The biannual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit meetings are a fixed component of regional summit diplomacy. Internationally, however, they tend to attract little to no attention. This is partly due to their reputation as mere “talk shops” that rarely produce concrete results and partly due to the structural and institutional weaknesses of ASEAN itself, which frequently become visible during such summits, reinforcing fundamental doubts about their effectiveness. The fact that the ASEAN Summit held in Kuala Lumpur in October 2025 attracted considerably greater international attention than usual can be attributed to several factors. United States (US) President Donald Trump participated in a meeting of the regional organisation for the first time and acted as patron of the so-called Thai-Cambodian peace agreement signed during the summit. Moreover, on the sidelines of the summit the US and China conducted negotiations aimed at limiting their trade disputes. The admission of Timor-Leste as ASEAN’s 11th member further underscored the organisation’s continuing appeal. Nevertheless, numerous concrete challenges, such as the management of regional conflicts or reform of the consensus principle, remain unresolved. Despite its limitations, ASEAN remains significant for Germany and Europe because of its “convening power”, its inclusive multilateralism, and the growing strategic significance of Southeast Asia.
Global warming is set to rise above 1.5°C by the early 2030s. Returning to 1.5°C before the end of the 21st century would not prevent all harms resulting from a period of excess temperatures, but it would reduce risks when compared to permanent warming above 1.5°C. Limiting the magnitude and duration of this period of “overshoot” to manage climate risks requires enhanced near-term mitigation efforts to ensure that warming peaks well below 2°C, followed by sustained net-negative carbon dioxide (CO2) and potentially net-negative greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions globally. This presents new challenges to international climate policy in efforts “to keep 1.5°C alive”. For frontrunners such as the European Union (EU), this will require reframing “net-zero” as a transitional stage towards net-negative GHG emissions rather than an endpoint, and developing policy instruments that are able to deliver this.
Du 20 au 23 novembre, la conférence des études slaves réunira à Washington plus de 2500 spécialistes, dont une centaine de membres de la New Yugoslav Studies Association. Un rendez-vous qui illustre la vitalité d'un champ en plein essor qui repense l'héritage yougoslave au-delà des récits d'effondrement.
- Articles / Une - Diaporama, Courrier des Balkans, Yougonostalgie, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Croatie, Kosovo, Macédoine du Nord, Serbie, Slovénie, Culture et éducationThe global development architecture is under the spotlight. This refers to the broad architecture of actors, norms, instruments and institutions that mobilise and coordinate resources, knowledge and political support for development goals. Within this system, Official Development Assistance (ODA) is a core financial instrument, primarily provided by OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) DAC (Development Assistance Committee) members. It functions alongside other modalities such as South–South cooperation, climate finance, philanthropic aid and private-sector engagement.
The global development architecture is under the spotlight. This refers to the broad architecture of actors, norms, instruments and institutions that mobilise and coordinate resources, knowledge and political support for development goals. Within this system, Official Development Assistance (ODA) is a core financial instrument, primarily provided by OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) DAC (Development Assistance Committee) members. It functions alongside other modalities such as South–South cooperation, climate finance, philanthropic aid and private-sector engagement.
The global development architecture is under the spotlight. This refers to the broad architecture of actors, norms, instruments and institutions that mobilise and coordinate resources, knowledge and political support for development goals. Within this system, Official Development Assistance (ODA) is a core financial instrument, primarily provided by OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) DAC (Development Assistance Committee) members. It functions alongside other modalities such as South–South cooperation, climate finance, philanthropic aid and private-sector engagement.
We argue that following the rise of new partners such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kenya’s problem is no longer access to finance, but rather the governance of finance. In other words, the question is not simply how much money the country can borrow or from whom, but whether its institutions are capable of turning loans into productive investments rather than patronage networks. As the debt burden mounts, Kenya’s ability to prevent growing options for economic partnerships from undermining domestic accountability will determine whether its infrastructure boom becomes a foundation for long-term development or a monument to short-term political ambition.
We argue that following the rise of new partners such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kenya’s problem is no longer access to finance, but rather the governance of finance. In other words, the question is not simply how much money the country can borrow or from whom, but whether its institutions are capable of turning loans into productive investments rather than patronage networks. As the debt burden mounts, Kenya’s ability to prevent growing options for economic partnerships from undermining domestic accountability will determine whether its infrastructure boom becomes a foundation for long-term development or a monument to short-term political ambition.
We argue that following the rise of new partners such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kenya’s problem is no longer access to finance, but rather the governance of finance. In other words, the question is not simply how much money the country can borrow or from whom, but whether its institutions are capable of turning loans into productive investments rather than patronage networks. As the debt burden mounts, Kenya’s ability to prevent growing options for economic partnerships from undermining domestic accountability will determine whether its infrastructure boom becomes a foundation for long-term development or a monument to short-term political ambition.
Today’s armed forces are highly dependent on software. Software products are built by complex networks of software components, software vendors, service providers, and other companies that, together, form the software supply chain. In “conventional” cybersecurity incidents, threat actors usually gain direct access to their target. But in the case of the software supply chain, the risks originate upstream in the supply chain itself and have an impact on entities downstream – often the end users. The armed forces are particularly vulnerable to these risks. Software supply chain incidents in the military sector have caused disruption and allowed malicious actors to engage in industrial espionage, political espionage, and sabotage. Policymakers and the Bundeswehr can manage software supply chain risk in the military sector through a set of measures. First, decision-makers should determine the requisite level of protection for the various areas of software use to strike a balance between risk management, on the one hand, and the functionality, cost, and speed of deployment, on the other. Thereafter, the Bundeswehr should establish effective risk management. Further, the federal government and the Bundeswehr should ensure that software suppliers reduce the software supply chain risk posed by their products. By doing so, the armed forces can be given adequate protection.
This research explores how epistemological dissonance shapes agrarian sustainabilities in Mbeya, Tanzania. Through a case study of smallholder farmers navigating both market-driven and eco-cultural paradigms of sustainability, the research explores how plural epistemologies shape local sensemaking and agricultural decision-making. It demonstrates how farmers reconcile divergent sustainability logics, those rooted in market interpretations of sustainability with those rooted in relational ethics, ecological stewardship, and cultural continuity within agrarian landscapes. Employing hybrid strategies, farmers compartmentalize production, input intensive, market-targeting monocultures co-exist alongside primarily subsistence agroecological systems. These spatial divisions mirror deeper ontological tensions, as farmers articulate pride in market breakthroughs while expressing anxiety about environmental degradation, cultural erosion, and the loss of intergenerational practices. Building on plural sustainabilities literature and epistemologies of the South theories, the paper adds to scholarship reinterpreting sustainability not as a universal, singular paradigm, but a contested, contextually negotiated process. The case of Mbeya illustrates how epistemological dissonance becomes embodied through emotional and cognitive labor, and how hybrid sensemaking enables farmers to navigate conflicting knowledge systems. Rather than viewing hybridity as incoherence, the paper interprets these strategies as acts of situated resilience, adaptation, and resistance. The analysis contributes to political ecology and sustainability studies by foregrounding the ontological multiplicity at play in agrarian transitions and calls for institutional recognition of knowledge pluralism. Ultimately, the paper proposes a shift toward pluriversal sustainability frameworks that integrate both empirical and relational epistemologies, acknowledging that sustainable futures are as much about values and worldviews as they are about technologies and yields.
This research explores how epistemological dissonance shapes agrarian sustainabilities in Mbeya, Tanzania. Through a case study of smallholder farmers navigating both market-driven and eco-cultural paradigms of sustainability, the research explores how plural epistemologies shape local sensemaking and agricultural decision-making. It demonstrates how farmers reconcile divergent sustainability logics, those rooted in market interpretations of sustainability with those rooted in relational ethics, ecological stewardship, and cultural continuity within agrarian landscapes. Employing hybrid strategies, farmers compartmentalize production, input intensive, market-targeting monocultures co-exist alongside primarily subsistence agroecological systems. These spatial divisions mirror deeper ontological tensions, as farmers articulate pride in market breakthroughs while expressing anxiety about environmental degradation, cultural erosion, and the loss of intergenerational practices. Building on plural sustainabilities literature and epistemologies of the South theories, the paper adds to scholarship reinterpreting sustainability not as a universal, singular paradigm, but a contested, contextually negotiated process. The case of Mbeya illustrates how epistemological dissonance becomes embodied through emotional and cognitive labor, and how hybrid sensemaking enables farmers to navigate conflicting knowledge systems. Rather than viewing hybridity as incoherence, the paper interprets these strategies as acts of situated resilience, adaptation, and resistance. The analysis contributes to political ecology and sustainability studies by foregrounding the ontological multiplicity at play in agrarian transitions and calls for institutional recognition of knowledge pluralism. Ultimately, the paper proposes a shift toward pluriversal sustainability frameworks that integrate both empirical and relational epistemologies, acknowledging that sustainable futures are as much about values and worldviews as they are about technologies and yields.