quietly turning that turmoil into leverage. In a new IDOS Policy Brief we argue that these dynamics are not background noise but the core story that will shape cooperation in the next few years.

It is clear 2026 will not be a routine year for global development cooperation. The US is now a deliberate norm-breaker under Trump 2.0, China is edging into high-income status while insisting it is still “developing”, close to 80 per cent of the population in low- and middle-income countries live under some form of autocracy, and Russia is selling long-term nuclear dependence as a development offer. At the same time middle powers from Brazil to the Gulf states are quietly turning that turmoil into leverage. In a new IDOS Policy Brief we argue that these dynamics are not background noise but the core story that will shape cooperation in the next few years.

Opportunities and challenges for Germany and the EU

Sascha dos Santos und seine Co-Autor*innen wurde für ihren Beitrag im European Sociological Review mit dem Titel „Does training beget training over the life course? Cumulative advantage in work-related non-formal training participation in Germany and the UK“ von der interdisziplinären Jury des ...

Neil Murray hat am 10. Dezember seine Dissertation mit dem Titel „The Dynamics of Risk Preferences: Empirical Perspectives on Adaption and Behavior“ erfolgreich an der Freie Universität Berlin (FU Berlin) verteidigt. Die Kommission bestand aus Prof. Dr. Carsten Schröder (Betreuer und Erstgutachter, ...

Despite strategic rivalry, bureaucratic behavior in China and the United States follows strikingly similar logics. Drawing on comparative research across foreign aid, environmental governance, and pandemic response, we show that Chinese and U.S. bureaucrats are often driven by strikingly similar incentives. Career pressures, blame avoidance, political signaling, and risk aversion shape day-to-day decision-making on both sides — frequently producing comparable outcomes, despite very different political systems. Understanding these shared bureaucratic dynamics helps explain why the two superpowers can appear deeply polarized politically, yet are surprisingly predictable in practice. Beneath geopolitical rivalry, common administrative logics continue to anchor state action.

Despite strategic rivalry, bureaucratic behavior in China and the United States follows strikingly similar logics. Drawing on comparative research across foreign aid, environmental governance, and pandemic response, we show that Chinese and U.S. bureaucrats are often driven by strikingly similar incentives. Career pressures, blame avoidance, political signaling, and risk aversion shape day-to-day decision-making on both sides — frequently producing comparable outcomes, despite very different political systems. Understanding these shared bureaucratic dynamics helps explain why the two superpowers can appear deeply polarized politically, yet are surprisingly predictable in practice. Beneath geopolitical rivalry, common administrative logics continue to anchor state action.

Despite strategic rivalry, bureaucratic behavior in China and the United States follows strikingly similar logics. Drawing on comparative research across foreign aid, environmental governance, and pandemic response, we show that Chinese and U.S. bureaucrats are often driven by strikingly similar incentives. Career pressures, blame avoidance, political signaling, and risk aversion shape day-to-day decision-making on both sides — frequently producing comparable outcomes, despite very different political systems. Understanding these shared bureaucratic dynamics helps explain why the two superpowers can appear deeply polarized politically, yet are surprisingly predictable in practice. Beneath geopolitical rivalry, common administrative logics continue to anchor state action.

Das Postgraduierten-Programm (PGP) des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS, vormals Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, DIE) ist ein renommiertes, neunmonatiges Ausbildungsprogramm für Hochschulabsolvent:innen, das seit 1965 jährlich durchgeführt wird. Ziel ist die gezielte Vorbereitung auf Fach- und Führungsaufgaben in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Die Verbleibstudie wurde anlässlich des 60-jährigen Programmjubiläums 2025 durchgeführt, um erstmals systematisch die Berufswege und den Nutzen des Programms für die bislang fast 1.000 Absolvent:innen zu analysieren. Die Studie basiert auf einer Online-Befragung aller Absolvent:innen der Jahrgänge 1965–2023. Es wurden rund 800 ehemalige Teilnehmer:innen erreicht, von denen sich 366 an der Befragung beteiligten (Rücklaufquote: 46 %). Die Auswertung erfolgte Kohorten vergleichend (10-Jahres-Gruppen), um Hinweise auf über die Zeit erfolgte Veränderungen zu gewinnen. Das PGP des IDOS/DIE hat sich in den Augen der Alumni und Alumnae des Programms als wirkungsvolles Sprungbrett in den Arbeitsbereich der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit erwiesen. Es bietet nach ihren Einschätzungen gute Möglichkeiten für Kompetenzaufbau, Netzwerkbildung und persönliche Entwicklung. Die ehemaligen Absolvent:innen empfehlen das Programm überwiegend weiter, sehen aber auch Potenzial für mehr Praxisnähe, Diversität und gezielte Vernetzung. Ihre Aussagen decken sich mit Aussagen, die bereits in den letzten Jahren in Rückmeldungen von den jeweiligen Kursteilnehmenden geäußert wurden. Sie bestätigen damit die Stoßrichtung grundlegender Reformen des Programms im Jahr 2024. Die Ergebnisse dieser Verbleibstudie liefern weitere Hinweise für die Entwicklung des Programms, um es an die sich wandelnden Anforderungen des Arbeitsmarktes und an die Bedürfnisse künftiger Teilnehmender anzupassen.