This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
This paper assesses whether regional trade integration under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) can mitigate the economic and distributional impacts of climate-induced
agricultural productivity losses in Ethiopia. A recursive dynamic Computable General Equilibrium(CGE) model is applied, incorporating crop-specific yield projections under RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 climate scenarios alongside tariff reductions and trade facilitation reforms. Results show that AfCFTA generates modest but sustained gains: real GDP increases by 0.21-0.55 percent by 2035, with gains of over 5 percent relative to the initial level over the 2021-2035 projection period, while private consumption rises by 0.42-0.75 percent and imports expand by 1.80 percent. Sectoral outcomes indicate a climate-constrained structural transformation, with manufacturing and services expanding while the agriculture sector contracts, as the sector hardest hit by climate change. Trade liberalization accelerates labor reallocation toward less climate-sensitive sectors, boosting employment among unskilled and semi-skilled workers and progressively affecting welfare, with the poorest rural households experiencing the largest gains in consumption. Despite these benefits, AfCFTA only partially offsets climate impacts. Our findings highlight that trade integration can support resilience, food security, and structural change when complemented by targeted climate adaptation and industrial policies.
This paper assesses whether regional trade integration under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) can mitigate the economic and distributional impacts of climate-induced
agricultural productivity losses in Ethiopia. A recursive dynamic Computable General Equilibrium(CGE) model is applied, incorporating crop-specific yield projections under RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 climate scenarios alongside tariff reductions and trade facilitation reforms. Results show that AfCFTA generates modest but sustained gains: real GDP increases by 0.21-0.55 percent by 2035, with gains of over 5 percent relative to the initial level over the 2021-2035 projection period, while private consumption rises by 0.42-0.75 percent and imports expand by 1.80 percent. Sectoral outcomes indicate a climate-constrained structural transformation, with manufacturing and services expanding while the agriculture sector contracts, as the sector hardest hit by climate change. Trade liberalization accelerates labor reallocation toward less climate-sensitive sectors, boosting employment among unskilled and semi-skilled workers and progressively affecting welfare, with the poorest rural households experiencing the largest gains in consumption. Despite these benefits, AfCFTA only partially offsets climate impacts. Our findings highlight that trade integration can support resilience, food security, and structural change when complemented by targeted climate adaptation and industrial policies.
This paper assesses whether regional trade integration under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) can mitigate the economic and distributional impacts of climate-induced
agricultural productivity losses in Ethiopia. A recursive dynamic Computable General Equilibrium(CGE) model is applied, incorporating crop-specific yield projections under RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 climate scenarios alongside tariff reductions and trade facilitation reforms. Results show that AfCFTA generates modest but sustained gains: real GDP increases by 0.21-0.55 percent by 2035, with gains of over 5 percent relative to the initial level over the 2021-2035 projection period, while private consumption rises by 0.42-0.75 percent and imports expand by 1.80 percent. Sectoral outcomes indicate a climate-constrained structural transformation, with manufacturing and services expanding while the agriculture sector contracts, as the sector hardest hit by climate change. Trade liberalization accelerates labor reallocation toward less climate-sensitive sectors, boosting employment among unskilled and semi-skilled workers and progressively affecting welfare, with the poorest rural households experiencing the largest gains in consumption. Despite these benefits, AfCFTA only partially offsets climate impacts. Our findings highlight that trade integration can support resilience, food security, and structural change when complemented by targeted climate adaptation and industrial policies.
Ce 15 novembre, l’American Jewish Committee (AJC) a publié l’édition 2027 de La radiographie de l’antisémitisme en France, relayée par Le Parisien, déclarant que la société française était sujette à une vague massive et durable d’antisémitisme depuis les attentats du Hamas le 7 octobre en 2023. Certains commentateurs parlent de « nouvel antisémitisme » pour qualifier un phénomène qui serait d’après eux avant tout porté par la gauche radicale et les musulmans français, sur fond d’hostilité à Israël.
Pourtant, la montée de l’antisémitisme est loin d’être nouvelle. Elle ressurgit dès la fin des années 1970 avec la négation de la Shoah par l’extrême-droite. Aujourd’hui, la haine des juifs demeure très implantée au sein de ce camp politique, bien que l’attention médiatique et politique pointe généralement du doigt la gauche. La confusion régulièrement alimentée entre critique d’Israël et antisémitisme brouille par ailleurs la compréhension des mutations que connait l’antisémitisme contemporain.
Comment interpréter les chiffres décrivant une montée de l’antisémitisme ? Existe-t-il un « nouvel antisémitisme » aux ressorts et causes différents de celui qui existait au XIXe et XXe siècles ? Comment expliquer le silence des médias et du gouvernement sur l’antisémitisme d’extrême-droite ? Ces enjeux soulèvent plus largement la question de la place laissée au débat intellectuel en France : les sciences sociales ont-elles encore un impact sur les décisions politiques ?
Autant d’enjeux abordés avec Michel Wieviorka, sociologue et directeur d’études émérite à l’EHESS.
L’article Un nouvel antisémitisme ? Avec Michel Wieviorka est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
Die Abteilung Forschungsinfrastruktur (FI) umfasst die Servicebereiche Informationstechnik (IT) und Bibliothek sowie den Service- und Forschungsbereich Forschungsdatenmanagement (FDM). Die Forschungsinfrastruktur ist Impulsgeber für innovative datengetriebene empirische Forschung am DIW Berlin innerhalb der Leibniz-Gemeinschaft. Die Hauptaufgabe der Abteilung ist die Erbringung von internen Dienstleistungen sowie die öffentliche Bereitstellung von Forschungsdaten in Forschungsdatenzentren wie dem Forschungsdatenzentrum Betriebs- und Organisationsdaten (FDZ-BO) gemäß den FAIR-Prinzipien, der Leibniz-Leitlinie Forschungsdaten und der DIW Data Policy.
Zusätzlich werden Forschungs- und Entwicklungsaktivitäten durchgeführt, um das FI-Dienstleistungsportfolio kontinuierlich weiterzuentwickeln und zusätzliche Datenquellen zu erschließen.
Zum 01.01.2027 suchen wir für ein Projekt im Bereich Forschungsdatenmanagement (FDM) eine*n Wissenschaftler*in (w/m/div) (befristet für 2 Jahre/ Teilzeit, 75 %).
Diese Stelle ist nicht zur wissenschaftlichen Qualifizierung gemäß § 2 (1) WissZeitVG geeignet.
Dans la nuit du 2 au 3 novembre 2026, la Banque centrale du Paraguay (BCP) a placé sous tutelle la banque numérique Ueno Bank pour insolvabilité, gelant les dépôts financiers de près de trois millions de clients, soit près de la moitié de la population. Très populaire grâce à des offres promotionnelles alléchantes, la banque avait réussi à capter 850 millions de dollars de fonds publics grâce à ses liens étroits avec le pouvoir exécutif. Cette affaire entraîna dans sa chute le président Santiago Peña, qui détenait des actions dans la société mère. Face aux importantes mobilisations de la population à Asunción, Santiago Peña présente sa démission le 5 novembre. Le Parlement l’a toutefois rejetée, préférant engager directement une procédure de destitution à son encontre. Ce scandale politico-financier interroge alors sur comment naissent et se reproduisent des sociétés oligarchiques qui mettent en péril, sont capables de mettre en péril l’ensemble d’une société sur le plan économique pour servir leurs propres intérêts.
Quelle est l’origine de ce scandale ? Au-delà des frontières du Paraguay, quelles sont les ramifications internationales de l’affaire Ueno Bank ? Enfin, que révèle cette crise sur les relations entre le pouvoir politique et les milieux financiers ?
Nouvelle chronique de l’Amérique latine avec Christophe Ventura, directeur de recherche à l’IRIS et responsable du Programme Amérique latine/Caraïbe.
L’article Paraguay : scandale politico-financier Ueno Bank est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
Chaque mardi, Pascal Boniface reçoit un membre de l’équipe de recherche de l’IRIS pour décrypter un fait d’actualité internationale. Aujourd’hui, échange avec Alexandre Roussel, chercheur à l’IRIS, autour des menaces qui pèsent sur le système alimentaire mondial. Déjà fragilisé par les perturbations du marché des engrais liées au conflit autour du détroit d’Ormuz et par les frappes militaires visant les ports d’exportation en mer Noire dans le contexte de la guerre russo-ukrainienne, celui-ci pourrait subir de nouvelles pressions avec le phénomène climatique El Niño.
L’article Vers une crise alimentaire majeure ? | Les mardis de l’IRIS est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
This report analyses how Argentina and Uruguay are navigating the early stages of developing a low-emission hydrogen (LEH2) economy under conditions of high technological, economic and political uncertainty. Based on extensive fieldwork conducted in early 2024 – including 75 expert interviews and a focus group – the study examines stakeholder perceptions, national strategies, governance challenges and opportunities for value creation in both countries. The research “focuses on the question of how the main actors and stakeholders in the hydrogen economy perceive the uncertainties related to it” and how policy and international cooperation can support constructive action. As the landscape for the international roll-out of hydrogen has changed significantly – with support measures also being adapted – it is important to better understand how stakeholders in the Global South view their prospects and what concerns they have. This study can make an important contribution in this regard. The interviews were prepared, conducted and analysed by a trilateral research team. The three institutional partners were the Universidad Nacional de Quilmes in Argentina, Universidad de la República in Uruguay and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). Senior researchers from Universidad Nacional de Quilmes and IDOS led the project, and the core research team comprised junior researchers from the partner institutions. The partners jointly designed the research project, arranged and conducted the interviews, and evaluated the findings and developed policy recommendations. Globally, hydrogen demand is rising, yet the ramp-up of LEH2 remains slow. Only 1% of global hydrogen is currently low-emission, and “the overall proportion of projects with final investment decision reached not more than 7%” of the expected production volumes by 2023. Persistently high producer prices and complex regulations (mainly at the level of the European Union) are seen as major obstacles to accelerating the roll-out of the hydrogen economy. This could change as a result of new technologies and regulatory reforms, but it is still unclear whether and when this will happen. Both Argentina and Uruguay therefore face a shifting environment: uncertain international markets, evolving certification rules and volatile investment conditions.
Argentina possesses substantial natural resources and industrial capabilities – excellent wind and solar resources for green hydrogen, major gas reserves for blue hydrogen and an established nuclear sector that could support pink hydrogen production. Its 2023 National Hydrogen Strategy envisioned integrated value chains, export markets and up to 82,000 jobs by 2050. However, the political shift in 2023 introduced institutional instability. The new government prioritises deregulation and an investment regime that offers incentives “without conditionality” and removes local content requirements. Stakeholders highlighted macro-economic volatility, grid bottlenecks and social and environmental concerns – especially water scarcity and community acceptance in Patagonia – as major barriers.
Uruguay, by contrast, benefits from long-term political consensus and a highly successful renewable energy transition, with renewables accounting for 98% of electricity generation. Its Green Hydrogen Roadmap (2022) outlines phased development towards 2040, supported by pilot projects such as H24U and Kahirós. Uruguay’s competitive advantages include strong institutions, highly complementary wind and solar resources and port access. Yet large-scale projects face increasing scrutiny: Environmental authorities have delayed major proposals (e.g. Enertrag’s Tambores project) due to concerns over water use, biodiversity and social licence. In both countries, stakeholders saw export demand – especially from Europe and Asia – as the primary driver of low-emission hydrogen development. Domestic markets remain small but relevant for learning and early deployment. Opportunities for local value creation exist in engineering services; renewable energy infrastructure; carbon capture, utilisation and storage; and niche eletrolyser development, but require targeted industrial policy and investment in research and development. The report concludes that the slowdown in global hydrogen development demands realistic, “no-regret” strategies: strengthening research cooperation, developing small-scale pilot projects for domestic markets, improving environmental governance and enhancing regional collaboration (e.g. through CertHiLAC, the Clean Hydrogen and Low Emissions Certification System in Latin America and the Caribbean, the emerging Latin American certification scheme). Transparent communication, early community engagement and co-benefits for local populations are essential to avoid stranded assets and secure social legitimacy for the hydrogen transition. While this conclusion is valid for many interventions supporting the sustainability transition, it is particularly relevant to the scale-up of hydrogen production, as unrealistically high expectations have long been promoted, including by Germany as a potential buyer in its engagement with potential exporters such as Argentina and Uruguay.
Verónica Robert is a senior researcher at CONICET and a professor at the National University of San Martín (UNSAM) in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Paula Prados is a professor and senior researcher at the National University of San Martín, and a specialist in Knowledge and Innovation Economy.
Guido Bambini and Guido Perrone are researchers at the Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Argentina. Fernanda Muniz is affiliated with the Universidad de la República, Uruguay.
Aaron Haas, Rebecca Rohe and Paulina Wende were postgraduate research fellows in the 59th Postgraduate Programme for Sustainability Cooperation at IDOS.
This report analyses how Argentina and Uruguay are navigating the early stages of developing a low-emission hydrogen (LEH2) economy under conditions of high technological, economic and political uncertainty. Based on extensive fieldwork conducted in early 2024 – including 75 expert interviews and a focus group – the study examines stakeholder perceptions, national strategies, governance challenges and opportunities for value creation in both countries. The research “focuses on the question of how the main actors and stakeholders in the hydrogen economy perceive the uncertainties related to it” and how policy and international cooperation can support constructive action. As the landscape for the international roll-out of hydrogen has changed significantly – with support measures also being adapted – it is important to better understand how stakeholders in the Global South view their prospects and what concerns they have. This study can make an important contribution in this regard. The interviews were prepared, conducted and analysed by a trilateral research team. The three institutional partners were the Universidad Nacional de Quilmes in Argentina, Universidad de la República in Uruguay and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). Senior researchers from Universidad Nacional de Quilmes and IDOS led the project, and the core research team comprised junior researchers from the partner institutions. The partners jointly designed the research project, arranged and conducted the interviews, and evaluated the findings and developed policy recommendations. Globally, hydrogen demand is rising, yet the ramp-up of LEH2 remains slow. Only 1% of global hydrogen is currently low-emission, and “the overall proportion of projects with final investment decision reached not more than 7%” of the expected production volumes by 2023. Persistently high producer prices and complex regulations (mainly at the level of the European Union) are seen as major obstacles to accelerating the roll-out of the hydrogen economy. This could change as a result of new technologies and regulatory reforms, but it is still unclear whether and when this will happen. Both Argentina and Uruguay therefore face a shifting environment: uncertain international markets, evolving certification rules and volatile investment conditions.
Argentina possesses substantial natural resources and industrial capabilities – excellent wind and solar resources for green hydrogen, major gas reserves for blue hydrogen and an established nuclear sector that could support pink hydrogen production. Its 2023 National Hydrogen Strategy envisioned integrated value chains, export markets and up to 82,000 jobs by 2050. However, the political shift in 2023 introduced institutional instability. The new government prioritises deregulation and an investment regime that offers incentives “without conditionality” and removes local content requirements. Stakeholders highlighted macro-economic volatility, grid bottlenecks and social and environmental concerns – especially water scarcity and community acceptance in Patagonia – as major barriers.
Uruguay, by contrast, benefits from long-term political consensus and a highly successful renewable energy transition, with renewables accounting for 98% of electricity generation. Its Green Hydrogen Roadmap (2022) outlines phased development towards 2040, supported by pilot projects such as H24U and Kahirós. Uruguay’s competitive advantages include strong institutions, highly complementary wind and solar resources and port access. Yet large-scale projects face increasing scrutiny: Environmental authorities have delayed major proposals (e.g. Enertrag’s Tambores project) due to concerns over water use, biodiversity and social licence. In both countries, stakeholders saw export demand – especially from Europe and Asia – as the primary driver of low-emission hydrogen development. Domestic markets remain small but relevant for learning and early deployment. Opportunities for local value creation exist in engineering services; renewable energy infrastructure; carbon capture, utilisation and storage; and niche eletrolyser development, but require targeted industrial policy and investment in research and development. The report concludes that the slowdown in global hydrogen development demands realistic, “no-regret” strategies: strengthening research cooperation, developing small-scale pilot projects for domestic markets, improving environmental governance and enhancing regional collaboration (e.g. through CertHiLAC, the Clean Hydrogen and Low Emissions Certification System in Latin America and the Caribbean, the emerging Latin American certification scheme). Transparent communication, early community engagement and co-benefits for local populations are essential to avoid stranded assets and secure social legitimacy for the hydrogen transition. While this conclusion is valid for many interventions supporting the sustainability transition, it is particularly relevant to the scale-up of hydrogen production, as unrealistically high expectations have long been promoted, including by Germany as a potential buyer in its engagement with potential exporters such as Argentina and Uruguay.
Verónica Robert is a senior researcher at CONICET and a professor at the National University of San Martín (UNSAM) in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Paula Prados is a professor and senior researcher at the National University of San Martín, and a specialist in Knowledge and Innovation Economy.
Guido Bambini and Guido Perrone are researchers at the Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Argentina. Fernanda Muniz is affiliated with the Universidad de la República, Uruguay.
Aaron Haas, Rebecca Rohe and Paulina Wende were postgraduate research fellows in the 59th Postgraduate Programme for Sustainability Cooperation at IDOS.
This report analyses how Argentina and Uruguay are navigating the early stages of developing a low-emission hydrogen (LEH2) economy under conditions of high technological, economic and political uncertainty. Based on extensive fieldwork conducted in early 2024 – including 75 expert interviews and a focus group – the study examines stakeholder perceptions, national strategies, governance challenges and opportunities for value creation in both countries. The research “focuses on the question of how the main actors and stakeholders in the hydrogen economy perceive the uncertainties related to it” and how policy and international cooperation can support constructive action. As the landscape for the international roll-out of hydrogen has changed significantly – with support measures also being adapted – it is important to better understand how stakeholders in the Global South view their prospects and what concerns they have. This study can make an important contribution in this regard. The interviews were prepared, conducted and analysed by a trilateral research team. The three institutional partners were the Universidad Nacional de Quilmes in Argentina, Universidad de la República in Uruguay and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). Senior researchers from Universidad Nacional de Quilmes and IDOS led the project, and the core research team comprised junior researchers from the partner institutions. The partners jointly designed the research project, arranged and conducted the interviews, and evaluated the findings and developed policy recommendations. Globally, hydrogen demand is rising, yet the ramp-up of LEH2 remains slow. Only 1% of global hydrogen is currently low-emission, and “the overall proportion of projects with final investment decision reached not more than 7%” of the expected production volumes by 2023. Persistently high producer prices and complex regulations (mainly at the level of the European Union) are seen as major obstacles to accelerating the roll-out of the hydrogen economy. This could change as a result of new technologies and regulatory reforms, but it is still unclear whether and when this will happen. Both Argentina and Uruguay therefore face a shifting environment: uncertain international markets, evolving certification rules and volatile investment conditions.
Argentina possesses substantial natural resources and industrial capabilities – excellent wind and solar resources for green hydrogen, major gas reserves for blue hydrogen and an established nuclear sector that could support pink hydrogen production. Its 2023 National Hydrogen Strategy envisioned integrated value chains, export markets and up to 82,000 jobs by 2050. However, the political shift in 2023 introduced institutional instability. The new government prioritises deregulation and an investment regime that offers incentives “without conditionality” and removes local content requirements. Stakeholders highlighted macro-economic volatility, grid bottlenecks and social and environmental concerns – especially water scarcity and community acceptance in Patagonia – as major barriers.
Uruguay, by contrast, benefits from long-term political consensus and a highly successful renewable energy transition, with renewables accounting for 98% of electricity generation. Its Green Hydrogen Roadmap (2022) outlines phased development towards 2040, supported by pilot projects such as H24U and Kahirós. Uruguay’s competitive advantages include strong institutions, highly complementary wind and solar resources and port access. Yet large-scale projects face increasing scrutiny: Environmental authorities have delayed major proposals (e.g. Enertrag’s Tambores project) due to concerns over water use, biodiversity and social licence. In both countries, stakeholders saw export demand – especially from Europe and Asia – as the primary driver of low-emission hydrogen development. Domestic markets remain small but relevant for learning and early deployment. Opportunities for local value creation exist in engineering services; renewable energy infrastructure; carbon capture, utilisation and storage; and niche eletrolyser development, but require targeted industrial policy and investment in research and development. The report concludes that the slowdown in global hydrogen development demands realistic, “no-regret” strategies: strengthening research cooperation, developing small-scale pilot projects for domestic markets, improving environmental governance and enhancing regional collaboration (e.g. through CertHiLAC, the Clean Hydrogen and Low Emissions Certification System in Latin America and the Caribbean, the emerging Latin American certification scheme). Transparent communication, early community engagement and co-benefits for local populations are essential to avoid stranded assets and secure social legitimacy for the hydrogen transition. While this conclusion is valid for many interventions supporting the sustainability transition, it is particularly relevant to the scale-up of hydrogen production, as unrealistically high expectations have long been promoted, including by Germany as a potential buyer in its engagement with potential exporters such as Argentina and Uruguay.
Verónica Robert is a senior researcher at CONICET and a professor at the National University of San Martín (UNSAM) in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Paula Prados is a professor and senior researcher at the National University of San Martín, and a specialist in Knowledge and Innovation Economy.
Guido Bambini and Guido Perrone are researchers at the Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Argentina. Fernanda Muniz is affiliated with the Universidad de la República, Uruguay.
Aaron Haas, Rebecca Rohe and Paulina Wende were postgraduate research fellows in the 59th Postgraduate Programme for Sustainability Cooperation at IDOS.