“Multipolarity” has become a central but, at the same time, highly ambiguous point of reference in debates about the future world order. The term is used descriptively, that is, to describe shifts in the distribution of power; and it is also used normatively, as an aspirational construct for a more just international order. However, as the following comparative analysis of seven countries shows, there is no coherent understanding of the term even in those countries that are pushing for multipolarity. Sharp dividing lines are evident between the United States, which has long understood the construct of multipolarity as being at odds with its strategic interests, and Russia and China, which both associate it with challenging US hegemony. However, while Russia is striving for a disruptive and violent transformation, China is aiming for an evolutionary one. Other states – above all, India and South Africa – hope that multipolarity will provide them with greater foreign-policy room for manoeuvre. And some derive their own reform proposals at the multilateral level from their understanding of the construct. Germany and the EU must rigorously examine the various interpretations and uses of the construct of multipolarity. They should not dismiss the term as irrelevant or inherently anti-Western as it can provide a common frame of reference on international politics. At the same time, its unreflective use carries risks, as the term is highly politicised and associated with what are at times the conflicting goals of a broad range of international actors. Rather than simply participating in conceptual debates, Germany and the EU should take concrete steps towards reforming the international order in policy areas such as trade, health, energy and climate. At the same time, they should regard the call for multipolarity as an indicator of the need for broad reforms of the international system and initiate negotiation processes with other states. To this end, they must first establish their own reference points with regard to the future international order so that they can identify suitable partners and institutions.
Since Russia launched its full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022, the European Union (EU) has pursued its enlargement policy as part of a geopolitical approach. According to the European Commission and candidate states, the EU could admit new members from 2028 onwards, while Ukraine is calling for accession in 2027. Yet significant obstacles remain. Within the EU, the reform process designed to improve its capacity to act and prepare it for a Union of 30 or more has stalled. However, the readiness of accession candidates and the Union’s absorption capacity are key criteria that German European policy has traditionally upheld. There is currently intense debate within the EU regarding gradual integration, fast-track routes, and new safeguard clauses aimed at reducing the tension between geopolitical urgency and sound integration policy. With regard to the Western Balkan states, the EU should adhere to the well-established accession process. In the case of Ukraine, the situation is so acute that the political commitment to admit the country must be reaffirmed. As a preliminary step towards membership, the EU should offer Kyiv a new type of accession association that also includes a security and defence dimension.
The return of power politics to the market is a defining feature of the geoeconomic Zeitenwende, as is currently being experienced in international politics. This has brought renewed attention to the long-standing conventional wisdom that economic activity can not only generate prosperity but also promote foreign and security policy objectives. The analysis and strategy of foreign, security, and economic policy require a clear conceptualisation of the term “geoeconomics”. This is necessary not least to weigh the costs and benefits of geoeconomic measures in a well-founded manner, and to assess their prospects for success more realistically. The contributions to this research paper focus on the theoretical and conceptual foundations of geoeconomic thought and examine selected empirical case studies of geoeconomic action in functionally defined policy areas. In order for German geoeconomic policy to become more effective and coherent, the following approaches are recommended: first, the establishment of interagency structures for the cross-cutting task of geoeconomics; second, the expansion of communication and coordination with relevant stakeholders from the business sector and academia; and third, the strengthening of international cooperation with like-minded partners.