Qu’est-ce qu’un pogrom ? Ce terme russe, signifiant « destruction » ou « pillage », désigne des violences organisées par des individus contre une communauté jugée inférieure, souvent avec la complicité passive ou active des autorités. Historiquement, les Juifs russes en ont été victimes à la fin du XIXᵉ et au début du XXᵉ siècle, dans un contexte où l’État attisait la haine antisémite pour détourner la colère populaire.
Aujourd’hui, les Palestiniens subissent cette même logique de la part des colons israéliens en Cisjordanie. Depuis le 7 octobre, plus de 1 000 Palestiniens ont été tués, soit par l’armée israélienne, soit par des colons, dans une impunité totale. Les autorités israéliennes, loin de sanctionner ces actes, les légitiment souvent en inversant le récit : des colons armés deviennent des « randonneurs » victimes de « terroristes », tandis que les Palestiniens subissent arrestations arbitraires, humiliations et punitions collectives.
Les exemples sont nombreux : villages terrorisés, oliviers arrachés, mosquées incendiées, hôpitaux investis, femmes enceintes empêchées d’accoucher. Pourtant, la communauté internationale, et notamment l’Union européenne, reste silencieuse ou se contente de discours équilibristes, renvoyant dos à dos oppresseurs et opprimés. Quelques Israéliens, comme l’ancien ministre Moshe Arens, osent qualifier ces actes de « terrorisme juif ».
Comment expliquer que des violences aussi systématiques, perpétrées en toute impunité, puissent persister sans réaction forte de la communauté internationale ? Dans quelle mesure l’inversion du récit par les autorités israéliennes contribue-t-elle à normaliser l’oppression des Palestiniens ? Comment concilier l’universalisme des droits humains avec le silence assourdissant face à ces crimes ?
L’article Pogrom en Palestine est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
Exacerbated by the cuts in development cooperation (DC), many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are currently facing severe financial constraints. Against this backdrop, higher domestic revenue is a desirable goal for most countries. Greater attention is being devoted to enhancing domestic revenue in the international development policy discourse too – across the entire political spectrum. For some, the goal is to extend the decision-making scope of government and enhance the development focus of public action, while others hope to relieve the burden of transfers on industrialised nations of the Global North and end the recipient countries’ “addiction” to DC payments. Yet what options are actually available to LMICs to generate more domestic revenue? The present policy brief shows that taxing personal income and landed property in particular could offer opportunities for additional revenue. Another important area is the rationalisation of tax expenditures, which often lead to substantially less revenue without providing any evident benefit. At the same time, however, it is also important to recognise the systemic – and eminently political – nature of tax reforms. Above and beyond the issue of technical and administrative feasibility, the political achievability of reforms must also be taken into
account. Short-term tax increases – for example through higher consumer taxes or tariffs – are often not very sustainable in their own right.
Instead, the aim must be to place the “fiscal contract” between taxpayers and the state on a broader and more stable base where better public services also play a role. One type of revenue (in this case DC) therefore cannot simply be replaced by another (taxes) – a fact that advocates of DC cuts often fail to mention. During the transition, DC must continue to provide contributions, despite declining overall funds.
International players, including the German Government and the EU, can support partner governments in a variety of ways. They are already doing so, for example by promoting the Addis Tax Initiative (ATI). In addition, Germany and the EU should make a determined effort to help strengthen multilateral approaches to cooperation. This particularly applies to the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on International Tax Coopera-tion currently being negotiated.
Exacerbated by the cuts in development cooperation (DC), many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are currently facing severe financial constraints. Against this backdrop, higher domestic revenue is a desirable goal for most countries. Greater attention is being devoted to enhancing domestic revenue in the international development policy discourse too – across the entire political spectrum. For some, the goal is to extend the decision-making scope of government and enhance the development focus of public action, while others hope to relieve the burden of transfers on industrialised nations of the Global North and end the recipient countries’ “addiction” to DC payments. Yet what options are actually available to LMICs to generate more domestic revenue? The present policy brief shows that taxing personal income and landed property in particular could offer opportunities for additional revenue. Another important area is the rationalisation of tax expenditures, which often lead to substantially less revenue without providing any evident benefit. At the same time, however, it is also important to recognise the systemic – and eminently political – nature of tax reforms. Above and beyond the issue of technical and administrative feasibility, the political achievability of reforms must also be taken into
account. Short-term tax increases – for example through higher consumer taxes or tariffs – are often not very sustainable in their own right.
Instead, the aim must be to place the “fiscal contract” between taxpayers and the state on a broader and more stable base where better public services also play a role. One type of revenue (in this case DC) therefore cannot simply be replaced by another (taxes) – a fact that advocates of DC cuts often fail to mention. During the transition, DC must continue to provide contributions, despite declining overall funds.
International players, including the German Government and the EU, can support partner governments in a variety of ways. They are already doing so, for example by promoting the Addis Tax Initiative (ATI). In addition, Germany and the EU should make a determined effort to help strengthen multilateral approaches to cooperation. This particularly applies to the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on International Tax Coopera-tion currently being negotiated.
Exacerbated by the cuts in development cooperation (DC), many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are currently facing severe financial constraints. Against this backdrop, higher domestic revenue is a desirable goal for most countries. Greater attention is being devoted to enhancing domestic revenue in the international development policy discourse too – across the entire political spectrum. For some, the goal is to extend the decision-making scope of government and enhance the development focus of public action, while others hope to relieve the burden of transfers on industrialised nations of the Global North and end the recipient countries’ “addiction” to DC payments. Yet what options are actually available to LMICs to generate more domestic revenue? The present policy brief shows that taxing personal income and landed property in particular could offer opportunities for additional revenue. Another important area is the rationalisation of tax expenditures, which often lead to substantially less revenue without providing any evident benefit. At the same time, however, it is also important to recognise the systemic – and eminently political – nature of tax reforms. Above and beyond the issue of technical and administrative feasibility, the political achievability of reforms must also be taken into
account. Short-term tax increases – for example through higher consumer taxes or tariffs – are often not very sustainable in their own right.
Instead, the aim must be to place the “fiscal contract” between taxpayers and the state on a broader and more stable base where better public services also play a role. One type of revenue (in this case DC) therefore cannot simply be replaced by another (taxes) – a fact that advocates of DC cuts often fail to mention. During the transition, DC must continue to provide contributions, despite declining overall funds.
International players, including the German Government and the EU, can support partner governments in a variety of ways. They are already doing so, for example by promoting the Addis Tax Initiative (ATI). In addition, Germany and the EU should make a determined effort to help strengthen multilateral approaches to cooperation. This particularly applies to the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on International Tax Coopera-tion currently being negotiated.
La Chine a longtemps été présentée comme la future première puissance économique mondiale, notamment grâce à sa forte capacité d’innovation dans les nouvelles technologies, susceptible de lui permettre de dépasser les États-Unis. Toutefois, elle est aujourd’hui confrontée à un déclin démographique qui pourrait freiner ses perspectives de croissance. À l’inverse, les États-Unis bénéficient d’une dynamique démographique plus favorable à leur économie, en partie grâce à l’immigration. D’autres facteurs pourraient également influencer l’évolution du rapport de force entre les deux puissances, tels que leurs capacités d’innovation, leur adaptation au changement climatique, leurs choix politiques ou encore leur influence régionale. Malgré les tensions, les économies chinoise et américaine restent fortement interdépendantes, ce qui rend plus probable un scénario de rivalité durable qu’un affrontement direct.
La Chine est-elle en mesure de dépasser la puissance américaine ? Comment les deux pays se préparent-ils aux conséquences du changement climatique sur la sécurité alimentaire et la production agricole ? Les relations sino-américaines évoluent-elles vers une concurrence durable ou vers un affrontement direct ?
À l’occasion de la sortie du Déméter 2026, Jean-François Di Méglio, président du conseil d’orientation d’Asia Centre, répond à nos différentes questions :
L’article Chine et États-Unis : divorce impossible est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
Vor genau einem Jahr stellte der Internationale Gerichtshof in Den Haag in einem Rechtsgutachten fest: Staaten sind völkerrechtlich verpflichtet, das Klima zu schützen und erhebliche Schäden zu verhindern. Der Klimaspruch kann ein Instrument der internationalen Klimadiplomatie sein, diese aber nicht ersetzen.
Vor genau einem Jahr stellte der Internationale Gerichtshof in Den Haag in einem Rechtsgutachten fest: Staaten sind völkerrechtlich verpflichtet, das Klima zu schützen und erhebliche Schäden zu verhindern. Der Klimaspruch kann ein Instrument der internationalen Klimadiplomatie sein, diese aber nicht ersetzen.
Vor genau einem Jahr stellte der Internationale Gerichtshof in Den Haag in einem Rechtsgutachten fest: Staaten sind völkerrechtlich verpflichtet, das Klima zu schützen und erhebliche Schäden zu verhindern. Der Klimaspruch kann ein Instrument der internationalen Klimadiplomatie sein, diese aber nicht ersetzen.
24. Juli 2026 – Im September 2026 wählt Sachsen-Anhalt einen neuen Landtag. Die AfD hat gute Chancen, stärkste Kraft zu werden. Doch was würden weniger Europa, weniger Zuwanderung und geringere öffentliche Investitionen für die Menschen bedeuten? Diese Kurzstudie belegt ein AfD-Paradox: Regionen, die überproportional stark für die AfD stimmen, leiden deutlich stärker unter einer AfD-Politik als andere. Obwohl vieles an der Unzufriedenheit der Menschen in starken AfD-Regionen verständlich ist, würden sie sich mit der Wahl der AfD selbst am meisten schaden. Das gilt nirgendwo mehr als in Sachsen-Anhalt. Durch die von der AfD geforderte Politik – den Austritt aus Euro und EU, Abschottung und einen Stopp der Zuwanderung sowie massive staatliche Kürzungen – würden Menschen dort im Durchschnitt jährlich rund 1.600 Euro pro Kopf an Einkommen verlieren; zudem könnten rund 10.000 Arbeitsplätze verloren gehen. Die Einkommensverluste durch eine AfD-Politik könnten in Sachsen-Anhalt bis zu doppelt so hoch ausfallen wie im Bundesdurchschnitt. Die Gefahr einer Abwärtsspirale ist groß. Unzufriedenheit treibt die Unterstützung für die AfD, was wiederum die Lebenssituation weiter verschlechtert. Eine hoffnungsvolle Perspektive: Gelingt es, neue Zukunftschancen zu schaffen, kann aus der Abwärts- eine Aufwärtsspirale werden. Denn diese Kurzstudie zeigt auch, dass AfD-Wähler*innen, gerade im Osten, auf Veränderungen reagieren. Die deutsche Geschichte belegt es: Die 1990er und 2000er Jahre waren gerade in den ostdeutschen Ländern Jahrzehnte der Stärkung der Demokratie, des wachsenden Wohlstands und sozialer Teilhabe.
The majority of the people displaced by the armed conflict in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province live in host communities. Our research shows that many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) live with family/friends. Less than half live in displacement camps. As in many other internal displacement contexts, the government of Mozambique, development partners and humanitarian organisations use the terms IDPs and host communities to distinguish between the people who fled the conflict and those who welcomed them, respectively. This is a necessary distinction because IDPs are in a particularly precarious situation, having lost homes, family members and means of livelihoods, which renders material and psychosocial support to them indispensable. However, this policy brief identifies two issues that are pertinent to this distinction and the provision of material support to IDPs. First, while the categories of IDPs and host communities may provide clarity for interventions, they do not always reflect the broader history of local communities and how people identify and relate to each other. Second, in contexts where economically vulnerable host communities share their meagre resources with IDPs prior to the arrival of external humanitarian support, humanitarian organisations need to be sensitive to the material circumstances of host communities so that these do not see such support as discriminatory, leading to conflict. When the material support that humanitarian organisations provide to IDPs is beyond the means of their hosts, the latter can become resentful and withdraw their own support from the IDPs. This is a common problem, and the policy brief shows some ways to address it. Governments, development partners, and humanitarian organisations that adopt simplistic distinctions between IDPs and host communities without locating them in the specific socio-economic context risk missing local acts of solidarity and mutual identification as channels of inclusion that are central to maintaining social cohesion.
Key policy messages:
The majority of the people displaced by the armed conflict in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province live in host communities. Our research shows that many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) live with family/friends. Less than half live in displacement camps. As in many other internal displacement contexts, the government of Mozambique, development partners and humanitarian organisations use the terms IDPs and host communities to distinguish between the people who fled the conflict and those who welcomed them, respectively. This is a necessary distinction because IDPs are in a particularly precarious situation, having lost homes, family members and means of livelihoods, which renders material and psychosocial support to them indispensable. However, this policy brief identifies two issues that are pertinent to this distinction and the provision of material support to IDPs. First, while the categories of IDPs and host communities may provide clarity for interventions, they do not always reflect the broader history of local communities and how people identify and relate to each other. Second, in contexts where economically vulnerable host communities share their meagre resources with IDPs prior to the arrival of external humanitarian support, humanitarian organisations need to be sensitive to the material circumstances of host communities so that these do not see such support as discriminatory, leading to conflict. When the material support that humanitarian organisations provide to IDPs is beyond the means of their hosts, the latter can become resentful and withdraw their own support from the IDPs. This is a common problem, and the policy brief shows some ways to address it. Governments, development partners, and humanitarian organisations that adopt simplistic distinctions between IDPs and host communities without locating them in the specific socio-economic context risk missing local acts of solidarity and mutual identification as channels of inclusion that are central to maintaining social cohesion.
Key policy messages:
The majority of the people displaced by the armed conflict in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province live in host communities. Our research shows that many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) live with family/friends. Less than half live in displacement camps. As in many other internal displacement contexts, the government of Mozambique, development partners and humanitarian organisations use the terms IDPs and host communities to distinguish between the people who fled the conflict and those who welcomed them, respectively. This is a necessary distinction because IDPs are in a particularly precarious situation, having lost homes, family members and means of livelihoods, which renders material and psychosocial support to them indispensable. However, this policy brief identifies two issues that are pertinent to this distinction and the provision of material support to IDPs. First, while the categories of IDPs and host communities may provide clarity for interventions, they do not always reflect the broader history of local communities and how people identify and relate to each other. Second, in contexts where economically vulnerable host communities share their meagre resources with IDPs prior to the arrival of external humanitarian support, humanitarian organisations need to be sensitive to the material circumstances of host communities so that these do not see such support as discriminatory, leading to conflict. When the material support that humanitarian organisations provide to IDPs is beyond the means of their hosts, the latter can become resentful and withdraw their own support from the IDPs. This is a common problem, and the policy brief shows some ways to address it. Governments, development partners, and humanitarian organisations that adopt simplistic distinctions between IDPs and host communities without locating them in the specific socio-economic context risk missing local acts of solidarity and mutual identification as channels of inclusion that are central to maintaining social cohesion.
Key policy messages:
Sans être encore officiellement candidat à l’élection présidentielle, Raphaël Glucksmann ne cache plus sa détermination à se présenter. Si son programme de politique étrangère reste à préciser, ses prises de position permettent déjà d’en distinguer les principales orientations : défense de la démocratie et des droits humains, fermeté face à la Russie et à la Chine, opposition à Donald Trump mais attachement à l’alliance avec les États-Unis.
Cette ligne s’inscrit dans la filiation intellectuelle de son père, André Glucksmann, et dans une tradition occidentaliste, atlantiste et néoconservatrice. Son engagement passé en Géorgie, aux côtés d’un pouvoir pourtant critiqué par Amnesty International concernant la protection des droits humains, illustre les premières contradictions de son positionnement.
Raphaël Glucksmann défend une diplomatie universaliste, mais celle-ci semble parfois s’appliquer à la carte. Très offensif sur les ingérences russes ou chinoises, il évoque beaucoup moins celles d’autres puissances, comme Israël. De même, très engagé dans la défense des droits humains s’agissant des Ouïghours ou de l’Ukraine, il apparait moins affirmé lorsqu’il est question des Palestiniens, de Gaza ou de la Cisjordanie.
Entre héritage occidentaliste, atlantisme et volonté de s’inscrire dans une tradition de gauche, quelles seront les véritables orientations diplomatiques en cas d’une candidature Glucksmann ? L’universalisme peut-il rester crédible lorsqu’il ne s’applique pas avec la même exigence à toutes les crises ?
Mon analyse dans cette vidéo.
L’article Glucksmann, ambiguïtés géopolitiques est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
The following paper was awarded first prize in the policy paper competition organized by ELIAMEP’s Turkey Programme, focusing on Turkey’s domestic developments, foreign relations, and socio-political dynamics.
The policy paper examines the systematic erosion of press freedom and digital rights in Turkey, focusing particularly on events following the arrest of Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu on March 19, 2025. The Saraçhane protests that erupted in response revealed the full dimensions of the Turkish government’s digital censorship apparatus: bandwidth throttling, mass social media account suspensions, and the systematic suppression of citizen journalism. Through an analysis of recent policy developments, legal frameworks, and the relationship between the Erdoğan regime and Big Tech companies, this report documents how authoritarian governments leverage digital platforms to silence dissent.
The analysis shows that with 90% of traditional media under state control, journalists have migrated to YouTube and social media platforms only to face expensive licensing requirements, threats of arrest, and platform-level censorship. The report argues that İmamoğlu’s case represents a dangerous precedent: his social media accounts remain suspended, despite his legal case maintaining the presumption of innocence, which effectively prevents him from campaigning as a presidential candidate. This systematic destruction of information infrastructure has implications not only for Turkey, but for democratic movements worldwide.
Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Ezgi Daryurek, Master’s Program in Media and Migration Flows, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.