Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Bonn, 14. September 2026. Morgen ist der Tag der Demokratie, doch Demokratie steht weltweit unter Druck. Auch in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland fordert Rechtspopulismus die freiheitlich-demokratische Grundordnung heraus wie selten zuvor. 

Bei der Wahl zum sachsen-anhaltinischen Landtag vor einer Woche schnitt der als gesichert rechtsextrem eingestufte Landesverband der Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) als stärkste Partei ab. Voraussichtlich wird er eine Regierungsbeteiligung in der Landesregierung haben. Auch in anderen Bundesländern sowie bundesweit kommt die Partei auf hohe Umfragewerte. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Bedrohung der Demokratie in Deutschland lohnt sich die Frage, welche Erkenntnisse man aus der Forschung zu Autokratisierung und internationalem Demokratieschutz für Deutschland ziehen kann. Dabei zeigt sich, dass man, um die Resilienz von Demokratie zu steigern, mit Mut ihre politischen Institutionen schützen und doch, wenn nötig, neugestalten muss. Denn sie bilden die Säulen und Pfeiler einer Demokratie, die diese zusammenhalten. 

Säulen und Pfeiler einer Demokratie: das politische Institutionengefüge

Das demokratische Institutionengefüge Deutschlands lässt sich aus vielerlei Blickwinkeln beschreiben. Im Hinblick auf die Beteiligung der AfD an Landesregierungen ist im öffentlichen Diskurs derzeit allerdings insbesondere der Föderalismus im Fokus. Dieser kann, wenn eine demokratiefeindliche Partei ein Bundesland regiert, treffend als „geflutetes Schott“ eines leckgeschlagenen Schiffs bezeichnet werden: zwar beschränkt der Föderalismus den eintretenden Angriff auf demokratische Strukturen auf ein Bundesland, dennoch kann er auch die Regierungsführung auf der Bundesebene erschweren. Vor allem aber bietet die Forschung keine Indizien, dass Föderalismus an sich Demokratien resilienter gegenüber demokratischer Erosion macht. Während Föderalismus Indiens beispielsweise Demokratieabbau nicht viel entgegensetzen kann, zeigt er sich in den USA als wichtiger Schutzmechanismus. In Indien kann die Regierungspartei die Institutionen derart dominieren, dass sie föderale Strukturen selbst angreift und sogar Bundesstaaten auflöst. In den USA erschwert dagegen die bundesstaatliche Verwaltung von Wahlen deren Vereinnahmung und Manipulation. 

In umgekehrter Richtung kann in Deutschland eine Landesregierung zahlreiche wichtige Institutionen angreifen oder umgestalten, etwa Teile des Bildungssystems, der Landesjustiz, der Medien, der Polizei oder des Verwaltungsapparats. Wie man im Falle des Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) in den USA beobachten konnte, darf man bei derartigen Angriffen auf Institutionen nicht darauf hoffen, dass ihnen aufgrund von gesetzlicher Unrechtmäßigkeit beizeiten Einhalt geboten wird. Dafür ist der Schaden in Institutionen häufig zu schnell und gleichzeitig unwiderruflich angerichtet. Stattdessen ist es wichtig, Angriffe auf Institutionen umgehend zu kontern und möglichst zu blocken.

Angriffe auf Institutionen kontern und blocken

In den Bereich des Konterns fiele zum Beispiel das Einfrieren von Bundes- und EU-Finanzierungen im Falle von Landesverstößen gegen die freiheitlich-demokratische Grundordnung. Sanktionsmechanismen dieser Art haben sich etwa im Falle des europäischen Rechtsstaatsmechanismus bei demokratischer Erosion in Polen und Ungarn als wirkmächtig erwiesen. Sanktionsmechanismen allein sind jedoch häufig nicht hinreichend und riskieren, politisch-gesellschaftliche Polarisierung zu verstärken. Daher müssen Angriffe auf Institutionen auch durch durchdachte Reformen politischer Regeln geblockt werden. 

Hierzu zählt die sachsen-anhaltinische Parlamentsreform vom April dieses Jahres. Änderungen von Mehrheitsbestimmungen und Sperrminoritäten sind jedoch ein zweischneidiges Schwert. Demokratische wie nicht-demokratische Parteien können sie unter veränderten Mehrheitsverhältnissen für ihre Zwecke nutzen. Statt sich auf Mehrheitsbestimmungen und Sperrminoritäten zu konzentrieren, kann es daher sinnvoller sein, durch institutionelle oder verfassungsrechtliche Regelungen „Verzögerungen“ in politische Prozesse einzubauen. Dies kann geschehen, indem entweder der Prozess der Entscheidungsfindung selbst oder das Inkrafttreten von Entscheidungen zeitlich gestreckt wird. Beispielsweise können Veränderungen an der niederländischen Verfassung nur in Kraft treten, nachdem sie auch von dem nächstgewählten Parlament verabschiedet wurden. In Dänemark wiederum kann ein Drittel der Parlamentsabgeordneten nach der Verabschiedung eines Gesetzes ein Referendum über das neue Gesetz verlangen. Derartige „Verzögerungs“-Regelungen machen demokratische Aushandlungsprozesse zwar langwieriger; sie fügen dem Institutionengefüge eines Landes jedoch weitere Schutzmechanismen hinzu. 

Willy Brandt wird zugeschrieben, gesagt zu haben, dass „unsere Demokratie“ eine „wachsame, eine kämpferische und eine sich stets erneuernde Demokratie sein“ muss. Dies gilt mehr denn je.

Turkey’s defence engagement in Africa is often read through the lens of geopolitics, drone use, and conflict dynamics. Yet the deeper story is industrial and strategic. Africa remains central to Turkey’s defence-export strategy because it helps resolve structural pressures within Turkey’s defence-industrial ecosystem by sustaining pro­duction, easing competitive pressures, and creating external demand for an increasingly export-dependent industry. As Turkish and European companies become more closely connected, these dynamics will increasingly matter for Germany and the European Union (EU) both within Europe’s defence-industrial landscape and in third markets beyond its direct reach.

Zusammenfassung:

14. September 2026 – Die Abgeordnetenhauswahl am 20. September 2026 könnte die politische Landschaft Berlins stark verändern. In den jüngsten Umfragen haben vor allem die Linke und die AfD im Vergleich zu 2023 deutlich zugelegt, während CDU und SPD klar verloren haben. Für welche Positionen stehen die politischen Parteien in Berlin? Und wie haben sich ihre Positionen in den letzten 20 Jahren verändert? Eine Auswertung des Wahl-O-Mat der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung zeigt eine bemerkenswerte Entwicklung: Die etablierten Parteien sind in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten deutlich progressiver geworden. Besonders stark gilt dies für die SPD – im Gegensatz vor allem zur FDP, die nun deutlich konservativere Positionen vertritt. Der große Gegenpol ist die AfD. Sie vertritt in fast allen Themenbereichen, vor allem in der Gesellschafts- und Sozialpolitik, extremere Positionen. Zudem zeigen sich deutliche Unterschiede zwischen den Positionierungen der Parteien in Berlin und auf Bundesebene, vor allem bei der CDU.

Der AfD-Sieg in Sachsen-Anhalt könnte zur Katastrophe führen. Oder zu einem Wandel zum Besseren. Doch dafür müssten Kanzler Merz und seine Koalition radikal umsteuern., Der 6. September 2026 könnte für unsere Gesellschaft und Demokratie zu einem ähnlichen Wendepunkte werden wie der 9. November 1989. Der historische Wahlsieg der AfD in Sachsen-Anhalt könnte einen politischen und gesellschaftlichen Schock auslösen. Und dieser könnte die etablierten Parteien zu einem ...

Family poultry farming is widely promoted as a nutrition-sensitive agricultural intervention, yet rigorous causal evidence on its dietary and food security impacts remains limited. Using three rounds of panel data from the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study - Integrated Surveys on Agriculture for Ethiopia (2011/12-2015/16), we follow a household fixed-effects strategy to examine the effect of poultry farming on egg consumption, dietary diversity, consumption expenditure, and food security. Despite 53% of households owning poultry in 2015/16, only 9% consumed eggs and 2% consumed chicken meat in the preceding seven days, revealing a stark production-consumption gap. Fixed-effects estimates show that poultry ownership increases the probability of egg consumption by 4 percentage points at the extensive margin, while each additional egg-laying chicken per capita raises it by 8 percentage points. Controlling for household income leaves these estimates unchanged, confirming that nutritional gains operate through direct access to own-produced eggs rather than income effects. Placebo tests find no significant association with milk or non-poultry meat consumption, further supporting this hypothesis. Poultry ownership is associated with higher household dietary diversity scores, but has no significant effect on food security, suggesting improvements in dietary quality without broader food quantity gains. Gender-disaggregated analysis shows that, despite lower ownership rates, female-headed households manage flocks more intensively and channel benefits more effectively into household food consumption. We also find a significant positive association between poultry ownership and diarrhea among children under five, underscoring the need to integrate hygiene and sanitation measures into poultry promotion programs.

Family poultry farming is widely promoted as a nutrition-sensitive agricultural intervention, yet rigorous causal evidence on its dietary and food security impacts remains limited. Using three rounds of panel data from the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study - Integrated Surveys on Agriculture for Ethiopia (2011/12-2015/16), we follow a household fixed-effects strategy to examine the effect of poultry farming on egg consumption, dietary diversity, consumption expenditure, and food security. Despite 53% of households owning poultry in 2015/16, only 9% consumed eggs and 2% consumed chicken meat in the preceding seven days, revealing a stark production-consumption gap. Fixed-effects estimates show that poultry ownership increases the probability of egg consumption by 4 percentage points at the extensive margin, while each additional egg-laying chicken per capita raises it by 8 percentage points. Controlling for household income leaves these estimates unchanged, confirming that nutritional gains operate through direct access to own-produced eggs rather than income effects. Placebo tests find no significant association with milk or non-poultry meat consumption, further supporting this hypothesis. Poultry ownership is associated with higher household dietary diversity scores, but has no significant effect on food security, suggesting improvements in dietary quality without broader food quantity gains. Gender-disaggregated analysis shows that, despite lower ownership rates, female-headed households manage flocks more intensively and channel benefits more effectively into household food consumption. We also find a significant positive association between poultry ownership and diarrhea among children under five, underscoring the need to integrate hygiene and sanitation measures into poultry promotion programs.

Family poultry farming is widely promoted as a nutrition-sensitive agricultural intervention, yet rigorous causal evidence on its dietary and food security impacts remains limited. Using three rounds of panel data from the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study - Integrated Surveys on Agriculture for Ethiopia (2011/12-2015/16), we follow a household fixed-effects strategy to examine the effect of poultry farming on egg consumption, dietary diversity, consumption expenditure, and food security. Despite 53% of households owning poultry in 2015/16, only 9% consumed eggs and 2% consumed chicken meat in the preceding seven days, revealing a stark production-consumption gap. Fixed-effects estimates show that poultry ownership increases the probability of egg consumption by 4 percentage points at the extensive margin, while each additional egg-laying chicken per capita raises it by 8 percentage points. Controlling for household income leaves these estimates unchanged, confirming that nutritional gains operate through direct access to own-produced eggs rather than income effects. Placebo tests find no significant association with milk or non-poultry meat consumption, further supporting this hypothesis. Poultry ownership is associated with higher household dietary diversity scores, but has no significant effect on food security, suggesting improvements in dietary quality without broader food quantity gains. Gender-disaggregated analysis shows that, despite lower ownership rates, female-headed households manage flocks more intensively and channel benefits more effectively into household food consumption. We also find a significant positive association between poultry ownership and diarrhea among children under five, underscoring the need to integrate hygiene and sanitation measures into poultry promotion programs.

Export bans are frequently used as trade policy instruments to stabilise domestic prices, but they often generate unintended consequences. This study examines the effects of Indonesia's palm oil export ban, introduced in April 2022 and lifted in May 2022, on the performance of the global agricultural sector and the stock markets of palm oil–producing countries. Drawing on a conceptual framework, we develop hypotheses regarding how stock indices with different industrial compositions respond to such trade policy interventions. Using an event study methodology, we analyse daily stock market data from palm oil–producing countries as well as a global agriculture-specific MSCI index. The analysis encompasses both nationally diversified stock indices and a global sector–specific index. The results reveal statistically significant negative cumulative abnormal returns for the global agricultural index following the introduction of the export ban, whereas national cross-industry indices show statistically insignificant reactions. Following the lifting of the ban, the global agricultural index experienced statistically significant positive cumulative abnormal returns, whereas national indices exhibited mixed and statistically insignificant responses. These findings are consistent with the conceptual framework, suggesting that the policy primarily affected the global agricultural sector while leaving diversified national stock markets largely unaffected. Importantly, the effects associated with the introduction and subsequent lifting of the ban did not fully offset each other, resulting in an overall negative net effect on the global agricultural index.

Export bans are frequently used as trade policy instruments to stabilise domestic prices, but they often generate unintended consequences. This study examines the effects of Indonesia's palm oil export ban, introduced in April 2022 and lifted in May 2022, on the performance of the global agricultural sector and the stock markets of palm oil–producing countries. Drawing on a conceptual framework, we develop hypotheses regarding how stock indices with different industrial compositions respond to such trade policy interventions. Using an event study methodology, we analyse daily stock market data from palm oil–producing countries as well as a global agriculture-specific MSCI index. The analysis encompasses both nationally diversified stock indices and a global sector–specific index. The results reveal statistically significant negative cumulative abnormal returns for the global agricultural index following the introduction of the export ban, whereas national cross-industry indices show statistically insignificant reactions. Following the lifting of the ban, the global agricultural index experienced statistically significant positive cumulative abnormal returns, whereas national indices exhibited mixed and statistically insignificant responses. These findings are consistent with the conceptual framework, suggesting that the policy primarily affected the global agricultural sector while leaving diversified national stock markets largely unaffected. Importantly, the effects associated with the introduction and subsequent lifting of the ban did not fully offset each other, resulting in an overall negative net effect on the global agricultural index.

Export bans are frequently used as trade policy instruments to stabilise domestic prices, but they often generate unintended consequences. This study examines the effects of Indonesia's palm oil export ban, introduced in April 2022 and lifted in May 2022, on the performance of the global agricultural sector and the stock markets of palm oil–producing countries. Drawing on a conceptual framework, we develop hypotheses regarding how stock indices with different industrial compositions respond to such trade policy interventions. Using an event study methodology, we analyse daily stock market data from palm oil–producing countries as well as a global agriculture-specific MSCI index. The analysis encompasses both nationally diversified stock indices and a global sector–specific index. The results reveal statistically significant negative cumulative abnormal returns for the global agricultural index following the introduction of the export ban, whereas national cross-industry indices show statistically insignificant reactions. Following the lifting of the ban, the global agricultural index experienced statistically significant positive cumulative abnormal returns, whereas national indices exhibited mixed and statistically insignificant responses. These findings are consistent with the conceptual framework, suggesting that the policy primarily affected the global agricultural sector while leaving diversified national stock markets largely unaffected. Importantly, the effects associated with the introduction and subsequent lifting of the ban did not fully offset each other, resulting in an overall negative net effect on the global agricultural index.

Ein Team der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt hat bei der europäischen Jahrestagung der International Association for Energy Economics (IAEE) zwischen dem 6. und 9. September 2026 in München aktuelle Forschung vorgestellt. Dabei hat Lukas Barner, Doktorand im DIW Graduate Center seit 2024, den ...

Il y a 25 ans aujourd’hui, les États-Unis étaient frappés par une attaque terroriste qui allait durablement marquer les esprits : les attentats du World Trade Center et du Pentagone, organisés par l’organisation Al-Qaida, qui ont fait environ 3 000 morts. Cet événement a poussé Washington à multiplier les interventions à l’étranger dans le cadre d’une « guerre contre le terrorisme ».

Peut-on pour autant affirmer que cet évènement a changé l’ordre du monde ?

Aussi marquants et tragiques qu’ils aient été, les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 n’ont pas fondamentalement bouleversé les rapports de force ni les grandes tendances géopolitiques. Ils ont plutôt amplifié et accéléré des phénomènes qui étaient déjà à l’œuvre. L’année 2001 reste néanmoins une année charnière, marquée par un choc structurel, moins médiatisé : l’adhésion de la Chine à l’Organisation mondiale du commerce.

Mon analyse dans cette vidéo.

L’article Le 11 septembre a-t-il changé le monde ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Die Terroranschläge vom 11. September 2001 waren ein fundamentaler historischer Einschnitt, der die Weltpolitik tiefgreifend veränderte. Dr. Guido Steinberg hatte damals gerade seine Doktorarbeit über "Religion und Staat in Saudi-Arabien" abgeschlossen und wurde rasch zum gefragten Gesprächspartner in den Medien, weil er sich auch mit Osama Bin Laden beschäftigt hatte. 25 Jahre danach wollen wir mit dem Islamwissenschaftler und Nahostexperten Dr. Guido Steinberg von der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin auf die Folgen dieser Zäsur blicken.

The Hamburg Sustainability Conference (HSC) 2026 convened around 1,600 participants from 112 countries at a moment of profound disruption and redistribution of power. The HSC confirmed sustainability as the organizing framework linking peace and stability, economic
resilience and competitiveness, planetary boundaries and international cooperation. The rules-based international order is under pressure, fiscal space is shrinking and conflicts are multiplying, while climate change, biodiversity loss and resource depletion are compounding
these pressures on economies and societies already stretched thin. Yet the world has never possessed greater technological capabilities, financial wealth and scientific knowledge. What matters now is how we use these resources to deliver shared prosperity and resilience.
The discussions at HSC 2026 can be summarized along three narrative arcs. The first asks why cooperation remains essential in a more multipolar world. Legitimacy depends on changing the terms of North–South relations, broadening representation and building a cooperative multipolar order in which a wider group of actors can shape and defend common rules. The launch of the South–North Commission on Development offers a structured process for rethinking international cooperation toward fairer partnerships and a  sustainability Agenda beyond 2030. The second narrative arc examines what needs to change. Sustainability transformation pays
off economically, but only where investment can flow, risks are shared and governance is predictable. Nature and human capital are systematically undervalued. The bottleneck is the institutional and financing structures needed to unlock them at scale. The third narrative arc addresses how cooperation can deliver. It shows that partnerships accelerate sustainable development when they move from one-off initiatives to systems that mobilize finance, create markets and build local capabilities. Scaling Capital for Sustainable Development (SCALED), Innovative Capital Mobilization in Africa (ICAMA), critical-mineral and hydrogen partnerships, and urban examples from Mombasa and eThekwini show how tangible forms of cooperation can turn commitments into sustainable investment, deeper value chains and locally owned action. This shift is especially visible in Africa, where partnerships are increasingly framed around opportunity, value creation and agency. The road ahead runs through the Triple COP+ year, the G20 under UK chairmanship, and the SDG Summit in September 2027. HSC 2026 demonstrated that navigating the new - disruptive - normal is possible. The task now is to prove it at scale. […]

The Hamburg Sustainability Conference (HSC) 2026 convened around 1,600 participants from 112 countries at a moment of profound disruption and redistribution of power. The HSC confirmed sustainability as the organizing framework linking peace and stability, economic
resilience and competitiveness, planetary boundaries and international cooperation. The rules-based international order is under pressure, fiscal space is shrinking and conflicts are multiplying, while climate change, biodiversity loss and resource depletion are compounding
these pressures on economies and societies already stretched thin. Yet the world has never possessed greater technological capabilities, financial wealth and scientific knowledge. What matters now is how we use these resources to deliver shared prosperity and resilience.
The discussions at HSC 2026 can be summarized along three narrative arcs. The first asks why cooperation remains essential in a more multipolar world. Legitimacy depends on changing the terms of North–South relations, broadening representation and building a cooperative multipolar order in which a wider group of actors can shape and defend common rules. The launch of the South–North Commission on Development offers a structured process for rethinking international cooperation toward fairer partnerships and a  sustainability Agenda beyond 2030. The second narrative arc examines what needs to change. Sustainability transformation pays
off economically, but only where investment can flow, risks are shared and governance is predictable. Nature and human capital are systematically undervalued. The bottleneck is the institutional and financing structures needed to unlock them at scale. The third narrative arc addresses how cooperation can deliver. It shows that partnerships accelerate sustainable development when they move from one-off initiatives to systems that mobilize finance, create markets and build local capabilities. Scaling Capital for Sustainable Development (SCALED), Innovative Capital Mobilization in Africa (ICAMA), critical-mineral and hydrogen partnerships, and urban examples from Mombasa and eThekwini show how tangible forms of cooperation can turn commitments into sustainable investment, deeper value chains and locally owned action. This shift is especially visible in Africa, where partnerships are increasingly framed around opportunity, value creation and agency. The road ahead runs through the Triple COP+ year, the G20 under UK chairmanship, and the SDG Summit in September 2027. HSC 2026 demonstrated that navigating the new - disruptive - normal is possible. The task now is to prove it at scale. […]

The Hamburg Sustainability Conference (HSC) 2026 convened around 1,600 participants from 112 countries at a moment of profound disruption and redistribution of power. The HSC confirmed sustainability as the organizing framework linking peace and stability, economic
resilience and competitiveness, planetary boundaries and international cooperation. The rules-based international order is under pressure, fiscal space is shrinking and conflicts are multiplying, while climate change, biodiversity loss and resource depletion are compounding
these pressures on economies and societies already stretched thin. Yet the world has never possessed greater technological capabilities, financial wealth and scientific knowledge. What matters now is how we use these resources to deliver shared prosperity and resilience.
The discussions at HSC 2026 can be summarized along three narrative arcs. The first asks why cooperation remains essential in a more multipolar world. Legitimacy depends on changing the terms of North–South relations, broadening representation and building a cooperative multipolar order in which a wider group of actors can shape and defend common rules. The launch of the South–North Commission on Development offers a structured process for rethinking international cooperation toward fairer partnerships and a  sustainability Agenda beyond 2030. The second narrative arc examines what needs to change. Sustainability transformation pays
off economically, but only where investment can flow, risks are shared and governance is predictable. Nature and human capital are systematically undervalued. The bottleneck is the institutional and financing structures needed to unlock them at scale. The third narrative arc addresses how cooperation can deliver. It shows that partnerships accelerate sustainable development when they move from one-off initiatives to systems that mobilize finance, create markets and build local capabilities. Scaling Capital for Sustainable Development (SCALED), Innovative Capital Mobilization in Africa (ICAMA), critical-mineral and hydrogen partnerships, and urban examples from Mombasa and eThekwini show how tangible forms of cooperation can turn commitments into sustainable investment, deeper value chains and locally owned action. This shift is especially visible in Africa, where partnerships are increasingly framed around opportunity, value creation and agency. The road ahead runs through the Triple COP+ year, the G20 under UK chairmanship, and the SDG Summit in September 2027. HSC 2026 demonstrated that navigating the new - disruptive - normal is possible. The task now is to prove it at scale. […]

Over the previous two months, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hosted a NATO summit in Ankara and attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek. On his way back, Erdoğan presented the latter as part of Turkey’s “commitment to diversifying its economic, political, and strategic options”. This is not far removed from the usual analytical vocabulary. Ankara’s ability to straddle East and West is variously described as balancing, hedging or seeking strategic autonomy.

There are important differences between these concepts. Yet they often direct attention towards the same question: Where does Turkey stand in relation to the great powers? Turkish practices become evidence of the country’s position. The risk is that position then becomes a shortcut for assessing agency.

This can distort assessments in both directions. A focus on positioning can overestimate agency when the practice, purpose and effects of balancing are collapsed into one another. Maintaining relationships with competing powers may be intended to preserve flexibility and may, in turn, expand Ankara’s diplomatic repertoire. But such effects do not by themselves establish what Turkey can achieve through the options that these relationships create. At the same time, viewing Turkish foreign policy primarily through alignment can underestimate agency when practices that do not alter Turkey’s geopolitical position are overlooked, despite altering what Ankara can do.

The appeal of a balancing lens is understandable. It makes seemingly contradictory practices intelligible as part of a broader strategy. But explaining their strategic logic is not the same as assessing their effects. 

What becomes visible if we set aside balancing as the primary lens?

The test in the Black Sea 

Turkey’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has commonly been read as a balancing act. Ankara has not joined Western sanctions against Russia and has maintained political and economic ties with Moscow. At the same time, it has provided military support to Ukraine and applied the Montreux Convention to the passage of warships through the Turkish Straits, with consequences for Black Sea and non-Black Sea states alike. Read in this way, these policies appear to place Ankara somewhere between Russia and its Western allies. But a practice can matter without moving Turkey anywhere geopolitically.

More than four years later, Turkey continues to regulate naval access to the Straits. Together with Romania and Bulgaria, it operates the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Group, whose mandate has expanded from mine clearance to the protection of critical undersea infrastructure following the Ankara NATO summit in July. Amid renewed attacks on commercial shipping, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has announced a proposal for the safe passage of grain, which Turkey is discussing with both Russia and Ukraine.

The basis of Turkish capacity is different in each case. Montreux gives Ankara authority over naval access within rules that also limit its discretion. Mine countermeasures are conducted through operational cooperation with Romania and Bulgaria. Relations with both Moscow and Kyiv create an opportunity for Ankara to broker an arrangement over commercial navigation, but not the conditions for agreement. Ankara’s agency is thus more specific, conditional and relational than the balancing vocabulary allows us to see.

What follows from where Turkey stands?

Turkey may well balance. The problem begins when balancing becomes the primary lens through which everything else is seen. It places great-power relations at the centre of the analysis, even where the capacity in question is produced elsewhere. Shifting the focus away from position raises a different set of questions: What can Ankara do? What enables it to do so? And which other actors does it depend on?

A practice that barely registers on an East–West axis may nevertheless alter what Turkey is able to do. For policy analysis, the relevant question is therefore not only where Ankara stands but also what it can affect, through which relationships and under what conditions.

The old establishment elites have opposed Namal’s arrest. They want to preserve a system where one of their own is not jailed for corruption.

• Turkey aspires to emerge as an AI-enabled middle power. Its main advantage is the ability to add selected AI tools to areas where it is already strong, especially defence manufacturing, unmanned systems and regional security cooperation.

• Turkey’s position in AI is uneven. It is stronger in applications and systems integration than in advanced chips, computing infrastructure, cloud capacity or specialised talent. For Ankara, strategic autonomy is therefore less about becoming self-sufficient and more about managing dependence.

• Defence offers Turkey the clearest way to turn AI into geopolitical influence. As military systems become more software-driven, defence exports can create longer relationships through training, software updates, data management and cybersecurity.

• At the same time, AI creates a new dependency problem. More advanced systems require more energy, better chips, greater computing capacity and continued access to trusted NATO and European technology networks. Strategic autonomy may therefore depend as much on reliable partnerships as on domestic production.

• Turkey’s biggest limits may be political and institutional rather than technical. Brain drain weakens the talent base, economic instability makes long-term investment harder, and an unpredictable foreign policy can reduce the trust needed for sensitive cooperation in AI, defence and data.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, Non-Resident Senior Scholar, Turkey Programme.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS BECOMING part of international power, not simply another technology sector. Much of the debate still focuses on which states can build frontier models, produce advanced chips or command huge computing resources. That makes sense when discussing the United States and China, while the European Union has tried to shape the field through regulation and standards (Landwehr-Matlé, Oppermann and Lambach, 2026). But this framework is less useful for middle powers. Turkey does not need to reproduce the whole AI ecosystem of the leading powers. The more relevant question is whether it can acquire and use selected technologies in areas where it already has an advantage. For this reason, Turkey is better understood as a possible AI-enabled middle power: a state that can turn selective technological capabilities into military, economic and diplomatic leverage.

This argument fits closely with the debate on strategic autonomy. In Turkish foreign policy, the term usually describes Ankara’s efforts to gain more room for manoeuvre while remaining inside Western security and economic structures. Öniş and Kutlay (2021) situate this strategy in the context of a more post-Western international order, where Turkey tries to diversify its partnerships and reduce excessive dependence on traditional centres of power. AI makes this harder. It relies on advanced chips, computing power, cloud services, electricity, data, software and highly skilled people. For Turkey, technological autonomy cannot realistically mean self-sufficiency; it means retaining access to critical technologies, limiting vulnerability and preventing outside actors from using technological bottlenecks as political pressure.

Recent work on digital sovereignty points in the same direction. Weymouth (2025) argues that competition over AI infrastructure is encouraging the formation of techno-blocs, as states try to secure key resources and reduce dependence on foreign suppliers. Brown and Ozluk (2026) make a similar point about Turkey. They describe its AI strategy as a search for sovereignty that still requires cooperation with larger regulatory and technological systems. The key point is simple: technological sovereignty is not a choice between dependence and independence. For a middle power, it is about controlling some critical areas while managing dependence in others.

The recent report by the National Intelligence Academy (Milli İstihbarat Akademisi, MİA) shows that this way of thinking is also emerging inside Turkey’s strategic community. The report does not reduce AI competition to software and algorithms; it also highlights chips, critical minerals, energy, data infrastructure and robotics (Milli İstihbarat Akademisi, 2026). This is useful, but the next question is how Turkey’s strengths and weaknesses are distributed across these areas. One way to see this is as an AI power stack. At the top of the supply chain are semiconductors, high-performance computing, energy and cloud infrastructure. In the middle are data, software and AI models. At the downstream end are sector-specific applications, systems integration and the ability to turn technology into practical results.

Turkey’s position is highly uneven. Its main weaknesses are upstream. It does not have a globally competitive advanced-chip industry, it does not control major cloud or GPU infrastructure, and it remains dependent on international supply chains. Talent is another problem. 

Seen this way, Turkey’s position is highly uneven. Its main weaknesses are upstream. It does not have a globally competitive advanced-chip industry, it does not control major cloud or GPU infrastructure, and it remains dependent on international supply chains. Talent is another problem. AI requires specialised researchers, data scientists and technical managers who can connect research with industrial and military use. Brown and Ozluk (2026) are therefore right to stress human capital and institutional capacity. These weaknesses matter even more as access to critical technologies becomes increasingly political.

Strategic technological power does not come only from producing the best algorithm. It also stems from connecting software to platforms, sensors, communications, doctrine and operational practice.

Turkey looks stronger further downstream. Over the past two decades it has built a substantial defence-industrial ecosystem linking state procurement, large defence firms, newer technology companies and export markets. AI can be added to this existing base in areas such as unmanned systems, intelligence processing, sensors, radar, electronic warfare and command-and-control. The key distinction is between invention and integration. Strategic technological power does not come only from producing the best algorithm. It also stems from connecting software to platforms, sensors, communications, doctrine and operational practice. Gormus (2025) shows this in the Turkish case, arguing that while AI-enabled military capabilities may support strategic autonomy, they can also create new interoperability problems within NATO.

This broader viewpoint also explains why Turkey should not be judged against the global technology leaders alone. Regional powers have very different strengths. Israel has a deeper research, cybersecurity and high-tech ecosystem. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have more capital, abundant energy and strong partnerships with major technology companies. Turkey’s advantage is different: it combines a sizeable defence industry, manufacturing capacity, operational experience with unmanned systems and a broad export network. Technological sophistication and strategic effect do not always move together. A state can remain dependent on advanced inputs while still producing major strategic effects, if it can successfully integrate imported and domestic components into usable systems.

This dynamic fits a wider debate on middle-power agency. Middle powers are often described as states that hedge between larger powers. Mishra (2026), however, uses the idea of positional power to show how they can benefit from rivalry and institutional competition. Viewed through this lens, Turkey’s technological position does depend in part on this kind of networked position: NATO membership, economic links with Europe, partnerships in the Gulf, ties with Asian suppliers and a widening defence-export geography. Now AI is poised to make these connections more valuable; unlike one-off hardware sales, modern military systems require ongoing relationships around software, training, data, cybersecurity, and interoperability.

An AI-enabled middle power can therefore be defined as a state that does not control the whole AI ecosystem, but has enough industrial and institutional capacity to turn selected technologies into strategic effects. For Turkey, three questions matter most. First, how exposed is it to external restrictions? Second, how well can it integrate AI into sectors where it already has advantages? Third, do these capabilities improve Ankara’s bargaining power with allies, rivals and customers?

More AI may strengthen Turkey’s defence and security autonomy, but it may also deepen dependence on foreign chips, computing infrastructure and specialised software. 

This leads to a central paradox. More AI may strengthen Turkey’s defence and security autonomy, but it may also deepen dependence on foreign chips, computing infrastructure and specialised software. Strategic autonomy in the AI era is therefore not about escaping interdependence; it is about organising it. The MİA report is right to focus on the material foundations of technological competition (Milli İstihbarat Akademisi, 2026). The middle-power perspective adds another point: these capabilities matter geopolitically only when they create leverage. The challenge facing Turkey is to reduce upstream vulnerability while using its downstream strengths to improve military capacity and foreign-policy influence.

From Drones to Algorithms: Defence, Regional Competition and Foreign-Policy Leverage

Turkey is not building military AI from scratch; it is adding new functions to an existing network of drones, sensors, electronic warfare, communications and command systems.

If Turkey is to become an AI-enabled middle power, defence is the most obvious space in which to test the idea. Because Turkey’s defence transformation began well before the current AI boom, AI is entering a sector that already has experience of localisation, procurement reform, battlefield use and exports. This matters. Turkey is not building military AI from scratch; it is adding new functions to an existing network of drones, sensors, electronic warfare, communications and command systems. The shift from heavy import dependence towards greater domestic production has already tied industrial policy more closely to foreign policy (Ciftci, 2023; Baysal, 2025). AI may deepen this link, because success increasingly depends on connecting sensors, data, software and weapons into faster and more effective systems.Turkey

Automation, autonomy and AI should not be treated as the same thing. An automated system follows predefined rules. An autonomous system can respond to its environment and carry out some tasks with less human input. An AI-enabled military system uses tools such as machine learning, computer vision or predictive analytics to process information and support decisions. This distinction matters because drones are often described as AI systems, when many are mainly automated or remotely controlled. The more important military uses of AI are likely to be in sensor fusion, intelligence analysis, target recognition, mission planning, electronic warfare, logistics and human-machine cooperation (Johnson, 2026; Omer, 2026). The main advantage may not be removing humans from the process, but helping them make sense of large amounts of battlefield information more quickly.

Turkey’s defence sector is already moving in this direction. Baykar receives most of the international attention, but the picture is much broader. TUSAŞ produces larger unmanned systems including ANKA, AKSUNGUR and ANKA III. ASELSAN provides much of the radar, electro-optics, communications, electronic warfare and command infrastructure needed for networked operations. HAVELSAN focuses heavily on software, simulation and command systems, while STM works on tactical UAVs, loitering munitions, maritime systems, swarms and AI-supported decision tools. STM, for example, has highlighted deep-learning image processing, sensor fusion and autonomous mission allocation, and in May 2026 demonstrated a 20-unit KARGU swarm with live ammunition during EFES-2026. None of this proves that Turkey has achieved military AI superiority. What it does show is that AI-related functions are spreading across several firms and operational areas, rather than being confined to one flagship project.

Turkey’s earlier drone experience helps explain why this matters. Turkish UAVs had effects well beyond their cost in Syria, Libya and the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, although drones alone did not determine the outcomes of hose conflicts. Rossiter and Cannon (2022) show how Turkey learned and adapted after early operational use, while Hwang and Song (2022) link drones to Ankara’s ability to intervene at relatively low political and financial cost and then convert military visibility into diplomatic influence. More recent work also warns against technological determinism: drones matter because of how they interact with doctrine, other military capabilities and enemy weaknesses (Hutto and Rogers, 2026). The same caution applies to AI. Turkey’s next advantage is unlikely to come from a single autonomous platform; it will depend on whether AI improves the way intelligence, electronic warfare, targeting, communications and command systems work together.

These capabilities also matter for foreign policy. Defence exports can create influence that goes beyond battlefield performance. Boyle and Wolfe (2026) show that drone exporters use sales not only to achieve commercial reasons, but also to build political relationships and longer-term dependencies. Turkish deals may include training, joint production, technology transfer, end-use arrangements and continued software support. AI can make these links deeper: as systems become more software-dependent, suppliers and customers remain connected through updates, data management, cybersecurity, maintenance and interoperability. Defence diplomacy can therefore become less about selling a platform and more about providing an ecosystem. This does not guarantee political alignment, but it can make the relationship longer and more difficult to replace.

Turkey is also part of broader regional competition over military technology. Israel remains ahead in advanced research, cybersecurity, sensors and military-technological integration. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are following a different model, using capital, energy and partnerships with global firms to develop their AI and defence sectors. The UAE’s EDGE and Saudi Arabia’s SAMI are examples of this state-backed approach, although both still rely heavily on foreign technology and partnerships (Rózsa, 2025). Iran follows another path, one shaped by sanctions and pressure for self-reliance but constrained by limited resources. Atwood (2025) shows the gap between Iran’s official claims of AI sovereignty and the more fragmented reality of its computing infrastructure, data centres and digital labour. These differences make a simple regional ranking misleading. Israel’s model is research-intensive, the Gulf model capital-intensive, Iran’s sanction-driven, and Turkey’s more focused on integration and manufacturing.

Turkey’s potential advantage is therefore not that it has the region’s most advanced AI ecosystem; it is that it may be able to combine sufficient technological sophistication with defence products that are scalable, relatively affordable and operationally tested. 

Turkey’s potential advantage is therefore not that it has the region’s most advanced AI ecosystem; it is that it may be able to combine sufficient technological sophistication with defence products that are scalable, relatively affordable and operationally tested. This matters because strategic utility is not the same as technological quality. Turkish drones expanded partly because they filled a market gap between advanced but tightly restricted Western systems and cheaper alternatives with different capabilities. AI-enabled systems could follow a similar path if Turkey can improve intelligence processing, autonomy and electronic warfare without making its products too expensive for existing customers. The wider growth of the defence sector has already become part of Ankara’s more assertive foreign-policy toolkit (Ciftci, 2023; Baysal, 2025).

The regional effects will be broad but uneven. In the Gulf, AI-related defence cooperation could support Turkey’s rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but Turkish firms will also face strong local competitors. In North Africa, defence ties can reinforce Ankara’s political and security presence, especially where affordable unmanned and electronic systems are attractive. The South Caucasus offers the clearest example of defence technology creating political visibility, while Central Asia connects defence cooperation with wider Turkic and connectivity agendas. The Black Sea is more constrained by Russia, NATO and the war in Ukraine. The Middle East is also highly competitive, with Israel, Iran, Gulf states and outside powers all active there. Turkey’s technological reach should therefore not be confused with regional dominance. Its value lies in giving Ankara more ways to enter security relationships, strengthen partnership and remain part of regional strategic calculations.

The broader point is that AI may change the political economy of Turkish defence influence before it changes the regional military balance. Turkey’s drone experience showed that a middle power could turn a specialised technology into operational reputation, exports and diplomatic access (Rossiter and Cannon, 2022; Soyaltin-Colella and Demiryol, 2023). AI could deepen this leverage because it ties hardware to software, data and continuing technical support. But the opportunity is conditional: it depends on reliable integration, affordability, battlefield performance and continued access to the advanced technologies on which these systems rely. AI does not replace Turkey’s defence-industrial model; it makes that model both more valuable and more vulnerable.

The New Dependency Paradox

Turkey’s growing use of AI in defence creates a problem that is easy to miss in discussions about localisation. Because, while more domestic production may reduce dependence on imported weapons, it may also increase dependence on the infrastructure needed to run advanced systems. AI requires much more than software. It needs advanced chips, computing power, cloud infrastructure, data centres, reliable electricity, cooling, skilled people and secure networks. Weymouth (2025) argues that control over these concentrated supply chains is becoming a source of geopolitical power. For Turkey, the question is therefore not only how much AI it can put into defence systems, but whether it can retain access to the infrastructure those systems need during periods of geopolitical tension.

Energy is central to this problem because AI is highly electricity-intensive. Indeed, the International Energy Agency estimates that global data-centre electricity use could rise from about 485 TWh in 2025 to roughly 950 TWh by 2030, with AI-focused facilities growing even faster (IEA, 2026). While Turkey does not need to copy the huge computing centres being built in the United States or the Gulf, the price, availability and reliability of electricity will nonetheless increasingly shape its technological capacity. Consequently, the advent of AI inextricably links energy security with technology policy. Expanding domestic computing requires generation capacity, stable grids, storage, cooling and some protection from imported-energy shocks. Turkey’s investment in renewables and nuclear power may therefore have a direct technological value. The relationship also works both ways: AI can help with forecasting, grid management and infrastructure efficiency (IEA, 2025).

A further issue is that Turkey’s energy position is itself uneven. The country has expanded its renewable capacity and is adding nuclear power, but it still depends heavily on imported energy. 

A further issue is that Turkey’s energy position is itself uneven. The country has expanded its renewable capacity and is adding nuclear power, but it still depends heavily on imported energy. This matters because AI infrastructure needs a stable and predictable supply of electricity. A sudden rise in energy prices, pressure on gas imports or problems with the grid would not only affect households and industry; it could also limit the expansion of data centres and high-performance computing. In that sense, energy dependence can become a technological dependence as well. The more Turkey wants to build domestic AI capacity, the more important it becomes to reduce exposure to external energy shocks and strengthen the resilience of the electricity system.

There is also a regional dimension. Gulf states have an obvious advantage in their ability to combine cheap energy, capital and large-scale investment in data centres and computing infrastructure. Turkey is unlikely to be able to compete with them on scale alone. Its advantage may instead come from combining a relatively diversified energy mix with industrial capacity, proximity to European markets and existing links to NATO and EU technological networks. This could make Turkey more attractive as a regional location for selected AI- and defence-related infrastructure, particularly if it can improve grid reliability and regulatory predictability. Energy policy therefore becomes part of a wider strategic question: not simply how much electricity Turkey can produce, but whether it can provide the stable, secure and internationally connected infrastructure needed for an AI-intensive economy.

This creates a second layer of dependence. Reducing reliance on imported defence platforms can simply move the vulnerability further upstream, to chips and computing capacity in particular. Advanced semiconductors are particularly sensitive because production is concentrated in a small number of countries and depends on highly specialised equipment and supply chains. Rone (2025) shows how semiconductor policy in Europe has become closely linked to national security. Export controls make the issue even more important. Weymouth (2025) argues that controls on chips and digital infrastructure are helping to reorganise technological interdependence into competing blocs. For Turkey, which has tried to maintain room for manoeuvre between Western institutions and a wider set of partners, this could make technological hedging more difficult. In other words, greater technological sophistication may actually make strategic autonomy harder to sustain.

This is why Turkey’s NATO membership and its links to European technology networks can also be assets. NATO’s revised AI strategy places interoperability, good-quality data, testing, responsible use and an AI-ready workforce at the centre of allied planning. It also recognises the energy demands of AI and the need to protect systems from adversarial interference (NATO, 2024). Participation can give Turkey access to standards, testing networks, DIANA centres, industry links and shared practices that would be expensive to build alone. The paradox is that deeper participation in allied technology networks may increase Turkey’s practical autonomy. In this sense, autonomy can come through institutional embeddedness rather than separation.

That embeddedness also creates obligations, however. NATO interoperability is no longer only about whether systems can communicate; it increasingly involves shared standards for testing, data quality, explainability, accountability and human control. NATO’s Principles of Responsible Use stress lawfulness, accountability, traceability, reliability, governability and bias mitigation (NATO, 2024). EU regulation adds a further layer by linking access to markets and technological networks to risk management and technical standards (Kilian, Jäck and Ebel, 2025). Turkey could therefore face difficulties if military AI develops more rapidly than its systems for verification, accountability and regulation. Governance is not simply a normative issue here; it can directly affect interoperability, procurement and access to trusted technology networks.

Turkey has long struggled to retain its most highly skilled professionals. Research on brain drain shows how institutional and labour-market conditions shape the decision of skilled workers to leave or return.

Human capital is another possible bottleneck. Defence AI requires people who combine machine-learning skills with engineering, cybersecurity and an understanding of military systems. Turkey has long struggled to retain its most highly skilled professionals. Research on brain drain shows how institutional and labour-market conditions shape the decision of skilled workers to leave or return (Elveren and Toksöz, 2019). This matters even more in AI, where specialists can find highly paid jobs in the United States, Europe and increasingly the Gulf. Investment in hardware will not be enough if Turkey cannot retain the people needed to develop, maintain and improve these systems.

AI also creates new security risks that cannot be measured simply by looking at industrial capacity. Machine-learning systems can be manipulated through bad data or adversarial inputs. More networked military platforms create more cyber vulnerabilities. Faster decision-support systems may also reduce the time available for human judgement in a crisis. NATO therefore treats adversarial AI, system protection and testing as core aspects of military AI readiness (NATO, 2024). There is also a domestic issue: technologies developed for defence and security can expand state surveillance, making questions of accountability and proportionality increasingly important.

Turkey’s AI position is therefore shaped by a dependency paradox: the more successfully Ankara adds AI to domestic defence and security systems, the more important resources it does not fully control become: energy, chips, computing capacity, software, skilled labour and international standards. This does not make technological autonomy impossible, but it changes what autonomy should mean. The realistic goal is resilience, in the form more diverse supply chains, reliable energy, secure computing, access to allied innovation networks and credible governance. Turkey’s AI power will depend as much on how it manages these dependencies as on the technologies it develops.

The Political Limits of Turkey’s AI Ambitions

Turkey already has several of the ingredients it needs to become an AI-enabled middle power: a large defence industry, experience with unmanned systems, manufacturing capacity, NATO membership and a growing network of defence partners. But technology alone will not decide whether these advantages produce lasting geopolitical influence. The biggest obstacles may lie in the political, economic and institutional environment surrounding innovation.

The first problem is human capital. Advanced AI depends on strong universities, scientific freedom, international research links and the ability to attract and keep skilled people. Turkey’s authoritarian turn makes this more difficult. Pressure on universities, weaker institutional autonomy and doubts about meritocracy can encourage researchers, engineers and other highly educated professionals to leave (Aydin, 2021; Elveren and Toksöz, 2019). Recent research also finds that brain drain has had a measurable negative effect on technological progress in Turkey, where it has weakened both the domestic talent pool and the R&D capacity (Mike et al., 2025). This creates a basic contradiction: a state seeking technological sovereignty may be losing one of the resources it needs most.

Though Turkey’s defence industry shows that concentrated state support can produce strong results in selected areas, AI requires a much wider and more expensive ecosystem. With macroeconomic instability and competing public spending priorities, sustaining investment across the whole chain will be difficult. 

A second problem is economic capacity. Competitive AI requires long-term spending on computing infrastructure, data centres, energy, research and specialised staff. Though Turkey’s defence industry shows that concentrated state support can produce strong results in selected areas, AI requires a much wider and more expensive ecosystem. With macroeconomic instability and competing public spending priorities, sustaining investment across the whole chain will be difficult. Turkey may therefore develop pockets of advanced capability, especially in defence, without building the wider infrastructure needed to support them over time.

Foreign policy creates a third constraint. Turkey is geopolitically important because of its location, NATO membership and military capabilities. That makes Ankara difficult for both allies and rivals to ignore. But being indispensable is not the same as being trusted. Transactional diplomacy, changing alignments and repeated disputes with Western partners can create short-term bargaining power while also making Turkey look unpredictable. This matters in an AI environment that is increasingly built around trusted networks, sensitive data, interoperability and controlled access to advanced technology. Positional power is useful only if partners believe that cooperation with Ankara will remain sufficiently predictable.

Turkey’s AI future therefore depends on much more than successful defence platforms. The key question is whether technological ambition can be matched by institutional quality, economic resilience and international trust. 

Turkey’s AI future therefore depends on much more than successful defence platforms. The key question is whether technological ambition can be matched by institutional quality, economic resilience and international trust. AI could strengthen strategic autonomy and increase Turkey’s middle-power influence, but authoritarianism, brain drain, economic weakness and declining trust could also place a clear ceiling on those ambitions. The real competition is not only over technology; it is also over the political and institutional capacity to sustain it.

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