Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

L’intelligence artificielle et la mémoire des start-ups : comment changer d’échelle sans perdre son identité ni oublier ses apprentissages ?

The following paper has received a distinction in the policy paper competition organized by ELIAMEP’s Turkey Programme, focusing on Turkey’s domestic developments, foreign relations, and socio-political dynamics.

Turkey has long sought to position itself as a regional energy hub through gas infrastructure, exploiting its geographical position between eastern supply and western demand. As decarbonisation and electrification accelerate, this hub agenda is expanding beyond hydrocarbons. This paper assesses Turkey’s emerging ambition to become an “electricity hub” by analysing two relevant projects, asking whether Ankara is extending its corridor-to-hub approach to cross-border electricity corridors, and what this implies for EU-backed corridor priorities. Empirically, it traces two strands of policy: “hub-building” measures that deepen Turkey-centred connectivity and market interfaces, and “hub-defending” measures that challenge bypass routes and political and regulatory risk. It argues that Turkey is seeking to shape the region’s evolving electricity map through a mix of selective cooperation and competitive obstruction, bolstering its strategic relevance while complicating EU efforts to diversify routes and de-risk priority interconnections.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Ioannis Voskidis, Master’s student, Sciences Po (Paris School of International Affairs), Paris.

Ioannis Voskidis is a Master’s student at Sciences Po (PSIA), focusing on energy geopolitics. He holds an MA in European studies from the College of Europe (Tirana campus), and a BA in international Affairs from Panteion University.

Introduction

The energy transition is changing the landscape of energy geopolitics. As electrification accelerates, cross-border electricity infrastructure such as HVDC links, interconnector corridors, converter stations and market interfaces are becoming a central variable rather than a set of purely technical assets, rivalling the importance of hydrocarbon infrastructure.[1] For the EU, this also means that strategic autonomy is no longer only about fuel suppliers, but it increasingly involves critical raw materials, clean-tech supply chains, and the digital infrastructures that operate modern grids. In Europe’s neighbourhood, this shift is already producing corridor competition, with rival routes for exporting “green” power, politically contested maritime spaces, and EU-backed projects whose success depends as much on bankability and geopolitics as on engineering. Interconnectors are increasingly the “arteries” of an electrifying region, and the actor that shapes their interfaces determines which corridors become the default. This makes them a growing focus of attention and contestation between geopolitical actors.[2]

Ankara’s long-standing ambition to be an “energy hub” has traditionally been pursued through natural gas and pipeline corridors connecting producers in the Caspian, Russia and the Middle East to European demand.

Turkey occupies a central position in this emerging regional geography. Ankara’s long-standing ambition to be an “energy hub” has traditionally been pursued through natural gas and pipeline corridors connecting producers in the Caspian, Russia and the Middle East to European demand.[3] This paper asks whether Turkey is now adapting that corridor-to-hub playbook to electricity, and what this means for the EU’s external electricity corridor strategy. It argues that electricity cannot replicate the classic gas-hub model of storage-enabled arbitrage and benchmark price formation, but it can reproduce the core geopolitical logic of routed energy through corridor power: shaping where interconnections are built, under what operational and market rules trade becomes routine, and which gateways become structurally central. Two short case studies highlight why the EU must treat Ankara’s external interconnections as geopolitical corridor choices and design response options accordingly.

Redefining hub leverage

Energy geopolitics is often less about who owns molecules and more about who shapes the routes and interfaces through which energy moves. In hydrocarbons, this logic is amplified by capital-intensive networks with high fixed costs and sunk investments.[4] Once infrastructure is built, pipelines and terminals lock in corridors, create dependence, and can confer bargaining power on states that host or control key infrastructure. As Europe’s energy transition accelerates electrification, a similar question arises for the emerging geography of cross-border electricity: what does it mean to be “central” in this new context.

…it conveys “corridor power”, meaning the ability to influence where interconnection is built, how cross-border capacity is governed, and under which market and regulatory arrangements trade becomes investable, reliable, and routinely usable.

In this paper, an “electricity hub” is defined in an operational, political-economy sense. It does not denote a single benchmark pricing point akin to TTF, nor does it imply control over point-to-point flows comparable to pipeline operations. Rather, it conveys “corridor power”, meaning the ability to influence where interconnection is built, how cross-border capacity is governed, and under which market and regulatory arrangements trade becomes investable, reliable, and routinely usable.[5] In electricity, centrality is therefore less about “owning” electrons than about shaping the geography and functioning of interconnector routes and landing points, as well as the rules that monetise and allocate access, including capacity allocation, congestion management and balancing arrangements.

Electricity interconnections differ fundamentally from hydrocarbon transport, so pipeline-style “corridor” analogies can only go so far.

Electricity interconnections differ fundamentally from hydrocarbon transport, so pipeline-style “corridor” analogies can only go so far. Power flows follow the physics of the grid (loop flows), meaning a transaction on one interconnector can load multiple lines across domestic and third-country networks.[6] As a result, congestion and access are system-wide and state-dependent, and cross-border trades can be curtailed on security grounds even under open access. Moreover, electricity lacks gas-style buy–store–resell dynamics at scale: with storage still limited and costly, trade is constrained by continuous real-time balancing and typically requires deeper operational integration and compatible market rules.[7] Gains from cross-border exchange often accrue primarily to a low-cost origin rather than the “corridor”, and value capture stems less from transit-style fees than from regulated access and scarcity pricing of constrained capacity (e.g., congestion rents). These distinctions are summarised in the table below:

Table 1. Why hydrocarbon hub logic doesn’t map onto electricity interconnections.

 

Dimension Electricity interconnection  

Implication Flow structure Loop flows: transactions spread across parallel lines Effects spill into internal/third-country grids Access under stress System-wide, state-dependent congestion “Open access” is bounded by reliability Intertemporal economics No large-scale buy–store–resell, storage limited/costly Arbitrage logic is weak compared to hydrocarbons Operational discipline Real-time balancing: supply = demand continuously Usable trade needs tight operational coordination Monetisation No transit fee by default, value via regulated access + congestion rents Rents come from scarcity, not per-unit tolls

Compiled by author. Source: Subhes C. Bhattacharyya, Energy Economics: Concepts, Issues, Markets and Governance

Yet the strategic logic of corridors still travels. Interconnectors are high-value, long-lived assets whose location reshapes regional dependence patterns as institutional and infrastructural leverage.[8] They can generate material gains such as cost savings, and renewable integration by expanding balancing options, as well as strategic gains by making a state a necessary partner for trade and long-term planning. These effects are magnified in contested environments where cable landing points, converter stations, and operational interfaces intersect with sovereignty claims and jurisdictional boundaries. In this adapted sense, transit and especially corridor remain analytically useful categories for electricity, while hub should be understood cautiously as shorthand for corridor power rather than as a claim to benchmark price-setting.

Applied to Turkey, the lens translates into two observable policy modes:

• Hub-building: promoting corridor architectures that route new cross-border power exchange through Turkey and embedding them in workable interfaces (interconnection choices, plus governance that makes exchange usable).
• Hub-defending: resisting bypass corridors that would consolidate alternative routes and reduce Turkey’s relevance in the emerging regional electricity map—especially where permitting, survey stages, landing points, and operational interfaces intersect with sovereignty claims.

The next section applies this diagnostic to two cases in order to test whether Turkey’s actions amount to corridor power in practice.

Turkey’s electricity hub strategy: a two-track approach

This section examines how effectively Turkey is translating its long-standing “corridor-to-hub” playbook from hydrocarbons into electricity through the two-track framework of hub-building and hub-defending.

This section examines how effectively Turkey is translating its long-standing “corridor-to-hub” playbook from hydrocarbons into electricity through the two-track framework of hub-building and hub-defending. Two cases operationalise the framework: the Great Sea Interconnector (Greece-Cyprus-Israel), which is the clearest illustration of (mainly) hub-defending dynamics, and the competing “green electricity corridor” agenda in the South Caucasus–Black Sea space, which illustrates hub-building dynamics. Both logics can coexist in practice, but each case foregrounds one mechanism more clearly than the other.

Great Sea Interconnector

The Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) is a planned HVDC submarine interconnector linking Greece (and thus the European grid) to Cyprus and Israel.[9] It has been framed at EU level as a Project of Common Interest (PCI) under the TEN-E framework, reflecting its role in a core EU objective: ending Cyprus’ electricity isolation and enabling the island’s fuller participation in the internal electricity market.[10] From a decarbonisation perspective, interconnection expands the menu of flexibility options for an island system, supporting renewable integration, adequacy and (in principle) lower system costs through trade and diversification. The EU has backed up this prioritisation with substantial support, including a reported €657 million CEF grant for construction and additional EU-backed financing instruments associated with project development.[11] Despite its advantages, the project faces significant domestic resistance in Cyprus. Beyond formal concerns over cost and viability,[12] parts of the electricity-sector debate have reflected opposition from actors worried about the impact of interconnection on the existing market structure, electricity prices and incumbent positions. Incumbents in an oligopolistic electricity market can have incentives to resist reforms that would come with deeper interconnection and competition, which would put downward pressure on prices over time.[13]

Figure 1. The Great Sea Interconnector

 

Source: https://tyndp2024.entsoe.eu/projects-map/transmission/219

From Turkey’s perspective, GSI is not merely an infrastructure project; it is a corridor choice that reconfigures an Eastern Mediterranean electricity route outside Turkish territory and provides no role for the Turkish Cypriot entity. In corridor terms, it reduces Turkey’s prospective centrality as a gateway between the Eastern Mediterranean and the European system by establishing a direct EU-backed route that shifts incentives of connectivity southwards.

From Turkey’s perspective, GSI is not merely an infrastructure project; it is a corridor choice that reconfigures an Eastern Mediterranean electricity route outside Turkish territory and provides no role for the Turkish Cypriot entity.[14] In corridor terms, it reduces Turkey’s prospective centrality as a gateway between the Eastern Mediterranean and the European system by establishing a direct EU-backed route that shifts incentives of connectivity southwards. Turkey’s hub-defending behaviour in the case of GSI is expressed through two mutually reinforcing mechanisms: First, Ankara is advancing a jurisdiction/consent argument, whereby the project cannot lawfully proceed without Turkish approval at those points where the route intersects maritime areas Turkey claims as part of its continental shelf or jurisdictional entitlement.[15] This is embedded in the wider Eastern Mediterranean delimitation dispute and is presented politically as a rejection of regional infrastructure planning that “excludes” Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. Second, Turkey’s posture generates a credible operational disruption risk during some of the most vulnerable phases of project execution (route surveying, permitting, and seabed works), where delays and uncertainty can rapidly translate into higher costs and contract instability. The 2024 Kasos incident in which Turkish naval assets reportedly moved to impede survey activity illustrates this point.[16] Even limited coercive signalling can interrupt technical work and increase the perceived probability of repetition.

Even in this primarily defensive case, a hub-building element is also visible. Turkey has promoted alternative interconnection concepts oriented toward Turkey-centred connectivity for Cyprus (or the island’s northern part).

The key effect is not necessarily permanent prevention but bankability erosion. Where investors, contractors and insurers anticipate recurring contestation, they account for political risk through higher contingencies, tighter contractual protections and longer implementation timelines. This can delay procurement, postpone construction milestones and, in practice, produce a gap between EU “priority” designation and deliverability. Reporting around GSI has linked geopolitical uncertainty to stoppages in surveying and to interruptions in project momentum, including pauses affecting key contractors and payment flows. From an EU perspective, this is a material risk because the Union’s objective depends on a corridor being buildable and operable under stress. Even in this primarily defensive case, a hub-building element is also visible. Turkey has promoted alternative interconnection concepts oriented toward Turkey-centred connectivity for Cyprus (or the island’s northern part).[17] The strategic logic is consistent: delay or complicate a bypass route, while keeping open (or advertising) an alternative architecture that would preserve Turkey’s corridor relevance.

The GSI shows what “hub-defending” looks like in an electricity context. No toll is extracted or price set, but corridor outcomes are shaped by raising execution risk and thereby influencing the feasibility, timing and bankability of a competing interconnection map.

Black Sea interconnector

The Black Sea Connectivity project (often referred to as the Black Sea Submarine Cable) is a proposed HVDC interconnector intended to link Georgia and Romania (Anaklia-Constanța) across the Black Sea.[18] For the participating and associated states (most prominently Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania and Hungary) the initiative is framed as a platform for exporting renewable electricity from the South Caucasus/Caspian basin, strengthening regional energy security, diversifying supply options, and anchoring a broader package of infrastructure investment and regulatory coordination around the corridor. Institutionally, the project has been formalised through intergovernmental arrangements and the creation of a dedicated project company to advance development. However, the initiative remains less mature than GSI, with delivery horizons commonly placed in the early 2030s; this matters, because projects with long lead times are particularly exposed to substitution by faster or more controllable alternatives.

Figure 2. The Black Sea Interconnector

Source: https://big-europe.eu/publications/2024-10-30-corridors-of-power-the-black-sea-cable-between-azerbaijan-and-europe/

For the EU, the project is a strategic connectivity route serving two primary goals: decarbonisation and—in a post-2022 context—energy security, as future plans would incorporate Moldova and Ukraine. It creates a direct channel for renewable electricity into the Union via Romania and onward toward Central and Eastern Europe.[19] The Commission has embedded the project within the Global Gateway narrative and linked it to regulatory approximation with EU electricity market rules—an explicit attempt to ensure that physical connectivity is paired with market governance compatible with the internal energy market.[20] In EU procedural terms, the project’s promoters have sought Project of Mutual Interest (PMI) status under TEN-E, which would facilitate cross-border governance and prioritisation for corridors that connect the EU with neighbouring regions.[21]

…the Black Sea cable would cement a Romania–Black Sea gateway for South Caucasus electricity into the EU, thereby reducing the strategic logic of routing those same flows through a Turkey-centred corridor.

Turkey has been less publicly confrontational on this file than on GSI, largely because it does not intersect directly with the Eastern Mediterranean sovereignty dispute. Yet the corridor implications are structurally similar: if implemented, the Black Sea cable would cement a Romania–Black Sea gateway for South Caucasus electricity into the EU, thereby reducing the strategic logic of routing those same flows through a Turkey-centred corridor. In corridor terms, the project would “set the map” around a direct maritime interface between the South Caucasus and the EU, rather than a land-based corridor in which Turkey acts as the main operational and political gateway.

Ankara is advancing a competing corridor architecture that seeks to make Turkey the preferred transit interface for South Caucasus electricity into Europe. 

Ankara’s response in this case is therefore best understood as hub-building rather than hub-defending. Instead of relying on legal contestation or operational disruption to block a bypass route, Ankara is advancing a competing corridor architecture that seeks to make Turkey the preferred transit interface for South Caucasus electricity into Europe. Concretely, Turkey has promoted a framework with Azerbaijan, Georgia and Bulgaria which is oriented toward upgrading interconnections and developing the operational/trading arrangements needed to move electricity into the Turkish system and onward through Turkey–Bulgaria—and potentially extending across the Balkans and toward other EU markets.[22] The strategic value of this approach is twofold: it expands Turkey’s role as a regional gateway in a decarbonising neighbourhood, and it embeds prospective export flows within the Turkish network and its associated governance interface.

The competition between these routes is commercial and institutional. A credible Turkey-mediated corridor can weaken the Commission-backed Black Sea gateway by

• offering investors and offtakers a substitute route that reduces expected utilisation and revenue certainty for the submarine-cable project, and
• shifting planning momentum and regulatory cooperation toward a Turkey-facing interface. In this sense, Turkey’s hub-building strategy can indirectly shift the region’s centre of gravity and increase EU exposure to a corridor whose operability and access conditions are shaped by a non-EU actor.

The Black Sea case highlights a distinct mechanism of outcompeting by advancing a corridor that appears more implementable, more politically controllable, or faster to deliver, thereby influencing which corridor becomes the default route for South Caucasus–EU electricity exchange.

Putting the cases together

The broader implication of these two case studies is that several core logics associated with hydrocarbon route geopolitics are already visible in electricity. What changes in electricity is the leverage mechanism. Thus, influence is exercised less through controllable, point-to-point shipment and the collection of transit tariffs and more through the ability to shape the feasibility and bankability of projects (by affecting political and economic risk), their timing (by accelerating preferred routes or delaying rivals), and the governance conditions under which interconnection becomes routinised (operational interfaces, security rules, access under scarcity, and the market arrangements that convert a cable into a functioning corridor). This also determines the ways through which contestation is achieved:

Increase of perceived disruption risk → higher contingencies → delayed surveys/procurement → weaker bankability.

In a system of capital-intensive, path-dependent interconnectors, these mechanisms matter because they determine which corridors become “default” and which are crowded out before they ever materialise.

In a system of capital-intensive, path-dependent interconnectors, these mechanisms matter because they determine which corridors become “default” and which are crowded out before they ever materialise. In this context the EU must assess its external electricity corridors and design response options.

EU implications & policy recommendations

The preceding analysis implies that the EU should treat cross-border electricity interconnectors not only as decarbonisation infrastructure, but also as geopolitical corridor choices that shape the region’s long-run connectivity map. In this setting, the key vulnerability is not simply “dependence on imports”; it is dependence on the political, legal and institutional conditions that make a corridor bankable, buildable and operable. This also fits the EU’s broader resilience agenda, which is shifting from managing single-supplier fuel dependence to monitoring and mitigating strategic dependencies across the technologies and infrastructures of electrification.[23] Given interconnectors’ technical and financial traits, even modest increases in perceived uncertainty can harden financing terms, slow procurement, disrupt construction schedules and redirect system planning towards alternative routes. Where routes are politically contested or where there is a credible risk of disruption, contractors, lenders and insurers price in geopolitical risk through higher contingencies and longer timelines. The EU therefore faces a recurring gap between formal priority designations and practical deliverability. This matters because EU-backed interconnectors involve sunk costs well before any power flows (as the GSI makes clear). Repeated pauses, rerouting or rescoping can strand preparatory expenditure and consume time in a decade where grid bottlenecks are already a binding constraint on decarbonisation.[24] In parallel, corridor competition can reallocate regional centrality away from EU-preferred gateways, pushing Brussels away from designing connectivity on its own terms towards having to adapt to corridors whose operational interface and political conditions are shaped by non-EU actors.

Brussels is already building an industrial and screening toolkit relevant to this corridor challenge, with instruments ranging from the Net-Zero Industry Act and Critical Raw Materials Act to FDI screening and the Foreign Subsidies Regulation aimed at limiting strategic vulnerabilities in the electrified economy. However, measures specifically targeting the project-level risks that determine whether priority corridors are delivered, seem to be missing. In fact, recent disputes over other energy projects in sensitive areas, including the buffer zone in Cyprus,[25] illustrate that geopolitical implementation bottlenecks are not taken into sufficient consideration and often hinder project deliverability.

Against this backdrop, the EU’s response should be framed less as a binary choice between “confronting” or “accommodating” Turkey (and other actors) and more as corridor governance under contestation, which could be useful in other areas as well. Key policy recommendations include:

1. a) Financially de-risking the delivery of EU-priority corridors (making “bankability” a funded deliverable). Where the EU has already designated projects as strategic (TEN-E/PCI) and committed grant money (CEF/RRF), it should establish concrete disbursement milestones. By employing stage-gated sequencing (survey → permitting → procurement → construction) with milestone-based disbursement and procurement terms that explicitly price disruption, the EU can ensure that disruption does not automatically fatally undermine bankability. This approach would provide EU instruments with the confidence required to sustain financial support through extended development cycles.
2. b) Coalition-building around shared corridor benefits. To reduce corridor vulnerability, the Commission should widen the set of actors who pay a reputational and financial cost if implementation stalls. Operationalise this through implementation compacts that bind third beneficiary states, TSOs, regulators and financiers to a shared timetable, defined escalation channels, and pre-agreed responses to permitting or maritime disruption.
3. c) Pursuing managed interoperability with Turkey on EU terms. Given the geography and existing links, Turkey will remain relevant for regional flows. The question is whether that relevance is predictable or discretionary. The EU should focus cooperation on a narrow set of operational rules that make cross-border exchange routine and contestation-resistant. Concretely, this means working through TSOs/regulators so that day-to-day operability cannot be turned into political leverage. A separate EU–Turkey technical dialogue on Eastern Mediterranean electricity connectivity could also help reduce escalation risks. Such a channel could focus on practical issues without giving Ankara a veto over the GSI route or reopening the discussion on the project’s legal basis, while keeping the Crete–Cyprus section as an EU-backed priority and avoiding any implication of recognition of Cyprus’s occupied north.
4. e) Providing maritime assurance for lawful survey and maintenance (reducing the security premium). For (mainly) offshore corridors, bankability hinges on whether surveys, cable-laying and maintenance can proceed predictably. The EU and participating member states should therefore complement efforts with maritime security measures. A coordinated presence to ensure the safety of civilian vessels conducting lawful works is necessary.

In sum, the EU’s best defence is to convert emerging corridor politics into a rules-based connectivity strategy: de-risk delivery, broaden coalitions, engage Turkey pragmatically on operability, and preserve route optionality so that interconnection remains feasible, bankable and governable even in contested geopolitical environments.

Conclusion

For the EU, the implication is that “priority” labels and funding are necessary but insufficient. External interconnectors should be treated as geopolitical corridor choices whose deliverability depends on geopolitical conditions, too. EU strategy therefore needs to develop a corridor governance that is reliable under contestation.

As electrification becomes central to the EU’s strategic energy autonomy, the politics of interconnection will increasingly determine whether decarbonisation reduces vulnerability or simply shifts it to new chokepoints and dependencies. Where interconnectors are built, how quickly they become deliverable, and under what governance arrangements cross-border exchange is organised will increasingly shape the region’s strategic landscape and become a focal point of geopolitical competition.[26] Accordingly, Turkey’s long-standing effort to translate geography into energy centrality is already extending beyond hydrocarbons, with electricity corridors now being incorporated into Ankara’s strategic calculus. The two cases show how Turkey is adapting a familiar corridor-to-hub goal to electricity. In the Eastern Mediterranean, GSI illustrates corridor-defending via jurisdictional contestation and credible disruption risk, while in the Black Sea, the competition is more about corridor-building and outcompeting. For the EU, the implication is that “priority” labels and funding are necessary but insufficient. External interconnectors should be treated as geopolitical corridor choices whose deliverability depends on geopolitical conditions, too. EU strategy therefore needs to develop a corridor governance that is reliable under contestation.

The geopolitical implications of electricity-corridor politics remain largely underexplored. Future research should therefore examine the concrete forms of leverage that attach to controlling interconnection infrastructure, identify which market-design instruments most effectively “operationalise” corridors in practice, and assess how expanding storage and hybrid system assets could reshape corridor competition as the next decades unfold.

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Λυσάνδρου Μιράντα. “Ευλογία ή κατάρα ο GSI για την Κύπρο; Ιστορία, παρασκήνιο, αβεβαιότητες και αναπάντητα ερωτήματα για το μεγαλόπνοο έργο”. Politis. n.d. https://www.politis.com.cy/politis-news/oikonomia/964727/efloghia-i-katara-o-gsi-ghia-tin-kypro-istoria-paraskinio-avevaiotites-kai-anapantita-erotimata-ghia-to-meghalepivolo-ergho

[1] IEA. World Energy Outlook 2025. Paris: International Energy Agency, 2025, 19. https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2025  License: CC BY 4.0 (report); CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 (Annex A).

[2] Tomas Jermalavičius, ed., The Ties That Bind: Energy Connectivity in the Age of Geopolitical Turbulence (Tallinn: International Centre for Defence and Security, April 2026), https://icds.ee/en/the-ties-that-bind-energy-connectivity-in-the-age-of-geopolitical-turbulence/

[3]Mahmoud A. Hammad, Sara Elgazzar, Matevž Obrecht, and Marjan Sternad. “Compatibility about the Concept of Energy Hub: A Strict and Visual Review”. International Journal of Energy Sector Management 16, no. 1 (2022): 4. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJESM-06-2020-0022

[4] Subhes C. Bhattacharyya, Energy Economics: Concepts, Issues, Markets and Governance (London: Springer, 2011), 237. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-85729-268-1

[5]Mahmoud A. Hammad, Sara Elgazzar, Matevž Obrecht, and Marjan Sternad. “Compatibility about the Concept of Energy Hub: A Strict and Visual Review”. International Journal of Energy Sector Management 16, no. 1 (2022): 5. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJESM-06-2020-0022

[6] Subhes C. Bhattacharyya, Energy Economics: Concepts, Issues, Markets and Governance (London: Springer, 2011), 409. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-85729-268-1

[7] Ibid. 228

[8] Mia Beams, “The U.S. Interconnection Challenge: Why Renewables Are Stuck in Line”, Council on Foreign Relations, October 2, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/articles/us-interconnection-challenge-why-renewables-are-stuck-line

[9] Βασίλης Νάνης, “Great Sea Interconnector: Η σημασία και η δύσκολη συγκυρία του εμβληματικού έργου”, Το Βήμα, 4 Σεπτεμβρίου 2025, https://www.tovima.gr/2025/09/04/explainers/kalodio-elladas-kyprou-i-simasia-kai-i-dyskoli-sygkyria-tou-emvlimatikou-ergou/

[10] Ιbid. 

[11] Ιbid.

[12] Lysandrou Miranda, “Ευλογία ή κατάρα ο GSI για την Κύπρο; Ιστορία, παρασκήνιο, αβεβαιότητες και αναπάντητα ερωτήματα για το μεγαλόπνοο έργο”, Politis, n.d., https://www.politis.com.cy/politis-news/oikonomia/964727/efloghia-i-katara-o-gsi-ghia-tin-kypro-istoria-paraskinio-avevaiotites-kai-anapantita-erotimata-ghia-to-meghalepivolo-ergho

[13] EnergyPress, “Καλώδιο Ελλάδας-Κύπρου: Τα συμφέροντα που δεν θέλουν το έργο”, October 13, 2025, https://energypress.gr/news/kalodio-elladas-kyproy-ta-symferonta-poy-den-theloyn-ergo

[14] Keep Talking Greece, “Ankara Threatens the Electricity Interconnection Greece-Cyprus Project (GSI)”, April 10, 2025, https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2025/04/10/turkey-gsi-interconnection-greece-cyprus-threats/

[15] Menelaos Hadjicostis, “EU Irked by Turkish Warnings against Greece-Cyprus-Israel Electricity Cable Link, Cyprus Says”, AP News (Associated Press), April 11, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/cyprus-turkey-greece-undersea-electricity-cable-interconnector-ccce85737cbf99cddd7cf1fa72678771

[16] Harry Aposporis, “Uncertain Future of Greece-Cyprus Great Sea Interconnector Project”, Balkan Green Energy News, September 9, 2025, https://balkangreenenergynews.com/uncertain-future-of-greece-cyprus-great-sea-interconnector-project/

[17] Igor Todorović, “Turkey promoting its alternative to Greece-Cyprus power cable”, Balkan Green Energy News, August 12, 2024, https://balkangreenenergynews.com/turkey-promoting-its-alternative-to-greece-cyprus-power-cable/

[18] Vladimir Spasić, “Azerbaijan, Georgia, Hungary, Romania Establish Firm for Black Sea Interconnector”, Balkan Green Energy News, September 5, 2024, https://balkangreenenergynews.com/azerbaijan-georgia-hungary-romania-establish-firm-for-black-sea-interconnector/

[19] Ibid.

[20] Thijs Van de Graaf, “Corridors of Power: the Black Sea Cable between Azerbaijan and Europe”, Brussels Institute for Geopolitics, October 30, 2024, https://big-europe.eu/publications/2024-10-30-corridors-of-power-the-black-sea-cable-between-azerbaijan-and-europe/

[21] European Commission, Directorate-General for International Partnerships, “Black Sea Connectivity Submarine Electricity Cable”, International Partnerships (Global Gateway), accessed January 25, 2026, https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/black-sea-connectivity-submarine-electricity-cable_en

[22] Igor Todorović, “Turkey Pushing against Rivals for Transmission of Green Electricity to EU”, Balkan Green Energy News, April 7, 2025, https://balkangreenenergynews.com/turkey-pushing-against-rivals-for-transmission-of-green-electricity-to-eu/

[23] European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Strategic Dependencies and Capacities, SWD(2021) 352 final (Brussels, May 5, 2021), 35, PDF.

[24] IEA (2025), Grid congestion is posing challenges for energy security and transitions, IEA, Paris https://www.iea.org/commentaries/grid-congestion-is-posing-challenges-for-energy-security-and-transitions  Licence: CC BY 4.0

[25] Cleaver Tom, “Buffer zone solar farm plans hit buffers, both sides silent as to why”, Cyprus Mail, April 3, 2025, https://cyprus-mail.com/2025/04/03/buffer-zone-solar-farm-plans-hit-buffers-both-sides-silent-as-to-why

[26] Kirsten Westphal, Maria Pastukhova, and Jacopo Maria Pepe, Geopolitics of Electricity: Grids, Space and (Political) Power, SWP Research Paper 2022/RP 06 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 15, 2022), https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2022RP06/ ; https://doi.org/10.18449/2022RP06

 

 

Les accords d’Oslo signés le 13 septembre 1993 sous l’égide des États-Unis, avaient porté l’espoir d’un règlement pacifique du conflit israélo-palestinien après des décennies de violence. L’échec des accords de Camp David II et l’éclatement de la deuxième Intifada en 2000 ont cependant démontré l’ampleur des divisions qui persistaient entre les deux camps. Aujourd’hui, le choc des attentats du 7 octobre 2023 perpétrés par le Hamas, la riposte israélienne à Gaza – régulièrement qualifiée de génocide – et l’intensification de la colonisation israélienne en Cisjordanie rendent plus improbable que jamais toute perspective de paix durable. La poursuite des violences est-elle pour autant inévitable ?

Comment l’histoire du conflit israélo-palestinien éclaire-t-elle la situation actuelle ? En quoi les accords d’Oslo peuvent-ils être qualifiés d’échec ? Quelles leçons peut-on tirer des précédentes tentatives de règlement du conflit ? La solution à deux États est-elle la seule option réaliste ? Comment l’opinion évolue-t-elle à ce sujet aux États-Unis ?

Autant d’enjeux abordés avec Robert Malley, enseignant à l’université de Yale et ancien conseiller des présidents Bill Clinton et Barack Obama sur le Proche-Orient.

L’article Israël – Palestine aux sources de l’échec diplomatique. Avec Robert Malley est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

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Pierre-Antoine Donnet, ancien rédacteur en chef central de l’Agence France-Presse et correspondant à Pékin, Tokyo et New York, a répondu aux questions de Emmanuel Lincot, directeur de recherche à l’IRIS, à propos de son ouvrage Chine, la défaite de l’Occident paru aux éditions de l’Aube en 2026. Extrait :

« Après le premier choc chinois des années 2000, lorsqu’un véritable tsunami de marchandises chinoises s’est déversé sur les marchés occidentaux à la suite de l’entrée de la Chine dans l’Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) en janvier 2001. Un « deuxième choc chinois » ou « choc chinois 2.0 » a déjà commencé, la première cible étant le secteur automobile. Je prends l’exemple de l’Allemagne qui a perdu 420 000 emplois industriels entre 2019 et 2025. Depuis les années 1970, tous les chanceliers allemands avaient parié sur la Chine et son marché qui donnait l’image trompeuse d’un eldorado infini. Volkswagen avait été l’un des précurseurs des délocalisations des majors de l’industrie européenne en Chine dans les années 70 et je me souviens très bien de ces Passat Volkswagen qui circulaient dans les rues de Pékin, prisées des cadres du Parti et de la haute administration, qui représentaient l’essentiel des voitures que l’on pouvait voir dans la capitale.

Aujourd’hui, ce pari chinois est largement perdu avec l’exemple le plus frappant de Volkswagen pour qui le marché chinois a longtemps été son premier marché mondial, avant même son marché domestique allemand. Le patron de Volkswagen, Oliver Blume, a publiquement annoncé en juillet la suppression de 100 000 emplois sur ses 660 000 employés dans le monde d’ici 2030, du fait principalement de la concurrence des véhicules électriques chinois. Déjà, ceux-ci envahissent les marchés mondiaux à des prix au moins 35 % moins chers que ceux de leurs concurrentes occidentales à qualité égale ou supérieure. La Chine compte près de 230 constructeurs automobiles employant 1,3 million d’ouvriers qui se livrent une concurrence acharnée pour survivre en réduisant au maximum les coûts de production de même que leurs marges. Les usines du géant BYD sont pour certaines presque entièrement robotisées et fonctionnent la nuit presque sans présence humaine. BYD construit en ce moment une méga-usine en Hongrie qui produira, à partir de la fin de cette année, des centaines de milliers de véhicules électriques par an sans craindre les sanctions commerciales ou les droits de douane puisque sa production sera localisée sur le sol de l’Union européenne. Pourquoi ce raz-de-marée ?

On le sait, depuis son arrivée au pouvoir en 2012, le président chinois Xi Jinping donne à la stabilité politique la priorité absolue sur l’économie. Mais comme la demande intérieure en Chine stagne depuis quelques années avec une hausse du chômage importante dont surtout celui des jeunes, l’économie s’essouffle au point que le doute s’installe et avec lui la consommation intérieure qui stagne. En période d’insécurité ou de doute, traditionnellement les Chinois épargnent pour faire face à de possibles lendemains difficiles. De ce fait, la surproduction industrielle est énorme en Chine et ne peut trouver de débouchés que sur les marchés extérieurs en exportant à prix cassés et en inondant les marchés mondiaux. La Chine est engagée dans un cercle vicieux où le régime doit absolument garantir un certain seuil de prospérité à sa population au risque sinon d’une instabilité sociale qu’il redoute. C’est là son « mandat du ciel » non écrit conclu avec la population : vous nous laissez conduire les affaires du pays en échange d’une prospérité minimale. Produire et exporter, même à perte, est de ce fait une nécessité absolue. »

L’article L’Occident face à la Chine : une défaite ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Over 30 national jurisdictions around the world have adopted a carbon tax. The tax rate is one of the key aspects of the design of carbon taxes, determining environmental effectiveness,
competitiveness, carbon leakage risks and revenue raised. This article sheds new light on the criteria countries use to set the tax rate in their domestic instruments. To do so, we first outline a taxonomy of criteria that governments can use in setting the tax rate and then provide a comparative analysis of the criteria actually used by 13 jurisdictions to set this rate.
We find that empirically driven criteria, such as marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) and the social cost of carbon (SCC), are rarely used to determine the tax rate. Few countries use
MACCs to set their carbon tax rate and such use is always combined with other criteria. Overall, carbon tax rates are mostly set based on evaluations that transcend purely empirical estimates. In addition, the Nobel Prize-winning idea of the SCC is not used in any documents published by the countries analysed, despite the fact that it can be adapted to suit political preferences. The common description of carbon taxes as instruments that primarily aim to internalise externalities does not reflect their implementation in practice. A corollary of this finding is that scholarship that criticises carbon taxes for embedding a cost-benefit analysis approach to climate policy simply condemns these instruments for being something they are not. Our analysis also indicates that emulation and competition play an important role in setting the tax rate, as governments copy price levels implemented in other jurisdictions or supranational carbon pricing instruments. This has implications for the design of carbon taxes in the current geopolitical situation, as changes in the tax rate in one jurisdiction may spill over into others.

Over 30 national jurisdictions around the world have adopted a carbon tax. The tax rate is one of the key aspects of the design of carbon taxes, determining environmental effectiveness,
competitiveness, carbon leakage risks and revenue raised. This article sheds new light on the criteria countries use to set the tax rate in their domestic instruments. To do so, we first outline a taxonomy of criteria that governments can use in setting the tax rate and then provide a comparative analysis of the criteria actually used by 13 jurisdictions to set this rate.
We find that empirically driven criteria, such as marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) and the social cost of carbon (SCC), are rarely used to determine the tax rate. Few countries use
MACCs to set their carbon tax rate and such use is always combined with other criteria. Overall, carbon tax rates are mostly set based on evaluations that transcend purely empirical estimates. In addition, the Nobel Prize-winning idea of the SCC is not used in any documents published by the countries analysed, despite the fact that it can be adapted to suit political preferences. The common description of carbon taxes as instruments that primarily aim to internalise externalities does not reflect their implementation in practice. A corollary of this finding is that scholarship that criticises carbon taxes for embedding a cost-benefit analysis approach to climate policy simply condemns these instruments for being something they are not. Our analysis also indicates that emulation and competition play an important role in setting the tax rate, as governments copy price levels implemented in other jurisdictions or supranational carbon pricing instruments. This has implications for the design of carbon taxes in the current geopolitical situation, as changes in the tax rate in one jurisdiction may spill over into others.

Over 30 national jurisdictions around the world have adopted a carbon tax. The tax rate is one of the key aspects of the design of carbon taxes, determining environmental effectiveness,
competitiveness, carbon leakage risks and revenue raised. This article sheds new light on the criteria countries use to set the tax rate in their domestic instruments. To do so, we first outline a taxonomy of criteria that governments can use in setting the tax rate and then provide a comparative analysis of the criteria actually used by 13 jurisdictions to set this rate.
We find that empirically driven criteria, such as marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) and the social cost of carbon (SCC), are rarely used to determine the tax rate. Few countries use
MACCs to set their carbon tax rate and such use is always combined with other criteria. Overall, carbon tax rates are mostly set based on evaluations that transcend purely empirical estimates. In addition, the Nobel Prize-winning idea of the SCC is not used in any documents published by the countries analysed, despite the fact that it can be adapted to suit political preferences. The common description of carbon taxes as instruments that primarily aim to internalise externalities does not reflect their implementation in practice. A corollary of this finding is that scholarship that criticises carbon taxes for embedding a cost-benefit analysis approach to climate policy simply condemns these instruments for being something they are not. Our analysis also indicates that emulation and competition play an important role in setting the tax rate, as governments copy price levels implemented in other jurisdictions or supranational carbon pricing instruments. This has implications for the design of carbon taxes in the current geopolitical situation, as changes in the tax rate in one jurisdiction may spill over into others.

Citizen participation, in various forms, has long played a part in African societies, with mixed results. In line with recent constitutional/decentralization reforms, Morocco and Kenya have shown political will and institutional commitment to invest more in participation. The chapter analyzes the two countries’ participatory approaches as a political agenda that is closely tied to decentralization politics and therewith to power plays between different stakeholders, including donors. Based on a comparison of the two cases, the chapter examines how the newly introduced spaces enable or disenable citizens to challenge power structures. The chapter finds that, despite positive effects in terms of citizen mobilization and partial accountability, the limited scope and scale of participatory institutions means that the outcomes of the approach are procedural rather than politically transformative. At the same time, the different trajectories of the two countries illustrate the importance of embedding the assessment of each case in the history of participatory practices and local political economy.

Citizen participation, in various forms, has long played a part in African societies, with mixed results. In line with recent constitutional/decentralization reforms, Morocco and Kenya have shown political will and institutional commitment to invest more in participation. The chapter analyzes the two countries’ participatory approaches as a political agenda that is closely tied to decentralization politics and therewith to power plays between different stakeholders, including donors. Based on a comparison of the two cases, the chapter examines how the newly introduced spaces enable or disenable citizens to challenge power structures. The chapter finds that, despite positive effects in terms of citizen mobilization and partial accountability, the limited scope and scale of participatory institutions means that the outcomes of the approach are procedural rather than politically transformative. At the same time, the different trajectories of the two countries illustrate the importance of embedding the assessment of each case in the history of participatory practices and local political economy.