Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Le retour de Donald Trump à la Maison-Blanche, dont la politique étrangère est caractérisée par l’unilatéralisme et l’imprévisibilité, pourraient entrainer un certain nombre de bouleversements en Amérique latine. La probable nomination à la tête de la diplomatie américaine de Marco Rubio, fermement anti-communiste, pourrait avoir des répercussions importantes pour les régimes de gauche opposés aux États-Unis (Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba) mais aussi pour les pays de centre-gauche comme le Brésil de Lula, tandis que les gouvernements de droite, à commencer par l’Argentine de Javier Milei, pourraient voir leur assise se renforcer. Le protectionnisme promu par Donald Trump pourrait également impacter le Mexique, premier partenaire commercial des États-Unis, tandis que le durcissement de la politique migratoire et les expulsions de masse auront des repercussions certaines sur les sociétés centre-américaines et caribéennes, d’où les flux de migration proviennent majoritairement.

Pascal Boniface · Une gouvernance mondiale en crise. Avec Anne-Cécile Robert | Entretiens géopo

Alors que le conflit syrien stagne depuis quelques années sans qu’aucune force de l’opposition au gouvernement n’émerge, le régime de Bachar Al-Assad est parvenu à s’imposer à nouveau comme le seul interlocuteur crédible pour la diplomatie internationale. Cette situation a permis au régime de se focaliser non plus sur sa survie, mais sur sa normalisation auprès d’États lui ayant été hostiles dans le passé, en atteste sa réintégration dans la Ligue des États arabes le 7 mai 2023. Reconnaissant la pérennité du régime, plusieurs États arabes ont souhaité renouer le dialogue avec le dirigeant syrien en espérant influer sur certains dossiers stratégiques, tels que l’emprise de l’Iran et le trafic de captagon. Les résultats restent pour le moment maigres : seules quelques actions concrètes ont pu voir le jour malgré de nombreuses rencontres officielles.

Cette absence de collaborations avec le régime reflète l’impuissance des diplomaties arabes qui peinent à proposer des contreparties attractives au régime syrien, tout en révélant un obstacle fondamental : l’internationalisation du conflit et les sanctions envers le régime qui en découlent.

Ainsi, les promesses d’investissements avancées par les États arabes, nécessaires à la reconstruction du pays se heurtent aux sanctions internationales, particulièrement celles des États-Unis. À travers son son projet de Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act of 2023, complétant le Caesar Act de 2019, l’administration états-unienne a souhaité ajouter des dispositions pour bloquer les efforts de normalisation avec le régime syrien, en sanctionnant tout individu ou entité collaborants avec ce dernier. Le retour de Donald Trump à la Maison-Blanche ne laisse présager aucun changement de politique pour le moment et le maintien de ces sanctions, qui touchent principalement la population civile, ne fait qu’entretenir le statu quo actuel.

Dans ce contexte, quels sont les partisans de la normalisation avec le régime syrien en au sein de l’Europe ? Quelles sont leurs motivations et les limites de leurs approches ?

Quels pays européens se montrent favorables à une normalisation avec le régime de Bachar Al-Assad ? Comment le gouvernement italien compte-t-il influencer l’approche européenne ?

L’Union européenne a globalement soutenu la politique états-unienne et n’a cessé de rappeler la nécessité d’un processus politique conformément à la résolution 2254 du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU, notamment à l’occasion de l’aide apportée à la Syrie lors des séismes des 5 et 6 février 2023.

Toutefois, certains États membres ont exprimé leur soutien à un rapprochement avec le régime syrien, essentiellement dans le but de lutter contre l’afflux de réfugiés. Parmi eux, le gouvernement italien se démarque et pourrait jouer un rôle moteur dans ce processus de normalisation. Le 20 septembre 2024, l’Italie a quitté le groupe de l’ONU chargé de surveiller les abus en matière de droits de l’homme en Syrie. Ce geste discret témoigne de la volonté du gouvernement italien de ne plus participer à la critique du régime, afin de pouvoir entamer un rapprochement avec celui-ci. En juillet 2024, l’Italie avait déjà pris des mesures en ce sens en nommant un chef de mission permanent à Damas, avec pour objectif de repenser la stratégie de l’Italie envers la Syrie.Ces initiatives s’inscrivent dans la stratégie de Giorgia Meloni, présidente du Conseil des ministres italienne, cherchant à inciter les pays de l’Union européenne à conclure des accords avec les pays d’origine ou de transit des migrants. Le gouvernement italien agit en établissant des coalitions avec d’autres pays pour créer un mouvement susceptible de faire évoluer les positions des institutions européennes. Dans cette logique, le ministre italien des Affaires étrangères, Antonio Tanjini, accompagné de ses homologues de sept autres pays (Autriche, Croatie, Chypre, République tchèque, Grèce, Slovaquie et Slovénie), a exprimé en juillet 2024 sa volonté de réengager le dialogue avec Bachar Al-Assad. En s’adressant à Josep Borrell, haut représentant de l’Union pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité, les ministres ont proposé de s’engager envers la Syrie pour créer des « conditions de vie décentes » favorisant un « retour volontaire » des réfugiés.

Plus largement, la stratégie du gouvernement Meloni reçoit un certain soutien au sein de l’Union européenne. Alberto Núñez Feijóo, leader du Partido Popular en Espagne, a par exemple exprimé son soutien à « l’approche italienne envers l’immigration ». La montée des partis souhaitant lutter contre l’immigration pourrait ainsi renforcer cette tendance, marquant une rupture avec la politique de sanction. En dehors de l’Union, le Premier ministre britannique Keir Starmer, semble également favorable à l’approche italienne vis-à-vis de l’immigration, son gouvernement étant enclin à parvenir à un accord avec la Syrie ce qui pourrait contribuer à une dynamique plus globale en faveur du régime de Bachar Al-Assad.

Quelles sont les limites politiques au projet du retour des réfugiés en Syrie ? Pourquoi est-ce que la politique européenne ne répond pas de manière adéquate à la crise syrienne ?

Ces approches centrées sur la question des réfugiés soulèvent des interrogations morales et stratégiques.

Selon la commissaire Hanny Megally, le retour des réfugiés en Syrie n’est toujours pas envisageable dans les conditions actuelles en septembre 2024. En liant les « conditions de vie décentes » au retour des réfugiés, les partisans de la normalisation négligent les raisons politiques et sécuritaires qui poussent à l’exil. Par ailleurs, l’expansion de la guerre à Gaza au Liban a engendré un scénario inattendu : le retour de réfugiés syriens du Liban vers la Syrie, un argument qui permet au régime syrien de présenter un narratif rassurant quant à la sécurité de son pays, un atout dans ses efforts de normalisation.

Sur le plan stratégique, cette crise illustre les défis posés par la gestion des flux migratoires en situation de conflit. Ces flux sont difficiles à contenir et donnent lieu à des abus dans les pays d’accueil. Selon l’ONG Human Rights Watch, les Syriens en Turquie sont victimes de traitements illégaux, tels que la détention et la conduite de forces vers la frontière. Ces mesures vont donc à l’encontre du principe de « non-refoulement » de la Convention de 1951 relative au statut des réfugiés, qui interdit aux États de renvoyer un individu vers des territoires où il serait en danger. L’utilisation de pays tiers par l’Union européenne, principalement la Turquie, n’a alors pas porté ses fruits, et les tensions autour des réfugiés dans les pays proches, comme le Liban, limitent les options pour restreindre leur arrivée en Europe.

En n’imposant pas de conditions claires pour renouer le dialogue avec Bachar Al-Assad, les États européens ne parviennent pas à offrir des perspectives de sortie de crise au peuple syrien. Dans la mesure où les risques de persécutions persistent, les réfugiés syriens resteront nécessairement hostiles à tout retour. Ces approches sont surtout motivées par des enjeux de politiques internes à ces pays et négligent la complexité de la crise syrienne.

La question de la normalisation avec la Syrie témoigne des ambivalences de la politique étrangère européenne qui ne parvient pas à mettre en œuvre une  position commune et peine à proposer des alternatives constructives.

Que ce soit en maintenant les sanctions ou en renouant le dialogue avec le régime, ces stratégies ne laissent pas présager un changement de nature du pouvoir, qui reste dangereux pour une majorité de la population. Ici, il est essentiel de comprendre la perspective du dirigeant syrien, pour qui le contrôle de la majorité du territoire et la survie de son régime sont prioritaires et ne nécessitent pas de concessions ou de retour des réfugiés.

• The key objective of the smart specialisation strategy is to mobilise research and innovation at regional level, focusing on existing potential, enhancing economic diversification and creating a comparative advantage.
• It was implemented at the European level for the first time during the 2014-2020 programming period with the mobilisation and active participation of national and regional authorities in the development and implementation of the strategy at its core.
• The research and development environment in Greece was already unfavourable both due to structural weaknesses and because of the deep economic crisis.
• The country’s institutional framework both in the management of the NSRF in general and in the management of the Smart Specialisation Strategy in particular was the main weakness that prevented the effective implementation of the strategy, with delays and lack of coordination between stakeholders.
• Despite the difficulties, Greece has managed to improve its performance with respect to the European innovation indicators, but has not managed to reach the European average.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy paper by by Pery Bazoti, PhD candidate, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.

 

Mathilde Jourde, chercheuse à l’IRIS au sein du Programme Climat, énergie et sécurité, répond à nos questions sur les possibles conflits liés à l’eau dans le contexte des changements climatiques.

– Quelles sont les différentes interactions entre eau et conflits ?
– Dans quelle mesure l’eau est-elle facteur de tensions au sein de conflits transnationaux ?
– À l’échelle intranationale, quels sont les enjeux hydriques en termes de conflictualités ?

Lire la note
Lire la synthèse

Cela fait moins de deux semaines que Donald Trump a été élu président. Son équipe de transition a lancé ses travaux à la vitesse de la lumière. Quelques jours seulement après la fin de la campagne, Trump avait déjà annoncé bon nombre de ses principales nominations au cabinet, et même certaines nominations à des postes importants mais secondaires. Le contraste entre cette transition et celle d’après les élections de 2016 ne pourrait être plus prononcé.

Les premiers mois d’un mandat présidentiel sont souvent les plus productifs, en particulier si le parti du président contrôle le Congrès. Il peut y avoir une certaine période de lune de miel pour les nouveaux dirigeants, et les leaders efficaces savent qu’il faut en profiter. Plus tard dans le mandat, des crises se produisent, une opposition se forme, le président prend presque invariablement une raclée aux élections de mi-mandat, perdant peut-être sa majorité dans l’une ou les deux chambres. Le moment d’agir est le premier jour.

C’est pourquoi la transition, c’est-à-dire cette période crépusculaire entre les élections début novembre et l’investiture du nouveau président le 20 janvier, est essentielle. C’est le moment pour un président élu de se concentrer sur la constitution d’une équipe cohérente et idéologiquement unifiée, l’élaboration d’options concrètes conçues pour mettre en pratique ses promesses de campagne, et le renforcement du soutien pour ses candidats et ses propositions politiques au Congrès. Un président élu qui gère efficacement la transition a une énorme longueur d’avance le jour où il arrive dans le Bureau ovale. Étant donnée l’importance de cette alternance, la loi américaine prévoit un financement gouvernemental et des bureaux pour les équipes de transition.

La première transition de Trump à la fin de 2016 a été désastreuse, et les effets de cette transition mal préparée se sont répercutés sur sa présidence. Trump a d’abord nommé l’ancien gouverneur du New Jersey, Chris Christie, à la tête de son équipe de transition. Christie a connu un départ lent, et avait quelques difficultés politiques, et Trump l’a licencié quelques jours seulement après le début de la transition. Christie a décrit plus tard la nouvelle équipe comme jetant littéralement à la poubelle les mois de travail que lui et ses collègues avaient préparés. Après le remplacement de Christie par le vice-président élu Pence, trois des enfants de Trump, dont aucun n’avait d’expérience de gouvernement, ont assumé des rôles clés dans le vetting des candidats pour la nouvelle administration. Trump lui-même s’est apparemment peu intéressé aux rouages de la planification de la transition. Souvent, il ne connaissait pas bien les personnes qu’il avait nommées et avait peu d’idée de leurs positions politiques. À la suite de ce processus chaotique, Trump s’est retrouvé, sans surprise, avec une série de choix au sein du cabinet et de la Maison-Blanche qui l’ont constamment déçu. Qu’il s’agisse d’un Attorney General qui a refusé d’annuler les enquêtes sur l’ingérence russe dans son élection ou de secrétaires d’État et de la Défense qui ont plaidé en faveur de politiques auxquelles Trump s’opposait, comme l’accord nucléaire iranien, Trump s’est souvent retrouvé dans les premières années de sa présidence bloqué ou opposé par ses propres représentants. Et il a découvert que même un Congrès contrôlé par les républicains pouvait faire preuve d’une indépendance surprenante.

Si l’on se fie aux deux dernières semaines, Trump a tiré de précieuses leçons de cette expérience. Parmi eux :

Agissez rapidement. Étonnamment tôt dans la transition, Trump a déjà désigné des candidats pour les postes clés du cabinet : secrétaire d’État, Défense, Sécurité intérieure, Intérieur, Santé et Services sociaux, Justice, directeur du renseignement national, directeur de la CIA, ambassadeur des États-Unis à l’ONU. Il a déjà nommé des membres clés du personnel de la Maison-Blanche.  Il a même décidé des nominations à des postes secondaires mais influents qui auront un impact sur son agenda, ambassadeur en Israël ou l’Agence de protection de l’environnement par exemple. Le fait que ces dirigeants de l’administration soient déjà identifiés leur laisse deux mois pour se familiariser avec leurs agences, élaborer des propositions politiques avec l’équipe Trump, et faire du lobbying avec le Congrès. Contrairement à la dernière fois, ces personnes seront préparées, et en phase avec Trump, le jour de l’investiture.

Nommez des personnes que vous connaissez, d’une loyauté sans faille. En 2016, Trump a parfois fait ses choix avec peu d’information ou suivant des suggestions d’autres personnes. Trump aimait l’idée de voir un ancien chef d’entreprise comme lui, par exemple, prenne la tête du State Department, mais il a apparemment nommé Rex Tillerson au poste de secrétaire d’État en grande partie sur la base des recommandations d’experts républicains comme Condoleezza Rice et Robert Gates. Une fois Tillerson à Foggy Bottom, cependant, il était de plus en plus clair qu’il y avait beaucoup de lumière entre eux – même lorsqu’il était encore dans son gouvernement Tillerson a qualifié Trump de « crétin » – et Trump l’a licencié par tweet seulement un an environ après son entrée en fonction. Maintenant, Trump a choisi des personnes qu’il connaît et avec lesquelles il a travaillé… Et qui lui ont personnellement démontré leur fidélité. Certains de ses candidats, comme Marco Rubio ou Elise Stefanik, étaient autrefois des républicains traditionnels, mais sont depuis passés à un soutien total et inconditionnel à Trump et aux politiques MAGA. Beaucoup d’autres doivent toute leur carrière à Trump, ou ont au moins été catapultés par Trump de rôles au Congrès ou dans la politique de l’État sous les projecteurs nationaux. Une expérience pertinente en matière de politique ou de gouvernance est facultative pour les personnes nommées par Trump ; la fidélité à Trump ne l’est pas. Le choix de Trump pour le poste de secrétaire à la Défense – l’homme qui supervisera près de 3 millions de militaires et de civils et un budget de 842 milliards de dollars – n’a essentiellement aucune préparation pour ce poste. Les seules qualifications de Pete Hegseth sont son service en tant qu’officier relativement subalterne dans la Garde nationale de l’armée et sa longue et très amicale relation avec Trump en tant que commentateur de Fox News.

Utilisez les choix du cabinet pour faire valoir un point politique, avec éclat. En 2016, certaines des nominations les plus importantes de Trump, en particulier en politique étrangère, ont été choisis parmi un groupe standard d’experts républicains du Congrès, de l’armée ou du monde des affaires. Il s’agissait souvent de personnes dont la politique était conservatrice, mais relativement conventionnelle, et qui n’était pas toujours en phase avec les approches idiosyncrasiques de Trump.  Cette fois-ci, Trump a fait des nominations spectaculaires qui s’inscrivent pleinement dans sa rhétorique incendiaire. Son choix de Matt Gaetz, l’un des membres les plus violemment pro-Trump du Congrès, en tête du Département de Justice, par exemple, envoie un message clair comme de l’eau de roche : son ministère mettra fin à toute enquête sur Trump et ses alliés et s’intéressera plutôt à ses adversaires. Le choix de Robert Kennedy Jr. – un célèbre théoricien du complot et anti-vaxxer – à la tête de la santé et des services sociaux est une attaque dramatique contre une agence si notablement en désaccord avec Trump sur le Covid-19 au cours de sa première administration. Cette nomination et d’autres font valoir un point politique qui ne sera pas perdu pour son électorat ou son parti.

Assurez-vous que le processus de confirmation n’entrave pas vos candidats. Trump a maintenant compris qu’un processus de confirmation sans heurts au Sénat pour ses candidats est essentiel. De nombreux postes importants nécessitaient l’approbation du Sénat avant de pouvoir aller de l’avant. Malgré le contrôle du Sénat par son parti, les nominations d’un président ne sont parfois pas acceptées ou font l’objet d’un examen minutieux que le président préférerait éviter.  Certaines des nominations les plus controversées de Trump – Gaetz et Kennedy en premier lieu – pourraient rencontrer des difficultés au cours du processus de confirmation, même avec un Sénat très amical. Il a donc appelé le Sénat à prendre immédiatement ses vacances après l’investiture.  Cela lui permettra de faire des recess appointments, qui ne nécessitent pas la confirmation du Sénat. En vertu de la Constitution, ces nominations sont valables jusqu’à la fin de la session suivante du Sénat. Il n’est pas encore clair que le Sénat acceptera cette abdication de ses responsabilités de surveillance, mais Trump exerce un pouvoir énorme dans le caucus républicain, donc ce n’est pas impensable.

Gardez le Congrès de son côté. Au début de son premier mandat, Trump semblait supposer que les membres républicains du Congrès resteraient loyaux, à un homme et à une femme. Bien qu’un Congrès contrôlé par les républicains à son avènement ait adopté une grande partie de son programme, cela n’a pas toujours été le cas. Et à certains des moments les plus tendus de sa présidence, lors de ses impeachments par exemple ou lors de la certification de la victoire de Joe Biden en 2020, des membres républicains du Congrès ont osé s’opposer à lui. Cette fois, Trump a agi très rapidement pour affirmer sa domination sur son parti au Congrès. Il a été particulièrement impliqué dans le choix du chef de la majorité au Sénat. Mitch McConnell, le dernier dirigeant républicain, était un stratège parlementaire exceptionnel mais avait une relation parfois difficile avec Trump. Trump voulait son propre homme. Ici, il n’a pas entièrement réussi, le Sénat ayant choisi le vétéran républicain John Thune pour être à la tête du Sénat plutôt que le loyaliste de Trump, Rick Scott.



The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for October 2024.

On October 5, 2024, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis held a working breakfast at his residence in Chania with a group of Republican US Senators who participate, among others, in the Committees on Appropriations, Intelligence and Energy of the United States Senate. The meeting was also attended by the Minister of National Defence Nikos Dendias, while the US side was represented by Senators Jerry Moran (Kan.), Susan Collins (ME), John Boozman (AR), John Cornyn (TX), John Hoeven (ND) and the US Ambassador to Athens, George Tsunis. During the meeting, they discussed the excellent level of Greek-American relations and Greek-American defence cooperation, as well as Greece’s role as a pillar of stability and security in the wider region.

According to Vassilis Nedos (Kathimerini), Greece is rekindling discussions with the US regarding the potential acquisition of four littoral combat ships (LCS) as part of the so-called ‘Blinken package’. Following previous negotiations that faltered due to the aging and defective nature of the offered ships, Athens is seeking alternatives that better meet its needs. The Hellenic Navy insists on acquiring upgraded LCS vessels, specifically the Wichita, Billings, Indianapolis and St Louis, rather than the older Milwaukee, Detroit, Little Rock and Sioux City.

On October 24, 2024, the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Mr. Giannis Kefalogiannis, met the US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Mr. James C. O’Brien, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Mr. Joshua R. Huck, in the Ministry of National Defence. The Chief of Hellenic National Defence General Staff, General Dimitrios Houpis, also participated in the meeting. During this meeting, common security and regional stability matters were discussed, while the strategic importance of the defensive cooperation between Greece and the United States, as that is defined in the updated Mutual Defence Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) of 2021, was highlighted.

According to the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation (ERT), on October 31, former Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo visited Greece and held a meeting with the Greek Prime Minister. As Secretary of State in the first Trump administration, Pompeo had expressed his support for Greece on several occasions with his visit to Chania in 2020 focusing on the US naval base in the Gulf of Souda and his letter on Greece-US strategic cooperation to his then Greek counterpart, Minister Nikos Dendias, in 2020.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

The policy paper “Cybersecurity: how to shield the country’s digital future” summarizes and elaborates on the conclusions of the roundtable discussion organized in March 2024 by the Center for Cyber Resilience of the Delphi Economic Forum, in collaboration with ELIAMEP, with the support of Vodafone Greece and the participation of leading government, political, academic and market representatives.

This paper presents: a) a brief historical review of the evolution and shaping of the cybersecurity architecture at the European Union level, as well as the corresponding efforts to formulate a policy framework in Greece; b) the findings of a public opinion survey on cybersecurity among Greek citizens and businesses operating in Greece, conducted by Metron Analysis; c) a set of policy proposals for strengthening cybersecurity in Greece.

Read the paper here (in Greek).

 

The policy brief outlines the strategic vision and structural reorganisation of the European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen’s second term. Emphasising “Security, Prosperity, and Democracy,” von der Leyen’s Commission 2.0 consolidates power through a streamlined, centralised structure with six Executive Vice-Presidents, aiming for a more responsive and efficient EU. Each Commissioner has been assigned specific, often overlapping, missions focusing on key areas such as the Green Deal, technological sovereignty, and European defence. This centralisation marks a shift toward a more presidential model, raising concerns about governance complexity and missed opportunities for deeper citizen engagement and clearer portfolio distinctions. At the same time, it constitutes the core strategic approach to addressing the EU’s complex priorities.

• Vision: President Ursula von der Leyen prioritises “Security, Prosperity, and Democracy,” aiming for a responsive, flexible, and efficient European Union.

• New Commission Structure: The von der Leyen Commission 2.0 introduces a centralised structure with six Executive Vice-Presidents, removing traditional Vice-Presidents to streamline leadership.

• Mission Letters: Each of the 26 Commissioners-designate received specific missions, with major focuses on the Green Deal, technological sovereignty, industrial sovereignty, and European defence.

• Presidentialisation: The Commission’s structure reflects increased centralisation, reinforcing von der Leyen’s authority and moving towards a presidential model.

• Challenges: Overlapping portfolios (e.g., environment, defence, and competitiveness) create complexity and redundancy across roles.

• Missed Opportunities: The new structure lacks a dedicated focus on EU governance reform and clearer citizen engagement pathways, which could enhance responsiveness to public concerns​.

• Strategic Approach: The persistent overlap of portfolios necessitates a centralised, streamlined structure to improve governance and address the EU’s complex priorities.

Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Spyros Blavoukos, Professor, Athens University of Economics and Business, Head of the ‘Arian Condellis’ European Programme, ELIAMEP; Dimitrios Kollias, Junior Research Fellow, Programme Manager, Ariane Condellis European Programme, ELIAMEP, Stefanos Spyridon Pappas, Research Assistant, EPACE-EU, ELIAMEP; Lefteris Foivos Vasilopoulos, Research Assistant, EPACE-EU, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

Ursula von der Leyen opened the game with a straight ‘Security, Prosperity, Democracy’ flush. The Commission President envisions a Europe that is more responsive to its citizens, grounded in local engagement and characterised by greater flexibility and efficiency. This vision is evident in the President’s initial written addresses to the Commissioners-designate. In the Mission Letters to Commissioners-designate (2024-2029), President von der Leyen establishes the priorities and expectations guiding each portfolio, setting a strategic tone for the responsibilities of each Commissioner and the collaborative goals within the Commission.

These letters draw upon insights and recommendations from landmark reports commissioned by previous administrations of the European executive. These documents include the Draghi Report, addressing the future of European competitiveness; the Strategic Dialogue report on the future of EU Agriculture; and the Letta Report, which focuses on the development of the Single Market. Additionally, the recent Niinistö Report, which will guide Europe’s civilian and defence preparedness, is also referenced. The incoming Commission will leverage these reports to underpin new proposals and initiatives.

The strategic orientation and concrete directives in each Commissioner-designate portfolio will be thoroughly discussed during the European Parliament’s rigorous screening process, scheduled between November 4th and 12th. This process is of high value in democratic and political terms. It will legitimise the Commission and reveal where prospective Commissioners stand on the more sensitive issues of the next five-year agenda.

This policy brief outlines and analyses the revamped structure and key features of the von der Leyen Commission 2.0. More importantly, it offers a comprehensive overview of the mission letters issued to the Commissioners-designate in anticipation of the forthcoming hearings.

The New Structure of von der Leyen’s Commission 2.0

Reshuffling of portfolios for a new Commission term is standard practice, necessary to accommodate the growing number of Commissioners and changing priorities. The 2019–2024 College of Commissioners bore some similarities to previous structures but also introduced notable differences. The Commission was directed by the President alongside Executive Vice-presidents (EVPs) and Vice-presidents (VPs). Each one of them was assigned the task of leading groups of Commissioners who focused on specific strategic pillars with a thematic orientation. Key portfolios, such as the European Green Deal, Promoting the European Way of Life, and Stronger Europe in the World, operated under the leadership of an EVP or VP, who in turn reported directly to the Commission President.

The mission letters addressed to the 2019-2024 College of Commissioners highlighted a clear distinction in structure and roles. Under von der Leyen’s initial leadership model, eight Vice-presidents were entrusted with guiding and coordinating thematic groups of Commissioners, each focused on one of the Commission’s key priorities, with support provided by the Secretariat-General. Every Commissioner was involved in one or more of these groups, with a notable exception: the Commissioner for Budget and Administration, Johannes Hahn, reported directly to the President of the European Commission. Among the eight Vice-presidents, three held the special role of Executive Vice-president, balancing dual responsibilities. These Executive Vice-presidents not only led a specific Commissioners’ Group, but also managed an assigned policy domain, overseeing a Directorate-General within their remit. A unique feature of this structure was that one of the three, First Vice-President Frans Timmermans, assumed the role of chairing the College in the President’s absence.

The von der Leyen Commission 2.0 features an increasingly centripetal organizational structure, reminiscent of presidential systems.

The von der Leyen Commission 2.0 features an increasingly centripetal organizational structure, reminiscent of presidential systems. Vice-presidents are out and the six Executive Vice-presidents (5 + the High Representative, Kaja Kallas) now oversee a select group of Directorates-General and departments, with their influence varying considerably by position. This resulting organizational structure is simpler, eliminating one layer of command and control, i.e. the Vice-presidents. This new organizational architecture is expected to remain irrespective of how the upcoming hearings of the Commissioners-designate play out.

Source: Politico, ‘Who works for whom in the new EU power structure’

 

Mission Letters in Brief

Reviewing the complete set of all twenty-six mission letters is a formidable task, even for EU enthusiasts. For this reason, we have compiled a table of concise overviews of the portfolios and the respective missions of the 2024–2029 Commissioners-designate.

Commissioner Portfolio Mission Teresa Ribera Rodríguez Executive VP for Clean, Just and Competitive Transition Circular Economy, European Green Deal, growth strategy and competition policy
• Clean Industry Deal
• European Climate Law: 90% reduction in emissions till 2040
• Social Climate Fund & Just Transition Fund Henna Virkkunen Executive VP for Tech Sovereignty, Security, and Democracy Cybersecurity, AI, Tech Sovereignty and internal security, border management – frontier technology, EU Digital Norms and Standards Internationally, digital public infrastructure
• Europe’s 2030 Digital Decade Targets
• AI Strategy – AI Factories Initiative
• European Data Union Strategy• European Democracy Shield Stéphane Séjourné Eexecutive VP for Prosperity and Industrial Sovereignty Productivity, Innovation, competitiveness, industrial strategy, horizontal Single Market strategy, research and development, Critical Raw Materials Act
• Clean Industrial Deal
• European Competitiveness Fund
• Competitiveness Coordination Tool Kaja Kallas High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and VP of the European Commission Strengthening security and defence, strategic partnerships, joined-up foreign policy
• Preparation of regular College of Commissioners’ debates on foreign policy issues.
• Modern and joined up FP (new foreign economic policy, external financial instruments) Roxana Mînzatu Executive VP for People, Skills and Preparedness Training and education, Erasmus+, European Sport Model, Quality Jobs roadmap
• European Pillar of Social Rights, New Pact for European Social Dialogue
• EU Anti-poverty Strategy
• European Affordable Housing Plan Raffaele Fitto Executive VP for Cohesion and Reforms Productivity, innovation, competitiveness, Next GenerationEU, resilience and sustainability
• Effective right to stay for every citizen
• European Affordable Housing Plan / New European Bauhaus Initiative
• Climate Adaptation Plan Maroš Šefčovič Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security; Interinstitutional Relations and Transparency Competitiveness, security, sustainability, free and fair trade, World Trade Organization, international negotiations, EU and the G7, new economic security doctrine
• European Economic Security Strategy
• Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships
• EU Customs Authority Valdis Dombrovskis Commissioner for Economy and Productivity; Implementation and Simplification Stability, Growth, NextGenerationEU, European Semester, competitiveness, digital euro
• Stability and Growth Pact
• Recovery and Resilience Facility
• Competitiveness Coordination Tool Dubravka Šuica Commissioner for Mediterranean Mediterranean, demography, external aspects of migration policy, security, crime, terrorism, Southern Neighbourhood
• New Pact for the Mediterranean
• Trans-Mediterranean Energy and Green Tech Cooperation Initiative
• Reconstruction plan for Gaza
• Gulf Strategy Olivér Várhelyi Commissioner for Health and Animal Welfare Health and Animal Welfare, European Health Union, modernisation of rules on animal welfare, food safety standards
• Critical Medicines Act
• European Biotech Act
• European Health Data Space Wopke Hoekstra Commissioner for Climate, Net Zero and Clean Growth Climate risks, climate diplomacy, security, ecological transition, emissions trading scheme and taxation
• European Climate Law
• Clean Industrial Deal / European Climate Adaptation Plan
• Revision of the Energy Taxation Directive Andrius Kubilius Commissioner for Defence and Space European Defence Union, space, military mobility, civil-military, EU-NATO strategy
• White Paper on the Future of European Defence
• EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence / EU Space Law
• European Defence Fund / European Defence Industrial Strategy Marta Kos Commissioner for Enlargement Enlargement, EU neighbourhood policy, Ukraine, Turkey, Balkans, Southern Caucasus
• Gradual integration of candidate countries
• Black Sea Strategy Jozef Síkela Commissioner for International Partnerships Clean trade and investment partnerships

• Team Europe approach

• Global Gateway Costas Kadis Commissioner for Fisheries and Oceans Coastal communities, food security, food sovereignty
• Common Fisheries Policy
• EU Ocean Research and Innovation Strategy
• Climate Adaptation Plan Maria Luís Albuquerque Commissioner for Financial Services and the Savings and Investments Union Financing green, social and digital transition, EU as global leader in sustainable finance

•             Banking Union / European Deposit Insurance Scheme

•             European Savings and Investments Union Hadja Lahbib Commissioner for Preparedness and Crisis Management; Equality Civil preparedness, integrated approach to crisis management, international humanitarian law, roadmap for women’s rights, antiracist action, LGBTIQ rights, People with Disability Rights, and rights of minorities
• EU Preparedness Union Strategy / EU Preparedness Law
• European Civil Defence Mechanism
• Gender Equality Strategy
• Anti-racism Strategy
• LGBTIQ Equality Strategy
• Strategy for the Persons with Disabilities Magnus Brunner Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration Internal security, strong common borders, migration, fight again organised crime, cybercrime, improvements of Schengen framework
• European Internal Security Strategy
• EU Visa-Policy Strategy
• Pact on Migration and Asylum Jessika Roswall Commissioner for Environment, Water Resilience and a Competitive Circular Economy European Green Deal, water security and resilience, natural world, bioeconomy, global water leadership
• European Water Resilience Strategy
• Climate Adaptation Plan
• New European Bauhaus Piotr Serafin Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration Responsive budget, anti-fraud, modern public administration
• European Competitiveness Fund
• Conditionality Regulation
• European Anti-Fraud Office Dan Jørgensen Commissioner for Energy and Housing Energy Union, sustainable and affordable housing
• European Affordable Housing Plan
• Clean Industrial Deal
• Electrification Action Plan Ekaterina Zaharieva Commissioner for Startups, Research and Innovation Startups, research and development, innovation
• European Innovation Council / European Research Council
• European Innovation Act
• European Research Area Michael McGrath Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, and the Rule of Law Democracy, Justice and Rule of Law, fairness and integrity, single market
• European Democracy Shield
• Rule of Law Report
• Consumer Agenda 2025-2030 Apostolos Tzitzikostas Commissioner for Sustainable Transport and Tourism Resilient and competitive tourism sector, sustainable transport

• Trans-European Transport Corridor

• Single Market for Transport Services

• Comprehensive EU Port Strategy Christophe Hansen Commissioner for Agriculture and Food Food security, rural areas, food sovereignty
• European Water Resilience Strategy
• Vision for Agriculture and Food Glenn Micallef Commissioner for Intergenerational Fairness, Youth, Culture and Sport Strategy on Intergenerational Fairness, youth participation, Culture Compass, European Sport Diplomacy
• Youth Policy Dialogues
• President’s Youth Advisory Board
• EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child

 

The Keywords of the new Commission: Presidentialisation, Overlap and Missed Opportunities

In her re-election speech to the European Parliament and subsequent political guidelines for the 2024-2029 European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen has outlined a strategic framework of action centred around seven key pillars. These define the focal areas of her vision and include:

• A New Plan for Europe’s Sustainable Prosperity and Competitiveness
• A new era for European Defence and Security
• Supporting people, strengthening our societies and our social model
• Sustaining our quality of life: food security, water and nature
• Protecting our democracy, upholding our values
• A global Europe: Leveraging our power and partnerships
• Delivering together and preparing our Union for the future.

In their in-depth analysis of the political guidelines and mission letters Levente Kocsis and Eric Maurice, identify 194 specific commitments made by the President of the Commission. These commitments are broadly organised across the strategic pillars mentioned in the guidelines, as seen in the following graph, in percentage terms. They also align closely with the priorities defined in the Strategic Agenda adopted in June 2024, as well as with those of the European political parties whose support was essential for von der Leyen’s re-election by the Parliament.

Source: EPC, COMPENDIUM EUROPEAN POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS PROGRAMME 24 OCTOBER 2024

When considering the new structure of the Commission (absent of Vice-presidents) in tandem with the study of specific policy areas in each portfolio, three features emerge: increased presidentialisation, continuity of overlapping mandates, and missed opportunities to upgrade policies and streamline Commision’s work.

Presidentialisation

Von der Leyen’s first term has been characterised by a slow but undoubtable shift of power to the Commission’s centre, i.e. a presidentialisation of the institution, that is especially poignant compared to the two previous office holders, namely José Manuel Barroso and Jean-Claude Juncker (Kassim 2021). The initial presidentialist thrust owes much to the first use of the Spitzenkandidaten process in 2014 (Dimitrakopoulos et al. 2024: 8). The multi-faceted and continuous crisis environment, from the global pandemic to the land war at the EU’s doorstep, have created windows of opportunity for the incremental centralisation of power and authority in the hands of the Commission President (Moens et al 2024). Von der Leyen has capitalised on all the above. This trend conflicts with the traditional Commission ethos of purely collegial pluralism, wherein Commissioners are of de facto equal rank and free to exercise independent judgment, as enshrined in the Treaties (Article 17(8) TEU and Articles 234 and 250 TFEU).

Still, there are references in the Treaties that pave the way for a different conceptualisation of the Commission President’s role. Such alternative approaches could be justified by the fact that Commission Presidents are elected first (as President-elect) and exercise considerable control over the subsequent composition of the College (Article 17(7) TEU). Furthermore, after the confirmation of the Commissioners, the President retains full control of the body. Their power to unilaterally compel the resignation of an individual Commissioner, except the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, is proof of this (Article 18(1) TEU). Finally, the Commission President has wide-ranging organisational powers that allow them to exert significant control over individual Commissioners, whether through re-shuffling of portfolios or division of portfolios (Article 17(6) TEU and Article 248 TFEU) (Cotter 2024).

…centralisation may allow for greater effectiveness, especially in a poly- and perma-crisis environment. 

The ongoing centralisation is accompanied by greater politicisation that risks undermining the technocratic nature of the Commission. The fusion of politics and technocracy may be anathema to many, whilst others may see it as a necessary step towards further political integration in the European project. Nevertheless, centralisation may allow for greater effectiveness, especially in a poly- and perma-crisis environment. While acknowledging the legitimacy concerns of such a development, its positive effect may prove catalytic for the association between European demos and the – oft demonised – EU institutional architecture.

Regardless of one’s disposition towards the Commission’s presidentialisation, what appeared to be an unorganized and seemingly improvisational manoeuvre in von der Leyen’s first term now seems baked into her strategy. The Commission’s new structure, with its murky portfolios and downgraded Vice-presidents now limited to a seemingly obedient executive role, hints at a transformation of the Commission from a collegial body into a Presidential office, as Alberto Alemanno argues. This restructuring is designed to drive key priorities forward by simplifying the ‘line of command’. In the new format, Executive Vice-presidents oversee only a select few Directorates-General and departments, with their influence varying significantly across roles. Certain Commissioners—including ‘heavy guns’ like former Vice-presidents Valdis Dombrovskis and Maros Šefčovič but also Piotr Serafin who will handle the EU budget ‘hot potato’ during the Multi-Annual Financial Framework negotiations—will report directly to the President. The new setup clearly indicates a Commission that operates under the strict supervision and guidance of President von der Leyen in most if not all key issues, including economic security and productivity. Thus, the structure of the new Commission is clearly hierarchical, which testifies to its further presidentialisation.

Overlaps

Each new College of Commissioners is typically prefaced by discussions around “overlap,” an issue recognised as fact rather than speculation. After successive enlargements, the number of Commissioners now exceeds the scope of EU competences, raising valid questions about the substantive content of certain portfolios. This presents a structural problem that underlies any discussion about the inevitable overlap of individual portfolios.

Clear examples of overlap include Teresa Ribera Rodríguez, Executive VP for a Clean, Just and Competitive Transition and Stéphane Séjourné, Executive VP for Prosperity and Industrial Sovereignty. The authority of Ribera Rodriguez appears somewhat uncertain. Although officially tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Green Deal, her remit includes control over the powerful Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP), the EU body with exclusive competence over competition; this is a policy area currently being transfigured by economic sovereignty concerns. She is tasked, among others, with the Circular Economy (although there is a Commissioner on Circular Economy: Jessika Roswall), the European Green Deal, growth strategy and competition policy, the Clean Industry Deal and the Social Climate Fund & Just Transition Fund. Crucially, Séjourné, responsible for prosperity and industrial sovereignty (and not competitiveness), is also responsible (among others) for Productivity (as opposed to growth strategy), competitiveness, industrial strategy the Clean Industrial Deal, the European Competitiveness Fund and the Competitiveness Coordination Tool.

Furthermore, an even more weirded situation exists between Roxana Mînzatu, Executive VP for People, Skills and Preparedness, in a triple (or more) partial overlap with Executive VP of Cohesion and Reforms Raffaele Fitto; and Commissioners-designate Glenn Micallef, Commissioner for Intergenerational Fairness, Youth, Culture and Sport; and Dan Jørgensen, Commissioner on Energy and Housing. The first focuses on skills and labour gaps, training and education, Erasmus+, the European Sport Model, the Quality Jobs roadmap, the European Pillar of Social Rights, the New Pact for European Social Dialogue, the EU Anti-poverty Strategy and the European Affordable Housing Plan. The second, Raffaele Fitto, also focuses on the European Affordable Housing Plan and New European Bauhaus Initiative, the Climate Adaptation Plan, competitiveness and NextGenerationEU. Glenn Micallef follows with every youth and culture-related topic before going back to Dan Jørgensen and sustainable and affordable housing, specifically the European Affordable Housing Plan and the Clean Industrial Deal (among other things).

Maroš Šefčovič, Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, Interinstitutional Relations and Transparency, has a portfolio that overlaps with the International Partnerships portfolio of Commissioner Jozef Síkela.

Executive Vice-president Henna Virkkunen, overseeing Tech Sovereignty, Security, and Democracy, manages a portfolio that intersects significantly with technology—particularly AI—and the strengthening of external borders, especially in relation to managing migration flows. Her role directly references the Pact on Asylum and Migration and is closely aligned with the operations of Frontex. This creates a reciprocal overlap with Andrius Kubilius, Commissioner for Defence and Space; Magnus Brunner, Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration; and Dubravka Šuica, Commissioner for the Mediterranean, highlighting a cohesive yet complex interrelation across portfolios.

Having already highlighted the overlap between Executive Vice-president Henna Virkkunen and Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, it is essential to address another area of significant overlap—namely, the intersection of foreign policy and defence. Kaja Kallas, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and VP of the European Commission, among others, also operates with a mandate to strengthen security and defence (focusing on Ukraine, European Defence Union, NATO, and sanctions).

Bearing in mind the above discussion, three features characterise the structure of the new College: overlapping hierarchy; significant differences between executive Vice-presidential portfolios; and reporting lines that run in different directions with several Executive Vice-presidents responsible for several Commissioners and von der Leyen being directly responsible for some parts of the Commissioners’ portfolios (Patrin 2024).

Missed Opportunities

The new Commission has missed the opportunity to sharpen its objectives and distribute more clearly defined portfolios.

The new Commission has missed the opportunity to sharpen its objectives and distribute more clearly defined portfolios. An example is that of the Belgian Commissioner-designate, Hadja Lahbib, who is responsible for “preparedness”, encompassing mainly prevention and crisis management. However, her portfolio also includes the promotion of gender equality and the combating of discrimination—two areas of competence notably distinct from her primary crisis-related duties, creating some confusion and raising doubts about the rationale behind this competence allocation. Moreover, considering the portfolio of Olivér Várhelyi, integrating public health policy with animal health could inadvertently undermine the efforts within his primary sector—a potentially shortsighted approach. Health policy is intricately connected to economic drivers such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals and is essential in addressing significant challenges, including demographic shifts, the implications of an ageing population, workforce sustainability, and the potential emergence of future health crises, such as pandemics.

A second missed opportunity regards interaction with European citizens. Although the Mission Letters broadly state that the Commission intends to usher in a new era of dialogue with citizens, this commitment is not clearly reflected in the responsibilities assigned in the mission statements. If the new Commission aims to integrate citizens into its work, this priority should have been explicitly incorporated into the Commission’s structure, ideally through the defined role of at least one Executive Vice-President (Zuleeg and Emmanouilidis, 2024).

Finally, the overarching goal of strengthening EU governance, rendered especially important in response to numerous internal and external challenges and the potential expansion to over 30 member states, is notably absent in the new Commission’s structure. This priority is only lightly touched upon in the general section of the Mission Letters and is not evident in the distribution of major portfolios. Such omissions strongly suggest that governance reform within the EU is not a central focus of the second von der Leyen Commission. 

Conclusion

…a much more centralised, compact and centripetal approach is required. Adopting a more streamlined, hierarchical structure is a strategic decision to enhance proactive and better-coordinated governance within the Commission.

As previously noted, portfolio reshuffling and overlap among Commissioners is not uncommon. On the contrary, it has become the norm. The Treaty-enshrined high number of Commissioners, directly linked with the number of member-states, and the challenge of accommodating all of them in different portfolios remain ongoing concerns. This was a notable feature of the prior political cycle and continues to be so in the new Commission structure. Restructuring and reshuffling have not yet solved the major problem of overlap as evidenced by the priorities of the Commissioners-designate discussed in the first section of this policy brief. The shift toward a more centripetal approach, therefore, may not be an unforeseen or undesirable development, especially given the ambitious and highly complex triptych of ‘Security, Prosperity, Democracy’ put forward by Von der Leyen herself. To achieve these goals, a much more centralised, compact and centripetal approach is required. Given the inevitability of portfolio overlaps, adopting a more streamlined, hierarchical structure is a strategic decision to enhance proactive and better-coordinated governance within the Commission. 

 

References

Cotter, J. (2024) ‘La Commission, c’est moi? The invisible hand of Article 17(6) TEU in the presidentialisation of the European Commission’, 25 September, https://verfassungsblog.de/eu-commission-new-von-der-leyen-president/

Dimitrakopoulos, D., Ceron, M. and Christiansen, Th. (2024) ‘Introduction: The Politicisation of the European Commission’s Presidency’ in Dimitrakopoulos, D., Ceron, M. and Christiansen, Th. (eds) The Politicisation of the European Commission’s Presidency Spitzenkandidaten and Beyond, Palgrave Macmillan.

Draghi, M., 2024. Report on European Competitiveness. Commissioned by the European Commission. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-looking-ahead_en  [Accessed 31 October 2024].

European Parliament, 2014. Letters by President Sassoli to Commission President-elect von der Leyen Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190930IPR62887/letters-by-president-sassoli-to-commission-president-elect-von-der-leyen [Accessed 31 October 2024].

European Parliament, 2024. Confirmation Hearings Process Overview. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu [Accessed 31 October 2024].

European Union, 2024. Mission Letters to Commissioners-designate (2024-2029). Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/documents_en [Accessed 31 October 2024].

European Council, 2024. Strategic Agenda Adopted by the EU. European Council Meeting, June 2024, Brussels. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ac_24_3549 [Accessed 31 October 2024].

Fondation Robert Schuman, 2024. Analysis on the Structure of the von der Leyen II Commission. Paris: Fondation Robert Schuman. Available at: https://server.www.robert-schuman.eu/storage/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-764-en.pdf [Accessed 31 October 2024].

Kassim, H. (2021) ‘The European Commission: from collegiality to presidential leadership’, in D. Hodson, U. Puetter, S. Saurugger, and J. Peterson (eds) The Institutions of the European Union (5th edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Kocsis, L. and Maurice, E., 2024. 194 Specific Commitments Analysis in European Politics and Institutions Programme. EPC Compendium on European Politics, European Policy Centre, Brussels.

Letta, E., 2024. Report on the Future of the Single Market. Commissioned by the European Commission. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf  (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

Moens, B., Griera, M. and Barigazzi, J (2024) ‘From queen to empress: Inside Ursula von der Leyen’s power grab’, Politico, 19 September, https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-europe-commission-brussels-power/

Niinistö, S. (2024) Safer Together Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness, Report by Sauli Niinistö, former President of the Republic of Finland, In his capacity as Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission, European Commission. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b77-8739b19d047c_en?filename=2024_Niinisto-report_Book_VF.pdf (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

Parliament Hearing Committee, 2019. Concerns on Nominees László Trócsányi, Rovana Plumb, and Sylvie Goulard. Internal Report, European Parliament Hearings, Brussels.

Patrin, M. (2024) ‘New Structure, New Priorities – Why the Next Commission May Be More Hierarchical but less Coherent’, 15 October, https://verfassungsblog.de/commissions-new-structure/

Piodi, F. (2007) A Study of the proceedings of the European Convention accompanied by archive documents, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/cardoc/pe_and_job_ce_en.pdf  (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

Strategic Dialogue Group, 2024. Report on the Future of EU Agriculture. European Commission, Brussels. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4528 (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

Taylor, S. (2014) How jeleva was forced out, POLITICO. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/how-jeleva-was-forced-out  (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

von der Leyen, U., 2024. Political Guidelines for the 2024-2029 European Commission. Brussels: European Commission. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf&trk=public_post_comment-text (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

von der Leyen, U., 2024. Re-election Speech to the European Parliament. European Parliament, Strasbourg, 4 July.

von der Leyen, U. (2019) Misson Letter Margrethe Vestager, European Commission. Available at: https://commissioners.ec.europa.eu/document/download/0146cc5f-761f-48ee-8316-a3e92dc3e7ca_en?filename=mission-letter-margrethe-vestager_2019_en.pdf(Accessed: 01 November 2024).

Zuleeg, F. and Emmanouilidis, J. (2024) Reactions to the next commission, EPC – European Policy Centre. Available at: https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/Reactions-to-the-next-Commission~5d5e58  (Access

Ioannis Armakolas and Alexandra Voudouri, co-authored the article “Relaunching Enlargement: How Will It Affect the Western Balkans?” for the 21st European Institute of the Mediterranean Yearbook, which focuses on the developments and perspectives of European policy in the wider Mediterranean region.

In their paper, the authors highlight the process of redefining the EU’s enlargement strategy in the light of geopolitical changes, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with a focus on the integration of Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans by 2030. They argue that the cycle of indecision can be broken if the EU links the new Growth Plan to critical reforms and negotiating chapters, providing incentives for candidate countries to overcome bilateral differences. Furthermore, according to the authors, a credible roadmap for deeper integration, clarity on the necessary reforms and effective communication to ensure public support are essential for a successful enlargement process.

You can read the article here.

This database provides an inventory and critical appraisal of available estimates and indicators related to irregular migration flows.  The datasets include meta-level information on sources and methodology and a quality assessment based on MIrreM’s criteria.

Siruno, L., Leerkes, A., Badre, A., Bircan, T., Brunovská, E., Cacciapaglia, M., Carvalho, J., Cassain, L., Cyrus, N., Desmond, A., Fihel, A., Finotelli, C., Ghio, D., Hendow, M., Heylin, R., Jauhiainen, J.S., Jovanovic, K., Kierans, D., Mohan, S.S., Nikolova, M., Oruc, N., Ramos, M.P.G., Rössl, L., Sağiroğlu, A.Z., Santos, S., Schütze, T., & Sohst, R.R. (2024) MIrreM Public Database on Irregular Migration Flow Estimates and Indicators. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10813413

This policy paper explores Russia’s use of the Wagner Group in Africa, highlighting how the concept of plausible deniability allows the Kremlin to expand its influence in regions such as Mali and the Central African Republic. By distancing itself from direct responsibility for controversial military actions, Russia is able to exert significant geopolitical control. The paper also examines the continuation of Wagner Group operations following the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and discusses the broader implications of these developments for Africa and the Mediterranean region.

• The Wagner Group’s operations continued after the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, with increased integration into Russia’s Ministry of Defence, signaling Russia’s deeper involvement in the continent’s security dynamics.
• Moscow’s activities in Africa signal a broader strategy to challenge Western influence by supporting local regimes and displacing Western control over critical resources, while securing Russia’s standing as a dominant player in the region’s security and economic landscape.
• Russia has secured access to valuable natural resources through its African interventions, extracting billions in gold and pursuing strategic control over uranium in countries like Niger. These resources likely help fund Russia’s broader geopolitical ambitions, including its war efforts in Ukraine.
• Russia offers “pragmatic engagement” as a substitute for dwindling Western aid in Africa, capitalizing on the gap left by reduced Western support to build influence through military assistance, resource extraction, and infrastructure projects.

Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Natalia Tellidou, Research Fellow at ELIAMEP’s Mediterranean Programme.

Russia’s Strategic Push into Africa

In 2020, the world witnessed a record 56 unique conflicts, the highest number in a single year since 1946.[1] Over half of these were internationalized civil wars, where external powers sponsor local actors to fight on their behalf. This practice, known as conflict delegation, has become a strategic tool for powerful states looking to extend their influence without direct involvement. As a result, geopolitical tensions have escalated, with proxy wars becoming a common feature of modern conflict.

One of the most prominent players in these proxy wars is Russia, which relies heavily on private military security contractors (PMSCs) like the Wagner Group. These contractors provide a range of services, including intelligence gathering, military training, logistical support, and infrastructure protection. Operating in countries like Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), the Wagner Group has supplied military training and assistance while enabling Russia to maintain plausible deniability. By relying on these contractors, Russia can distance itself from controversial actions, all while securing a foothold in these key regions.

Even after the death of Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group’s operations have continued, underscoring the strategic importance of their mission. Russia has adapted to ensure these activities persist, maintaining its involvement in ongoing conflicts and protecting its interests in Africa (Figure 1). Beyond military influence, Russia reaps significant rewards from these operations, including increased security leverage, access to critical natural resources, and the ability to offer African states an alternative to dwindling Western aid.

By multiplying risks in the Global South, Russia seeks to undermine the United States and its allies, positioning itself as a dominant force in the region.

By multiplying risks in the Global South, Russia seeks to undermine the United States and its allies, positioning itself as a dominant force in the region.

Considering all this, this policy brief will first explore how the Wagner Group became instrumental in providing military support to countries like Mali and the CAR followed by an analysis of the post- Prigozhin period and the operations. Finally, the discussion will focus on what Russia gains from these activities—enhanced security leverage, access to valuable natural resources, and a pragmatic engagement to the diminishing development aid offered by Western countries.

Figure 1: Where and How Wanger Group Has Engaged in Africa. Sources: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, ACLED, Kathrin Buchholz https://www.statista.com/chart/30665/wagner-group-engagement-africa/

Wagner Group in Africa: A Tool for Russia’s Military and Political Ambitions 

 

Long before the war in Ukraine, Russia was already actively expanding its influence in the Global South, particularly through the Wagner Group, that allows Moscow to operate in conflict zones with plausible deniability.

Long before the war in Ukraine, Russia was already actively expanding its influence in the Global South, particularly through the Wagner Group, that allows Moscow to operate in conflict zones with plausible deniability. Plausible deniability refers to a strategy in which a sponsoring state avoids direct responsibility for its involvement in foreign conflicts[2]. By covertly supporting proxies, as the Wagner Group, the sponsor-state can reap the benefits of a potential victory without facing the risks and costs associated with direct intervention, including defeat or international condemnation. This approach allows the state to distance itself from the consequences of its actions, evading criticism from both international and domestic audiences. As a result, plausible deniability becomes a key incentive for states to engage in proxy wars. By leveraging Wagner’s presence, Russia has been able to support regimes and shape outcomes while distancing itself from the group’s often controversial and illegal activities.

Take Mali, for example. Since December 2021, Wagner has been actively involved in the country’s security landscape, invited by the Malian government, which had grown frustrated with international forces like the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) and French troops. Wagner’s presence was intended to stabilize the country and support the peace process following the 2012 crisis. At its peak, over 2,000 Wagner personnel were stationed in Mali, providing military support, handling air force operations, and securing the ruling elite.

Wagner’s primary objective was to strengthen Mali’s offensive capabilities, particularly in the conflict-ridden northern region. Unlike international forces, Wagner and the Malian government reject population-centric, “soft” approaches to counterinsurgency. Wagner forces are notorious for their violent tactics, especially towards civilians, and they often coerce prisoners and locals into collaborating by providing intelligence or leading them to insurgent hideouts. While the French-backed reconciliation process with northern Tuareg rebels sought a more diplomatic solution, the Malian government—supported by Wagner—favored a military strategy, fueling renewed conflict in the north. Without Wagner, Mali’s armed forces would struggle to challenge insurgent control, and the demand for Wagner’s expertise in training and air force operations continues to grow.

Politically and socially, the group has exploited widespread discontent with the security situation and anti-French sentiments, positioning itself as a necessary force for stability.

Wagner’s impact in Mali is not confined to military efforts alone. Politically and socially, the group has exploited widespread discontent with the security situation and anti-French sentiments, positioning itself as a necessary force for stability. This multifaceted approach extends Russia’s influence far beyond the battlefield.

A similar pattern can be observed in the Central African Republic (CAR). Since January 2018, Wagner—alongside another Russian PMC, Patriot—has provided military training and security in exchange for access to valuable resources like gold, uranium, and diamonds. Wagner has been instrumental in bolstering the regime of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, particularly during a 2020 rebel incursion into Bangui, where the group played a critical role in defending the government. Wagner has since become a cornerstone of Touadéra’s war efforts, helping him reclaim rebel-held territories.

However, Wagner’s involvement in CAR has exacerbated violence and militarization, much like in Mali. Russian mercenaries have instructed local militias to merge with the national army and function as self-defense units. These units, however, soon became rogue, committing widespread human rights abuses against civilians. Wagner’s presence has not only intensified the violence but also fragmented the region’s security environment, further entrenching instability.

In both Mali and the CAR, Wagner’s role extends beyond providing military support—it is about leveraging local grievances, securing valuable resources, and deepening Russia’s influence while operating in the shadows. The group’s activities have serious implications for the stability of these regions and underscore Russia’s strategic use of conflict delegation to assert itself on the global stage. 

Post-Prigozhin Dynamics 

While disruptions following the group’s mutiny and Prigozhin’s death caused some temporary instability—such as delayed salaries and suspended missions—operations quickly resumed, signaling the group’s resilience.

Despite the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s operations across Africa have persisted, though not without adjustments. The “Expeditionary Corps,” Wagner’s key operational unit, continued its activities in countries like Sudan, Niger, and Burkina Faso, maintaining its original objectives and utilizing the same resources. While disruptions following the group’s mutiny and Prigozhin’s death caused some temporary instability—such as delayed salaries and suspended missions—operations quickly resumed, signaling the group’s resilience. 

In Mali, for instance, after internal disagreements, Wagner reached a new agreement to work directly under the Russian Ministry of Defence. This shift allowed the Ministry to supply Wagner with essential military assets—vehicles, planes, and ammunition—at no cost, reinforcing Wagner’s role in the region. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence has sought additional means of support, including potential collaborations with other groups like Redut, which operate similarly to Wagner.

Following Prigozhin’s mutiny, the Kremlin formally moved Wagner’s African operations under the control of Russian military intelligence, the GRU. This reorganization saw senior Russian officials, including General Averyanov and Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, visiting former Wagner strongholds in Africa in early September. Far from signaling the end of Russia’s involvement, Prigozhin’s death marked a deeper entrenchment of Russian influence in the region. Wagner’s activities have since been rebranded under the Ministry of Defence as the “Africa Corps,” reflecting this increased oversight[3].

Russia’s diplomatic engagement has also expanded. In January 2024, Chad’s junta leader, Mahamat Idriss Déby, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss strengthening bilateral ties. This meeting is particularly significant, as Chad had previously maintained a pro-Western stance. These developments indicate that Russia’s strategy in Africa, spearheaded by the Wagner Group and its successors, remains robust and continues to adapt to evolving geopolitical realities.

Strategic Returns: Russia’s Gains from its African Engagement

Russia’s involvement in Africa through the Wagner Group brings several strategic advantages. First and foremost, it strengthens Russia’s security posture. One clear example is Russia’s ongoing effort to establish a naval base at Port Sudan, which would grant Russia vital access to the Red Sea. Although the agreement has faced setbacks due to United States pressure, Russia remains determined to secure this critical foothold, signaling its broader ambitions in the region.

Secondly, Russia gains access to valuable natural resources. Over the past two years, Russia has reportedly extracted $2.5 billion worth of gold from Africa, with much of this wealth likely funding its war in Ukraine, according to the Blood Gold Report. Russian fighters, many of them former Wagner mercenaries, also took control of the Intahaka gold mine in northern Mali, a strategically significant asset long contested by various armed groups. In Niger, Russia is actively pursuing uranium concessions, aiming to reduce French influence over these critical resources. The broader pattern is clear: Russia seeks to challenge Western dominance over Africa’s minerals and energy reserves, positioning itself as a key player in this global resource competition.

Russia presents itself as a “pragmatic engagement” to diminishing Western development aid.

Lastly, Russia presents itself as a “pragmatic engagement” to diminishing Western development aid. With countries like the UK significantly cutting back on foreign aid, many African nations are turning to Russia as a reliable partner. By filling the void left by the West, Russia secures both influence and access to resources, while offering these nations military assistance, infrastructure projects, and less conditional diplomatic engagement. This approach allows Russia to build alliances, exert political influence, and further undermine Western presence in the region.

Implications for Global Security: Russia’s Growing Role in Africa

In conclusion, Russia’s strategy in Africa, executed largely through the Wagner Group and other proxies, represents a multifaceted attempt to enhance its geopolitical influence while undermining the global standing of the United States and its allies. By providing military support, gaining control over vital natural resources, and offering a pragmatic alternative to Western aid, Russia is positioning itself as a dominant force across the continent. 

Moving forward, it is crucial for policymakers and international actors to recognize the implications of Russia’s growing influence and to respond accordingly.

The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin did little to disrupt these plans, as Russia’s operations have not only persisted but have expanded under direct Kremlin oversight. This deepened involvement, combined with its strategic maneuvering in key areas like Mali, the Central African Republic, and Chad, ensures that Russia remains a pivotal player in the Global South. Moving forward, it is crucial for policymakers and international actors to recognize the implications of Russia’s growing influence and to respond accordingly. The stakes are not only regional but have far-reaching consequences for global security and resource access.

[1] Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020 is published by the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Figure 1, page 2, presents the number of battle deaths and conflicts.

[2] Mark Galeotti presents the benefits Russia reaps from covert proxy relationships highlighting how plausible deniability was expertly used in Ukraine, before the military invasion in 2022.

[3] Wagner Group is a reference to the composer Richard Wagner. The reasons why this name was chosen remains a mystery.

 

References

‘A Mixed Picture: How Mali Views the Wagner Group’. 2024. 11.10.2024. https://rusi.orghttps://rusi.org

Arduino, Alessandro. 2024. ‘Wagner Group Is Now Africa Corps. What This Means for Russia’s Operations on the Continent’. The Conversation. 14.02.2024. https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-is-now-africa-corps-what-this-means-for-russias-operations-on-the-continent-223253.

Bloomberg.Com. 2024. ‘Russia Raises the Stakes in Tussle Over Africa’, 30.01.2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-01-30/russia-raises-the-stakes-in-tussle-over-africa.

‘Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare’. n.d. New America. Accessed 11.10.2024. http://newamerica.org/future-security/reports/decoding-wagner-group-analyzing-role-private-military-security-contractors-russian-proxy-warfare/.

Doxsee, Catrina. 2023. ‘How Does the Conflict in Sudan Affect Russia and the Wagner Group?’, April. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-does-conflict-sudan-affect-russia-and-wagner-group.

Galeotti, Mark. 2016. ‘Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-Linear? How New Is Russia’s “New Way of War”?’ Small Wars & Insurgencies 27 (2): 282–301. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129170.

‘Infographic: Where & How Wagner Group Has Engaged in Africa’. 2023. Statista Daily Data. 24 August 2023. https://www.statista.com/chart/30665/wagner-group-engagement-africa.

Jones, Seth G., Catrina Doxsee, Brian Katz, Eric McQueen, and Joe Moye. 2021. ‘Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies’, July. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-corporate-soldiers-global-expansion-russias-private-military-companies.

Liik, Kadri. 2023. ‘From Russia with Love: How Moscow Courts the Global South’. ECFR. 21.12.2023. https://ecfr.eu/publication/from-russia-with-love-how-moscow-courts-the-global-south/.

‘Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies’. 2023. Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://russianpmcs.csis.org.

Reuters. 2024. ‘Putin Meets Chad Junta Leader as Russia Competes with France in Africa’, 24 January 2024, sec. Africa. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/putin-meets-chad-junta-leader-russia-competes-with-france-africa-2024-01-24/.

‘Russia Is Using the Soviet Playbook in the Global South to Challenge the West – and It Is Working | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank’. 2024. 16.05.2024. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/russia-using-soviet-playbook-global-south-challenge-west-and-it-working.

Saucedo, Natalia. 2023. ‘Russia’s Influence in Mali’. Human Rights Foundation (blog). 11.08.2023. https://hrf.org/russias-influence-in-mali/.

‘Stop Taking the Global South for Granted | Wilson Center’. 2024. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/stop-taking-global-south-granted.

‘The Blood Gold Report’. n.d. Blood Gold Report. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://bloodgoldreport.com/.

‘Wagner in Africa: How the Russian Mercenary Group Has Rebranded’. 2024, 20.02.2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68322230.

Watts, Stephen, Bryan Frederick, Nathan Chandler, Mark Toukan, Christian Curriden, Erik E. Mueller, Edward Geist, et al. 2023. ‘Proxy Warfare in Strategic Competition: Military Implications’. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA307-3.html.

 

[1] Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020 is published by the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Figure 1, page 2, presents the number of battle deaths and conflicts.

[2] Mark Galeotti presents the benefits Russia reaps from covert proxy relationships highlighting how plausible deniability was expertly used in Ukraine, before the military invasion in 2022.

[3] Wagner Group is a reference to the composer Richard Wagner. The reasons why this name was chosen remains a mystery.

Based on 20 countries across Europe, North America and North Africa, this report synthesises key trends and patterns of national policy approaches towards migrant irregularity, highlighting commonalities and differences across various contexts. In particular, this report examines three key research questions: how have irregular migration policies evolved over time and in response to what; what pathways into and out of irregularity have these policies produced or aimed to address; and what challenges have hindered policy implementation. In doing so, the report aims to contextualise irregular migration policy changes, as well as how such policies can channel migrants into or out of irregularity.

 

Hendow, M., Qaisrani, A., Rössl, L., Schütze, T., Kraler, A., Ahmad Yar, A. W., Bircan, T., Oruc, N., Mohan, S. S., Triandafyllidou, A., Jauhiainen, J. S., Smolander, S., Toivonen, H., Cyrus, N., Nikolova, M., Desmond, A., Heylin, R., Cacciapaglia, M., Bonizzoni, P., … Sohst, R. R. (2024). Comparing national laws and policies addressing irregular migrants. In MIrreM Working Paper No. 6. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10782561

The Public Database on Irregular Migration Stock Estimates (the Database) provides an inventory and critical appraisal of country-level estimates of irregular migration stocks in 13 European countries, the United States and Canada for the period 2008 to 2023. It is a deliverable of the MIrreM project, which is a follow-up to Clandestino. Clandestino covered the period 2000-2008.

Kierans, D., Vargas-Silva, C., Ahmad-Yar, A. W., Bircan, T., Cacciapaglia, M., Carvalho, J., Cassain, L., Cyrus, N., Desmond, A., Fihel, A., Finotelli, C., Gonzalez Ramos, M. P., Heylin, R., Jauhiainen, J., Kraler, A., Leerkes, A., Nikolova, M., Rössl, L., Santos, S., … Sohst, R. R. (2024). MIrreM Public Database on Irregular Migration Stock Estimates (Version 2) [Data set]. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.13856861

 

 

This brief provides an abridged overview of the national policy landscape on irregular migration in Greece, based on a more extensive policy analysis. It also provides an overview of the main types of migrant irregularity that emerge and the pathways into and out of irregularity, including regularisations as relevant. Annexed to this deliverable is also an overview of the mapped legal and policy frameworks.

Nikolova, M. (2024). MIrreM Country Brief on Migration Policy Context – Greece. In MIrreM Report. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.12606423